Court East Fed

(1 of 416)
Selected docket entries for case 17−55505

Generated: 12/13/2023 22:59:17
Filed Document Description Page Docket Text

04/14/2017 1 DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEARANCES
1 Docketing Letter 0 OF COUNSEL. SEND MQ: Yes. The schedule is set as
follows: Mediation Questionnaire due on 04/21/2017.
1 Attorneys Not Registered for 3
Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial
E−Filing
Ltd. and East Feneridou opening brief due 09/20/2017.
1 Case Opening Packet 4 Appellee Reflex Media, Inc. answering brief due
1 Mediation Letter 13 10/20/2017. Appellant's optional reply brief is due 14 days
1 Mediation Questionnaire 15 after service of the answering brief. [10396160] (JMR)
04/21/2017 2 Main Document 17 Filed (ECF) notice of appearance of Michael Terrance
Conway for Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou. Date of service:
04/21/2017. [10406389] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
04/21/2017 Added attorney Michael Conway for E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd. East Feneridou Apiriliaco Limited, in case
17−55505. [10406497] (CW)
04/21/2017 4 Main Document 19 Filed (ECF) Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou Motion to remand case.
Date of service: 04/21/2017. [10406843] [17−55505]
(Conway, Michael)
05/02/2017 5 Order − MQ1 Overdue 26 Filed order MEDIATION: The court of appeals' records do
not indicate that appellant has filed a mediation
questionnaire in accordance with Cir. R. 3−4. Within seven
(7) days of the filing date of this order, appellant shall file a
Mediation Questionnaire...dismiss the appeal voluntarily...
or show cause in writing why this appeal should not be
dismissed. Failure to comply with this order will result in
dismissal pursuant to Ninth Cir. R. 42−1. [10418260]
(BLS)
Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou Mediation
Questionnaire. Date of service: 05/02/2017. [10418740]
[17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
06/15/2017 7 Main Document 32 Filed order (Appellate Commissioner): The motion for a
limited remand (Docket Entry No. [4]) is denied
withoutprejudice to filing a renewed motion accompanied
by an indication that the districtcourt is willing to entertain
the proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a)motion.
See Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b).In the absence of a renewed
motion, the opening brief and excerpts of recordare due
September 20, 2017; the answering brief is due October 20,
2017; and theoptional reply brief is due within 21 days
after service of the answering brief. (MOATT) [10475625]
(JBS)
(2 of 416)
09/12/2017 Filed (ECF) Streamlined request for extension of time to

file Opening Brief by Appellants Apiriliaco Limited,
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou. New
requested due date is 10/20/2017. [10577384] [17−55505]
(Conway, Michael)
09/12/2017 Streamlined request [8] by Appellants Apiriliaco
Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. and East
Feneridou to extend time to file the brief is approved.
Amended briefing schedule: Appellants Apiriliaco
Feneridou opening brief due 10/20/2017. Appellee
Reflex Media, Inc. answering brief due 11/20/2017. The
optional reply brief is due 21 days from the date of
service of the answering brief. [10577750] (LW)
09/19/2017 Court correction: Attorney Mark L. Smith in 17−55505
substituted by Attorney Mark Lee Smith in 17−55505.
[10586237] (RY)
10/13/2017 11 Filed (ECF) Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir
11 Main Document 33 Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou Motion to extend time
to file Opening brief until 04/20/2018. Date of service:
11 Additional Document 42
10/13/2017. [10617916] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
10/19/2017 12 Main Document 46 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: SM): Appellants’ motion
(Docket Entry No. [11]) for a 6−month extension of timeto
file the opening brief is denied. The opening brief is now
due November 20,2017. The answering brief is due
December 20, 2017. The optional reply brief isdue within
21 days after service of the answering brief. [10624076]
(AF)
11/20/2017 13 Submitted (ECF) excerpts of record. Submitted by
13 ER Vol 1 47 Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial
Ltd. and East Feneridou. Date of service: 11/20/2017.
13 ER Vol 2 54
[10661274] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
11/20/2017 14 Main Document 260 Submitted (ECF) Opening Brief for review. Submitted by
Ltd. and East Feneridou. Date of service: 11/20/2017.
[10661281] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
11/21/2017 15 ECF Brief and Excerpts Filed 316 Filed clerk order: The opening brief [14] submitted by
Order appellants is filed. Within 7 days of the filing of this order,
filer is ordered to file 7 copies of the brief in paper format,
accompanied by certification, attached to the end of each
copy of the brief, that the brief is identical to the version
submitted electronically. Cover color: blue. The paper
copies shall be printed from the PDF version of the brief
created from the word processing application, not from
PACER or Appellate CM/ECF. The Court has reviewed the
excerpts of record [13] submitted by appellants. Within 7
days of this order, filer is ordered to file 4 copies of the
excerpts in paper format, with a white cover. The paper
copies must be in the format described in 9th Circuit Rule
30−1.6. [10662672] (KWG)
(3 of 416)
11/24/2017 Received 7 paper copies of Opening Brief [14] filed by

Appellants. [10666370] (SD)
11/24/2017 Filed 4 paper copies of excerpts of record [13] in 2
volume(s) filed by Appellants. [10668394] (LA)
file Answering Brief by Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.. New
requested due date is 01/19/2018. [10680626] [17−55505]
(Smith, Mark)
12/07/2017 Streamlined request [18] by Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.
to extend time to file the brief is approved. Amended
briefing schedule: Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.
answering brief due 01/19/2018. The optional reply
brief is due 21 days from the date of service of the
answering brief. [10681775] (LW)
01/19/2018 20 Main Document 318 Submitted (ECF) Answering Brief for review. Submitted
by Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.. Date of service:
01/19/2018. [10731368] [17−55505] (Smith, Mark)
01/22/2018 21 ECF Brief Filed Order 355 Filed clerk order: The answering brief [20] submitted by
Reflex Media, Inc. is filed. Within 7 days of the filing of
this order, filer is ordered to file 7 copies of the brief in
paper format, accompanied by certification, attached to the
end of each copy of the brief, that the brief is identical to
the version submitted electronically. Cover color: red. The
paper copies shall be printed from the PDF version of the
brief created from the word processing application, not
from PACER or Appellate CM/ECF. [10733909] (LA)
01/25/2018 Received 7 paper copies of Answering Brief [20] filed by
Reflex Media, Inc.. [10738740] (SD)
file Reply Brief by Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou. New requested
due date is 03/09/2018. [10755830] [17−55505] (Conway,
Michael)
02/08/2018 Streamlined request [23] by Appellants Apiriliaco
Feneridou to extend time to file the brief is approved.
Amended briefing schedule: the optional reply brief is
due 3/9/18. [10755882] (LW)
03/09/2018 25 Main Document 357 Submitted (ECF) Reply Brief for review. Submitted by
Ltd., East Feneridou and Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.. Date
of service: 03/09/2018. [10792794] [17−55505] (Conway,
Michael)
03/09/2018 26 ECF Brief Filed Order 387 Filed clerk order: The reply brief [25] submitted by
appellants is filed. Within 7 days of the filing of this order,
filer is ordered to file 7 copies of the brief in paper format,
accompanied by certification, attached to the end of each
copy of the brief, that the brief is identical to the version
submitted electronically. Cover color: gray. The paper
copies shall be printed from the PDF version of the brief
(4 of 416)
created from the word processing application, not from

PACER or Appellate CM/ECF. [10793511] (LA)
03/16/2018 Received 7 paper copies of Reply Brief [25] filed by
Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. and East
Feneridou. [10801491] (RG)
04/20/2018 This case is being considered for an upcoming oral
argument calendar in Pasadena
Please review the Pasadena sitting dates for August 2018

and the two subsequent sitting months in that location at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/court_sessions. If you have an
unavoidable conflict on any of the dates, please inform the
court within 3 days of this notice, using CM/ECF (Type of
Document: File Correspondence to Court; Subject:
regarding availability for oral argument).
When setting your argument date, the court will try to work
around unavoidable conflicts; the court is not able to
accommodate mere scheduling preferences. You will
receive notice that your case has been assigned to a
calendar approximately 10 weeks before the scheduled oral
argument date.
If the parties wish to discuss settlement before an argument

date is set, they should jointly request referral to the
mediation unit by filing a letter within 3 days of this notice,
using CM/ECF (Type of Document: File Correspondence
to Court; Subject: request for mediation).[10844872]
(AW)
Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou Correspondence:
Regarding availability for oral argument. Date of service:
05/02/2018 [10859241] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
07/25/2018 This case is being considered for an upcoming oral
argument calendar in Pasadena
Please review the Pasadena sitting dates for November

2018 and the two subsequent sitting months in that location
at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/court_sessions. If you have
an unavoidable conflict on any of the dates, please inform
the court within 3 days of this notice, using CM/ECF (Type
of Document: File Correspondence to Court; Subject:
regarding availability for oral argument).
When setting your argument date, the court will try to work
around unavoidable conflicts; the court is not able to
accommodate mere scheduling preferences. You will
receive notice that your case has been assigned to a
calendar approximately 10 weeks before the scheduled oral
argument date.
(5 of 416)
If the parties wish to discuss settlement before an argument

date is set, they should jointly request referral to the
mediation unit by filing a letter within 3 days of this notice,
using CM/ECF (Type of Document: File Correspondence
to Court; Subject: request for mediation).[10954492]
(AW)
07/26/2018 31 Main Document 391 Filed (ECF) Appellee Reflex Media, Inc. Correspondence:
Regarding availability for oral argument. Date of service:
07/26/2018 [10956535] [17−55505] (Smith, Mark)
09/02/2018 Notice of Oral Argument on Friday, November 16, 2018 −
9:30 am − Courtroom 1 − Pasadena CA.
View the Oral Argument Calendar for your case here.
Be sure to review the GUIDELINES for important

information about your hearing, including when to arrive
(30 minutes before the hearing time) and when and how to
submit additional citations (filing electronically as far in
advance of the hearing as possible).
When you have reviewed the calendar, download the

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE form
and within 21 days of Friday, November 16, 2018, file the
completed form via Appellate CM/ECF.
[10998592] (AW)
10/18/2018 33 Main Document 393 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: AF): The parties should be
prepared to discuss the following questions at oral
argument: (1) whether this court can consider the merits of
Defendants−Appellants’ claims, where the district court
has not ruled on a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate, and (2) if
so, which claims. Compare Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648
F.3d 779, 789 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011), Pecarsky v.
Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2001), In
re Kubick, 171 B.R. 658, 660 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), with
Consorzio Del Prosciutto Di Parma v. Domain Name
Clearing Co., LLC, 346 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003).
[11051736] (AF)
10/22/2018 34 Main Document 395 Filed (ECF) Acknowledgment of hearing notice. Location:
Pasadena. Filed by Attorney Michael Conway for
Ltd. and East Feneridou. [11054875] [17−55505] (Conway,
Michael)
10/22/2018 35 Main Document 396 Filed (ECF) Acknowledgment of hearing notice. Location:
Pasadena. Filed by Attorney Mr. Mark Lee Smith for
Appellee Reflex Media, Inc.. [11055676] [17−55505]
(Smith, Mark)
11/16/2018 ARGUED AND SUBMITTED TO RONALD M. GOULD,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, JR. and MARY H.
MURGUIA. [11090807] (BG)
(6 of 416)
11/21/2018 37 Main Document 397 Filed Audio recording of oral argument.

Note: Video recordings of public argument calendars are
available on the Court's website, at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
[11095741] (BG)
12/07/2018 38 FILED MEMORANDUM DISPOSITION (RONALD M.
38 Memorandum 398 GOULD, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, JR. and MARY H.
MURGUIA) REVERSED and REMANDED, with
38 Post Judgment Form 402
instructions to VACATE the judgment. FILED AND
ENTERED JUDGMENT. [11113928] (SD)
12/07/2018 39 Costs Award Order 406 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk: SD): At the direction of
the Court, costs are hereby taxed against appellee.
[11114467] (SD)
Secretarial Ltd. and East Feneridou bill of costs (Form 10)
in the amount of 297.00 USD. Date of service: 12/11/2018
[11116956] [17−55505] (Conway, Michael)
12/31/2018 41 Mandate Order 409 MANDATE ISSUED.(RMG, BDP and MHM) Costs taxed
against Appellee in the amount of $279.80. [11136772]
(CW)
(7 of 416)
Case: 17-55505, 04/14/2017, ID: 10396160, DktEntry: 1-1, Page 1 of 3
Office of the Clerk

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Post Office Box 193939
San Francisco, California 94119-3939
415-355-8000
Molly C. Dwyer
Clerk of Court April 14, 2017
No.: 17-55505
D.C. No.: 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
Short Title: Reflex Media, Inc. v. Apiriliaco Limited, et al
Dear Appellant/Counsel
A copy of your notice of appeal/petition has been received in the Clerk's office of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. Court of
Appeals docket number shown above has been assigned to this case. You must
indicate this Court of Appeals docket number whenever you communicate with
this court regarding this case.
Please furnish this docket number immediately to the court reporter if you place an
order, or have placed an order, for portions of the trial transcripts. The court
reporter will need this docket number when communicating with this court.
The due dates for filing the parties' briefs and otherwise perfecting the appeal
have been set by the enclosed "Time Schedule Order," pursuant to applicable
FRAP rules. These dates can be extended only by court order. Failure of the
appellant to comply with the time schedule order will result in automatic
dismissal of the appeal. 9th Cir. R. 42-1.
(8 of 416)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APR 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada No. 17-55505

corporation,
D.C. No. 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
Plaintiff - Appellee,
U.S. District Court for Central
v. California, Santa Ana
APIRILIACO LIMITED, DBA TIME SCHEDULE ORDER

HoneyDaddy.com; EAST
FENERIDOU; E.C.A. KARTOIR
SECRETARIAL LTD.,
Defendants - Appellants.
The parties shall meet the following time schedule.
Fri., April 21, 2017 Mediation Questionnaire due. If your registration for
Appellate ECF is confirmed after this date, the
Mediation Questionnaire is due within one day of
receiving the email from PACER confirming your
registration.
Wed., September 20, 2017 Appellant's opening brief and excerpts of record
shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 32 and
9th Cir. R. 32-1.
Fri., October 20, 2017 Appellee's answering brief and excerpts of record
shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 32 and
9th Cir. R. 32-1.
(9 of 416)
The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and served within fourteen
days of service of the appellee's brief, pursuant to FRAP 32 and 9th Cir. R.
32-1.
Failure of the appellant to comply with the Time Schedule Order will result in
automatic dismissal of the appeal. See 9th Cir. R. 42-1.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Janne Nicole Millare Rivera

Deputy Clerk
Ninth Circuit Rule 27-7
(10 of 416)
Office of the Clerk

Post Office Box 193939
San Francisco, California 94119-3939
415-355-8000
Molly C. Dwyer
Clerk of Court
ATTENTION
YOU ARE NOT REGISTERED FOR ELECTRONIC FILING
You are listed as counsel of record in this new appeal/petition but you are not
registered for electronic filing with this Court. See Ninth Circuit Rule 25-5.
Until you register for electronic filing or provide the Court with proof of an
exemption, you will not receive further notice of filings from the Court in this case,
including important scheduling orders and orders requiring a response. Failure to
respond to a Court order or otherwise meet an established deadline can result in the
dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute by the Clerk pursuant to Ninth
Circuit Rule 42-1, or other action adverse to your client.
Please register for electronic filing with the Court immediately or file a
notice/motion to withdraw as counsel from this appeal.
To register for electronic filing, and for more information about Ninth Circuit
CM/ECF, visit our website at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/cmecf/#section-
registration.
(11 of 416)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the NINTH CIRCUIT
Office of the Clerk
After Opening a Case – Counseled Cases

(revised April 2016)
Court Address – San Francisco Headquarters
Mailing Address for Mailing Address for Street Address

U.S. Postal Service Overnight Delivery
(FedEx, UPS, etc.)
Office of the Clerk Office of the Clerk 95 Seventh Street
James R. Browning James R. Browning San Francisco, CA
Courthouse Courthouse 94103
U.S. Court of Appeals U.S. Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 193939 95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA San Francisco, CA
94119-3939 94103-1526
Court Addresses – Divisional Courthouses
Pasadena Portland Seattle

Richard H. Chambers The Pioneer Courthouse William K. Nakamura
Courthouse 700 SW 6th Ave, Ste 110 Courthouse
125 South Grand Avenue Portland, OR 97204 1010 Fifth Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91105 Seattle, WA 98104
Court Website – www.ca9.uscourts.gov
The Court’s website contains the Court’s Rules and General Orders, information
about electronic filing of documents, answers to frequently asked questions,
directions to the courthouses, forms necessary to gain admission to the bar of the
Court, opinions and memoranda, live streaming of oral arguments, links to practice
manuals, and an invitation to join our Pro Bono Program.
(12 of 416)
Court Phone List

Main Phone Number. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8000
Attorney Admissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7800
Calendar Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8190
CJA Matters (Operations Unit) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7920
Docketing.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7840
Death Penalty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8197
Electronic Filing – CM/ECF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Submit form at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/cmecf/feedback
Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8650
Mediation Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7900
Motions Attorney Unit.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8020
Procedural Motions Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7860
Records Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7820
Divisional Court Offices:
Pasadena.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (626) 229-7250
Portland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (503) 833-5300
Seattle.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (206) 224-2200
Electronic Filing - CM/ECF
The Ninth Circuit’s CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) system is

mandatory for all attorneys filing in the Court, unless they are granted an
exemption. All non-exempted attorneys who appear in an ongoing case are
required to register for and to use CM/ECF. Registration and information about
CM/ECF is available on the Court’s website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under
Electronic Filing–CM/ECF. Read the Circuit Rules, especially Ninth Circuit Rule
25-5, for guidance on filing documents electronically via CM/ECF, and see the
CM/ECF User Guide for a complete list of the available types of filing events.
After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 2

(13 of 416)
Rules of Practice
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Fed. R. App. P.), the Ninth Circuit
Rules (9th Cir. R.) and the General Orders govern practice before this Court. The
rules are available on the Court’s website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Rules.
Practice Resources
The Appellate Lawyer Representatives’ Guide to Practice in the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is available on the Court’s website
www.ca9.uscourts.gov at Guides and Legal Outlines > Appellate Practice Guide.
The Court provides other resources in Guides and Legal Outlines.
Admission to the Bar of the Ninth Circuit
All attorneys practicing before the Court must be admitted to the Bar of the Ninth
Circuit. Fed. R. App. P. 46(a); 9th Cir. R. 46-1.1 & 46-1.2.
For instructions on how to apply for bar admission, go to www.ca9.uscourts.gov

and click on the Attorneys tab > Attorney Admissions > Instructions.
Notice of Change of Address
Counsel who are registered for CM/ECF must update their personal information,
including street addresses and email addresses, online at:
https://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pscof/login.jsf 9th Cir. R. 46-3.
Counsel who have been granted an exemption from using CM/ECF must file a
written change of address with the Court. 9th Cir. R. 46-3.
Motions Practice
Following are some of the basic points of motion practice, governed by Fed. R.
App. P. 27 and 9th Cir. R. 27-1 through 27-14.
• Neither a notice of motion nor a proposed order is required. Fed. R. App. P.

27(a)(2)(C)(ii), (iii).
• Motions may be supported by an affidavit or declaration. 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

(14 of 416)
• Each motion should provide the position of the opposing party. Circuit
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 27-1(5); 9th Cir. R. 31-2.2(b)(6).
• A response to a motion is due 10 days from the service of the motion. Fed. R.
App. P. 27(a)(3)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 26(c). The reply is due 7 days from service
of the response. Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(4); Fed. R. App. P. 26(c).
• A response requesting affirmative relief must include that request in the caption.
Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(3)(B).
• A motion filed in a criminal appeal must include the defendant’s bail status. 9th
Cir. R. 27-2.8.1.
• A motion filed after a case has been scheduled for oral argument, has been
argued, is under submission or has been decided by a panel, must include on the
initial page and/or cover the date of argument, submission or decision and, if
known, the names of the judges on the panel. 9th Cir. R. 25-4.
Emergency or Urgent Motions
All emergency and urgent motions must conform with the provisions of 9th Cir. R.
27-3. Note that a motion requesting procedural relief (e.g., an extension of time to
file a brief) is not the type of matter contemplated by 9th Cir. R. 27-3. Circuit
Advisory Committee Note to 27-3(3).
Prior to filing an emergency motion, the moving party must contact an attorney in
the Motions Unit in San Francisco at (415) 355-8020.
When it is absolutely necessary to notify the Court of an emergency outside of

standard office hours, the moving party shall call (415) 355-8000. Keep in mind
that this line is for true emergencies that cannot wait until the next business day
(e.g., an imminent execution or removal from the United States).
Briefing Schedule
The Court generally issues the briefing schedule at the time the appeal is docketed.
Certain motions (e.g., a motion for dismissal) automatically stay the briefing
schedule. 9th Cir. R. 27-11.
The opening and answering brief due dates are not subject to the additional time
described in Fed. R. App. P. 26(c). 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1. The early filing of

(15 of 416)
appellant’s opening brief does not advance the due date for appellee’s answering
brief. Id.
Extensions of Time to File a Brief
Streamlined Request
Subject to the conditions described at 9th Cir. R. 31-2.2(a), you may request one
streamlined extension of up to 30 days from the brief’s existing due date. Submit
your request via CM/ECF using the “File Streamlined Request to Extend Time to
File Brief” event on or before your brief’s existing due date. No form or written
motion is required.
Written Extension
Requests for subsequent extensions or extensions of more than 30 days will be
granted only upon a written motion supported by a showing of diligence and
substantial need. This motion shall be filed at least 7 days before the due date for
the brief. The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit or declaration that
includes all of the information listed at 9th Cir. R. 31-2.2(b).
The Court will ordinarily adjust the schedule in response to an initial motion.
Circuit Advisory Committee Note to Rule 31-2.2. The Court expects that the brief
will be filed within the requested period of time. Id.
Contents of Briefs
The required components of a brief are set out at Fed. R. App. P. 28 and 32, and
9th Cir. R. 28-2, 32-1 and 32-2. After the electronically submitted brief has been
reviewed, the Clerk will request 7 paper copies of the brief that are identical to the
electronic version. 9th Cir. R. 31-1. Do not submit paper copies until directed to
do so.
Excerpts of Record
The Court requires Excerpts of Record rather than an Appendix. 9th Cir. R. 30-
1.1(a). Please review 9th Cir. R. 30-1.3 through 30-1.6 to see a list of the specific
contents and format. For Excerpts that exceed 75 pages, the first volume must
comply with 9th Cir. R. 30-1.6(a). Excerpts exceeding 300 pages must be filed in
multiple volumes. 9th Cir. R. 30-1.6(a).

(16 of 416)
Appellees may file supplemental Excerpts and appellants may file further Excerpts.
9th Cir. R. 30-1.7 and 30-1.8. If you are an appellee responding to a pro se brief
that did not come with Excerpts, then your Excerpts need only include the contents
set out at 9th Cir. R. 30-1.7.
Excerpts must be submitted in PDF format in CM/ECF on the same day the filer
submits the brief. The filer shall serve a paper copy of the Excerpts on any party
not registered for CM/ECF.
If the Excerpts contain sealed materials, you must submit the sealed documents
electronically in a separate volume in a separate transaction from the unsealed
volumes, along with a motion to file under seal. 9th Cir. R. 27-13(e). Sealed
filings must be served on all parties by mail, or if mutually agreed by email, rather
than through CM/ECF noticing.
After electronic submission, the Court will direct the filer to file 4 separately-
bound paper copies of the excerpts of record with white covers.
Mediation Program
Mediation Questionnaires are required in all civil appeals except cases in which the
appellant is proceeding pro se, habeas cases (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 and 2255)
and petitions for writs (28 U.S.C. § 1651). 9th Cir. R. 3-4.
The Mediation Questionnaire is available on the Court’s website at

www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms. The Mediation Questionnaire should be filed
within 7 days of the docketing of a civil appeal. The Mediation Questionnaire is
used only to assess settlement potential.
If you are interested in requesting a conference with a mediator in any type of

appeal, you may call the Mediation Unit at (415) 355-7900, email
ca09_mediation@ca9.uscourts.gov or make a written request to the Chief Circuit
Mediator. You may request conferences confidentially. More information about
the Court’s mediation program is available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation.

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Oral Hearings
Approximately 14 weeks before a case is set for oral hearing, the parties are
notified of the hearing dates and locations and are afforded 3 days from the date of
those notices to inform the Court of any conflicts. Notices of the actual calendars
are then distributed approximately 10 weeks before the hearing date.
The Court will change the date or location of an oral hearing only for good cause,
and requests to continue a hearing filed within 14 days of the hearing will be
granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 9th Cir. R. 34-2.
Oral hearing will be conducted in all cases unless all members of the panel agree
that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Oral arguments are live streamed to You Tube and can be accessed through the
Court’s website.

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Ninth Circuit Appellate Lawyer Representatives

APPELLATE MENTORING PROGRAM
1. Purpose
The Appellate Mentoring Program is intended to provide mentoring on a

voluntary basis to attorneys who are new to federal appellate practice or would
benefit from guidance at the appellate level. In addition to general assistance
regarding federal appellate practice, the project will provide special focus on two
substantive areas of practice - immigration law and habeas corpus petitions.
Mentors will be volunteers who have experience in immigration, habeas corpus,
and/or appellate practice in general. The project is limited to counseled cases.
2. Coordination, recruitment of volunteer attorneys, disseminating information

about the program, and requests for mentoring
Current or former Appellate Lawyer Representatives (ALRs) will serve as

coordinators for the Appellate Mentoring Program. The coordinators will recruit
volunteer attorneys with appellate expertise, particularly in the project's areas of
focus, and will maintain a list of those volunteers. The coordinators will ask the
volunteer attorneys to describe their particular strengths in terms of mentoring
experience, substantive expertise, and appellate experience, and will maintain a
record of this information as well.
The Court will include information about the Appellate Mentoring Program
in the case opening materials sent to counsel and will post information about it on
the Court's website. Where appropriate in specific cases, the Court may also
suggest that counsel seek mentoring on a voluntary basis.
Counsel who desire mentoring should contact the court at

mentoring@ca9.uscourts.gov, and staff will notify the program coordinators. The
coordinators will match the counsel seeking mentoring with a mentor, taking into
account the mentor's particular strengths.
3. The mentoring process
The extent of the mentor's guidance may vary depending on the nature of the case,
the mentee's needs, and the mentor's availability. In general, the mentee should
initiate contact with the mentor, and the mentee and mentor should determine
(19 of 416)
together how best to proceed. For example, the areas of guidance may range from
basic questions about the mechanics of perfecting an appeal to more sophisticated
matters such as effective research, how to access available resources, identification
of issues, strategy, appellate motion practice, and feedback on writing.
4. Responsibility/liability statement
The mentee is solely responsible for handling the appeal and any other
aspects of the client's case, including all decisions on whether to present an issue,
how to present it in briefing and at oral argument, and how to counsel the client.
By participating in the program, the mentee agrees that the mentor shall not be
liable for any suggestions made. In all events, the mentee is deemed to waive and
is estopped from asserting any claim for legal malpractice against the mentor.
The mentor's role is to provide guidance and feedback to the mentee. The
mentor will not enter an appearance in the case and is not responsible for handling
the case, including determining which issues to raise and how to present them and
ensuring that the client is notified of proceedings in the case and receives
appropriate counsel. The mentor accepts no professional liability for any advice
given.
5. Confidentiality statement
The mentee alone will have contact with the client, and the mentee must
maintain client confidences, as appropriate, with respect to non-public information.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Circuit Mediation Office
Phone (415) 355-7900 Fax (415) 355-8566
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation
MEDIATION QUESTIONNAIRE
This form is available in a fillable version at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/forms/Mediation_Questionnaire.pdf .
The purpose of this questionnaire is to help the court’s mediators provide the best possible mediation
service in this case; it serves no other function. Responses to this questionnaire are not confidential.
Appellants/Petitioners must electronically file this document within 7 days of the docketing of the case.
9th Cir. R. 3-4 and 15-2. Appellees/Respondents may file the questionnaire, but are not required to do so.
9th Circuit Case Number(s):
District Court/Agency Case Number(s):
District Court/Agency Location:
Case Name: v.
If District Court, docket entry number(s)

of order(s) appealed from:
Name of party/parties submitting this form:
Briefly describe the dispute that gave rise to this lawsuit.
Briefly describe the result below and the main issues on appeal.
(Continue to next page)

(23 of 416)
Describe any proceedings remaining below or any related proceedings in other tribunals.
Provide any other thoughts you would like to bring to the attention of the mediator.
Any party may provide additional information in confidence directly to the Circuit Mediation Office at
ca09_mediation@ca9.uscourts.gov. Provide the case name and Ninth Circuit case number in your
message. Additional information might include level of interest in including this case in the mediation
program, the case’s settlement history, issues beyond the litigation that the parties might address in a
settlement context, or future events that might affect the parties’ willingness or ability to mediate the case.
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
I certify that:
a current service list with telephone and fax numbers and email addresses is attached
(see 9th Circuit Rule 3-2).
I understand that failure to provide the Court with a completed form and service list
may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the appeal.
Signature
("s/" plus attorney name may be used in lieu of a manual signature on electronically-filed documents.)
Counsel for
How to File: Complete the form and then convert the filled-in form to a static PDF (File > Print > PDF
Printer or any PDF Creator). To file, log into Appellate ECF and select File Mediation Questionnaire. (Use
of the Appellate ECF system is mandatory for all attorneys filing in this Court, unless they are granted an
exemption from using the system.)
(24 of 416)
Case: 17-55505, 04/21/2017, ID: 10406389, DktEntry: 2, Page 1 of 2
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(26 of 416)
Appeal Docket No. 17-55505

__________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

REFLEX MEDIA INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
APIRILIACO LIMITED;
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.;
and EAST FENERIDOU
Defendant-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California
Case No. 16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
Hon. John F. Walter
MOTION FOR LIMITED REMAND TO FILE

MOTION TO VACATE PURSUANT TO FRCP RULE 60
Based on the papers and pleadings previously filed in this matter and in the
District Court, the Defendant-Appellants, APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com (“Apiriliaco”), EAST FENERIDOU (“Feneridou”) and E.C.A.
KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. (“Kartoir”) (all three collectively referred to as
“Defendant-Appellants”), hereby file this Motion under Federal Rules of Appellate
1
(27 of 416)
Procedure (“FRAP”) Rule 27 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule
60(a) for leave to proceed in the District Court with their motion to vacate the
Judgment entered on March 14, 2017 [District Court Doc. No. 39] -that is the
subject of the above-captioned appeal (the “Rule 60 Motion”).
This motion is made with the = consent of counsel for Plaintiff REFLEX
MEDIA, INC. (“Plaintiff-Appellee”).
Background and Relief Requested
On March 14, 2017, the District Court entered a default judgment against the
Defendant-Appellants for failure to timely appear. On April 4, 2017, the
Defendant-Appellants timely filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment under FRCP
Rule 60 (the “Motion to Vacate”) within the 28 day period set forth in FRAP Rule
4(a)(4)(A)(vi), which had the effect of tolling the 30 day appeal period relating to
the Judgment pending a determination of the Motion to Vacate.
-, -On April 12, 2017, the District Court struck the Motion to Vacate due to a
failure to include confirmation of compliance with District Court Local Rule 7-3,
which requires a “meet and confer” by counsel at least seven days prior to the
filing of a motion and paragraph 5(b) of the District Court’s Standing Order which
requires a Joint Statement regarding such meet and confer be filed three days after
the Local Rule 7-3 Conference (the “Order”). (District Court Doc. No. 42). In the
2
(28 of 416)
Order, the District Court instructed counsel to refile the Motion to Vacate after
compliance with the afore-mentioned local rules. -However, the Order was entered
on the 29th day following the entry of the Judgment, and accordingly there was no
way - Defendant-Appellants could comply within the 28 time period set forth in
FRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
-Consequently, Defendant-Appellants were required to file their Notice of
Appeal on April 13, 2017 (District Court Doc. No. 43) in order to preserve their
rights - pending the filing and determination of a renewed Motion to Vacate.
During -the meet and confer with counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee on April 18,
2017, counsel indicated that although he was not authorized to stipulate to the
relief of voluntarily vacating the Judgment, he was not opposed to- and would
consent to- the present motion for a limited remand for the purpose of refiling and
hearing the - Motion to Vacate.
Accordingly, the Defendant-Appellants - respectfully request that this Court
order a limited remand of the case for the purpose of allowing the District Court to
regain jurisdiction in order to hear the Motion to Vacate, and a stay of -the appeal
pending a report -stating the outcome of -the Motion to Vacate.
Grounds For Relief
FRCP Rule 60(a) states:
Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions.
3
(29 of 416)
The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from

oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or
other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own,
with or without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed in the
appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be
corrected only with the appellate court’s leave.
[Emphasis added]. Don’t give emphasis with italics AND bold
FRAP Rule 12.1(a) states:
Notice to the Court of Appeals. If a timely motion is made in the

district court for relief that it lacks authority to grant because of an
appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the movant must
promptly notify the circuit clerk if the district court states either that it
would grant the motion or that the motion raises a substantial issue.
While the present facts do not fit squarely within the four corners of Rule
12.1(a) because the Motion to Vacate was timely made, but then stricken with
instructions to re-file, it still falls within the intent and purpose of the Rule. - Here,
in the event that the Motion to Vacate is heard by the District Court and granted,
the present appeal -will be moot -because the interests of judicial efficiency favor
granting the relief requested.
Specifically, the District Court entered the following Order:
TEXT ENTRY ORDER by Judge John F. Walter. The Motion

to Vacate Judgment filed on April 4, 2017 (Docket No. [41]) is
stricken for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3 which requires the
conference of counsel to take place at least seven days prior to the
filing of the Motion and paragraph 5(b) of the Court's Standing Order
which requires the Joint Statement to be filed three days after the
Local Rule 7-3 Conference. If Defendants wish to re-file the Motion,
counsel shall meet and confer in person by April 19, 2017. If the
4
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parties cannot resolve the issues raised in the Motion, within 3 days of
the meet and confer, each party shall file a declaration setting forth the
issues resolved at the conference and those issues that were not
resolved with a detailed explanation of why those issues could not be
resolved. If a Motion remains necessary, it shall not be filed until 2
days after each party files the declaration required by this Order.
THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
ENTRY. (jloz) TEXT ONLY ENTRY
The parties have complied with the Order by meeting and conferring on
April 18, 2017, and intend to file a declaration setting forth the issues resolved and
- unresolved at the conference. - Not necessary.
Conclusion
It is respectfully requested that the Court remand this matter for the limited
purpose of hearing the Motion to Vacate and stay the Appeal - until the Motion -
has been resolved.
Dated: April 21, 2017

SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP
/s/ Michael T. Conway
Michael T. Conway (SBN 164004)
400 Park Avenue, Fifth Floor
New York, New York 10022
Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com
HOWARD R. PRICE (SBN 41522)

9663 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1250
Beverly Hills, CA. 90210
Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com
5
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Attorneys for Appellants

Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com,
“East Feneridou” and E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd.
6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 21, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the appellate CM/ECF system. In addition, the following parties were served by e-
mail and FedEx:
Mark L. Smith, Esq.

SMITH CORRELL LLP
11766 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1670
Los Angeles, CA 90025
(213) 377-5464
Date: April 21, 2017


Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com
Secretarial Ltd.
(33 of 416)

FILED
MAY 02 2017

corporation,
APIRILIACO LIMITED, DBA ORDER

HoneyDaddy.com; et al.,
The Court of Appeals’ records do not indicate that appellants have filed a
Mediation Questionnaire in accordance with Circuit Rule 3-4.
Within seven (7) days of the filing of this order, appellants shall: (a) file a
Mediation Questionnaire (available on the court's website, www.ca9.uscourts.gov);
(b) dismiss the appeal voluntarily pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b); or (c) show
cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to Ninth Cir. R.
42-1. Failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal pursuant to Ninth
Cir. R. 42-1.
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Information about the mediation program may be found on the court's
website: www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation.
FOR THE COURT:
Beatriz Smith
bs/mediation Deputy Clerk
(35 of 416)

Circuit Mediation Office
Phone (415) 355-7900 Fax (415) 355-8566
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation
MEDIATION QUESTIONNAIRE
The purpose of this questionnaire is to help the court’s mediators provide the best possible mediation
service in this case; it serves no other function. Responses to this questionnaire are not confidential.
Appellants/Petitioners must electronically file this document within 7 days of the docketing of the case.
9th Cir. R. 3-4 and 15-2. Appellees/Respondents may file the questionnaire, but are not required to do so.
9th Circuit Case Number(s): 17-55505
District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
District Court/Agency Location: Central District of California
Case Name: REFLEX MEDIA INC. v. APIRILIACO LIMITED, et al.
If District Court, docket entry number(s) of

Docket No. 39
order(s) appealed from:
Name of party/parties submitting this form: Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
Please briefly describe the dispute that gave rise to this lawsuit.
Alleged trademark infringement.
Briefly describe the result below and the main issues on appeal.
Default judgment.
Describe any proceedings remaining below or any related proceedings in other tribunals.
Appellants have filed a consent motion to this Court for limited remand to complete a motion to vacate the default
judgment which is the subject of this appeal.
Page 1 of 2
(36 of 416)
Provide any other thoughts you would like to bring to the attention of the mediator.
Mediation is premature given the motion for limited remand; if granted, this motion would resolve the appeal.
Any party may provide additional information in confidence directly to the Circuit Mediation Office at
ca09_mediation@ca9.uscourts.gov. Please provide the case name and Ninth Circuit case number in your
message. Additional information might include interest in including this case in the mediation program, the
case’s settlement history, issues beyond the litigation that the parties might address in a settlement context,
or future events that might affect the parties’ willingness or ability to mediate the case.
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
I certify that:
a current service list with telephone and fax numbers and email addresses
is attached (see 9th Circuit Rule 3-2).
I understand that failure to provide the Court with a completed form and
service list may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the appeal.
Signature s/ Michael T. Conway
("s/" plus attorney name may be used in lieu of a manual signature on electronically-filed documents.)
Counsel for Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
Note: Use of the Appellate ECF system is mandatory for all attorneys filing in this Court, unless they are
granted an exemption from using the system. File this document electronically in Appellate ECF by
choosing Forms/Notices/Disclosure > File a Mediation Questionnaire.
Page 2 of 2
(37 of 416)
I hereby certify that on May 2, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
the appellate CM/ECF system. In addition, the following parties were served by e-
mail and First Class Mail:
Mark L. Smith, Esq.

Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck, Esq.
SMITH CORRELL LLP
Matthew Lawrence Seror, Esq.

BUCHALTER NEMER, A Professional Corporation
1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2457
A current Service List includes the following:
PARTIES COUNSEL OF RECORD
Plaintiff-Respondent Reflex Media Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck, Esq. (pro hac vice)
Inc. a Nevada corporation Mark L. Smith, Esq.
SMITH CORRELL LLP
11766 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 1670
Tel. No.: (213) 443 - 6222
Fax No.: (877-730-5910
E-mail:jfonnesbeck@smithcorrell.com
msmith@smithcorrell.com
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Non-Appellant/Defendants Matthew Lawrence Seror, Esq.

Gregory Chan and BUCHALTER NEMER, A Professional Corporation
Pylon Media Group, Inc. 1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500
Tel. No.: (213) 896 - 0700
Fax No.: (213) 896 - 0400
E-mail: mseror@buchalter.com
Defendants-Appellants Apiriliaco Michael T. Conway, Esq.

Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP
East Feneridou, and E.C.A Kartoir 400 Park Avenue, Fifth Floor
Secretarial Ltd. New York, New York 10022
Tel. No.: (212) 376-3010
Fax No.: (212) 376-3024
E-mail: mconway@goodwin.com
Howard R. Price, Esq.

Tel. No.: (310) 277-8438
Fax No.: (323) 935-5017
E-mail: hrprice@aol.com
Date: May 2, 2017

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com
Secretarial Ltd.
(39 of 416)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 15 2017
corporation,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellee, 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
Central District of California,
v. Santa Ana

Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Peter L. Shaw, Appellate Commissioner.
The motion for a limited remand (Docket Entry No. 4) is denied without
prejudice to filing a renewed motion accompanied by an indication that the district
court is willing to entertain the proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a)
motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b).
In the absence of a renewed motion, the opening brief and excerpts of record
are due September 20, 2017; the answering brief is due October 20, 2017; and the
optional reply brief is due within 21 days after service of the answering brief.
SMR/MOATT
(40 of 416)

__________________________________________________________________

REFLEX MEDIA INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
APIRILIACO LIMITED;
and EAST FENERIDOU

Hon. John F. Walter
__________________________________________________________________
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS TO FILE APPEAL BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
Based on the papers and pleadings previously filed in this matter and in the
District Court, the Defendants-Appellants, APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com (“Apiriliaco”), EAST FENERIDOU (“Feneridou”) and E.C.A.
KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. (“Kartoir”) (all three collectively referred to as
“Defendants-Appellants”), hereby file this Motion under Federal Rules of

(41 of 416)
Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) Rule 31-2.2 for a six month extension of time, to
and including April 20, 2018, to file their opening brief and excerpts of the record
in the above-captioned appeal. Defendants-Appellants respectfully request that all
other current briefing deadlines likewise be extended by six months to correspond
therewith.
This motion is made with the consent of counsel for Plaintiff REFLEX
MEDIA, INC. (“Plaintiff-Appellee”) after a meet and confer was held on October
13, 2017.
Defendants-Appellants deadline to file the appeal brief was initially
scheduled for September 20, 2017. A Streamlined Request for Extension to Time
was filed on September 12, 2017 [Doc. 8] requesting a thirty (30) day extension
of time until October 20, 2017, which was approved by the Court on the same date
[Doc. 8].
Background and Relief Requested
On March 14, 2017, the District Court entered a default judgment against
the Defendants-Appellants for failure to timely appear. On April 4, 2017, the
Defendants-Appellants timely filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment under FRCP
Rule 60 (the “Motion to Vacate”) within the twenty-eight (28) day period set forth
in FRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), which had the effect of tolling the thirty (30) day
2
(42 of 416)
appeal period relating to the Judgment pending a determination of the Motion to
Vacate. On April 12, 2017, the District Court struck the Motion to Vacate because
it did not include confirmation of compliance with District Court Local Rule 7-3,
which requires a “meet and confer” by counsel at least seven days prior to the
filing of a motion, and paragraph 5(b) of the District Court’s Standing Order,
which requires the filing of a Joint Statement regarding such meet and confer to be
filed three days after the Local Rule 7-3 Conference (the “District Court Order”).
(District Court Doc. No. 42).
In the District Court Order, the District Court instructed Defendants-
Appellants to refile the Motion to Vacate after compliance with the afore-mentioned
local rules and Standing Order. However, the District Court Order was entered on
the twenty-ninth (29th) day following the entry of the Judgment. Defendants-
Appellants, therefore, could not comply with such directives within the twenty-
eight (28) day time period set forth in FRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) and risked an
adverse determination by the District Court that the renewed Motion to Vacate was
untimely, during which time the period by which a notice of appeal would need to
be filed would have also expired. Consequently, Defendants-Appellants were
required to file their Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2017 (District Court Doc. No.
43) in order to preserve their rights and to ensure its timeliness.
3
(43 of 416)
Because the filing of the Notice of Appeal divested the District Court of its
jurisdiction to continue to hear the matter [see, e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982], Defendants-Appellants made a motion to
this Court for limited remand of the case to the District Court for the purpose of
allowing the District Court to regain jurisdiction in order to hear the renewed
Motion to Vacate, and for a stay of the appeal pending a report stating the outcome
of the renewed Motion to Vacate (the “Motion to Remand”) [Doc. 4].
On April 18, 2017, prior to the filing of the Motion to Remand, a meet and
confer was conducted between counsel for the parties, at which counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellee indicated that he was not opposed to, and would consent to, the
Motion to Remand; however, he further stated that he was not authorized to
stipulate to the relief of voluntarily vacating the Judgment. As indicated during the
meet and confer, upon the filing of the Motion to Remand, Plaintiff-Appellee did
not oppose the Motion to Remand.
The Motion to Remand was denied by order of this Court dated June 15,
2017 (the “Ninth Cir. Order”), “without prejudice to filing a renewed motion
accompanied by an indication that district court is willing to entering the proposed
Federal Rule 60(a) motion.” [Doc. 7].
4
(44 of 416)
In compliance with the Ninth Cir. Order, Defendants-Appellants filed a
Motion for Indicative Ruling with the District Court on August 15, 2017, but were
foced to withdraw and refile this motion (the “First Motion for Indicative Ruling”).
[District Court Doc. No. 50]. A second Motion for Indicative Ruling was filed by
Defendants-Appellants on September 13, 2017 [District Court Doc. No. 55] (the
“Motion for Indicative Ruling”). The Motion for Indicative Ruling was scheduled
to be heard by Judge John F. Walter on October 16, 2017 - after the initial time
for Defendants-Appellants to file the opening brief and only four days prior to the
present deadline to file the opening brief. Today, Judge Walter issued an order
vacating the hearing date and taking the Motion for Indicative Ruling under
submission. [District Court Doc. No. 65].
Grounds for Relief
Pursuant to FRAP 31-2.2(b), “an extension of time may be granted only
upon written motion supported by a showing of diligence and substantial need.”
As set forth above and in the accompanying Declaration of Michael T. Conway
(the “Conway Declaration”), Defendants-Appellants have exercised diligence in
pursuing the within appeal and the deadlines imposed by this Court and the District
Court, as well as to timely seek extensions of time where it would be impractical
to meet such deadlines under the relevant facts. A six month extension of time for
5
(45 of 416)
Defendants-Appellants to file their opening brief would enable Defendants-
Appellants to timely file the opening brief without overlapping with the continued
motion practice, which motion practice is directly related to the subject matter of
this appeal. Indeed, the only reason Defendants-Appellants seek an extension of
time is to allow time to reach a final determination in the District Court as to
whether the Defendants-Appellants default in the underlying action will be vacated.
If the motion to vacate is permitted and ultimately granted, then the judgment from
which the appeal has been take will have been vacated and the appeal moot. Indeed,
the Ninth Cir. Order itself indicates that upon the filing of a renewed Motion to
Remand - upon obtaining an indicative ruling from the District Court - that this
Court would extend the deadline to file the opening brief. See, Ninth Cir. Order,
stating “[i]n the absence of a renewed motion, the opening brief and excerpts of
record are due September 20, 2017”. However, Defendants-Appellants cannot
make such renewed motion until there has been a ruling on the Motion for
Indicative Ruling.
Barring a ruling for the District Court that it will not vacate the default or
even entertain such a motion, or from this Court that it will not remand the matter
for such limited purpose, Defendants-Appellants wish to preserve their rights to
proceed with the appeal in the event any of the foregoing motions are not granted
6
(46 of 416)
by either this Court or the District Court. However, until such time as a
determination is reached on those motions by this Court or the District Court, it
would be premature to proceed with an appeal that may be otherwise rendered
moot if the each motion is ultimately granted. Further, it would be impractical for
Defendants-Appellants to either (i) prepare and file an opening brief in the four
days from the presently scheduled hearing date for the Motion to Indicative Ruling
or (ii) make a renewed Motion for Remand - assuming a ruling is even made on
October 16, 2017.
No significant delay of this matter will result from this extension, and, to
the contrary, it will preserve judicial resources pending the outcome of the motions
detailed above.
Conclusion
It is respectfully requested that the Court grant an extension of time for
Defendants-Appellants to file to the appeal brief for a period of six months from
the present deadline of October 20, 2017 to April 20, 2018 in light of the foregoing,
or for such further period time as deemed appropriate by the Court to allow for the
Motion for Indicative Ruling to be ruled upon by the District Court, for a renewed
Motion for Limited Remand to be filed, and for the Motion to Vacate to be filed.
7
(47 of 416)
Dated: October 13, 2017

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com

Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com,“East Feneridou”
and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
8
(48 of 416)
I hereby certify that on October 13, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
the appellate CM/ECF system.
Date: October 13, 2017
9
(49 of 416)
______________________________________________________________

REFLEX MEDIA INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
APIRILIACO LIMITED;
and EAST FENERIDOU
Hon. John F. Walter
______________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL T. CONWAY IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE OPENING BRIEF
______________________________________________________________
I, Michael T. Conway, hereby declare, pursuant to Section 1746 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, as follows:
1. I am co-counsel for defendants-appellants APIRILIACO LIMITED

d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com (“Apiriliaco”), EAST FENERIDOU (“Feneridou”) and
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. (“Kartoir”) (all three collectively
referred to as “Defendants-Appellants”). I make this Declaration of my own
1
(50 of 416)
personal knowledge and in support of Defendants-Appellants Motion for Extension

of Time to File the Opening Brief.
2. The brief was originally scheduled to be filed on or before September

20, 2017.
3. Defendants-Appellants filed a request for a Streamlined Extension of

Time on September 12, 2017 [Doc. 8] requesting a thirty (30) day extension of
time until October 20, 2017 to file the appeal brief, which was approved by the
Court on the same date [Doc. 8].
4. Defendants-Appellants seek a six month extension of time to file the

opening brief in the above-captioned appeal up through and until April 20, 2018,
and to extend all corresponding deadlines.
5. A six month extension of time is necessary to (i) allow time for the
District Court to issue a ruling on the Motion for Indicative Ruling filed on
September 13, 2017; (ii) for this Court to issue a ruling on a renewed Motion for
Limited Remand upon the District Court’s granting of the Motion for Indicative
Ruling; and (iii) for the District Court to issue a ruling on the Motion to Vacate
upon the matter being remanded for such limited purpose (the “Motions”).
6. Defendants-Appellants have at all times exercised diligence and the

brief is anticipated to be filed within the time requested, subject to the timing of the
rendering of decisions by the District Court and this Court on the Motions.
7. On October 13, 2017 I conferred with counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Mark Smith, who consents to this request.
8. There have been no prior requests for the relief requested other than
as set forth herein.
2
(51 of 416)
9. To the best of my knowledge, the court reporter is not in default with

regard to any designated transcripts.
Dated: October 13, 2017

Michael T. Conway
3
(52 of 416)
I hereby certify that on October 13, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
Date: October 13, 2017
4
(53 of 416)
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 19 2017

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

corporation,
D.C. No.
v. Santa Ana
APIRILIACO LIMITED, DBA

HoneyDaddy.com; et al., ORDER
Appellants’ motion (Docket Entry No. 11) for a 6-month extension of time
to file the opening brief is denied. The opening brief is now due November 20,
2017. The answering brief is due December 20, 2017. The optional reply brief is
due within 21 days after service of the answering brief.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Samantha Miller

Deputy Clerk
SM/Pro Mo/10/16/2017
(54 of 416)
No. 17-55505
United States Court of Appeals

for the
Ninth Circuit

REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
– v. –
APIRILIACO LIMITED, dba HoneyDaddy.com; EAST FENERIDOU;

E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.,
___________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (SANTA ANA)
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
EXCERPTS OF RECORD
Volume I of II (Pages 1–2)
MICHAEL T. CONWAY HOWARD R. PRICE

SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP 9663 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1250
400 Park Avenue, Fifth Floor Beverly Hills, California 90210
New York, New York 10022 (310) 277-8438
(212) 376-3010
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Apiriliaco Limited, dba HoneyDaddy.com,

East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
(55 of 416)
Table of Contents
Dkt. No. Page
39 Judgment Appealed From of the Honorable John F.
Walter, Dated March 14, 2017, which Granted a
Default Judgment against Defendants Apiriliaco
Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ........................................ 1
Volume II of II (Pages 3–202)
43 Notice of Appeal, Dated and Filed April 13, 2017 ............. 3
43 Exhibit A to Notice of Appeal -
Judgment Appealed From of the Honorable John F.
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
(Reproduced herein at pp. 1–2) ................................... 7
41 Notice of Motion and Motion to Vacate Judgment,
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof,
Dated and Filed April 4, 2017.......................................... 8
41-1 Declaration of Vasilis Zertalis, for Defendants,
in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment,
Dated April 3, 2017, and Filed April 4, 2017 .................. 38
41-2 Proposed Order Granting Motion to Vacate Judgment
and Dismiss Complaint, Filed April 4, 2017 ................... 43
38 Notice of Lodging, Dated and Filed March 10, 2017 ...... 45
38-1 Proposed Judgment against Defaulted Defendants
Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East
Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
Filed March 10, 2017 ....................................................... 47
36 Order of the Honorable John F. Walter (in chambers)
Granting Application for Entry of Default Judgment
against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed March 7, 2017 ............. 49
35 Application for Entry of Default Judgment against
Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
Secretarial Ltd., with Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, Dated and Filed February 21, 2017.............. 51
i
(56 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

