Power System Protection (ELG 7113)

Lecture 1

Dr. Javad Fattahi

Sep 06, 2023

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 Why Power System Protection

I Northeast Blackout of 2003: Inadequate relaying and protection played a role in the cascading failure that led to the
blackout.
I Newfoundland and Labrador Outage of 2014: A series of relay coordination issues and misoperations led to a major
outage affecting nearly the entire island of Newfoundland.
I Saskatchewan Outage of 2015: A transformer fault and subsequent relay misoperations caused a large-scale power
outage in Saskatchewan. Inadequate settings and coordination of protective relays were identified as factors in the
incident.
I Ontario Outages in 2021: A heatwave in Ontario led to high electricity demand, triggering equipment failures and
misoperations of relays.
I Due to either sensitivity settings that were too aggressive or inadequate coordination with other relays, some
under-voltage relays might have operated prematurely.
I This sudden loss of load in one area led to an increase in voltage in neighboring areas, triggering protective
relays there as well.
I The sudden shift in load caused by the disconnection of circuits might have resulted in over-current conditions in
other parts of the grid.

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 Why Power System Protection: Resource Loss in Texas
I On May 9 and June 26, 2021, widespread reductions of solar PV resource power output occurred in the TI, the first
events of this type that have occurred outside California. The May 9 Odessa Disturbance, the subject of the September
2021 Joint NERC Texas RE Staff Report, 21 involved over 1,100 MW of reduced output from solar PV facilities up to
200 miles away from the location of the initiating event and a single-line-to-ground fault that occurred on a generator
step-up transformer near Odessa, Texas. Like the California events that preceded them, the May and June events in
Texas were mainly attributed to abnormal performance of the inverter controls, plant controls, and protections within
the facility. Four additional widespread solar PV loss events occurred in California between June and August of 2021,
caused primarily by the legacy facilities that had been interconnected with minimal performance requirementsa .

I We know from experience and empirical data that over 85% of all electrical faults are phase-to-ground faults and we
have documented and quantitative data from various studies summarizing the costs and impact of ground faults on
industry.
One leading US based insurance company notes that over a 7 year period their clients reported 228 losses that were
attributed to ground faults resulting in payments of $180 million. There were 72 occurrences in the commercial sector,
hotels, universities, hospitals and shopping malls at an average cost of $830,000 each and 156 occurrences in
manufacturing locations with an average cost of $769,000 per occurrenceb .

a) 2022 State of Reliability.

b) Responsible Electrical Safety

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 Engineering Expectations

Two synchronous machines are connected through three phase transformers to the transmission line as given in
the following figure. The ratings and reactances of the machines and transformers are:
- Machines 1 and 2: 100 MVA; 20 KV; -3" = -1 = -2 = 20%, -0 = 4%; -= = 5%.
- Transformers )1 and )2 : 100 MVA; 20/345 KV; - = 8%.
- Both transformers are solidly grounded on two sides on a chosen base of 100 MVA, 345KV in the
transmission line circuit.
- The line reactances are -1 = -2 = 15% and -0 = 50%.

The system is operatingat nominal voltage without pre-fault currents when a single line-to-ground fault occurs
on phase A at bus 3. Determine the subtransient current to ground at the fault.

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 Power system fault

Power System Fault Currents: Notes:

I Three-Phase Short Circuit Fault: Typically 5
to 20 times the rated current.
I Three-Phase-to-Ground Fault: Typically 5 to
20 times the rated current.
I Single-Line-to-Ground Fault: Around 2 to 3
times the rated current.
I Double-Line-to-Ground Fault: Slightly higher
than single-line fault.
I Line-to-Line (Phase-to-Phase) Fault: Similar to
or slightly higher than single-line fault.
I Open Conductor Fault: Depends on system
impedance.

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 Power System Protective Device Classification

ANSI Numbers Function Description

50/51 Overcurrent Relay Operates when current exceeds a preset value to protect
against overloads and short circuits.
50/51I Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Provides immediate protection by tripping the circuit
breaker when current exceeds a threshold.
51T Time-Delayed Overcurrent Relay Introduces a time delay before tripping to allow for tem-
porary overcurrent conditions.
51V Inverse Time Overcurrent Relay Response time is inversely proportional to the magnitude
of the overcurrent.
27 Under-Voltage Relay Trips the circuit breaker when voltage falls below a preset
threshold.
27T Under-Voltage Relay with Time Delay Similar to 27 but with a time delay for voltage dips.
59 Overvoltage Relay Operates when voltage exceeds a preset level to protect
against surges.

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 Power System Protective Device Classification

ANSI Numbers Function Description

87 Differential Relay Compares current entering and leaving a component to
detect internal faults.
21 Distance Relay Protects transmission lines by measuring impedance to
the fault point.
67 Directional Overcurrent Relay Operates for overcurrent in a specific direction.
81 Frequency Relay Monitors system frequency and trips if it deviates from
an acceptable range.
40 Loss of Excitation Relay Trips the generator’s field excitation upon loss of excita-
tion voltage.
48 Motor Protection Relay Monitors motor parameters to prevent motor damage.
25 Synchronizing Relay Ensures synchronization of power sources before con-
nection.
81U Under-Frequency Relay Trips when system frequency falls below a set level.

See IEEE Standard for Electrical Power System Device Function Numbers, Acronyms, and Contact Designations.

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 Identifying Fault Type for Sequence Network Analysis

Identifying Fault Type for Sequence Network Notes:

Analysis:
I Different fault types (e.g., three-phase,
single-line-to-ground) result in distinct fault
currents and behaviours.
I Fault type determines which sequence
networks (positive, negative, zero) to consider
for analysis.
I Sequence networks help capture fault currents’
symmetrical and asymmetrical components.
I By selecting the appropriate sequence
networks, engineers can accurately model fault
conditions and predict system behaviour.
Fault type identification is the foundation for
effective fault analysis. It guides engineers in
selecting the right sequence networks and
understanding the implications of faults on power
system components.

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