COMP-547 Fall 2023

Cryptography & Data Security

Lecture 02
Claude Crépeau
 (To Be Con rmed)

• Tomas Langsetmo • Ziyue Xin

• McConnell 107 • McConnell 305 307
• Of ce Hours:
Mondays 10:30-12:00
• Of ce Hours:
Fridays 12:30-14:00

• For all class matters please use:

cs547@cs.mcgill.ca
fi
fi
fi
 tasks
Encryption Authentication Identification Quantum
security
Quantum
Symmetric MVM Wegman-Carter Simple
Key
Informational One-Time PAD Universal Hash Solutions
Distribution

from PRBG from PRBG from PRBG Quantum

Symmetric
from PRFG from PRFG from PRFG Attacks,
Computational
DES, AES, etc DES, AES, etc DES, AES, etc Q-Safety
RSA, ElGammal, Guilloux- Quantum
Asymmetric
Blum- RSA, DSA, etc Quisquater, Attacks,
Computational
Goldwasser Schnor, etc Q-Safety

DONE IN PROGRESS TO DO GIVE UP

 Key
Distribution
Information Theoretical Cryptography

• • • • •

Quantum key distribution

• • • • •
Ambiguous Coding Scheme

0 1
+
×
Calcite Crystal
 Calcite Crystal
& Photodetection

1/2 1/2
Quantum Key
Distribution
 Quantum Key
Distribution

Α: 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
× + × + + + × × × × + + + + × × × + × + + + × +
Β: × × + + × + + + × + + × × × + × × × + + × + × +
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Α: × + × + + + × × × × + + + + × × × + × + + + × +
Β: 0 ææ 0 æ 1 ææ 1 æ 0 ææææ 1 0 ææ 1 æ 0 0 0
Β: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Α: 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0

Α: 0 1 0 1 0
Β: = = = ≠ = 20%
Β: 0 1 1 1 0 0
Α: 0 1 1 1 0 0

Bennett-Brassard
 Quantum Key
Distribution
• • • • •

• Produces raw classical key

• Observed error rate indicates amount

of eavesdropper information

• Error-correction is used to fix errors

• Random hash function is used to distill

a smaller very secret classical key
• • • • •
 Complexity

Theoretical

Cryptography
Complexity Theoretical Symmetric Cryptography

• • • • •

Encryption

Authentication

Identification
• • • • •
 Pseudo-random Bit Generator

Manuel Blum Silvio Micali

g g(x) SEEMS
RANDOM x RANDOM
 Truelyrandom
Truly Random bits
Bits .
Pseudo-random Bits
?
Encryption
 »
pseudo-key

cleartext

⊕ =
ciphertext

ciphertext
pseudo-key
⊕ =
Stream Cipher from Pseudo-random Bits

cleartext
»
The Enigma Machine

Arthur Scherbius
 Plaintext

Data
Data EncyptIIPiPon SStandard
Encryption tandatrd .

L0 L0 R0 R0

F K1

L1 =L1
R 0= R0 R 1 = L 0 ⊕ F ( R0 , K 1 )

F K2

L2 = R 1 R 2 = L 1 ⊕ F ( R1, K 2 )

L15 = R14 R15=L 14 ⊕F( R14 , K 15 )

F K16

R16 = L15 ⊕F( R15 ,K 16 ) L16 = R15

-1
inv I PI P

Ciphertext
 AdvancedEncryption
Advanced Encyption StStandard
andatrd .

ByteSub

ShiftRow

Joan Daemen MixColumn Vincent Rijmen

AddRoundKey

Figure 7: Propagation of activity pattern (in grey) through a single round

authentication
 Authentication from Pseudo-random Bits

» »
?
⊕ = ⊕ =
?
tag

tag
⊗ ⊗
message

message
pseudo-key

pseudo-key
identification
 On-line Identification
ALICE ALICE
TEST TEST
» ANSWER
OK
ANSWER
OK
»
 On-line Identification
ALICE ALICE
TEST TEST
» ANSWER
OK
ANSWER
OK
»
ALICE ALICE
TEST TEST
» ANSWER
OK
ANSWER
OK
»
 On-line Identification
ALICE ALICE
TEST TEST
» ANSWER
OK
ANSWER
OK
»
ALICE ALICE
TEST TEST
» ANSWER
OK
ANSWER
OK
»
ALICE ALICE
TEST ' TEST '
» ANSWER '
NO!
ANSWER '
NO!
»
Truely Random Function
Pseudo-random Function Generator
?
 Identification from PRFG