35-1 Exhibit 1 to Application -
Declaration of Mark L. Smith, for Plaintiff, in
Support of Application for Entry of Default
Judgment, Dated and Filed February 21, 2017 ........... 70
35-1 Attachment 1 to Smith Declaration -
Payment Receipts ................................................. 73
Screenshots from HoneyDaddy.com ................... 86
Screenshots from Reflex Media’s
SeekingArrangement.com .................................... 87
Defendant Gregory Chan’s Response to Plaintiff
Reflex Media, Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories,
Dated December 23, 2016, and Filed
February 21, 2017 ................................................ 92
Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair
Competition, Dilution of Famous Marks and
Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage, Dated April 27, 2016, and Filed
February 21, 2017........................................................ 102
35-2 Exhibit 1 to Complaint -
Email from Seeking Arrangement,
Dated March 31, 2016.......................................... 120
Trademark Electronic Search for Seeking
Arrangement ........................................................ 121
Proposed Judgment on Application for Entry
of Default Judgment by Court against
Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., Filed
February 21, 2017 ................................................ 123
33 Default by Clerk as to Defendants Apiriliaco Limited
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed
February 14, 2017 ............................................................ 126
ii
(57 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

Granting Request for Entry of Default against
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com,
East Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
Dated and Filed February 14, 2017.................................. 127
30 Notice of Deficiency Regarding Default Judgment,

Dated and Filed January 23, 2017.................................... 128
29 Request for Entry of Default and Memorandum in

Support against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
Secretarial Ltd., and Declaration of Mark L. Smith, for
Plaintiff, in Support of Request, Dated and Filed
January 23, 2017 .............................................................. 129
29-1 Exhibit 1 to Foregoing -

Copy of Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters ............................................. 136

Proof of Service of Complaint upon Apiriliaco
Limited, East Feneridou and Reflex Media, Inc. ........ 151

Letter from Jacob Fonnesbeck to Apiriliaco,
East Fenerdiou and Kartoir Secretarial,
Dated September 7, 2016 ............................................ 160

Screenshot of HoneyDaddy.com Website with
Las Vegas Address, Captured September 7, 2016 ...... 161

Las Vegas Address Removed, Captured
September 21, 2016 ..................................................... 164

FedEx Delivery Confirmation,
Dated January 18, 2017 ............................................... 167

Dated January 18, 2017 ............................................... 168
iii
(58 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

Denying Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of Default
against Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com,
Dated and Filed November 21, 2016 ............................... 169
26 Application for Entry of Default against Apiriliaco
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., and Declaration of
Mark L. Smith, for Plaintiff, in Support of Application,
21 Proof of Service of Summons on E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed August 12, 2016 .......... 184
20 Proof of Service of Summons on East Feneridou,
Dated and Filed August 12, 2016 .................................... 187
19 Proof of Service of Summons on Apiriliaco Limited,
1 Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair
Competition, Dilution of Famous Marks and Negligent
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,
Dated and Filed April 27, 2016
(Reproduced herein at pp. 102–119)................................ 193
Dated March 31, 2016
(Reproduced herein at p. 120) ..................................... 193
Arrangement
(Reproduced herein at pp. 121–122) ........................... 193
District Court Docket Sheet ............................................. 194
Certificate of Service
iv
(59 of 416)
ase 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 39 Filed 03/14/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:295
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH - California SBN 213829
2 msmith cv,smithcorrell.com
1 1 s ITe B v ., mte 1670
3 Los Angeles, CA 90025
Tel: (2f3) 443-6222
4 Fax: (817) 730-5910
5 Attorneys for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CENTRAL DISTRICT
10
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795-JFW-JEM
11 corporation,
JUDGMENT
12 Plaintiff, AGAINST DEFAULTED
DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO
13 vs. LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDad(!y.com;
EAST FENERIDOfL; AND E.C.A.
14 GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
GROUP, INC.· APIRILIACO
15 LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com;
EAST FENERIDOU;-E.C.A.
16 KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.; and Complaint filed: April 27, 2016
Does 1-10, inclusive,
17
Defendants.
18
JUDGMENT
19
The Court, having considered the Application for Entry of Default Judgment
20
Against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East
21
Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. (the "Application"), the supporting
22
declarations, exhibits and pleadings on file in this action and the Eitel factors, and good
23
cause appearing therefore, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
24
1. The Application (Dkt. 35) is granted.
25 '
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., and
26
against Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir
27
Secretarial Ltd., jointly and severally, for the total sum of Two Million Forty-Four
28
JUDGMENT
D
1
(60 of 416)
1 Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($2,044,278.21),

2 calculated as follows:
3 a. $2,000,000.00 (statutory damages);plus
4 b. $43,600.00 (attorneys' fees);plus
5 C. $678.21 (costs).
6
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 DATED: March 14, 201 7

9 on. ater
Judge, United States District Court
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
WDGMENT
D
2
(61 of 416)
No. 17-55505

for the
Ninth Circuit

Plaintiff-Appellee,
– v. –

___________________________
EXCERPTS OF RECORD

New York, New York 10022 (310) 277-8438
(212) 376-3010

(62 of 416)
Table of Contents
Dkt. No. Page
39 Judgment Appealed From of the Honorable John F.
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ........................................ 1
43 Notice of Appeal, Dated and Filed April 13, 2017 ............. 3
43 Exhibit A to Notice of Appeal -
Judgment Appealed From of the Honorable John F.
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
(Reproduced herein at pp. 1–2) ................................... 7
41 Notice of Motion and Motion to Vacate Judgment,
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof,
Dated and Filed April 4, 2017.......................................... 8
41-1 Declaration of Vasilis Zertalis, for Defendants,
in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment,
Dated April 3, 2017, and Filed April 4, 2017 .................. 38
41-2 Proposed Order Granting Motion to Vacate Judgment
and Dismiss Complaint, Filed April 4, 2017 ................... 43
38 Notice of Lodging, Dated and Filed March 10, 2017 ...... 45
38-1 Proposed Judgment against Defaulted Defendants
Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East
Feneridou and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
Filed March 10, 2017 ....................................................... 47
Granting Application for Entry of Default Judgment
against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed March 7, 2017 ............. 49
35 Application for Entry of Default Judgment against
Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
Secretarial Ltd., with Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, Dated and Filed February 21, 2017.............. 51
i
(63 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

Declaration of Mark L. Smith, for Plaintiff, in
Support of Application for Entry of Default
Judgment, Dated and Filed February 21, 2017 ........... 70
Payment Receipts ................................................. 73
Screenshots from HoneyDaddy.com ................... 86
Screenshots from Reflex Media’s
SeekingArrangement.com .................................... 87
Defendant Gregory Chan’s Response to Plaintiff
Reflex Media, Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories,
Dated December 23, 2016, and Filed
February 21, 2017 ................................................ 92
Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair
Competition, Dilution of Famous Marks and
Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage, Dated April 27, 2016, and Filed
February 21, 2017........................................................ 102
Dated March 31, 2016.......................................... 120
Arrangement ........................................................ 121
Proposed Judgment on Application for Entry
of Default Judgment by Court against
Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., Filed
February 21, 2017 ................................................ 123
33 Default by Clerk as to Defendants Apiriliaco Limited
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou and E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed
February 14, 2017 ............................................................ 126
ii
(64 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

Granting Request for Entry of Default against
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com,
Dated and Filed February 14, 2017.................................. 127

Dated and Filed January 23, 2017.................................... 128
29 Request for Entry of Default and Memorandum in

Support against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
Secretarial Ltd., and Declaration of Mark L. Smith, for
Plaintiff, in Support of Request, Dated and Filed
January 23, 2017 .............................................................. 129

Copy of Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters ............................................. 136

Proof of Service of Complaint upon Apiriliaco
Limited, East Feneridou and Reflex Media, Inc. ........ 151

Letter from Jacob Fonnesbeck to Apiriliaco,
East Fenerdiou and Kartoir Secretarial,
Dated September 7, 2016 ............................................ 160

Las Vegas Address, Captured September 7, 2016 ...... 161

Las Vegas Address Removed, Captured
September 21, 2016 ..................................................... 164

Dated January 18, 2017 ............................................... 167

Dated January 18, 2017 ............................................... 168
iii
(65 of 416)
Dkt. No. Page

Denying Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of Default
against Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com,
26 Application for Entry of Default against Apiriliaco
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., and Declaration of
Mark L. Smith, for Plaintiff, in Support of Application,
21 Proof of Service of Summons on E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd., Dated and Filed August 12, 2016 .......... 184
20 Proof of Service of Summons on East Feneridou,
19 Proof of Service of Summons on Apiriliaco Limited,
1 Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair
Competition, Dilution of Famous Marks and Negligent
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,
Dated and Filed April 27, 2016
(Reproduced herein at pp. 102–119)................................ 193
Dated March 31, 2016
(Reproduced herein at p. 120) ..................................... 193
Arrangement
(Reproduced herein at pp. 121–122) ........................... 193
District Court Docket Sheet ............................................. 194
Certificate of Service
iv
(66 of 416)
Case 8: 6-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 43 Filed 04/13/17 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:334

1 Michael T. Conway (SBN 164004)
2 400 Park Avenue, Fifth Floor
3 Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
4 mconway@goodwin.com
5 9663 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1250
6 Telephone: f310) 277-8438
7 Facs.1mile: 323) 935-5017
hrpnce@ao .com
8
Attorneys f9r Defendants
9 Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy. com, "East Feneridou"
10 and E. C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd
11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12
13 REFLEX MEDIA, INC, a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795-JFW-JEM
Corporation,
14 Plaintiff,
15 V.
16 GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA

17 GROUP, INC.; APIRILIACO LIMITED
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.collJi "?AST
18 FENERIDOUA·E.C.A. lV\RTOIR
SECRETARI L LTD.; and
19 Does 1-10, inclusive,
20
Defendants.
21
NOTICE OF APPEAL
22
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
23
HoneyDaddy.com, "East Feneridou" and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
24
("Defendants") defendants in the above-named case, hereby appeal to the United
25 States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from a judgment granting plaintiff
26 Reflex Media, Inc. 's Application for Entry of Default Judgment Against Defaulted
27
28
1
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND REPRESENTATION STATEMENT
D
3
(67 of 416)
1 Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and E.C.A
2 Kartoir Secretarial Ltd entered in this action on the 14th day of March, 2017
3 (Docket No. 39) attached as Exhibit A.
4 Defendants' Representation Statement is attached to this Notice as required
5 by Ninth Circuit Rule 3-2(b).
6 Dated: April 13, 2017
7
10
11
12
13
9663 Santa Monica Bivd., Suite 1250
14
Telephone: {310) 277-8438
15
Facsimile: 323) 935-5017
hrprice@ao .com
16 Attorneys for Defendants
17
ft.__piriliaco Limited d/b/a
Hon~Dadd_y.com, "East Feneridou"
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
4
(68 of 416)
1 REPRESENTATION STATEMENT
2 The undersigned represents Defendants-Appellants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
3 HoneyDaddy.com, "East Feneridou" and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., and no
4 other party. Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
5 and Circuit Rule 3-2(b), Defendants-Appellants submit this Representation
6 Statement. This following list identifies all parties to the action, and it identifies
7 their respective counsel by name, firm, address, telephone number, and e-mail,
8 where appropriate.
9 11-=-====--------1-=~:::...=....:.==--.:==-=---=-==-=-==----------I
1o Plaintiff-Res~ondent Reflex Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck, Esq. (pro hac vice)
Media Inc. a Nevada Mark L. Smith, Esg.
11 corporation SMITH CORRELI: LLP
Tel. No.: (213) 443 - 6222
13 Fax No.: (877-730-5910
E-mail: jfonnesbeck@smithcorrell.com
14 E-mail: msmith@sm1thcorrell.com
15
Defendants Gregory Chan and Matthew Lawrence Seror, Esq.
16 Pylon Media Group, Inc. BUCHALTER NEMER, A Professional
Comoration
17 1000 Wilshire Boulevard;. Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA 90017-L.457
18 Tel. No.: (213) 896 - 0700
Fax No.: (213) 896 - 0400
19 E-mail: mseror@buchalter.com
20
Defendants-Appellants Michael T. Conwayhe_s_g. _
21 fi._piriliaco Limited d/b/a SHIPMAN & GOOuWIN LLP
Hone_yDaddy .com, 400 Park Avenue.z pifth Floor
22 East Feneridou, and E.C.A. New York, New rork 10022
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. Tel. No.: (212) 376-3010
23 Fax No.: (212) 376-3024
E-mail: mconway@goodwin.com
24
Howard R. Price, Es_g.
25 9663 Santa Momca Blvd., Suite 1250
Beverly HillsA CA. 90210
26 Tel. No.: (31v) 277-8438
Fax No.: (323) 935-5017
27 E-mail: rice aol.com
11---------------'--=----::::::=....:==::....::..,,;.=:..::..:....::.=:,__---------'
28
3
D
5
(69 of 416)
1
2
I certify that on April 13, 2017, I served the foregoing NOTICE OF
3
APPEAL; REPRESENTATION STATEMENT and accompanying exhibits upon
4
all parties of record via ECF:
5 Mark L. Smith
6 SMITH CORRELL, LLP
7
8 msmith@smithcorrell.com
9
Matthew L. Seror
10 BUCHALTER NEMER
11
12 mseror@buchalter.com
13
This 13 th day of April, 2017
14
15
16
17
Michael T. Conway
19
Telephone: (212) 376-3010
20 Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
D
6
(70 of 416)
EXHIBIT A TO NOTICE OF APPEAL -
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER,
DATED MARCH 14, 2017, WHICH GRANTED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO LIMITED D/B/A HONEYDADDY.COM,
EAST FENERIDOU AND E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
(REPRODUCED HEREIN AT PP. 1–2)
7
(71 of 416)

1 Michael T. Conwayi (SBN 164004)
2 400 Park A venue, Frfth Floor
3 Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
5 HOWARD R. PRICE (SBN 41522)

7 Telephone: {310) 277-8438
Facsimile: 323) 935-5017
8 hrprice@ao .com
Attorneys for Defendants
9 Apiriliaco Limited d/bla HoneyDaddy.com, "East Feneridou"
10
11
12
Corporation,
14 Plaintiff,
15
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
v. MOTION TO VACATE
16 JUDGMENTJ...POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF;
17GREGORY CHAN, PYLON MEDIA DECLARATION OF
18 GROUP,INC., APIRILIACO LIMITED VASILIS ZERTALIS
d/bla HoneyDaddy.com, EAST
19 FENERIDO,E.C.A. KARTOIR D!1te: May 8, 2017
SECRETARIAL LTD., and Time: 1:30 p.m.
20 Does 1-10, inclusive, Ctrm: 16
21
Defendants. Judgment: March 14, 2017
22
23
24 Ill
25
Ill
26
Ill
27
28
1
MOTION TO VACA TE JUDGMENT
5533802vl
D
8
(72 of 416)
1 TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 8, 2017, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon
2
thereafter as this matter may be heard in Courtroom 16 of the above-entitled Court,
3
located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California, courtroom 7A, counsel for
4
defendants APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com ("Apiriliaco"), EAST
5
FENERIDOU ("Feneridou") and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
6
("Kartoir") (all three collectively referred to as "Defendants"), will and hereby do
7
move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 60(b)(l), (4) and (6), to vacate the
8
Judgment previously entered on March 14, 2017 in favor of REFLEX MEDIA,
9
INC. ("Plaintiff') [Doc. 39]; and then dismiss the Complaint as to the Defendants,
10
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P., Rule 12, for lack personal jurisdiction and improper
11
service of process; or in the alternative, to allow Defendants to either respond to
12
the Complaint and contest the action on the merits, or at the very least, conduct an
13
actual hearing on damages.
14
At the time and place of the hearing, counsel for Defendants will present
15
proof of the following matters:
16
(1) Defendants were not properly served with service of process in
17
Cyprus and the Judgment is void;
18
(2) The Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
19
Defendants and the Judgment is therefore void;
20
(3) Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by vacating the default,
21
(4) Defendants have a meritorious defense to the action, and their
22
default was not due to their own culpable conduct;
23
( 5) Extraordinary circumstances exist that would warrant the
24
vacating of the default;
25
(6) Upon vacating Defendants' default, the action should be
26
dismissed as against them.
27
28
2
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
5533802vl
D
9
(73 of 416)
1 This motion is based upon this notice, the accompanying Declaration of

2 Vasilis Zetalis, the documents and pleadings on file with the Court, and any oral or
3 documentary evidence that may be presented at the time of hearing on this matter.
5
6 /s/ Michael T. Conwa

7
Mic ae T. onwap BN 164004)
400 Park Avenue, i h Floor
8
Telephone: [2121376-3010
Facsimile: 212 376-3024
9 mconway@goo win.com
10
e
12
Telephone: 10] 277-8438
Facsimile: 323 935-5017
13 hrprice@ao .com
15 Atriliaco Limited d/b/a
on_~·Daddk..com, "East Feneridou"
16
and . C.A. artoir Secretarial Ltd.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
MOTION TO VACATE ruDGMENT
5533802vl
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10
(74 of 416)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................. 4

4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 6
5 LEGAL STANDARDS .............................................................................................. 8
6 I. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS FOR
IMPROPER SERVICE UNDER FRCP RULE 60(B)(4) .................. 8
7
A.
8
9 II. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS UNDER FRCP

RULE 60(B)(l )....................................................................................... 9
10
III. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS UNDER FRCP
11 RULE 60(B)(6) ....................................................................................... 1
12 IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
IMPROPER SERVICE AND LACK OF PERSONAL
13 JURISDICTION ................................................................................... 11
14 ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................. 11
15 I. DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED, AND
THEREFORE THE DEFAULT ORDER IS VOID AND
16 MUST BE VACATED UNDER FRCP RULE 60(B)(4).................... 1
17 II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED
UNDER FRCP RULE 60(b)(1 ) ............................................................ 1
18
A. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the
19 Issues on the Merits .................................................................... 1
20 B. Defendants Have Meritorious Defenses to All of
Plaintiffs Claims ......................................................................... 1
21
C. Defendants' Allegedly Culpable Conduct Did Not
22 Lead to the Default ..................................................................... 21
23 III. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED
UNDER FRCP RULE 60(b)(6) . ........................................................... 2
24
IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD DISMISSED UNDER
25 FRCP 12 UPON VACATING THE DEFAULT................................ 2
26 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 2
27
28
D
11
(75 of 416)
2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
3
Cases
4
Ackermann v. United States,
5 340U.S.193(1950) ....................................................................................... ll,22
6 Ballard v. Savage,
65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................ 12
7
Bateman v. U.S. Postal Service,
8 231 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................ 9
9 Bl14ib¥~Id\iWs(ift{ncit 1~~~{(~~'::.~~:............................................................... 20
10 Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. ofFlorida,
11
653 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 10
12 Bu4o/11ft!f2{)985f~~~~:~~~:............................................................................. 19
13 Colleg_eSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc.
653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 20
14
Community Dental Services v. Tani,
15 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 23
16 Co638 f2di 19 ~{6e~if!1i~,'1) ................................................................................ 23

17 Delay_ v. Gordon,
18 475 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 10
19 D248·F~3d9I15~9~h'c:ir. 2001) ................................................................................ 11

20
21
Eg5j~ ff.s'. 1fi1~6bl) .~~~:.~~~~~~~:........................................................................... 8
0
Falk v. Allen,
22 739 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.1984) ..................................................................... 10, 14, 21
23
Fa565SP~3di~t9~h1 cfr. v20~7)~~.~!~~~.~!~~~: .................................................... 23
24
Gardner v. Martino,
25 563 F .3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................ 10
26 Gordon and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute ofPhysics,
166 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1999) ................................................................................. 20
27 Hawaii Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone,
28 794 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................................ 14
ii
5533S02vl
D
12
(76 of 416)
1 Hirsch v. Blue CrosJ, Blue Shield ofKansas City,

800 F.2d 1474 (9 Cir. 1986) ............................................................................... 12
2
Intl. Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. o/Unempl. Campen. and Placement,
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ....................................................................................... 18, 20
4 Johnson v. Jones,
149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................ 20
5 Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement,
6 791 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986) .............................................................................. 23
7 Li¾sielf.s.· {f{/(fiis)..~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~::....................................................... 22
8 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanco Solutions, Inc.,
658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 17
9
Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union,
10 448 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1971) ................................................................................ 23
11 M96(tF2dG84~s(9tticC: f99f( ................................................................................. 9

12
13 M81~ F.~J-5ffc~~CCir.R{9gft~:.............................................................................. 8
0
14 MississJppi Publishing_Corp. v. Murphree,

326 U.S. 438, 66 S.Ct. 242, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946) .................................................. 8
15 Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., v. Nissan Computer Corp.,
89 F.Supp. 1154 (C.D. Cal., 2000) ...................................................................... 19
16
11 °7si tf.~~t3~tllsf{~·. ~·. ~~1!!.~. ~~:~..................................................................... 9

18 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,
155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................ 20
19
20 Pe!/1OVF ~Ts1rctfh~7:e{9~5}.~:~.~~ ......................................................................... 8
21 Pioneer Inv. Svcs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.,
507 U.S. 380 (1993) ............................................................................................. 10
22 Quach v. Cross,
23 2004 WL 2862285 (C.D.Cal. December 3, 2004) ............................................... 22
24 Rocha v. Thaler,
619 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 10
25 S.E. C. v. Internet Solutions for Bus. Inc.,
509 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1007) .......................................................................... 9, 12
26
27 Sc~74F.3 t{o/§7(9tlicif ¥o'1oJt.~~~~~.~~:'. ............................................................ 11

1
28 Sher v. Johnson,
111
5533802vl
D
13
(77 of 416)
1 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................. 11
2 Ti1F.3~
3
rt:~
iifi {9fii 2otit~~~~~~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
1
Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica,

4 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980) .......................................................................... 9, 12
5 Thomson v. Anderson,
113 Cal.App 4th 258 (2003) ................................................................................ 18
6 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,
7 984 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1993) .............................................................................. 23
United States v. Karahalias,
8 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953) ................................................................................. 10
9
UtfsdF~1c:f1s128S{9ili'cir. 1982) .............................................................................. 22
IO
Statutes & Rules
11
15 U.S.C. § 1116 ...................................................................................................... 17
12
l?U.S.C.§ 1117 ................................................................................................ 15, 17
13 15 u.s.c. §1114 ................................................................................................... 4, 15
14 15 u.s.c. §1125 ................................................................................................... 4, 15
15 Cal.Code Civ.Pro § 410.10 ...................................................................................... 18
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(1)(1) ............................................................................................... 9
17 Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) ............................................................................................ passim
18 7 J. Moore, Fed. Prac. if60.19 .................................................................................... 7
19 12 Moore's FEDERAL PRACTICE§§ 60.48[3][b] ...................................................... 22
20 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 1083 (2003) ........................ 12
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IV
5533802vl
D
14
(78 of 416)
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 Defendants APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com ("Apiriliaco"),
3 EAST FENERIDOU ("Feneridou") and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
4 ("Kartoir") (all three collectively referred to as "Defendants" - "Apiriliaco" and
5 "Katoir" together as the "Corporate Defendants"), hereby file this Motion under
6 FRCP 60 (the "Rule 60 Motion") seeking to vacate the Judgment entered on March
7 14, 2017 [Doc. 39] against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff REFLEX MEDIA,
8 INC. ("Plaintiff').
9 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
10 Plaintiff commenced this action by the filing of a Complaint for Trademark
11 Infringement; Unfair Competition; Dilution of Famous Marks; and Negligent
12 Interference with Prospective Advantage on April 27, 2016 (the "Complaint")
13 [Doc. 1]. As for the basis of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants,
14 two foreign entities located in Cyprus and an individual who is last believed to
15 reside in Cyprus, used a display name containing the combined words "Seeking"
16 and "Arrangement" in e-mail advertisements, which infringed upon Plaintiffs
17 trademark "SEEKING ARRANGMENT" (the "Mark"). It is from this usage of
18 the words "Seeking" and "Arrangement" that Plaintiff claims Defendants are
19 jointly and severally liable on the five causes of action alleged in the Complaint: (i)
20 Federal Trademark Infringement 15 U.S.C. §1114(1); (ii) Federal False

21 Designations, False Descriptions, and False Advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (iii)
22 Dilution of Famous Marks, 15 U.S.C. §1125(c); (iv) Unfair Competition, Cal. Bus.
23 & Prof. Code § 17200 et. seq.; and (v) Negligent Interference with Prospective
24 Economic Advantage.
25 The only alleged service of the summons and complaint made upon the
26 Defendants was via Federal Express ("FedEx"), which was made at an address
27 other than the Corporate Defendants principal place of business and Feneridou's
28 principal residence and which was made upon an individual described only as
4
5533802vl
D
15
(79 of 416)
1 "MARIOS", who was not an individual authorized to accept service on their

2 behalf. Therefore, none of the Defendants were properly served. Despite the
3 improper service, a default judgment was entered against them, jointly and
4 severally, in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $2,044,278.21. Because service
5 was improper, the Judgment is void and must be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4).
6 Service was improper for a number of reasons: (1) service on the Corporate
7 Defendants was made at a place other than their principal place of business; (2)
8 service on all Defendants was made upon an individual who was not employed by
9 the Corporate Defendants or authorized by any of the Defendants to accept service
10 on behalf of any of them; and (3) service on Feneridou, an individual, was made at
11 a place that was not her place of business, was made against a name that was not
12 her actual name, and no subsequent mailing was made to her residence.
13 Although Plaintiff never attempted proper service on any of the Defendants,
14 Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment relying on the patently deficient
15 service described above and falsely attested to in the proofs of service filed with
16 the Court [Docs. 19-21]. Plaintiff filed an Application for Default Judgment on
17 February 21, 2017 [Doc. 35] (the "Application"). The Application was granted by
18 Order of the Court dated March 7, 2017 [Doc. 36] (the "Order"). On March 10,
19 2017, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lodging requesting entry of final judgment [Doc.
20 38] (the "Notice of Lodging"), which contained hearing dates of March 20, 2017
21 and March 27, 2017. The proposed judgment was entered by the Court on March
22 14, 2017 [Doc. 39]. Due to Plaintiffs failure to effect lawful service on any of the
23 Defendants, the Court had no jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.
24 Accordingly, Judgment must be vacated as void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).
25 Alternatively, if the Court were to find service was lawful, the Judgment
26 should still be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 1) because Defendants' failure to
27 appear was based on their lack of knowledge of the action and inability to defend,
28 even though they have meritorious defenses.
5
5533802vl
D
16
(80 of 416)
Case 8:1 -cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 41 Filed 04/04/17 Page 10 of 30 Page ID #:306
1 Even if the Court will not set aside the default, it should still vacate the
2 Judgment and allow Defendants to contest the portion of the Application seeking
3 statutory damages in the amount of $2,000,000. As detailed below and in the
4 attached Zertalis Declaration, the only documents actually received by Defendants
5 were the Notice of Lodging and the accompanying copy of the previously filed
6 Application, which contained two return dates, i.e., March 20, 2017 and March 28
7 See above dates, 2017, both of which dates were after the March 14, 2017date
8 Judgment was actually entered. The two "return dates" is confusing and
9 misleading to these foreign Defendants.
10 With respect to Feneridou, the individual Defendant claimed to have been
11 served by Plaintiff, "East Feneridou" is not a person known to Defendants.
12 Therefore, a determination should be made by the Court that service, or attempted
13 service, on "East Feneridou" was insufficient to constitute service on Anatoli
14 Feneridou, the former employee of the Corporate Defendants who is believed to be
15 the individual improperly named by Plaintiff.
16 To the extent the Court determines that unique circumstances here do not
17 fall squarely within Rule 60(b)(l) or (b)(4), the relief sought should be granted
18 under Rule 60(b)( 6).
19 Upon vacating Defendants' default, the Complaint should be dismissed
20 premised upon the lack of proper service of process and lack of personal
21 jurisdiction unless and until the Complaint is properly served.
22
STATEMENT OF FACTS
23
24 Apiriliaco is a Cyprus company which does not have a physical location in,
25 or do business in, California or elsewhere in the United States. Kartoir is a Cyprus
26 company which does not have a physical location in or does business in California
27 or elsewhere in the United States, and merely serves as the corporate secretary for
28 Aprilicao. Zertalis Declaration ~1. Anatoli Feneridou is a former director of the
6
5533802v)
D
17
(81 of 416)
1 Corporate Defendants who ceased working in such capacity prior to the

2 commencement of this action. Zertalis Declaration fn. 2. The principal place of
3 business for the Corporate Defendants is not the address to where the papers were
4 allegedly served. See Zertalis Declaration ,rs.
5 The Court can take judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge,
6 Cyprus, including its capital, Nicosia, has been divided into two separate
7 "countries" by a wall and buffer zone between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus
8 since 1974. Accordingly, FedEx delivery to an office in Nicosea is problematic at
9 best and in any event is no guarantee that due notice of the pendency of a United
10 States Federal Court case involving an alleged United States trademark and its
11 alleged infringement will be delivered to its intended recipient.
12 In its proofs of service, Plaintiff claims that service on Defendants was
13 completed on August 5, 2016 via FedEx. However, a review of the facts
14 demonstrates that Defendants were not properly served in a manner that would
15 give them reasonable notice of this action, which is evident on the face of the
16 proofs of service themselves. They consist, in main part, of (i) a statement by the
17 affiant that the documents were sent via FedEx to each of the Defendants at 11
18 Souliou, Vamiko 5, Floor 1, Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cyprus and (ii) a copy of the
19 FedEx digital printout showing a package was delivered to "MARIOS" with no
20 description of the individual or any other description of the relationship between
21 "MARIOS" and the Defendants. No return receipt was requested and none was
22 provided to Plaintiff or to the Court.
23 This evidence is insufficient to show proper service on any party under the
24 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and here it conclusively demonstrates that there
25 was no service made on any of the Defendants. Specifically, 11 Souliou, Vamiko
26 5, Floor 1, Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cyprus is not the principal place of business for
27 any of the Defendants. In the case ofFeneridou, she no longer even worked for the
28 Corporate Defenda~ts as of August 5, 2016. There is no employee of either of the
7
5533802vl
D
18
(82 of 416)
1 Corporate Defendants named "MARIOS," nor is there anyone named "MARIOS"

2 who was authorized to accept service on behalf of any of the Defendants. See
3 Zertalis Declaration ,r,r 13-17. Indeed, there is insufficient evidence that the
4 summons and complaint were ever served on Defendants at their principal place of
5 business upon an agent authorized to accept service or that an attempt was ever
6 made to ensure that international service was effectuated properly so as to give
7 reasonable notice to any of the Defendants.
8 LEGAL STANDARDS
9
10
I. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS FOR IMPROPER
SERVICE UNDER FRCP RULE 60(B)(4)
11
A. Default Judgments Obtained Without Proper Service Are
12
Void.
13 Default judgments are generally disfavored, as public policy dictates that

14 cases be adjudicated on the merits whenever possible. See Pena v. Seguros La
15 Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985). When a movant seeks to
16 vacate a default judgment, "doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion
17 to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits." Id. (citing
18 7 J. Moore, Fed. Prac. ,r60.19, at 232-233); see also Meadows v. Dominican
19 Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has consistently
20 held that where there has been no decision on the merits, appropriate exercise of
21 discretion under Rule 60(b) requires that the interest in achieving a final resolution
22 of the matter should readily give way to the competing interest in reaching the
23 merits of the dispute. See TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691,696
24 (9th Cir. 2001) [overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,
25 532 U.S. 141 (2001)].
26 A federal court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
27 without proper service of process. Omni Capital Int'!, Ltd. v. Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
28 97, 104 (1987) (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
8
5533802vl
D
19
(83 of 416)
1 444-445, 66 S.Ct. 242, 245-246, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946)). "Unless service is waived,
2 proof of service must be made to the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(1)(1).

3 A default judgment is void and must be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) when
4 the defendant shows the service of process was insufficient and the court therefore
5 lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant
6 had notice of the underlying proceeding. S.E. C. v. Internet Solutions for Bus. Inc.,
7 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp.' 960 F2d 849,
8 851 (9th Cir. 1992). If the court deems that process was not sufficient, the
9 judgment is void and must be vacated:
10
11
There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a
motion is uncfer Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is there any reg_uirement, as there
12
usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b)., that
the moving party show that he has a meritorious defense. Bitner a
judgment is void or it is valid.
13
14 Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614

15 F.2d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted); see also Internet Sols.,
16 509 F.3d at 1165.
17
18 II. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS UNDER FRCP RULE

60(B)(l)
19
20 FRCP Rule 60(b)(l) provides that a court may relieve a party from a default
21 judgment on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See
22 Bateman v. U.S. Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). What
23 conduct constitutes excusable neglect or "mistake" under FRCP Rule 60(b)(l) and
24 similar rules "is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant
25 circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv. Svcs. Co. v.
26 Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
27 The Ninth Circuit has held that the "good cause" standard that governs
28 vacating an entry of a default judgment under FRCP Rule 55(c) is the same
9
5533802vl
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(84 of 416)
1 standard that governs vacating a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(l) and (6). See
2 TC/ Group Life, 244 F .3d at 696. A party moving to vacate a default judgment
3 under FRCP Rule 60(b)(l) must satisfy the "good cause" standard consisting of a
4 three-factor test: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced, (2) whether the
5 defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) whether culpable conduct of the
6 defendant led to the default. Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir.1984). The
7 court is to consider all three Falk factors in determining whether to liberally
8 exercise its power to vacate a default judgment - no one factor is conclusive. See
9 Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011)
10 ("The district court's finding that [the moving party] acted culpably did not
11 preclude it, as a matter of law, from setting aside the default judgment[.]")
12 III. VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS UNDER FRCP RULE
60(B)(6)
13
14 FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) allows the court to vacate a default judgment for "any
15 other reason that justifies relief." Here, if the Court finds that the totality of the
16 circumstances applicable to the instant action does not fall squarely within
17 subsection (b)( 1), or any other subsection, then the default should be vacated under
18 subsection (b)(6). This subsection, serves "as an equitable remedy to prevent
19 manifest injustice." Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
20 and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387,400
2l (5th Cir. 2010) (describing how courts commonly understand Rule 60(b)(6) as a
22 "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice") (internal quotation marks
23 omitted); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1953)
24 ( characterizing Rule 60(b)( 6) as providing for "situations of extreme hardship").
25 To obtain relief from judgment, the moving party must demonstrate
26 "extraordinary circumstances," Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198-202
27 ( 1950), which courts generally regard as showing that "both injury and
28 circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect its interest."
IO
5533802vl
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(85 of 416)
1 Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009). See Klapprott v. United
2 States, 335 U.S. 601, 608-615 (1949) (finding the requisite "extraordinary
3 circumstances" and granting relief from four-year-old default judgment procured
4 while petitioner was ill and wrongfully incarcerated).
5 IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
IMPROPER SERVICE AND LACK OF PERSONAL
6 JURISDICTION
7
FRCP Rule 12(b)(2) provides the Court with the authority to dismiss an
8
action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech Assoc.,
9
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1997). Where a defendant moves to dismiss a
10
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction the plaintiff bears the burden of
11
establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
12
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); see
13
also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001); Sher v. Johnson, 911
14
F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). While a plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that,
15
if true, would support jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court may not assume
16
the truth of such allegations if they are contradicted by affidavit. Ballard v. Savage,
17
65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1284.
18
Additionally, FRCP Rule 12(b)(5) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint where
19
service is insufficient.
20
21
22 Ill
23 Ill
24 Ill
25
26
27
28
11
SS33802vl
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(86 of 416)
1 ARGUMENT
2 I. DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED, AND THEREFORE
THE DEFAULT ORDER IS VOID AND MUST BE VACATED
3 UNDER FRCP RULE 60(B)(4).
4 Plaintiffs proof of service suffers from various independent fatal defects,
5 each of which is sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants were never properly
6 served. Accordingly, the Judgment is void and must be vacated. See S.E. C. v.
7 Internet Solutions for Business, Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Thomas
8 P. Gonzalez Corp., 614 F.2d at 1256.
9 Once a defendant contests the adequacy of service of process, the burden is
10 on the plaintiff to establish the validity of service. Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue
11 Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986) (burden of proving
12 personal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction).
13 A plaintiff must show that he has satisfied the service requirements as a
14 matter of law. See, e.g., Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 1083
15 (2003) ("As numerous cases make clear, the party on whose behalf service of
16 process is made has the burden of establishing its validity when challenged; to do
17 so, she must demonstrate that the procedure employed to deliver the papers
18 satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other
19 applicable provision oflaw.")
20 The proofs of service on the Corporate Defendants demonstrate that service
21 upon them was improper. Most glaringly, process was served on the Corporate
22 Defendants at a place other than their principal place of business upon an
23 individual, referred to only as "MARIOS", who was not authorized to accept
24 service on their behalf. FRCP Rule 4(h)(2) allows service to be made upon a
25 corporation, partnership or association at a place not within any judicial district of
26 the United States in any manner allowed for under FRCP Rule 4(±), which governs
27 service on an individual in a foreign country. FRCP Rule 4(±) allows service to be
28 made by "any internationally agreed means of service reasonably calculated to give
12
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(87 of 416)
1 notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
2 of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents". FRCP Rule 4(f)(i). Reference to the
3 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
4 (the "Hague") does not negate that the means of service must still be "reasonably
5 calculated to give notice.". As stated above and attested to in the Zertalis
6 Declaration, the place of attempted service is not the principal place of business for
7 either of the Corporate Defendants. Further, even if it were, "MARIOS" was not
8 authorized to accept service on their behalf.
9 Further, there is no evidence that the documents served were translated from
10 English. Rather, based upon the record, Plaintiff seemingly makes the assumption
11 that whoever would have received the documents would have been able to
12 decipher their import and then attempt to direct them to the correct location. This
13 apparent assumption has greatly prejudiced the Corporate Defendants. Pursuant to
14 Article 5(3) of the Hague, in the event of formal service where the addressee does
15 not understand English, a request may be made for a translation into the official
16 language of Cyprus. Although here only informal service was made pursuant to
17 Article 10 of the Hague, logic dictates that service cannot be proper if made upon
18 someone who does not understand the contents of the document received. Here,
19 the documents were left with someone only known as "MARIOS", with no ability
20 to determine the extent of his familiarity with the English language or the
21 importance of foreign legal documents.
22 The foregoing concerning the Corporate Defendants equally applies to
23 Feneridou. Additionally, Plaintiff not only failed to effectuate service at her place
24 of business, but service was also not made at her residence or by using her actual
25 name.
26 Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to effectuate service in a manner reasonably
27 calculated to give notice and service is therefore defective. Accordingly, the
28 Judgment is void and Defendants' default should be vacated.
13
5533802vl
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(88 of 416)
II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED UNDER

1 FRCP RULE 60(b)(l).
2 As stated above, FRCP Rule 60(b)(l) provides for relief from a final
3 judgment where that judgment was based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
4 excusable neglect" provided the movant can show "good cause." See 244 F.3d at
5 696.
6 The good cause analysis considers three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff
7 will be prejudiced, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3)
8 whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default. Falk, 739 F.2d at 463.
9 Here, all three factors weigh in favor of vacating the default.
10 A. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the Issues on
11
the Merits
12 In order for there to be cognizable prejudice to Plaintiff, the vacating of the

13 default judgment must cause greater harm than merely delaying the ultimate
14 resolution of the case - the standard is whether Plaintiffs ability to pursue his
15 claims will be hindered. See Falk, 739 F.2d at 463; see also United States v
16 /scandari, Cll- 0797 JSC, 2012 WL 2568187, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012).
17 Prejudice to a plaintiff in vacating a default judgment occurs when a plaintiffs
18 ability to pursue its claim will be hindered because evidence is lost, discovery
19 becomes more difficult, or there is an opportunity for fraud or collusion. See TC/
20 Group Life, 244 F.3d at 701. The ordinary cost of litigating is not a recognized
21 factor under the Falk test. Id.
22 Here, Plaintiff will incur no prejudice if the default judgment is vacated.
23 First, Plaintiff's claims remain active against several answering defendants, thus
24 litigating this matter on the merits on the same claims as to the moving Defendant
25 is not prejudicial. Second, there is no evidence in the record that vacating the
26 default will lead to any loss of evidence, onerous discovery, or fraud or collusion.
27 Further, there is no risk of lost evidence as Defendants would be under a duty to
28
14
5533802vl
D
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(89 of 416)
1 ensure that relevant documents or information concerning the issues in this matter
2 be preserved.
3 B. Defendant Has Meritorious Defenses to All of Plaintitrs
Claims
4
In considering whether a defendant has a meritorious defense, the Court
5
must determine "whether there is some possibility that the outcome of the suit after
6
a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved by the default." Hawaii
7
Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986). As shown
8
below, Defendants have valid defenses to Plaintiffs claims demonstrating that
9
there is a strong likelihood that the outcome at trial will be contrary to the default
10
judgment here.
11
Plaintiff has asserted five causes of action against the Defendants in the
12
Complaint: (1) federal trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. §1114(1); (2)
13
federal false designations, false descriptions and false advertising under 15 U.S.C.
14
§l 125(a); (3) dilution of famous marks under 15 U.S.C. §l 125(c); (4) unfair
15
competition under California Business & Professions Code§ 17200 et seq.; and (5)
16
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Upon seeking a
17
final default judgment, Plaintiff requested that the Court award it statutory
18
damages, jointly and severally against Defendants, under 15 U.S.C. §l ll 7(b) for
19
willful infringement of Plaintiffs Mark. In doing so, Plaintiff represented to the
20
Court that (a) it could prevail on the merits of its claims against each Defendant
21
and calculated damages to be in excess of $2,000,000, and (b) statutory damages
22
were appropriate and warranted because of the willful use by Defendants of a
23
counterfeit mark. Had Defendants been properly served with the summons and
24
complaint, or at the very least with the Application to contest damages, they would
25
have been able to defend these baseless claims. Notably, however, they would not
26
have been able to defend the claim that they were liable for statutory damages in
27
the amount of $2,000,000for willful use of counterfeit mark because this was not
28
15
5533802vl
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26
(90 of 416)
1 alleged in the Complaint. Rather, the Complaint alleges use of an infringing mark,
2 which has a much less restrictive burden of proof than a counterfeit mark, and only
3 seeks actual and trebles damages, not statutory damages for a counterfeit mark.
4 Further, none of Plaintiffs papers demonstrate how its claims could apply to
5 a company that serves as nothing more than a corporate secretary (Kartoir) or to an
6 individual who formerly worked for the Corporate Defendants (Feneridou) and
7 who would be an improper defendant, absent an extraordinary showing sufficient
8 to extinguish the corporate veil, to an action against a corporate party. Nor do the
9 papers show how this Court has personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants,
10 all of which are located in Cyprus, irrespective of the Court's determination on the
11 sufficiency of service.
12
i. Defendants Did Not Use an Infringing or Counterfeit
13
Mark in Commerce
14 The Court awarded statutory damages in Plaintiffs favor based on the

15 allegation in the Application - which allegation was not in the Complaint - that
16 Defendants willfully used a counterfeit mark by using the Mark as a display name
17 in an e-mail. Plaintiff, however, has not set forth any admissible evidence
18 supporting this claim. Defendants dispute Plaintiffs unsupported assertions, and
19 state that they have not used the words "Seeking" and "Arrangement" as a
20 trademark, and, therefore, could not have infringed upon the Mark.
21 The core of Plaintiff's allegations for each of the causes of action asserted in
22 the Complaint, and upon which default judgment has been granted, is whether a
23 display name, consisting of two ordinary words, used in an advertising e-mail, is
24 use of a mark in commerce. Plaintiff's Application, wherein it claims that the
25 allegations in the Complaint have merit, fails to assert a single case where this
26 would be held in the affirmative, likely because no such case exists. In actuality,
27 Defendants did not use the words "Seeking" and "Arrangement" as a trademark or
28 in connection with Defendants' goods or services. Defendant also did not use the
16
5533802vl
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27
(91 of 416)
1 words "Seeking" and "Arrangement" to deceive the consumer of an affiliation

2 between Plaintiff and Defendants. Rather, those words were used merely for
3 descriptive purposes as a display name for e-mail addresses on an e-mail
4 advertisement. A review of Exhibit 1 to the Complaint reveals that the body of the
5 e-mail contains the words "Honey Daddy", "Sugar Daddy" and "Sugar Party."
6 Nothing in the body of the e-mail indicates or otherwise suggests an affiliation
7 with Plaintiff, nor would it cause any confusion to the consumer. Therefore, there
8 was nothing "illegal" about the advertisements and Plaintiffs authorization was
9 not required.
10 Further, Plaintiff has not proven that the Mark is "famous" to warrant relief
11 for dilution or that Plaintiff actually sustained any damages. Accordingly,
12 Defendants have a meritorious defense that they did not use the words "Seeking"
13 and "Arrangement" in commerce as a trademark. Therefore, they cannot be liable
14 under any of the causes of action asserted against them.
15 Even if the Court were to find that the words "Seeking" and "Arrangement"
16 were used as a trademark in commerce in connection with goods and/or services to
17 meet the definition of a trademark, statutory damages for use of a counterfeit mark
18 are still inappropriate. To claim statutory damages for use of a counterfeit mark
19 under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), a plaintiff must prove that the elements of 15 U.S.C. §
20 1116(d) are met. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanco Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d
21 936 (9th Cir. 2011). The statute defines a counterfeit mark as one that "is
22 registered on the principal register in the [USPTO] for such goods or services sold,
23 offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against
24 whom relief is sought knew such mark was so registered." Id., citing, 15 U.S.C. §
25 1116(d)(l)(B)(i). Upon making its Application, Plaintiff goes beyond that and
26 seeks increased statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2), which
27 allows damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00 per counterfeit mark "if the court
28 finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful." Even after hurdling all other
17
5533802vl
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(92 of 416)
I obstacles Plaintiff would have to overcome to prove any wrongdoing by

2 Defendants, Plaintiff certainly would not be able to show that use of the Mark,
3 which use is not conceded, was willful. Feneridou is an individual and former
4 employee. Nothing in the Complaint or in the Application supports piercing the
5 corporate veil to attach any liability to her for infringement, especially not willful
6 infringement. The same applies to Kartoir, which is only an agent (at best) of
7 Apiriliaco for limited secretarial purposes. With respect to Apiriliaco, it too cannot
8 be found to have engaged in any willful conduct, as the words in issue were not
9 used to purposefully divert potential consumers of Plaintiff to any of the
1O Defendants.
11
ii. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction
12
13 The existence of personal jurisdiction over a party to a lawsuit is perhaps the

14 most important part of a complaint. Where there is no personal jurisdiction
15 established -- particularly over a nonresident -- the plaintiff cannot obtain relief,
16 and the courts will not allow a lawsuit to go forward. In California, courts may
17 exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents "on any basis not inconsistent with
18 the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Cal.Code Civ.Pro § 410.10.
19 For personal jurisdiction to attach, due process requires that a nonresident party
20 have certain minimum contacts with the forum "such that the maintenance of the
21 suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Intl.
22 Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off ofUnempl. Campen. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310,
23 316 ( 1945). Furthermore, the "substantial connection between the defendant and
24 the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by
25 an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State."
26 Thomson v. Anderson, 113 Cal.App 4th 258 (2003). (internal citations omitted.)
27 It is well established that personal jurisdiction may be general or specific.
28 General jurisdiction attaches where a nonresident defendant's contacts are
18
5533802vl
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29
(93 of 416)
1 "substantial ... continuous and systematic." Id Specific jurisdiction attaches where

2 that defendant "has purposely availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation
3 omitted], and the 'controversy is related to or 'arises out of a defendant's contact
4 with the forum." Id See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
5 (1985). Where a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, it is the
6 plaintiff who bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the
7 defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to substantiate
8 personal jurisdiction. Indeed, "the plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that
9 the conduct of the defendants related to the pleaded causes is such as to constitute
10 constitutionally cognizable 'minimum contacts'." Id. (internal citations omitted).
11 The existence of personal jurisdiction, when such is in dispute, is a question of
12 fact, to be determined by the court.
13 There cannot be a finding of personal jurisdiction over Defendants, either
14 generally or specifically. There is no evidence that Feneridou, an individual, ever
15 visited California or has any direct contacts with the United States at all. Likewise,
16 there is no evidence that the Corporate Defendants have ever conducted business in
17 the United States. Defendants own no property in California, have never owned
18 any property, had offices or personnel here, or anywhere else in the United States.
19 At best, only a small percentage of Apiriliaco' s customers may have a connection
20 to California. The only conceivable connection to California is Apiriliaco's
21 website and e-mail advertisements.
22 A passive website and domain name alone are insufficient to confer
23 jurisdiction. See Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F.Supp.
24 1154 (C.D. Cal., 2000). Here, this is not even alleged; rather, Plaintiffs only
25 allegations are that there was an e-mail advertisement and a phone number with a
26 California area code, which phone number in and of itself does not make any of the
27 Defendants a California resident or subject to its jurisdiction. No allegation is
28 made that any advertisements were specifically directed towards California or that
19
5533802vl
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30
(94 of 416)
1 there were any deliberate actions directed toward California; therefore, there is no
2 specific jurisdiction. Burdick v. Super. Ct., 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Cal. App. 4th
3 Dist. 2015), citing, Advanced Tactical Ordinance Systems, LLC v. Real Action
4 Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014). Defendants' alleged acts do "not
5 support general jurisdiction because the [alleged wrong] was not a 'continuous and
6 systematic' forum activity, but was, rather, a few discrete acts over a relatively
7 short period of time". CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc. 653 F.3d 1066
8 (9th Cir. 2011 ), citing, International Shoe, 131 S.Ct. at 2852. "Marketing to forum
9 residents, where such marketing does not result in substantial and continuous
10 commerce with the forum, does not support general jurisdiction." Id at 1075.
11 Therefore, personal jurisdiction by this Court over Defendants fails.
12
iii. Attorneys' Fees Should Not Have Been Awarded
13
14 The default judgment's award of attorneys' fees under Local Rule 53-1, also
15 based on the award of profits, is similarly problematic. The Court is entitled to
16 award attorneys' fees only in exceptional cases to the prevailing party. Such a case
17 occurs only when the trademark infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate,
18 or willful. Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir.
19 1998); Gordon and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 166
20 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1999) (under the Lanham Act, attorneys' fees should be awarded
21 only in exceptional cases and only on evidence of fraud or bad faith). Willful or
22 bad faith infringement, so as to justify an award of attorney's fees under the Act,
23 usually means passing off a product or service as another seller's better established
24 one, or some other deliberate theft of a marketholder's goodwill. Johnson v. Jones,
25 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998). The prevailing party must demonstrate the
26 exceptional nature of a case by clear and convincing evidence to be entitled to an
27 award of attorneys' fees. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.
28 1998). Once again, Plaintiff has set forth no evidence whatsoever that Defendants'
20
5533802vl
D
31
(95 of 416)
1 were infringing Plaintiffs Mark, much less clear and convincing evidence of
2 willfulness. In these circumstances, the award constitutes nothing more than a
3 penalty for failing to respond to a Complaint that was never served properly.
4
5
C. Defendants' Allegedly Culpable Conduct Did not Lead to
the Default
6 The third and final Falk factor looks to the culpability of the moving
7 defendant's conduct in the entry of the default judgment. Situations where the
8 moving defendant offers a credible, good faith explanation negating any "intention
9 to take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decision making, or
10 otherwise manipulate the legal process" generally render the defendant's conduct
11 not "culpable," even if the defendant had actual notice of the pending action. TC/
12 Group Life, 244 F.3d at 697-98. The TC/ court went on to elaborate on the indicia
13 of culpability: "In contrast, we have typically held that a defendant's conduct was
14 culpable for purposes of the Falk factors where there is no explanation of the
15 default inconsistent with a devious, deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to
16 respond." Id at 698.
17 Here, Defendants, two Cyprus companies and an individual who is last
18 known to reside in Cyprus, did not file a responsive pleading because lawful
19 service had not been effectuated. Defendants did not become aware of the action
20 until on or about March 20, 2017 when the Notice of Lodging was delivered to the
21 attention of the parent company of Kartoir, which is the corporate secretary for
22 Apiriliaco, at a different address. Immediately thereafter Defendants retained
23 counsel. After calling the Court in advance of the date noticed for a hearing on
24 the application for judgment, and learning that the judgment had already been
25 entered and no hearing would in fact take place, this Motion was expeditiously
26 filed.
27 The failure of two Cyprus companies and an individual who is last known to
28 reside in Cyprus, served by FedEx at an address other their principal place of
21
5533802vl
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32
(96 of 416)
1 business or residence, with unknown documents on a person not employed by or

