The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 36, No.

1, 2008

Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy

Communities, and Their Networks
Diane Stone

Public policy has been a prisoner of the word “state.” Yet, the state is reconfigured by globalization.
Through “global public–private partnerships” and “transnational executive networks,” new forms of
authority are emerging through global and regional policy processes that coexist alongside nation-state
policy processes. Accordingly, this article asks what is “global public policy”? The first part of the
article identifies new public spaces where global policies occur. These spaces are multiple in character
and variety and will be collectively referred to as the “global agora.” The second section adapts the
conventional policy cycle heuristic by conceptually stretching it to the global and regional levels to
reveal the higher degree of pluralization of actors and multiple-authority structures than is the case at
national levels. The third section asks: who is involved in the delivery of global public policy? The focus
is on transnational policy communities. The global agora is a public space of policymaking and
administration, although it is one where authority is more diffuse, decision making is dispersed and
sovereignty muddled. Trapped by methodological nationalism and an intellectual agoraphobia of
globalization, public policy scholars have yet to examine fully global policy processes and new mana-
gerial modes of transnational public administration.
KEY WORDS: public policy, agora, globalization, transnational networks

1. Introduction

The concept of “global public policy” is not well established. Accordingly, this
article asks: what is global public policy, where is it enacted, and who executes such
policies? The first part of the article sets out to delimit the discussion to transnational
policy spaces where global public policies occur. These spaces are multiple in char-
acter and variety and will be collectively referred to as the “agora.” This section also
addresses what is “global public policy” and some difficulties with the use of the
term or its synonyms as well as the way in which some higher education institutions
are responding.
The second section conceptually stretches the conventional policy cycle heuristic
to the global and regional levels. The policy cycle concept is used as an analytical
device (not as a portrayal of decision-making realities). It is done to reveal the higher
degree of pluralization of actors as well as the multiple and contested modes of
authority than is usually the case at national levels of policymaking. It is also adopted

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20 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

to make the point that the mainstream study of public policy can ill afford to
disregard these policy processes and new administrative structures.
The third section asks: who is involved in the delivery of global public policy?
The discussion addresses the roles of policy networks. The activities of transnational
policy communities reveal the dual dynamics of new public spaces carved out in
tandem with privatizing modes of decision making. In other words, “globalization
makes such publicness more problematic . . . reshaping multi-level governance
around various ‘new architectures’ that will recreate the ‘public’ either at a higher
level or through a more complex network structure” (Cerny, 2006, p. 105).
Some policy scholars have addressed global policy dynamics (inter alia,
Baltodano, 1997; Evans, 2004; Soroos, 1991). First, there are discussions of the “inter-
nationalisation of the public sector” (e.g., Ladi, 2005). Second, there are secto-
ral or issue-specific studies of elements of global public policy. Analyses of “global
trade policy” (Xu & Weller, 2004), “global environmental policy” (Haas, 2000), or
aspects of “global health policy” are readily found. But, there has been little reflec-
tion on the commonality and differences concerning the process dynamics across
these sectors. Third, over the past decade there has been a raft of debate and discus-
sion of the public policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO), and United Nations (UN) agencies, among others. However,
accounts of globalized policy processes—distinct from national processes—are few
and far between.

2. Public Spheres and Private Policy Practice in the Global Agora

If global public policy is distinct and to some extent delinked from national
processes of policymaking, the venues in which such policy action occurs need not
be tied to sovereign structures of decision making. This is not to suggest a divorce
between global and national policy processes. However, national public institutions
no longer serve as the sole organizing center for policy. Instead, it is necessary to
“look at the restructuring of the playing field itself” (Cerny, 2006, p. 97), that is, the
historical and structural changes to the “state” and “sovereignty.” Through the
reinvention of a Greek political term, this restructured playing field will be referred
to as the “global agora.”

The Global Agora

The notion of “agora” is a more familiar concept in studies of Athenian history

and politics but has been stretched conceptually to the global arena. At its simplest,
the term is meant to mean a marketplace or a public square. While it is commonplace
in the contemporary era to see the “marketplace” and the “public square” as distinct
domains, such boundaries were neither clear nor fast in the Greek agora. Impor-
tantly, the “agora” was not only a marketplace, but the heart of intellectual life and
public discourse.
In ancient times, the agora was a physical place as well as a social and political
space (Wycherley, 1942, p. 21). The public landscape included the mint, shrines and
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 21

statuary, shops and law courts, the market hall and the council house, and the
Assembly. Evidence from archaeological digs—public documents inscribed on
stone, weight and measure standards, and jurors’ identification tickets and
ballots—reflect the administrative nature of the site.1 In short, the agora was a place
for social, economic and political interaction. The boundaries were ill defined and
fluid where political activity was as likely to take place inside private shops (cobblers,
barbers) as in public buildings. That is, the “commercial impinged upon the public
buildings and shrines of the central Agora at many points, and probably on every
side” (Wycherley, 1956, p. 10).
The merging and the blurring of the commercial and the public domains is
apparent in the modern global era.

The agora embraces much more than the market and much more than
politics. As a public space it invites exchanges of all kinds. . . . Although the
agora is a structured space, it is wrong to attempt to subdivide into sectors
like markets, politics or media (Nowotony, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001, p. 209).