#6

» »
pseudo-key #6
OK ! pseudo-key #6
 Identification from PRFG

#6

» »
pseudo-key #6
fail ! pseudo-key #6
Complexity Theoretical Asymmetric Cryptography

• • • • •

public key distribution

asymmetric encryption

asymmetric authentication

zero-knowledge identification
• • • • •
Public Key
Distribution
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
 Public-Key Distribution

x:=f(p,a) y:=f(p,b)
x
y
k:=f(y,a) k:=f(x,b)
f(f(p,a),b)=k=f(f(p,b),a)
Public Key
Encryption
 Asymmetric Encryption
(Public-Key Cryptography)

Encryption

Ke
P C
Kd
Decryption

Complexity Theoretical Security

 Public-Key Cryptography

»
»»»
»

»
»

Decryption Encryption

»
»
Will you marry me ? marry me ?
 Public-Key Cryptography

»
»»»
»

»
»

Decryption Encryption

»
»
Will you marry me ? marry me ?
 Public-Key Cryptography

»
»»»
»

»
»

Decryption Encryption

»
»
Will you marry me ? marry me ?
 Digital
Signatures
 Asymmetric Authentication
(Digital Signature Scheme)

Authentication

Ka
M T
Kv

Verification

Complexity Theoretical Security

 Digital Signature
Will you marry me ?
?

Digital Signature

»
»»»
Authentication
»

Will you marry me ?

marry me ?

»
»
»
»
»»»

»
Verification Authentication

»
VALID
» marry me ?
Will you marry me ?
 Digital Signature
Will you marry me ?
?

Digital Signature

»
»»»
Authentication
»

Will you marry me ?

marry me ?

»
»
»
»
»»»

»
Verification Authentication

»
VALID
» marry me ?
Will you marry me ?
 Digital Signature
Will you marry me ?
?

Digital Signature

»
»»»
Authentication
»

Will you marry me ?

marry me ?

»
»
»
»
»»»

»
Verification Authentication

»
VALID
» marry me ?
Will you marry me ?
Zero-Knowledge
Identification
 Off-line Identification
ALICE »
TEST ALICE

»
» ANSWER
OK PUBLIC CERTIFICATE
 Off-line Identification
ALICE »
TEST ALICE

»
» ANSWER
OK PUBLIC CERTIFICATE

ALICE » ALICE

»
TEST
» ANSWER
OK PUBLIC CERTIFICATE
 Off-line Identification
ALICE »
TEST ALICE

»
» ANSWER
OK PUBLIC CERTIFICATE

ALICE » ALICE

»
TEST
» ANSWER
OK PUBLIC CERTIFICATE

ALICE »
TEST ' ALICE

»
» ANSWER '
NO! PUBLIC CERTIFICATE
Interactive Proofs and Zero-Knowledge

x∈L

YES !

∀x∈L Pr( [A,B](x)=YES ) ≈ 1

Interactive Proofs and Zero-Knowledge

x∉L

NO !

∀x∉L ∀D Pr( [D,B](x)=YES ) ≈ 0

Interactive Proofs and Zero-Knowledge

x∈L

YES !
Interactive Proofs and NOT Zero-Knowledge

?
x∈L

x∈L

WOW !
YES !
 Zero-Knowledge with Simulator

x∈L
S

x∈L

YES !

∀effD ∃effSD ∀x∈L viewD[A,D](x) = SD(x)

 tasks
Encryption Authentication Identification Quantum
security
Quantum
Symmetric MVM Wegman-Carter Simple
Key
Informational One-Time PAD Universal Hash Solutions
Distribution
from PRBG from PRBG from PRBG Quantum
Symmetric
from PRFG from PRFG from PRFG Attacks,
Computational
DES, AES, etc DES, AES, etc DES, AES, etc Q-Safety
RSA, ElGammal, Guilloux- Quantum
Asymmetric
Blum- RSA, DSA, etc Quisquater, Attacks,
Computational
Goldwasser Schnor, etc Q-Safety

DONE IN PROGRESS TO DO GIVE UP

COMP-547 Fall 2023
Cryptography & Data Security

Claude Crépeau