PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – BRIDGING CLASS

(LLB 111 - 7060)

WRITTEN REPORT ON PERSONS AND DOMICILE

Atty. Elaine Bathan

Submitted by : Bhenz Bryle Nino M. Tomilap

Civil personality

Juridical capacity – the fitness to be subject to legal relations

- inherent in every natural person

- lost in death

Capacity to act – power to do acts with legal effect, which may be acquired and may be
lost

When is it acquired? Upon reaching the age of majority.

Juridical capacity vs. capacity to act

- Juridical capacity is an inherent attribute of man, attached to him by the mere fact of his
being a man and is lost through death
- Capacity to act is acquired and may be lost
- Juridical capacity can exist without capacity to act, but the latter cannot exist without the
former

Three basic elements of a right

A.) Subject – active & passive subject

B.) Object

C.) Efficient Cause – what binds the subject and object together

Restrictions on the capacity to act (Art. 38)

- Minority
- Insanity/Imbecility
- State of being deaf/mute
- Prodigality
- Civil interdiction

TN: But it doesn’t mean that an incapacitated person is exempted from certain obligations
(because these persons still have juridical capacity which means they are still susceptible to
obligations/rights)

Limitations on the capacity to act (Art. 39)

  Age

 Insanity

 Imbecility

 State of being deaf-mute – does not know how to read and write

 Penalty

 Prodigality

 Family Relations

 Alienage

 Absence

 Insolvency

 Trusteeship

CHAPTER 2 – NATURAL PERSONS

 Juridical capacity – the fitness to be subject to legal relations

- inherent in every natural person
- lost in death
 Capacity to act – power to do acts with legal effect, which may be acquired and may be
lost
- When is it acquired? Upon reaching the age of majority.

Important Principles in Art. 40 :

 Personality begins at birth, not during conception (bec. Birth determines personality;
actual personality)
 BUT under the concept of presumptive personality, personality begins at conception, but
it is important that the child be born, or else the fetus will not be considered to have a
legal personality
 “Person” - any being, physical or moral, real or juridical and legal, susceptible to rights
and obligations, or being the subject of legal relations
  may include entities that have no physical existence (corporations/associations etc.)

Art. 41 – when is a fetus considered born?

 Two kinds of children:

1.) Ordinary – at least 7 months

2.) Extraordinary

 If it is alive from the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb
 BUT if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months only, it shall not be
considered born (for civil purposes*) if it dies w/in 24 hours after complete delivery
 Civil Purposes* - in defining the conferment of rights

Art. 42 – civil personality: When extinguished?

 It is extinguished by death
 Effects of death is determined by law, by contracts, or by will
 EX. Death of one party terminates a marriage contract, term of public office, right of
support ends

JURIDICAL PERSONS

Who are considered as juridical persons?

1.) The State + its political subdivisions (public juridical persons)

2.) Corporations/institutions/entities for public interest/purpose created by law (public juridical

persons)

3.) Corporations/partnerships/associations for private interest/purpose granted juridical

personality by law (private juridical persons)

- its personality begins from the time a certificate of incorporation is granted to it; the grant of
incorporation rights is not a matter of right but a privilege

- Juridical persons 1 & 2 are governed by the laws creating/recognizing them

- Private corporations on the other hand shall be governed by laws of general application

- Partnerships & associations for private interest shall be governed by the Civil Code provisions
on partnership

Art. 46 - Rights of juridical persons

Juridical persons may:

A.) Acquire and possess properties

B.) Incur obligations

C.) Bring civil or criminal actions

- hence, a non existent corporation (those who failed to comply with the requirements set forth
by law) cannot sue

- however, it may be sued, as long as third persons are not prejudiced

Art. 47 – rule when public juridical persons are dissolved

 Dissolution of their assets/properties shall be governed by the charters creating them

 If not specified: properties and assets shall be applied for purposes beneficial to the
region/province/city/municipality which derived principal benefits from such juridical
person/s
 Corporations may only exercise powers/transact business thru its board of directors,
officers, and agents (must be authorized by a board resolution)

DOMICILE

 “Domicile” Shall be understood as a person’s place of habitual residence

 Domicile vs. Citizenship:
 Domicile refers to one’s place of abode while citizenship/nationality indicates ties of
allegiance/loyalty
 A person can be a Filipino citizen without being domiciled in the Philippines
  One may possess a domicile in one country without being a citizen thereof (depends on
the law of the country)

Importance of knowing domicile

 Philippine laws make domicile the controlling factor in the solution of conflicts of law
problems rather than the national law of the person involved (ex. Art. 829 – Revocations
made outside the Philippines)
 Some important foreign states adopt the domiciliary theory (to avoid renvoi)
 3 kinds of Domicile:
 Domicile of Origin – one assigned to a person during birth
 Domicile of Choice – because one has his home there
 Domicile by Operation of Law / Constructive Domicile – esp. for those who lack capacity
to choose their own domicile