The idea of agora is used here to identify a growing global public space of fluid,
dynamic, and intermeshed relations of politics, markets, culture, and society. This
public space is shaped by the interactions of its actors—that is, multiple publics and
plural institutions. Some actors are more visible, persuasive, or powerful than
others. However, the global agora is a social and political space—generated by
globalization—rather than a physical place. Some have already adopted the term to
speak of the agora as an electronic or virtual global commons (Alexander & Pal, 1998;
Arthurs, 2001, p. 97). The global agora is also a domain of relative disorder and
uncertainty where institutions are underdeveloped and political authority unclear,
and dispersed through multiplying institutions and networks. Similar to Plato’s
Athenian agora when political discussions took place in the dwelling of a resident
foreigner,2 the sovereignty challenging features of global decision making in semi-
private or quasi-public networks are increasingly apparent.
The global agora is normatively neutral. This is in contrast to a growing body of
literature that advocates the need to democratize global governance and to enhance
the legitimacy of international organizations (e.g., the special edition in Government
& Opposition, 2004). Without disputing the value of such advocacy, nevertheless, the
call for global accountabilities puts the (normative) cart before the (conceptual)
horse. The realm where such legitimacy questions and accountability issues are to be
raised remains poorly conceptualized. Social scientists operate with a series of meta-
phors where the new vocabulary attempts to grasp new policy structures. They
include:

• “Transnational public sphere” (Nanz & Steffek, 2004) or the “global public
sphere” (Dryzek, 1999);
• “The return of the public domain” (Drache, 2001);
• The “global arena” (Ronit & Schneider, 2000) or “global policy arena” (World
Bank3);
22 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

• A “playing field” of “new levels and spaces” (Cerny, 2006);

• “An acephalous . . . modern global polity” (Drori, Meyer, & Hwang, 2006, p. 14).

Some argue that the realization of a democratic global order “ultimately depends
on the creation of an appropriate public sphere” (Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 315). Yet,
the emphasis is on what is “appropriate” (read: deliberative) and the presumed
progressive potential of global civil society in forging this sphere. Here, the transna-
tional public sphere is conceived as a Habermasian “communicative network”
(Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 322).
The concept of a “global agora” makes no presumptions about the communica-
tive, progressive, or deliberative character of institutional or network interactions.
The dynamics for exclusion, seclusion, and division are just as likely. A “global
agora” encompasses a wider array of political relationships inspired by liberal
democracy through to coercive arrangements of strong authoritarianism, as well as
to patterns of disorder, randomness, and an absence of rational imposition of plan-
ning. The global policy agora may become an accessible participative domain for
plural expressions of policy input. But it might not.
As in the ancient Athenian agora, the global one is characterized primarily by
elite rule and lack of participation. The majority of Athenian citizenry did not par-
ticipate directly in politics. Instead the Athenian agora was made up of three kinds of
citizens:

. . . the passive ones’ who did not go to Assembly; the standing participants
who went to the assembly but listened and voted, and “did not raise their
voice in discussion,” and the “wholly active citizens” (a small group of
initiative takes who proposed motions) (Hansen quoted in Urbinati, 2000,
pp. 762–63).

It is the “wholly active citizens” in international nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), in international organizations, and in internationalized public agencies that
drive global policy processes. While the global policy agora may have dimensions of
“publicness,” the capacity for, and character of public action is much more varied.
In the Athenian agora, the mint, shrines and statuary, shops and law courts, the
market hall and the council house, and the Assembly were all in physical proximity
even if women, slaves, or resident foreigners had little participation in these forums.
In the global agora, the international institutions are dispersed between Washington,
DC, the Hague, Geneva, and Paris. The nodes of global finance are found in exclu-
sive venues in New York, London, Tokyo, and a few other global cities such as Basle
or Davos. As discussed below, policy networks and self-regulation privatize decision
making. Consequently, the institutional locations are dispersed and the boundaries
of the global agora are indeterminate and opaque. Policy activity is as likely to take
place inside private associations among nonstate actors as in intergovernmental
conferences. The vast majority of citizens of nation-states are uninformed about
these policy venues and even if interested, face significant obstacles “to raise their
voice.”
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 23

