(06a) Making Moral Targeting Decisions in War

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Journal of Military Ethics

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Making Moral Targeting Decisions in War: The
Importance of Principal-Agent Motivation Alignment and
Constraining Doctrine*
Tomislav Z. Ruby a
a
USAF Air Command and Staff College 225 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, USA
Online Publication Date: 01 March 2006

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War: The Importance of Principal-Agent Motivation Alignment and Constraining
Doctrine*', Journal of Military Ethics, 5:1, 12 - 31
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Making Moral Targeting Decisions in

War: The Importance of Principal-
Agent Motivation Alignment and
Constraining Doctrine*
TOMISLAV Z. RUBY
USAF Air Command and Staff College 225 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, USA
ABSTRACT To ensure moral targeting decisions, national political leaders must accept the costs
of monitoring in terms of time and money, and provide detailed direction, as well as oversight to
ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions. Military officers must ensure
that their motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining
doctrine for planning and executing operations is followed. The process of aligning motivations
with respect to desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine
together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the processes of getting war plans
approved according to published US doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and
feedback through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on
a product that results in a sort of corporate ‘buy-in’. Through case studies of Desert Storm (the
first Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (NATO’s war against Serbia), and the US War on Terror
(Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral targeting
decisions made. Furthermore, they were the only case studies wherein both constraining doctrine
was present and principal-agent motivations were aligned with respect to objectives.
KEY WORDS: Morality, targeting, principal-agent motivations, just war
Soldiers have many faults, but they have one redeeming merit; they are never
worshippers of force. Soldiers more than any other men are taught severely and
systematically that might is not right. The fact is obvious. The might is in the hundred
men who obey. The right (or what is held to be right) is in the one man who commands
them.
G.K. Chesterton, 1908
Correspondence Address: Tomislav Z. Ruby, Lt. Col., USAF, Air Command and Staff College, 225
Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, USA. Tel: /1-334-953-7724. Email: tom.ruby@maxwell.
af.mil
1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/06/0100012 /20 # 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/15027570500422349
Making Moral Targeting Decisions in War 13
Introduction
With the United States engaged in its Global War on Terror, there has been a
recent increase in the literature surrounding the subject of Just War and
international law. Classical Just War literature sets moral norms for leaders to
follow in deciding whether to go to war and for what is acceptable once in
war. In addition to the rich traditional Just War literature some fine
contemporary work explores international law and the debate over whether
recent US actions are indeed just or legal (see Byers 2003; Crawford 2003; de
Torrente 2002).
Authors of Just War literature enjoin leaders with philosophical arguments
about what they ought to do, even if it means accepting greater loss in return
for protecting non-combatants on all sides of the conflict. Several recent
works discuss the need to maintain moral standards within wars; that is being
consistent from conflict to conflict without a changing standard (see Thomas
2001; Carlino, 2002; Lopez 2003; Nash 2003). Still others discuss the
boundaries of international law and the consequences that should result
when one is found guilty of abusing these norms (see Mendez 2001; Lamont
2003; MacCuish and Ruby 2003). Furthermore, this literature is not solely
found in the academic domain, nor is it discussed solely among professors
and pundits. US military officers increasingly discuss and debate the issue of
morality and warfare.1
Yet through all the discussions about the propriety of following interna-
tional moral norms, there is still the seemingly inevitable report of harm to
non-combatants and the debate as to the proportionality and necessity of
such actions (Arkin 2002). With advances in precision weapons technology,
the increased media scrutiny of non-combatant casualties, and US political
attempts to immunize its service-members from prosecution by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), the subject of morality in warfare is today a
major topic. However, merely writing about the subject and producing
evidence of potential war crimes cannot prevent future such instances from
occurring.
Once a country enters into a conflict, determining exactly what is and is not
necessary or how many non-combatant casualties would be proportionally
acceptable given a target is a difficult task. While international law and US
Uniformed Code of Military Justice and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
explicitly forbid the deliberate attack of innocents, that is not the focus of this
inquiry. Rather it is in the area of balancing the necessity of some attack
against the unintended harm that may come to innocents as an indirect effect
of the attack.2
The national political leader and the military commander operate in that
area between the ‘is’ of science and the ‘ought’ of philosophy. Some leaders
would likely be happy if there was a scientific formula for calculating the
acceptability of a target. But that does not exist. They understand the
difference between theory and practice, but when it comes to practice, they
often ignore or explain away the philosophical ‘ought-to-do’ argument in
favor of the more expedient practical task of securing some objective or end
14 T. Z. Ruby
state. And thus is found the basis for this paper. The classical and
contemporary literature, as detailed as it is in its admonishment of leaders
to follow a now universally-accepted moral standard, does not tell leaders
how they can ensure their decisions meet the moral standard since that
standard is not defined outside normative language.
Given the absence of specific means by which to ensure that moral
targeting decisions are made in war, this article proposes a model by which to
achieve those moral decisions. This article considers only jus in bello issues
and thus falls between the literatures on whether the US should go to war,
and what we do with those that do not follow norms. This article does not
explore determining individual accountability through courts or inquiries
because it focuses instead on preventing the need for such determinations by
making moral decision in war.
The article presents a scientific model to explain a normative decision
process in targeting during war. It presents two key variables, that if present in
a country during war, should result in moral targeting decisions as laid out in
both classical and contemporary Just War literature. Still, in the end this
paper finds that although this model can offer national leaders the ability to
ensure their decisions are consistent with jus in bello prescriptions, these
decisions can still vary from state to state bringing up the issue of how
standardized a moral standard is.
There are many reasons why states may choose to fight a moral conflict /
expression of national values; desire to follow international law; gain