Rules for the domicile of origin

 For a child – domicile of choice of his father at the time of the former’s birth
 For an illegitimate child – domicile of choice of the mother at the time of the former’s
birth
 For a legitimated child - domicile of choice of his father at the time of the former’s birth
(and not at the time of legitimation)
 Adopted child – domicile of the real parent by consanguinity
 Foundling – country where they are found

Rules for constructive domicile

 For legitimate infants – the domicile of choice of the father (or whoever exercises
parental authority over them
 If illegitimate – domicile of choice of the mother
 If adopted – domicile of choice of the adopter
 If a ward – domicile of choice of the guardian
 For married women, if marriage is valid – the domicile of choice of her husband
 Instances when the married woman can have a separate domicile:

A.) If husband lives abroad

B.) Legal separation

C.) If the husband forcibly evicts wife from the conjugal home

D.) Separation de facto

If marriage is voidable – domicile of choice of the husband (exc: if permitted to have a separate
domicile of choice)

If marriage is void – wife has no constructive domicile; if wife continues to live in her husband’s
abode, such shall be considered her domicile of choice only

Rules for Idiots/Lunatics/Insane:

A.) If below the age of majority – rules for infants apply to them

B.) If above age of majority – follows the domicile of choice their guardians; if no guardians, their
constructive domicile is the domicile of choice they had shortly before they became insane (exc:
lucid intervals)

How is a domicile of choice made?

A.) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality

B.) Intention to remain there

C.) Intention to abandon the old domicile

Domicile vs. Residence:

- Residence is more or less temporary, while domicile is more or less permanent

- A person can have several places of residence, but can only have one domicile
- Domicile carries a note of habituality

Art. 51 – If the law creating a juridical person does not fix domicile

It shall be:

A.) in the place where their legal representation is established OR

B.) where they exercise their legal representation

GR: The domicile is based on the law creating or recognizing the juridical person

CASES:

DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA (GR No. L-39110; NOVEMBER 28, 1933)

Topic: A conceived child can be acknowledged even before birth

FACTS:

Cesar Syquia was 23, an unmarried scion of a prominent family possessing a considerable
property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in
Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. Antonia Loanco, a young
unmarried girl was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia had amorous relations with
Antonia, and not long after, resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy was born.

During the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor and he
even wrote a letter to a rev. father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be
given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant asks his friend Dr. Talavera
to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married another woman.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge
of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar
Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco.

RULING:

The recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In
the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus.
There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.

It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother,
in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until
Antonia became enceinte a second time, when the idea entered the defendant’s head of abandoning
her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father’s resolution to
concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this
action was started is unimportant. The word “continuous” in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil
Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be
of an intermittent character while it continues.

The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed
breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none
of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC (GR No. 221697; March 8, 2016)

Topic: Rule on Foundlings

FACTS:

In her COC, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968, and she was a foundling in Jaro, Iloilo. She was legally
adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces afterwards. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her
marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating

medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in
the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY
24, 2005.

On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine Passport. Before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB,
she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion
of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banccancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that Poe is
qualified as candidate for presidency.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe- Llamanzares can be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen

RULING:

Yes. Grace Poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.The SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on
the deliberations of.

Foundlings are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there
is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law on the Reduction of
Statelessness.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

Topic: Domicile & Residency

Facts:

On March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate
of candidacy changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
the member of the House of Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a supplemental
petition, Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the election.
Issue: Whether or not IMELDA MARCOS was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:

Yes. Imelda Marcos is a legitimate resident in the first District of Leyte. Residence is
synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Montejo lacks the
degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that Marcos possess the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

“Residence” is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary,

while “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents.

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile or
abandonment.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

GALLEGO VS. VERRA (GR NO. L-48641)

Topic: How a domicile of choice is acquired

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to the office of municipal mayor of
Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the
residence qualification.Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a
school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran
as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a
plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for
assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his
residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half
years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at
the time he was elected mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile
in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:
 NO. In the definition of “residence”in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a
domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The
court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1)
When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even
resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up
for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and
children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the
land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice
despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
“exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community.”

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was
now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC

(GR NO. 120265; SEPTEMBER 18. 1995)

FACTS:

Agapito A. Aquino filed his COC for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district, particularly in 284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to
1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes,
won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration
with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and
June 2 orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino had properly established his domicile of choice in the locality
where he was running in

RULING:

No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The
Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a
previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election.
His birth certificate indicated Concepcion as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be
a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up
to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home
in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring
his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
 Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district.