Global Public Policy

In the last decade, there has been increasing use of the term “global public
policy.” Books have emerged under this title (Reinicke, 1998) or related titles like
Global Social Policy (Deacon, 2007). University courses in development studies or
political science have been launched with this label. Yet, the term remains un-
derspecified. It is used without definition by many scholars (inter alia, Grugel &
Peruzzotti, 2007; Held & Koenig Archibugi, 2004; True, 2003). Generally, “global
public policy” has little resonance among policy elites and the general public.
Instead, other terms and concepts are better established in the lexicon. One of
the most current terms is “global governance.” An alternative term is “governing
without government.” At other times, “global policy” is equated with the financing
and delivery of global public goods (Kaul et al., 2003). Another synonym is the idea
of “global public–private partnerships” or the “global programs” sponsored by the
World Bank (2004). “Transnational constitutionalism” is a phrase rarely encountered;
indeed, these constitutional processes have emerged only in the European Union
(Arthurs, 2001, p. 107).
In classical political science, public policy occurs inside nation-states. In the field
of international relations, a “realist” perspective would also hold that states are the
dominant actor in the international system and that international policies are made
between states. With its strong tendency to “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer
& Schiller, 2002), traditional comparative public policy has compounded this stand-
point. Scholars in the field usually compare policy development within and between
states where states remain the key policymaking unit. That is, “. . . public adminis-
tration has been a prisoner of the word ‘state’ . . . (it) has assumed that the nation-
state is the natural context within which the practice of public administration has to
be studied” (Baltodano, 1997, p. 618).
Moving beyond minimalist interpretations (of a realist-rationalist variety) that
limits analysis to the capacity of public sector hierarchies to globalize national poli-
cies does not necessarily entail jumping to maximal positions (of an idealist-
cosmopolitan character) that speak of deliberative world government. A complex
range of state capacities, public action and democratic deliberation fall in between
these two extremes. Scholars and practitioners alike are arguing that new forms of
authority are emerging through global and regional policy processes that coexist
alongside nation-state processes. Governance can be informal and emerge from
strategic interactions and partnerships of national and international bureaucracies
with nonstate actors in the marketplace and civil society (Reinicke & Deng, 2000).
However, economic globalization and regional integration are proceeding at a
much faster pace than processes of global government. One outcome of this disjunc-
ture is that the power of the nation-states has been reduced or reconfigured without
a corresponding development of international institutional cooperation. This is one
of the major causes of a deficiency of public goods at global levels. For example, the
regulation of financial flows, environmental protection or intellectual property safe-
guards are inadequately provided. UN agencies such as UNDP (Kaul, 2003) and
UNIDO have become institutions central in researching and articulating dimensions
24 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

of “publicness” in the global sphere and how international organizations and non-
state actors create global public goods or seek to regulate the adverse effects of global
public bads.
Policy practice is moving faster than its paradigmatic parallels. The Westphalian
conceptual cage of a nation-state system has incapacitated critical thinking (Albert &
Kopp-Malek, 2002). Multilevel polycentric forms of public policy in which a plethora
of institutions and networks negotiate within and between international agreements
and private regimes have emerged as pragmatic responses in the absence of formal
global governance. If “public policy” is “whatever governments choose to do or not
to do” (Dye, 1984, p. 2), then some governments are choosing to devolve aspects of
public policy. This is a double devolution; first, beyond the nation-state to global and
regional domains; and second, a delegation of authority to private networks and
nonstate actors.
An indicator of “global public policy” is the extent to which is becoming a field
of teaching. Graduate programs in “global public policy” are rare, but they provide
insight into attempts to conceptualize, and operationalize for educational purposes,
this field. The first of its kind in Germany, the mission of the graduate degree
program in Global Public Policy at Potsdam University is a good example. It is
meeting the challenges posed by the internationalization of policies and econo-
mies, and the changing demands of citizens, requires political and economic
leaders to rethink their roles and act appropriately. Increased economic and
political interdependence worldwide has meant that events and decisions in
one part of the world can have significant repercussions in others. Public
Policy issues (e.g. Environmental protection or refugees) are increasingly
“transnationalized,” and require joint management by governments, private
concerns, and the citizens concerned. At the same time, globalization has
considerable impact on the ability of national governments to deal with what
were previously purely “domestic” policies [my emphasis].4
Similarly, the University of British Columbia offers an MA in Global Policy,5 and
the Fletcher School’s Global Master of Arts Program6 is designed for the “interna-
tional affairs professional,” while the Masters in Public Policy at Central European
University (CEU) emphasizes “international policy practice.”7 The CEU program has
been criticized for developing an “elite that adheres to the ideology of globalization,
is familiar with its main debates and tends to be compliant with its requisites”; that
is, CEU is “training the administrators of globalisation” (Guilhot, 2007).
In developing and transition countries, international organizations are encour-
aging the establishment of new graduate programs. The World Bank has been more
active in promoting graduate education in economics albeit with recent emphasis
on the parallel need for “good governance” (see Bourguignon, Elkana, & Pleskovic,
2007). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European
Union (EU) have been active in advocating for public administration and public
policy programs that can deal with problems of transition, development and global-
ization (Verheijen & Connaughton, 2003). Many other examples could be given. The
point is that universities are adapting to their changing environment to provide
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 25

education and training for young professionals who need the skills and knowledge
to traverse global policy processes. As “expanding globalized institutions of science
and expertise,” universities, their scholars, and their students are drawn into, and
structure, the global agora (Drori et al., 2006, p. 12).