worldwide political support; expression of military values; reduce post-war
reconstruction costs; avoid domestic opposition to the war; because precision
weapons technology makes it easier to do so; or make postwar settlements
easier to reach. One key stumbling block to conflict resolution is often
determining how to dole out justice for immoral conduct in war after
conflicts are ended. Following a model to achieve moral targeting may thus
lead to stable peace.
A model to achieve moral decisions

For methodological purposes, we must limit the scope of this study to US
military operations since the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization
/
Act was signed in 1986. Since that time, all US operations have been fought
under the combatant command structure outlined in the law. Furthermore,
all three cases studied herein occurred after the Cold War, thus ensuring a
common international context. The goal with case selection is to ensure that
by limiting variation in only the two primary variables, we can see how they
affect moral targeting decisions. The cases are Operation Desert Storm (the
First Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (the Air War Over Serbia), and
the ongoing War On Terror, including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
While the cases selected herein are of American conflicts, the model presented
here should be universally applicable across all states.
This model contends that variations in (1) bureaucratic principal-agent
motivations, and (2) administrative structures and processes (found in
military doctrine), can lead to differences in the moral targeting decisions that
arise from military plans and strategy, regardless of the objectives outlined by
national civilian leadership. This model can be explained visually with the
following matrix:
No constraining doctrine and principal-agent No constraining doctrine and aligned

motivations not aligned principal-agent motivations
Not moral targeting decision Not moral targeting decision
Constraining doctrine but principal-agent Constraining doctrine and aligned
motivations not aligned principal-agent motivations
Not moral targeting decision Moral targeting decision
Yet neither of these two variables by themselves can ensure morality in

decision-making. US military doctrine does not tell leaders and planners to
be moral, but it does exhort decision-makers to take necessity and
discrimination into account. However, that alone does not ensure moral
decisions. Likewise if principals (national leaders) and agents (military
officers) get together to deliberately align their motivations with respect to
the objectives for an operation, that does not ensure moral decisions if they
do not follow a doctrinal process.
This research shows that the process of aligning motivations with respect to
desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to
doctrine together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the
processes of getting plans approved according to published US doctrine, a
deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback through several
steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a
product which leads to a sort of corporate ‘buy-in’. It would be difficult to
follow this process and end up with targeting decisions that are not
proportional to necessity, especially when principals and agents come
together in a deliberate effort to ensure they align their motivations with
respect to objectives.
Defining moral decisions in war

For the purpose of bounding a definition in this paper, a moral targeting
decision is one in which a senior principal specifically determines whether
foreseeable non-combatant and combatant casualty rates are proportional to
the necessity of any given objective issued by senior military or civilian
leadership. While military and national leaders claim that non-combatant
casualties were not the intent of certain attacks, they most often fail to
explain that those casualties were not merely unfortunate. They were often
directly foreseeable and should, therefore, have been taken into account in any
proportionality-necessity balance. Both the doctrine of double effect and the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) require that decision-makers take into
account likely harm to be done to those who are innocents in the conflict.
As Michael Walzer notes, proportionality and necessity must be balanced so
that no harm is done that does not ‘tend materially to the end [of victory]’
16 T. Z. Ruby
(Walzer 1977). The case studies will show that the US military made great
strides in this respect from Operation Allied Force to the Afghanistan
campaign.
Furthermore, for accountability purposes, the proportionality-necessity
balance must be made by Joint Force Commander (the combatant
commander with overall command responsibility for the particular conflict),
or higher (Secretary of Defense or President), for each objective or target
where foreseeable non-combatant casualties are likely (see Gingras & Ruby
2000). The decision should rest at this level because this is the commander
vested with legal authority within US law to conduct combat operations
(Title 10 US Code, Section 161) when directed by the President and Secretary
of Defense (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001).
The significance level of acceptable non-combatant casualties may vary
based on some criteria defined by the national leadership, or it may be
established in some standing orders from the Joint Force Commander.
General guidelines, however, such as ‘minimize civilian casualties’ cannot be
considered sufficient as they are vague and unmeasurable and leave the
proportionality-necessity decision to lower level officers.
As Michael Carlino argues, it is not enough that easily foreseeable
casualties be considered in the proportionality necessity balance, but also
/
those unfortunate casualties that should have been foreseen (Carlino 2002).
For today’s military is different from the past in one significant way. From
ancient history through the middle ages and into the twentieth century,
militaries would have to make positive attempts to disproportionately harm
non-combatants due to a clear separation of the battlefield from the
population. Today, militaries have to make positive attempts not to harm
non-combatants since the line between military and civilian has not only been
blurred, but in some cases has been erased.
Before delving into the three cases, it is important to specify how the two
proposed variables affect the desired outcome of moral targeting decisions. To
do so requires a short discussion of the factors that make principal and agent
motivations, as well as doctrine, vary across cases. Before the reader can
accept the variables as truly affecting the outcome, those variables must be
defines and supported through previous research and literature.
Aligning principal and agent motivations