2 otherwise authorized to accept service on behalf of any of them, requiring an
3 appearance in a matter pending in the United States, could hardly be construed as a
4 "devious, deliberate, willful" attempt to "manipulate the legal process." See TC/
5 Group Life; see also Quach v. Cross, 2004 WL 2862285 at *7 (C.D.Ca. December
6 3, 2004) (finding excusable neglect and vacating default where defaulting party
7 failed to respond because they felt they were improperly served).
8 As discussed supra, Defendants can satisfy all three Falk factors.
9 Accordingly, it is in the interests of justice to vacate the default judgment entered
1O on March 14, 2017 and to allow Defendants to defend the present action on the
11 merits.
12
III. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED UNDER
13 FRCP RULE 60(b)(6).
14 Defendants have satisfied their burden under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6). As
15 attested to in the Zertalis Declaration, Defendants were not aware of the action
16 because service was not proper. Having been unaware of the action, they could not
17 have taken "steps that would have prevented the judgment." 12 MOORE'S FEDERAL
18 PRACTICE §§ 60.48[3][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2014). Once they were aware,
19 immediate action was taken by retaining counsel and contacting the Court. As
20 such, Defendants acted diligently to protect their interests, but were not able to do
21 so prior to entry of judgment because judgment had already been entered prior to
22 the date noticed on the face of the application for default judgment.
23 A district court may vacate a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6)
24 "whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice." United States v.
25 Sparks, 685 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1982). However, relief under Fed.R.Civ.P.
26 60(b)(6) is warranted only if "extraordinary circumstances" exist. Liljeberg v.
27 Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988); Ackermann v.
28 United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-201 (1950). Indeed, a party must demonstrate
22
5533S02vl
D
33
(97 of 416)
1 "extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute
2 [his case]." Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.
3 2002), quoting Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730
4 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). "This rule 'has been used sparingly as an equitable
5 remedy to prevent manifest injustice' and 'is to be utilized only where
6 extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent
7 or correct an erroneous judgment.' " Fantasy/and Video, Inc. v. County of San
8 Diego, 505 F .3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting United States v. Alpine Land &
9 Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has stated
10 that "[c]lause 60(b)( 6) is residual and 'must be read as being exclusive of the
11 preceding clauses.' " Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F .2d
12 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119
13 (9th Cir. 1981). In other words, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion "must be based on grounds
14 other than those listed in the preceding clauses." Id
15 Although Defendants have asserted grounds under (b)(1) and (b)(4), in the
16 event the Court determines these grounds do not apply, separate and distinct
17 grounds exist under (b)(6) due to the circumstances surrounding the entry of final
18 judgment, i.e., that judgment was entered prior to the dated set forth on the Notice
19 of Lodging, which document itself contained two conflicting dates - March 20 and
20 March 28. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion is with legal support and could be
21 granted under these circumstances alone as to the final judgment, notwithstanding
22 the issues surrounding the service of process in the first instance.
23
IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD DISMISSED UNDER FRCP 12
24
UPON VACATING THE DEFAULT.
25 Where a default judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, it is proper not
26 only to enter relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b )(4), but to dismiss the
27 action as well. Thos. P. Gonzales Corp., 614 F.2d at 1256. Here, personal
28 jurisdiction is clearly lacking against Defendants for the reasons set forth above,
23
5533802vl
D
34
(98 of 416)
1 specifically, (i) improper service of process and (ii) lack of specific or general
2 jurisdiction over Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed.
3 As has been addressed above, Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendants

4 with the summons and complaint in Cyprus. Such service was defective due to
5 having been served at an address of than the Defendants' principal place of
6 business - or for the individual defendant, at her residence - upon an individual,
7 "MARIOS", who was not authorized to accept service on their behalf. The
8 foregoing, coupled with the fact that the documents served were not, upon
9 information and belief, translated from English, establish that service was not done
10 in a manner likely to give reasonable notice as required under Rule 4(f). See,
11 Argument, Point I, supra.
12 The Court also does not personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See,
13 Argument, Point Il(B)(iii), supra. There cannot be a finding of personal
14 jurisdiction over Defendants, either generally or specifically, as they do not have
15 sufficient, or in the case of Feneridou and Kartori, any contacts with California.
16 The only conceivable connection to California is Apiriliaco's website and e-mail
17 advertisements, which is insufficient.
18
CONCLUSION
19
20 For each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to
21 vacate the default judgment.
23
24
25
26
27
28
24
5533802vl
D
35
(99 of 416)

1 9663 Santa Monica Bivd., Suite 1250
2 Beverly Hills, CA. 90210
Telephone: f310) 277-8438
Facsimile: 323) 935-5017
3 hrprice@ao .com
5
Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
ffon~Dadd_y.com, "East Feneridou"
6
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
25
5533802vl
D
36
(100 of 416)
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I certify that on April 4, 2017, I served the foregoing NOTICE OF MOTION
3 TO VACATE JUDGMENT; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
4 SAME and accompanying exhibits upon all parties of record via ECF:
5 Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
6 11766 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1670
8
9 Matthew L. Seror
BUCHALTER NEMER
11 Los Angeles, CA 9001 7
mseror@buchalter.com
12
13 This 4th day of April, 2017
14 SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP
15
16 Isl Michael T. Conway

17 Michael T. Conway
400 Park A venue, Fifth Floor
18 New York, New York 10022
19 Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
26
5533802vl
D
37
(101 of 416)
Case 8:16 cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 41-1 Filed 04/04/17 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:327

Michael T. Conway, Esq. SBN 164004
3 Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
4 mconwav(@.goodwin.com

ApiriUaco Limited dlbla HoneyDaddy.com. ''East Feneridou''
6 and E. C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
7

9
IO REFLEX MEDIA, INC, a Nevada Corporation, Case No. 8:16-cv-795-JFW-JEM

11 Plaintiff,
12 v. DECLARATION OF
VASILIS ZERTALIS
13 GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA GROUP, INC.;
APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com;
14 EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A. KARTOIR
SECRETARIAL LTD.; and Does 1-10, inclusive,
15
Defendant.
16
17 I, Vasilis Zertalis, hereby declare pursuant to section 1746 of title 28 of the United States
18 Code that:
19 1. I am the Chief Executive Offer and Director of Prospectacy Ltd., the parent
20 company of E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ("Kartoir'"). Krutoir serves as the corporate secretary
21 for Apiriliaco Limited 1 ("Apiriliaco") (collectively, with the named defendant, East Feneridou2,
22 "Defendants"). Companies in Cyprus often have corporate bodies rather than individuals serve
23
24
25 Although the caption of this action states that Apiriliaco is doing business as
"HoneyDaddy.com", it is not filed any OBA and is not doing, and has not done, business under
26 such name.
2 There is no person known to me named ''East Feneridou". To the extent this is intended
27 to mean Anatoli Feneridou (Anatoli is Greek for east), as stated in greater detail below, Anatoli
Feneridou was a former director of Defendants. As such, counsel has only been retained on
28 behalf of"East Feneridou" to the extent the Court considers such unknown person to be the srune
as Anatoli Feneridou. Defendants do not waive any rights relating to the foregoing.
D
38
(102 of 416)
l
as corporate secretaries. a practice that is permitted by Cyprus law and is different from
2
corporate practice in the United States.
3
2. The facts set forth in this Declaration are personally known to me and, if called as
4
a witness, I could and would testify thereto.
5
3. I was specifically asked by counsel to clarify the circun1stances surrounding
6
Defendants' alleged default in appearing in the within action.
7
4. I first becan1e aware of the instant action upon receipt of Plaintiff Reflex Media.
8
Inc."s ("'Plaintiff') Notice of Lodging filed March 10, 2017 (Doc. 38) (the "Notice of Lodging'').
9
5. The Notice of Lodging was sent to Defendants in Cyprus via FedEx to an address
10
other the Defendants' principal place of business and was received by me on or about March 20.
11
2017. These documents were provided to me at my company which is the parent company of
12
Kartoir.
13
6. Upon receipt and review of the Notice of Lodging. I was able to determine the
14
importance of the documents due to my prior experience working in the United States as a
15
licensed certified public accountant in New York. The contents and important of the legal papers
16
emanating from the United States would not be known to other officers, directors, and employees
17
of Defendants, especially when such documents were provided only in English and not sent via
18
registered post or mail.
19
7. Shortly thereafter, on March 20, 2017, I contacted counsel in the United States to
20
discuss the contents of the document and this pending action.
21
8. The version of the Notice of Lodging I received did not include any indication
22
that it was filed with the Court in that it did not bear any markings on the top border of the page.
23
Accompanying the Notice of Lodging was a document which did appear to have been previously
24
filed3 and was titled "Application for Entry of Default Judgment Against Defaulted Defendants
25
Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd:'
26
which stated it was filed on February 21, 2017 (the '"Application") [Doc. 35].
27
28 3 I have since been advised by counsel that the Notice of Lodging was filed on March 10,
2017 [Doc. 38].
D
39
(103 of 416)
Case 8:16 v-00795-JFW-JEM Document 41-1 Filed 04/04/17 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:329
1
9. My understanding from the face of the Application was that it was scheduled to
2
be heard by the Court on either March 20, 2017 or March 27, 2017. The cause ofmy confusion
3
is the multiple dates listed in the document in various locations. Specifically. it states next to the
4
caption ··Date: March 20, 2017'' and then in the body of the document states "PLEASE TAKE
5
NOTICE that on March 27, 201 T' the matter will be heard.
6
10. My initial belief was that Defendants would have until March 27, 2017 to oppose
7
or otherwise respond to the document received.
8
11. I have subsequently been advised by counsel that the Application was granted by
9
Order of the Court dated March 7, 2017 [Doc. 36] and that Judgment was entered on March 14,
10
2017 [Doc. 39] in the amount of $2,044,278.21 against Defendants, notwithstanding the hearing
11
dates set forth on the face of the Application.
12
12. I have further been advised by counsel that the basis for granting default judgment
13
against Defendants and was the alleged failure of Defendants to timely appear in the action after
14
purported service of the Summons and Complaint, which service is claimed to have been
15
attempted on August 5, 2016 via Federal Express pursuant to the Hague Convention.
16
13. I am advised by my attorneys that the proofs of service filed by Plaintiff on
17
August 12, 2016 (Docs. 19-21) state that the Summons and Complaint were served on
18
Defendants by Federal Express on August 5, 2016, which packages were claimed to have been
19
signed by "MARIOS" on behalf of Defendants at the address 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5, Floor L
20
Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cyprus.
21
14. There is no one employed by Defendants named '·MARIOS" and there is 110 one
22
named "MARIOS" authorized to accept service on behalf of Defendants.
23
15. Fmther, the place where the service allegedly took place and as stated in the
24
proofs of service, 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5, Floor 1, Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cypius, is not
25
Defendants' principal places of business. This is also not Feneridou's place ofresidence.
26
16. With respect to the default judgment entered against "East Feneridou", there is no
27
person named East Feneridou who works, or worked, for either of the corporate Defendants.
28
D
40
(104 of 416)
l
Further. I am advised that because the person against whom service was sought is an individual,
2
substitute service by Federal Express at the alleged place of business of '·East Feneridou'" alone
3
would have been insufficient and an additional mailing would have been required to have been
4
addressed to "East Feneridou.. at that individual's residence. which is not alleged by Plaintiff to
5
have occurred. There was a person named Anatoli Feneridou who previously worked for
6
Defendants: however, she ceased working there prior to the commencement of this law suit.
7
17. Additionally, there is no indication on the proofs of service that any
8
commencement documents purported to have been served were translated from English and no
9
one at the location where service was purportedly made would have been able to decipher the
IO
nature of the documents or translate them, even had they been received, let alone determine the
11
legal importance of them.
12
18. Not only were Defendants not afforded the opportunity to appear in the action by
13
having not been properly served, but they were also deprived of the ability to contest their
14
default prior to the entry of default and to challenge the purported evidence submitted to the
15
Court in support of the Application, both as to the substance of the Plaintiffs claim and as to the
16
alleged damages purportedly suffered by Plaintiff.
17
19. Ffad Defendants been afforded the ability to defendant themselves, it would have
18
been apparent that they have a meritorious defense to the allegations in the Complaint. It is my
19
understanding that the basis for Plaintiffs claims is alleged trademark infringement for
20
Defendants' use of the words "Seeking" and "Arrangements·•. Despite the use of these words as
21
a display name on limited e-mail advertisements, it was never the intent to use the words
22
together as a trademark associated with Apiriliaco's services. Certainly, any potential confusion
23
that could have conceivably arose to consumers, of which I an1 not aware, was not willful and
24
the use of the display name was not done for the purpose of gaining an unfair competitive
25
advantage, to seek any benefit from Plaintiffs trademark and/or reputation, or with the intent to
26
otherwise harm Plaintiff.
27
28
D
41
(105 of 416)
1
20. Further, as stated above, Kartoir is only a service agency and would not have been
2
involved in business activities such as e-mail advertisements, marketing, web content, or
3
otherwise. Additionally, Feneridou, who ceased working for the corporate Defendants prior to
4
the commencement of this action, was never more than an employee and would not have been
5
involved in her individual capacity in e-mail advertisements, marketing, web content, or
6
otherwise. Feneridou, to the best of my knowledge, has never visited California nor does she
7
have any direct contacts with the United States at all. L
8
21. Likewise, the Corporate Defendants have never conducted business in the United
9
States, they own no property in California, have never owned any property in California, have no
10
offices, and no personnel in California, or anywhere else in the United States. At best, only a
11
small percentage of Apiriliaco's customers may have a connection to California. The only
12
conceivable connection to California is via the internet (websites and e-mail advertisements).
13
There has been no directing marketing by Defendants purposefully directed to California
14
residents.
15
22. I understand that the lawsuit is still ongoing and no prejudice will be suffered by
16
Plaintiff by the Court allowing the Defendants to participate fully in this case.
17
I declare under the penalties of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in
18
Nicosia, Cyprus, this 3 day of April, 2017.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
D
42
(106 of 416)
Case 8: -cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 41-2 Filed 04/04/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:332
1SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP

Michael T. Conway,. (SBN 164004)
2 400 Park A venue-l liflh Floor
New York, New r ork 10022
3 Telephone: (212J 376-3010
Facsimile: (212 376-3024
4 mconway@goo win.com
5 HOWARD R. PRICE (SBN 41522)

9663 Santa Monica Bivd., Suite 1250
f
Telephone: 310) 277-8438
7 Facsimile: 323) 935-5017
hrprice@ao .com
8
9 Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, "East Feneridou"
10

12

Corporation,
14
Plaintiff,
15 rPROPOSEDl ORDER
v. GRANTING MOTION TO
16 VACATEJUDGMENTAND
GREGORY CHAN, PYLON MEDIA DISMISS COMPLAINT
17 GROUP,INC., APIRILIACO LIMITED
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, EAST
18 FENERIDOU,.C.A. KARTOIR Date: May 8, 2017
SECRETARIAL LTD., and Time: 1:30
19 Does 1-10, inclusive, Ctrm: 16
20 Defendants. Judgment: March 14, 2017
21
22 The Court, having considered the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and to
23 Dismiss the Complaint filed by defendants APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
24 HoneyDaddy.com, EAST FENERIDOU, and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
25 LTD ("Defendants") (the "Motion"), the supporting declarations, exhibits and
26 pleadings on file in this action, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby
27 ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
28
1
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO VACATE DEFEAULT JUDGMENT AND DISMISS COMPLAINT
5533631vl
D
43
(107 of 416)
Case 8: -cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 41-2 Filed 04/04/17 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:333
1 The Court, having considered the Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and to
2 Dismiss the Complaint filed by defendants APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
3 HoneyDaddy.com, EAST FENERIDOU, and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
4 LTD ("Defendants") (the "Motion"), the supporting declarations, exhibits and
5 pleadings on file in this action, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby
6 ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
7 (1) The Motion [Doc. No._] is hereby granted in its entirety;
8 (2) The Judgment entered on March 14, 2017 [Doc. 39] and
9 Defendants' defaults in this action are hereby vacated.
10 (3) The within action is dismissed as against Defendants Apiriliaco
11 Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, "East Feneridou" and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial
12 Ltd.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED
14 DATED:
JOHNF. WALTER
15 United States District Court
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO VACATE DEFEAULT JUDGMENT AND DISMISS COMPLAINT
D
44
(108 of 416)
2
3
5 Attomey_s for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
11 corporation,
12 Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF LODGING
13 vs.
GROUP INC.· APIRILIACO
15 LIMITED d/b!a Honeypaddy.com;
EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A.
16 KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.; and
Does 1-10, inclusive, Complaint filed: April 27, 2016
17
Defendants.
18
Pursuant to Local Rule 5-4.2, the attached Proposed Judgment Against Defaulted
19
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited; East Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial LTD is
20
exempt from electronic filing, and will therefore be manually lodged and emailed to
21
chambers.
22
23 DATED: March 10, 2017 SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Isl Mark L. Smith
24 Mark L. Smith
25
26
27
28
NOTICE OF LODGING
D
45
(109 of 416)
2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3 I hereby certify that on March 10, 2017, the foregoing NOTICE OF LODGING
4
was served upon the person(s) named below via Federal Express and CM/ECF:
5
6
Matthew Lawrence Seror
BUCHALTER NEMER, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
7 1000 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 1500
8 Los Angeles, CA 90017-2457
Email: mseror@buchalter.com
9
10 E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial LTD

11 Souliou, Vamiko 5
11 Floor 1, Flat 14
12 Strovolos 2018 Cyprus
13 East F eneridou
14 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5
Floor 1, Flat 14
16
Apiriliaco Limited
17 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5
18 Floor 1, Flat 14
Strovolos 2018 Cyprus
19
20 Apiriliaco Limited
C/O Apirliaco Inc.
21 5550 Painted Mirage Road, Ste. 320
22 Las Vegas, NV 89149
23
24 ls/Melina Hernandez
25
26
27
28
2
NOTICE OF LODGING
D
46
(110 of 416)
C se 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 38-1 Filed 03/10/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:293
5 Attorney§ for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
11 corporation,
12 Plaintiff, [PROPOSEDl JUDGMENT
AGAINST D£FAULTED
13 vs. DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO
LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com;
14 GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA EAST FENERIDOfl; AND E.C.A.
GROUP INC.· APIRILIACO KARTOIR SECRE1ARIAL LTD.
15 LIMITED d/b/a Honeypaddy.com;
EAST FENERIDOU; ~E.C.A.
Does 1-10, inclusive, Complaint filed: April 27, 2016
17
Defendants.
18
[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
19
The Court, having considered the Application for Entry of Default Judgment Against
20
Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and
21
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. (the "Application"), the supporting declarations, exhibits
22
and pleadings on file in this action and the Eitel factors, and good cause appearing
23
therefore, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
24
1. The Application (Dkt. 35) is granted.
25
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., and
26
against Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir
27
Secretarial Ltd., jointly and severally, for the total sum of Two Million Forty-Four
28
[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
D
47
(111 of 416)
1 Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($2,044,278.21),

2 calculated as follows:
3 a. $2,000,000.00 (statutory damages); plus
4 b. $43,600.00 (attorneys' fees); plus
5 C. $678.21 (costs).
6
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
DATED:
9 John F. Walter
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
D
48
(112 of 416)
Case 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 36 Filed 03/07/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:288

CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
Case No. SACV 16-795-JFW (JEMx) Date: March 7, 2017
Title: Reflex Media, Inc. -v- Gregory Chan, et al.
PRESENT:
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Shannon Reilly None Present

Courtroom Deputy Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:

None None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFAULTED
DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com; EAST FEDERIDOU; AND E.C.A.
KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. [filed 2/21/17; Docket
No. 35]
On February 21, 2017, Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Plaintiff') filed an Application for Entry of
Default Judgment Against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East
Federidou; and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ("Application"). Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com; East Federidou; and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. did not file an Opposition.
Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds
that this matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for
March 20, 2017 is hereby vacated and the matter taken off calendar. After considering the moving
papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) provides for a court-ordered default judgment
following entry of default under 55(a). Local Rule 55-1 requires that the application for default
judgment be accompanied by a declaration that includes: (1) when and against what party default
was entered; (2) the identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the
defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented
by a general guardian, committee, conservator or other representative; (4) that the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply; and (5) that notice has been served on the
defaulting party, if required. L.R. 55-1.
The entry of default judgment is left to the court's sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616
F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Because granting or denying relief is entirely within the court's
Page 1 of 2 Initials of Deputy Clerk ....§L
D
49
(113 of 416)
discretion, a defendant's default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a court ordered
judgment. Id.; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494,498 (C.D. Cal.
2003). In deciding whether to exercise discretion to enter a default judgment, courts may consider:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the
sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a
dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7)
the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). "In applying this discretionary standard,
default judgments are more often granted than denied." PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D.
431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
After default has been entered against a defendant, the well-pleaded factual allegations of
the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. Tele Video
Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United
Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The general rule of law is that upon default
the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be
taken as true."). In determining damages, the court may conduct a full evidentiary hearing, or rely
on declarations submitted by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. 55(b)(2); LR. 55-2. However, "[a] default
judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
For the reasons stated in Plaintiff's Application, and after considering the Eitel factors, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated that default judgment should be entered against
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East Federidou; and E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd. and that Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00,
attorneys' fees in the amount of $43,600.00, and costs in the amount of $678.21. See Eitel v.
McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Application is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file a proposed Judgment

consistent with this Order by March 10, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Page 2 of 2 Initials of Deputy Clerk _g_
D
50
(114 of 416)
se 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35 Filed 02/21/17 Page 1 of 19 Page ID #:204
2
3

6 REFLEX MEDIA, INC.

10
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795-JFW (JEMx)
II corporation,
12 Plaintiff, APPLICATION FOR ENTRY
OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
13 vs. DEFAULTED DEFENDANTS
APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
14 GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA Honeypaddy.comL,EAST FENERIDOU;
GROUP INC.· APIRILIACO AND E.C.A. KARtOIR
15 LIMITED d/b/a Honey_Daddy.com; SECRETARIAL LTD.
16 KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.; and ATTACHED HERETO:
Does 1-10, inclusive, EX. 1: DECLARATION OF MARK
17 L. SMITH
Defendants. EX. 2: COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 1)
18 EX. 3: [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
19
Date: March 20, 2017
20 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Ctrm: 16
21
Complaint filed: April 27, 2016
22
TO ALL INTERETED PARTES:
23
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 27, 2017, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter
24
as this matter may be heard in Courtroom 16 of the above-entitled Court, located at 312
25
North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, Mark L. Smith, counsel for Plaintiff Reflex
26
Media, Inc. ("Reflex Media"), will and hereby does present Reflex Media's application to
27
28
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFAULTED DEFENDANTS
D
51
(115 of 416)
1 the Court for entry of default judgment against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
2 HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd (collectively, the
3 "Defaulted Defendants"). The clerk, at the direction of this Court, entered default against
4 the Defaulted Defendants on February 14, 2017. (Dkt. No. 33.)
5 At the time and place of hearing, counsel for Reflex Media will present proof of the
6 following matters:
7 1. The Defaulted Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint on
8 August 5, 2016, but have failed to appear in this action. (See Dkt. No. 29.)
9 2. Following their failure to appear, counsel for Reflex Media sent the Defaulted
10 Defendants a letter by way of Federal Express to inform them that Reflex Media intended
11 to seek a default judgment against them if they did not respond to the Complaint. See
12 Declaration of Mark L. Smith attached in support of Reflex Media's Motion for Clerk to
13 Enter Default (Dkt. No. 29, Smith Deel. at ~~ 5-7.) The Defaulted Defendants did not
14 respond to counsel's letters. Id.
15 3. The Defaulted Defendants are not minors or incompetent persons or in
16 military service or otherwise exempted under the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act of
17 1940. See Declaration of Mark L. Smith attached hereto as Exhibit 1 ("Smith Deel.").
18 4. The Defaulted Defendants have not appeared in this action. (Id.; see also Dkt.
19 Nos. 29, 32-33.)
20 5. Notice of this application was served on the Defaulted Defendants on
21 February 21, 2017 by way of Federal Express, in accordance with Local Rule 55-1.
22 6. Reflex Media is entitled to judgment against the Defaulted Defendants on
23 account of the claims pleaded in the Complaint, to wit: This action involves a claims of
24 trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; false designation of origin under 15
25 U.S.C. § 1125(a); dilution of famous marks under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); unfair competition
26 under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and interference with prospective economic
27 advantage under the common law.
28 2

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1 7. The amount ofjudgment sought against the Defaulted Defendants, jointly and
2 severally, is the sum of $2,044,278.21, as allowed by 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (statutory
3 damages); 15 U.S.C. § 11 l 7(a) I Local Rule 55-4 (attorneys' fees); and 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
4 (costs).
5 This Application is based upon this notice, the accompanying Smith Deel., the
6 papers and pleadings on file with the Court, and any oral or documentary evidence that
7 may be presented at the time of hearing on this matter.
8
Dated: February 21, 2016 SMITH CORRELL, LLP.
9
By: Isl Mark L. Smith
10 Mark L. Smith
Attorney§ for Plaintiff
12
13 ////
14 ////
15 ////
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 3
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Reflex Media is entitled to a default judgment entered against the Defaulted
3
Defendants because they have, without permission, used a counterfeit of Reflex Media's
4
SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark to promote their own competing business and
5
have willfully disobeyed judicial process by refusing to answer the Complaint or otherwise
6
participate in this litigation. As more fully set forth in the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), a copy
7
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, the Defaulted Defendants operate a dating website
8
that operates m direct competition to Reflex Media's website,
9
<SeekingArrangement.com>. Reflex Media uses the registered mark, SEEKING
10
ARRANGEMENT, in connection with the promotion of its business. A copy of SEEKING
11
ARRANGEMENT's registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office was
12
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 2. (Dkt. 1-2.)
13
On or about March 31, 2016, the Defaulted Defendants began publishing
14
advertisements that invited the recipients-which included <SeekingArrangement.com>'s
15
customers-to visit their competing website, <HoneyDaddy.com>. (Dkt. 1 at ,i 43.)
16
Without Reflex Media's consent, the Defaulted Defendants' advertisements used a
17
counterfeit version of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark and falsely indicated
18
that the solicitation was originated by Reflex Media's business, "Seeking Arrangement."
19
(Id. at ,i 43-44; see also Dkt. 1-1.)
20
To bring an end to the Defaulted Defendants' unlawful conduct, Reflex Media
21
initiated this action by filing its complaint on April 27, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint
22
and Summons were served on the Defaulted Defendants in the country of Cyprus on
23
August 5, 2016, but they failed to appear or otherwise respond within the time allowed by
24
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which expired on August 26, 2016. (Dkt. No. 29
25
("Application for Entry of Default").) After the time for the Defaulted Defendants to
26
respond to the Complaint had expired, counsel for Reflex Media noticed that a U.S.-based
27
28 4

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1 address for the Defaulted Defendants was listed on the landing page of their website,
2 <HoneyDaddy.com>. (Dkt. No. 29, Deel. of M. Smith attached thereto at ,r 5.) Therefore,
3 on September 9, 2016, counsel for Reflex Media sent correspondence to the Defaulted
4 Defendants-at both their address in Cyprus and the address in Las Vegas, Nevada-
5 explaining that they had failed to timely respond to the Complaint and that Reflex Media
6 would move to have defaults entered against them if they failed to appear. (Id. at ,r,r 6-7.)
7 The Defaulted Defendants never responded to counsel's letters and failed to appear in this
8 action. (Id. at ,r 8.) Thus, Reflex Media moved for the clerk of the court to enter defaults
9 against the Defaulted Defendants on January 23, 2017. (Dkt. No. 29.)
10 On January 23, 2017, the clerk of the court referred Reflex Media's Application for
11 Entry of Default to this Court, who ordered the clerk to enter the requested defaults on or
12 about February 14, 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 30, 32.) The clerk entered defaults against the
13 Defaulted Defendants, as ordered, on February 14, 2017. (Dkt. No. 33.) Then, on February
14 15, 2017, the Court ordered Reflex Media to submit its application for default judgment
15 against the Defaulted Defendants by February 21, 2017. (Dkt. No. 34.) This application
16 followed, and Reflex Media now respectfully requests that the Court enter default
17 judgments against the Defaulted Defendants consistent with the proposed judgment
18 attached hereto.
19 II. ARGUMENT
20 A. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
21 Under federal law, a court may order that a default judgement be entered after a default
22 is entered against a defendant by the court clerk. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(b). In the Ninth
23 Circuit, courts consider the following seven factors when deciding whether to enter a
24 default judgment:
25 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiffs
26 substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at
27 stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6)
28 5
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1 whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy
2 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
3 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). "In applying this discretionary
4 standard, default judgments area more often granted than denied." PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex,
5 Inc., 189 F .R.D. 431,432 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Further, this Court may enter default judgments
6 based on declarations or affidavits and other documentary evidence, without holding an
7 evidentiary hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Local Rule 55-2; David v. Fendler, 650
8 F .2d 1154, 1161---62 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a party may waive a hearing on a motion
9 for default judgment); Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2nd Cir. 1991)
10 (noting that Rule 55(b)(2) "does not require the district judge to conduct a hearing")
11 ( citations omitted).
12 "After a default has been entered by the court clerk, the well-pleaded factual
13 allegations of the complaint are taken as true ...." Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld
14 Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494,498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted).
15 B. THE EITEL FACTORS SUPPORT GRANTI~G REFLEX MEDIA'S REQUESTED
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
16
1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff
17
The Defaulted Defendants' decision to ignore judicial process, and their refusal to
18
participate in this action, means that Reflex Media would be unable to avenge the wrongs
19
perpetrated against it by the Defaulted Defendants unless this Court enters a default
20
judgment against them. Accordingly, this factor favors entering a default judgment against
21
the Defaulted Defendants. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 499.
22
2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint
23
The second and third Eitel factors are generally reviwed together and require the
24
court to consider whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded its claims against the
25
defendant. Id. at 499. Reflex Media has brought claims against the Defaulted Defendants
26
for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, false designation of origin under 15
27
28 6

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1 U.S.C. § 1125(a), dilution of famous marks under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), unfair competition
2 under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and tortious interference with prospective
3 economic advantage under common law.
4 To prevail on its trademark infringement claim, Reflex Media "must prove that,
5 without its consent, [the Defaulted Defendants] used in commerce a reproduction or copy
6 of a registered trademark in connection with the sale or advertising of any goods or
7 services, and that such use is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deceive customers."
8 See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 499 (citing 15 U.S.C. § ll 14(a)(l)). In this
9 case, the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark is registered with the United States Patent
10 and Trademark Office and has become incontestable. (Dkt. No. 1, ,i,i 6-9, 37-38, 60; see
11 also Dkt. No. 1-2.) And, as set forth in the Complaint, the Defaulted Defendants have used
12 a counterfeit of Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark on
13 advertisements for their own online dating website; a website that operates in direct
14 competition with Reflex Media's own website, <SeekingArrangement.com>. (Id. at ,i,i 5-
15 7, 43-45, 61; see also Dkt. No. 1-1.) Under these circumstances, the Defaulted Defendants'
16 conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive customers. (Id. at ,i,i 8, 46, 62-
17 63.) For these reasons, Reflex Media has established a claim of trademark infringement
18 against the Defaulted Defendants.
19 To prevail on its false designation of origin claim, Reflex Media "must establish that
20 [the Defaulted Defendants] used in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
21 any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
22 of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or
23 to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of [the
24 Defaulted Defendants] with [Reflex Media], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
25 of [their] goods by [Reflex Media]." See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 499 (citing
26 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A)). Here, the Defaulted Defendants sent out email solicitations
27 that, among other things, represented that they were sent by "Seeking Arrangement." (Dkt.
28 7

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1 No. 1-1; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 11 67-71.) Reflex Media's business,
2 <SeekingArrangement.com>, did not send the solicitations at issue and did not authorize
3 the Defaulted Defendants to do so on its behalf. (Dkt. No. 1 at 144.) Instead, the Defaulted
4 Defendants used Seeking Arrangement's name and trademark on their solicitations for the
5 purpose of deceiving consumers into believing that an affiliation, connection or association
6 exists between the Defaulted Defendants' business and Reflex Media's Seeking
7 Arrangement. (Id. at 11 69-71.)
8 To prevail on its dilution claim, the plaintiff "must show that "(1) the mark is
9 famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the
10 defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the
11 mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify
12 and distinguish goods and services." Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
13 1316, 3124 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Reflex Media and its predecessor have spent considerable
14 amounts of time and money promoting the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark and it is
15 now famous. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1141, 76-77.) After the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark
16 became famous, the Defaulted Defendants began using a counterfeit mark on email
17 solicitations used to promote their competing business. (Id. at 1178-79.) Such use by the
18 Defaulted Defendants dilutes the quality of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark. (Id.
19· at 1180-81.)
20 To prevail on its unfair competition claim, Reflex Media "must show that [the
21 Defaulted Defendants] engaged in 'any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
22 practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."' Id. at 500 (citing Cal.
23 Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). As explained in the previous paragraph, the Defaulted
24 Defendants intentionally sent out false advertisements using Reflex Media's valuable
25 SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark. (Dkt. No. 1 at 188; see also Dkt. No. 1-1.) In
26 addition, the advertisements indicated that they were sent by Reflex Media's business,
27 <SeekingArrangement.com>. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) The Defaulted Defendants did not have
28 8
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEF AULT JUDGMENT

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1 permission to use the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark and the advertisements

2 were not sent or approved by Reflex Media. (Id. at, 44.) Thus, Reflex Media is entitled to
3 relief based on its unfair competition claim.
4 Finally, to prevail on a claim for' negligent interference with prospective economic
5 advantage, a plaintiff must show "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and
6 [a] third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff, (2)
7 knowledge by the defendant and of the existence of the relationship, (3) intentional acts on
8 the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship, (4) actual disruption of the
9 relationship, and (5) damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
10 defendant." Ingrid & Isabel, LLC v. Baby Be Mine, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1120 (N.D.
11 Cal. 2014). In addition, a plaintiff must also prove that the defendant "engaged in conduct
12 that was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself." Id.
13 ( citation omitted). Here, Reflex Media had an economic relationship with the customers of
14 its website, <SeekingArrangement.com>. (Dkt. No. 1 at, 91.) The Defaulted Defendants
15 were aware of this relationship and deliberately sought to interfere with it by sending
16 solicitations to Reflex Media's customers for the Defaulted Defendants' competing
17 business, and sent solicitations which indicated that they were originated or approved by
18 <SeekingArrangement.com>. (Id. at,, 92-94.) This use of Reflex Media's SEEKING
19 ARRANGEMENT trademark and false designation of origin constitutes a violation of
20 federal law and has caused actual disruption to the relationship between Reflex Media and
21 its customers, resulting in damages to Reflex Media. (Id. at,, 95-96.)
22 As set forth above, the well-pleaded facts of the Complaint-which are deemed true
23 by operation oflaw--demonstrate that Reflex Media is entitled to relief on each of the five
24 causes of action identified above. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500 ("Again,
25 as Defendants' failure to answer constitutes an admission as to the averments contained in
26 the complaint, the Court must accept these allegations as true.") Accordingly, the second
27 and third Eitel factors favor entering a default judgment against the Defaulted Defendants.
28 9

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C se 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35 Filed 02/21/17 Page 10 of 19 Page ID #:213
3. Amount at Stake
2 The fourth Eitel factor considers "the amount of money at stake in relation to the
3 seriousness of the Defendant's conduct." Id. at 500 (citation and internal quotations
4 omitted). Here, the Defaulted Defendants willfully used a counterfeit mark in connection
5 with the sale of their product and services, and such use is likely to cause confusion,
6 mistake or otherwise deceive customers into erroneously believing that there is some
7 affiliation between Reflex Media and the Defaulted Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1 at ,r,r 47-58.)
8 Under such circumstances, the Lanham Act provides for statutory damages (which are
9 further discussed below), and the Defaulted Defendants' refusal to comply with judicial
1O process or participate in the instant litigation justifies the imposition of a default judgment
11 against them consistent with the statutory framework provided by Congress. See 15 U. S.C.
12 § 1117 (providing for statutory damages for violations of the Lanham Act); see also Philip
13 Morris USA, Inc., 219 F .R.D. at 500 (reaching a similar conclusion based on similar facts).
14 4. Possibility of Dispute
15 The fifth Eitel factor considers the possibility of a dispute concerning any material
16 facts in the case. Here, the facts alleged in the Complaint are deemed to be true, and as they
17 pertain to the Defaulted Defendants, no dispute has been raised to date. Accordingly, the
18 possibility of a genuine dispute about the material facts is remote, and thus, this factor
19 favors entry of default. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500.
20 5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect
21 The sixth Eitel factor considers whether the default resulted due to some excusable
22 neglect. In this case, the Defaulted Defendants received multiple notices of the Complaint
23 and the motion for default judgment. (Dkt. No. 29.) Given the multiple notices and the
24 extended period of time that has elapsed since the Defaulted Defendants were made of this
25 action, the possibility of excusable neglect is remote. Indeed, it is more likely that default
26 was entered as a result of the Defaulted Defendants' willful disobedience, and thus, this
27 factor favors grating a default judgment. See Philip Morris USA Inc., 291 F .R.D. at 500-
28 10

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1 01 (finding only a remote possibility that default was entered due some excusable neglect
2 when the defendant received notice of the complaint and motion for default judgment); see
3 also Dkt. No. 29 and the Declaration of Mark L. Smith attached thereto (describing
4 evidence suggesting that the Defaulted Defendants have actively avoided this litigation).
5 6. Policy for Deciding on the Merits
6 As courts in this district have recognized, "the mere existence of Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 55(b) indicates that the seventh Eitel factor is not alone dispositive" and a defendant's
8 "failure to answer [the] Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not
9 impossible." Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 501. Here, the Defaulted Defendants
10 have made it impossible for this case to be decided on the merits because they have failed
11 to appear or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (Dkt. 29.) Accordingly, the seventh Eitel
12 factor favors entering default judgment against them.
13 C. REFLEX MEDIA RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS LEGAL AND EQUITABLE
RELIEF.
14
1. Statutory Damages are Appropriate
15
Under the Lanham Act, a "plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is
16
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits ... an award
17
of statutory damages .... " 15 U.S.C. § l l 17(c). A plaintiff that elects to recover statutory
18
damages is entitled to an amount "not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per
19
counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed," except
20
where the court finds that such use was willful, in which case the court may award statutory
21
damages of "not more than $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services
22
sold, offered for sale, or distributed ... ."Id.As the U.S. Supreme Court and courts in this
23
circuit have recognized, deterring future infringement is an important factor in determining
24
damages, and therefore, an award of statutory damages does not need to equal the amount
25
of a plaintiffs actual damages. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 501 (citations
26
omitted).
27
28 11
AGAINST DEF AUL TED DEFENDANTS
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1 Here, Reflex Media seeks an award of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages
2 pursuant to § 1117(c). 1 Reflex Media respectfully submits that an award of statutory
3 damages for $2,000,000 is reasonable to compensate it for the harm caused by the
4 Defaulted Defendants' willful infringement and to deter future infringement. The
5 Defaulted Defendants launched their website, <HoneyDaddy.com>, sometime in late
6 February or March 2016. (Smith Deel. at ,r 12.) As of the date of this application, the
7 Defaulted Defendants claim to have nearly 10,000 membersfromjust six major U.S. cities.
8 (Id. at ,r 10.) Thus, in less than a year, the Defaulted Defendants have apparently grown
9 their membership from zero to over 10,000 members worldwide.
1O As noted above, Reflex Media first became aware of the Defaulted Defendants'
11 illegal advertising campaign on or about March 31, 2016, which is 11 months ago, and
12 approximately the same time they launched <HoneyDaddy.com>. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Thus, if
13 just 10% of the initial membership growth, or 1,000 members, were diverted by this illegal
14 advertising campaign, and that membership fees are approximately the same on both
15 parties' websites, then the Defaulted Defendants' have realized profits in excess of
16 $800,000 as a result of their actions in violation of the Lanham Act. The formula for
17 estimating the Defaulted Defendants' profits is as follows:
18 1,000 paid, renewing members diverted from <SeekingArrangement.com>
19 x $79.95 monthly subscription cost
20 x 11 months (the time that has elapsed since the illegal advertisements started)
21 TOTAL: $879,450
22
23
24
1 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff use rights under§§ 1114 and 1125(a) have been infringed are entitled
25 to recover damages equal to "(1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3)
the costs of the action." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). In this case, where the Defaulting Defendants have refused
26 to respond to the Complaint or otherwise participate in this litigation, it is impossible for Reflex Media
27 and this Court to determine the amount of the defendant's profits under§ 1117(a). As such, an award of
statutory damages under§ l l 17(c) is more appropriate.
28 12

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1 Reflex Media's <SeekingArrangement.com> has over 5 million users. (Smith Deel.

2 at ,r 11.) Thus, it is easy to imagine that the Defaulted Defendants could have diverted more
3 than just 1,000 users through its targeted, illegal advertising campaign.
4 If the Defaulted Defendants had appeared in this action and Reflex Media been
5 afforded an opportunity, through discovery, to prove the actual profits they derived from
6 their illegal acts, Reflex Media would also be entitled to treble damages under 15 U.S.C. §
7 1 l l 7(b), which requires the court, absent "extenuating circumstances," to "enter judgment
8 for three times such profit ... if the violation consists of (1) intentionally using a mark or
9 designation ...." See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). The evidence that the Defaulted Defendants
10 intentionally infringed on Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark is evident
11 from the solicitation at issue (Dkt. No. 1-1) and is presumed by operation of law because
12 that fact was alleged in the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1 at ,r 47) ("Defendants acted with willful
13 intent when they disseminated the Illegal Ads . . . which fraudulent identified Seeking
14 Arrangement as the display name of the sender and "reply to recipient ...."). Using the
15 estimate set forth above, an award for treble damages would have resulted in a judgment
16 for Reflex Media in the amount of $2,638,350 ($879,450 x 3 = $2,638,350). Accordingly,
17 the amount Reflex Media requests herein ($2,000,000) represents more than a $600,000
18 discount from the award it likely would have recovered if the Defaulted Defendants had
19 appeared in this case.
20 Moreover, this is not a case about a company that ignorantly infringed on another's
21 trademarks. The Defaulted Defendants are operating in the United States-specifically in
22 the Los Angeles, California area. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ,r 30 (explaining that the only known
23 telephone number for the Defaulted Defendant's business/website has a 310 prefix, i.e. a
24 Los Angeles County area code).) Nevertheless, they have attempted to put themselves
25 outside the reach of the law by forming their business in Cyprus, failing to register as a
26 foreign entity doing business in any state in the United States, including California where
27 their phone number originates, and refusing to respond to judicial process. Indeed, as
28 13
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1 explained in the Declaration of Mark L. Smith attached in support of the Motion for Clerk
2 to Enter Default (Dkt. No. 29), the Defaulted Defendants began listing a U.S. address on
3 their website until they were served at that address with notice that Reflex Media would
4 move to have defaults entered against them unless they responded to the Complaint. (Dkt.
5 No. 29, Smith Deel. at 16.) After receiving this notice, the U.S.-based address was removed
6 from their website. (Id.)
7 A primary purpose of the Lanham Act is deterrence, and Reflex Media respectfully
8 submits that an award for less than $2,000,000 will result in a windfall to the Defaulted
9 Defendants by making it a profitable for them to violate the Lanham Act and then hide
10 behind foreign corporations that refuse to comply with the law of jurisdictions where they
11 do business and refuse to participate in judicial process. To prevent this type of trademark
12 infringement from becoming profitable by the Defaulted Defendants or others, and to
13 promote the purpose of the Lanham Act, Reflex Media respectfully requests an award of
14 statutory damages for the sum of $2,000,000. pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
15 2. Injunctive Relief is Appropriate
16 Under the Lanham Act, a court has "power to grant injunctions according to the rules
17 of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation
18 of mark holder's rights. Id. at 502 (citing 15 U.S.C. ~ 1116(a)) (internal quotations
19 omitted). Here, Reflex Media has properly pleaded claims warranting injunctive relief. The
20 factors that must be considered in granting an injunction are whether: (1) there would be
21 irreparable injury if an injunction is not issued; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate
22 to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between Reflex
23 Media and the Defaulted Defendants, an injunction should issue; and (4) the public interest
24 would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126
25 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
26 First, Reflex Media would suffer irreparable injury if the Defaulted Defendants
27 continue to infringe and use Reflex Media's trademark on a website unaffiliated with
28 14

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(128 of 416)
1 Reflex Media through loss of its market share and reputationaal harm caused by users
2 confusing the two websites as being affiliated or associated with one another. See Metro-
3 Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1215 (C.D. Cal.
4 2007) ("Plaintiffs may establish an irreparable harm stemming from the infringement (e.g.,
5 loss of market share, reputational harm)."). In this case, there are no assurances that the
6 Defaulted Defendants' trademark infringement and related unlawful and unethical
7 behavior will not resurface once this case is concluded if only monetary damages are
8 awarded.
9 Second, monetary damages alone are inadequate. The Defaulted Defendants'
10 conduct can be considered willful and they have given no indication that they will not
11 infringe in the future as they has chosen not to participate in this litigation. See Adobe Sys.
12 Inc. v. Brooks, 2009 WL 593343, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009) ("[Defendant's] refusal to
13 answer or appear in this litigation has given the court no assurance that [Defendant's]
14 infringing activitiy will cease and make it difficult for [Reflex Media] to prevent further
15 infringement.").
16 Third, the balance of hardship favors Reflex Media because the Defaulted
17 Defendants would suffer no harm by simply being required to comply with existing law.
18 See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995)("Where
19 the only hardship that the defendant will suffer is lost profits from an activity which has
20 been shown likely to be infringing, such an argument in defense merits little equitable
21 consideration [on appeaal from a preliminary injunction].")
22 Finally, the public interest is served when trademark holders' rights are protected
23 against infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.
24 Supp. 2d at 1222 ("[T]he public interest will be served with a permanent injunction, since
25 it will protect Plaintiffs copyrights against increased infringement.").
26 Reflex Media has therefore properly pleaded a claim for injunctive relief and is
27 entitled to injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1 l 16(a). As prayed for in the Complaint,
28 15

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1 Reflex Media respectfully requests an order from this Court enjoining the Defaulted
2 Defendants from:
3 a. Selling, offering for sale, distributing, advertising, or promoting any goods or
4 services that display any words or symbols that so resemble or are confusingly
5 similar to the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark, or the look and feel of
6 <SeekingArrangement.com>, as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or
7 deception, on or in connection with any goods or services that are not authorized by
8 or for Reflex Media;
9 b. Using the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark, any other marks or domain
10 names confusingly similar to those marks alone or in combination with any other
11 letters, words, letter strings, phrases or designs, or the look and feel of
12 <SeekingArrangement.com> in commerce or in connection with any goods or
13 services;
14 c. Using any word, term, name, symbol, or device or combination thereof that causes
15 or is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the affiliation or
16 association of Defendants' or their goods with Reflex Media or as to the origin, false
17 or misleading description or representation of fact;
18 d. Further infringing on the rights of Reflex Media in and to any of its trademarks, trade
19 dress, products and services or otherwise damaging Reflex Media's goodwill or
20 business reputation;
21 e. Using any of Reflex Media's confidential information in connection with any
22 product or service, in any medium; and
23 f. Otherwise competing unfairly with Reflex Media in any manner.
24 3. Attorneys' Fees are Appropriate
\,
25 Section l 117(a) of the Lanham Act "gives the Court discretion to award reasonable
26 attorneys' fees in 'exceptional cases," which include cases where the trademark
27 infringement is deliberate and willful. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 502 (citing
28 16

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66
(130 of 416)
1 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). "[A] case may [also] be deemed 'exceptional,' and merit an award of
2 attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act, when the Defendant disregards the proceedings and
3 does not appear." Id. (citation omitted). In this case, the Defaulted Defendants' deliberately
4 and willfully infringed on Reflex Media's trademarks when they used them in
5 advertisements for their competing business. (Dkt. No. 1 at ,r,r 47-58; see also Dkt. No. 1-
6 1.) Additionally, Defendants have disregarded the judicial process by failing to respond to
7 the Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 29, 33.) Accordingly, Reflex Media respectfully requests an
8 award of attorneys' fees.
9 Under Local Rule 55-3, for a damage award over $100,000, the fee schedule
10 provides for an award of attorneys' fees equal to $5,600 plus 2% of the amount of the
11 damages over $100,000. Accordingly, for an award of $2,000,000, the corresponding
12 award of attorneys' fees would equal $43,600.
13 4. Costs are Appropriate
14 "[W]hen a violation of any right under the registrant of a mark registered in the
15 Patent Office, or a violation under § 43(a), shall have been established in a civil action
16 arising under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
17 equity, to recover the costs of the action." Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F .R.D. at 503
18 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). As set forth in Section II(B)(2), supra, Reflex Media has met
19 these requirements, and therefore, respectfully requests that the Court enter a default
20 judgment against the Defaulted Defendants for an award of costs in the amount of $678.21
21 III. CONCLUSION
22 For the reasons set forth above, Reflex Media respectfully requests that this Court
23 enter a default judgment against the Defaulted Defendants as follows: for statutory
24 damages in the amount of $2,000,000; for attorneys' fees pursuant to Local Rule 55-3 in
25 the amount of $43,600; for costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3) in the amount of
26 /Ill
27 ////
28 17
D
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C e 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35 Filed 02/21/17 Page 18 of 19 Page ID #:221
1 $678.21; and for a permanent injunction, as set forth in the [Proposed] Default Judgment
2 filed concurrently herewith.
3 DATED: February 21, 2017 /s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
4 Counsel for Reflex Media, Inc.
5
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1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the above-captioned action. My business
3 address is 11766 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1670, Los Angeles, CA 90025.
4 A true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) described as:
5 APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFAULTED DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com;
6 EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.,
7 will be served in the manner indicated below:
8 1. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC
9 FILING ("NEF"):
10 Matthew L. Seror
BUCHALTER NEMER
Los Angeles CA 9001 7
12 Counselfor befendant Gregory Chan and Pylon Media Group, Inc.
13 2. SERVED BY U.S. MAIL OR OVERNIGHT MAIL: On February 21,
14 2017, I served the following person(s) and/or entity(ies) in this case by placing a true and
15 correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, and/or
16 with an overnight mail service addressed as follows:
17 Af iriliaco Limited
1 Souliou, Vamiko 5,
18 Floor 1, Flat 14,
19
East F eneridou
20 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5,
Floor 1, Flat 14,
22 E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
11 Souliou, Vamiko 5,
23 Floor 1, Flat 14,
24
Executed on February 21, 2017. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws
25
of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
26
/s/ Jacob L. Fonnesbeck
27
28 19

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(133 of 416)
c e 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 2 of 37 Page ID #:224
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH - Caiifornia SBN 213829
2 msmith a)smithcorrell.com
1 1 s ire v ., mte 1670
3 Los Angeles1 CA 90025
Tel: (2 f3) 443-6222
4 Fax: (877) 730-5910
5 Attorney_s for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8: 16-cv-795-JFW (JEMx)
11 corporation,
12 Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF MARK L. SMITH
13 vs.
14 GREGORYCHAN,.;.._~YLONMEDIA
GROUP INC.· APuuLIACO
17
Defendants.
18
19
20
21
22
DECLARATION OF MARK L. SMITH
23
I, Mark L. Smith, declare as follows:
24
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before this Court. I have personal
25
knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify to these facts if called
26
upon to do so.
27
2. I am the attorney for the plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Reflex Media") in the
28
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C e 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 3 of 37 Page ID #:225
1 above-entitled action. This Declaration is submitted in support of Reflex Media's

2 application for default judgments against defendants Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou,
3 and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial LTD (collectively, the "Defaulting Defendants").
4 3. The Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and Summons were served on the Defaulting
5 Defendants on August 5, 2016.
6 4. The Defaulting Defendants failed to respond to the Complaint or otherwise
7 appear in this action, and therefore, defaults were entered against them by the clerk of the
8 Court on February 14, 2017. (Dkt. No. 33.)
9 5. None of the Defaulting Defendants are infants or incompetent persons.
10 6. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. § 521) is inapplicable
11 to the Defaulting Defendants, as they are all foreign nationals.
12 7. Notice of Reflex Media's application for entry of default judgments was
13 served on each of the Defaulting Defendants via Federal Express on February 21, 201 7.
14 8. To date, Reflex Media has incurred costs associated with the prosecution of
15 this action against the Default Defendants in the total amount of $678.21, which sum
16 includes:
17
18
19
: -· : :.~VENT'·(";:
-- : '-' : .. '
/> :.. COST
Filing fee for Complaint $400.00