3. Global Policy Processes

The global agora is expanding and diversifying. The state is not necessarily
retreating or in decline. However, it is reconfiguring with the dynamics of global-
ization and remains an important or central agent in the agora. Yet, the constitution
of the agora—its values, discourses, symbols, norms, institutions, and practices
(Arthurs, 2001, p. 89)—are also created by other nonstate actors that have acquired or
appropriated public authority when responding unilaterally or in partnership to
global policy problems. Global policy processes have emerged with governments,
international organizations, and nonstate actors responding to three types of policy
problems (Soroos, 1991):
• “transboundary problems” of cross-border-movement money laundering, pol-
lution or drug trafficking (see, e.g., Raab & Milward, 2003);
• “common property problems” regarding oceans, Antarctica, the atmosphere (see
Haas, 2000);
• “simultaneous problems” of nations experiencing similar problems in areas of
education; health, welfare, urbanization, and population growth (see Deacon,
2007).
These problems have led to new forms of “soft” authority or “soft law” (Arthurs,
2001) that complements the traditional “hard” or formal authority of states and
international organizations. “Soft” authority is seen in the emergence of private
regimes, and global standard setting and transnational policy communities. The
exercise of public and private authority through policy networks and law-like
arrangements creates policy processes.
Adapting traditional concepts from policy studies highlights some of the diffi-
culties in analytically capturing the idea of global public policy. One advantage of
adapting this approach to the global levels is that it brings into relief the role of
private actors and processes of self-regulation (Porter & Ronit, 2006). The common
(overly sequential) heuristic device for the policy cycle is to divide it into four stages:
1. problem definition and agenda setting;
2. formal decision making;
3. policy implementation; and
4. monitoring and evaluation.
These traditional elements of the “policy cycle,” as understood in domestic
contexts, are conceptually stretched to the global context.8 This context is evolving, fast
26 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

changing, and lacks formal, authoritative, and sovereign power. To date, transnational
public administration has also been less transparent than at the domestic level.

Problem Definition and Agenda Setting

There is no global decision-making process, at least not in the sense understood

in policy studies where there is an authoritative, sovereign decision maker. Conse-
quently, at the global level, the “ownership” of public problems is often character-
ized by a policy vacuum. Which countries or what institutions have responsibility for
dealing with issues is not automatically apparent, and if public goods are insufficient,
those who take responsibility for their financing and provision is not self-evident.
Contemporary social and civic regimes in the policy sectors of health, labor stan-
dards, and social inclusion are sectors where nonstate activists have been prominent
(Grugel & Peruzzotti, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; True, 2003). Agenda setting is
more contested, externalized beyond the nation-state, and open to the input and
disruption of a variety of political agents.
Some see this diversity of interests and institutions as a sign of a healthy and
vibrant global civil society (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), that is, indicative of a pluralistic
set of political pressures and countervailing power at the global level where the anti-
and alter-globalization movements voice their causes in the same domain as multi-
national companies, the media, states, and international organizations. The World
Social Forum reacts to the agenda-setting or “opinion-forming” aspirations of the
World Economic Forum. Agenda setting is characterized by cacophonic sets of
debates and demands where it is unclear who, or what institution, has the authority
or legitimacy to mediate. There are not only significant problems of negotiation and
compromise, but also uncertainty concerning in which forums it is appropriate to
advance issues. This has consequences for policy coordination and policy coherence
alongside continuing conflict and power battles of who gets to set global agendas.

Policy Transfer and Formal Decision Making

A difference in the policy process under globalization would appear to be that

“policy transfer” is on the increase. Policy transfer is a process whereby knowledge
about policies, administrative arrangements, or institutions in one place is used
across time or space in the development of policy elsewhere (Evans, 2004). An
emerging but as yet not fully understood characteristic of the global era is the
manner in which some governments and international organizations become proac-
tive in promoting cross-border policy harmonization (especially in regional arrange-
ments) or in exporting policy lessons. Privatization policies, the spread of the
ombudsman institution (Ladi, 2005), and freedom of information laws, gender main-
streaming (see True, 2003), or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) guidelines on budgetary best practices are examples of policy
transfer and standard setting (Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, 2007).
There is no global forum for global decision making such as a “world parlia-
ment” or “global state.” However, international commissions such as those headed
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 27

by Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland function as venues for the official discussion of
global public policies (see the essays in Thakur, Cooper, & English, 2005). When a
problem is recognized by nations, the policy tools available are international treaties
and conventions. Their effectiveness is problematically reliant on compliance and
good international citizenship, and founded upon an implicit assumption that states
will act “rationally” and recognize that collective action is to long-term interests.
The transnational dimensions of public policy and decision making is usually
seen as the responsibility of international organizations such as the Bretton Woods
institutions, regional associations such as the EU or other bodies such as the WTO,
Global Environment Facility, and International Telecommunication Union. They
have the scope and delegated powers to deal with specified common property and
transboundary problems. These organizations do not have a global remit but are
restricted by their charters to limited domains of responsibilities. These are disag-
gregated regimes that collectively create a complicated architecture of institutions,
laws, and instruments.
Looking toward these organizations for coherent global responses to global
policy problems, one finds serious unresolved coordination issues and overlapping
responsibilities. This can lead to cooperation among international organizations, but
it also leads to “turf battles” where authority is contested. Similarly, in the absence of
enforcement capabilities and use of sanctions, noncompliance remains high.
Nevertheless, international organizations do develop policies to deliver global
public goods. The World Bank is a good example. Through its Development Grant
Facility, the bank funds programs such as the Global Invasive Species Program, the
Global Forum for Health Research, and the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Public–
Private Partnership, among 56 other initiatives.9 These examples are only a snapshot
of considerably more diverse activity of public policy being “spun-off” to semiau-
tonomous networks and partnerships. Moreover, it is not restricted to international
organization. Business plays a role in multilateral initiatives, for example, the Global
Road Safety Partnership and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS. These
global programs are sector or issue specific, executed through multiple public and
private venues rather than through a single executive authority.