Principal-agent motivations are aligned when senior military and civilian
decision-makers clearly agree on the rationale for the conflict as well as the
objectives and end states for the particular operation. Aligning motivations of
principals and agents is not as easy as a boss telling a subordinate to do
something and the subordinate saluting smartly and carrying out the orders.
Several key factors affect whether and how bosses and subordinates align
their motivations.
For example, Defense Department presidential appointees are typically in
office for less than 2.5 years with many positions going vacant for long
periods of time (Marcum et al. 2001). With constant turnover among staff
planners and more frequent turnover among senior leaders, opportunities

exists for planning staffs to change their direction with respect to moral
decision-making as often as their personnel and leadership change. Given this
ability to define their mission and constant staff turnover, how can the US
government and military move toward moral targeting decisions over time,
regardless of their leadership?
James Q. Wilson introduces four factors as the foundation for bureaucratic
motivations namely circumstances, beliefs and interests, and constraints
/
(Wilson 1989). In this section, I describe how each affects principal-agent

motivations. In the case studies, each of these is considered to determine how
the overall principal-agent motivations either were aligned or not during the
three conflicts.
Circumstances
The first factor that affects principal-agent motivations is circumstances,
which are considered the political and international context within which
issues arise (Wilson 1989). Circumstances that can affect military planners
and executors are issues such as media access to the battlefield to report on
noncombatant casualties, the nature of operations (i.e. are we responding to a
direct attack on the US or are we engaged in peacekeeping), and most
importantly, the gravity of the threat to national interests.
Aside from the international context, other circumstances Wilson discusses
as very important are peer expectations and clarity of goals (in the military
case, objectives) (Wilson 1989). Historian John Keegan posits that, aside from
the will to survive, the most important reasons soldiers stay in the line of fire
next to their comrades is peer expectations (Keegan 1976). When a mission is
not clearly defined, it can affect peer expectations.
For example, in Desert Storm several pilots in one US fighter wing, who
were targeting an anti-aircraft artillery location, upon seeing the gunners flee
their weapons and run to bunkers, targeted the bunkers so that the gunners
could not come back to fight another day. Other pilots in the same formation
targeted only the anti-aircraft guns. After the mission, the pilots gathered
together with their intelligence officers and commanders to discuss whether it
was their job to merely take out the anti-aircraft guns, or to kill the gunners if
they were away from the guns. That particular discussion centered not so
much on the issue of morality, as one might expect, but on peer expectations.
The pilots who targeted the fleeing gunners raised the question of peer
support with respect to those who did not. The issue was whether the pilots
cared more about their fellow fliers or the fleeing gunners.3
In a complete reversal of the Desert Storm example, however, multiple
sources, to include pilots and planners on the command staffs that
participated in Operation Allied Force, the NATO air war over Serbia, detail
numerous examples where pilots dropped their bombs out in the open, away
from their designated targets, and were never called to task by their peers. One
key member of the NATO planning staff at Vicenza, Italy, stated ‘this
happened all the time, and the most amazing thing is that nobody in their
18 T. Z. Ruby
squadrons called them ‘‘wussies’’’, which would indicate that in other

circumstances, they would have been called just that if they dropped out in
the open.4 In this case, the peer expectations and ambiguous objectives
formed a totally different context within which US planners and executors
worked from the circumstances of 1991.
Beliefs and interests