20
21 Service of the Complaint $211.41
22 Service of Notices oflntent to Default $66.80
23
TOTAL: $678.21
24
25 9. Receipts supporting each of the claimed amounts listed above are attached
26 hereto as Attachment 1.
27 10. Attached hereto as Attachment 2 1s a true and correct screenshot from
28
2
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c e 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 4 of 37 Page ID #:226
1 <HoneyDaddy.com>, captured on February 21, 2017, showing that <HoneyDaddy.com>

2 claims to have 8,700 members in just six major U.S. cities.
3 11. Attached hereto as Attachment 3 are two true and correct screenshots from
4 Reflex Media's, <SeekingArrangement.com>. The first is a screenshot from the
5 homepage, showing that <SeekingArrangement.com> has more than 5 million members.
6 The second is a screenshot of the current pricing model for <SeekingArrangement.com>,
7 which identifies that the cost of a monthly subscription is $79.95.
8 12. Attached hereto as Attachment 4 is a true and correct copy of Gregory
9 Chan's responses to Reflex Media's initial interrogatories. In response to
10 INTERROGATORY NO. 3, Chan explains that he transferred the <HoneyDaddy.com>
11 domain to one of the Defaulting Defendants in late February or early March 2016, and at
12 that time, the website was not operational.
13 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best
14 ofmy knowledge.
15 Executed on February 21, 2017, in Los Angeles, California.
16
17 By:_/:.,.:,sF""/"""M,:::a:r:rk~Lc.:.....=r.Sm~it~h_ _ _ _ _ __
Mark L. Smith, Esq.
18
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Case 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 6 of 37 Page ID #:228
From: paygovadmin@mail doc.twiu.gov

Subject: Pay.gov Payment Confirmation: CACD CM ECF
Date: April 27, 2016 at 5:16 PM
To: rr.tiernand1iJz!r,)sm1thcorrell.coni, msmith@sm1thcorrell com
Your payment has been submitted to Pay.gov and the details are below. If you have any questions or you wish to cancel this payment, please
contact CACD CM/ECF Helpdesk at (213) 894-0242.
Application Name: CACD CM ECF

Pay.gov Tracking ID: 25RA6MFT
Agency Tracking ID: 0973-17723618
Transaction Type: Sale
Transaction Date: Apr 27, 2016 7:16:20 PM
Account Holder Name: Mark Smith

Transaction Amount $400.00
Card Type: MasterCard
Card Number· ************7032
THIS IS AN AUTOMATED MESSAGE. PLEASE DO NOT REPLY.
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Tracking ID no !, Prev l776806671643 :J Next~ Business Closed or Adult Rec1p1ent Unavailable - D Read More
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Invoice no 6-642-49740
Account no 7040-1952-1 Higher rate applied as package weight exceeded we, Read More
B1lldate 07/21/2016
Total Billed $7047
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Status Pa1dCC
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V,ew signature proof of delivery
Transaction Details
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JACOB L FONNESBECK APIRILIACO REP OR OWNER

SMITH CORRELL LLP APIRILIACO
124 WEST 1400 SOUTH 11 SOULIOU, VAMIKO 5
SUITE204 FLOOR 1, FLAT 14
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 STROVOLOS 2018
us CY
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JACOB L FONNESBECK EAST FENERIDOU

SMITH CORRELL LLP 11 SOULIOU, VAMIKO 5
124 WEST 1400 SOUTH FLOOR 1, FLAT 14
SUITE204 STROVOLOS 2018
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 CY
us
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JACOB L FONNESBECK E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD

SMITH CORRELL LLP EC A KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD
124 WEST 1400 SOUTH 11 SOULIOU, VA.MIKO 5
SUITE 204 FLOOR 1, FLAT 14
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 STROVOLOS 2018
us CY
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Ship to: Ship from:
Kartoir Secretarial, LTD Loren Washburn
Apiriliaco Limited, East
Feneridou
11 Souliou, Vamiko 5 50 West Broadway Suite
1010
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STROVOLOS, Salt Lake City, UT
2018 84101
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Tracking no.: 777175902991
Ship date: 09/07/2016
Estimated shipping charges: 53.55
Package Information
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Number of packages: 1
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Declared Value: 0.00 USD
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Bill duties/taxes/fees to: Recipient
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Use of this system constitutes your agreement to the service conditions in the current FedEx Service Guide, available on fedex.com.FedEx will not be
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#:240
Shipment Receipt
Address Information
Ship to: Ship from:
C/O Apiriliaco Inc. Loren Washburn
Apiriliaco Limited
5550 Painted Mirage Road 50 West Broadway Suite
1010
Ste. 320
LAS VEGAS, NV Salt Lake City, UT
89149 84101
us us
8014365550 8014770997
Shipment Information:
Tracking no.: 777175948103
Ship date: 09/07/2016
Estimated shipping charges: 13.25
Package Information
Pricing option: FedEx One Rate
Service type: FedEx Express Saver
Package type: FedEx Envelope
Number of packages: 1
Total weight:
Declared Value: 0.00 USD
Special Services: Adult signature required
Pickup/Drop-off: Drop off package at FedEx location
Billing Information:
Bill transportation to: Washburn Law Group-521
Your reference:
P.O.no.:
Invoice no.:
Department no.:
Thank you for shipping online with FedEx ShipManager at fedex.com.
Please Note
FedEx wdl not be responsible for any claim ,n excess of $100 per package, whether the result of loss, damage, delay, non-delivery, m1sdehvery, or m1smformat1on, unless you declare a higher value, pay an
add1bonal charge, document your actual loss and file a timely claim L1mrtat1ons found 1n the current FedEx Service Guide apply Your nght to recover from FedEx for any loss, 1nclud1ng 1ntnns1c value of the
package, loss of sales, income interest, profit, attorney's fees, costs, and other forms of damage whether direct, 1nc1dental, consequential, or special 1s hm1ted to the greater of $100 or the authonzed
declared value Recovery cannot exceed actual documented loss Maximum for items of extraordinary value 1s $1000, e g, Jewelry, precious metals, negobable instruments and other ,terns listed ,n our
Service Guide Wntten claims must be filed wrthin strict time l1mrts, Consult the applicable FedEx Service Guide for details
The estimated sh1pp1ng charge may be different than the actual charges for your shipment Differences may occur based on actual weight, d1mens1ons, and other factors Consult the applicable FedEx
Service Guide or the FedEx Rate Sheets for details on how shipping charges are calculated
1ttps://www.fedex.com/sh1pp1ng/html/en/PrintlFrame.html Page 2 of 2
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Case 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Docume nt 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 22 of 37 Page ID

#:244
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Ca,s 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 28 of 37 Page ID

#:250
1 MAITHEWL. SEROR(SBN: 23S043)

mseror@buchalter.com
2 BUCHACTER NEMER
A Professional Corporation
3 I 000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite I S00
Los Angeles~CA 900 I 7-2457
4 Telephone: 213) 891-0700
Fax: (213) 8 6-0400
S Email: mseror@buchalter.com
6 Atto~e.YS for Defendants
GREGORY CHAN and
7 PYLON MEDIA GROUP, INC.
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CENTRAL DISTRICT
10
11 REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
cotp0ration,
12 DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S
Plaintiff, RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF
13 REFLEX MEDIA. INC.'S FIRST
vs. SET OF INTERROGATORIES
14
GREGORY CHAN· PYLON MEDIA
1S GROUP, INC.; APilULIACO LIMITED
d/b/a HoneyDaddy.co~; ~~ST
16 FENERII?Q.Vi ~.C.A. .1.\.1\KTOIR
SECRETJ\KU\L LTD.; and
17 DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
18 Defendants.
19
20 PROPOUNDING PARTY: PLAINTIFF REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
21 RESPONDING PARTY: DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN
22 SETNO.: ONE(l)
23
24 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN
25 ("Defendant" or "Responding Party'') hereby responds to PLAINTIFF REFLEX
26 MEDIA, INC. 's (''Propounding Party'') First Set of Interrogatories, as follows:
27
28
BUOIAL'!IR NEMllt
BN 26046S24Vl 1
A PIIOPIUIONM CovoutlON DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8: I6-cv-0079S
LolANC&&.a
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
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Cc;tse :16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 29 of 37 Page ID

#:251
1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
2 1. These responses are made solely for the purpose of, and in relation to,
3 this action. Further, these responses are based upon Responding Party's perception
4 and understanding of the nature and type of information and documents requested,
5 and upon the information presently known and available to Responding Party and
6 its attorneys as of the time of the response. Each response is given subject to all
7 appropriate objections which would require the exclusion of any statement
8 contained herein if made by a witness present and testifying in court. All such
9 objections and grounds therefore are reserved and may be interposed at the time of
10 trial.
11 2. Responding Party is pursuing its investigation and analysis of the facts
12 and law relating to this case and has not completed its discovery or its preparation
13 for trial. Therefore, the responses set forth herein are given without prejudice to
14 Responding Party's right to produce evidence of any subsequent facts or
15 interpretations thereof, or to add to, modify or otherwise change or amend the
16 responses herein. These responses are based upon documents and information
17 presently available to Responding Party. The information hereinafter set forth is
18 true and correct to Responding Party's best knowledge as of this date, and is subject
19 to correction for inadvertent errors, mistakes or omissions if any such errors,
20 mistakes or omissions should be found to exist. References in response to a
21 preceding or subsequent response incorporate both the information and objections
22 set forth in the referenced response.
23 3. Responding Party reserves the right to introduce at trial any and all
24 evidence heretofore and hereinafter produced by the parties in this action or by any
25 third party that supports or tends to support Responding Party's contentions at trial
26 or in support of or in opposition to any motion in this case. To the extent that
27 Responding Party identifies facts in response to the Interrogatories herein, it does
28
BUCHALTER NEMER
BN 26046524VI 2
DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-00795
OF INTERROGATORIES
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Ci;i.se :16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 30 of 37 Page ID

#:252
1 so without prejudice to establish at a later date any additional facts that may be
2 discovered as a result of any additional investigation and discovery.
3 4. Responding Party reserves the right to object to the use and/or
4 admissibility of any of the responses at the trial of this action, at any other·
5 proceeding, or in any other action or proceeding.
6 5. Any response contained herein does not constitute a waiver of any
7 applicable privilege, nor does any response contained herein waive any objection,
8 including relevancy, to the admission of such responses or responsive documents in
9 evidence.
10 6. Except for explicit facts admitted herein, no incident.al or implied
11 admissions of any nature whatsoever are intended hereby, are implied, or should be
12 inferred. The fact that an Interrogatory has been responded to herein should not be
13 taken as an admission, or a concession of the existence of any facts set forth or
14 assumed by the Interrogatories, or that such response constitutes evidence of any
1S fact. In addition, the fact that Responding Party has responded to part or all of any
16 Interrogatory is not intended and shall not be construed to be a waiver by
17 Responding Party of all or any part of any objection to any Interrogatory.
18 7. Responding Party incorporates by reference this Preliminary Statement
19 in each and every response set forth below.
20 GENERAL OBJECTIONS
21 A. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories propounded by
22 Propounding Party to the extent they seek information which is neither relevant to
23 the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
24 of admissible evidence with respect to the issues in this action.
25 B. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories to the extent they are
26 burdensome and are designed, in whole or in part, to harass rather than to serve any
27 legitimate discovery purpose.
28
BUCHALTER NEMER
BN 26046S24Vl 3
DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-0079S
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
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#:253
1 C. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories to the extent they are

2 overbroad and not limited to a reasonable time period.
3 D. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories to the extent they seek
4 information of a commercially sensitive nature. Revealing such information would
5 substantially and irreparably injure Responding Party by revealing information
6 which derives independent economic value from not being generally known or
7 which has been acquired primarily through confidential research and development
8 efforts by or on behalf of Responding Party.
9 E. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories to the extent they seek
10 privileged informatio~ protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney
11 work product doctrine. Such privileged information includes, but is not limited to,
12 the following:
13 1. Information which constitutes, reflects, refers to or relates to
14 confidential communications between officers, directors or employees of
15 Responding Party and counsel; and
16 2. Information which constitutes, reflects, refers to or relates to the
17 impressions, conclusions, opinions or mental process of counsel, their agents or
18 employees.
. 19 G. Responding Party objects to the Interrogatories to the extent they seek
20 information which is equally or more accessible to Propounding Party and which is
21 maintained primarily by persons or entities other than Responding Party.
22 H. Responding Party objects to the form of the Interrogatories insofar as
23 the Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production are all
24 contained in the same document.
25 RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
26 INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
27 Please describe the circumstances surrounding your acquisition the domain,
28
ilUCHALTERNEMER
BN26046524VI 4
A PIKlfllllON.t,L C'OltNllA'PION DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-00795
LOIANCLn
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
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Case :16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 32 of 37 Page ID

#:254
1 www.honeydaddy.com. Please be sure to include the date of acquisition, the seller,

2 how the domain was held out for sale, the purchase price and any other applicable
3 terms related to the acquisition.
4 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
5 Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous as phrased
6 and with respect to the terms, "circumstances," "held out for sale" and "any other
7 applicable terms." Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's
8 understanding of this Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant
9 acquired the www.honeydaddy.com domain as a potential domain for a third party
10 in or about February 2016. Defendant believes it acquired the domain name from
11 C. Law.
13 Please describe the reasons (i.e., your motive and intent) for acquiring the
14 domain, www.honeydaddy.com.
16 Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous and as
17 overbroad. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's
19 acquired the www.honeydaddy.com domain not for his own use, but for the
20 potential future use by a third party.
22 Please describe the circumstances surrounding your subsequent disposition of
23 the domain, www.honeydaddy.com. Please be sure to include the date of
24 disposition, the purchaser, how the domain was held out for sale, the purchase price
25 and any other applicable terms related to the disposition.
28
BUCHALTER NEMER
BN26046S24VI 5
DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8: 16-cv-0079S
l.oeANHI.U
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
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#:255
1 and with respect to the terms, "circumstances," ''held out for sale" and "any other
2 applicable terms." Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's
4 transferred the www.honeydaddy.com domain to Apiriliaco Limited in or about late
5 February or early March 2016. At the time of the transfer, Defendant does not
6 believe there was any content on the website. Defendant received no compensation
7 for the transfer.
9 Please provide a list of all entities in which you have any ownership interest
10 from January 1, 2014, to the present.
12 Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as overbroad as to time and scope,
13 seeking information which is not relevant to the claims and defenses asserted in this
14 action or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant also
15 objects to the extent it seeks confidential or proprietary information.
16 INTERROGATORYNO.S:
17 With respect to each entity listed in INTERROGATORY NO. 4, please
18 identify your current ownership interest and account for any changes that have
19 occurred in that interest since January 1, 2014.
20 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. S:
24 objects to the extent it seeks confidential or proprietary information.
26 Please provide a list of all entities in which you have served as a member,
27 manager, officer or held a similar position from January 1, 2014, to the present.
28
BUCKALTER NEMER
BN26046524Vl 6
A , . ,...,oNAI. COIPOaAtlOII DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8: 16-cv-0079S
LINANGII.U
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
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(161 of 416)

. #:256

4 action or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Notwithstanding
5 the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's understanding of this Interrogatory,
6 Defendant responds as follows: As related to this matter, Defendant was an officer
7 of Defendant Pylon Media Group, Inc.
9 Please describe the nature of any relationship you now have or have had in
10 the past with Davide Azzato.
12 Defendant objects to this Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous and
14 understanding of this Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows: Mr. Azzato is a
15 friend of the Defendant.
17 Please describe the nature of any relationship you now have or have had with
18 Sean Ober.
22 understanding of this Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant has
23 no relationship with Sean Ober and does not believe he has ever met Mr. Ober.
25 Please describe the nature of any relationship with Pylon Media Group, Inc.,
26 from its origin to the present.
28
BUCHALTER NEMER
BN 26046524Vl 7
A PIIWINI""'" Colln,a11TIO" DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-00795
l.otANGAD
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
98
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Cps 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 35 of 37 Page ID

. #:257

2 overbroad as to time and scope. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to
3 Defendant's understanding of this Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows:
4 Defendant was the Chief Executive Officer of Pylon Media Group, Inc.
5 INTERROGATORYNO.10:
6 Please describe all facts upon which you intend to rely in showing that
7 Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., has abandoned the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT
8 trademark (as identified in the Answer).
9 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.10:
10 Defendant objects to this Interrogatory insofar as it calls for a legal
11 conclusion and is premature insofar as discovery is ongoing. Defendant also
12 objects to this Interrogatory to the extent it seeks information which is pro_tected
13 under the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.
15 Please identify every instance in which you have used the phrase "seeking
16 arrangement" in connection with any business.
19 and with respect to the term, "used," and ''in connection with any business."
20 Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's understanding of this
21 Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant never used the phrase
22 "seeking arrangement" in connection with any business.
24 Please identify every instance in which you have used the word "seeking" in
25 connection with any online dating or similar web service.
28
BUCHALTER NEMIIR
BN 26046524VI 8
DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTin''S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-00795
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
99
(163 of 416)
Cps 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 36 of 37 Page ID

. #:258
1 and with respect to the term, ''used," and "in connection with." Notwithstanding
3 Defendant responds as follows: Defendant never used the phrase "seeking" in
6 Please identify every instance in which you have used the word
7 "arrangement" in connection with any online dating or similar web service.
10 and with respect to the term, ''used," and ''in connection with." Notwithstanding
12 Defendant responds as follows: Defendant never used the phrase "arrangement" in
15 Please identify every domain you have owned since January 1, 2014.
20 objects to the extent this Interrogatory calls for confidential or proprietary
21 information.
23 Please identify every person you have hired that is now or previously was
24 employed by Reflex Media, Inc., or InfoStream Group, Inc.
28
BUCHALTER Nl!MIR
BN 26046524VI 9
A Pao,,..IONAI. ColNL\1"* DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-00795
LolANCllU
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
100
(164 of 416)
. Cas 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-1 Filed 02/21/17 Page 37 of 37 Page ID

#:259
1 action or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Notwithstanding

3 Defendant responds as follows: None.
5 Please identify every person that has ever provided you with information
6 concerning the operation of <www.SeekingArrangement.com>.
9 and as vague and ambiguous, and as seeking information which is not relevant to
IO the claims and defenses asserted in this action or likely to lead to the discovery of
11 admissible evidence. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Defendant's
12 understanding of this Interrogatory, Defendant responds as follows: None.
13
14 DATED: December 23, 2016 BUCHALTER NEMER
A Professional Corporation
15
16
17 By: ----,,~,...,,.....,---......L-.--dR--.o""""'R--
Atto~e~ for Defendants
18 GREGORY CHAN and PYLON
MEDIA GROUP, INC.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
BUCHALTER NEMER
BN 26046524Vl 10
A P&olPIIONAL COIPO&A'hON DEFENDANT GREGORY CHAN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET Case No. 8:16-cv-0079S
LoaANCILG
OF INTERROGATORIES
D
101
(165 of 416)
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH-Caiifornia SBN 213829
2 msmith a.;,correllsmith.com
1 7 1 s 1re v ., mte 1670
4 Tel: (2B) 443-6222
Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
10
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795
11 corporation,
COMPLAINT FOR TRADEMARK
12 Plaintiff, INFRINGEMENT; UNFAIR
COMPETITION; DILUTION OF
13 vs. FAMOUS MARKS; AND NEGLIGENT
INTERFERENCE WITH
14 GREGORY CHAN;_,,~YLON MEDIA PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
GROUP, INC.· APlL-uLIACO ADVANTAGE.
EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
17
Defendants.
18
19 COMES NOW Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Reflex Media" or "Plaintiff'), and
20 hereby brings this Complaint against Defendants Gregory "Greg" Chan ("Chan"); Pylon
21 Media Group, Inc. ("Pylon Media"); Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com
22 ("HoneyDaddy"); Ava-ro11.11 <l>ew:p16ou ("Ava-ro11.11"), 1 E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
23 ("Kartoir Secretarial," and together with HoneyDaddy and Avarn11.11 (the "Offshore
24 Parties")); and Does 1-10, inclusive, (collectively, "Defendants"), and alleges as follows:
25 /Ill
26 /Ill
27 ////
28
1Defendant's name has been translated and added to the caption as "East Feneridou" for filing purposes.
I
COMPLAINT
D
102
(166 of 416)
1
2 INTRODUCTION
3 1. Defendants are engaged in an illegal scheme designed to defraud consumers
4 through false advertisements using Plaintiff Reflex Media's protected trademarks. As
5 further explained below, Defendants' conduct is causing actual harm to both the
6 recipients of Defendants' false advertisements and to Reflex Media, whose name, brand
7 and goodwill is suffering irreparable harm by being wrongfully associated with
8 Defendants' illegal operations.
9 2. Reflex Media operates2 <SeekingArrangement.com> (sometimes referred to
10 herein as "Seeking Arrangement"), an online dating website that is globally recognized in
11 the online "sugar daddy" dating industry. 3
12 3. Seeking Arrangement's brand 1s the result of substantial investment,
13 innovative sales and marketing techniques, and ethical business practices that distinguish
14 it from its competitors.
15 4. Reflex Media has been diligent in cultivating a reputable brand in the look
16 and feel of <SeekingArrangement.com> and its associated trademarks; a brand that is
17 associated in the minds of the consumers with a high-quality service provider in this
18 niche market.
19 5. Defendants own and/or operate two websites offering competing sugar
20 daddy dating services: <HoneyDaddy.com> and <PartyWithSugar.com> (collectively
21 referred to herein as "Defendants' Infringing Websites").
22 6. Without Reflex Media's consent, Defendants are deliberately using Reflex
23
24
2 Reflex Media operates Seeking Arrangement under a sub-licensing and operating
25 agreement. Under this arrangement, Reflex Media has been assigned the right to sue on
26 behalf of the owners of the intellectual property.
3 "Sugar daddy" dating refers to a unique business model that differentiates its users as
27 either a "sugar daddy" or "sugar momma" who are persons willing to pamper others (a
28 "Benefactor"), on the one hand, and a "sugar baby," who seeks the companionship of a
Benefactor (a "Member"), on the other hand.
2
COMPLAINT
D
103
(167 of 416)
1 Media's4 federally registered mark-SEEKING ARRANGEMENT-in the distribution

2 of advertisements intended to sell directly competing dating services to U.S. residents,
3 including customers of Seeking Arrangement. These advertisements are referred to herein
4 as "Defendants' Illegal Ads." An exemplar of Defendants' Illegal Ads is attached hereto
5 as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference in its entirety.
6 7. Defendants' Illegal Ads falsely and misleadingly identify Seeking
7 Arrangement as the originator of an email containing a solicitation for the recipient to
8 visit and subscribe to the services available on Defendants' Infringing Websites.
9 Defendants accomplished this by using the display name 5 "Seeking Arrangement" in the
10 emails sent as part of Defendants' Illegal Ads.
11 8. Defendants' fraudulent actions have caused confusion and mistake, leading
12 the unsuspecting recipient consumers to believe that they in fact have been contacted by
13 Seeking Arrangement and that an affiliation, connection, or association exists between
14 Seeking Arrangement and Defendants and/or Defendants' Infringing Websites.
15 9. Reflex Media never authorized Defendants' to use its trademark, and would
16 never have done so to assist Defendants' Infringing Websites, which give no indication of
17 promoting ethical business practices, or providing high-quality, legitimate dating
18 services.
19 10. To bring an end to this deceptive and illegal campaign, to protect its own
20 business and clients, as well as the other recipients of Defendants' Illegal Ads, Reflex
21
22 4 Reflex Media is not the owner of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark; rather, it is
the entity within its corporate structure responsible for defending the marks at issue in
23 this case. To simply matters, Reflex Media is sometimes referred to in this Complaint as
24 the owner of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark.
5 A "display name" is the name that is displayed as the sender of an email by an email
25 recipient's email client. Here, on one email, for example, the display name was "Seeking
26 Arrangement" but the return email address was <noreply@partywithsugar.com>. A
display name is chosen by the sender using their email client and can be any name,
27 including one that deliberately misleads recipients who are not sufficiently
28 technologically savvy to understand the difference between a display name and the actual
identity of the sender. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.
3
COMPLAINT
D
104
(168 of 416)
1 Media has been forced to bring this action.

2 PARTIES
3 11. Plaintiff Reflex Media is, and at all material times hereto was, a corporation
4 duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place
5 of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. Among other things, Reflex Media operates several
6 online dating websites. 6
7 12. Upon information and belief, Defendant Gregory "Greg" Chan is a resident
8 of the State of California.
9 13. Upon information and belief, after purchasing the
10 <www.HoneyDaddy.com> URL7 on or about February 26, 2016, Chan owns, maintains
11 and/or operates the Infringing Websites. Upon information and belief, Chan is also the
12 owner of Defendant Pylon Media Group.
13 14. Upon information and belief, Defendant Pylon Media Group, Inc. ("Pylon
14 Media"), is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Irvine,
15 California.
16 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant Pylon Media owns, maintains
17 and/or operates the Infringing Websites.
18 16. Upon information and belief, Defendant Apiriliaco (sometimes referred to
19 herein as "HoneyDaddy") is a company organized in Nicosia, Cyprus, with its principal
20 place of business at Souliou, Vamiko 5, Flat 14, 2018 Strovolos, Nicosia, Cyprus.
21 17. Upon information and belief, Defendant HoneyDaddy owns, maintains,
22 and/or operates the infringing website, <www.HoneyDaddy.com>.
23 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant AvaWAT} is an individual that
24 resides in or around Nicosia, Cyprus.
25
26 6 Reflex Media operates the following websites: <SeekingArrangement.com>,
<SeekingMillionaire.com>, <MissTravel.com>, <WhatsYourPrice.com>,
27 <OpenMinded.com>, <PairMeUp.com>, and <PerfectArrangement.com>.
28 7 URL is an acronym for Uniform Resource Locator, a device used to identify web
addressed on the World Wide Web.

4
COMPLAINT
D
105
(169 of 416)
1 19. Upon information and belief, Defendant Avcrt0A1l is the registered director,
2 and an agent, owner and/or employee of Apiriliaco, the owner and/or operator of the
3 infringing website, <www.HoneyDaddy.com>.
4 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kartoir Secretarial is a company
5 based in Nicosia, Cyprus, with its principal place of business in Nicosia, Cyprus.
6 21. Upon information and belief; Defendant Kartoir Secretarial is the registered
7 secretary, and an agent, owner and/or employee of Apiriliaco, the owner and/or operator
8 of the infringing website, <www.HoneyDaddy.com>.
9 22. Upon information and belief, Doe No. 1 d/b/a PartyWithSugar.com is a
10 company based in Nicosia, Cyprus.
11 23. Upon information and belief, Doe No. 1 owns, maintains, and/or operates
12 the infringing website <www.PartyWithSugar.com>.
13 24. Reflex Media does not presently know the true names and capacities of the
14 defendants named herein as Does 1 through 10, inclusive. Reflex Media will seek leave
15 to amend this Complaint to allege these defendants' true names and capacities as soonas
16 they are ascertained. Reflex Media is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges,
17 that each of the fictitiously named defendants, Does 1 through 10, participated in, and in
18 some manner are responsible for, the acts alleged in this Complaint and the damages
19 resulting therefrom.
20 25. Reflex Media is informed and believes that at all times referenced herein,
21 each Defendant was or is the agent, employee, partner, co-venturer, joint venture,
22 successor-in-interest, alter ego, and/or co-conspirator of each and all of the other
23 Defendants, and was acting within the course and scope of said agency, employment,
24 partnership, co-venture, joint venture, relationship and/or conspiracy. Reflex Media is
25 informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that each Defendant acted in concert
26 with, and with the consent of, each of the other Defendants, and that each Defendant
27 ratified or agreed to accept the benefits of the conduct of each of the other Defendants.
28 Reflex Media is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that each
5
COMPLAINT
D
106
(170 of 416)
1 Defendant actively and knowingly participated in the furtherance of the wrongful acts
2 alleged herein, directed the wrongful acts alleged herein, benefitted from the wrongful
3 acts alleged herein, and/or used the entity-defendants in a willful and intentional manner
4 to carry out the wrongful acts alleged herein.
5 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6 26. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
7 1338, where Reflex Media's claims arise under the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §
8 1051, et seq., and further present a claim of unfair competition joined with a substantial
9 and related claim under the trademark laws.
10 27. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Reflex Media's state law
11 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, where said claims are integrally interrelated with
12 the federal questions and arise from a common nucleus of operative facts such that
13 supplemental review furthers the interest of judicial economy.
14 28. In addition, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this
15 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because the matter in controversy exceeds the
16 sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of
17 different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties,
18 namely, the Offshore Parties.
19 29. Personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants Chan, Pylon Media, and
20 HoneyDaddy as the owners and/or operators of <HoneyDaddy.com>; the website through
21 which Defendants engage in interactive and commercial conduct, which, upon
22 information and belief, involves soliciting and/or otherwise actively seeking to transact
23 business with residents of the U.S, including residents of the Central District of
24 California.
25 30. Information from Who Is records, other registration records, Defendants'
26 communications with Seeking Arrangement's members and Defendants' sites show that
27 Defendant HoneyDaddy is publicly associated with a telephone number containing a 310
28 area code: a Los Angeles County area code. Moreover, this LA county number is the only
6
COMPLAINT
D
107
(171 of 416)
1 U.S. contact information publicly available for Defendant HoneyDaddy, at present.

2 31. As such, personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants because they promote
3 their business in, and derive material benefits from, the State of California and this
4 judicial district, or otherwise purposefully avail themselves of the privileges and
5 protections of the laws of the State of California, such that traditional notions of fair play
6 and due process are not offended by this Court's exercise of jurisdiction overthem.
7 32. Personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants AvatoA:11 and Kartoir Secretarial
8 because, based upon information and belief, they are agents, owners and/or employees of
9 Defendants Chan, Pylon Media, and/or HoneyDaddy , and the acts giving rise to this
1o .action arise from the promotion and furtherance of their business-which, as described
11 above, has sufficient ties to this judicial district.

12 33. As such, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants
13 Avawlr1 and Kartoir Secretarial without offending traditional notions of fair play and
14 substantialjustice.
15 34. Personal jurisdiction exists over Defendant Doe 1 d/b/a PartyWithSugar.com
16 because, upon information and belief, it is associated and/or affiliated with HoneyDaddy,
17 which, as described above, has sufficient ties to this judicial district. As such, this Court
18 may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant Doe 1 d/b/a PartyWithSugar.com
19 without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice.
20 35. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) given that
21 Defendants' conduct is believed to be directed at residents of this forum, and given the
22 association between HoneyDaddy and the Los Angeles County telephone number, the
23 only U.S. contact information publicly available for Defendant HoneyDaddy.
24 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
25 REFLEX MEDIA HAS OBTAINED FEDERAL REGISTRATION AND INCONTESTABLE LEGAL
26 PROTECTION FOR TRADEMARKS ASSOCIATED WITH SEEKINGARRANGEMENT.COM
27 36. Since 2006, Reflex Media and its predecessor in interest, InfoStream Group,
28 Inc. ("InfoStream"), have used the mark, SEEKING ARRANGEMENT, in commerce
7
COMPLAINT
D
108
(172 of 416)
1 and in connection with the online sugar daddy dating services available at
2 <SeekingArrangement.com>.
3 37. On May 25, 2007, Reflex Media's predecessor, InfoStream, applied for
4 federal registration of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark. United States
5 Trademark Registration No. 3,377,772 was issued on February 5, 2008. A copy of
6 Registration No. 3,377,772 is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
7 38. On February 5, 2013, the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark became
8 incontestable.
9 39. Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark has acquired
1O secondary meaning and inherent distinctiveness.
11 40. Reflex Media and its predecessor have invested millions of dollars to
12 promote and establish the look and feel of <SeekingArrangement.com> and its associated
13 trademarks and to promote the trademarks in the market. As a result, the website and its
14 use of the mark SEEKING ARRANGEMENT has become synonymous with Reflex
15 Media's business and the high quality product that <www.SeekingArrangement.com>
16 provides.
17 DEFENDANTS' TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
18 41. Reflex Media has expended substantial time and resources building a high
19 quality product in an industry that has attracted countless unethical, fraudulent service
20 providers, but its efforts have paid off in Reflex Media's acquisition of valuable goodwill
21 in connection with its services, as well as the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark
22 and overall brand.
23 42. Defendants who own and/or operate the subject competing websites,
24 <HoneyDaddy.com> and <PartyWithSugar.com>, launched years after Reflex Media's
25 well-developed Seeking Arrangement brand. 8
26
8 HoneyDaddy first registered its business on November 27, 2014.
27 <PartyWithSugar.com> provides no information as to its owner(s) and/or operator(s), or
28 any registration details; it serves only as an alternative domain name, inviting users to
join <HoneyDaddy.com.>
8
COMPLAINT
D
109
(173 of 416)
IIB:~JffW-JIBM IDmtcuJmllt!mtt 35-!=i IERllelrilAZl'l.lfi'l P afjle.~102>f mtge'~E#l9>

#:269
1 43. On or about March 31, 2016, Defendants began disseminating Defendants'

2 Illegal Ads. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a copy of one of Defendants' Illegal Ads. The
3 email lists "Seeking Arrangement" both as the display name of the sender of the email
4 and the display name of the "reply to" recipient.
5 44. Defendants did not have permission to use Reflex Media's SEEKING
6 ARRANGEMENT trademark for this purpose, or any other purpose.
7 45. Defendants' infringed on the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark by
8 using the mark in connection with the Infringing Websites, without authorization and in a
9 deceptive and confusing manner.
10 46. Defendants' unlawful use of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark is
11 likely to deceive or confuse consumers into believing that an affiliation, association,
12 sponsorship or connection exists between Reflex Media's <SeekingArrangement.com>
13 website and Defendants' Infringing Websites.
14 47. Upon information and belief, Defendants acted with willful intent when they
15 disseminated the Illegal Ads-including the advertisement described above-which
16 fraudulently identified Seeking Arrangement as the display name of the sender and "reply
17 to recipient," with the intention of using the goodwill and notoriety of the trademark,
18 SEEKING ARRANGEMENT, and in a manner likely to cause confusion and deception.
19 48. Furthermore, Defendants' websites <HoneyDaddy.com> and
20 <PartyWithSugar.com> do not have Seeking Arrangement's notoriety, positive reviews,
21 market leader status, substantial membership, or lengthy history. In fact, Google searches
22 of Defendants Avai:OAT] and Kartoir Secretarial associate them with scam companies.
23 (http://scamcreditcardabuse.blogspot.com/2015/08/enormous-scam-organization.html.)
24 49. Thus, any association with Defendants and/or their websites has, and will
25 continue to, result in a dilution of reputation, goodwill, and notoriety of Reflex Media's
26 websites, the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark and related brands.
27 50. To further perpetuate the false and deceptive affiliation between Reflex
28 Media's website and Defendants' Infringing Websites, Defendants have taken a number
9
COMPLAINT
D
110
(174 of 416)
(lllali!Sffi:~aB:lM/1 ~tl35F.8ecf~l/PB.ge>a.@a:>112>f ~ge>~etl IOO

#:270
1 of news articles related to Seeking Arrangement and posted them prominently on the
2 homepage of <HoneyDaddy.com>.
3 51. Specifically, the first m a line of three quotes at the bottom of the
4 <HoneyDaddy.com> homepage is the following: "There's nothing wrong with entering
5 into a consensual, reciprocal relationship in which 'love' is exchanged for material gain."
6 Following the quote, is a citation to "Bustle."
7 52. The quote that Defendants' reprinted was extracted from an article titled,
8 "18 Things I Learned About Being a Sugar Baby from Seeking Arrangement's Summit
9 on Dating Rich Older Men."
10 53. The second referenced article states: "The upfront nature of being able to lay
11 out exactly the type of person and relationship you want, without fear of judgment or
12 stigma from potential partners is empowering." Again, Defendants merely identify the
13 newspaper publisher, Daily Mail.
14 54. In fact, the person who made that statement when interviewed by the Daily
15 Mail was Angela Jacob Bermudo, who is employed by and a Public Relations Manager
16 for Reflex Media.
17 55. The final quoted article reads: "With annual university costs where they are
18 how do students these days make ends meet? I'm here to help," citing The Daily Beast.
19 56. The above-statement came from a post by member of
20 <SeekingArangement.com>.
21 57. Demonstrating the intent and thoroughness with which Defendants have
22 attempted to improperly copy Seeking Arrangement's business, initial research indicates
23 that Defendants are using many of the same vendors used by Seeking Arrangement to
24 operate its website, including the same service Seeking Arrangement uses to send-emails
25 to its customers.
26 58. These facts demonstrate that Defendants are intentionally attempting to
27 confuse Seeking Arrangement's consumers and illegally gain market share by posing as a
28 Seeking Arrangement affiliate.
10
COMPLAINT
D
111
(175 of 416)
1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

2 (Federal Trademark Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1))
3 59. Reflex Media incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained
4 in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forthherein.
5 60. As alleged herein, Reflex Media has an exclusive license to use protectable
6 trademarks and has been assigned the right to protect those trademarks by, among other
7 things, suing parties infringing on the trademarks.
8 61. Without Reflex Media's consent, Defendants have used in commerce, in
9 connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of Defendants'
10 goods and services, marks identical to or confusingly similar to Reflex Media's
11 SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, mistake
12 and/or deception with consumers that Defendants' goods and services are the same as
13 those of Reflex Media, and/or that Defendants' goods and services are somehow
14 associated, affiliated, connected, approved, authorized or sponsored by Reflex Media.
15 62. Defendants acted with the intent to cause confusion, mistake, or deception
16 with consumers.
17 63. Defendants' continued use of marks identical or confusingly similar to
18 Reflex Media's mark has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable harm and injury
19 to Reflex Media and to Reflex Media's reputation and goodwill for which Reflex Media
20 has no adequate remedy at law. The threat of future injury to consumers and to Reflex
21 Media's business, identity, goodwill and reputation necessitates the award of injunctive
22 relief to prevent Defendants' continued infringement of Reflex Media's valuable marks.
23 64. Defendants have unjustly profited from their infringement of Reflex Media's
24 marks.
25 65. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' infringing activities as
26 alleged herein, Reflex Media has suffered substantial damage in an amount to be proven
27 at trial, but estimated to exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
28
11
COMPLAINT
D
112
(176 of 416)
(IGe~BlH~,gjll)J'ma.J.IIWWd,mll/1 ~tl35F.ilecf~l/Page>8.geo13.2>f ~ge>~E#l[Q

#:272
1 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

2 (Federal False Designations, False Descriptions, and False Advertising, 15 U.S.C. §
3 1125(a))
4 66. Reflex Media incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth
5 in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.
6 67. Defendants' misuse of Reflex Media's marks in commerce in connection
7 with the goods and services offered on Defendants' Infringing Websites-including
8 commercial advertising and promotion of Defendants' Infringing Websites-constitutes a
9 false designation of origin and/or a false or misleading representation that is likely to
10 cause confusion, mistake and/or deception with consumers that Defendants' goods and/or
11 services are associated, affiliated, connected, approved, authorized or sponsored by
12 Reflex Media.
13 68. Specifically, without Reflex Media's consent, Defendants have disseminated
14 email advertisements-namely, Defendants' Illegal Ads-that contain the SEEKING
15 ARRANGEMENT trademark in the header contents.
16 69. The email advertisement, which contained content promoting Defendants'
17 competing sugar daddy dating services offered through <HoneyDaddy.com> and
18 <PartyWithSugar.com>, gave the false and misleading impression that Seeking
19 Arrangement was the sender of the email, containing promotional material for its
20 competitors.
21 70. Furthermore, Defendants' false and deceptive email display name further
22 gave the wrongful impression of an association, affiliation, connection, approval,
23 authorization or sponsorship by, between, and among Seeking Arrangement and
24 <HoneyDaddy.com> and/or <PartyWithSugar.com>.
25 71. Defendants' conduct constitutes a false designation of origin and/or false or
26 misleading representation that ( 1) is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception with
27 the public and/or consumers as to the affiliation, connection, or association between
28 Defendants' and Seeking Arrangement; (2) is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
12
COMPLAINT
D
113
(177 of 416)
1 deception with the public and/or consumers as to the original sender of the email, as the
2 origin of the services being provided, and/or (3) is intended to misrepresent the nature,
3 characteristics, and/or qualities of the goods and services offered by Defendants by
4 usurping Seeking Arrangement's respected brand name.
5 72. Defendants have unjustly profited from their foregoing conduct.
6 73. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' foregoing conduct, Reflex
7 Media has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but estimated to exceed
8 $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
9 74. Defendants' foregoing acts constitute an exceptional case and are
10 intentional, entitling Reflex Media to treble their actual damages and to an award of
11 attorneys' fees.
12 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
13 (Dilution of Famous Marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c))
16 76. Reflex Media, through its predecessor InfoStream, was the first to actually
17 use the registered trademark described herein in commerce.
18 77. The SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark is distinctive and famous
19 within the meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c),
20 for the following reasons:
21 a. The mark is distinctive and represents a provocative phrases that is not
22 merely descriptive;
23 b. The mark is used extensively in connection with advertising for Reflex
24 Media's goods and services;
25 c. The mark is recognized widely among the general consuming public
26 because of the unsolicited attention given by news media to Reflex
27 Media's business associated with the marks;
28 d. Prior to Defendants' infringing conduct, no other party used a mark
13
COMPLAINT
D
114
(178 of 416)
®eliEffl:~JmJl/1 IDxmtulrml1lt135F-lecf~l/Page>~1!i2>f Mige>Mgfitllr'A

#:274
1 similar to Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark; and

2 e. The SEEKING ARRANGEMENT mark is protected by incontestable
3 federal trademark registration.
4 78. Defendants have used marks identical or confusingly similar to Reflex
5 Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark in commerce in connection with the
6 selling and offering for sale services that compete directly with Reflex Media's business.
7 79. On information and belief, Defendants' use of this trademark occurred after
8 Reflex Media's trademark became famous and distinctive.
9 80. Defendants' use of identical or confusingly similar trademarks dilutes the
10 distinctive quality of Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark as it
11 causes and can cause confusion among consumers and potential customers of Seeking
12 Arrangement.
13 81. Defendants' use of identical or confusingly similar trademarks also tarnishes
14 Reflex Media's marks by harming the reputation of its famous mark, especially where, as
15 here, the owners of Defendants' Infringing Websites are associated with scam companies.
16 (See http://scamcreditcardabuse.blogspot.com/2015/08/enormous-scam-
17 organization.html.).
18 82. Defendants willfully intended to trade on the recognition of Reflex Media's
19 famous marks and willfully intended to harm the reputation of that mark and Reflex
20 Media's brand generally.
21 83. Defendants' use of marks identical or confusingly similar to Reflex Media's
22 trademark has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable harm and injury to Reflex
23 Media and its trademarks, reputation and goodwill for which there is no adequate remedy
24 at law. The threat of future injury to Reflex Media's trademarks, business, identity,
25 goodwill and reputation necessitates the award of injunctive relief to prevent Defendants'
26 continued misuse of Reflex Media's mark.
27 84. Defendants have unjustly profited from their foregoing conduct.
28 85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Reflex Media has
14
COMPLAINT
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#:275
1 been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, but estimated to exceed $75,000,

2 exclusive of interest and costs.
3 86. Defendants' foregoing conduct constitutes an exceptional case and is
4 intentional, entitling Reflex Media to treble its actual damages and to an award of
5 attorneys' fees.
6 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
7 (Unfair Competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code.§ 17200 et seq.)
10 88. Defendants have falsely represented an affiliation, connection, and/or
11 association between Defendants' infringing website, <HonneyDaddy.com> and
12 <SeekingArrangement.com> through the dissemination of an email promoting their
13 competing sugar daddy dating services, and fraudulently identifying Seeking
14 Arrangement as the sender. (See Ex. 1.)
15 89. Reflex Media requests that that this Court enjoin Defendants from further
16 engaging m consumer fraud by stating or implying that there is any affiliation,
17 connection, or association between/among <HonneyDaddy.com>,
18 <PartyWithSugar.com>, and <SeekingArrangement.com>.
19 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
20 (Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)
23 91. At all times relevant to this action, Reflex Media had a prospective
24 contractual relationship with the customers of its website, <SeekingArrangement.com>,
25 and a reasonable probability in the continuation of those business relations.
26 92. Defendants intentionally, or with substantial certainty, sought to interfere
27 with the relationship between Reflex Media and its customers through its unauthorized
28 use of the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark with the intent to deceive customers
15
COMPLAINT
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#:276
1 into believing that Seeking Arrangement and <HoneyDaddy.com> and/or

2 <PartyWithSugar.com> are affiliated, associated or otherwise connected.
3 93. Defendants' knew or should have been aware that their failure to act with
4 due care would result in the interference with Reflex Media's business relationships.
5 94. Defendants' acted negligently, at best, by misrepresenting the sender of an
6 email advertisement as Seeking Arrangement, when the contents of same encouraged the
7 email recipients to join competing dating sites.
8 95. Defendants' above-described conduct has caused actual disruption to the
9 relationship between Reflex Media and its customers.
1O 96. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants foregoing conduct, Reflex
11 Media has suffered damages and losses in an amount to be determined at trial, but
12 estimated to exceed $75,000.
13 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
14 WHEREFORE, Reflex Media prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
15 1. Adjudge that Reflex Media's SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark has
16 been infringed by Defendants in violation of Reflex Media's rights under 15 U.S.C. §
17 1114;
18 2. Adjudge that Defendants have competed unfairly with Reflex Media in
19 violation of Reflex Media's rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1125;
20 3. Adjudge that Defendants' activities are likely to, or have, diluted Reflex
21 Media's famous trademark in violation of Reflex Media's rights under 15 U.S.C. §
22 1125(c);
23 4. Adjudge that Defendants have negligently interfered with Reflex Media's
24 prospective economic advantages;
25 5. Adjudge that Defendants and each of their agents, employees, attorneys,
26 successors, assigns, affiliates, and joint ventures and any person(s) in active concert or
27 participation with them, and/or person(s) acting for, with, by, through or under them, be
28 enjoined and restrained at first during the pendency of this action and thereafter
16
COMPLAINT
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1 permanently from:
2 a. Selling, offering for sale distributing, advertising, or promoting any goods or
3 services that display any words or symbols that so resemble or are
4 confusingly similar to the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark, or the
5 look and feel of <SeekingArrangement.com>, as to be likely to cause
6 confusion, mistake or deception, on or in connection with any goods or
7 services that are not authorized by or for Reflex Media;
8 b. Using the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark, any other marks or
9 domain names confusingly similar to those-marks alone or in combination
1O with any other letters, words, letter strings, phases or designs, or the look and
11 feel of <SeekingArrangement.com> in commerce or in connection with any
12 goods or services;
13 c. Using any word, term, name, symbol, or device or combination thereof that
14 causes or is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the
15 affiliation or association of Defendants' or their goods with Reflex Media or
16 as to the origin of Defendants' goods or services, or any false designation of
17 origin,false or misleading description or representation of fact;
18 d. Further infringing on the rights of Reflex Media in and to any of its
19 trademarks, trade dress, products and services or otherwise damaging Reflex
20 Media's goodwill or business reputation;
21 e. Using any of Reflex Media's confidential information in connection with
22 any product or service, in any medium, including future contact or business
23 with Seeking Arrangement's members;
24 f. Otherwise competing unfairly with Reflex Media in any manner; and
25 g. Continuing to perform in any manner whatsoever any of the other acts
26 complained of in the Complaint;
27 6. Adjudge that Defendants, within thirty (30) days after service of the
28 judgment demanded herein, be required to file with this Court and serve upon Reflex
17
COMPLAINT
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#:278
1 Media's counsel a written report under oath setting forth in detail the manner in which it
2 has complied with the judgment;
3 7. Adjudge that Reflex Media recover from Defendants their actual damages
4 and lost profits in an amount to be determined at trial, but estimated to exceed $75,000,
5 for Defendants' violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125; that Defendants be required to
6 account for any profits that are attributable to its illegal acts; and that Reflex Media be
7 awarded the greater of (1) three times Defendants' profits or (2) three times any damages
8 sustained by Reflex Media under 15 U.S.C. § 1117, plus prejudgmentinterest;
9 8. Adjudge that Reflex Media recover from Defendants the damages caused by
10 Defendants, as well as punitive and/or treble damages and attorneys' fees;
11 9. Adjudge that Reflex Media be awarded its costs incurred in connection with
12 this action, including its reasonable attorneys' fees and investigativeexpenses;
13 10. Impose a constructive trust on all of Defendants' funds and assets that arise
14 out of Defendants' infringing activities; and
15 11. Adjudge that all such other relief be awarded to Reflex Media as this Court
16 deems just and proper.
17 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
18 Reflex Media hereby requests a jury trial in this matter.
19
Dated: April 27, 2016 SMITH CORRELL, LLP.
20
21
By:_/..=cs.-/M=-c..=a;,;. :rk:.: . . .rL-'--.S;;,;...;m.==-:ith=----------
22 Mark L. Smith
Attorneys for Plaintiff
24
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26
27
28
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COMPLAINT
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Trademarks > Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS)
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Seeking Arrangement
Word Mark SEEKING ARRANGEMENT

Goods and IC 045. US 100 101. G & S: Matchmaking services; Social introduction agencies; Computer dating
Services services. FIRST USE: 20050730. FIRST USE IN COMMERCE: 20060801
Standard
Characters
Claimed
Mark Drawing
(4) STANDARD CHARACTER MARK
Code
Serial Number 77191867
Filing Date May 29, 2007
Current Basis 1A
Original Filing
1A
Basis
Published for
November 20, 2007
Opposition
Registration
3377772
Number
Registration
February 5, 2008
Date
Owner (REGISTRANT) lnfoStream Group Inc. CORPORATION NEVADA 6785 S. Eastern Ave. Suite 1 6785 S.
D
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(185 of 416)
Eastern Ave. Suite 1 Las Vegas NEVADA 89119
< C m i e f f i ~ ~ anmwmmtt:B~-2Fileitet'l4J27Qlti7P~8 f!lfl.3)f ~4glP l:lge!:ll!B
(LAST LISTED OWNER) CLOVERS IN\/t;8ir-MENTS PTE. LTD .. PRIVATE LIMITED CORPORATION
SINGAPORE 71 CLOVER CRESCENT SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 579232
Assignment
ASSIGNMENT RECORDED
Recorded
Attorney of
Michael N. Cohen
Record
Disclaimer NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "ARRANGEMENT" APART FROM THE
MARK AS SHOWN
Type of Mark SERVICE MARK
Register PRINCIPAL
Affidavit Text SECT 15. SECT 8 (6-YR).
Live/Dead
LIVE
Indicator
_,a;,q:i,, ....
I HOME I SITE INDEXI SEARCH I eBUSINESS I HELP I PRIVACY POLICY
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se 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Document 35-3 Filed 02/21/17 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:285

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795-JFW (JEMx)
11 corporation,
12 Plaintiff, [PROPOSEDl JUDGMENT ON
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY
13 vs. OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY
COURT AGAINST DEFAULTED
14 GREGORYCHAN;PYLONMEDIA DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO
GROUP INC.· APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com;
15 LIMITED d/b/a Honey_Daddy.com; EAST FENERIDOll; AND E.C.A.
EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
17
Defendants. Date: March 20, 2017
18 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Ctrm: 16
19
Complaint filed: April 27, 2016
20
[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
21
The Court, having considered the Application for Entry of Default Judgment
22
Against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, East
23
Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. (the "Application"), and the supporting
24
declarations, exhibits and pleadings on file in this action, and good cause appearing
25
therefore, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
26
1. The Application is granted.
27
2. The Complaint was filed on April 27, 2016.
28
[PROPOSED] DEFAULT JUDGMENT
D
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1 3. The Summons and Complaint were served on the above-named defendants

2 (the "Defaulting Defendants") on August 5, 2016.
3 4. The Defaulting Defendants' failure to appear and answer this lawsuit
4 constitutes an admission of all allegations in the Complaint.
5 5. The Clerk of the Court entered default against the Defaulting Defendants on
6 February 14, 2017 (Dkt. No. 33).
7 6. Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Reflex Media"), is entitled to default
8 judgement against the Defaulting Defendants.
9 7. A default judgment is thus hereby entered in favor of Reflex Media, and
IO against the Defaulting Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,044,278.21.
11 8. In addition, the Court hereby permanently enjoins each of the Defaulting
12 Defendants from:
13 a. Selling, offering for sale, distributing, advertising, or promoting any goods
14 or services that display any words or symbols that so resemble or are
15 confusingly similar to the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark (Reg.
16 No. 3,377,772), or the look and feel of <www.SeekingArrangement.com>,
17 as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception, on or in connection
18 with any goods or services that are not authorized by or for Reflex Media;
19 b. Using the SEEKING ARRANGEMENT trademark, any other marks or
20 domain names confusingly similar to those marks alone or in combination
21 with any other letters, words, letter strings, phrases or designs, or the look
22 and feel of <www.SeekingArrangement.com> in commerce or in connection
23 with any goods or services;
24 c. Using any word, term, name, symbol, or device or combination thereof that
25 causes or is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the
26 affiliation or association of the Defaulting Defendants' or their goods with
27
28
2
D
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1 Reflex Media or as to the ongm, false or misleading description or

2 representation of fact;
3 d. Further infringing on the rights of Reflex Media in and to any of its
4 trademarks, trade dress, products and services or otherwise damaging Reflex
5 Media's goodwill or business reputation;
6 e. Using any of Reflex Media's confidential information in connection with
7 any product or service, in any medium; and
8 f. Otherwise competing unfairly with Reflex Media in any manner.
9
10
IT IS SO ORDERED.
11
DATED:
12 John F. Walter
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CASE NUMBER:
REFLEX MEDIA INC.