Policy Implementation and International Coordination

There are major analytical problems when addressing public policy implemen-
tation in a global context. International organizations generally lack both the author-
ity and the means to enforce policy compliance. Implementation is dependent on
international cooperation and states behaving as responsible “international citizens”
to keep their commitments as well as educating electorates and convincing them of
the real impact of global problems on local communities. There are few sanctions that
can be employed against recalcitrant states except for engineering consensus, moral
pressure from other states, trade sanctions, and, at the extreme, military intervention.
At official levels, there is considerable policy rhetoric for joint commitment,
cofinancing, or aid harmonization, all of which represent pleas for policy coordina-
tion. Time-consuming processes of consensus building, the diplomatic pressures for
28 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

compromise, the sources of opposition, and the resource implications of developing

global policy programs significantly delay state coordinated international action.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, on issues ranging from organized crime and
terrorism to human rights, the environment, finance, and trade, it is increasingly
evident that government officials are exchanging information, coordinating policies,
enforcing laws, and regulating markets through increasingly elaborate informal
intergovernmental channels. Public policy is enacted in the decentralized (and less
visible) activity of judges, regulators, and legislators working with foreign counter-
parts on specific issues (Slaughter, 2004). This is horizontal intergovernmental net-
working on transboundary problems. For instance, issue-specific policy fields that
generate networked bodies like the International Association of Insurance Supervi-
sors (IAIS),10 the Basle Committee11 or the International Network on Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement (INECE)12 for functional coordination and policy
cooperation.
“Global public policy networks” are of a more mixed character than the “inter-
governmental networks” identified earlier. They are composed of business, NGOs,
and other civil society actors, governments, and international organizations.
Examples include the Global Environmental Facility (Haas, 2000), the Global Alli-
ance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI),13 and the Global Water Partnership.14
Actors build consensus, pool their authority, engage in collective decision making
and share policy responsibilities and program funding, that is “soft” authority. These
“global public policy networks” (sometimes called “transnational public–private
partnerships”) are quasipublic or semiprivate. They can be contrasted with private
regimes. For instance, bond rating agencies (Sinclair, 2005) and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) are different types of private actors that
perform global roles of accreditation and coordination respectively (Ronit &
Schneider, 2000).
More generally, the emergence and spread of legal and law-like arrangements
mean that states cooperate in more or less precise, binding and independent regimes,
but also that nonstate actors can engage in the framing, definition, implementation,
and enforcement of these norms and rules (Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, 2007). However,
global standards and best practices that may be adopted in OECD countries are far
less likely to be seen in failed states; consequently, the pattern of implementation is
also highly uneven and contingent. At the same time, there may be ongoing shifts in
the balance of power between different international organizations, and continual
contests for “forum switching” of global issues and responsibilities.

Transnational Monitoring and Evaluation

Reflection on success and failure potentially promotes efficiency, innovation, and

learning in policy. At the national level, evaluation is usually undertaken “in-house”
by national bureaucracies, commissions of inquiry, or audit agencies. In global
spheres, evaluation comes from various sources. The international financial institu-
tions often have an in-house capacity for research and evaluation that bolsters their
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 29

sovereignty challenging policies. For instance, the intellectual homogeneity and

professional strength of the economists within the international financial and trade
institutions is well recognized.
Sometimes evaluation is contracted out to private sector experts and advisers.
Unsolicited advice and evaluation comes from NGOs and social movements. The
sheer volume of knowledge, expertise, and advice cannot all be incorporated and
potentially creates incoherence, conflict, and gridlock. There is a need for translators
and interpreters of analysis, and for “knowledge management” systems. Such
experts who edit and vouch the credibility of information and analysis acquire
power and potentially become “gate keepers” in determining what meets interna-
tional standards and best practice. Rather than operating independently, they are
often to be found in transnational networks of think tanks, consultants, university
policy centers, professional bodies, and consultancy firms. In the weak institutional
context of the global agora, these policy actors are arguably more influential in
shaping the parameters of policymaking, defining problems, and specifying what
constitutes “global public goods” and selling their “expert evaluation” services than
they are within the confines of the nation-state.

Order and Chaos in Global Policy Processes

The model of the policy cycle depicts a linear model of policy moving from one
stage to the next. In reality, policymaking is messy. It is more accurate to conceptu-
alize the policy process as “a chaos of purposes and accidents” (Juma & Clark, 1995).
This is apparent at national levels, but even more so beyond the authority structures
of “sovereign” nation-states. A major theme in the conceptual literature on public
policy is a prescriptive one of making the policy process more rational. However, to
search for signs of an orderly or stable global policy process is misguided. Global
policy processes are more fluid and fragmented than might be found in stable
political systems of most OECD nations. Instead, disorder and unpredictability are
the norm. As a result of the vast differences in policy style, structure, institutional
setup, powers, and resources of global policy arrangements and regulatory frame-
works, there is no consistent pattern of global policy processes. To the contrary, the
bewildering array of public action is complicated by its often semiprivate composi-
tion. The absence of, or constantly contested, authority structures within the global
agora mean far greater time and effort is also spent convening, debating, and nego-
tiating in arenas created by interlocutors in order to promote compliance rather than
exert enforcement (Porter & Ronit, 2006, p. 57).
This disjointed pattern of policy processes is enhanced by the “new public
management” with its ethos of contracting out, “freeing” managers, and market
incentivisation (Kettl, 2005). However, where this managerial paradigm for the
public sphere focuses on devolution to subnational units of governance, analysis has
missed the equally apparent devolution to supranational and intergovernmental
models of governance. The public domain is not under threat; instead, it is “state-
ness” that is under stress (Drache, 2001, p. 40). As a corollary, public-ness is expand-
ing as the global agora takes shape.
30 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