The second and third factors affecting principal and agent motivations, are
personal beliefs and interests (Wilson 1989). Variation in both of these can
lead to variation in motivations of officers to place emphasis on moral
considerations in the planning and execution of military operations. Wilson
posits that it is these underlying beliefs and interests that affect bureaucrats’
behavior (Wilson 1989).
In contrast to a person’s underlying convictions, another factor creates
tension with his core interests. Stephen Rosen points out that regardless of
underlying beliefs, it is in an officer’s best interest to do what his superiors
require of him, not by being a ‘Maverick’ (Rosen 1991). Steven Stehr also
shows that agents want overhead direction, saying that they desire to comply
with their bosses (Stehr 1997). This reality can be a serious force against
change unless some more powerful interest emerges to supercede career goals.
One potential force for superceding individual career goals is an organiza-
tional culture that becomes embedded in an individual’s underlying beliefs.
Wood notes ‘effective action requires insulation to assure that policy reversals
do not occur with every fleeting political whim’ (Wood 1990). Such insulation
can lead to interests and beliefs gaining a foothold or even becoming
entrenched in organizations over time.
With the goal of affecting underlying interests, the Department of Defense
has institutionalized law of war training in the services through the DoD Law
of War Program. This program is meant to ensure that DoD components
observe the law of war obligations, implement programs to prevent violations,
and provide for reporting and investigating violations. Each Military
Department Secretary is responsible for ensuring that ‘the principles and
rules of the law of war will be known to members of their respective
Departments, to the extent that such knowledge be commensurate with each
individual’s duties and responsibilities’ (Swift 2001).
Constraints
The final factor that can impact principal-agent motivation is constraints.
Wilson describes constraints as boundaries around motivations. They are
methods by which leaders can prevent shirking, on the one hand, or set clear
and objective standards to allow an unambiguous sense of mission, on the
other (Wilson 1989). As will be shown in the case studies, when clear missions
are delineated moral motivations are constrained.
In 1990/1991, the United States national objectives and those of the
Multinational Coalition were clearly defined: expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
restore the sovereignty of the government of Kuwait; degrade Iraqi offensive

military capabilities to a level sufficient to prevent further attacks on
neighboring countries (Woodward 1991; Keaney & Cohen 1993; Gordon &
Trainor 1995; Rogers 2002). While there was significant disagreement within
the services and national security bureaucracy as to the strategy to achieve
these ends, clear objectives provided guidance for the entire bureaucracy to
proceed in concert. Such was not the case eight years later.
In 1998, during the lead-up to Operation Allied Force, there was an
absence of clarity as to the objectives for which planners were ordered to
develop strategies and an absence of constraints on planners. According to a
finding by US Air Force researchers, there were multiple separate sets of
objectives, none of which were identical (Air Force Doctrine Center 1998). In
fact, President Clinton and the NATO Secretary-General each gave speeches
outlining different objectives for the NATO forces. Gingras and Ruby point
out that problems arise from lack of coordinated direction:
The contrast in wording from an address by Clinton nine days earlier was enough to
cause a serious difference of opinion regarding how to conduct the war. American
planners, ordered to damage the capacity of Serbia to wage war, subjected a range of
targets to attack. Other members of the Alliance did not recognize that U.S. objective as
a NATO aim and would not agree to certain targets. This dispute over guidance inserted
friction into the process of coordinating multinational planning staffs and into the
operations of the coalition as a whole. (Gingras & Ruby 2000)
Such friction could hinder coordination that would prevent disproportionate

non-combatant as well as combatant loss of life.
Describing military doctrine

US military doctrine comprises the historically relevant, agreed upon best
practices and principles of military conduct. It is authoritative, but not
directive. Commanders use doctrine as a guide for how best to operate, but
they may deviate from doctrine if there is a compelling reason to do so. For
the purposes of this paper, constraining doctrine is that which leads officers to
develop limited strategies to achieve specific objectives set out by the
President and Secretary of Defense. Bureaucratic politics literature presents
two key elements of bureaucratic control that are key to understanding
doctrine: structures and procedures.
Structures
Graham Allison posits that bureaucratic structures constrain behavior in that
they are established to orient those organizations ‘towards doing whatever
they do’. He gives the example of the Chinese restaurant and how it is
structured to achieve a particular end, namely serving Chinese food (Allison
& Zelikow 1999). Likewise, planning and execution bureaucracies in the
military are established to perform certain tasks. When you step outside those
structures you step outside those constraints. In Allison’s analogy, you cannot
20 T. Z. Ruby
expect to order hamburger or pizza at a Chinese restaurant. Likewise, one

should not expect planning and execution organizations to seamlessly
coordinate with, or take direction from, organizations outside their estab-
lished structure. Yet this expectation often occurs.
The planner on a combatant commander’s staff, in addition to coordinat-
ing within his own staff structure, will have to coordinate with the Joint Staff
at the Pentagon, other combatant commander staffs, and his service
component staffs. In addition, given the scope of the operations, he may
also have to coordinate with the National Security Council staff, the State
Department staff for his region, the NATO staff, multiple non-governmental
organizations and private volunteer organizations, as well as certain service
staffs key to modern operations such as ‘Checkmate’5 and the ‘Skunkworks’,6
two key Air Force offices on the Air Staff in Washington. According to
Allison, forcing these outside organizations to work with established
structures would be akin to improvisation, rather than orchestration. This
makes variation between the expected moral decisions, and those that
actually result likely.
Processes
In his classic Inside Bureaucracy, Downs posits that structure aside, processes
can be put in place to produce particular ends or induce particular behaviors,
regardless of motivations. He says that:
Whenever there is no clear linkage between the nature of an action and its value or
ultimate end, pressure arises for the development of formal rules to help individuals
decide their behavior. Formalized rules are efficient means of coordinating complex
activities. If no such rules existed, each bureau member could respond to any given
situation in whatever manner appeared appropriate to him at that time. (Downs 1967)
For those reasons, doctrinal procedures are established to constrain discretion