8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
PLAINTIFF(S)
v.
GREGORY CHAN, et al.
DEFAULT BY CLERK
F.R.Civ.P. 55(a)
DEFENDANT(S).
It appearing from the records in the above-entitled action that summons has been served upon the
defendant(s) named below, and it further appearing from the affidavit of counsel for Plaintiff, and other
evidence as required by F.R.Civ.P. 55(a), that each of the below defendants have failed to plead or otherwise
defend in said action as directed in said Summons and as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Now, therefore, on request of counsel, the DEFAULT of each of the following named defendant(s) is
hereby entered:
Apiriliaco Limited dba HoneyDaddy.com
East Feneridou
E.C.A. Kartoit Secretarial Ltd
Clerk, U.S. District Court
February 14. 2012 By Isl ,Jenny Lam

Date Deputy Clerk
CV-37 (10/01) DEFAULT BY CLERK F.R.Civ.P. SS(a)
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Case No. SACV 16-795-JFW (JEMx) Date: February 14, 2017
PRESENT:


None None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF

DEFAULT AGAINST DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO
LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; EAST FENERIDOU;
AND E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. [filed
1/23/16; Docket No. 29]
On January 23, 2017, Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Plaintiff') filed a Request for Entry of
Default Against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East Feneridou; and E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ("Request"). No Opposition was filed. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter is appropriate for
decision without oral argument. After considering the moving papers, and the arguments therein,
the Court rules as follows: ·
Plaintiff's Request is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter default against Defendants Apiriliaco
Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoit Secretarial Ltd. Plaintiff shall
file an Application for Default Judgment by February 21, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Page 1 of 1 Initials of Deputy Clerk....§L
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I

REFLEX MEDIA INC. CASE NUMBER:
Plaintiff(s}, 8: 16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
V.
GREGORY CHAN, et al. NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY

Defendant(s). DEFAULT/DEFAULT JUDGMENT
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
The Clerk cannot enter the requested Default of Apiriliaco Ljmjted. E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East
Feneridou for the following reason(s):
No declaration as required by F.R.Civ.P 55(a)

No proof of service/waiver of service on file
The name of the person served does not exactly match the person named in complaint
Proof of Service is lacking required information
Waiver of Service lacking the signature of the sender and/or the person acknowledging receipt
Time to respond has not expired
Answer and/or Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Motion to Dismiss on file
.x. Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded to the assigned Judge
Party dismissed from action on
Case terminated on
Requesting party shall file a new Request/Application with noted deficiencies corrected in order to
have default reconsidered.
Other: The Request for default is sent to the Judge for review. The clerk is not authorized to do a
.x default on defendant (s) in a foreign country
The Clerk cannot enter the requested Default Judgment against_ for the following reason(s):
No Entry of Default on file

No declaration as required by F.R.Civ.P 55(b)
The name of the person for which Default Judgment is requested does not exactly match the person
named in the complaint
Amounts requested differ or exceed the amounts prayed for in the demand for judgment in the most
recently filed complaint
A declaration establishing the amount due must accompany the plaintiff's request for default
judgment
No judgment by default may be entered by the Clerk against the United States or an incompetent
person. The Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded to the assigned Judge
Amount sought is not for a sum certain or cannot be computed to a sum certain
Attorney Fees sought not in compliance with Local Rule 55-3
Amount sought for costs is incorrect
Case terminated on
have default judgment reconsidered.
Other:
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Date: Januazy 23. 2017 By: Isl Lori Muraoka

Deputy Clerk
CV-528(09/12) NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY - DEFAULT/DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH- Caiifomia SBN 213829
2 msmith c ,correllsmi1h.com
1 1 s tre v ., mte 1670
Tel: (2 r~ 443-6222
4 Fax: (877) 730-5910
5 Attorney§ for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
11 corporation,
12 Plaintiff, REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF
DEF"AULT AND MEMORANDUM IN
13 vs. SUPPORT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
14 GREGORY CHAN~__I~YLON MEDIA Hon~Daddy_.coll.!i EAST FENERIDOU;
GROUP INC.· APIK1LIACO and E.C.A. KARtOIR SECRETARIAL
15 LIMITED d/b/a HoneyJ)addy.com; LTD.
17
Defendants.
18
19
20 TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

21
22 Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Reflex Media" or "Plaintiff') respectfully requests that
23 the Clerk enter defaults against defendants Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou, and E.C.A.
24 Kartoir Secretarial LTD because these defendants have failed to appear or otherwise
25 respond to the Complaint within the time prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil
26 Procedure.
27 ////
28 Ill/
D
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1 These defendants were served with a copy of the Complaint by mail, as evidenced
2 by the Proof of Service filed with this Request for Entry of Default. Measured from the
3 date of personal service on defendants, the time for these defendants to respond has
4 expired.
5
Dated: January 23, 2017 SMITH CORRELL, LLP
6
7
By:_/.;;;s/,..;;M-ar=k;..;;;L;:.:... ...:;:;S.:;:am=it=h'--_ _ _ _ __
8 Mark L. Smith
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2 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
3 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
4 1332(a), and 1338.
5 2. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc. 's
6 ("Reflex Media") state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, where said claims are
7 integrally interrelated with the federal questions and arise from a common nucleus of
8 operative facts such that supplemental review furthers the interest of judicial economy.
9 3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to 28
10 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2). Further, this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants as
11 they have engaged, and continue to engage, in business activities in and directed to this
12 district, and have committed tortious acts within this district or directed at this district.
13 4. Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial LTD
14 (hereinafter "Defendants") own, maintain and/or operate www.HoneyDaddy.com
15 (hereinafter "<Honeydaddy.com>").
16 5. Defendants reside in the country of Cyprus.
17 6. Service on Defendants was made pursuant to the express provisions of the
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(l) and 4(h)(2). Rule 4 provides that an individual "may be served at a
19 place not within any judicial district of the United States by any internationally agreed
20 means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by
21 the Hague Convention .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(l). A corporation may be served "at a
22 place not within any judicial district of the United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule
23 4(f) for serving an individual ...." Id. at 4(h)(2). Use of the [Hague Service] Convention
24 procedures, when available, is mandatory if documents must be transmitted abroad to effect
25 service." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1993 Amendments.
26 7. The United States and Cyprus are signatories to the Hague Convention on the
27 Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters
28
D
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(195 of 416)
1 (hereinafter "Hague Convention"). 1 See Fraserside IP L.L.C. v. Youngek Solutions Ltd.,

2 796 F.Supp 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
3 8. Article 1 of the Hague Convention provides that it applies "in all cases, in
4 civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
5 document for service abroad." Hague Convention art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 20 U.S.T. 361,
6 1969 WL 97765.
7 9. Articles 2 through 7 of the Hague Convention govern the primary means of
8 effectuating service, which is through the Central Authority of the foreign state in which
9 the party to be served is located. See id. at Art. 2-7. Pursuant to Article 5, the Central
10 Authority of the foreign state shall serve/arrange service of the documents by either (1) a
11 method allowed for under the state's internal law; or (2) by a method requested by the
12 applicant, so long as it is compatible with the state's internal law. See id. at Art. 5.
13 10. Article lO(a) also allows for service by postal channels if the member state
14 has not opted out of this provision within the treaty. See id. at Art. 10. Here, the member
15 state of Cyprus has not opted out of, or objected to, Article 10. See Fraserside, 796 F .Supp
16 2d at 954; see also Cyprus, https://travel.state.gov/conten:tftravel/en/legal-
17 considerations/judicial/country/cyprus.html (last visited January 11, 2017) (website
18 maintained by United States Department of State).
19 11. FedEx or similar commercial channels have been allowed as postal channels
20 in compliance with the Hague Convention Article l0(a). See TracFone Wireless, Inc. v.
21 Sunstrike Intern., Ltd., 273 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ("The Court thus finds that
22 serving Hong Kong Defendants with a copy of the Summons and Amended Complaint sent
23 via international express mail and via FedEx . . . is permissible pursuant to Rule
24 4(f)(2)(C)(ii).); R. Griggs Grp. Ltd. v. Filanto Spa, 920 F.Supp 1100, 1106-08 (D. Nev.
25 1996) (finding that service via Federal Express was proper on the Italian Defendants
26 because it complied with the Hague Convention); Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., No. 1:06-
27
28 1A copy of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters is attached as Exhibit 1.
4
D
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(196 of 416)
1 CV-2376, 2008 WL 1995369, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2008) ([P]laintiffs sent a copy of
2 the complaint to each defendant via OHL, a proper method of service under the Hague
3 Service Convention, and provided the court with proof of service."); TracFone Wireless,
4 Inc. v. Unlimited PCS Inc., 279 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D. Fla. 2012) ("The Court observes that
5 numerous courts have recognized that FedEx (or other commercial mail couriers) are
6 permissible 'postal channels' through which to complete service consistent with Article
7 l0(a) of the Hague Service Convention.").
8 12. Defendants were served when Reflex Media sent the Complaint via FedEx, in
9 compliance with the Hague Convention, on July 21, 2016. Defendants took possession of
10 the Compliant on August 5, 2016. A copy of the proof of service for Defendants is attached
11 as Exhibit 2.
12 13. Because Reflex Media, Inc. has complied with the Hague Convention in
13 service of the Complaint and Defendants have failed to file a response to the Complaint in
14 the time allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an entry of default against
15 Defendants is proper.
16
Dated: January 23, 201 7 SMITH CORRELL, LLP
17
18
By:_/""'s/,.....CM-ar,..;;..ck'-,iiL-=·-S.,cm=it=h'---------
19 Mark L. Smith
21
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1 DECLARATION OF MARK L. SMITH

2 I, Mark L. Smith, declare and state:
3 1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before this Court. I have personal
4 knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify to these facts if called upon
5 to do so.
6 2. I am the attorney for Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., in this action. This
7 Declaration is submitted in support of Reflex Media's request that the Clerk enter the
8 defaults of defendants Apiriliaco Limited, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial
9 LTD (collectively, "Defendants").
10 3. This action was filed on April 27, 2016. Reflex Media, as the exclusive,
11 worldwide licensee of the trademark SEEKING ARRANGEMENT, alleges, among other
12 things, that Defendants have deliberately and without authorization used its trademark, and
13 made false and misleading statements in advertising Defendants' services. Reflex Media
14 asserts claims for trademark infringement, false advertising, dilution of a famous mark,
15 unfair competition, and interference with prospective economic advantage.
16 4. After filing this action, I arranged for personal service via FedEx of a copy of
17 the Summons and Compliant upon Defendants in the country of Cyprus pursuant to the
18 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
19 Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention").
20 5. By September 9, 2016, defendants had not filed a response to the Complaint
21 or reached out to me. On September 9, 2016, my office sent a letter to Defendants via
22 FedEx stating that the time to respond had expired and asking that the Defendants contact
23 my office if they were intending to respond to the Complaint by September 16, 2016. The
24 letter also stated that if we did not hear from the Defendants we would file a request for
25 entry of Defendants' default with the Court. The letter is attached as Exhibit 3.
26 6. My office sent the letter to the original address we had for the Defendants in
27 Cyprus. We also sent a copy of the letter to a new address in Las Vegas, Nevada, that
28 appeared on the <HoneyDaddy.com> website. (The Las Vegas address was removed from
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1 the website after our letter was delivered. Screenshots of the website were taken to preserve
2 the information. A screenshot of the <HoneyDaddy.com> website with the Las Vegas
3 address was captured on September 7, 2016, and is attached as Exhibit 4. A screenshot
4 captured on September 21, 2016, that has the Vegas address removed is attached as Exhibit
5 5.)
6 7. Both letters were signed for and FedEx records show that they were delivered.
7 See Exhibit 6 and 7.
8 8. Defendants did not respond to the Complaint and I received no response to
9 my September 9, 2016 letter.
10 9. In the meantime, Defendants are still operating <HoneyDaddy.com>.
11 10. The Court's docket does not reflect Defendants' filing of a response to the
12 Complaint.
13 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
14 on January 20, 2017 in Los Angeles, California.
15
16 Dated: January 23, 2017

17 By:---;,/.=,;s/....=M=ar=k...;;;;:L:.:.....=Sm=ith_,___ _ _ _ __
Mark L. Smith, Esq.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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T.I.AS. No. 6638 (U.S. Treaty), 20 U.S.T. 361 (U.S. Treaty), 1969 WL 97765 (U.S. Treaty)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Multilateral
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
Convention done at The Hague November 15, 1965;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America April 14, 1967;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America April 24, 1967;
Ratification of the United States of America deposited with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands August 24, 1967; 1
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America January 8, 1969;
Entered into force February 10, 1969.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL

OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
Article 1
CHAPTER I - JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
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Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
CHAPTER H - EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 17
CHAPTER Ill - GENERAL CLAUSES
Article 18
Article 19
Article 20
Article 21
Article 22
Article 23
Article 24
Article 25
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 29
Article 30
Article 31
Designations and Declarations Made on the Part of the United States in Connection with the Deposit of the United States
Ratification
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
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*1 WHEREAS the convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters done at The Hague on November 15, 1965, was signed for the United States of America on that same date;
WHEREAS a certified copy of the text of the said convention in the English and French languages is word for word
as follows:
CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND

EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be
brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time,
Desiring to improve the organisation of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the
procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the following provisions:
Article l
The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.
This Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.
CHAPTER I - JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 2
Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive requests for service coming
from other contracting States and to proceed in conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6.
Each State shall organise the Central Authority in conformity with its own law.
Article 3
The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the State in which the documents originate shall forward
to the Central Authority of the State addressed a request conforming to the model annexed to the present Convention,
without any requirement of legalisation or other equivalent formality.
The document to be served or a copy thereof shall be annexed to the request. The request and the document shall both
be furnished in duplicate.
Article 4
If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply with the provisions of the present Convention it
shall promptly inform the applicant and specify its objections to the request.
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Article 5
The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an
appropriate agency, either -
(a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are
within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State
addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an
addressee who accepts it voluntarily.
If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may require the document to be
written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed.
That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document
to be served, shall be served with the document.
Article 6
The Central Authority of the State addressed or any authority which it may have designated for that purpose, shall
complete a certificate in the form of the model annexed to the present Convention.
The certificate shall state that the document has been served and shall include the method, the place and the date of
service and the person to whom the document was delivered. If the document has not been served, the certificate shall
set out the reasons which have prevented service.
The applicant may require that a certificate not completed by a Central Authority or by a judicial authority shall be
countersigned by one of these authorities.
The certificate shall be forwarded directly to the applicant.
Article 7
The standard terms in the model annexed to the present Convention shall in all cases be written either in French or in
English. They may also be written in the official language, or in one of the official languages, of the State in which the
documents originate.
The corresponding blanks shall be completed either in the language of the State addressed or in French or in English.
Article 8
Each contracting State shall be free to effect service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application of
any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents.
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Any State may declare that it is opposed to such service within its territory, unless the document is to be served upon
a national of the State in which the documents originate.
Article 9
Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward documents, for the purpose of
service, to those authorities of another contracting State wich are designated by the latter for this purpose.
Each contracting State may, if exceptional circumstances so require, use diplomatic channels for the same purpose.
Article 10
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with -
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial
documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through
the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
Article l l
The present Convention shall not prevent two or more contracting States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of
service of judicial documents, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding articles and, in
particular, direct communication between their respective authorities.
Article 12
The service of judicial documents coming from a contracting State shall not give rise to any payment or reimbursement
of taxes or costs for the services rendered by the State addressed.
The applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by -
(a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under the law of the State of destination,
(b) the use of a particular method of service.
Article 13
Where a request for service complies with the terms of the present Convention, the State addressed may refuse to comply
therewith only if it deems that compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security.
It may not refuse to comply solely on the ground that, under its internal law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not permit the action upon which the application is based.
The Central Authority shall, in case of refusal, promptly inform the applicant and state the reasons for the refusal.
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Article 14
Difficulties which may arise in connection with the transmission ofjudicial documents for service shall be settled through
diplomatic channels.
Article 15
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under
the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is
established that -
(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of
documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this
Convention,
and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
Each contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of
this article, may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the following conditions
are fulfilled -
(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since
the date of the transmission of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through
the competent authorities of the State addressed.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional
or protective measures.
Article 16
When a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the
provisions of the present Convention, and a judgment has been entered against a defendant who has not appeared, the
judge shall have the power to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiration of the time for appeal from the
judgment if the following conditions are fulfilled -
(a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend,
or knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to appeal, and
(b) the defendant has disclosed a prim a f acie defence to the action on the merits.
An application for relief may be filed only within a reasonable time after the defendant has knowledge of the judgment.
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Each contracting State may declare that the application will not be entertained if it is filed after the expiration of a time
to be stated in the declaration, but which shall in no case be less than one year following the date of the judgment.
This article shall not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity of persons.
CHAPTER II - EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 17
Extrajudicial documents emanating from authorities and judicial officers of a contracting State may be transmitted for
the purpose of service in another contracting State by the methods and under the provisions of the present Convention.
CHAPTER III - GENERAL CLAUSES
Article 18
Each contracting State may designate other authorities in addition to the Central Authority and shall determine the
extent of their competence.
The applicant shall, however, in all cases, have the right to address a request directly to the Central Authority.
Federal States shall be free to designate more than one Central Authority.
Article 19
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided
for in the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention
shall not affect such provisions.
Article 20
The present Convention shall not prevent an agreement between any two or more contracting States to dispense with -
(a) the necessity for duplicate copies of transmitted documents as required by the second paragraph of article 3,
(b) the language requirements of the third paragraph of article 5 and article 7,
(c) the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 5,
(d) the provisions of the second paragraph of article 12.
Article 21
Each contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a later date,
inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of the following-
(a) the designation of authorities, pursuant to articles 2 and 18,
(b) the designation of the authority competent to complete the certificate pursuant to article 6,
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(c) the designation of the authority competent to receive documents transmitted by consular channels, pursuant to article
9.
Each contracting State shall similarly inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of -
(a) opposition to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10,
(b) declarations pursuant to the second paragraph of article 15 and the third paragraph of article 16,
(c) all modifications of the above designations, oppositions and declarations.
Article 22
Where Parties to the present Convention are also Parties to one or both of the Conventions on civil procedure signed
at The Hague on 17th July 1905, 2 and on 1st March 1954, 3 this Convention shall replace as between them articles I
to 7 of the earlier Conventions.
Article 23
The present Convention shall not affect the application of article 23 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The
Hague on 17th July 1905, or of article 24 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 1st March 1954.
These articles shall, however, apply only if methods of communication, identical to those provided for in these
Conventions, are used.
Article 24
Supplementary agreements between parties to the Conventions of 1905 and 1954 shall be considered as equally applicable
to the present Convention, unless the Parties have otherwise agreed.
Article 25
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 22 and 24, the present Convention shall not derogate from Conventions
containing provisions on the matters governed by this Convention to which the contracting States are, or shall become,
Parties.
Article 26
The present Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law.
It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands.
Article 27
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· · -· .. · · -·- · .. · .. .. .. .. - · · · · .. · · ·· · #,165 .. .. · -·· · · ·
The present Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification
referred to in the second paragraph of article 26.
The Convention shall enter into force for each signatory State which ratifies subsequently on the sixtieth day after the
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article 28
Any State not represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law may accede to
the present Convention after it has entered into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27. The instrument
of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for such a State in the absence of any objection from a State, which has ratified
the Convention before such deposit, notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands within a period of six
months after the date on which the said Ministry has notified it of such accession.
In the absence of any such objection, the Convention shall enter into force for the acceding State on the first day of the
month following the expiration of the last of the periods referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Article 29
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention shall extend to
all the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration
shall take effect on the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned.
At any time thereafter, such extensions shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for the territories mentioned in such an extention on the sixtieth day after the
notification referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Article 30
The present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date of its entry into force in accordance with the
first paragraph of article 27, even for States which have ratified it or acceded to it subsequently.
If there has been no denunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five years.
Any denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands at least six months before the
end of the five year period.
It may be limited to certain of the territories to which the Convention applies.
The denunciation shall have effect only as regards the State which has notified it. The Convention shall remain in force
for the other contracting States.
Article 31
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands shall give notice to the States referred to in article 26, and to the
States which have acceded in accordance with article 28, of the following -
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· .. · · ............ · ... .. .. ......... #:166···· · ·
(a) the signatures and ratifications referred to in article 26;
(b) the date on which the present Convention enters into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27;
(c) the accessions referred to in article 28 and the dates on which they take effect;
(d) the extensions referred to in article 29 and the dates on which they take effect;
(e) the designations, oppositions and declarations referred to in article 21;
(f) the denunciations referred to in the third paragraph of article 30.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Convention.
DONE at The Hague, on the 15th day of November, 1965, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally
authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Netherlands, and of which
a certified copy shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to each of the States represented at the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
For the Federal Republic of Germany,
(s.) KARL HERMANN KNOKE
For Austria,
For Belgium,
(s) VAN DER STRATEN

21 I 1966
For Denmark,
For Spain,
For the United States of America,
(s.) WILLIAM ROY ALL TYLER
For Finland,
(s.) SIGURD VON NUMERS
For France,
For Greece,
For Ireland,
vVE:$TLA\.\'
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For Israel,
(s.) DAVID SHALTIEL 25.XI.1965
For Italy,
For Japan,
For Luxembourg,
For Norway,
For the Netherlands,
(s.) J. LUNS
For Portugal,
For the United Arab Republic,
(s) SAYED FAHMI

1st of March 1966
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
(s) PETER GARRAN

10th December 1965
For Sweden,
For Switzerland,
For Turkey,
For Yugoslavia,
' ,' ',,' :- .. ' : ,·
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WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 14, 1967, two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said convention;
WHEREAS the President of the United States of America on April 24, 1967 duly ratified the convention, in pursuance
of the advice and consent of the Senate;
WHEREAS Article 27 provides that the convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the
third instrument of ratification;
WHEREAS instruments of ratification were deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands as follows:
United States of America on August 24, 1967; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on November
17, 1967; and the United Arab Republic on December 12, 1968;
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..... .. · ..... · ... .. .... · · ..... ······ #:.170 ....... ..
AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Article 27 of the convention, the convention will enter into force on
February 10, 1969;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby
proclaim and make public the convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or
commercial matters, to the end that the convention and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled
with good faith on and after February 10, 1969, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States
of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington this eighth day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred sixty-
nine and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-third.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
[SEAL]
By the President:
DEAN RUSK
Secretary of State
Designations and Declarations Made on the Part of the United States

in Connection with the Deposit of the United States Ratification
1. In accordance with Article 2, the United States Department of State is designated as the Central Authority to receive
requests for service from other Contracting States and to proceed in conformity with Articles 3 to 6.
2. In accordance with Article 6, in addition to the United States Department of State, the United States Department of
Justice and the United States Marshal or Deputy Marshal for the judicial district in which service is made are designated
for the purpose of completing the certificate in the form annexed to the Convention.
3. In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 15, it is declared that the judge may, notwithstanding the provisions
of the first paragraph of Article 15, give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the
conditions specified in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the second paragraph of Article 15 are fulfilled.
4. In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 16, it is declared that an application under Article 16 will not be
entertained if it is filed (a) after the expiration of the period within which the same may be filed under the procedural
regulations of the court in which the judgment has been entered, or (b) after the expiration of one year following the
date of the judgment, whichever is later.
5. In accordance with Article 29, it is declared that the Convention shall extend to all the States of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Footnotes
For designations and declarations made in connection with the deposit, see page 373. [Footnote added by the Department
of State.]
2 99 BFSP 990.
3 286 UNTS 265
WE<;HAIN ., '
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.. · · ... · · · · #:171 · .......... .
T.I.A.S. No. 6638
l·.nd of I)ocwn~nt
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Date Filed: 8/12/16

1 SMITH CORRELL LLP Document Number: 19
MARK SMITH - Caiifomia SBN 213829
2 msmith correllsmith.com
1 1 s tre v ., uite 1670
Tel: (2r3) 443-6222
4 Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CENTRAL DISTRICT
9
10 REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Case No. 8:16-cv-795

corporation,
11
Plaintiff, PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
12
vs.
13
GREGORY CHAN; PYLON MEDIA
14 GROUP INC: APIRILIACO
15 EAST FENERIDOU; E.C.A.
KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.; and
17 Defendants.
18
19
20 COMES NOW Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., by and through its counsel of record,
21 and hereby submits the following as proof of service of summons upon Apiriliaco
22 Limited:
23 1. At the time of service, I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this
24 action.
25 2. I served copies of the Summons, Complaint, Exhibits 1-2 to the Complaint, and
26 a copy of the Court's Standing Order.
27 3. Party served: Apiriliaco Limited.
28
I
PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
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1 4. Address where the party was served: 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5, Floor 1, Flat 14,
2 Strovolos 2018 Cyprus.
3 5. I served the party by: substituted service on Friday, August 5, 2016, at 11 :00
4 a.m. via Federal Express by requiring signature as acknowledgement of receipt
5 and having been signed for by "MARIOS." I sent the documents listed in
6 paragraph two on July 20, 2016, from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Strovolos,
7 Cyprus, in accordance with Fed R. Civ. P. 4(f) and The Hague Convention on
8 the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents. Proof of delivery
9 and acknowledgement of receipt is attached hereto.
10 6. Person who served the papers: Melina Hernandez, 124 West 1400 South, Salt
11 Lake City, Utah, 84115, (801) 436-5550. The fee for service was $53.55. I am
12 exempt from registration under Business and Professions Code Section
13 22350(b)(2).
14 7. J declare under penalty ofperjury under the law of the State of California and
15 under the laws of the United States ofAmerica that the forgoing is true and
16 correct.
17 Dated: August 12, 2016 Isl Melina Hernandez
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
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FecE:x
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
The following is the proof-of-delivery for tracking number 776806671643.
Delivery Information:
Status: Delivered Delivery location: STROVOLOU 20
STROVOLOS 2018
Signed for by: MARIOS
Service type: FedEx International Priority
Special Handling: Deliver Weekday
NO SIGNATURE IS AVAILABLE
FedEx Express proof-of-delivery details appear below; however, no signature is currently available for this shipment.
Please check again later for a signature.
Shipping Information:
Tracking number: 776806671643 Ship date: Jul21,2016
Weight: 0.7 lbs/0.3 kg
Recipient: Shipper:
APIRILIACO REP OR OWNER JACOB L. FONNESBECK
APIRILIACO SMITH CORRELL LLP
11 SOULIOU, VAMIKO 5 124 WEST 1400 SOUTH
FLOOR 1, FLAT 14 SUITE204
STROVOLOS 2018 CY SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 US
Thank you for choosing FedEx.
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1 SMITH CORRELL LLP Date Filed: 8/12/16

MARK SMITH - Caiifomia SBN 213829 Document Number: 20
2 msmith a correllsmith.com
1 1 s ire v ., mte 1670
Tel: (2B) 443-6222
4 Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
14 GROUP, INC.· APIRILIACO
LIMITED d/bla HoneyJ)addy.com;
17 Defendants.
18
19
21 and hereby submits the following as proof of service of summons upon East Feneridou:
23 action.
26 3. Party served: East Feneridou.
1
D
154
(218 of 416)
11 22350(b)(2).
12 7. I declare under penalty ofperjury under the law of the State of California and
14 correct.
15 Dated: August 12, 2016 /s/ Melina Hernandez
MELINA HERNANDEZ
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
155
(219 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
FedEx Express proof-of-delivery details appear below: however, no signature is currently available for this shipment.
Weight: 0. 7 lbs/0.3 kg
Recipient: Shipper:
EAST FENERIDOU JACOB L. FONNESBECK
11 SOULIOU, VAMIKO 5 SMITH CORRELL LLP
FLOOR 1, FLAT 14 124 WEST 1400 SOUTH
STROVOLOS 2018 CY SUITE 204
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115 US
D
156
(220 of 416)
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP Date Filed: 8/12/16

MARK SMITH - Caiifomia SBN 213829 Document Number: 21
1 1 s ire v ., mte 1670
4 Tel: (213) 443-6222
Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
GROUP, INC.; APIRILIACO
15 EAST FENERIDOU;-E.C.A.
17 Defendants.
18
19
21 and hereby submits the following as proof of service of summons upon E.C.A. Kartoir
22 Secretarial Ltd.:
24 action.
27 3. Party served: E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.
28
1
D
157
(221 of 416)
13 22350(b)(2).
16 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
158
(222 of 416)
case B:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM Doctl.mlenfl: 21}-a=ile~l7 P ~ d1tlbf F.tog~#:EID)

#:181
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
Recipient: Shipper:
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD JACOB L. FONNESBECK
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD SMITH CORRELL LLP
D
159
(223 of 416)

SM ITH CO R R ELLLLP Offices
11766 Wilshire Blvd
Las Vegas, NV I Los Angeles, CA I Salt Lake City, UT Suite 1670
(213) 443-6222
124 West 1400 South

Suite 204
September 7, 2016
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801) 436-5550
VIAFEDEX:
3960 Howard Hughes Pkwy
Apiriliaco Limited Suite 500
East Fenerdiou LasVegas, NV 89169
Kartoir Secretarial, LTD (702) 990-3705
fax: (877) 730-5910
Floor 1, Flat 14
Strovolos 2018 Cyprus Lawyers
RE: Reflex Media, Inc. v. Gregory Chan, et al. Mark Smith••

Michelle Correll •
To Whom It May Concern: Jacob L. Fonnesbeck ...,.
• Admitted in CA
The above named individuals have failed to respond to the attached complaint,
• Admitted in UT
which was filed against them in the United States District Court for the • Admitted in NV
Central District of California. The complaint was served via FedEx pursuant
to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention"). The
time to submit a response has passed and it is now our intent to file for default www.smithcorrell.com
judgment. If any of the defendants intend to seek leave from the court to file a
response, please contact me as soon as possible, but no later than September
16, 2016.
Best,
Jacob Fonnesbeck
Attachments.
D
160
(224 of 416)
No Strings Attached
Beautiful and wealthy singles connect with drama-free expectations.
D
161
(225 of 416)
An Algorithm That Works
It's all about you. New matches suggested based on your daily activity.
Play Safely
Meet other members looking for the real Honey deal.
----@----
BU E
Start Browsing
D
162
(226 of 416)
D
163
(227 of 416)
No Strings Attached
Beautiful and wealthy singles connect with drama-free expectations.
D
164
(228 of 416)
An Algorithm That Works

It's all about you. New matches suggested based on your daily activity.
Play Safely
Meet other members looking for the real Honey deal.
----@----
D
165
(229 of 416)
D
166
(230 of 416)
January 18,2017
Dear Customer:
Status: Delivered Delivery location: LAS VEGAS, NV
Signed for by: A.DIMALMATA Delivery date: Sep 12, 2016 12:53
Service type: FedEx Express Saver
Adult Signature Required
Signature image is available. In order to view image and detailed information, the shipper or payor account number of
the shipment must be provided.
Tracking number: 777175948103 Ship date: Sep 7, 2016
Recipient: Shipper:
LAS VEGAS, NV US SALT LAKE CITY, UT US
D
167
(231 of 416)
January 18,2017
Dear Customer:
Status: Delivered Delivery location: STROVOLOS
Signed for by: M.MARINELLA Delivery date: Sep 22, 2016 15:41
Residential Delivery
Signature image is available. In order to view image and detailed information, the shipper or payor account number of
the shipment must be provided.
Tracking number: 777175902991 Ship date: Sep 7, 2016
Recipient: Shipper:
STROVOLOS CY SALT LAKE CITY, UT US
D
168
(232 of 416)

Case No. SACV 16-795-JFW (JEMx) Date: November 21, 2016
PRESENT:


None None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR

ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST: (1) APIRILIACO
LIMITED D/B/A HONEYDADDY.COM; (2) EAST
FENERIDOU; AND (3) E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
LTD. [filed 11/14/16; Docket No. 26]
On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. ("Plaintiff') filed an Application for Entry of
Default Against: (1) Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a Honeydaddy.com; (2) East Feneridou; and (3) E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. ("Application"). Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument.
After considering the moving papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
In the Application, Plaintiff states that Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a Honeydaddy.com,
East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. (collectively, "Defendants") "were served pursuant
to Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." However, Plaintiff fails to explain under which
paragraph of Rule 4(f) Defendants were served or how sending the Defendants a copy of the
Summons and Complaint via Federal Express complies with the Rule. In addition, although counsel
for Plaintiff, Mark Smith, states in his declaration, which is attached to the Application, that service of
Defendants complies with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention"), Plaintiff has failed to explain
or provide any authority that demonstrates how service via Federal Express complies with the Hague
Convention.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Application is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Page 1 of 1 Initials of Deputy Clerk _fil_
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REFLEX MEDIA INC. CASE NUMBER:
Plaintiff(s), 8: 16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
V.
GREGORY CHAN, et al. NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY

Defendant(s). DEFAULT/DEFAULT JUDGMENT
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
The Clerk cannot enter the requested Default of Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd .. East
Feneridou for the following reason(s):
No declaration as required by F.R.Civ.P 55(a)

No proof of service/waiver of service on file
The name of the person served does not exactly match the person named in complaint
Proof of Service is lacking required information
Waiver of Service lacking the signature of the sender and/or the person acknowledging receipt
Time to respond has not expired
Answer and/or Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Motion to Dismiss on file
.x Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded to the assigned Judge
Party dismissed from action on
Case terminated on
have default reconsidered.
Other: Clerk is NOT authorized process Default. Due to the complexities in the service of summons
.x and complaint of corporation in foreign country
The Clerk cannot enter the requested Default Judgment against_ for the following reason(s):
No Entry of Default on file

No declaration as required by F.R.Civ.P 55(b)
The name of the person for which Default Judgment is requested does not exactly match the person
named in the complaint
Amounts requested differ or exceed the amounts prayed for in the demand for judgment in the most
recently filed complaint
A declaration establishing the amount due must accompany the plaintiff's request for default
judgment
No judgment by default may be entered by the Clerk against the United States or an incompetent
person. The Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded to the assigned Judge
Amount sought is not for a sum certain or cannot be computed to a sum certain
Attorney Fees sought not in compliance with Local Rule 55-3
Amount sought for costs is incorrect
Case terminated on
have default judgment reconsidered.
Other:
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Date: November 15. 2016 By: ls/Jenn,r Lam

Deputy Clerk
CV-528(09/12) NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY - DEFAULT/DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH - California SBN 213829
2 msmith ivcorrellsmith.corn
1 1 s 1re v ., mte 1670
Tel: (2f3) 443-6222
4 Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6

10
11 corporation,
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF
12 Plaintiff, DEFAULT AGAINST:
13 vs.
g)APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a

GROUP INC.· APIRILIACO
t:~;!Wl~~d/i~~i:iDou· AND
ti:c.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
15 LIMITED d/b/a Honeypaddy.com;
17
Defendants.
18
19 TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

20 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:
21 As provided by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P."),
22 Plaintiff REFLEX MEDIA, INC., requests that the Clerk enter the default of the following
23 Defendants for failure to plead or otherwise defend against this action in a timely manner:
24 APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com
25 1. As evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court, the above-named
26 Defendant was served pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
27 August 5, 2016.
28
1
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
D
171
(235 of 416)
1 2. The applicable time limit for the above-named Defendant to appear or

2 otherwise respond to this action expired on August 26, 2016.
3 EAST FENERIDOU
5 Defendant was served pursuant to Rule 4(±) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
6 August 5, 2016.
9 E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
11 Defendant was served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on August
12 5, 2016.
15 The above-named Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise respond to the
16 Complaint.
I7 This request is based on the attached Declaration of Mark L. Smith, counsel for
18 Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc.
19
Dated: November 14, 2016. SMITH CORRELL, LLP.
20
21
By:~/;,.::;s;,..;/M=-,=a.-=rk.::..;L;;;:.;·:.....:S;::;m;=i=th~------
22 Mark L. Smith
Attorney~ for Plaintiff
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
172
(236 of 416)
I DECLARATION OF MARK L. SMITH

2 I, MARK L. SMITH, declare and state:
3 1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before this Court. I have personal
4 knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify to these facts if called upon
5 to do so.
6 2. I am counsel for Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc. This Declaration is submitted in
7 support of Plaintiffs request that the Clerk enter default against Defendants Apiriliaco
8 Limited; East Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial LTD (collectively, the "Default
9 Defendants").
IO 3. This action was filed on April 27, 2016. Plaintiff, as the owner of the
11 trademark SEEKING ARRANGEMENT, alleges, among other things, that the Default
12 Defendants have deliberately and without authorization used Plaintiffs trademark, and
13 made false and misleading statements in advertising their services. Plaintiff asserts claims
14 for trademark infringement, false advertising, dilution of a famous mark, unfair
15 competition, and interference with prospective economic advantage.
16 4. After filing this action, I arranged for service of a copy of the Summons and
17 Compliant upon the Default Defendants in the country of Cyprus pursuant to Rule 4(f) of
18 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
19 and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention").
20 Service of process was made on the Default Defendants on August 5, 2016.
21 5. Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Default
22 Defendants were required to plead or otherwise respond to the Complaint by August 26,
23 2016. The time to plead or otherwise respond to the Complaint has not been extended by
24 any agreement of the parties or any order of the Court.
25 6. On September 9, 2016, my office sent a letter to the Default Defendants via
26 FedEx stating that the time to respond to the Complaint had expired. That letter also asked
27 the Default Defendants to contact my office if they planned to respond to the Complaint.
28 The letter also stated that if I did not hear from them we would file a request for entry of
3
D
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(237 of 416)
1 default with the Court.

2 7. My office sent a copy of the September 9, 2016, correspondence to the same
3 address where the Default Defendants were originally served with the Complaint in
4 Cyprus. In addition, we also sent a copy of the letter to a new address in Las Vegas, Nevada,
5 that appeared on the <HoneyDaddy.com> website. (The Las Vegas address was removed
6 from the website after our letter was delivered. Screenshots of the website were taken to
7 preserve the information.)
8 8. Both letters (i.e., the copy sent to Cyprus and the copy sent to Las Vegas) were
9 signed for and FedEx records show that they were delivered.
10 9. Defendants did not respond to the Complaint and I received no response to
11 my September 9, 2016, correspondence.
12 10. The Default Defendants are not minors or incompetent persons.
13 11. The Default Defendants are not currently in U.S. military service, and
14 therefore, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply.
15 12. I have attached to this declaration a true and correct copy of the three (3)
16 proofs of service on file with this Court for the above-named Default Defendants.
17 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
18
Dated: Novmeber 14, 2016. By:---:/..,,,s/--'M~arr.!.k~L:,:,!.c.:;S~m=ic:;,:th:.--_ _ _ _ __
19 Mark L. Smith, Esq.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
D
174
(238 of 416)
1 Date Filed: 8/12/16

Document Number: 19
2

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
14 GROUP, INC: APIRILIACO
15 EAST FENERIDOU; -E.C.A.
17 Defendants.
18
19
22 Limited:
24 action.
28
1
D
175
(239 of 416)
I 4. Address where the party was served: 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5, Floor 1, Flat 14,
13 22350(b)(2).
16 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
176
(240 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
status: Delivered Delivery location: STROVOLOU 20
STROVOLOS 2018
Seivice type: FedEx International Priority
Recipient: Shipper:
APIRILIACO REP OR OWNER JACOB L. FONNESBECK
D
177
(241 of 416)
aeE8B:fli&Yl~Orogs@EJW\OEffiM rnoomeaneso FJKladm8'.'t~fli6 P0§9E8'.bbft.3 Page ID #:ffl50

Document Number: 20
2
3
5 Attorney_s for Plaintiff

REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
LIMITED d/b/a Honey_Daddy.com;
17 Defendants.
18
19
23 action.
1
D
178
(242 of 416)
1 5. I served the party by: substituted service on Friday, August 5, 2016, at 11:00
5 Cyprus, in accordance with Fed R. Civ. P. 4(£) and The Hague Convention on
11 22350(b)(2).
14 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
179
(243 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
Recipient: Shipper:
STROVOLOS 2018 CY SUITE204
D
180
(244 of 416)

Document Number: 21
2

7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
17 Defendants.
18
19
24 action.
28
l
D
181
(245 of 416)
7 Cyprus, in accordance with Fed R. Civ. P. 4(t) and The Hague Convention on
13 22350(b)(2).
14 7. I declare under penalty ofpery·ury under the law of the State of Cal(fornia and
16 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
182
(246 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
Delivery lnfonnation:
STROVOLOS 2018
Shipping lnfonnation:
Recipient: Shipper:
FLOOR 1, FLAT 14 SUITE 204
D
183
(247 of 416)
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH - Caiifomia SBN 213829
I 1 s rre v ., mte 1670
4 Tel: (2r3) 443-6222
Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
GROUP, INC.· APIRILIACO
LIMITED d/b/a Honey_Daddy.com;
15 EASTFENERIDOU;E.C.A.
17 Defendants.
18
19
24 action.
28
I
D
184
(248 of 416)
13 22350(b)(2).
14 7. / declare under penalty ofperjury under the law of the State of California and
16 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
185
(249 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
Tracking number: 776806707008 Ship date: Jul 21, 2016
Recipient: Shipper:
D
186
(250 of 416)
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH - Cafifomia SBN 213829
1 1 s ire v ., mte 1670
4 Tel: (2f3) 443-6222
Fax: (877) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9

corporation,
11
12
vs.
13
14 GROUP INC.; APIRILIACO
LIMITED d/b/a Honeypaddy.com;
17 Defendants.
18
19
23 action.
I
D
187
(251 of 416)
9 Lake City, Utah, 84115, (801) 436-5550. The Tee for service was $53.55. I am
11 22350(b)(2).
14 correct.
MELINA HERNANDEZ
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
188
(252 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
Shipping lnfonnation:
Recipient: Shipper:
STROVOLOS 2018 CY SUITE 204
D
189
(253 of 416)
1 SMITH CORRELL LLP

MARK SMITH-Caiifomia SBN 213829
2 msmith acorrellsmith.com
1 7 1 s 1re v ., mte 1670
Tel: (2r3) 443-6222
4 Fax: (817) 730-5910
REFLEX MEDIA, INC.
6
7
8
9
10
11
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada
corporation,
l Case No. 8: 16-cv-795

12
vs.
13
14 GROUP, INC.; APIRILIACO
16 Does 1-1 0, inclusive,
17 Defendants.
18
19
22 Limited:
24 action.
28
I
D
190
(254 of 416)
13 22350(b)(2).
16 correct.
17 Dated: August 12, 2016 Isl Melina Hernandez
MELINA HERNANDEZ
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
D
191
(255 of 416)
August 9,2016
Dear Customer:
STROVOLOS 2018
Shipping lnfonnaUon:
Recipient: Shipper:
APIRILIACO REP OR OWNER JACOB l. FONNESBECK
D
192
(256 of 416)
COMPLAINT FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
DILUTION OF FAMOUS MARKS AND NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE, DATED AND FILED APRIL 27, 2016
EXHIBIT 1 TO COMPLAINT -
EMAIL FROM SEEKING ARRANGEMENT,
DATED MARCH 31, 2016
(REPRODUCED HEREIN AT P. 120)
EXHIBIT 2 TO COMPLAINT -
TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC SEARCH FOR SEEKING ARRANGEMENT
193
(257 of 416)
10/27/2017 CM/ECF - California Central District
ACCO,(JEMx),APPEAL,' . , • · · ., ·,DISCOVERY,MANADR

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Southern Division - Santa Ana)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 8:16-cv-00795-JFW-JEM
Reflex Media Inc. v. Gregory Chan et al Date Filed: 04/27/2016

Assigned to: Judge John F. Walter Date Terminated: 04/24/2017
Referred to: Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott Jury Demand: Both
Demand: $75,000 Nature of Suit: 840 Trademark
Case in other court: 9th CCA, 17-55505 Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Cause: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)
Plaintiff
Reflex Media Inc. represented by Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck
a Nevada corporation Smith Correll LLP
213-443-6222
Fax: 877-730-5910
Email: jfonnesbeck@smithcorrell.com
PROHACVICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MarkLSmith
Smith Correll LLP
213-443-6222
Fax: 877-730-5810
Email: msmith@smithcorrell.com
V.
Defendant
Gregory Chan represented by Matthew Lawrence Seror
Buchalter Nemer APC
213-891-0700
Fax:213-896-0400
Email: mseror@buchalter.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Defendant
Pylon Media Group, Inc. represented by Matthew Lawrence Seror
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
https //ecf.cacd uscourts gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?115205922656322-L_1_0-1 1/9
D
194
(258 of 416)
10/27/2017 CM/ECF - CallfomIa Central DIstnct
Defendant
Apiriliaco Limited represented by Howard R Price
doing business as Howard R Price Law Offices
HoneyDaddy.com 9663 Santa Monica Boulevard Suite 1250
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
310-277-8438
Fax: 323-935-5017
Email: hrprice@aol.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Michael T Conway
Shipman and Goodwin LLP
400 Park Avenue 5th Floor
New York, NY 10022
212-376-3010
Fax: 212-376-3024
Email: mconway@goodwin.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
Defendant
East Feneridou represented by Howard R Price
LEAD ATTORNEY
Michael T Conway
LEAD ATTORNEY
Defendant
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. represented by Howard R Price
LEAD ATTORNEY
Michael T Conway
LEAD ATTORNEY
Defendant
Does
1 through 10, inclusive
Date Filed # Docket Text