4. Transnational Policy Communities

Scholarly investigation of those who execute or implement global public policies

has long been underdeveloped (Weiss, 1982). Attention is now being paid to indi-
vidual agents of policymaking with attempts to get inside the “black box” of inter-
national organizations (see Gulrajani, 2007; Xu & Weller, 2004).
More specifically, the staff of certain international organizations have a sub-
stantial degree of discretion in formulating and implementing policies, and
thus should be regarded as distinct actors in global governance (Held &
Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 128).
The concern is to address the roles, powers, and impacts of what has been
variously described as “international civil servants” (Weiss, 1982) or “supranational
bureaucrats” (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 128) who are also the “wholly
active citizens” in the global agora, those who are proposing and implementing
global public policy. It is useful to disaggregate these actors into three general types.
The umbrella term “transnational policy community” will be used for the three
types. They are the carriers of global policy processes involved in the diffusion of
ideas, standards, and policy practice.
First is the “internationalised public sector official.” This is the type of indi-
vidual (described by Anne Marie Slaughter, 2004) who operates in “transnational
executive networks.” Slaughter (2004, p. 19) argues that the state is not disappearing
but that it is becoming disaggregated and penetrated by horizontal networks
existing between “high level officials directly responsive to the national political
process—the ministerial level—as well as between lower level national regulators.”
These networks of judges, legislators, or regulators are intergovernmental in char-
acter, and the state remains core. What makes her idea of network “public” is that
actors who compose them are formally designated power holders and rule makers
who derive their authority from their official positions within their nation-state.
Examples of such networks include the International Association or Insurance
Supervisors or INECE.
Second, “international civil servants” are employed by an international organi-
zation to staff its secretariat and institute operations. They are not state delegates. The
conventional paradigm of international civil service includes impartiality, objectivity,
and international loyalty rather than national particularism (Weiss, 1982, pp. 288–92).
The reality of international administration is more complex, where national interests
continue to be pursued. In international organizations, civil servants have consider-
able capacity to shape (or delay) policies because of their expertise, routines, and
positions of power (Xu & Weller, 2004). The relative lack of analysis of these actors,
or a tendency to treat them as a conforming to the conventional paradigm, combined
with the lack of transparency of most international organizations, means their roles
as global policy implementers and their contributions to policy innovation are rarely
open to public scrutiny.
Third is the emergence of “transnational policy professionals.” This is a diverse
community of consultants, foundation officers, business leaders, scientific experts,
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 31

think tank pundits, and NGO executives who are growing in number, policy reach,
and professionalism. Their status as either public or private agents is not always
clear-cut. Private consultants are contracted by public bodies, and private experts are
co-opted into official advisory bodies. Rather than acting individually, they are
usually found in a network or association that is often in receipt of public support
and/or patronage.
All three categories of actors interact in varying degree with each other to
facilitate multilateral cooperation and the delivery of global public goods. It is
increasingly evident to see individuals building careers across all three categories.
Their sources of power and influence vary. In general, however, they hold power
as a result of their (semi)official position; their control of information, and other
organizational resources; their technical expertise or epistemic authority; or their
often lengthy international experience as career officials and consultants. They are
agents in the galaxy of transnational networks that are the vehicles for policy
processes.

Transnational Policy Networks

Networks, coalitions, and multilateral partnerships contribute to the shape,

diversity, and (in)equality of the global agora. Networks can be thought of as creat-
ing spaces of assembly in the global agora. They are potentially a means for civic
engagement and a vehicle for expanding participation. This is neatly captured in the
social movement character of “transnational advocacy coalitions” (TANs). These
networks accommodate a range of NGOs and activists. TANs are bound together by
shared values or “principled beliefs” and a shared discourse where the dominant
modality is information exchange. They are called advocacy networks because
“advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition” (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998, p. 8). For instance, a TAN emerged around the theme of “blood
diamonds” or “conflict diamonds” (Mbabazi, McLean, & Shaw, 2005) in part as a
response to the covert “dark network” mode of operation of arms traffickers (Raab
& Milward, 2003). TANs usually have a strong normative basis for moral judgment in
seeking to shape the climate of public debate and influence global policy agendas.
However, they are not well integrated into policymaking and tend to operate more
like “outsider groups.”
The “agora” is also an economic sphere of commerce and market exchange. In
this regard, networks can be a force for “market deepening.” Business-related net-
works such as the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) or the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD) have an advocacy orientation.15 They operate more as
“insider groups” given their closer connections with governments. Networks with a
social movement or interest-group character are usually more prominent in agenda
setting.
By contrast, the transnational executive networks described earlier have greater
executive authority where government officials have a dual domestic and interna-
tional function. Networks become tools for the maintenance of sovereignty where
32 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