and ensure outcomes are in line with established objectives. Note that
nowhere in US joint doctrine nor in Air Force doctrine are planners told to
make moral decisions. Doctrine tells them the best way to plan strategies to
achieve national objectives.
Specifically, the Joint Force Commander may limit or restrict action
against certain targets based on political considerations, military risk, the
Law of Armed Conflict, or Rules of Engagement (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff 2002). How does he make that determination? Joint Targeting
Doctrine says the Joint Force Commander must take into account the Law of
Armed Conflict and specifically exhorts him to consider necessity and
proportionality.
The document says ‘Under no circumstances would military necessity
authorize actions specifically prohibited by LOAC such as . . . the deliberate
targeting of innocent civilians’. Furthermore, the document says ‘the
principle of proportionality prohibits occurrence of collateral civilian
casualties so excessive in nature when compared to the expected military
advantage to be gained as to be tantamount to the intentional attack of
civilians, or to a wonton disregard for the safety of the civilian population’

(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2002).
Summary of case study findings

In researching these cases, I found that definitive proportionality necessity
/
decisions indeed varied with doctrine and alignment of principal-agent

motivation. Specific findings of the cases follow.
Desert Storm
Prior to Desert Storm, doctrinal processes that would naturally lead planners
to develop operational strategies to achieve national political objectives did
not exist.7 Absent a doctrinal guide for the processes by which to plan, and
structures in which to conduct this war planning, there was no way to ensure
the military targeted only those Iraqi elements necessary to achieve the
national objectives. Furthermore, Desert Storm showed us how absent
doctrine, misalignment of principal and agent motivations influenced the
morality of decisions made during the war.
President Bush promulgated clear objectives to military planners (Kearney &
Cohen 1993):
1. Secure the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of Iraqi
forces from Kuwait.
2. Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.
3. Assure the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.
4. Protect American lives.
However, the plan developed in the Pentagon by Air Force Colonel John
Warden and his staff went further. It was designed to collapse the Iraqi
regime and prove his theory that air power could win a war on its own (Mann
1995). Furthermore, when General Buster Glosson briefed senior principals
in Washington on what he considered the most controversial targets, ones
that would likely incur non-combatant casualties, none of the principals
objected. An Air Force historian asked Glosson, ‘Sir would you say that for
the initial weeks of the war, and certainly prior to the actual start of the war,
that you and your folks had virtual autonomy in target selection and what
have you?’ To which Glosson answered with one word: ‘Total’ (Glosson
1992).
Although I found that principal and agent motivations did not always
align, I did not find anywhere in my research any indication that these
differences in motivation would have been strong enough to overcome
doctrinal constraints had constraining doctrine existed. McCubbins et al.
argued that there will be non-compliance, and that either procedural control
or oversight is necessary to limit it (see McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989). But
neither were found in the Desert Storm case. Because there was a lack of
oversight by senior principals, and because key agents did not think there was
22 T. Z. Ruby
anything wrong with the targeting strategy, there was no attempt at a