04/27/2016 l COMPLAINT Receipt No: 0973-17723618 - Fee: $400, filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media
Inc .. (Attachments: # l Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2) (Attorney Mark L Smith added to party
Reflex Media Inc. (pty:pla))(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
https://ecf.cacd.uscourts gov/cg1-b1n/Dk!Rpt pl?115205922656322-L_1_0-1 2/9
D
195
(259 of 416)
10/27/2017 CM/ECF - California Central D1stnct
04/27/2016 2. CIVIL COVER SHEET filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc.. (Smith, Mark) (Entered:
04/27/2016)
04/27/2016 .1 NOTICE oflnterested Parties filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc., identifying (1) Reflex
Media, Inc., (2) W8Tech.com Limited, (3) Clover8 Investments PTE. LTD .. (Smith, Mark)
(Entered: 04/27/2016)
04/27/2016 .4 Request for Clerk to Issue Summons on Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening) l filed
by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
04/28/2016 ~ NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT to District Judge John F. Walter and Magistrate Judge John
E. McDermott. (car) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
04/28/2016 Q NOTICE TO PARTIES OF COURT-DIRECTED ADR PROGRAM filed. (car) (Entered:
04/28/2016)
04/28/2016 1 NOTICE TO COUNSEL RE: Copyright, Patent and Trademark Reporting Requirements.
Counsel shall file the appropriate AO-120 and/or AO-121 form with the Clerk within 10
days. (car) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
04/29/2016 8 TEXT ONLY ENTRY by chambers of Judge John F. Walter. If not yet provided, courtesy
copies of all case opening documents shall be delivered to chambers by 10:30 a.m. on May
2, 2016. (Refer to Court's Standing Order, and Local Rule 5-4.5) Failure to comply may
result in an Order to Show Cause re Dismissal and/or Sanctions for Failure to Comply with
Rules. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (kss)
TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/29/2016)
04/29/2016 2 STANDING ORDER by Judge John F. Walter. This action has been assigned to the
calendar of Judge John F. Walter. Both the Court and counsel bear responsibility for the
progress of litigation in Federal Court. READ THIS ORDER CAREFULLY. IT
CONTROLS THE CASE AND DIFFERS IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THE LOCAL
RULES. (kss) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
04/29/2016 lQ REPORT ON THE FILING OF AN ACTION Regarding a Patent or a Trademark (Initial
Notification) filed by Reflex Media Inc .. (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
05/02/2016 11 DECLARATION of Mark Smith Lead Trial Counsel Re: Compliance with Local Rules
Governing Electronic Filing filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Smith, Mark) (Entered:
05/02/2016)
05/05/2016 12 21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening) las to Defendants
Apiriliaco Limited, Gregory Chan, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou, Pylon
Media Group, Inc. (car) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
06/09/2016 ll NOTICE of Appearance filed by attorney Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck on behalf of Plaintiff
Reflex Media Inc. (Attorney Jacob Lex Fonnesbeck added to party Reflex Media Inc.
(pty:pla))(Fonnesbeck, Jacob) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
06/09/2016 14 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc., upon Defendant Pylon
Media Group, Inc. served on 6/2/2016, answer due 6/23/2016. Service of the Summons
and Complaint were executed upon Pylon Media Group, Inc. in compliance with Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by personal service.Original Summons NOT returned.
(Fonnesbeck, Jacob) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
06/16/2016 li PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc., upon Defendant Gregory
Chan served on 6/10/2016, answer due 7/1/2°016. Service of the Summons and Complaint
were executed upon Gregory Chan in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
substituted service at home address and by also mailing a copy.Original Summons NOT
returned. (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
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07/15/2016 16 ANSWER to Complaint (Attorney Civil Case Opening) 1 JURY DEMAND .. (Attorney
Matthew Lawrence Seror added to party Gregory Chan(pty:dft), Attorney Matthew
Lawrence Seror added to party Pylon Media Group, Inc.(pty:dft))(Seror, Matthew)
(Entered: 07/15/2016)
07/15/2016 11 NOTICE oflnterested Parties filed by Defendant Gregory Chan, Pylon Media Group, Inc.,
identifying Gregory Chan and Pylon Media Group, Inc .. (Seror, Matthew) (Entered:
07/15/2016)
07/20/2016 18 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge John F. Walter: Counsel are hereby notified
that a Scheduling Conference has been set for 8/29/2016 at 08:30 AM before Judge John F.
Walter. Lead Trial Counsel shall attend all proceedings before this Court, including the
Scheduling Conference. Counsel are directed to comply with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 26-1 in a timely fashion and to file a Joint Report, on or
before 8/15/2016. Gp) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
08/12/2016 19 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc., upon Defendant Apiriliaco
Limited served on 8/5/2016, answer due 8/26/2016. Service of the Summons and
Complaint were executed upon Apiriliaco Limited in compliance with Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by method of service not specified.Original Summons NOT returned.
(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
08/12/2016 20 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc., upon Defendant East
Feneridou served on 8/5/2016, answer due 8/26/2016. Service of the Summons and
Complaint were executed upon East Feneridou in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by method of service not specified.Original Summons NOT returned. (Smith,
Mark) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
08/12/2016 n PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Reflex Media _Inc., upon Defendant E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. served on 8/5/2016, answer due 8/26/2016. Service of the
Summons and Complaint were executed upon E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. in
compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by method of service not
specified.Original Summons NOT returned. (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
08/15/2016 22 JOINT REPORT Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan; estimated length of trial 1 week, filed by
Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc ... (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
08/17/2016 23 ORDER VACATING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND REFERRAL TO PRIVATE
MEDIATION by Judge John F. Walter. The Court has reviewed the parties' Joint Rule
26(f) Report and finds that a Scheduling Conference is not necessary. The hearing on
August 29, 2016 is vacated and taken off calendar. A Scheduling and Case Management
Order will issue. Any unserved DOE defendants are dismissed at this time. Case ordered to
a private mediator based upon a stipulation of the parties or by the court order. ADR
Proceeding to be held no later than February 1, 2017. Gloz) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
08/17/2016 24 SCHEDULING AND CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER by Judge John F. Walter. The
purpose of this Order is to notify the parties and their counsel of the deadlines and the
schedule that will govern this action. SEE THE LAST PAGE OF THIS ORDER FOR THE
SPECIFIED DATES. ( Jury Trial set for 5/23/2017 at 08:30 AM and Pretrial Conference
set for 5/5/2017 at 10:00 AM before Judge John F. Walter.) Gloz) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
11/07/2016 25 NOTICE TO PARTIES by District Judge John F. Walter. Effective November 14, 2016,
Judge Walter will be located at the 1st Street Courthouse, COURTROOM 7A on the 7th
floor, located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All Court appearances
shall be made in Courtroom 7A of the 1st Street Courthouse, and all mandatory chambers
copies shall be hand delivered to Chambers, not to the Clerk's Office. The location for
filing civil documents in paper fonnat exempted from electronic filing and for viewing
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case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North
Spring Street, Room G-8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing criminal
documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at Edward R. Roybal
Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles,
California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/07/2016)
11/14/2016 26 APPLICATION for Clerk to Enter Default against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Smith, Mark)
(Entered: 11/14/2016)
11/15/2016 27 NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY Re: APPLICATION for Clerk to Enter Default against
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou 26. The
Clerk cannot enter the requested relief as: Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded
to the assigned Judge. Clerk is NOT authorized process Default. Due to the complexities in
the service of summons and complaint of corporation in foreign country. GP) (Entered:
11/15/2016)
11/21/2016 28 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
AGAINST: (1) APIRILIACO LIMITED D/B/A HONEYDADDY.COM; (2) EAST
FENERIDOU; AND (3) E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD. 26 by Judge John F.
Walter: Plaintiff's Application is DENIED without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Gloz)
(Entered: 11/21/2016)
01/23/2017 29 REQUEST for Clerk to Enter Default against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A.
Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Attachments:
# l Exhibit 1, # 2. Exhibit 2, # .l Exhibit 3, # i Exhibit 4, #~Exhibit 5, # 2 Exhibit 6, # 1
Exhibit 7) (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
01/23/2017 30 NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY Re: REQUEST for Clerk to Enter Default against Defendants
Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou 29 . The Clerk cannot
enter the requested relief as: Request for Entry of Default has been forwarded to the
assigned Judge. The Request for default is sent to the Judge for review. The clerk is not
authorized to do a default on defendant (s) in a foreign country. (lorn) (Entered:
01/23/2017)
02/08/2017 .ll JOINT REPORT of Alternative Dispute Resolution filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc ..
(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
02/14/2017 32 MINUTE (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING Request for Entry of Default against
Defendants Apiriliaco Limited dba HoneyDaddy.com; East Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd 29 by Judge John F. Walter: Plaintiff Request is GRANTED. The Clerk
shall enter default against Defendants ApiriliacoLimited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East
Feneridou; and E.C.A. Kartoit Secretarial Ltd. Plaintiff shall file an Application for
Default Judgment by 2/21/2017. GP) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
02/14/2017 33 DEFAULT BY CLERK F.R.Civ.P.55(a) as to Defendants Apiriliaco Limited dba
HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, E.C.A. Kartoit Secretarial Ltd. Pursuant to Minute
Order 32. GP) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
02/15/2017 34 NOTICE filed by Defendants Gregory Chan, Pylon Media Group, Inc .. re Firm Name
Change (Seror, Matthew) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
02/21/2017 35 First APPLICATION for Default Judgment against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com; East Feneridou; E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. filed by Plaintiff Reflex
Media Inc .. Application set for hearing on 3/20/2017 at 01 :30 PM before Judge John F.
Walter. (Attachments:# l Declaration Declaration of Mark L. Smith in Support of
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Application for Default Judgment,# 2. Exhibit Complaint (Dkt. No. 1, with exhibits),# J
Proposed Order [Proposed] Judgment) (Fonnesbeck, Jacob) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
03/07/2017 .3..6 ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFAULTED DEFENDANTS APIRILIACO LIMITED d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com; EAST FEDERIDOU; AND E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.
35 by Judge John F. Walter: Plaintiffs Application is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file a
proposed Judgment consistent with this Order by March 10, 2017. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gloz) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
03/09/2017 .ll NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice
(Other) 34. The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event
is: Change of Address. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or
correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court
deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until
the court directs you to do so. (lorn) (Entered: 03/09/2017)
03/10/2017 38 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re Order on Motion for Default Judgment, 36 (Attachments:
# l Attachment)(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
03/14/2017 12 JUDGMENT against Defaulted Defendants Apiriliaco Limited dba HoneyDaddy.com;
East Feneridou; and E.C.A. kartoir Secretarial Ltd by Judge John F. Walter, it hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows: (1) The Application (Dkt. 35) is
granted. (2) Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Reflex Media, Inc., and
against Apiriliaco Limited dba HoneyDaddy.com, East Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd., jointly and severally, for the total sum of $2,044,278.21, calculated as
follows: (a) $2,000,000.00 (statutory damages); plus (b) $43,600.00 (attorneys fees); plus
(c) $678.21 (costs). GP) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
04/03/2017 40 Effective April 10, 2017, Judge McDermott will be located at the Edward R. Roybal
Federal Building, COURTROOM 630 on the 6th Floor, located at 255 East Temple Street,
Los Angeles, California 90012. All court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 630 of
the Roybal Federal Building, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to
the judge's mailbox located outside the Clerk's Office on the 1st Floor of the Roybal
Federal Building. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from
electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United
States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G-8, Los Angeles, California 90012.
The location for filing criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing
remains at the Roybal Federal Building, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles,
California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/03/2017)
04/04/2017 41 [STRICKEN] NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Vacate Judgment,, 39 filed by
defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou. Motion set
for hearing on 5/8/2017 at Ol :30 PM before Judge John F. Walter. (Attachments: # l
Declaration Declaration ofVasilif Zertalis, # 2. Proposed Order) (Attorney Michael T
Conway added to party Apiriliaco Limited (pty:dft), Attorney Michael T Conway added to
party E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.(pty:dft), Attorney Michael T Conway added to party
East Feneridou(pty:dft)) (Conway, Michael) Modified on 4/12/2017 Gloz). (Entered:
04/04/2017)
04/12/2017 42 TEXT ENTRY ORDER by Judge John F. Walter. The Motion to Vacate Judgment filed on
April 4, 2017 (Docket No. 41 ) is stricken for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3 which
requires the conference of counsel to take place at least seven days prior to the filing of the
Motion and paragraph 5(b) of the Court's Standing Order which requires the Joint
Statement to be filed three days after the Local Rule 7-3 Conference. If Defendants wish to
re-file the Motion, counsel shall meet and confer in person by April 19, 2017. If the parties
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cannot resolve the issues raised in the Motion, within 3 days of the meet and confer, each
party shall file a declaration setting forth the issues resolved at the conference and those
issues that were not resolved with a detailed explanation of why those issues could not be
resolved. If a Motion remains necessary, it shall not be filed until 2 days after each party
files the declaration required by this Order. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. Gloz) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/12/2017)
04/13/2017 43 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals filed by Defendant Apiriliaco
Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou. Appeal of Judgment,, 39.
(Appeal Fee - $505 Fee Paid, Receipt No. 0973-19684438.) (Conway, Michael) (Entered:
04/13/2017)
04/14/2017 44 NOTIFICATION from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of case number assigned and
briefing schedule. Appeal Docket No. 17-55505 assigned to Notice of Appeal to 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 43 as to Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou. (lorn) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
04/21/2017 45 STIPULATION to Dismiss Defendants Pylon Media Group, Inc., Gregory Chan filed by
Defendants Pylon Media Group, Inc., Gregory Chan. (Attachments: # l Proposed Order)
(Seror, Matthew) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
04/24/2017 46 ORDER On Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendants Gregory chan and Pylon media
Group, Inc., Without Prejudice 45 by Judge John F. Walter that the above captioned case is
hereby dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Gregory Chan and Pylon Media
Group, Inc. only. Each Party to bear bear its own costs, expenses, and attorneys fees that it
has incurred in connection with or arising out of this lawsuit. (Made JS-6. Case
Terminated.) GP) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
04/24/2017 47 REPORT ON THE DETERMINATION OF AN ACTION Regarding a Patent or
Trademark. (Closing). (Attachments:# l Order on Stipulation of Dismissal) GP) (Entered:
04/24/2017)
04/24/2017 48 DECLARATION of Michael T. Conway re (TERMED) Text Only Scheduling Notice,,,, 42
filed by Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou.
(Conway, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
06/15/2017 49 ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 43 filed by Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East
Feneridou. CCA # 17-55505. The motion for a limited remand is denied without prejudice
to filing a renewed motion accompanied by an indication that the district court is willing to
entertain the proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) motion. (mat) (Entered:
06/19/2017)
08/15/2017 50 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION MOTION for Consideration of Request for
Indicative Ruling filed by defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
East Feneridou. Motion set for hearing on 9/11/2017 at 01 :30 PM before Judge John F.
Walter. (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 08/15/2017)
08/21/2017 .il OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION MOTION for Consideration of
Request for Indicative Ruling 50 filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Attachments:# l
Declaration of Mark L. Smith,# 2. Exhibit I,# J Exhibit 2, # i Exhibit 3, #~Exhibit 4, # Q
Exhibit 5, # 1 Exhibit 6, # .8. Exhibit 7, # .2 Exhibit 8, # lQ Exhibit 9)(Smith, Mark)
(Entered: 08/21/2017)
08/29/2017 52 Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Consideration, 50 filed by defendants Apiriliaco
Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou. (Conway, Michael) (Entered:
08/29/2017)
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09/01/2017 53 STATEMENT re Compliance with Meet and Confer Requirements for Defendants' Motion
for Indicative Ruling filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc. (Smith, Mark) (Entered:
09/01/2017)
09/12/2017 54 DECLARATION of Howard R. Price as Lead Counsel filed by Defendant Gregory Chan.
(Price, Howard) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
09/13/2017 55 MOTION FOR INDICATIVE RULING; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF MICHAEL T. CONWAY re First APPLICATION
for Default Judgment against Defendants Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com; East
Feneridou; E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. Ji filed by Defendants Apiriliaco Limited,
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou. (Conway, Michael) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
09/14/2017 56 DECLARATION of Howard R. Price as Lead Counsel filed by Defendant Apiriliaco
Limited. (Price, Howard) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
09/14/2017 57 DECLARATION of Howard R. Price as Lead Counsel filed by Defendant E.C.A. Kartoir
Secretarial Ltd.. (Price, Howard) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
09/14/2017 58 DECLARATION of Howard R. Price as Lead Counsel filed by Defendant East Feneridou.
(Price, Howard) (Entered: 09/14/2017)
09/25/2017 59 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Indicative Ruling (Dkt. 55)
filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Attachments:# l Exhibit 1, # 2. Exhibit 2, # J Exhibit
3, #~Exhibit 4, # 5. Exhibit 5, #~Exhibit 6, # 1 Exhibit 7, # .8. Exhibit 8, # .2 Exhibit 9, #
lQ Declaration of Mark L. Smith)(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
10/02/2017 60 REPLY filed by Defendants Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East
Feneridou to Motion Related Document, 55 in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition [Dkt. 59] to
Defendants' Motion for Indicative Ruling [Dkt. 55} (Conway, Michael) (Entered:
10/02/2017)
10/03/2017 61 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Reply,
60. The following error(s) was/were found: Incorrect event selected. Correct event to be
used is: Reply (Motion related). Other error(s) with document(s): To find the correct
efiling event, see: Motions and Related Filings - Responses, Replies and Other Motion
Related Documents - Reply (Motion related). In response to this notice, the Court may: (1)
order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3)
take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response
to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (lorn) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
10/04/2017 62 NOTICE OF LODGING filed Proposed Statement ofDecision re Motion Related
Document, 55 (Attachments:# l Proposed Order)(Smith, Mark) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
10/04/2017 63 NOTICE of Appearance filed by attorney Howard R Price on behalf of Defendants
Apiriliaco Limited, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd., East Feneridou (Attorney Howard R
Price added to party Apiriliaco Limited (pty:dft), Attorney Howard R Price added to party
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.(pty:dft), Attorney Howard R Price added to party East
Feneridou(pty:dft))(Price, Howard) (Entered: 10/04/2017)
10/05/2017 64 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re Motion Related Document, 55 (Attachments:# l
Proposed Order)(Conway, Michael) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
10/12/2017 65 ORDER TAKING UNDER SUBMISSION DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
INDICATIVE RULING 55 by Judge John F. Walter. Defendants' Motion for Indicative
Ruling is currently on calendar for October 16, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. Pursuant to Rule 78 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter
is appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for October 16,
2017 is hereby vacated and the matter is taken off calendar. The matter will be deemed
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submitted on the vacated hearing date and the clerk will notify the parties when the Court
has reached a decision. IT IS SO ORDERED. Gloz) (Entered: l 0/13/2017)
10/17/2017 66 NOTICE of Change of address by Mark L Smith attorney for Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc ..
Changing attorneys address to 11601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2080, Los Angeles, CA 90025.
Filed by Plaintiff Reflex Media Inc .. (Smith, Mark) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
10/17/2017 67 MINUTE (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING Defendants Motion for Indicative
Ruling 55 by Judge John F. Walter: Defendants Motion is DENIED without prejudice to
re-filing their Motion, if appropriate and if necessary, after the conclusion of Defendants
appeal. GP) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
PACER Service Center I

Transaction Receipt I
1
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1::::========10=12=1=12=0=11=0=9::::::;:38;:::::s=6========:1
lsg068989:2712850:4514800 1~:::: 100-000 00 I
I s:16-cv-00795-
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Description:Docket Report ISe~rc~ JFW-JEM End
Cntena: date: 10/27/2017
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9th Circuit Case Number(s) 17-55505
NOTE: To secure your input, you should print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator).
*********************************************************************************
When All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system
on (date) .
November 20, 2017
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be
accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
Signature (use "s/" format) s/Michael T. Conway
*********************************************************************************
When Not All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System
on (date) .
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate
CM/ECF system.
I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I
have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it
to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following
non-CM/ECF participants:
Signature (use "s/" format)

(267 of 416)
No. 17-55505

for the
Ninth Circuit

Plaintiff-Appellee,
– v. –

___________________________
OPENING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

APIRILIACO LIMITED, dba HONEYDADDY.COM,
EAST FENERIDOU, and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.

New York, New York 10022 (310) 277-8438
(212) 376-3010

(268 of 416)
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Apiriliaco Limited and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. are not subsidiaries of
publically traded companies.
i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv

I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................................................................1
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ..........................................................................................1
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................2
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................5
V. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................7
a. The Default Judgment was Void Because the Court Lacked Personal
Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Defendants and Service of Process of Defective. ..8
i. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction..........................................................8
ii. The Purported Service of Process Was Defective ...................................11
b. The Judgment was Void Because it was Prematurely Entered by the District
Court. ....................................................................................................................16
c. The Default Judgment is Void Because it is Based Solely on Only
Unsubstantiated Evidence and a Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel Attesting to
Damages. ..............................................................................................................17
d. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the Eitel Factors and Default Judgment Should Not
Have Been Entered. ..............................................................................................24
i. There is No Merit to Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim and Defendant Has a
Meritorious Defense. .........................................................................................24
a. Defendants Did Not Use an Infringing or Counterfeit Mark in
Commerce ......................................................................................................26
b. Plaintiff Did Not Demonstrate a Likelihood of Confusion and the Fair
Use Exception Applies ..................................................................................29
ii. The Complaint is Insufficient...................................................................33
iii. The Sum of the Money at Stake. ..............................................................34
iv. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the Issues on the Merits 34
v. There is a Dispute Concerning Material Facts .........................................36
vi. The Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect ............................................36
vii. Policy Weighs in Favor of Vacating the Default .....................................38
ii
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e. Attorneys’ Fees Should Not Have Been Awarded ........................................39

f. The Complaint Should be Dismissed Under FRCP Upon Vacating the
Default Due the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction .....................................................40
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 44
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ................................................................... 45
iii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Advanced Tactical Ordinance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,

751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014) ......................................................................... 11
Ballard v. Savage,
65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir.1995) .......................................................................... 41
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe,

141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir.1998) ....................................................................... 39
Breaking the Chain Found., Inc. v. Capitol Educ. Support, Inc.,

589 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2008) ................................................................ 20
Brockmeyer v. May,
383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 14
Burdick v. Super. Ct.,

183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2015) ............................................ 10
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462 (1985) ........................................................................................ 9
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,

292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................... 30
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc.

653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.2011) ....................................................................... 11
Community Dental Services v. Tani,

282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................... 34
Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co.,

125 F.3d 28 (2d. Cir. 1997) .......................................................................... 31
Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara,

183 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 1999) ......................................................................... 21
iv
(272 of 416)
Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America,

980 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................... 23
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech Assoc., Inc.,

557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.1997) .................................................................40, 41
Davis v. Fendler,
650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981) ....................................................................... 17
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................... 41
Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) ....................................................24, 34, 36, 39
Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc,

54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................... 7
Falk v. Allen,
739 F.2d 461 (9th Cir., 1984) ............................................................35, 37, 38
Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt. Inc.,

618 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010). ..................................................................... 30
Franchise Holdings II, LLC v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc.,

375 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 19
Geddes v. United Fin. Grp.,

559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977) ..................................................................17, 23
Gordon and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute of Physics,

166 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.1999) .......................................................................... 39
Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp.,

973 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1992) ......................................................................... 18
Hawaii Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone,

794 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.1986) .......................................................................... 26
In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.,

759 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................ 8
v
(273 of 416)
Intl. Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unempl. Compen. and Placement,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) ..................................................................................9, 11
Jackson v. Beech,
636 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ...................................................................... 17
Johnson v. Jones,
149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) ............................................................. 39-40, 41
Jones v. Giles,
741 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1984) .......................................................................... 8
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,

408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 31
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanco Solutions, Inc.,

658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011). .................................................................28, 29
Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp.,

960 F2d 849 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................................ 11
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,

326 U.S. 438 (1946) ...................................................................................... 11
Monge v. Portofino Ristorante,

751 F. Supp. 2d 789 (D. Md. 2010) .............................................................. 18
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306 (1950) ........................................................................................ 8
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.,

971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................... 33
Oceanic Trading Corp. v. Vessel Diana,

423 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970) .......................................................................20, 21
Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Wolff & Co.,

484 U.S. 97 (1987) ........................................................................................ 11
vi
(274 of 416)
Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy,

453 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................... 10
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,

155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.1998) ......................................................................... 40
Pena v. Seguros La Comerical, S.A.,

770 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................ 39
Phillip Morris USA, Inc., v. Castworld Products, Inc.,

219 F.R.D. 494 (C.D. Cal. 2003) .................................................................. 23
Quach v. Cross,
2004 WL 2862285 (C.D.Ca. December 3, 2004) ......................................... 38
Redding Ford v. California State Bd. of Equalization,

722 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 7
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.,

374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 41
SEC v. Internet Sols. For Bus. Inc.,

509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................... 7
Sher v. Johnson,
911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir.1990) ........................................................................ 41
Spivey v. United States,

912 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................... 21
Stephenson v. El-Batrawi,
524 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 18
TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber,

244 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................35, 37, 38
Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica,

614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.1980) .................................................................12, 40
vii
(275 of 416)
Thomson v. Anderson,
113 Cal.App 4th 258 (Cal. Crt. App. 2003) ................................................... 9
United Artists Corp. v. Freeman,

605 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1979) ..................................................................17, 18
Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace
Young Inc.,
109 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 18
U2 Home Entm't, Inc. v. Fu Shun Wang,

482 F. Supp. 2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) .......................................................... 18
United States v. Berke,

170 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................... 7-8
United States v Iscandari,

C11- 0797 JSC, 2012 WL 2568187 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012 ........................ 35
United States v. State of Wash.,

98 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) ........................................................................ 24
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Lacey,

510 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D. Ala. 2007) .......................................................... 18
Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth.,

653 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 8
Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon,

137 S. Ct. 1504 (2017)................................................................................... 14
Statutes, Rules & Secondary Sources
10A WRIGHT, MILLER, § 2688 ................................................................................. 18

15 U.S.C. §1114 ......................................................................................................... 2
15 U.S.C. §1115 ....................................................................................................... 30
15 U.S.C. § 1116 ................................................................................................28, 29
15 U.S.C. §1117 ...........................................................................................25, 28, 29
viii
(276 of 416)
15 U.S.C. §1125 ...................................................................................................2, 30

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................ 1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................ 1
Article 5 of the Hague Convention .......................................................................... 13
Article 10 of the Hague Convention ........................................................................ 14
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 ................................................................................. 2
Cal.Code Civ.Pro § 410.10 ........................................................................................ 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4 ......................................................................................passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 .....................................................................................40, 41
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 54 ........................................................................................... 23
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 55 ........................................................................................... 23
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 .........................................................................3, 4, 7, 12, 40
Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 6:131 (2003) ............................................. 23
ix
(277 of 416)
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction of this case involving claims
under the Federal Lanham Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from the District Court's final
Judgment, which was entered on March 14, 2017. [R. 1]. Defendants-Appellants
Apiriliaco Limited d/b/a HoneyDaddy.com, E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd.,
(together the “Corporate Defendants”) and East Feneridou (“Feneridou”,
collectively with the Corporate Defendants, the “Defendants”) filed their Notice of
Appeal on April 13, 2017. [R. 3]. This Court granted a thirty (30) day extension of
time to file the opening brief on September 21, 2017. This Court granted a second
thirty (30) day extension of time to file the opening brief on October 21, 2017. Thus,
the opening brief is due on November 20, 2017 and is timely.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the Trial Court Have Personal Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Defendants?
2. Was Service of Process Proper Under the Applicable Laws?
3. Was Entry of the Judgment Premature?
4. Did Plaintiff’s Submit Sufficient Evidence for an Award of Statutory
Damages?
5. Did Plaintiff’s Establish Entitlement to Default Judgment?
6. Should Attorneys’ Fees Have Been Awarded?
1
(278 of 416)
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This cases arises from Plaintiff’s filing of a Complaint for trademark
infringement; unfair competition; dilution of famous marks; and negligent
interference with prospective advantage on April 27, 2016 (the “Complaint”) [R.
102]. As for the basis of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants, two
foreign entities located in Cyprus and an individual who is last believed to reside in
Cyprus, used a display name containing the combined words “Seeking” and
“Arrangement” in e-mail advertisements, which infringed upon Plaintiff’s trademark
“SEEKING ARRANGMENT” (the “Mark”). It is from this usage of the words
“Seeking” and “Arrangement” that Plaintiff claims Defendants are jointly and
severally liable on the five causes of action alleged in the Complaint: (i) Federal
Trademark Infringement 15 U.S.C. §1114(1); (ii) Federal False Designations, False
Descriptions, and False Advertising, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a); (iii) Dilution of Famous
Marks, 15 U.S.C. §1125(c); (iv) Unfair Competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§17200, et. seq.; and (v) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage.
The alleged service of the summons and complaint made upon the Defendants
was via Federal Express (“FedEx”). [R. 184-192]. This service was made at an
address other than the Corporate Defendants’ principal place of business. [R. 38].
This service was not made at Feneridou’s principal residence nor was there any
2
(279 of 416)
suggestion by Plaintiff that a follow up mailing was made to Feneridou’s residence.
[R. 41]. This service was made upon an individual described only as “MARIOS”,
who was not an individual authorized to accept service on their behalf. [R. 40].
Therefore, none of the Defendants were properly served. Despite the improper
service, a default judgment was entered against them, jointly and severally, in favor
of Plaintiff in the amount of $2,044,278.21. Because service was improper, the
Judgment should be vacated under FRCP Rule 60(b)(4).
In summary, service was improper for a number of reasons: (1) service on the
Corporate Defendants was made by mail at a place other than their principal place
of business; (2) service on all Defendants was made by mailing to an individual who
was not employed by the Corporate Defendants or authorized by any of the
Defendants to accept service on behalf of any of them; (3) service on Anatoli
Feneridou, the former employee of the Corporate Defendants was made by mail to
a place that was not her place of business, addressed with the name “East Feneridou,”
a name that was not her actual name, and no subsequent mailing was made to her
residence; and (4) the law of Cyprus does not permit service by mail unless it is
based on a court order, which the Plaintiffs did not obtain in this instance.
Although Plaintiff never attempted proper service on any of the Defendants,
Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment relying on the patently deficient service
described above and falsely attested to in the proofs of service filed with the Court
3
(280 of 416)
[R. 171]. Plaintiff filed an Application for Default Judgment on February 21, 2017
[R. 51] (the “Application”). The Application was granted by Order of the Court dated
March 7, 2017 [R. 49] (the “Order”). On March 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Lodging requesting entry of final judgment [R. 45] (the “Notice of Lodging”), which
contained hearing dates of March 20, 2017 and March 27, 2017. The proposed
judgment was entered by the Court on March 14, 2017 [R. 1]. Due to Plaintiff’s
failure to effect lawful service on any of the Defendants, the Court had no
jurisdiction over any of the Defendants. Accordingly, the Judgment is void and
should be vacated pursuant to FRCP Rule 60(b)(4).
Alternatively, if the Court were to find service was lawful, the Judgment
should still be vacated pursuant to FRCP Rule 60(b)(1) because Defendants’ failure
to appear was based on their lack of knowledge of the action and inability to defend,
even though they have meritorious defenses. Thus, even if the Court will not set
aside the default, it should still vacate the Judgment and allow Defendants to contest
the damages associated with any default judgment. Here, a judgment in excess of $2
million was entered without any admissible evidence that Plaintiff actually suffered
damages at any level, and certainly no evidence of a willful violation of the Lanham
Act. As detailed in the Declaration of Vasilis Zertalis dated April 3, 2017, the only
documents actually received by Defendants were the Notice of Lodging and the
accompanying copy of the previously filed Application [R. 39-40], which contained
4
(281 of 416)
two return dates, i.e., March 20, 2017 and March 28, 2017 [R. 51], both of which
dates were after the March 14, 2017 date Judgment was actually entered [R. 1]. The
use of two “return dates” was and is confusing and misleading, especially to foreign
Defendants. [R. 39-40].
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Apiriliaco is a Cyprus company which does not have a physical location in,
or do business in, California or elsewhere in the United States. [R. 42]. Kartoir is a
Cyprus company which does not have a physical location in or does business in
California or elsewhere in the United States, and merely serves as the corporate
secretary for Apriliaco. [R. 38]. Anatoli Feneridou is a former director of the
Corporate Defendants who ceased working in such capacity prior to the
commencement of this action. [R. 38]. The principal place of business for the
Corporate Defendants is not the address to where the papers were allegedly served.
[R. 40].
The Court can take judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge, Cyprus,
including its capital, Nicosia, has been divided into two separate “countries” by a
wall and buffer zone between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus since 1974.
Accordingly, FedEx delivery to an office in Nicosea is problematic at best and, in
any event, there is no guarantee that due notice of the pendency of an action pending
5
(282 of 416)
in the federal courts of the United States involving the alleged infringement of an
alleged United States trademark will be delivered to its intended recipient.
In its proofs of service [R. 184-192], Plaintiff claims that service on
Defendants was completed on August 5, 2016 via FedEx. However, a review of the
facts demonstrates that Defendants were not properly served in a manner that would
give them reasonable notice of this action, which is evident on the face of the proofs
of service themselves. They consist, in main part, of (i) a statement by the affiant
that the documents were sent via FedEx to each of the Defendants at 11 Souliou,
Vamiko 5, Floor 1, Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cyprus and (ii) a copy of the FedEx
digital printout showing a package was delivered to “MARIOS” with no description
of the individual or any other description of the relationship between “MARIOS”
and the Defendants. No return receipt was requested and none was provided to
Plaintiff or to the Court.
This evidence is insufficient to show proper service on any party under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and here it conclusively demonstrates that there
was no service made on any of the Defendants. Specifically, 11 Souliou, Vamiko 5,
Floor 1, Flat 14, Strovolos 2018 Cyprus is not the principal place of business for any
of the Defendants. [R. 40]. In the case of Feneridou, she had ceased working for the
Corporate Defendants prior to the August 5, 2016 service, and, even if she had not,
there is no evidence that an attempt was made to serve her at her place of residence
6
(283 of 416)
or that a subsequent mailing was made thereto. [R. 40-41]. There is no employee of
either of the Corporate Defendants named “MARIOS,” nor is there anyone named
“MARIOS” who was authorized to accept service on behalf of any of the
Defendants. [R. 40]. Indeed, there is insufficient evidence that the summons and
complaint were ever served on Defendants at their principal place of business upon
an agent authorized to accept service or that an attempt was ever made to ensure that
international service was effectuated properly so as to give reasonable notice to any
of the Defendants.
V. ARGUMENT
Here, the Default Judgment is void because the District Court lacked
jurisdiction. Whether a judgment is void is a question of law reviewable de novo
on appeal. See, e.g., Redding Ford v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 722 F.2d
496, 497 (9th Cir. 1983); see, also, Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc., 54 F.3d
1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We review de novo … a district court's ruling upon
a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a [default] judgment as void, because the
question of the validity of a judgment is a legal one”); SEC v. Internet Sols. For Bus.
Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (whether default judgment is void because
of lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service is reviewed de novo). A
“final judgment is ‘void' purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court ... acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law.” United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882,
7
(284 of 416)
883 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985);
Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1984). Due process requires that any
deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit
Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2011); citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Accordingly, this Court should review the
District Court’s granting of default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor de novo because the
Judgment is void by virtue of the lack of due process afforded to Defendants as it
was based upon defective service and inadequate notice.
a. The Default Judgment was Void Because the Court

Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over the Foreign
Defendants and Service of Process of Defective.
i. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction
The existence of personal jurisdiction over a party to a lawsuit is perhaps the
most important part of a complaint. Where there is no personal jurisdiction
established -- particularly over a nonresident -- the plaintiff cannot obtain relief, and
the courts will not allow a lawsuit to go forward. In California, courts may exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents “on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal.Code Civ.Pro § 410.10. For
personal jurisdiction to attach, due process requires that a nonresident party have
certain minimum contacts with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does
8
(285 of 416)
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Intl. Shoe Co. v.
State of Wash., Off. of Unempl. Compen. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Furthermore, the “substantial connection between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Thomson v. Anderson, 113
Cal.App 4th 258, 266 (Cal. Crt. App. 2003). (internal citations omitted.)
It is well-established that personal jurisdiction may be general or specific.
General jurisdiction attaches where a nonresident defendant's contacts are
“substantial ... continuous and systematic.” Thomson, 113 Cal.App 4th at 265.
(internal citations omitted.) Specific jurisdiction attaches where that defendant “has
purposely availed himself or herself of forum benefits” and the “controversy is
related to or arises out of a defendant's contact with the forum.” Id at 266. (internal
citations omitted.) See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463
(1985). Where a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, it is the
plaintiff who bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to substantiate
personal jurisdiction. Indeed, “the plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that the
conduct of the defendants related to the pleaded causes is such as to constitute
constitutionally cognizable minimum contacts.” Thomson, 113 Cal.App 4th at 266.
9
(286 of 416)
(internal citations omitted). The existence of personal jurisdiction, when such is in
dispute, is a question of fact, to be determined by the court.
There cannot be a finding of personal jurisdiction over Defendants, either
generally or specifically. There is no evidence that Feneridou, an individual, ever
visited California or has any direct contacts with the United States at all. Likewise,
there is no evidence that the Corporate Defendants have ever conducted business in
the United States. Defendants own no property in California, have never owned any
property, had offices or personnel here, or anywhere else in the United States. At
best, only a small percentage of Apiriliaco’s customers may have a connection to
California. The only conceivable connection to California is Apiriliaco’s website
and e-mail advertisements.
A passive website and domain name alone are insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, this is not even alleged; rather, Plaintiff’s only allegations are that there was
an e-mail advertisement and a phone number with a California area code, which
phone number in and of itself does not make any of the Defendants a California
resident or subject to its jurisdiction. No allegation is made that any advertisements
were specifically directed towards California or that there were any deliberate
actions directed toward California; therefore, there is no specific jurisdiction.
Burdick v. Super. Ct., 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2015), citing,
10
(287 of 416)
Advanced Tactical Ordinance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d
796 (7th Cir. 2014). Defendants’ alleged acts do “not support general jurisdiction
because the [alleged wrong] was not a ‘continuous and systematic’ forum activity,
but was, rather, a few discrete acts over a relatively short period of time”.
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc. 653 F.3d 1066, 1074-1075 (9th Cir.2011),
citing, International Shoe, 131 S.Ct. at 2852. “Marketing to forum residents, where
such marketing does not result in substantial and continuous commerce with the
forum, does not support general jurisdiction.” CollegeSource, Inc. at 1075.
ii. The Purported Service of Process Was Defective
A federal court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
without proper service of process. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97, 104 (1987)[(citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-
445, (1946)]. “Unless service is waived, proof of service must be made to the court.”
FRCP Rule 4(1)(1).
A default judgment is void when the defendant shows the service of process
was insufficient and the court, therefore, lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, regardless of whether the defendant had notice of the underlying
proceeding. Internet Solutions for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d at 1165; Mason v. Genisco
Tech. Corp., 960 F2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.1992). If the court deems that process was
not sufficient, the judgment is void and must be vacated:
11
(288 of 416)
There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion

is under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is
when default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving
party show that he has a meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void
or it is valid.
Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir.1980) (internal citation omitted); see also Internet Sols.,
509 F.3d, supra, at 1165.
Plaintiff’s proof of service suffers from various independent fatal defects,
each of which is sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants were never properly
served. Accordingly, the Judgment is void and must be vacated. See S.E.C., 509
F.3d at 1165; Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., 614 F.2d at 1256.
A plaintiff must show that he has satisfied the service requirements as a matter
of law. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1083 (2003)
(“As numerous cases make clear, the party on whose behalf service of process is
made has the burden of establishing its validity when challenged; to do so, she must
demonstrate that the procedure employed to deliver the papers satisfied the
requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision
of law.”)
The proofs of service on the Corporate Defendants demonstrate that service
upon them was improper. Most glaringly, process was served on the Corporate
Defendants at a place other than their principal place of business upon an individual,
12
(289 of 416)
referred to only as “MARIOS”, who was not authorized to accept service on their
behalf. [R. 40]. FRCP Rule 4(h)(2) allows service to be made upon a corporation,
partnership or association at a place not within any judicial district of the United
States in any manner allowed for under FRCP Rule 4(f), which governs service on
an individual in a foreign country. FRCP Rule 4(f) allows service to be made by
“any internationally agreed means of service reasonably calculated to give notice,
such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents”. FRCP Rule 4(f)(i). Reference to the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (the
“Hague”) does not negate that the means of service must still be “reasonably
calculated to give notice.” As stated above and attested to in the Zertalis Declaration
[R. 38], the place of attempted service is not the principal place of business for either
of the Corporate Defendants. Further, even if it were, “MARIOS” was not authorized
to accept service on their behalf.
Further, there is no evidence that the documents served were translated from
English. [R. 41]. Rather, based upon the record, Plaintiff seemingly makes the
assumption that whoever would have received the documents would have been able
to decipher their import and then attempt to direct them to the correct location. This
apparent assumption has greatly prejudiced the Corporate Defendants. Pursuant to
Article 5(3) of the Hague, in the event of formal service where the addressee does
13
(290 of 416)
not understand English, a request may be made for a translation into the official
language of Cyprus. Although here only informal service was made pursuant to
Article 10 of the Hague, logic dictates that service cannot be proper if made upon
someone who does not understand the contents of the document received. The
documents were left with someone only known and identified as “MARIOS” [R.
184-192], with no ability to determine the extent of his familiarity with the English
language or the importance of foreign legal documents, let alone his relationship to
the Defendants or ability to ensure their receipt.
Even if this form of “courier mail” is acceptable under the Hague Convention,
it is still necessary for Plaintiff to establish that it complied with FRCP Rule 4. This
issue was recently explained by the Supreme Court in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon,
137 S. Ct. 1504 (2017). The Supreme Court held that even where, as is the case for
Cyprus, a jurisdiction does not reject service by mail pursuant to Article 10(a) of the
Hague Convention:
this does not mean that the Convention affirmatively authorizes service
by mail. Article 10(a) simply provides that, as long as the receiving
state does not object, the Convention does not ‘interfere with ... the
freedom’ to serve documents through postal channels. In other words,
in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is
permissible if two conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not
objected to service by mail; and second, service by mail is authorized
under otherwise-applicable law.”
Water Splash, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1513 [citing, Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798,
804 (9th Cir. 2004)]. (emphasis added.)

14
(291 of 416)
Brockmeyer, a case with very similar facts, confirms that the “otherwise
applicable law” referred to by the Supreme Court is FRCP Rule 4(f)(2), which would
allow for service by mail under circumstances not applicable here (e.g., service
pursuant to means used in the receiving country for service in an action in its courts
of general jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 4(f)(2)(A) -- this would not include
by overnight courier or mail1; service by registered mail by the clerk of the court in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii); or service made in
accordance with a Court order obtained in accordance with Rule 4(f)(3)). See
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 806. Here, Plaintiff did not obtain a court order authorizing
service by mail or overnight courier, nor was the service made by registered mail
issued by the clerk of the Court. Accordingly, this service was ineffective. Moreover,
Plaintiff does not at any time evidence that service by mail is authorized under
otherwise-applicable law in the process of obtaining default judgment.
The foregoing concerning the Corporate Defendants equally applies to the
individual defendant, Feneridou, upon whom Plaintiff not only failed to effectuate
service at her place of business, but service was also not made at her residence or by
using her actual name.
1
The relevant Cyprus statue is the Cyprus Civil Procedure (“CCP”), Order 5 which
statute does not authorize service by mail or FedEx other than in the circumstance
where an agent for a nonresident who has entered into a contract in Cyprus is served
pursuant to Court order. CCP Order 5(8). A true and correct copy of CCP Order 5 is
annexed to the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibit “A.”
15
(292 of 416)
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to effectuate service in a manner reasonably

calculated to give notice and service is therefore defective. Accordingly, the
Judgment is void and Defendants’ default should be vacated.
b. The Judgment was Void Because it was Prematurely

Entered by the District Court.
Defendants were denied due process by the District Court’s failure to
allow adequate time for a response. Plaintiff filed its Application
for Default Judgment on February 21, 2017 with two hearing dates: March 20, 2017
and March 27, 2017, with former contained in the caption and the latter in the body
of the notice. [R. 51]. On March 7, 2017, the District Court entered the Order, which
was either thirteen (13) or twenty (20) days before the two noticed hearing dates [R.
49] and on March 14, 2017, the District Court entered the Judgment, which was
either six (6) or thirteen (13) days before the two notice hearing dates. [R. 1]. Even
if the requisite time had passed for Defendants to oppose the relief sought under the
applicable local rules, the confusion as the actual hearing date and the fact that
Defendants are two foreign entities and a foreign individual, should be found to be
sufficient to excuse them not timely opposing the defective motion. Since Judgment
was entered before the hearing date, due process was denied rendering
the Judgment void.
16
(293 of 416)
c. The Default Judgment is Void Because it is Based Solely

on Only Unsubstantiated Evidence and a Declaration of
Plaintiff’s Counsel Attesting to Damages.
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment consists of only: (i) Memorandum of
Points and Authorities; (ii) a Declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark L. Smith
attaching receipts supporting claimed cost associated with the prosecution of the
action, a purported screenshot from HoneyDaddy.com, purported screenshots from
SeekingArrangment.com, and codefendant Gregory Chan’s responses to Plaintiff’s
interrogatories; (iii) a copy of the filed Complaint; and a Proposed Judgment. [R. 51-
125]. This is insufficient evidence to support a judgment in the amount of over $2
million, especially when that judgment is based on alleged willfulness on the part of
Defendants.
“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the
complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”
Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). (emphasis added.)
“It is well settled that a default judgment for money may not be entered without a
hearing unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical
calculation.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); citing United
Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979); accord Jackson v.
Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum) (“Modern courts are also
reluctant to enter and enforce judgments unwarranted by the facts. This may be why
17
(294 of 416)
a court must hold a hearing on damages before entering a judgment on an
unliquidated claim even against a defendant who has been totally unresponsive.”).
Further, under Rule 55 of the FRCP, a hearing is necessary if the evidence submitted
is insufficient to support the damages request, requiring that damages requests be
discerned from definite figures in documentary evidence or affidavits. Davis, 650
F.2d at 1161; Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div.
of Ace Young Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); United Artists Corp. v.
Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 867 (5th Cir. 1979). “Proceeding without a hearing is the
exception,” the court may award damages without a hearing if “the record supports
the damages requested,” such as through comprehensive, detailed, and
uncontroverted exhibit and affidavit evidence establishing the amount of damages.
Monge v. Portofino Ristorante, 751 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (D. Md. 2010)(citing, inter
alia, Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d
Cir. 1992); Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 (S.D. Ala.
2007); U2 Home Entm't, Inc. v. Fu Shun Wang, 482 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318 (E.D.N.Y.
2007)). See Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 917 n. 11 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“Foregoing an evidentiary hearing may constitute abuse of discretion when the
existing record is insufficient to make necessary findings in support of
a default judgment.”); see also *13 10A WRIGHT, MILLER, § 2688, at 57- 58 & 63-
70.
18
(295 of 416)
Here, Defendants were denied due process by the District Court's failure to
hold a hearing and where the damages were completely supported. The only actual
documents submitted supporting Plaintiff’s claim are unauthenticated attachments
to the Declaration of Mark L. Smith in the form of purported screenshots of websites.
[R. 86-91]. Plaintiff’s claim otherwise rests on hearsay and the self-serving
arguments contained in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the
Application of Entry of Default Judgment. There were no affidavits from Plaintiff
authenticating the purported screenshots of its website, attesting to the willfulness
of Defendants alleged infringement, or otherwise attesting to the various categories
of damages or allegations in the Complaint. Simply stated, there is no foundation for
any of the support submitted to the Court by Plaintiff that resulted in an award of
over $2 million against foreign defendants.
“[A] claim is not a sum certain unless no doubt remains as to the amount to
which a plaintiff is entitled as a result of the defendants’ default. Franchise Holdings
II, LLC v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004). The
damages here are not the type that evoke a sum certain, regardless of any possible
claim by Plaintiff to the contrary due to its reliance on hearsay statements that the
alleged trademark infringement was willful, thereby resulting in statutory damages.
Indeed, to arrive as this sum, Plaintiff relies on speculation that 1,000 of Plaintiff’s
members were diverted to Defendants over the course of an eleven (11) month
19
(296 of 416)
period, resulting damages in the amount of $879.450 (1,000 customers x $79.95
monthly subscription fee). [R. 62]. Notably, there is no testimony from Plaintiff itself
nor any basis for authenticating these figures contained anywhere in Plaintiff’s
submission. Plaintiff then further speculates, again based on hearsay, that
Defendants actions were willful, thereby entitling Plaintiff to treble damages. [R.
63]. As treble damages calculated from the fabricated amount of $879,450 exceeds
the minimum amount of statutory damages, Plaintiff claims to have instead accepted
the “discounted” award of less than what it would have been entitled to had it had
the opportunity to prove actual profits received by Defendant. [R. 63]. However, this
so called “discount” was only a ploy to side step the failure to actually prove
damages, otherwise, there is no reason why Plaintiff would not have subsequently
agreed to vacate Plaintiff’s default.
The District Court was required to hold a hearing when the evidence submitted
was insufficient to support the damages claimed by Plaintiff. “Unless there are very
unusual circumstances to justify it, evidentiary material offered in support of
final default judgment should consist of material within personal knowledge of
affiant and not hearsay, and attached exhibits should be accompanied by sworn
statements of circumstances that would qualify them as full exhibits.” Oceanic
Trading Corp. v. Vessel Diana, 423 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970); Breaking the Chain
Found., Inc. v. Capitol Educ. Support, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2008).
20
(297 of 416)
In Oceanic Trading Corp., 423 F.2d 1, the court entered default judgment against
Oceanic in the amount of $35,055.55 based on the affidavit of its counsel, alone.
Oceanic Trading Corp., 423 F.2d at 3. Oceanic moved to vacate and/or set aside
the default judgment and the court denied Oceanic's motion. Id. The Second Circuit
overturned that ruling because the only evidence relied upon by the trial court were
statements under oath by Oceanic's counsel based on materials that were unsworn.
Id. at 4. Oceanic recognized “...attorneys too often swear to all manner of pleadings
and representations on information and belief, when the information is of dubious
accuracy and their belief of the moment is tailored to fit the exigencies of the case.”
Id.
As the Fourth Circuit explained in an analogous situation in Spivey v. United
States, 912 F.2d 80, 84 (4th Cir. 1990), “[w]hile affidavits submitted by counsel are
permissible under some circumstances, this [is] not one of them. It is elementary that
counsel may not participate both as an advocate and as a witness, absent special
circumstances.” See also Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d
151, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1999) (“At the time judgment was entered, the court had before
it only the allegations in the complaint and the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, who
did not purport to have personal knowledge of the facts .... This was insufficient
evidence upon which to enter the amount of the judgment.”)
21
(298 of 416)
Here, the District Court determined the amount of
the default judgment against Defendant based on an affidavit of Plaintiff’s counsel
attesting to matters outside his personal knowledge and which itself did not contain
any of detail regarding the amount of damages or the willfulness of Defendants’
alleged trademark infringement, which still would have been insufficient. [R. 70].
Instead, all information relied upon by the District Court was contained in the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. [R. 54]. Further, the District Court
entered default judgment based on unsworn documents that were unsubstantiated.
[R. 54]. Finally, the District Court entered judgment without an affidavit from the
Plaintiff itself attesting to any of the allegations considered by the Court.
Because the evidence submitted in support of his Motion
for Default Judgment was insufficient, the District Court was required to hold a
hearing to establish the appropriate default judgment amount. By failing to do so,
the trial court deprived Defendants of their due process rights rendering
the default judgment void. Plaintiff’s own papers stated that it could not determine
actual damages and it should not be allowed skirt this obligation with hearsay
allegations of willfulness.
Plaintiff also cannot rely on the principal that all allegations are deemed true
by virtue of Defendants default to support any argument that the allegations have
merit and the damages are warranted because all allegations as to willfulness and
22
(299 of 416)
use of the mark go to damages and, therefore, are not deemed admitted. Geddes, 559
F.2d at 560. “[I]f the facts necessary to determine damages are not contained in the
complaint, or are legally insufficient, they will not be established by default.” Phillip
Morris USA, Inc., v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal.
2003). As further held by the Court in Phillip Morris,
However, if the facts necessary to determine damages are not contained

in the complaint, or are legally insufficient, they will not be established
by default. See Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 980 F.2d 1261,
1267 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, fundamental fairness, required by the due
process of law, limits the scope of relief. Schwarzer, et al., California
Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 6:131 (2003).
Under FRCP 54(c) and 55(d), a judgment by default shall not
award damages that are different or exceed the amount requested in
plaintiff's complaint. Similarly, under FRCP 8(a)(3), the demand for
relief must be specific.
Therefore, a default judgment must be supported by specific allegations

as to the exact amount of damages asked for in the complaint.
Id. at 489-499.
In light of the foregoing, Defendants were denied due process rendering
the default judgment void because the District Court failed to conduct a hearing, did
not allow sufficient time for Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Default Judgment.
23
(300 of 416)
d. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the Eitel Factors and Default

Judgment Should Not Have Been Entered.
A District Court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if
it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact. See United States
v. State of Wash., 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has
enumerated the following factors (collectively, the Eitel factors) that a court may
consider in determining whether to grant default judgment: (1) the merits of the
plaintiff's substantive claim; (2) the sufficiency of the complaint; (3) the sum of
money at stake in the action; (4) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (5) the
possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to
excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72
(9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff conducted a broad and self-serving analysis of these factors
in the Application [R. 56], and, in the Order, the District Court recites the Eitel
factors [R. 1]; however, there is no discussion in the Order as to how those factors
were met. A review of Plaintiff’s argument reveals that those factors were in fact not
met.
i. There is No Merit to Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim

and Defendant Has a Meritorious Defense.
Plaintiff has asserted five causes of action against the Defendants in the
Complaint sounding in various forms of trademark infringement and related claims.
24
(301 of 416)
Upon seeking a final default judgment, Plaintiff requested that the Court award it
statutory damages, jointly and severally against Defendants, under 15 U.S.C.
§1117(b) for willful infringement of Plaintiff’s Mark. In doing so, Plaintiff
represented to the Court that (a) it could prevail on the merits of its claims against
each of the Defendants individually and calculated actual damages to be in excess
of $2 million; and (b) regardless of the amount of actual damages, statutory damages
were appropriate and warranted because of the willful use by Defendants of a
counterfeit mark.
Had Defendants been properly served with the summons and complaint, or at
the very least with the Application to contest damages, they would have been able
to defend these baseless claims. They would also have been able to defend the claim
that they were liable for statutory damages in the amount of $2 million for willful
use of counterfeit mark because this was not alleged in the Complaint.2 Rather, the
Complaint alleges use of an infringing mark, which has a much less restrictive
burden of proof than a counterfeit mark, and only seeks actual and trebles damages,
not statutory damages for a counterfeit mark.
Further, none of Plaintiff’s papers demonstrate how its claims could apply to
a company that serves as nothing more than a corporate secretary (Kartoir) or to an
2
Although the Complaint alleges willfulness, the relief sought makes no reference
to seeking damages for willful use of a counterfeit trademark and, instead, only seeks
damages for actual damages and lost profits.
25
(302 of 416)
individual who formerly worked for the Corporate Defendants (Feneridou) and who
would be an improper defendant, absent an extraordinary showing sufficient to
extinguish the corporate veil, to an action against a corporate party. Nor do the
papers show how this Court has personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants, all
of which are located in Cyprus, irrespective of the Court’s determination on the
sufficiency of service.
Not only is there no merit to Plaintiff’s claim, rendering the Complaint
insufficient, but Defendants have a meritorious defense. In considering whether a
defendant has a meritorious defense, the Court must determine “whether there is
some possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the
result achieved by the default.” Hawaii Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d
508, 513 (9th Cir.1986). As shown below, Defendants have valid defenses to
Plaintiff's claims demonstrating that there is a strong likelihood that the outcome at
trial will be contrary to the default judgment here.
a. Defendants Did Not Use an Infringing or Counterfeit

Mark in Commerce
The Court awarded statutory damages in Plaintiff’s favor based on the
allegation in the Application - which allegation was not in the Complaint - that
Defendants willfully used a counterfeit mark by using the Mark as a display name
26
(303 of 416)
in an e-mail.3 Plaintiff, however, has not set forth any admissible evidence
supporting this claim. Defendants dispute Plaintiff's unsupported assertions, and
state that they have not used the words “Seeking” and “Arrangement” as a
trademark, and, therefore, could not have infringed upon the Mark. Rather, the two
words were used together merely as an e-mail display name.
The core of Plaintiff’s allegations for each of the causes of action asserted in
the Complaint, and upon which default judgment has been granted, is whether a
display name, consisting of two ordinary words, used in an advertising e-mail, is
use of a trademark in commerce. Plaintiff’s Application, wherein it claims that the
allegations in the Complaint have merit, fails to assert a single case where this would
be held in the affirmative, likely because no such case exists. In actuality, Defendants
did not use the words “Seeking” and “Arrangement” as a trademark or in connection
with Defendants’ goods or services. Defendant also did not use the words “Seeking”
and “Arrangement” to deceive the consumer of an affiliation between Plaintiff and
Defendants. Rather, those words were used merely for descriptive purposes as a
display name for clearly fabricated e-mail addresses on an e-mail advertisement. A
review of Exhibit 1 to the Complaint [R. 120] reveals that the body of the e-mail
contains the words “Honey Daddy”, “Sugar Daddy” and “Sugar Party.” Nothing in
the body of the e-mail indicates or otherwise suggests an affiliation with Plaintiff,
3
The word “counterfeit” is not stated the Complaint at all.
27
(304 of 416)
nor would it cause any confusion to the consumer. Therefore, there was nothing
“illegal” about the advertisements and Plaintiff’s authorization was not required
because its Marks was not used by Defendants.
Further, Plaintiff has not proven that the Mark is “famous” to warrant relief
for dilution or that Plaintiff actually sustained any damages. To the extent that any
evidence was presented at all, it was improperly presented to the District Court
through counsel, not from Plaintiff itself. Accordingly, Defendants have a
meritorious defense that they did not use the words “Seeking” and “Arrangement”
in commerce as a trademark and they cannot be liable under any of the causes of
action asserted against them.
Even if the Court were to find that the use of the words “Seeking” and
“Arrangement” as a display name constituted their use as a trademark in commerce
in connection with goods and/or services to meet the definition of a trademark -
despite there being no known cases to support such a finding - statutory damages for
use of a counterfeit mark are still inappropriate. To claim statutory damages for use
of a counterfeit mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), a plaintiff must prove that the
elements of 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) are met. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanco
Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.2011). The statute defines a counterfeit mark
as one that “is registered on the principal register in the [USPTO] for such goods or
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the
28
(305 of 416)
person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so registered.” Id., citing,
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(i). Upon making its Application, Plaintiff goes beyond
that and seeks increased statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2),
which allows damages in the amount of $2 million per counterfeit mark “if the court
finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful.” Even after hurdling all other
obstacles Plaintiff would have to overcome to prove any wrongdoing by Defendants,
Plaintiff certainly would not be able to show that use of the Mark, which use is not
conceded, was willful by the Defendants. Again, Feneridou is an individual and
former employee. Nothing in the Complaint or in the Application supports piercing
the corporate veil to attach any liability to her for infringement, especially not willful
infringement. The same applies to Kartoir, which is only an agent (at best) of
Apiriliaco for limited secretarial purposes. With respect to Apiriliaco, it too cannot
be found to have engaged in any willful conduct, as the words in issue were not used
to purposefully divert potential consumers of Plaintiff to any of the Defendants.
b. Plaintiff Did Not Demonstrate a Likelihood of