global problems are solved by “networked government” responses. As mechanisms

for the state to reinvent itself, transnational executive networks offer a system
of “checks and balances” to ensure accountability and public responsiveness
(Slaughter, 2004, p. 29).
The global public policy networks described earlier are trisectoral in character,
and different yet again in their public-ness and sources of authority. Although the
term corporatism has fallen out of fashion and the “operative word today is partner-
ship,” this framework has considerable applicability (Ottaway, 2001, p. 266) for
arrangements like GAVI or the Global Water Partnership.
Knowledge networks and epistemic communities give discursive, intellectual,
and scientific structure to the global agora (Stone, 2005). They provide scholarly
argumentation and scientific justification for “evidence-based” policy formulation.
The transnationalization of research and policy-analysis industries is readily appar-
ent. Knowledge networks of likeminded think tanks are commonplace including
PASOS in Central and Eastern Europe or the Network of Democracy Research
Institutes.16 One long-term regional venture—the Asian Fisheries Social Science
Research Network—has formalized as a part of the World Fish Center. Epistemic
communities are “scientific” in membership (Haas, 2000). They have common
notions of validity based on intersubjective, internally defined criteria for validat-
ing knowledge which galvanize members toward a common policy enterprise.
They seek privileged access to decision-making venues on the basis of their exper-
tise and knowledge. Technocratic in design, the concept builds in (social) scientific
knowledge as an independent force in policy development. Scientific consensus
seeking among scientific experts is considered to promote learning and a transfor-
mation of interests that converge around policy choices in favor of the public inter-
est (Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 319). Critics highlight how scientific expertise is used
for ideological purposes of “paradigm maintenance” and the normalization of dis-
courses of power (Bull, Boas, & McNeill, 2004; Stone, 2005). Typically, knowledge
networks and epistemic communities overlap with one of the types of policy
networks outlined earlier or build alliances with governments and international
organizations.
The different varieties of networks that intersect and help compose public spaces
can be a force for democratization by creating a venue for representation of “stake-
holder” interests, a means for wider participation in modes of global governance and
a venue for societal voices. In short, networks are “gateways.” However, these same
networks can also be exclusive, elite and closed to deliberative decision making.
For instance, the discourse and techno-scientific language as well as professional
credentials of those within knowledge networks can be a form of “gate keeping.”
Policy debate in the agora need not be democratic. Instead, as in the Athenian
agora (Urbinati, 2000), the global agora is managed by the elite transnational policy
community.
Moreover, network participation is resource intensive. Access to global public
policy networks requires time, commitment, and funds. Many developing countries,
and most ordinary citizens, do not have sufficient resources to devote to national
policy deliberations, let alone global dialogues. Despite widening Internet “connec-
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 33

tivity,” they are “passive” or “standing” citizens in the agora compared to the
“wholly active” citizens of transnational policy communities.

Global Managers and Transnational Policy Communities

Transnational networks and policy processes calls forth new forms of leadership
and public management. Policymaking and administration of global nature means
understanding different decision-making milieu, greater cross-cultural sensitivity,
and different behaviors on the part of policy actors. This is not limited to diplomats
but has widened and applies to the more diverse “transnational policy commun-
ities,” Similarly, there are greater pressures on parliamentarians and political party
officials to engage with counterparts (McLeay & Uhr, 2006). Indeed, the World Bank
seed funded the development of the Parliamentary Network on the Bank.17 Leader-
ship skills required in the global agora mean functioning in several languages,
comprehending the legal and political contexts of many policy venues (for example,
the EU, neighbouring countries, WTO) and mastering different modes of commu-
nication and policy deliberation.
The geographical dispersion of international civil servants means that they meet
irregularly, are highly reliant on information technology, and travel all the time.
It may be the case that they adopt a globalized identity and outlook. In other
words, the values guiding the behavior of bureaucrats are increasingly shaped by
the imperatives of the global economy and constraints on governmental policy
(Baltodano, 1997, p. 625).
By fore-grounding their professional identity, they transcend the power of
the nation-state system to impose its categories of identity upon them. They
also tend to assume a global or regional rather than national outlook on key
issues (Krause Hansen, Salskov-Iversen, & Bislev, 2002, p. 109).
Whether or not transnational managers see themselves as a class apart is some-
thing that is yet to be subject to in-depth anthropological and ethnographic work. It
is, however, fertile ground for consideration of the types of policy entrepreneurs and
various styles of professionalism in play.
Comparing transnational managers to traditional bureaucrats, their hybrid char-
acter suggests that they could be more difficult to control. This is largely because of
their office being more privatized or less public. Their institutions and networks tend
to behave like regulated organizations rather than extensions of administrative agen-
cies under legislative control. Hybrid entities—given their private, informal, and
“delegated authority” status—are also intrinsically less responsive to the political
preferences of their political masters and publics. Moreover, networks are often
temporary and can be easily unpacked and reassembled into different entities. This
makes enforcing accountability difficult. It is more than simply an issue of bureau-
cratic control as networked policy communities implies that public authority has
been semiprivatized.
There is a sizable literature from business studies—especially in the subfield of
human resource management—concerning the global leadership models and styles
34 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