dialogue to clear anything up. There was not a perceived need for any such
dialogue as neither the principals, nor agents realized there was a misalign-
ment of motivations, let alone that such a misalignment was detrimental.
Had there been a doctrinal process in place that linked the national
objectives to a military strategy and plan, a process that was worked through
the CENTCOM staff and briefed to the Secretary of Defense for approval, I
contend that a proportionality-necessity calculus would likely have been
instituted for targets and objectives. It is certain that the key principals and
agents, especially after Warden’s removal from the process, were interested in
limiting not just non-combatant casualties, but total casualties, to include US
forces, throughout the war (Horner 1991). However, without constraining
doctrine, and with misaligned motivations, no proportionality decisions were
made at senior levels.
Even though the Al Firdos Bunker incident, in which Iraqi civilians were
killed in an attack on a command bunker, led to a cessation of bombing in
downtown Baghdad, that decision was made without regard to the necessity
of any targets in that city (Deptula 1991). If one accepts that no targets were
important enough to strike in Baghdad after that incident, then one would
have to ask why they were important enough to strike the day before that
incident. It is clear that target necessity was not weighed against acceptable
non-combatant casualties. Thus, despite low numbers of claimed civilian
casualties in Iraq, the targeting decisions cannot be said to have been moral
within the framework of this model.
Allied Force
In Operation Allied Force, despite the fact that clear constraining doctrine for
the planning and conduct of joint operations existed, principal and agent
motivations were not aligned for much of the war. Furthermore, that
constraining doctrine, having been written and updated since Desert Storm,
was not followed. As a result, although individual targets had been approved
by the White House, a proportionality necessity decision was not consis-
/
tently made.
The first issue to affect the doctrine variable was that objectives were either
inconsistent or unmeasurable, resulting in the inability to develop a strategy
that lent itself to moral decision-making.8 Without clearly defined and
measurable objectives, it is impossible to determine necessity and proportion-
ality for any target or objective. Such friction can lead to political differences.
Even worse, it could hinder coordination that would prevent disproportionate
non-combatant as well as combatant loss of life.
According to a post-war briefing by a senior USAF general officer,
the planning process skipped all the steps that would have ensured non-
combatant protection.9 This general reported at the AF Doctrine Symposium
in March 1999 that the planning process skipped from determining objectives
straight to picking targets without any attempt to match desired effects with
appropriate weapons or platforms. The NATO Chief of Targets during Allied
Force concurred, saying that there were so many targets added to the list so
quickly in order to build up a large list, that there was not enough time to
accomplish a proper workup on all of them (Author interviews 1999 220).10 /
The Washington Post agreed: ‘NATO began the war over Kosovo with a one-
volume Master Target File containing 169 targets. It ended the war with more
than 976, filling six volumes’ (Priest 1999a,b). This non-doctrinal directive
resulted in a waste of resources (bombs, fuel) and lives (both of non-
combatants on the ground and potentially for airmen flying through air
defenses) without achieving any operational or strategic effect.
Aside from the doctrinal lapses, serious misalignment in principal-agent
motivations became evident. One important belief that led to misalignment of
motivations was the notion that the Milosevic government would capitulate
after only a few days of bombardment. General Wesley Clark believed
Milosevic would cave in to Western demands to accept a settlement with
Kosovar Albanians because he did not want to be bombed (Clark 2001).
Furthermore, Air Force Doctrine Center researchers found numerous
planners and subordinate commanders stated that because of General Clark’s
belief that Milosevic would capitulate after a mere show of bombing, the
initial plan was only to target several radio relays in Kosovo (Air Force
Doctrine Center 1998).
Other leaders and planners did not accept these premises, and that led to
disagreements in the direction of planning for operations. General Michael
Short, the commander of the air campaign, often disagreed with Clark.
Had he been free to structure the air effort as he wanted, Short would have
arranged for the leaders in Belgrade to wake up ‘after the first night . . . to a
city that was smoking. No power to the refrigerator and . . . no way to get to
work’. He believed that very quickly, Milosevic’s staunchest supporters would
have been demanding that he justify the benefits of ethnic cleansing, given the
cost (Tirpak 2000).
Clearly such a strategy would have tested the bounds of proportionality.
Clark mentions the opposition he received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
with the generals arguing against Clark that the conflict in Kosovo was not in
the national interest (Clark 2001). His relationship with Cohen and Shelton
was further strained because these principals felt Clark was asserting too
much influence through his role as SACEUR that was contrary to the
position of the United States Government. When it became clear that he was
on the opposite side of the key issues from his principals, Clark appeared
more frequently in the media and tried to use back channels to the White
House and State Department.
So how did these beliefs and interests affect proportionality necessity
/
decisions? There was not a proportionality necessity balance made for each
/
target or objective at the beginning of this war. There was, however a standing
directive to not exceed 25 non-combatant casualties, regardless the target or
significance. Yet even then, that standard was not adhered to early in the war.
The NATO Chief of Targets said ‘we were so overtasked with numbers of
targets that the targets became anonymous numbers’. He said that targeteers
would try to justify lower numbers of expected casualties by adjusting their
24 T. Z. Ruby
assumptions of building occupancy to lower the numbers below 25 simply

because they were too inundated to perform detailed analysis (Bethel
Interview 2002).
When casualties among non-combatants began to rise, civilian leaders
began to ask what NATO forces were hitting and why. When those leaders
were not satisfied that target necessity was properly balanced against
proportionality of non-combatant casualties, they exercised their rights of
authority over their militaries. Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Bill Clinton all
determined to ‘review targets that might cause high casualties or affect a large
number of civilians’ (Priest 1999a,b). Only then did the process begin to
follow doctrinal guidelines and did the senior principals and the planners
achieve aligned motivations. This happened because the key decision-making
authority, and the strongest point of misalignment, namely, the senior
commanders, were effectively removed from the decision-making process.
The result was a proportionality necessity balance made for each pre-
/
planned target mid-way through the war.
War on Terror (Afghanistan and Iraq)

Finally, I researched the present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both
campaigns in the War on Terror, constraining doctrine existed11 and was
followed, and principal-agent motivations aligned. The result was a clear and
positive proportionality necessity decision for each pre-planned target or
/
objective in both campaigns. This decision was made by the combatant

commander, or if he did not feel he should make the decision, then by the
Secretary of Defense of President. Most notably, two processes were observed
which did not occur in either of the previous cases.
First, as prior to Allied Force, the military planners were not initially given
clear and measurable national objectives from which to develop strategies for
combat employment. However, officers in the Pentagon outlined the national
objectives based on statements made by senior administration officials in
public speeches and private consultations. They turned this draft over to the
White House and the President approved those objectives (Hyde interview
2002). So the potential break in the first step in doctrinal planning was
overcome through communication by planners and senior principals.
Furthermore, a Joint Targeting Coordination Board was established for
operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it worked out prioritization
and deconfliction of targets between service and functional combatant
components. This targeting board also was a key element in the establishment
of military necessity for each objective and target. This information was
passed through the combatant commander to the Secretary of Defense. If the
combatant commander questioned whether a target was worth the expected
non-combatant casualties, he sent the decision to the Secretary of Defense or
President.12
Second, despite perceived differences in the core beliefs and interests that
form principal-agent motivations, through feedback from agents and over-
sight by principals, those differences were worked out and those motivations
were aligned prior to commencement of operations. When planners were