Confusion and the Fair Use Exception Applies
While Defendants maintain that “Seeking” and “Arrangement” were not used
as a trademark, even the Court were to find to the contrary, the manner in which it
was used would be permissible under the fair use exception. Further, Plaintiff has
not demonstrated that the use of the works “Seeking” and “Arrangement” in the
display name of an e-mail would have a likelihood to cause confusion. “The Lanham
29
(306 of 416)
Act creates a comprehensive framework for regulating the use of trademarks and
protecting them against infringement, dilution, and unfair competition.” Fortune
Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt. Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030
(9th Cir. 2010). “To prove infringement, a trademark holder must show that the
defendant's use of its trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.’ ” Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)-(a)(1)(A).
The fair use defense depends on a showing that: (1) defendant's use of the
term is not as a trademark; (2) defendant uses the term fairly and in good faith; and
(3) defendant uses the term only to describe its goods or services. Fortune Dynamic,
Inc., 618 F3d at 1031.
The Lanham Act provides some affirmative defenses, see 15 U.S.C. §

1115(b), one of which allows an accused infringer to avoid liability
by showing that it has used the plaintiff's trademark “fairly,” id. §
1115(b)(4). To establish a fair use defense, the defendant must show
that it used the term “fairly and in good faith only to describe [its] goods
or services.” Id. We have recognized a nominative fair use defense and
a classic fair use defense. Nominative fair use applies ‘where a
defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff's
product,’ Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th
Cir.2002) (emphasis added), whereas classic fair use — the
only defense at issue here — involves a defendant's use of a
descriptive term “in its primary, descriptive sense,” id. at 1150–51
(quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1031.
Defendants have a meritorious defense of classic fair use because “Seeking”
and “Arrangement” were not used a trademark at all, the use was in good faith and,
30
(307 of 416)
to the extent that the words were used to describe any goods, it was intended to
describe Defendants’ own goods and services. This case is analogous to
Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28
(2d. Cir. 1997) where the Court analyzed whether use of the phrase “SEALED
WITH A CASE” on a physical display case contained its goods was in violation of
a competitors trademark “SEAL IT WITH A KISS”. The Court found that it was “a
clear instance of non-trademark use of words in their descriptive sense” because the
allegedly infringing mark in question was used to describe the seller’s hopes of what
actions the consumer may take. Id. at 30. Likewise, “Seeking” and “Arrangement”
was not used as a source identifier, but as means to convey a hope to reach consumers
who are literally seeking an arrangement through one of Defendants’ websites.
Although Cosmetically Sealed was distinguished by the Ninth Circuit in KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005)
to add that in the Ninth Circuit the Court must also consider whether there was a
likelihood of confusion when the classic fair use defense is raised, there could not
have been a likelihood of confusion here where the body of the e-mail clearly
identified to the provided company, Defendants.
Notably, next to the display name was noreply@partywithsugar.com (which
website - www.partywithsugar.com - it is alleged in the Complaint is owned by
Defendants), which removes any conceivable argument there was confusion as to
31
(308 of 416)
the source of the provider of the services. If that alone did not make it patently clear
that “Seeking” and “Arrangement” was not used a trademark or otherwise as source
identifier, the subject line of the e-mail was “Join the Sugar Party” and the first
portion of the text was the stylized words “HONEY DADDY” (which references a
website Plaintiff’s allege in the Complaint is owned by Defendants -
www.honeydaddy.com). The bottom of the e-mail again uses the words “Honey
Daddies”, again referring to Defendants’ website. Absolutely nowhere in the subject
line or body of the e-mail is “SEEKING ARRANGMENT” used, nor is any other
word, phrase, or image used remotely suggesting an connection with Plaintiff’s
services that would cause a consumer any confusion at all. Thus, there could not
possibly have been any confusion, nor could Defendants be reasonably found to have
willfully violated a counterfeit mark, or otherwise infringed upon Plaintiff’s
trademark.
Given that the nature of the instant appeal is for the default judgment to be
vacated as void, Defendants will not go through the applicable test to determine if a
likelihood of confusion existed, but, instead, reserve those arguments should it have
the opportunity to defend the action and/or damages awarded on the merit.
Even if the Court were to find and/or Plaintiff were to argue that “Seeking”
and “Arrangement” were used as a trademark and described Plaintiff’s goods and
services, not Defendants, then the nominative fair use defense would apply. The
32
(309 of 416)
product/service was not readily identifiable without the use of the Mark, the Mark
was only used to the extent reasonably necessary to identify the product and service,
and Defendants did nothing that would suggest sponsorship or an affiliation with
Plaintiff. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
308 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the actual body of the e-mail in question clearly
identifies that the product and service advertised belongs to Defendants, not
Plaintiff, and the use of “Seeking” and “Arrangement” was not for the purpose of
source identification. See, Id. at 308 (“Such nominative use of a mark - where the
only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service
- lies outside the strictures of trademark law: Because it does not implicate the
source-identification function that is purpose of trademark, it does not constitute
unfair competition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.”)
Because there is no evidence presented that there was a likelihood of
confusion, the words in question were not used as a trademark, the term was used
fairly and in good faith, and because they were used to describe Defendants’ own
goods and services, the fair use defense applies.
ii. The Complaint is Insufficient.
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint is insufficient in that it makes
the conclusory allegations that an e-mail display name is a trademark and fails to
33
(310 of 416)
allege anywhere in the body of the Complaint that the alleged willful use by
Defendants was of a counterfeit trademark, nor does it state that Plaintiff is seeking
statutory damages.
iii. The Sum of the Money at Stake.
Another important factor that is relevant in considering whether to set aside
a default is the amount at stake. See Eitell, 782 F.2d at 1472) (listing as relevant the
“sum of money at stake,” and holding that “because Eitel was seeking almost $3
million in damages … and because the parties disputed material facts in their
pleadings,” district court did not abuse discretion in denying default
judgment); Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir.
2002) (district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant relief
from default judgment exceeding $6.5 million).
It is undisputed that this Eitel factor weighs strongly in Defendants’ favor:
judgment against Defendants exceeds $2 million, an extraordinarily high award to
establish by default.
iv. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the

Issues on the Merits
In order for there to be cognizable prejudice to Plaintiff, the vacating of the
default judgment must cause greater harm than merely delaying the ultimate
resolution of the case - the standard is whether Plaintiff's ability to pursue his claims
34
(311 of 416)
will be hindered. See Falk, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984); see also United States
v Iscandari, C11- 0797 JSC, 2012 WL 2568187, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012).
Prejudice to a plaintiff in vacating a default judgment occurs when a plaintiff's ability
to pursue its claim will be hindered because evidence is lost, discovery becomes
more difficult, or there is an opportunity for fraud or collusion. See TCI Group Life
Ins. Plan v. Knoebbler, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001). The ordinary cost of
litigating is not a recognized factor under the Falk test. Id.
Here, Plaintiff will incur no prejudice if the default judgment is vacated. There
is no evidence in the record that vacating the default will lead to any loss of evidence,
onerous discovery, or fraud or collusion. Further, there is no risk of lost evidence as
Defendants would be under a duty to ensure that relevant documents or information
concerning the issues in this matter be preserved.
Plaintiff’s claimed prejudice in the Application for Default Judgment lacks
merit. [R. 56]. Defendants have not decided to ignore the judicial process nor have
they refused to participate in this action. Rather, as discussed throughout this brief,
Defendants were unaware that the action was even proceeding and were deprive the
ability to defend themselves. Once Defendants became aware, they took all
necessary steps to defend against Plaintiff’s baseless claims, during which time
Plaintiff has been able to use the Judgment as both a shield and a sword preventing
35
(312 of 416)
Defendants from defending themselves from a judgment in excess of $2 million for
wrongs they did not commit.
v. There is a Dispute Concerning Material Facts
In claiming it met the fifth Eitel factor which considers whether there is a
possibility of dispute, Plaintiff merely glossed over the factor by claiming that
Defendant’s admitted the facts alleged in the Complaint by virtue of their default.
Since that time, and since learning of the pendency of this action, Defendants have
made clear that there is a dispute concerning material facts, i.e., that Defendants did
not use a counterfeit mark in commerce, willfully or otherwise, nor did it use an
infringing trademark in commerce. The words that comprise the Mark in question -
“Seeking” and “Arrangement” - was only used as a display name on an e-mail and
there was no evidence submitted to the District Court, nor does any exist, that this
caused confusion to, or the diversion of, Plaintiff’s consumers.
vi. The Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect
As discussed in greater detail above regarding the improper service of process,
Defendants default can be considered no worse than excusable neglect. In actuality,
there was no neglect at all because it was unaware of the proceedings and has
engaged themselves in the action ever since becoming aware of same. Plaintiff’s
representation to the District Court that Defendants received “multiple notices” is
36
(313 of 416)
false. While multiple notices may be sent they were not received, with the exception
of the Application for Default Judgment, and they were sent to the wrong location.
Further, regardless of whether there was actual notice of the commencement of this
action, which is disputed, service of process was defective for the reasons set forth
above. Accordingly, Defendants nonappearance was, at a minimum, excusable
neglect.
Situations where the moving defendant offers a credible, good faith
explanation negating any “intention to take advantage of the opposing party,
interfere with judicial decision making, or otherwise manipulate the legal process”
generally render the defendant's conduct not “culpable,” even if the defendant had
actual notice of the pending action. TCI Group Life, 244 F.3d at 697-98. The TCI
court went on to elaborate on the indicia of culpability: “In contrast, we have
typically held that a defendant's conduct was culpable for purposes of the Falk
factors where there is no explanation of the default inconsistent with a devious,
deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to respond.” Id. at 698.
Here, Defendants, two Cyprus companies and an individual who is last known
to reside in Cyprus, did not file a responsive pleading because lawful service had not
been effectuated. Defendants did not become aware of the action until on or about
March 20, 2017 when the Notice of Lodging was delivered to the attention of the
parent company of Kartoir, which is the corporate secretary for Apiriliaco, at a
37
(314 of 416)
different address. Immediately thereafter Defendants retained counsel. After
calling the Court in advance of the date noticed for a hearing on the application for
judgment, and learning that the judgment had already been entered and no hearing
would in fact take place, this Motion was expeditiously filed.
The failure of two Cyprus companies and an individual who is last known to
reside in Cyprus, served by FedEx at an address other their principal place of
business or residence, with unknown documents on a person not employed by or
otherwise authorized to accept service on behalf of any of them, requiring an
appearance in a matter pending in the United States, could hardly be construed as a
“devious, deliberate, willful” attempt to “manipulate the legal process.” See TCI
Group Life, 244 F.3d at 689; see also Quach v. Cross, 2004 WL 2862285 at *7
(C.D.Ca. December 3, 2004) (finding excusable neglect and vacating default where
defaulting party failed to respond because they felt they were improperly served).
Accordingly, it is in the interests of justice to vacate the default judgment
entered on March 14, 2017 and to allow Defendants to defend the present action on
the merits.
vii. Policy Weighs in Favor of Vacating the Default
Default judgments are “appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case,
whenever possible, should be decided on the merits.” Falk, 739 F.2d at 463.
Moreover, any doubts as to the propriety of a default should be resolved against the
38
(315 of 416)
party seeking the default judgment. Pena v. Seguros La Comerical, S.A., 770 F.2d
811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985). (Default judgments are generally disfavored, as public
policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on the merits whenever possible.)
“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably
possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, where the Defendants have come forwarded
and express and intent to defend the allegations against them, have valid basis for
not previously appearing, and a myriad of procedural and substantive issues exist, it
would be appropriate overturn the Judgment.
e. Attorneys’ Fees Should Not Have Been Awarded
The default judgment's award of attorneys' fees under Local Rule 53-1, also
based on the award of profits, is similarly problematic. The Court is entitled to award
attorneys’ fees only in exceptional cases to the prevailing party. Such a case occurs
only when the trademark infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or
willful. Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir.1998);
Gordon and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 166 F.3d 438
(2d Cir.1999) (under the Lanham Act, attorneys' fees should be awarded only in
exceptional cases and only on evidence of fraud or bad faith). “Willful or bad faith
infringement, so as to justify an award of attorney's fees under the Act, usually means
passing off a product or service as another seller's better established one, or some
other deliberate theft of a marketholder's goodwill.” Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494,
39
(316 of 416)
503 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). The prevailing party must
demonstrate the exceptional nature of a case by clear and convincing evidence to
be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155
F.3d 526 (5th Cir.1998). Once again, Plaintiff has set forth no evidence whatsoever
that Defendants’ were infringing Plaintiff’s Mark, much less clear and convincing
evidence of willfulness. In these circumstances, the award constitutes nothing more
than a penalty for failing to respond to a Complaint that was never served properly.
f. The Complaint Should be Dismissed Under FRCP Upon

Vacating the Default Due the Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
Where a default judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, it is proper not only
to enter relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), but to dismiss the action
as well. Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., 614 F.2d. at 1256. Here, personal jurisdiction is
clearly lacking against Defendants for the reasons set forth above, specifically, (i)
improper service of process and (ii) lack of specific or general jurisdiction over
Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed.
FRCP Rule 12(b)(2) provides the Court with the authority to dismiss an action
for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech Assoc., Inc.,
557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1997). Where a defendant moves to dismiss a
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
40
(317 of 416)
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir.2004); see
also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001); Sher v. Johnson, 911
F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). While a plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that,
if true, would support jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court may not assume the
truth of such allegations if they are contradicted by affidavit. Ballard v. Savage, 65
F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1284. Additionally,
FRCP Rule 12(b)(5) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint where service is
insufficient.
As has been addressed above, Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendants
with the summons and complaint in Cyprus. Such service was defective due to
having been served at an address of than the Defendants’ principal place of business
- or for the individual defendant, at her residence - upon an individual, “MARIOS”,
who was not authorized to accept service on their behalf. The foregoing, coupled
with the fact that the documents served were not, upon information and belief,
translated from English, establish that service was not done in a manner likely to
give reasonable notice as required under Rule 4(f). See, Argument, supra.
The Court also does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See,
Argument, supra. There cannot be a finding of personal jurisdiction over
Defendants, either generally or specifically, as they do not have sufficient, or in the
case of Feneridou and Kartoir, any contacts with California. The only conceivable
41
(318 of 416)
connection to California is Apiriliaco’s website and e-mail advertisements, which is
insufficient under these facts.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that the Court enter an order to
reverse the District Court's ruling granting default judgment, specifically, its finding
of willful use of a counterfeit trademark in commerce, and its finding of attorneys'
fees in favor of the Plaintiff, and either (i) dismiss the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction or, alternative (ii) to remand the matter back the to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with the ruling.
Dated: November 20, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ Michael T. Conway
Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com
42
(319 of 416)

“East Feneridou”
43
(320 of 416)
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e)(3), I certify that this
brief contains 10,211 words, which meets the type-volume limitation stated in
Circuit Rule 28.1-1(c). This brief uses a proportional typeface and 14-point font.
Dated: November 20, 2017

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com

44
(321 of 416)
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Defendants-Appellants are not aware of any case pending in this Court that is
related to this case as defined in Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6.
45
(322 of 416)
*********************************************************************************
on (date) .
November 20, 2017
Signature (use "s/" format) s/Michael T. Conway
*********************************************************************************
on (date) .
CM/ECF system.

(323 of 416)

FILED
NOV 21 2017

corporation,

The opening brief submitted on November 20, 2017 is filed.
Within 7 days of this order, appellants are ordered to file 7 copies of the
brief in paper format, with a blue cover, accompanied by certification (attached to
the end of each copy of the brief) that the brief is identical to the version submitted
electronically. A sample certificate is available on the Court's website,
www.ca9.uscourts.gov, at the File a Document - CM/ECF link.
The paper copies shall be printed from the PDF version of the brief created
from the word processing application, not from PACER or CM/ECF.
The Court has reviewed the excerpts of record submitted on November 20,
2017. Within 7 days of this order, appellants are ordered to file 4 copies of the
(324 of 416)
excerpts in paper format, with a white cover. The paper copies must be in the
format described in 9th Circuit Rule 30-1.6.
The paper copies shall be submitted to the principal office of the Clerk. For
regular U.S. mail, the address is P.O. Box 193939, San Francisco, CA 94119-3939.
For overnight mail, the address is 95 Seventh Street, San Francisco, CA 94103-
1526.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Kevin Wing Gee

Deputy Clerk
(325 of 416)
No. 17-55505
REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada Corporation
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
APIRILIACO LIMITED,
and EAST FENERIDOU,
On Appeal from the United States Central District of California

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE REFLEX MEDIA, INC.’S

ANSWERING BRIEF
SMITH CORRELL, LLP

MARK SMITH – California SBN 213829
Tel: (213) 443-6222
Fax: (877) 730-5910
Attorneys for Appellee REFLEX MEDIA,
INC.
{00046613 1 }
(326 of 416)
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Appellee Reflex Media, Inc. is not a subsidiary of a publicly traded
company.
DATED: January 19, 2018

s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Phone: (213) 443-6222
Attorneys for Appellee Reflex Media,

Inc.
{00046613 1 } i
(327 of 416)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT…………………………………......i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………iv
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT………………………………………....1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………...1
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………..3
IV. ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………......4
A. Apiriliaco is Subject to California Jurisdiction…………………………..5
B. Reflex Media Properly Served Apiriliaco………………………………..9
C. The Default Judgment Was Not Void For Being Entered Prematurely….13
D. The Default Judgment Properly Awards Damages…………………......14
E. The Eitel Factors Favor Affirming the Default Judgment……………….18
1. Reflex Media’s Claims Have Merit………………………………….18
a. Reflex Media Adequately Pled Its Claims………………………..18
b. The Fair Use Defense Does Not Apply……………………….….20
2. The Complaint Is Sufficient………………………………………….22
3. The Sum of Money At Stake Does Not Weigh Against The Default
Judgment…………………………………………………………….22
4. Reflex Media Will Be Prejudiced If The Default Judgment Is

Reversed……………………………………………………………..23
5. The Material Facts Are Undisputed………………………………....24
6. Apiriliaco’s Default Was Not Due To Excusable Neglect…………..24

{00046613 1 } ii
(328 of 416)
7. Public Policy Supports Sustaining the Default Judgment…………...26
F. The Attorneys’ Fees Were Properly Awarded………………………….27
G. Apiriliaco Is Subject to Jurisdiction in California………………………27
V. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….28
{00046613 1 } iii
(329 of 416)
CASES: Page(s)
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem International, Inc.,

874 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2017)……………………………………………..7, 8
Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino,

116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997)…………………………………………..24
Cripps v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,

980 F.2d 1621 (9th Cir. 1992)………………………………………………..6
Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986)………………………………………..4, 18, 26
Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014)) 571 U.S. 12 (2014)………………………………...8
Hand and Nail Harmony, Inc. v. Guangzhou Shun Yan Cosmetics Co., Ltd.
2015 WL 4378197 (D. Nevada)………………………………………..15, 16
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,

408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005)……………………………………………….20
Marketquest Group, Inc. v. BIC Corp.,

862 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017)……………………………………………….21
McComb v. Vejar,
2014 WL 5494017 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014)……………………………...15
Microsoft Corp. v. Nop,

549 F.Supp.2d 1233 (E.D.Cal.2008)……………………………………….16
Oceanic Trading Corp. v. Vessel Diana,

423 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1970)………………………………………………….17
Origami Owl, LLC v. Mayo,

2016 WL 1408302 (D. Ariz. 2016)………………………………………...16
{00046613 1 } iv
(330 of 416)
Pebble Beach v. Caddy,

453 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2006)………………………………………………5
Phillip Morris USA v. Castworld,

219 F.R.D. 494 (C.D.C.A. 2003)………………………14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 27
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership,

507 U.S. 380 (1993)……………………………………………………….24
Spivey v. U.S.,
912 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1990)…………………………………………………17
Washington Shoe v. A-Z Sporting Goods,

704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012)…………………………………………………8
Water Splash, Inc v. Menon,

137 S. Ct. 1504 (2017)……………………………………………..11, 12, 13
OTHER:
Hague Service Convention (Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and

Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters)………………….11, 12
{00046613 1 } v
(331 of 416)
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee Reflex Media agrees with the Appellants’ jurisdictional statement.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Reflex Media filed its complaint in the Central District of California on April
27, 2016, listing as defendants (among others) Apiriliaco, Ltd. d/b/a
HoneyDaddy.com, Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. (a Cypriot corporation that is the
registered secretary and/or agent of Apiriliaco) and Ms. Feneridou, the reputed
director and owner of Apiriliaco. R.102. Service of process was effected at the
Cypriot address displayed on the HoneyDaddy website. Such service was carried
out through express mail (signed on receipt), and was completed on August 5. R.
151-152.
The three defendants so served (collectively referred to throughout this brief
as “Apiriliaco”) did not respond.1 Reflex Media’s counsel accordingly sent them a
letter on September 7—with the complaint attached—warning them of the
possibility of default judgment. R. 160. Again, no response. Interestingly, this
follow-up letter and attached complaint was served by Federal Express not only at
the same Cyprus address, but also at a Las Vegas, Nevada address then displayed on
the HoneyDaddy website. R.134-35; 167-68. And, although there was no response
1
As the three appellant-defendants are similarly situated with respect to nearly all
of the issues, all three will be referred to in this brief, collectively, as “Apiriliaco”
except when the text clearly specifies otherwise.
{00046613 1 } 1
(332 of 416)
from either address, the address in Nevada disappeared from the website shortly
thereafter. R. 134-35; 161-66.
Ultimately, and after following all required procedures, Reflex Media applied
for default judgment on February 21, serving that application on the same Cypriot
address. R.51-69. A hearing was set for March 27. In its application, Reflex Media
requested $2,000,000 in statutory damages, $43,600 in attorneys’ fees, $678.21 in
costs, and a permanent injunction against continued infringement. R.67-68. Reflex
Media believed the $2,000,000 award to be reasonable, as HoneyDaddy’s website
boasted nearly ten thousand members, and its estimated profits from even one
thousand of these members (when trebled for willful infringement) would exceed
$2,000,000. R. 62-64.
But again, there was no response from Apiriliaco, and specifically no response
within the time allowed by Local Rules. The District Court accordingly dispensed
with the scheduled hearing and granted Reflex Media’s application on March 7.
R.49-50. Notice of lodgment of the judgment was filed on March 10, and the default
judgment itself entered on March 14. R.45, 1-2.
And then Apiriliaco appeared. On April 4, Apiriliaco (meaning all three of
the defaulted defendants) moved to strike the default judgment. R.8. Relying on a
declaration by company employee Vasilis Zertalis, Apiriliaco maintained that it first
learned of the lawsuit upon receipt of the notice of lodging judgment. R.38-42. The
{00046613 1 } 2
(333 of 416)
company did not know what had happened to the prior pleadings served upon it, and
professed not to know who had signed for them. Mr. Zertalis, an accountant, claimed
to be the first Apiriliaco employee with sufficient knowledge of the American legal
system to recognize the purport of these pleadings, and admitted to being confused
as to the appropriate deadline for responding to the default papers. Id.
The District Court struck Apiriliaco’s motion as violating Local Rule, and
Apiriliaco appealed the default judgment to this Court. R.1. Subsequent motion
practice below (for example, Apiriliaco’s Sep. 13, 2017 “Motion for an Indicative
Ruling” (dkt. #55)) has been stayed pending the resolution of this appeal.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee Reflex Media, a Nevada corporation based in Las Vegas, operates
SeekingArrangement.com, a recognized website in the global “sugar daddy” dating
industry. R.103-105. Reflex Media has been diligent in cultivating this brand, and
accordingly maintains Seeking Arrangement as a registered trademark. R. 103-104;
108-109.
Hence, Reflex Media was naturally concerned when it realized that its
trademark was being significantly infringed by a competitor. The competitor—the
HoneyDaddy.com website operated by Cypriot company Apiriliaco—disseminated
email advertisements inviting potential customers to the website. R.109-110. Both
the “From” and “To” lines of these emails read “Seeking Arrangement,” in a clear
{00046613 1 } 3
(334 of 416)
attempt to mislead these customers. R.120. Not stopping there, the HoneyDaddy
website featured quotations about “Seeking Arrangement” lifted directly from
articles about Reflex Media’s Seeking Arrangement brand (one quote lifted directly
from Reflex Media’s Public Relations Manager). R.110-111. Apiriliaco was even
using many of the same vendors as Seeking Arrangement, apparently in order to
maximize the customer confusion. Id.
Reflex Media was therefore faced with intentional trademark infringement,
which infringement was sharply accelerating the growth of the HoneyDaddy brand.
This brand—meaning the HoneyDaddy website—is less than two years old, and yet
its home page boasts thousands of “members” in six U.S. cities, including nearly
four thousand in California alone. R.86. Reflex Media accordingly determined to
sue Apiriliaco and other responsible parties, and filed trademark infringement and
other claims in the Central District of California.
IV. ARGUMENT
A grant of default judgment is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Apiriliaco has levelled
every conceivable attack on the judgment below, but these attacks do not singly or
collectively justify reversal of that judgment. For all of the reasons given below, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting default judgment, and that
judgment should be affirmed.
{00046613 1 } 4
(335 of 416)
A. Apiriliaco is Subject to California Jurisdiction
Apiriliaco’s “HoneyDaddy” website boasts on its home page of its 2,000
“members” in Los Angeles, and 1,900 more in San Francisco—apparently having
more members in California than in any other state—yet maintains that it lacks
adequate presence in California to be subject to jurisdiction here. R.86. Apiriliaco
maintains that its “passive website” alone does not suffice (see Appellant’s Brief
(“App. Brief”) at 10), and relies on a prior decision of this Court in which the
defendant was a British bed and breakfast whose generic website was its only
possible link to California or the U.S.A. See Pebble Beach v. Caddy, 453 F.3d
1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006).
But Apiriliaco’s website is certainly not passive in that sense: its home page
proudly lists thousands of HoneyDaddy members in six U.S. cities (but no city
outside the U.S.) two of which are in California. Apiriliaco, in other words,
specifically holds itself out as a company doing business in America (and only in
America), with much of this business being focused in California. Moreover, Reflex
Media has specifically alleged in its complaint that HoneyDaddy.com is “the website
through which Defendants engage in interactive and commercial conduct, which,
upon information and belief, involves soliciting and/or otherwise actively seeking to
transact business with residents of the U.S., including residents of the Central
District of California.” R. 107, Paragraph 29 (emphasis added). And, “[i]n
{00046613 1 } 5
(336 of 416)
reviewing a default judgment, this court must take the well-pleaded factual
allegations of … [the complaint] as true.” Cripps v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America, 980 F.2d 1621, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).
Reflex Media has also alleged that “Defendant HoneyDaddy is publicly
associated with a telephone number containing a 310 area code: a Los Angeles
County area code,” and that this “L.A. county number is the only U.S. contact
information publicly available for Defendant HoneyDaddy, at present.” R.107-108,
Paragraph 30. This contact, combined with the deliberate, boasted cultivation of
thousands of HoneyDaddy “members” in California cities, certainly justifies Reflex
Media’s general allegation that “personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants
because they promote business in, and derive material benefits from, the State of
California and this judicial district, or otherwise purposefully avail themselves of the
privileges and protections of the laws of the State of California.” R.108, Paragraph
31.
Apiriliaco, operator of the HoneyDaddy website, is therefore subject to
California jurisdiction; arguably general jurisdiction, but specific jurisdiction will
suffice here. Specific jurisdiction is in fact appropriate in that this case arises from
Apiriliaco’s contacts in support of its U.S. and California HoneyDaddy membership.
As described in Reflex Media’s Complaint, Apiriliaco pirated the “Seeking
Arrangement” mark that properly belonged to Reflex Media, used that mark in
{00046613 1 } 6
(337 of 416)
advertisements for its (Apiriliaco’s) websites, prominently and deceptively posted
news articles relating to Seeking Arrangement on the HoneyDaddy.com website,
and even lifted a quote from a Reflex Media Public Relations Manager to promote
its own business. See R.110-111, Paragraphs 42-56. In short, Apiriliaco deliberately
targeted the trademarks of Reflex Media (an American company) on a website
directed towards American and California residents. Reflex Media’s claims arise
directly from these contacts with the U.S. and California and, as a consequence,
specific jurisdiction obtains.
Indeed, the facts alleged and established by Reflex Media more than meet the
“three requirements for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:
(1) the defendant must either purposefully direct his activities toward the forum or
purposefully avail himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum; (2)
the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related
activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e, it must be reasonable.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem
International, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
This is especially true given a willful, targeted, intellectual property infringement
like that found here, as “we have held that a defendant’s alleged willful infringement
of [a plaintiff’s] copyright, and its knowledge of both the existence of the copyright
and the forum of the copyright holder established individualized targeting” for
{00046613 1 } 7
(338 of 416)
jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 1069 (citing Washington Shoe v. A-Z Sporting Goods,
704 F.3d 668 at 675 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Reflex Media is of course aware that this Court, in the Axiom Foods case,
raised the jurisdictional standard in cases like this (in response to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014)) but is confident that its
allegations clear that bar. The Axiom Foods Court—speaking of Walden—noted
that “the [Supreme] Court found that our approach impermissibly allowed a
plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis,”
and that “[t]he Court made clear that we must look to the defendant’s own contacts
with the forum, not to the defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s connections to the
forum.” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis added). Fair enough: as stated,
Defendant Apiriliaco boasts of having thousands of HoneyDaddy “members” in
California, its website is therefore directed specifically towards this State, that
website (per the complaint’s allegations) is “interactive and commercial,” and
HoneyDaddy’s only known contact number is in Los Angeles County. Apiriliaco,
in other words, has ample and extensive contacts with California, over and above its
specific, targeted efforts at pirating Reflex Media’s Seeking Arrangements
trademarks, and those contacts justify the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
////
////
{00046613 1 } 8
(339 of 416)
B. Reflex Media Properly Served Apiriliaco
Reflex Media properly served process on Apiriliaco, notwithstanding the
latter’s argument to the contrary. But before discussing the law of service, Reflex
Media must point out that Apiriliaco had notice of this suit, and chose not to respond.
The evidence for actual notice is overwhelming, including:
1) Service of the complaint by mail at the Cyprus address listed on
Apiriliaco’s HoneyDaddy website, and signed receipt of that service (Aug.
5, 2016). R. 151-152, 161-163.
2) Service of a follow-up letter (with the complaint attached) at the same
Cyprus address that warned Apiriliaco that default judgment would be
sought, and signed receipt of that service (Sep. 22, 2016). R. 160; R. 134-
35; 168.
3) Service of the same follow-up letter (again, with the complaint attached)
at a Las Vegas, Nevada address temporarily featured on the HoneyDaddy
website, and signed receipt of that service (Sep. 12, 2016). Afterwards,
the Nevada address disappeared from the HoneyDaddy website. R. 161-
167.
4) Service by Federal Express of the Application for Default Judgment at the
Cyprus address (Feb. 21, 2017). R. 51, 69.
{00046613 1 } 9
(340 of 416)
5) Service by Federal Express of the Notice of Lodging that Judgment at the
Cyprus address (March 10, 2017). R. 45-46.
Apiriliaco cannot explain why it admittedly received the last of these
pleadings but not the earlier ones, even though all were served (and some signed for)
at the same Cyprus address. The declaration of its employee Mr. Zertalis, who
reviewed the Notice of Lodging, implies that he was the first person at the company
with sufficient knowledge of American law to review one of these pleadings, but
this is certainly not an excuse. It seems, moreover, quite suspicious that the
complaint and all follow-up correspondence fell through the “legal expertise” crack,
but a default judgment notice was luckily spotted by someone with knowledge. It is
much more likely that Apiriliaco ignored legal papers for as long as it could. And
this latter possibility is virtually a certainty given that Apiriliaco also received notice
of the suit at a Nevada address and promptly took that Nevada address off of its
website. All of these facts—which were known to the District Court—demonstrate
that Apiriliaco is not a belatedly surprised litigant, but a party that had actual notice
of these proceedings from their commencement.
As to effective service: Apiriliaco received the complaint by express mail at
its Cyprus address on Aug. 5, 2016, and then received (again by mail) the complaint
as an attachment to the follow-up letter at both the Cyprus and Las Vegas addresses
then listed on its website. Apiriliaco maintains that the service at Cyprus was
{00046613 1 } 10
(341 of 416)
inadequate because this was not its “principal place of business,” (See App. Brief at
13) but points to no rule of law that makes this a requirement. In any event, Reflex
Media was entirely justified in concluding that the Cyprus address publicly
displayed for Apiriliaco on the HoneyDaddy website was in fact the company’s
principal place of business.
Apiriliaco argues that the documents served were in English but (again) cites
no requirement that they be in any other language. And having put the Cypriot
address on display on a website boasting thousands of American members in six
U.S. cities, it is rather late for Apiriliaco to disclaim familiarity with the English
language.
Finally, Apiriliaco, although admitting that the service made here by mail was
allowed by Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention,2 contends that such service
was made retroactively improper by the U.S. Supreme Court’s May 22, 2017
decision of Water Splash, Inc v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504. But this argument is flawed
for at least three reasons, beginning with waiver. Apiriliaco never raised this
argument below in its lengthy “Motion for Indicative Ruling,” (filed below on Sep.
13, 2017) which sought to overturn the default judgment ruling. Not having
2
The “Hague Service Convention” is used here for the formal, longer title of the
“Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters.”
{00046613 1 } 11
(342 of 416)
mentioned the Water Splash decision to the District Court, Apiriliaco cannot now
argue this point on appeal.
Secondly, Apiriliaco fails to mention the central holding of Water Splash,
namely, “whether the Convention prohibits service by mail. We hold that it does
not.” Water Splash at 1507 (emphasis added). The Water Splash Court, in other
words, held that international service by mail—the type of service used here—was
not prohibited by the Hague Convention. Apiriliaco therefore relies on a paragraph
of (arguable) dicta from that decision which discusses the difference between such
service being authorized or allowed by the Hague Convention. Respectfully, Reflex
Media does not see this distinction as being relevant here.
This is especially the case when the Water Splash decision was not entered
until May 22 of 2017, nearly two months after the March 14 default judgment
entered here by the District Court. R.1. The Water Splash Court expressed no intent
to invalidate all existing judgments based on international mail service, and a single
paragraph of dicta—embedded in a clear holding that such service is not prohibited
by the Hague Convention—should not have that effect. For these reasons, in
addition to waiving this argument by not raising it below, Apiriliaco cannot use the
Water Splash decision to overturn the default judgment entered by the District Court.
Finally, even if there were some defects in the service at Cyprus (which Reflex
Media does not admit), it is still a fact that Apiriliaco was served with the complaint
{00046613 1 } 12
(343 of 416)
at its Las Vegas, Nevada address by mail in the U.S. It is undisputed that a follow-
up letter—with the complaint attached—was sent to this address. R.134-35, 160,
167. Hence, Apiriliaco was served with the complaint by mail, a permissible
method, in the United States where Hague Convention rules and the Water Splash
decision do not apply. As both this U.S.-based service and the service in Cyprus are
adequate, alternative grounds for a finding of effective service, Apiriliaco’s
arguments on this issue are without merit, and the default judgment should be
upheld.
C. The Default Judgment Was Not Void For Being Entered Prematurely
Apiriliaco argues, without case law support, that the default judgment against
it should be voided as having been entered prematurely. See App. Brief at 16. There
is no rule or law that dictates this result; rather, as Apiriliaco concedes, Reflex Media
applied for default judgment on Feb. 21st, 2017, with March 27 as the proposed
hearing dates. R.51. As Apiriliaco did not respond within 21 days before the hearing
date, the District Court properly granted the motion without hearing, as per Central
District of California Local Rules 7-9 or 7-12. R.49-50.
Apiriliaco cites no authority that makes the District Court’s ruling improper;
but asks for mercy because of “the confusion as to the hearing date and the fact that
Defendants are two foreign entities and a foreign individual.” See App. Brief at 16.
But these facts do not require reversal of the default judgment under any known legal
{00046613 1 } 13
(344 of 416)
doctrine, nor should they. As Apiriliaco and the other two appellants operate a U.S.-
targeted website that boasts of the thousands of American and (specifically)
California “members” who use their services—and have now hired U.S. counsel—
they cannot now plead a tearful unfamiliarity with American law. R.86. Having
admittedly received and reviewed Reflex Media’s application for default judgment
at the address listed publicly on the HoneyDaddy website, with the hearing date
clearly shown, Apiriliaco has no excuse for being “confused,” or for otherwise not
responding to that application within the time provided by Local Rule. Given that
Apiriliaco had already ignored Reflex Media’s complaint and follow-up
correspondence—served at the same address—the District Court had every reason
to approve the application for default judgment as soon as the relevant response
deadlines had expired. Hence, this objection to the default judgment fails.
D. The Default Judgment Properly Awards Damages
Apiriliaco attacks the default judgment as resting on an unproven damages
amount, but this attack rests on several misstatements of the law. See App. Brief at
17-23. First, although (as Apiriliaco argues) a complaint’s damages allegations are
the only allegations not admitted by default, “Plaintiff’s burden in “proving up”
damages is relatively lenient.” Phillip Morris USA v. Castworld, 219 F.R.D. 494,
498 (C.D.C.A. 2003) (emphasis added). “If proximate cause is properly alleged in
the complaint, it is admitted upon default. Injury is established and plaintiff need
{00046613 1 } 14
(345 of 416)
prove only that the compensation sought relates to the damages that naturally flow
from the injuries pled.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Apiriliaco likewise misstates the law in asserting that a complaint’s allegation
of willfulness in trademark or copyright infringement is not admitted by default; the
law is specifically the opposite. See Phillip Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. 494 at 500.
(“According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s importation of the 8,000,000 counterfeit
cigarettes was willful and deliberate. Again, as Defendants’ failure to answer
constitutes an admission as to the averments contained in the complaint, the Court
must accept these allegations as true.”) (emphasis added); see also Hand and Nail
Harmony, Inc. v. Guangzhou Shun Yan Cosmetics Co., Ltd. No. 2:12–cv–01212,
2015 WL 4378197 at *6 (D. Nevada) (“In this case, by Defendant’s default,
Defendant has admitted that its activities constitute counterfeiting and intentional,
willful infringement.”) (emphasis added). So, contrary to Apiriliaco’s contention,
the willful infringement specifically alleged in Reflex Media’s complaint is now
admitted through default. See R.106-107, 110, 115 (specifically Paragraphs 25, 47,
and 82).
And Apiriliaco is just as mistaken in insisting on the need for a hearing in
damages. See App. Brief at 17-18. Although a hearing must be held when the
amount claimed is not “a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation,”
this does not apply to statutory damages, which “are an example of damages that
{00046613 1 } 15
(346 of 416)
may be awarded without a hearing for default judgment.” Origami Owl, LLC v.
Mayo, No. 15-00010, 2016 WL 1408302, *2-3 (D. Ariz. 2016) (internal citations
omitted, emphasis added); see also McComb v. Vejar, No. 2:14-CV-00941-RSWL-
E, 2014 WL 5494017, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (“Monetary damages are
appropriate in a default judgment if the amount is a liquidated sum or capable of
mathematical calculation, such as when statutory damages are elected; in such a
case, the actual amount of monetary damages need not be proved up.”) (emphasis
added).
And here, statutory damages are exactly what Reflex Media is asking for, in
the amount of $2,000,000. See R.62-63. Federal courts in California have awarded
this exact amount in default judgments on trademark infringement cases, and have
even called it a “conservative award.” See Phillip Morris, 219 F.R.D. 494 at 502.
And further, Apiriliaco’s contention that “Plaintiff’s own papers stated that it could
not determine actual damages” is absurd, since actual damages, i.e. Apiriliaco’s
profits, are of course unknowable when it declined to participate in this lawsuit. See
Microsoft Corp. v. Nop, 549 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1238 (E.D.Cal.2008) (“[S]tatutory
damages are appropriate in default judgment cases because the information needed
to prove actual damages is within the infringers’ control and is not disclosed.”)
Moreover, Apiriliaco cites no law from or within the Ninth Circuit to buttress
its argument that such statutory damages cannot be awarded without a hearing;
{00046613 1 } 16
(347 of 416)
rather, district courts in the Circuit have routinely awarded such damages without
any mention of one. See Phillip Morris USA v. Castworld, 219 F.R.D. 494, 501-502
(C.D.C.A. 2003); Hand and Nail Harmony, Inc. v. Guangzhou Shun Yan Cosmetics
Co., Ltd. No. 2:12–cv–01212, 2015 WL 4378197 at *6-7 (D. Nevada). And
Apiriliaco’s contention that damages in a default judgment hearing may not rest on
counsel’s affidavit likewise rests on no support from Ninth Circuit case law, or (as
best Reflex Media can tell) from any case involving statutory damages for
intellectual property involvement. Instead, Apiriliaco cites older appellate decisions
involving counsel’s affidavits on (respectively) the disputed facts of a maritime
vessel’s ownership, and an injured client’s medical prospects. See Oceanic Trading
Corp. v. Vessel Diana, 423 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1970) and Spivey v. U.S., 912 F.2d 80
(4th Cir. 1990). (cited in App. Brief at 20-21). These cases have no bearing in a case
like this, in which counsel’s affidavit is really the only evidence which could be
provided on a subject like statutory damages, especially when Apiriliaco did not
engage in the lawsuit.
For Apiriliaco, of course, had the opportunity to present its position at a
hearing but chose not to respond to Reflex Media’s application for default judgment
in the time given. Complaining now about the lack of a hearing is therefore absurd
{00046613 1 } 17
(348 of 416)
on its part. For this reason, and for all of the other reasons given above, Apiriliaco’s
attack on the damages claimed by Reflex Media is groundless.3
E. The Eitel Factors Favor Affirming the Default Judgment.
1. Reflex Media’s Claims Have Merit
a. Reflex Media Adequately Pled Its Claims.
Apiriliaco argues at length that the District Court erred in granting default
judgment under the factors set forth in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th
Cir. 1986). But as Eitel itself held, that decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion;
this appeal is not (as Apiriliaco seems to believe) an opportunity to present the merits
arguments Apiriliaco could not be bothered to present below prior to entry of default
judgment.
Turning to the merits of Reflex Media’s claim (the second Eitel factor,
although Apiriliaco discusses it first), Apiriliaco’s discussion simply ignores the
allegations in the complaint. Apiriliaco admits that Seeking Arrangement is a
registered Reflex Media trademark, and further admits to using that phrase in its own
advertisements. See App. Brief at 27-28. Apiriliaco maintains that its use of the
phrase was intermittent and inadvertent, but this ignores the specific well-pleaded
allegations in Reflex Media’s complaint that are now admitted by default. In its
3
Reflex Media would also point out that Apiriliaco’s attack on the damages portion
of the judgment, even if true, would lead merely to remand for reconsideration of
the damages award and not to reversal of the default judgment.
{00046613 1 } 18
(349 of 416)
complaint, Reflex Media described in detail how—in addition to the email
advertisements—Apiriliaco’s HoneyDaddy website used multiple quotes from
articles dealing with Seeking Arrangement (one by Reflex Media’s Public Relations
Manager) to confuse and mislead potential customers. The “intent and
thoroughness” of this effort was demonstrated by the use of many of the same
website vendors used by Seeking Arrangement. R.110-111, Paragraphs 50-58.
These acts, which Apiriliaco does not even mention, prove conclusively that Reflex
Media’s claims are about much more than a supposedly coincidental use of the
phrase “Seeking Arrangement.”
Apiriliaco’s remaining merits arguments are equally unsound. Apiriliaco
argues, for example, that Reflex Media has not “proven” that its mark is famous (see
App. Brief at 28), when this was specifically pled and alleged in the complaint
(R.114-115, Paragraph 77). Apiriliaco likewise argues that Reflex Media must
prove that infringement was willful, but willfulness was also alleged in the
complaint, and is now admitted by default. R.106-107, 110, 115 (Paragraphs 26, 47
and 82).
In short, Reflex Media’s complaint adequately and specifically alleged a
willful trademark infringement case. The elements of that case which Apiriliaco
describes as not “proven” are fully set forth in that complaint, and the District Court
{00046613 1 } 19
(350 of 416)
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Reflex Media had pled a meritorious
case.
b. The Fair Use Defense Does Not Apply
Apiriliaco’s attempted reliance on the “fair use defense” is just as flawed. To
begin with, this entire argument assumes that a judge ruling on a default judgment
must not only weigh the sufficiency of the complaint, but anticipate defenses and
counterarguments the defaulting party never made. Such a doctrine would make
default judgments almost impossible in practice; it is not surprising that Apiriliaco
cites no caselaw for it.
But the fair use defense, even if considered here, “only comes into play once
the party alleging infringement has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
confusion is likely.” KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
408 F.3d 596, 608-609 (9th Cir. 2005). This has been demonstrated here. Apiriliaco
argues that its “Seeking Arrangements” email advertisement could not possibly have
been confused with the Seeking Arrangements mark (see App. Brief at 29-32). But
the face of the advertisement shows otherwise: it is set up as an email from “Seeking
Arrangement” to “Seeking Arrangement” [capitalized in both instances.] R.120. It
is impossible to believe that this was a coincidental use of the phrase, and just as
impossible to believe that such an advertisement was not likely to confuse recipients
with respect to the Seeking Arrangements mark. And this is without considering the
{00046613 1 } 20
(351 of 416)
quotations on the HoneyDaddy website deliberately pirated from news articles about
the real Seeking Arrangement mark. R.110-111, Paragraphs 50-57. Apiriliaco’s
use of the Seeking Arrangement mark were therefore likely to cause confusion;
certainly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so holding.
Turning to the fair use defense itself, this defense applies when a defendant
shows that “its use is (1) other than as a trademark, (2) descriptive of the defendant's
goods, and (3) in good faith. Additionally, the degree of customer confusion [is] a
factor in evaluating fair use.” Marketquest Group, Inc. v. BIC Corp., 862 F.3d 927,
935 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations added, emphasis added). The facts here (as
already set forth) do not support these elements. Reflex Media has specifically
alleged and described how Apiriliaco used the “Seeking Arrangement” phrase
(capitalized) in both the “From” and “To” lines of an email advertisement, mixed
with online quotations lifted from articles about Reflex Media’s “Seeking
Arrangement” brand. These allegations more than support a finding that Apiriliaco’s
use of “Seeking Arrangement” was intended to mimic a trademark, was not in good
faith, and was combined with a high degree of customer confusion. Hence,
Apiriliaco’s fair-use-defense argument fails—certainly on an abuse-of-discretion
standard—and the default judgment should stand.
////
////
{00046613 1 } 21
(352 of 416)
2. The Complaint Is Sufficient
Apiriliaco alleges in cursory fashion that Reflex Media’s complaint is
insufficient, based on arguments already made. See App. Brief at 33-34. Reflex
Media reiterates that its complaint was sufficient, for all of the reasons already given,
and given hereafter.
3. The Sum of Money At Stake Does Not Weigh Against The Default
Judgment
Apiriliaco lists the $2 million amount of the default judgment as a factor in its
favor. But, this amount (as already explained) is a quite conservative estimate of the
actual damages that would have been awarded had Apiriliaco entered a defense.
Such damages would have reflected Apiriliaco’s profits from the expanded
‘HoneyDaddy’ customer base due to its illegal use of the Seeking Arrangement
mark. Here, if only a small percentage percent of the customer base listed on the
“HoneyDaddy” website is traceable to the improper use of “Seeking Arrangement,”
Apiriliaco’s profits (when trebled for willful infringement) would still exceed the
$2,000,000 statutory damages awarded here by default judgment. R.62-64. Given
the reasonableness of these damages, the sum of money at stake should not weigh
against upholding the judgement below.
////
////
{00046613 1 } 22
(353 of 416)
4. Reflex Media Will Be Prejudiced If The Default Judgment Is

Reversed
Reflex Media has suffered considerable and continuing loss from the pirating
of its trademark by Apiriliaco, and it is now over eighteen months since suit was
filed to redress that injury. If the default judgment is reversed, and the case
essentially started at ‘square one,’ it will be some additional years before Reflex
Media is compensated. As held by a court in this Circuit when finding prejudice in
a similar infringement case, “[T]he evidence before the Court established that
Plaintiff will likely suffer great prejudice through the loss of sales and diminution of
goodwill if default is not entered.” Phillip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 499.
Reflex Media will suffer prejudice, moreover, from Apiriliaco’s
gamesmanship with the judicial system. Had Apiriliaco answered the initial
complaint there would be a ruling on the merits by now, but it chose to ignore that
complaint and the follow-up correspondence, and not to join in the lawsuit until after
a default judgment had been entered. Essentially, Apiriliaco adopted a “heads-I-
win-tails-you-lose” approach to the litigation: if Reflex Media could not prove its
right to default judgment the litigation would go away, but if default judgment was
entered, it could demand a “redo” on the merits. Such a strategy should not prevail,
and if Reflex Media is forced to begin the litigation anew after having painstakingly
established its right to default judgment, it will have suffered prejudice by definition.
For this reason as well, the default judgment should stand.