(see Morrison, 2000, for an overview). However, there is very little discussion in the
political science, policy studies, and international relations literatures regarding the
different qualities and capacities of the diverse actors in the global agora. While there
is a burgeoning literature on “policy entrepreneurs,” it tends to focus on the roles of
such individuals at local and national levels of governance.
The requirements of a transnational network executive or officer of a philan-
thropic foundation (such as Gates, Ford, or Aga Khan) may require management
skills and bureaucratic knowledge that differ from counterparts in national or local
governments. Consequently, the types of graduate programs referred to earlier may
well spread as pressures increase for innovation and creativity in how national
leaders as well as nonstate executives to project their organizational and community
interests in the global agora. More young elites will be sent for international educa-
tion and training. Already, international consortiums of graduate education such as
the Global Public Policy Network aim “to prepare some of the world’s most able
graduate students to assume global leadership roles in the coming decades.”18 Such
programs provide graduate training for administrative positions in internationalized
public sectors. These programs also cater for international organizations (which
appear to be growing in number and policy ambit) as well as for a new generation
of policy entrepreneurs who see their future careers in transnational networks and
regimes.
Not only do countries need to rethink civil service training in order to fully and
effectively negotiate global policy processes, so too the citizenry needs to consider
these new domains for the pursuit of democratic accountability. For public policy
and management scholars, it means a greater engagement with the increasingly
related research communities of international relations, political economy, and orga-
nization studies. For too long, the scholar of public policy and administration
assumed an insulated sovereign domain within which to make policy. What hap-
pened beyond these borders was the stuff of foreign policy and diplomacy. Such
assumptions are no longer tenable.

5. Conclusion

A global agora is evolving with different sets of networks, global public–private

partnerships, and multilateral initiatives. These global policy processes are distin-
guishable from national and intergovernmental processes but remain intercon-
nected. The agora is portrayed in its network character, managed by business and
policy elites, and more so exclusionary than participatory. The objective has been to
shift the focus from institutions, actors, and policies at the nation-state level, to
address how policymaking has transnational dimensions. This is not to deny the
continuing power and impact of nation-states. The domestic politics of nation-states
will continue to ensure difference and diversity. States will remain important media-
tors of globalization, but their capacities to react and respond will differ dramatically.
Circumstances of complex multilateralism bring additional considerations of how
global activists and networks bypass national and intergovernmental policymaking
Stone: Transnational Policy Communities and Their Networks 35

processes to influence international organizations, private regimes, and multilateral

initiatives.
The global agora is a public space, although it is one where authority is diffuse,
decision making is dispersed and semiprivatized, and sovereignty is muddled by
recognition of joint responsibility and collective action. Transnational networks—
whether they go by the label “partnership,” “alliance,” “facility,” or “forum”—are
one mechanism of global public policy. For the scholar, these developments presage
the need to overcome the methodological nationalism and agoraphobia of main-
stream public policy scholarship to examine global policy processes and new mana-
gerial modes of transnational public administration.

Diane Stone is a Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of

Warwick and Marie Curie Chair, Central European University. Research for this
article was funded by the Non-Governmental Public Action Programme of UK
Economic and Social Research Council. www.lse.ac.uk/ngpa.

Notes

1. The Athenian Agora Excavations: http://www.agathe.gr/introduction.html. See also: http://www.

users.globalnet.co.uk/~loxias/agora.htm
2. In the scene that opens Plato’s Republic, the dialogue takes place in a metic household (i.e., the home
of a resident alien, the patriarch Cephalus, and his son Polemarchus). Metics typically shared the
burdens of citizenship with few of its privileges.
3. “More than ever before, the Bank is playing an important role in the global policy arena” (my emphasis).
From World Bank History: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20053333~menuPK:63762~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:
29506,00.html
4. http://www.mgpp-potsdam.de/
5. UBC organizers state: “Global problems transcend borders, defy regulation and cannot be solved by
any single state no matter how powerful. Addressing these issues effectively requires new combina-
tions of knowledge and action—it requires governments, international institutions, and citizen-based
networks working together in new and innovative ways.” http://www.supporting.ubc.ca/priorities/
faculties/grad/current/global.html
6. Dean of Fletcher School, Deborah Nutter: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/gmap/overview.html
7. CEU Department of Public Policy: http://www.ceu.hu/dpp
8. This is not the place to enter debates about the utility of the policy stages model which has
faced substantive criticism. It is a heuristic tool that provides “partial answers” (Pielke, 2004,
p. 11).
9. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTFININSTRUMENTS/
EXTTRUSTFUNDSANDGRANTS/EXTDGF/0,,enableDHL:TRUE~menuPK:64283045~pagePK:
64283090~piPK:64283077~theSitePK:458461,00.html
10. IAIS: http://www.iaisweb.org/
11. The committee is not a classical multilateral organization. It has no founding treaty, and it does not
issue binding regulation. Instead, its main function is to act as an informal forum to find policy
solutions and to promulgate standards.
12. INECE: http://www.inece.org/
13. GAVI: http://www.gavialliance.org
14. Global Water Partnership: http://www.gwpforum.org
36 Policy Studies Journal, 36:1

15. ERT is a personal membership organization of 46 chiefs of European companies: http://www.ert.be.

TABD companies work with governments to foster regulatory co-operation: http://www.tabd.org
16. PASOS: http://www.pasos.org/; NDRI: http://www.wmd.org/ndri
17. PNoB: http://www.pnowb.org/
18. Lisa Anderson, Dean of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs—SIPA:
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=154039

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