concerned that they would not be supported for developing a strategy that
required greater risk to both military and non-combatants as directed by the
principals, they used their feedback channels to let the principals know their
concerns instead of shirking or sabotaging the orders (Thomas et al. 2003).
The result was trust and a smooth relationship between civilian principals
and military agents.
Principals likewise used their oversight channels to reassure the agents and
continue to monitor them for compliance. This was an iterative process that
continued even after alignment of motivations. When a noncombatant
casualty estimate for a given target was higher than acceptable for the
necessity of the target, rather than lowering the acceptability level of
casualties or reworking the estimate of predicted casualties to achieve a
lower number, planners changed weapons, fuses, delivery platforms or attack
parameters to achieve objectives within acceptable levels of noncombatant
casualties.13
Finally, in the present war, new and powerful tools to determine collateral
damage estimates were not only available, but were used for every target.
Compelling imagery from this war shows that not only did the two variables
in my model lead to moral decisions, but that the military worked very hard
to innovate new methods of attack specifically to prevent non-combatant
casualties. Few military members with experience in weaponeering and
weapons delivery would have thought it possible to deliver 2000-pound
bombs on a building without even shattering windows in the adjacent
structures. In previous wars, these capabilities could have existed, but were
not developed.
In this conflict, both of the proposed variables were present. Sound
doctrine existed and was followed. Principals and agents worked to align their
motivations. While the overall level of non-combatant casualties were low in
the previous two case studies (in Allied force, the total non-combatant
casualties were likely lower than in the War on Terror), they were not low
because of specific decisions made by senior leaders weighing proportionality
of affected non-combatants against the necessity of targets. In the War on
Terror, however, the lowest level at which that decision was made was by the
combatant commander.
Alternative explanations of findings

In any study of this scope, it is important to posit potential alternative
explanations to the findings of the presented research. Three potential
alternative explanations follow. The first is that the context of each case is
truly different and that the measurement of moral targeting decisions is not
valid. The second alternative is a technological one. Precision weapons make
it possible to achieve more ‘sanitary’ results in combat operations. A third
potential alternative explanation is that the American officer corps is
internalizing moral norms over time, which accounts for moral decisions
being made. Each of these will be covered in turn.
26 T. Z. Ruby
One could argue that the nature of these conflicts was fundamentally
different, and therefore the international context allowed for a different
acceptability level of what is considered proportional to necessity. It is true
that the level of national interest in each of the three case studies was
different. In Desert Storm, the US had not been attacked, and early on, there
was an internal debate within the US government over whether to respond at
all to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the case of Kosovo, there was clearly no
US national interest threatened. The charge was that the US could not stand
by and do nothing while innocents were repressed in Europe. But General
Clark could not convince his principals that Serbia presented the threat he
believed Serbia to be (Smith 2004).14 In the first two cases there should not
have been many targets, therefore, which warranted high numbers of non-
combatant casualties.
In the War on Terror, however, the US was attacked and its national
interests threatened. In that sense the War on Terror is counterintuitive in that
the one case that might have seen a greater acceptability of non-combatant
casualties was the one in which the most care was taken to avoid them.
Therefore, political context is not in itself a sufficient alternative explanation.
A second alternative explanation for these case study findings is that
technology allows for greater discrimination. Precision weapons and com-
munications allow senior decision-makers to micro-manage operations to
ensure compliance with moral decisions. In a classic example of the trend
towards the belief that precision engagement will lower non-combatant
casualty rates, Dwight Ryobler writes that the US was poised to minimize
collateral damage in Afghanistan due to technological advances such as
satellite-enhanced weapons that are delivered to specific coordinates (Ryobler
2003).
However, Dunlap argues that countries that have put too much faith in new
technologies have been responsible for a greater destructiveness in war. He
contends precision weapons are to some a fulfillment of a ‘humane’ way to
wage war. However, adversaries have learned how to confound our precision
weapons and place important targets in and amongst non-combatants to
bring that element of warfare back into the picture. Dunlap argues that
precision munitions and their high cost raise other moral questions
themselves. Must a commander use these weapons? To what end must the
US procure expensive precision munitions to the detriment of other domestic
programs (Dunlap 2004)?
In the cases studied herein, it would be difficult to show that precision
munitions reduced non-combatant casualties. The Al Firdos bunker in
Baghdad was hit with a precision munition that went right where it was
supposed to go. Furthermore, numerous incidents cited by international
organizations during Allied Force involved guided weapons. Precision
munitions only go precisely where people tell them to go whether the
decision-makers discriminated between innocents or not. They cannot
discern who to kill and who to leave alone. So the effects of the weapons
are what are important and even precisely delivered weapons can yield
extremely lethal results. Technology, while critical in lessening the potential
for non-combatant casualties and in discriminating between the combatant