{00046613 1 } 23
(354 of 416)
5. The Material Facts Are Undisputed
Apiriliaco’s cursory contention that there is a dispute on the material facts is
groundless. See App. Brief at 36. Nowhere in its Brief does Apiriliaco dispute the
authenticity of the “Seeking Arrangements” email advertisements attached to Reflex
Media’s complaint. R.120. Nor does Apiriliaco deny (or even mention) Reflex
Media’s specific allegations as to the prominent display of quotes lifted from articles
about Reflex Media’s Seeking Arrangements brand, or the use of Seeking
Arrangement website vendors. R.110-111 (Paragraphs 50-57). Apiriliaco can
argue, without evidence, that some or all of this was unintentional on its part, but it
does not deny or dispute the major facts. Hence, this factor also weighs in favor of
affirming that judgment.
6. Apiriliaco’s Default Was Not Due To Excusable Neglect
Apiriliaco’s actions in this case were not “excusable neglect” by any stretch
of the imagination. But first, the definition: “neglect has its normal expected
meaning, i.e, negligence, carelessness, inadvertent mistake.” Briones v. Riviera
Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997) citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). Whether neglect is
“excusable” depends on factors such as “the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was
within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good
{00046613 1 } 24
(355 of 416)
faith.” Id. Reflex Media submits that this definition of excusable neglect cannot
possibly be met by any of the following actions, let alone all of them together:
1) To run a business in the United States, with a website boasting thousands
of U.S. customers, including nearly four thousand California customers,
and purport to be inaccessible for service anywhere in the United States.
R.86.
2) To list a Cyprus address on that website, and to argue that this disclosed
address is not a proper address for service. R.161.
3) To receive and sign for certified mail—including a complaint in California
federal court—at this Cyprus address, and yet to maintain that the signer
cannot be found and that company is unaware of what happened to the
complaint. R.151.
4) To receive and sign for follow-up correspondence relating to the complaint
(which included another copy of the complaint) and to again profess
ignorance as to what happened to this correspondence. R.160, 168.
5) To display (temporarily) a Nevada address on the website as well, and to
receive and sign for the same correspondence (including a copy of the
complaint) at the Nevada address. R. 160-167.
6) To remove the Nevada address from that website after receiving and
signing for the above-mentioned correspondence. R.161-166.
{00046613 1 } 25
(356 of 416)
7) To receive, in Cyprus, an application for default judgment, this time
(admittedly) reviewed by someone in the company who knows that this is
an American legal pleading. R.38-42.
8) To fail to respond to the default judgment application in the time called for
by Local Rule. R.38-42, 69.
These actions cannot possibly add up to the type of good-faith inadvertence
which constitutes “excusable neglect.” Rather, they reflect (at best) willful
ignorance of the most basic legal requirements for a sophisticated entity doing
business in the United States, and (at worst) deliberate evasion of legal process in
this case. The repeated and intentional disregard of multiple notices of this lawsuit
cannot be excused, and consideration of this Eitel factor strongly demands that the
default judgment be sustained.
7. Public Policy Supports Sustaining the Default Judgment
Apiriliaco’s brief statement on public policy (see App. Brief at 38-39) is
adequately answered by what has already been said here, especially on excusable
neglect. Apiriliaco’s disregard of this lawsuit, and of the American judicial system,
has been repeated, willful, and intentional. Promotion of such misbehavior should
not be public policy, which policy instead supports affirmance of the default
judgment, along with all of the other Eitel factors.
////
{00046613 1 } 26
(357 of 416)
F. The Attorneys’ Fees Were Properly Awarded
Apiriliaco’s brief argument against the award of attorneys’ fees is that such
fees should not be awarded absent a finding of willful infringement. See App. Brief
at 39-40. Reflex Media maintains, in response, that the facts given support a finding
of willfulness, that (as per law already cited) the complaint’s allegations of
willfulness are admitted by default, and that “a case may be deemed “exceptional,”
and merit an award of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act, when Defendant
disregards the proceedings and does not appear.” Phillip Morris, 219 F.R.D 494 at
502. This is exactly what happened here, and the award of attorneys was entirely
appropriate.
G. Apiriliaco Is Subject to Jurisdiction in California
Apiriliaco argues, finally, that this case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction after the default judgment is reversed for defective service. See App.
Brief at 40-42. For the reasons given, service was proper and jurisdiction obtains.
Apiriliaco’s argument in this regard is therefore moot.
////
////
////
////
////
{00046613 1 } 27
(358 of 416)
V. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons given above, Reflex Media asks this Court to find that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion, and to accordingly affirm the default
judgment entered below.

s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Phone: (213) 443-6222

Inc.
{00046613 1 } 28
(359 of 416)
Plaintiff-Appellees are not aware of any cases pending in this court that are
related to this case as defined in Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6.

s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Phone: (213) 443-6222

Inc.
{00046613 1 } 29
(360 of 416)
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), I certify that:
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 6,162 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionately spaced typeface using Microsoft Word
2016 Times New Roman 14-point font.

s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Phone: (213) 443-6222

Inc.
{00046613 1 } 30
(361 of 416)
I hereby certify that on January 19, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing

s/ Mark L. Smith
Mark L. Smith
SMITH CORRELL, LLP
Phone: (213) 443-6222

Inc.
{00046613 1 } 31
(362 of 416)

FILED
JAN 22 2018

corporation,

The answering brief submitted on January 19, 2018 is filed.
Within 7 days of this order, appellee is ordered to file 7 copies of the brief in
paper format, with a red cover, accompanied by certification (attached to the end of
each copy of the brief) that the brief is identical to the version submitted
(363 of 416)
1526.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Liora Anis

Deputy Clerk
(364 of 416)
No. 17-55505

for the
Ninth Circuit

Plaintiff-Appellee,
– v. –

___________________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

APIRILIACO LIMITED, dba HONEYDADDY.COM,
EAST FENERIDOU, and E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL LTD.

New York, New York 10022 (310) 277-8438
(212) 376-3010

(365 of 416)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ii

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................2
a. The Default Judgment was Void for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and
Defective Service of Process. ................................................................................3
i. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction ....................................................3
ii. The Purported Service of Process Was Defective .................................7
b. The Judgment was Void Because it was
Prematurely Entered by the District Court. .............................................11
c. The Default Judgment is Void Because it is Based Solely on Only
Unsubstantiated Evidence and a Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel Attesting
to Damages. .........................................................................................................12
d. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the Eitel Factors and Default Judgment Should
Not Have Been Entered. .....................................................................................13
i. There is No Merit to Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim and Defendant Has
a Meritorious Defense. ....................................................................................13
ii. The Complaint is Insufficient................................................................15
iii. The Sum of the Money at Stake. ...........................................................16
iv. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the Issues on the
Merits................................................................................................................16
v. There is a Dispute Concerning Material Facts....................................18
vi. The Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect ........................................19
vii. Policy Weighs in Favor of Vacating the Default .................................20
e. Attorneys’ Fees Should Not Have Been Awarded ....................................21
f. The Complaint Should be Dismissed Under FRCP Upon Vacating the
Default Due the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ................................................23
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................23
i
(366 of 416)
Cases Page(s)
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem International, Inc.,

874 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2017) ...............................................................passim
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe,

141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir.1998) ....................................................................... 21
Brockmeyer v. May,
383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................... 8
Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................3, 13, 16, 21
Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc,

54 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................... 3
Falk v. Allen,
739 F.2d 461 (9th Cir., 1984) ........................................................................ 20
Gordon and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute of Physics,

166 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.1999) .......................................................................... 21
Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior Court,

2018 WL 1069714 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2018) .............................................. 8, 9
Johnson v. Jones,
149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) ......................................................................... 22
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder,
646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 8
Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy,

453 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................ 6
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,

155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.1998) ......................................................................... 22
ii
(367 of 416)
Pena v. Seguros La Comerical, S.A.,

770 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................ 20
Phillip Morris USA, Inc., v. Castworld Products, Inc.,

219 F.R.D. 494 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ............................................................17, 22
Quach v. Cross,
2004 WL 2862285 (C.D.Ca. December 3, 2004) ......................................... 19
Redding Ford v. California State Bd. of Equalization,

722 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 3
TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber,

244 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2001) ......................................................................... 19
Walden v. Fiore,
134 U.S. 1115 (2014) ..................................................................................... 4
Washington Shoe Co., v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc.,

704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 3
Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon,

137 S. Ct. 1504 (2017)................................................................................. 7-8
Statutes, Rules & Secondary Sources
The Hague Convention ......................................................................................1, 7, 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 55 ............................................................................................. 3
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 ................................................................................... passim
iii
(368 of 416)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Opening Brief presents six issues which in turn center on two primary
issues: (1) whether the use of the words “SEEKING” and “ARRANGEMENT” as a
display name in an e-mail constitutes willful use of a trademark as a counterfeit mark
that would entitle Plaintiff1 to statutory damages - especially where the Complaint
did not even allege counterfeiting or request statutory damages; and (2) whether
service via Federal Express in Cyprus proper in an action in which the forum is
California.
As to the first issue, Defendants maintain that the use of “SEEKING” and
“ARRANGEMENTS” as a display name on an e-mail is not use of a trademark in
commerce and that there is no law to the contrary. It would logically flow therefrom
that any alleged harm would not be by virtue of “willful use of a counterfeit mark”
that would warrant statutory damages. Moreover, even if it were, Plaintiff cannot
belatedly claim that there was counterfeit use of the trademark and seek - and be
awarded - statutory damages based on the Record below.
With respect to the second issue, Defendants maintain that service in Cyprus
by Federal Express was not valid service on any of the three defendants. While the
Hague Convention may allow service by mail in some circumstances, all the
1
All defined terms in the Opening Brief are hereby incorporated by referenced,
unless stated otherwise.
1
(369 of 416)
requisite elements for this to be permissible were not met here, i.e., otherwise-
applicable law in Cyprus does not permit service via mail, and California, the forum
State, does not authorize service by Federal Express.
Of note, Plaintiff’s Answering Brief seeks to group together the three
defendants as to why they all three allegedly engaged in some form of wrongdoing
and why service on one would be service of all. The three defendants, two corporate
entities and one individual, are separate and distinct. In the case of Feneridou, she
was not even employed by either of the Corporate Defendants at the time of alleged
service. In the case of Kartoir, a Cyprus company, it merely serves as the corporate
secretary for Apiriliaco. [R. 38]. Thus, it is improper to group these three entities
together as one where the elements of service and of alleged wrongdoing should be
established separately against each. Seemingly, Plaintiff cannot independently
demonstrate why Kartoir or Feneridou are even parties to this lawsuit, how this Court
could have jurisdiction over them (or Apiriliaco), or how they could somehow be
liable for alleged trademark infringement - let alone willful infringement of a
counterfeit mark.
Based on the foregoing, the appeal should be granted and the default vacated.
II. ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that the standard of review on appeal should be abuse of
discretion, not de novo. Answering Brief, p. 4. This is wrong. As stated in the
2
(370 of 416)
Opening Brief, whether a judgment is void - which it is respectfully submitted is the
case here due to the lack of jurisdiction - is a question of law reviewable de novo on
appeal. See, e.g., Redding Ford v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 722 F.2d
496, 497 (9th Cir. 1983). Opening Brief, p. 7. Plaintiff’s reliance on Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) for this proposition is inaccurate. What Eitel
states is that “we review a denial of a default judgment under Rule 55(b), Fed.
R.Civ.P., for abuse of discretion.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. (emphasis added). That
is in stark contrast to the present matter in which Defendants are seeking to vacate
a default judgment and are appealing the district court’s ruling upon a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion to set aside the default judgment. See. e.g., Export Group v. Reef Industries,
Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995); see, also, Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem
International, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017) [“We review de novo ‘[a]
district court’s determination of whether personal jurisdiction may be properly
exercised.’ Washington Shoe Co., v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671
(9th Cir. 2012)”].
a. The Default Judgment was Void for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction and Defective Service of Process.
i. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction
As Plaintiff acknowledges, there are three requirements for a court to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: (1) the defendant must either
3
(371 of 416)
purposefully direct his activities toward the forum or purposefully avail himself of
the privileges of conducting activities in the forum; (2) the claim must be one which
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise
of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be
reasonable. Answering Brief, p. 7, citing Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1068.
In Axiom Foods, this Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Therein, specific jurisdiction over a foreign
entity was analyzed relying on the guidance set forth in Walden v. Fiore, 134 U.S.
1115 (2014). The Walden v. Fiore Court conducted an analysis under the
“purposeful direction” test: the “defendant must have ‘(1) committed an intentional
act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant
knows was likely to be suffered in the forum state.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069.
Although it was found in Axiom Foods that an intentional act was committed, here,
the Record does not establish that any of the Defendants committed an intentional
act or that there was infringement. The Axiom Foods Court found that the intentional
act alleged was not expressly aimed at the forum state because “[t]he alleged
infringement barely connected Acerchem UK to California residents, much less to
California itself.” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1071. Similarly, the intentional act
alleged by Plaintiff here, sending two e-mails to an e-mail distribution list that was
4
(372 of 416)
not directed to a specific recipient nor a specific location in California cannot be
enough to confer subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s proclaimed basis for subject matter jurisdiction - i.e., (i) the number
of “members” listed on the HoneyDaddy website in California and in the United
States, (ii) alleged engagement in interactive and commercial conduct through said
website by, upon information and belief, soliciting and/or actively seeking to
transact business with U.S. residents, and (iii) maintaining a phone number with a
310 area code (Answering Brief, p. 6), is insufficient to constitute purposefully
availing themselves to the privileges and protections of the laws of the State of
California. Notably, this again clumps together all three defendants - including a
separate corporate secretarial entity and an individual who was not employed by
either of the Corporate Defendants at the time of the commencement of this action.
Plaintiff’s continued emphasis on the number of “members” in California, or even
the United States, is only a red herring in an attempt to create an appearance of
connection to the forum state where one does not exist. “It can hardly be said that
California [wa]s the focal point both of the [e-mail] and of the harm suffered.” Axiom
Foods, Inc., 874 F.3d at 1070-71. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) (first
alternation in original).
As discussed in the Opening Brief, the only conceivable connection to
California is Apiriliaco’s website (which although it is alleged contains quotes
5
(373 of 416)
belonging to Plaintiff, it is not alleged that the purportedly infringing mark was ever
used on the website) and two e-mail advertisements identified by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
disputes that the website was passive only by distinguishing the case relied upon by
Defendants in the Opening Brief, Pebble Beach v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2006), but without providing any authority as to what it believes defines a
passive versus active website.
There is also nothing more than the conclusory and self-serving statement in
the Complaint that Defendants engage in “interactive and commercial conduct”
through the HoneyDaddy.com website. It is unknown how a website such as
HoneyDaddy.com could be described as “interactive and commercial”, and certainly
no description is provided by Plaintiff in the Complaint or elsewhere. Further, the
Complaint itself states that the purported interactive and commercial “upon
information and belief involves soliciting and/or otherwise actively seeking to
transact business with residents of the U.S., including residents of the Central
District of California.” [R. 107]. Thus, even Plaintiff does not know whether the
alleged interactive and commercial activity - which is a woefully inaccurate manner
of describing how the website operates - solicits or seeks to transact business in the
forum State. Plaintiff cannot profess ignorance as to the functionality of the website
as it claims to operate a similar business.
6
(374 of 416)
ii. The Purported Service of Process Was Defective
Plaintiff’s contra-argument, that service of process on each of the Defendants
was not defective, is not supported by the Record.
The key here is whether the method of service itself was proper. The
controlling authority for this issue is Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504
(2017) (“Water Splash”). Plaintiff attempts to avoid the Water Splash decision by
arguing Defendants somehow waived any right to rely on Water Splash by not citing
it in their Motion for Indicative Ruling, but that is not the decision that has been
appealed. See Answering Brief, p. 11-12. Even if it were the decision on appeal here,
Plaintiff conflates the concept of raising an issue for the first time on appeal with the
citing of new case law on appeal. The latter is simply not prohibited. Defendants
have also not “failed to mention the central holding in Water Splash” and the portion
relied upon by Defendants is not merely “dicta.” See Answering Brief, p. 12. Indeed,
under the heading “held” (not buried in dicta) the Water Splash decision expressly
states:
The fact that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail does not mean
that it affirmatively authorizes such service. Rather, service by mail is
permissible if the receiving state has not objected to service by mail
and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable law.
Water Splash, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1507. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the inquiry
must go beyond whether or not mail is generally permissible under the Hague
Convention and a finding must be made whether service by mail is authorized by
7
(375 of 416)
otherwise-applicable law. As detailed in the Opening Brief, otherwise-applicable
law in Cyprus does not allow for service by mail unless expressly allowed by an
order of the trial court. Opening Brief, p. 15.
In yet another attempt to avoid the holding in Water Splash, Plaintiff argues
it obtained judgment prior to the decision in Water Splash, claiming that the Supreme
Court expressed no intent to invalidate prior judgments. This argument likewise falls
flat. Assuming Water Splash changed, as opposed to confirmed, the applicable law,
there is no requirement for a specific statement of retroactivity. Nunez-Reyes v.
Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690-691 (9th Cir. 2011) (also noting that a new rule of law
that would strip a court of jurisdiction must be applied retroactively). Regardless,
Water Splash signaled the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Ninth Circuit approach
on this issue in Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004). See, Inversiones
Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior Court, 2018 WL 1069714, at *4 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,
2018) (“Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach
in Brockmeyer, which required that the receiving state not object to service by mail
and that the forum state in which the action is pending to affirmatively authorize
service by international mail.”). Brockmeyer is yet another case relief upon by
Defendants in its Opening Brief. Although Inversiones dealt with a reverse scenario
where it was a foreign entity seeking to commence an action in California and to
8
(376 of 416)
effectuate service via the Hague Convention, the forum state in both instances is
California. As explained in Inversiones:
the forum state (California) must affirmatively authorize service by

international mail. Section 413.10, subdivision (c), does not
affirmatively authorize service by mail, let alone by Federal Express.
We conclude that the attempted service by Federal Express did not
constitute valid service of process under California law, and as a result,
did not comply with the Hague Service Convention pursuant to Article
10(a).
Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S., 2018 WL 1069714 at *5. Thus, the law in California
is that service cannot be completed by Federal Express. The relevant Cyprus statue
is the Cyprus Civil Procedure (“CCP”), Order 5, which statute does not authorize
service by mail or FedEx other than in the circumstance where an agent for a
nonresident who has entered into a contract in Cyprus is served pursuant to Court
order. CCP Order 5(8).
It is untrue that Defendants cannot explain why they would have received the
last of the mailings but not the earlier ones. The explanation, which has been
provided, is because they do not know who the individual was who signed for the
packages. R. 40. They were only fortunate that the last delivery was actually re-
directed because the person delivering it knew the address was incorrect and so he
delivered it to the address he knew for one of the Defendants; they immediately took
steps to defend those baseless allegations in the motion for default judgment, but
were too late. Plaintiff overlooks the portion of the Zertalis Declaration explaining
9
(377 of 416)
that the individual who signed for the deliveries was not an employee of either of
the Corporate Defendants. R. 40. The paperwork did not “fall through the cracks”,
as claimed by Plaintiff in the Answering Brief, but was not properly sent to the
intended recipients.
With respect to the sufficiency of service, assuming arguendo that service by
courier mail was sufficient - which it was not - there is no evidence in the Record
that any of the Defendants actually received the Complaint by FedEx on August 5,
2016, nor was the follow up delivery received. Plaintiff can cite to no evidence of
receipt other than that a package was signed by someone who Defendants have stated
did not work for them. There is simply no basis to Plaintiff’s claim that substitutes
service at an address other than the Defendants’ actual address, in a language other
than the native language in the Country where service was made, should be deemed
adequate. Plaintiff argues that Defendants cite to no authority for this proposition,
yet Plaintiff cites to no authority for its contra-argument.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff argues that Defendants must have had “actual”
notice of the suit because of an apparent change to the content of a website during
the course of this litigation (Answering Brief, p. 10); this is both wrong and
irrelevant. Plaintiff’s argument is not based on admissible evidence and asks the
Court to make a factual determination that no other party was in control of this
website (such as the other defendant in this action who apparently admitted to setting
10
(378 of 416)
up the website). Defendants have detailed, and attested to, the lack of knowledge of
the commencement of this action. R. 39-42. Regardless, Defendants’ knowledge is
irrelevant if service was defective. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to circumvent
its improper service in Cyprus by relying on a mailing to a Nevada address, such
mailing was not itself proper service and does not cure otherwise improper service.
b. The Judgment was Void Because it was Prematurely

Entered by the District Court.
Defendants reiterate that they were denied due process by the District Court’s
failure to allow adequate time for a response. Plaintiff filed its Application
for Default Judgment on February 21, 2017 with two hearing dates: March 20, 2017
and March 27, 2017, with the former contained in the caption and the latter in the
body of the notice. [R. 51]. On March 7, 2017, the District Court entered the Order,
which was either only thirteen (13) or twenty (20) days before the two noticed
hearing dates [R. 49] and, on March 14, 2017, the District Court prematurely entered
the Judgment, which was either six (6) or thirteen (13) days before the two notice
hearing dates. [R. 1]. Even if the requisite time had passed for Defendants to oppose
the relief sought under the applicable local rules, the confusion as to the actual
hearing date and the fact that Defendants are two foreign entities and a foreign
individual, should be found to be sufficient to excuse their failure to timely oppose
the defective motion. Since Judgment was entered before the hearing date, due
11
(379 of 416)
process was denied rendering the Judgment void. Plaintiff’s argument that operating
a website “that boasts of the thousands of American and (specifically) California
‘members’ who use their services” (Answering Brief, p. 14) is illogical. There is no
correlation between this and whether any confusion would have been caused.
Similarly, having subsequently retained United States counsel has no bearing on the
initial confusion caused by the dates.
c. The Default Judgment is Void Because it is Based Solely

on Only Unsubstantiated Evidence and a Declaration of
Plaintiff’s Counsel Attesting to Damages.
While a plaintiff’s burden in “proving up” damages may be lenient in the
context of a default judgment, it does not mean that there is no burden. Using the
very standard stated by Plaintiff - that compensation must relate to the damages that
naturally flow from the injuries pled (Answering Brief, p. 14) - there would be no
damages. The injuries pled are speculative and are based on a claim that a display
name on an e-mail can constitute a trademark. Because there is no basis for the form
of infringement alleged, there could be no injury. Further, Plaintiff offered nothing
below to suggest any actual injury occurred. Rather, it elected instead to argue for
statutory damages, despite not having requested statutory damages in the Complaint.
Regardless of whether the default - which should be vacated - constitutes an
admission of the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff should not be awarded relief
not requested therein. Plaintiff even concedes in its brief that it did not seek statutory
12
(380 of 416)
damages until its Application for Entry of Default Judgment (Answering Brief, p.
16). This is precisely why an actual inquest on damages should alternatively be
required in the event that the default is not vacated.
Regardless of whether or not an affidavit from counsel is sufficient “where
only statutory damages are sought” (a point not conceded by Defendants), counsel’s
affidavit went beyond just providing the law that would demonstrate why he
believed statutory damages were appropriate. See Answering Brief, p. 17. Instead,
counsel provided an accounting of the estimate of what he - on behalf of his client -
thought his client’s actual damages were, assumed treble damages should be
awarded, and then stated that Plaintiff would accept the “lesser” amount available in
the form of statutory damages. [R. 62-63]. It cannot be denied that this was evidence
of damages, not a legal analysis, which should not have taken into consideration.
d. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the Eitel Factors and Default

Judgment Should Not Have Been Entered.
i. There is No Merit to Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim

and Defendant Has a Meritorious Defense.
In attempting to convince this Court that its claims have merit, Plaintiff
misstates Defendants’ position. Defendants have not admitted to using the phrase
“Seeking Arrangement” in advertisements. The drafter of the e-mails in question
used those words as a display name on an e-mail, not on the advertisement itself.
Defendants also do not claim that that the use of the phrase was “intermittent” and
13
(381 of 416)
“inadvertent”, but only that a display name consisting of those words was used in
two e-mails.
Here, there is no legal authority that would support the claim that use of words
or a phrase as a display name equates to use of those words or phrase as a trademark,
let alone use of a counterfeit mark giving rise to an award of statutory damages.
Therefore, even if Defendants are deemed to have admitted the allegations in the
Complaint by virtue of the entry of default judgment, Plaintiff must still establish
that there is sound underlying law to support the allegations in the Complaint.
“Seeking” and “Arrangement” were used as descriptive words as an e-mail
display name, not as a trademark nor as an advertisement itself. There is no
indication whatsoever that there was any consumer confusion that resulted, nor is
there any indication that there was a diminution of Plaintiff’s mark. Glaringly,
nowhere in Plaintiff’s Answering Brief does it address that the Complaint is devoid
of the word “counterfeit” (as well as “statutory damages”). Plaintiff is seeking to
avoid the myriad of deficiencies and lack of merit in its Complaint and subsequent
filings by taking advantage of having deprived Defendants of due process, which
should not be condoned.
Plaintiff also claims that the fair use defense does not apply because it has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that confusion is likely. This is not
so. The argument relies on the opinion that a display name in an e-mail could cause
14
(382 of 416)
customer confusion as to the source of the goods or service and relies on an
admission by default. However, as discussed in the Opening Brief, there could not
have been any confusion as to the source due to the fact that next to the display name
was the e-mail address noreply@partywithsugar.com (which website,
www.partywithsugar.com, is alleged in the Complaint is owned by Defendants).
Further, the subject line of the e-mail was “Join the Sugar Party” and the first portion
of the text was the stylized words “HONEY DADDY” (which references a website
Plaintiff’s allege in the Complaint is owned by Defendants, www.honeydaddy.com).
The bottom of the e-mail again uses the words “Honey Daddies”, again referring to
Defendants’ website. Absolutely nowhere in the subject line or body of the e-mail is
“SEEKING ARRANGMENT” used, nor is any other word, phrase, or image used
remotely suggesting an connection with Plaintiff’s services that would cause a
consumer any confusion at all. This removes any conceivable argument there was
confusion as to the source of the provider of the services. Plaintiff’s reliance on the
claim that quotations on the HoneyDaddy website were pirated from articles about
“the real Seeking Arrangement” mark have no bearing on whether there was either
any infringement or whether there was any confusion.
ii. The Complaint is Insufficient.
Plaintiff argues that the Complaint was sufficient by virtue of incorporating
all other arguments contained in its brief. Answering Brief, p. 22. However, nowhere
15
(383 of 416)
in those arguments does it establish that a display name on an e-mail constitutes a
trademark. It also does not remedy the fact that the Complaint does not seek statutory
damages or allege use of a counterfeit mark, but that statutory damages were
awarded for use of a counterfeit mark. Accordingly, this Eitel factor weights in
Defendants’ favor.
iii. The Sum of the Money at Stake.
The awarding of damages in the amount of $2,000,000 is not “quite
conservative” given what the actual damages could be had this matter been litigated
on the merits. Rather, it represents a windfall to Plaintiff when Plaintiff could not
prove that there are any actual, as opposed to merely speculative damages. It further
assumes that Plaintiff would have been able to prove that it was entitled to treble
damages, which it would not be had this matter been litigated on the merits.
Regardless, Plaintiff does not cite to a single case suggesting that the sum of money
at stake is weighed relative to what the sum of money potentially could have been
when determining this prong. No matter how it is viewed, $2,000,000 is a large sum
of money and this Eitel factor should be weighed in Defendants’ favor.
iv. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced By Litigating the

Issues on the Merits.
Plaintiff has not shown, at all, that if has ever suffered or that it continues to
suffer “considerable and continuing loss from the pirating of its trademark by
16
(384 of 416)
Apiriliaco”. Answering Brief, p. 23. Indeed, even upon obtaining a final judgment it
did not show that it suffered any losses at all. Rather, Plaintiff settled for statutory
damages because it could not prove any loss (despite its claim that it would have
proven losses excess of the statutory damages had it needed and had access to
Defendants’ records). There is no prejudice to Plaintiff in the absence of any
identifiable damages. Certainly, there cannot be any continuing loss. Even if the case
is reset back to “square one” and if it takes years before compensation is potentially
received - as claimed to be Plaintiff’s concern - it will not change the alleged damage
caused by the two allegedly offensive e-mail advertisements. This case is unlike
Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc., v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494 (C.D.Cal.
2003), a case heavily relied upon by Plaintiff throughout its brief. In Phillip Morris,
the defendants “engaged in an ongoing and unrestrained commercial importation of
counterfeit cigarettes” bearing plaintiff’s trademarks “MARLBORO” and
“MARLBORO Red Label”. Here, even if Plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating that
the words “SEEKING” and “ARRANGMENTS” were used as a trademark - which
they were not - they were only used in two instances (as evidenced by, among other
things, the amount of statutory damages sought and awarded on default). This was
not an ongoing violation or one that has a likelihood of reoccurring if the default is
vacated.
17
(385 of 416)
Moreover, there has been no “gamesmanship with the judicial system”.
Defendants have discussed at length why it could not timely answer the improperly
served Complaint. Defendants also timely sought to vacate the default. It is absurd
to assert that good faith efforts to vacate a default judgment is somehow a form of
prejudice towards the plaintiff. To the contrary, Defendants are prejudiced by
Plaintiff’s use of the legal system to deprive Defendants a fair day in court to defend
what are ultimately baseless claims.
v. There is a Dispute Concerning Material Facts.
A judgment was entered against Defendants for the alleged willful use of a
counterfeit mark in commerce with statutory damages awarded for the alleged
violation. Thus, Plaintiff’s statements regarding whether or not Defendants deny
other allegations upon which judgment was not entered and for which damages were
not awarded - e.g., the alleged prominent display of quotes purportedly lifted from
articles about Plaintiff’s brand or the use of the same vendors as Plaintiff - are
immaterial. It is also immaterial whether or not the e-mail advertisement annexed to
Plaintiff’s complaint are authentic. What is material, and what is in dispute, is
whether or not Defendants, individually or collectively, infringed, either willfully or
unintentionally, on Plaintiff’s trademark. Plaintiff’s Complaint and the damages
awarded on default, are primarily, if not solely, based on each of the defendants’ use
of a counterfeit mark. Defendants deny that they ever used “SEEKING” and
18
(386 of 416)
“ARRANGEMENTS” as a trademark at all. Therefore, there is unquestionably a
dispute concerning not only a material fact but the fact most material to Plaintiff’s
action. Moreover, other issues of fact exists, e.g., whether there was any consumer
confusion and whether Plaintiff’s mark rises to the level of a famous mark.
vi. The Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect
Defendants have offered a credible, good faith explanation negating any
“intention to take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decision
making, or otherwise manipulate the legal process.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v.
Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697-98 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, Defendants should not
be found “culpable”, even if the Court finds that they had actual notice of the pending
action, despite the defects in service. The failure of two Cyprus companies and an
individual who is last known to reside in Céyprus, served by Federal Express at an
address other their principal place of business or residence, with unknown
documents on a person not employed by or otherwise authorized to accept service
on behalf of any of them, requiring an appearance in a matter pending in the United
States, could hardly be construed as a “devious, deliberate, willful” attempt to
“manipulate the legal process.” See TCI Group Life, 244 F.3d at 689; see also Quach
v. Cross, 2004 WL 2862285 at *7 (C.D.Ca. December 3, 2004) (finding excusable
neglect and vacating default where defaulting party failed to respond because they
felt they were improperly served).
19
(387 of 416)
Plaintiff relies on eight “actions” by Defendants in an attempt to show that the
default could not have been the result of excusable neglect, none of which support
Plaintiff’s argument or address why the default was not excusable. Instead, they are
just a rehashing of Plaintiff’s failed attempts at service of the Complaint and follow-
up correspondence, as well as Defendants eventually learning of the action later in
time. Much like all other times, these “actions” are recited by Plaintiff, they are
inaccurate, e.g., the signer of the Federal Express - “MARIOS” - was not an
employee of any of the Defendants.
Accordingly, it is in the interests of justice to vacate the default judgment
entered on March 14, 2017 and to allow Defendants to defend the present action on
the merits.
vii. Policy Weighs in Favor of Vacating the Default.
Default judgments are “appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case,
whenever possible, should be decided on the merits.” Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461,
463 (9th Cir., 1984). Moreover, any doubts as to the propriety of a default should be
resolved against the party seeking the default judgment. Pena v. Seguros La
Comerical, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985) (Default judgments are generally
disfavored, as public policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on the merits whenever
possible.)
20
(388 of 416)
“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably
possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, where the Defendants have come forward
and express an intent to defend the allegations against them, have valid basis for not
previously appearing, and a myriad of procedural and substantive issues exist, it
would be appropriate overturn the Judgment. Defendants have not shown disregard
for this lawsuit or the American judicial system at all, let alone in a manner that has
been repeated, willful, and intentional. As set forth in the Opening Brief and the
submissions to the Court below, Defendants were unaware of the pendency of the
action until after the Notice of Lodging. R. 38. Shortly upon learning of the action,
they attempted to have the default vacated. R. 8. Thus, it is a gross
mischaracterization to state that they have engaged in repeated, willful, and
intentional disregard of this lawsuit or the American judicial system.
e. Attorneys’ Fees Should Not Have Been Awarded.
The default judgment's award of attorneys' fees under Local Rule 53-1, also
based on the award of profits, is similarly problematic. The Court is entitled to award
attorneys’ fees only in exceptional cases to the prevailing party. Such a case occurs
only when the trademark infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir.1998); Gordon
and Breach Science Pub. S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 166 F.3d 438 (2d
Cir.1999) (under the Lanham Act, attorneys' fees should be awarded only in
21
(389 of 416)
exceptional cases and only on evidence of fraud or bad faith). “Willful or bad faith
infringement, so as to justify an award of attorney's fees under the Act, usually means
passing off a product or service as another seller's better established one, or some
other deliberate theft of a marketholder's goodwill.” Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494,
503 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). The prevailing party must
demonstrate the exceptional nature of a case by clear and convincing evidence to be
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d
526 (5th Cir.1998). Once again, Plaintiff has set forth no evidence whatsoever that
Defendants’ were infringing - or even used - Plaintiff’s Mark, much less clear and
convincing evidence of willfulness. In these circumstances, the award constitutes
nothing more than a penalty for failing to respond to a Complaint that was never
served properly. To the extent that Plaintiff relies on Phillip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at
502 for the proposition that the requisite willfulness was admitted by virtue of
Defendants’ default, thereby deeming it an exceptional circumstance, this is not what
Phillip Morris holds. Such would suggest that “exceptional” circumstances exist
every time a judgment is obtained on default. Rather, in Phillip Morris, the Court
combined the fact that the Complaint alleged that the conduct was willful and
deliberate with the defendant’s refusal to meaningfully communicate with the
plaintiff regarding the lawsuit. This is not the case here, where Defendants have
22
(390 of 416)
submitted a declaration stating that they were not even aware of the existence of the
litigation until after default judgment had been sought. [R. 38].
f. The Complaint Should be Dismissed Under FRCP Upon

Vacating the Default Due the Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Defendants have
established that the service was improper and that the Court lacked jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed upon vacating the default.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that the Court enter an order to
reverse the District Court's ruling granting default judgment, specifically, its finding
of willful use of a counterfeit trademark in commerce, and its finding of attorneys'
fees in favor of the Plaintiff, and either (i) dismiss the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction or, alternative (ii) to remand the matter back the to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with the ruling.
Dated: March 9, 2018

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
23
(391 of 416)
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024

mconway@goodwin.com

Telephone: (310) 277-8438
Facsimile: (323) 935-5017
hrprice@aol.com

24
(392 of 416)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e)(3), I certify that this
brief contains 5,571 words, which meets the type-volume limitation stated in Circuit
Rule 28.1-1(c). This brief uses a proportional typeface and 14-point font.
Dated: March 9, 2018
s/ Michael T. Conway
MICHAEL T. CONWAY
(212) 376-3010
(393 of 416)
*********************************************************************************
on (date) .
March 9, 2018
Signature (use "s/" format) s/Micheal T. Conway
*********************************************************************************
on (date) .
CM/ECF system.

(394 of 416)

FILED
MAR 09 2018

corporation,

The reply brief submitted on March 9, 2018 is filed.
Within 7 days of this order, appellants are ordered to file 7 copies of the
brief in paper format, with a gray cover, accompanied by certification (attached to
the end of each copy of the brief) that the brief is identical to the version submitted
(395 of 416)
1526.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Liora Anis

Deputy Clerk
(396 of 416)

REFLEX MEDIA, INC, a Nevada Case No. 17-55505

Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY
APIRILIACO LIMITED,
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
LTD., and EAST FENERIDO, CDCA Case No. 8:16-cv-795
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for the Defendant-Appellants is not
available for oral argument of the appeal in the above-captioned mater during the
Pasadena session set for October 9-12, 2018. Unfortunately, I am now scheduled to
be in Tennessee on another matter that entire week.
Dated: May 2, 2018

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellants

Secretarial Ltd.
(397 of 416)
I hereby certify that on May 2, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
by using the appellate CM/ECF system. The following registered CM/ECF users
will be served by the appellate CM/ECF by e-mail:
Mark L. Smith, Esq.

SMITH CORRELL LLP
Howard R. Price
hrprice@aol.com
Dated: May 2, 2018

Telephone: (212) 376-3010
Facsimile: (212) 376-3024
mconway@goodwin.com
2
(398 of 416)

REFLEX MEDIA, INC, a Nevada Case No. 17-55505

Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY
APIRILIACO LIMITED
E.C.A. KARTOIR SECRETARIAL
LTD., and EAST FENERIDO, CDCACaseNo. 8:16-cv-795
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellee is not
available for oral argument of the appeal in the above-captioned matter during
the Pasadena session set for December 3-7, 2018. Counsel will be on family trip
during that time.
Dated: July 26, 2018
SMITH WASHBURN, LLP
Isl Mark L. Smith

Mark L. Smith (SBN 213829)
500 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 1450
Telephone: (213) 418-2390
Facsimile: (213) 418-2399
msmith@smithwashburn.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Reflex

Media, Inc.
(399 of 416)
I hereby certify that on July 26, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. The following registered CM/
ECF users will be served by the appellate CM/ECF by e-mail:

400 Park Avenue, Fifth Floor New
York, New York 10022
mconway@goodwin.com
Howard R. Price
9663 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite
hrprice@aol.com
Dated: July 26, 2018
SMITH WASHBURN LLP
/s/ Leigh Davis-Schmidt
Case Assistant
Telephone: (801) 584-1800
Facsimile: (801) 584-1820
ldschmidt@smithwashburn.com
2
(400 of 416)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 18 2018
corporation,
D.C. No.
v. Santa Ana

The parties should be prepared to discuss the following questions at oral
argument: (1) whether this court can consider the merits of Defendants-Appellants’
claims, where the district court has not ruled on a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate, and
(2) if so, which claims. Compare Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 789 n.1
(9th Cir. 2011), Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.
2001), In re Kubick, 171 B.R. 658, 660 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), with Consorzio Del
Prosciutto Di Parma v. Domain Name Clearing Co., LLC, 346 F.3d 1193, 1195
(9th Cir. 2003).

(401 of 416)
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Allison Fung

Deputy Clerk
2
(402 of 416)
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE (PASADENA)
I acknowledge receipt of the notice of assignment showing my case:
Case Number 17-55505
Case Title Reflex Media, Inc. v. Apiriliaco Ltd., et al.
assigned for hearing:
Date 11/16/18 Time 9:30 Courtroom 1
Location Pasadena
Counsel to argue (or, if argument to be presented "in pro per" enter party information):
Name Michael T. Conway
Phone (212) 376-3011 Email Address mconway@goodman.com
Party/parties represented All Defendant-Appellants
Names of other appearing

counsel on side and allocation
of total time per side if more
than one attorney to argue
Special needs you may

require in the courtroom
Counsel who have not entered an appearance in the case(s) listed above must file a
$ separate Notice of Appearance using CM/ECF.
Admission status (to be completed by attorneys only):
I certify that I am admitted to practice before this Court.

I certify that I am generally qualified for admission to practice before the bar of the Ninth Circuit
and that I will immediately apply for admission (forms available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov).
Signature (use
"s/" format)
s/ Michael T. Conway Date 10-22-18
Filing Instructions
Electronically: Print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator), then, in CM/ECF, choose Forms/
Notices/Disclosures > File an Acknowledgment of Hearing Notice.
-or, if exempt from electronic filing-
US Mail: Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, P.O. Box 91510, Pasadena CA 91109-1510
Overnight: Richard H. Chambers U.S. Court of Appeals Building, 125 South Grand Avenue, Pasadena CA 91105
Phone: 626-229-7250
(403 of 416)
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HEARING NOTICE (PASADENA)
I acknowledge receipt of the notice of assignment showing my case:
Case Number 17-55505
Case Title Reflex Media, Inc. v. Apiriliaco Ltd., et al
assigned for hearing:
Date 11/16/2018 Time 9:30 am Courtroom Courtroom 1
Location Pasadena
Counsel to argue (or, if argument to be presented "in pro per" enter party information):
Name Mark L. Smith
Phone (213) 418-2390 Email Address msmith@smithwashburn.com
Party/parties represented Plaintiff/Appellee- Reflex Media, Inc.
Names of other appearing

counsel on side and allocation
of total time per side if more
than one attorney to argue
Special needs you may

require in the courtroom
Counsel who have not entered an appearance in the case(s) listed above must file a
 separate Notice of Appearance using CM/ECF.
Admission status (to be completed by attorneys only):
I certify that I am admitted to practice before this Court.

I certify that I am generally qualified for admission to practice before the bar of the Ninth Circuit
and that I will immediately apply for admission (forms available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov).
Signature (use
"s/" format)
s/Mark L. Smith Date 10/22/2018
Filing Instructions
Electronically: Print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator), then, in CM/ECF, choose Forms/
Notices/Disclosures > File an Acknowledgment of Hearing Notice.
-or, if exempt from electronic filing-
US Mail: Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, P.O. Box 91510, Pasadena CA 91109-1510
Overnight: Richard H. Chambers U.S. Court of Appeals Building, 125 South Grand Avenue, Pasadena CA 91105
Phone: 626-229-7250
(404 of 416)
(405 of 416)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 7 2018

corporation,
D.C. No.
v.
MEMORANDUM*
APIRILIACO LIMITED, dba
Appeal from the United States District Court

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2018

Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, PARKER,** and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The district court entered default judgment against Defendants-Appellants
Apiriliaco Ltd., Anatoli Feneridou, and E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial Ltd. Defendants
appeal that decision on various grounds. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
(406 of 416)
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 789 n.1 (9th Cir.
2011), Consorzio Del Prosciutto Di Parma v. Domain Name Clearing Co., LLC,
346 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003). We reverse and remand, with instructions to
the district court to vacate the default judgment.
Plaintiff-Appellee Reflex Media, Inc. contends that it properly served
process on Defendants in Cyprus—by service of process on Apiriliaco’s and
E.C.A. Kartoir Secretarial’s principal place of business, and on Feneridou’s
domicile. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and hold that Plaintiff did not
make proper service of the summons and complaint on any of the defendants.
Although Cyprus “has not objected to service by mail,” see U.S. State Dep’t,
Judicial Assistance Country Information: Cyprus Judicial Assistance Information,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/ legal/Judicial-Assistance-Country-
Information/Cyprus.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2018), “otherwise-applicable law”
did not authorize service by mail in this case by the means used by Plaintiff, Water
Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1513 (2017) (citing Brockmeyer v. May,
383 F.3d 798, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2004)). First, Plaintiff did not follow the procedure
specified in the Hague Service Convention for serving process on international
parties. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters arts. 3–6, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Service was ineffective under Federal Rule of Civil
2
(407 of 416)
Procedure 4(f)(1) because Plaintiff did not follow the procedure specified in the
Hague Service Convention. Second, Plaintiff—not the district court clerk—mailed
the summons and complaint to Defendants. For this reason, service was
ineffective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2)(C)(ii). Third, Plaintiff
did not “obtain prior court approval” before mailing the summons and complaint to
Defendants. Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 805–06. For this reason, service was
ineffective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). See id. Fourth and
finally, in Brockmeyer, we interpreted an older but functionally equivalent version
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2)(A). Agreeing with the other courts that
had considered the question, we held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)(2)(A) does “not authorize service of process by ordinary first class
international mail.” Id. at 806–08. Service was ineffective under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff alternatively contends that it properly served Defendants at a
Nevada address. Assuming arguendo that Defendants could properly be served at
that address, service here was nonetheless ineffective, because Plaintiff mailed the
complaint to the Nevada address, but did not attach the summons, as Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(c)(1) requires.
Because the “attempted service” here was ineffective, “the default judgment
3
(408 of 416)
against [Defendants] cannot stand.” Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 809.1
REVERSED and REMANDED, with instructions to VACATE the
judgment.
1
We express no opinion on whether Plaintiff may properly serve Defendants. We
hold only that Plaintiff has not done so to this point.
4
(409 of 416)
Office of the Clerk

95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
Information Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings
Judgment
• This Court has filed and entered the attached judgment in your case.
Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please note the filed date on the attached
decision because all of the dates described below run from that date,
not from the date you receive this notice.
Mandate (Fed. R. App. P. 41; 9th Cir. R. 41-1 & -2)

• The mandate will issue 7 days after the expiration of the time for
filing a petition for rehearing or 7 days from the denial of a petition
for rehearing, unless the Court directs otherwise. To file a motion to
stay the mandate, file it electronically via the appellate ECF system
or, if you are a pro se litigant or an attorney with an exemption from
using appellate ECF, file one original motion on paper.
Petition for Panel Rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40; 9th Cir. R. 40-1)
Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1 to -3)
(1) A. Purpose (Panel Rehearing):

• A party should seek panel rehearing only if one or more of the following
grounds exist:
► A material point of fact or law was overlooked in the decision;
► A change in the law occurred after the case was submitted which
appears to have been overlooked by the panel; or
► An apparent conflict with another decision of the Court was not
addressed in the opinion.
• Do not file a petition for panel rehearing merely to reargue the case.
B. Purpose (Rehearing En Banc)

• A party should seek en banc rehearing only if one or more of the following
grounds exist:
Post Judgment Form - Rev. 12/2018 1

(410 of 416)
► Consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain

uniformity of the Court’s decisions; or
► The proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance; or
► The opinion directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another
court of appeals or the Supreme Court and substantially affects a
rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for
national uniformity.
(2) Deadlines for Filing:

• A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party in a civil case,
the time for filing a petition for rehearing is 45 days after entry of judgment.
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the mandate has issued, the petition for rehearing should be
accompanied by a motion to recall the mandate.
• See Advisory Note to 9th Cir. R. 40-1 (petitions must be received on the
due date).
• An order to publish a previously unpublished memorandum disposition
extends the time to file a petition for rehearing to 14 days after the date of
the order of publication or, in all civil cases in which the United States or an
agency or officer thereof is a party, 45 days after the date of the order of
publication. 9th Cir. R. 40-2.
(3) Statement of Counsel

• A petition should contain an introduction stating that, in counsel’s
judgment, one or more of the situations described in the “purpose” section
above exist. The points to be raised must be stated clearly.
(4) Form & Number of Copies (9th Cir. R. 40-1; Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2))
• The petition shall not exceed 15 pages unless it complies with the
alternative length limitations of 4,200 words or 390 lines of text.
• The petition must be accompanied by a copy of the panel’s decision being
challenged.
• An answer, when ordered by the Court, shall comply with the same length
limitations as the petition.
• If a pro se litigant elects to file a form brief pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-1, a
petition for panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc need not comply with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.

(411 of 416)
• The petition or answer must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance
found at Form 11, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under
Forms.
• You may file a petition electronically via the appellate ECF system. No paper copies are
required unless the Court orders otherwise. If you are a pro se litigant or an attorney
exempted from using the appellate ECF system, file one original petition on paper. No
additional paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise.
Bill of Costs (Fed. R. App. P. 39, 9th Cir. R. 39-1)

• The Bill of Costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
• See Form 10 for additional information, available on our website at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms.
Attorneys Fees
• Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1 describes the content and due dates for attorneys fees
applications.
• All relevant forms are available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms
or by telephoning (415) 355-7806.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

• Please refer to the Rules of the United States Supreme Court at
www.supremecourt.gov
Counsel Listing in Published Opinions

• Please check counsel listing on the attached decision.
• If there are any errors in a published opinion, please send a letter in writing
within 10 days to:
► Thomson Reuters; 610 Opperman Drive; PO Box 64526; Eagan, MN 55123
(Attn: Jean Green, Senior Publications Coordinator);
► and electronically file a copy of the letter via the appellate ECF system by using
“File Correspondence to Court,” or if you are an attorney exempted from using
the appellate ECF system, mail the Court one copy of the letter.

(412 of 416)

Form 10. Bill of Costs
Instructions for this form: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/forms/form10instructions.pdf
9th Cir. Case Number(s)
Case Name
The Clerk is requested to award costs to (party name(s)):
I swear under penalty of perjury that the copies for which costs are requested were
actually and necessarily produced, and that the requested costs were actually
expended.
Signature Date
(use “s/[typed name]” to sign electronically-filed documents)
REQUESTED
COST TAXABLE
(each column must be completed)
No. of Pages per TOTAL
DOCUMENTS / FEE PAID Cost per Page
Copies Copy COST
Excerpts of Record* $ $
Principal Brief(s) (Opening Brief; Answering

Brief; 1st, 2nd , and/or 3rd Brief on Cross-Appeal; $ $
Intervenor Brief)
Reply Brief / Cross-Appeal Reply Brief $ $
Supplemental Brief(s) $ $
Petition for Review Docket Fee / Petition for Writ of Mandamus Docket Fee $
TOTAL: $
*Example: Calculate 4 copies of 3 volumes of excerpts of record that total 500 pages [Vol. 1 (10 pgs.) +
Vol. 2 (250 pgs.) + Vol. 3 (240 pgs.)] as:
No. of Copies: 4; Pages per Copy: 500; Cost per Page: $.10 (or actual cost IF less than $.10);
TOTAL: 4 x 500 x $.10 = $200.
Feedback or questions about this form? Email us at forms@ca9.uscourts.gov
Form 10 Rev. 12/01/2018

(413 of 416)

FILED
DEC 07 2018

corporation,

At the direction of the Court, costs are hereby taxed against appellee.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Shelby Davis

Deputy Clerk
(414 of 416)

Form 10. Bill of Costs
Instructions for this form: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/forms/form10instructions.pdf
9th Cir. Case Number(s)

Case Name 5()/(;0(',$,1&Y$3,5,/,$&2/,0,7('HWDO
The Clerk is requested to award costs to (party name(s)):
$SLULOLDFR/LPLWHGGED+RQH\GDGG\FRP(&$.DUWRLU6HFUHWDULDO/WGDQG
(DVW)HQHULGRX
I swear under penalty of perjury that the copies for which costs are requested were
actually and necessarily produced, and that the requested costs were actually
expended.
Signature V0LFKDHO7&RQZD\ Date 'HFHPEHU
(use “s/[typed name]” to sign electronically-filed documents)
REQUESTED
COST TAXABLE
(each column must be completed)
No. of Pages per TOTAL
DOCUMENTS / FEE PAID Cost per Page
Copies Copy COST
Excerpts of Record* $ $
Principal Brief(s) (Opening Brief; Answering

Brief; 1st, 2nd , and/or 3rd Brief on Cross-Appeal;
$ $
Intervenor Brief)

Reply Brief / Cross-Appeal Reply Brief $ $
Supplemental Brief(s) $ $
Petition for Review Docket Fee / Petition for Writ of Mandamus Docket Fee $
TOTAL: $
*Example: Calculate 4 copies of 3 volumes of excerpts of record that total 500 pages [Vol. 1 (10 pgs.) +
Vol. 2 (250 pgs.) + Vol. 3 (240 pgs.)] as:
No. of Copies: 4; Pages per Copy: 500; Cost per Page: $.10 (or actual cost IF less than $.10);
TOTAL: 4 x 500 x $.10 = $200.
Feedback or questions about this form? Email us at forms@ca9.uscourts.gov
Form 10 Rev. 12/01/2018

(415 of 416)
I hereby certify that on December 11, 2018, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be
served by the appellate CM/ECF system.
Date: December 11, 2018

(416 of 416)

FILED
DEC 31 2018

corporation,
APIRILIACO LIMITED, DBA MANDATE

The judgment of this Court, entered December 07, 2018, takes effect this
date.
This constitutes the formal mandate of this Court issued pursuant to Rule
41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Costs are taxed against the appellee in the amount of $279.80.
FOR THE COURT:
MOLLY C. DWYER
CLERK OF COURT
By: Craig Westbrooke

Deputy Clerk

Court East Fed

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(1 of 416)

Selected docket entries for case 17−55505

Filed Document Description Page Docket Text

09/12/2017 Filed (ECF) Streamlined request for extension of time to

11/24/2017 Received 7 paper copies of Opening Brief [14] filed by

created from the word processing application, not from

Please review the Pasadena sitting dates for August 2018

If the parties wish to discuss settlement before an argument

Please review the Pasadena sitting dates for November

If the parties wish to discuss settlement before an argument

View the Oral Argument Calendar for your case here.

Be sure to review the GUIDELINES for important

When you have reviewed the calendar, download the

11/21/2018 37 Main Document 397 Filed Audio recording of oral argument.

Office of the Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

REFLEX MEDIA, INC., a Nevada No. 17-55505

APIRILIACO LIMITED, DBA TIME SCHEDULE ORDER

The parties shall meet the following time schedule.

FOR THE COURT:

By: Janne Nicole Millare Rivera

Office of the Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the NINTH CIRCUIT

Office of the Clerk

After Opening a Case – Counseled Cases

Court Address – San Francisco Headquarters

Mailing Address for Mailing Address for Street Address

Court Addresses – Divisional Courthouses

Pasadena Portland Seattle

Court Website – www.ca9.uscourts.gov

Court Phone List

Electronic Filing - CM/ECF

The Ninth Circuit’s CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) system is

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 2

The Appellate Lawyer Representatives’ Guide to Practice in the United States

Admission to the Bar of the Ninth Circuit

For instructions on how to apply for bar admission, go to www.ca9.uscourts.gov

Notice of Change of Address

• Neither a notice of motion nor a proposed order is required. Fed. R. App. P.

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 3

Emergency or Urgent Motions

When it is absolutely necessary to notify the Court of an emergency outside of

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 4

Extensions of Time to File a Brief

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 5

The Mediation Questionnaire is available on the Court’s website at

If you are interested in requesting a conference with a mediator in any type of

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 6

After Opening a Case – Counseled Appeals Page 7

Ninth Circuit Appellate Lawyer Representatives

The Appellate Mentoring Program is intended to provide mentoring on a

2. Coordination, recruitment of volunteer attorneys, disseminating information

Current or former Appellate Lawyer Representatives (ALRs) will serve as

Counsel who desire mentoring should contact the court at

3. The mentoring process

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

9th Circuit Case Number(s):

District Court/Agency Case Number(s):

District Court/Agency Location:

If District Court, docket entry number(s)

Name of party/parties submitting this form:

Briefly describe the dispute that gave rise to this lawsuit.

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