and the innocent, does not ensure moral decisions will be made.
A third alternative explanation to these findings is that US officers
internalize moral norms over time and this internalization accounts for the
increased awareness of non-combatant casualties and the desire to minimize
harm to innocents. The US Department of Defense mandates annual training
on the Law of Armed Conflict, and Professional Military Education of US
officers emphasizes the ethical aspects of warfare.
One key Air Force planner discussed internalization is a major factor:
The Air Force institutionally expects me to take moral norms into account. It is second
nature. If you give me time to think about it, I’ll have a better chance to make that
consideration, but if I don’t have time, as in combat situations, I have to rely on
embeddedness to take over. (Hyde interview 2002)
However, without a detailed quantitative analysis of internalization of norms,

it is not possible to show any empirical effect of such a theory. Furthermore,
the officer quoted above indicated that his ability to make that moral decision
is affected by other factors such as time, indicating that internalization can
itself be affected by outside pressures. So none of these three alternatives are
convincing explanations for my case results.
Conclusion
Should national political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is
not as easy a merely saying ‘go do it’. To ensure moral targeting decisions,
national political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time
and money, and provide not only detailed direction, but also constant
oversight to ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions.
Military officers must ensure that their motivations align with those of their
principals, and they must ensure that constraining doctrine for planning and
executing combat operations is followed. Having satisfied these variables,
moral targeting decisions should then be easily attainable.
Debates will continue as to the morality of entering into conflicts with new
literature on every instance. But once that conflict is entered, this model
provides a guide to ensure that moral targeting decisions are made. It will not
guarantee any limited level of violence or some low number of casualties, but
it will justify what targets are attacked through necessity and proportionality.
Thus the principals and agents making targeting decisions should not find
themselves named in the expanding literature on war crimes and conse-
quences of immoral decisions in war.
While this research satisfies the questions of what national leaders can do
to ensure moral targeting decisions, it does not, and can not answer the
greater question of how national leaders define what is morally acceptable. A
greater philosophical question awaits further research and that is whether the
Just War construct is sufficient in today’s geopolitical context. One country’s
leaders can in good faith follow this model and agree that their decisions were
moral and legal, while their successors or another country’s leaders disagree.
28 T. Z. Ruby
National leaders should not look to Just War to tell them how many non-
combatant casualties are acceptable given some objective. Neither should
there be a single number of expected casualties above which a target cannot be
attacked. Those are individual and idiosyncratic decisions which cannot be
quantified by a normative doctrine. Just War requires that a good faith
proportionality necessity decision be made, but it does not proscribe how to
/
make it. Until such time as a universal standard of what is proportional and
necessary can be agreed upon, national leaders should work to ensure their
militaries follow constraining doctrine and that their motivations for
engaging in conflict align with those of their subordinates.
Notes
1
From 1965 to 2001, 122 articles relating to ethics, or morality in warfare issues (that span the spectrum
from jus ad bellum to jus in bello ), were published in defense journals worldwide. Of these, US military
officers wrote 61. Thanks to Ms Diana Simpson, Air University Library for the search assistance.
2
James Turner Johnson, in Morality and Contemporary Warfare, eloquently states that ‘the denial of a
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is wrong, both morally and in international law;
and the direct, intentional targeting of noncombatants as a means of waging war is an even more
fundamental violation of the justice that moral tradition and law seek to protect’ (124).
3
Author was 363 Tactical Fighter Wing Mission Planning Cell Intelligence Chief during Desert Storm,
the Gulf War of 1991. He led the officers and enlisted who planned all combat missions and debriefed
the fliers upon their return from their missions.
4
Air Force officers in multiple interviews in Montgomery, Alabama, and Washington, DC (the Pentagon).
Officers asked that their identity remain anonymous for purposes of this research. Interviews were
carried out in June 2002, as well as during Operation Allied Force when the author worked on the staff
of the Air Force Doctrine Center.
5
‘Checkmate’ is the Current Operations Division of the Operations Directorate on the Air Staff; HQ
USAF/XOOC.
6
‘Skunkworks’ is the Strategy Division of the Plans Directorate on the Air Staff; HQ USAF/XOXS.
7
The two relevant US doctrine documents when Iraq invaded Kuwait were JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for
Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas Land Areas), dated 1 April 1986, and Joint Pub 3-0
(test pub), Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, January 1990. Neither document guided US
forces in targeting to achieve national objectives or to take into account a proportionality /necessity
balance. The only conceivable objective was total victory by defeating the enemy’s army.
8
Several inconsistent versions of objectives were given to US planners. These came from the President,
NATO Secretary-General, Secretary of Defense, as well as military staffs. See United States General
Accounting Office, GAO-01-784, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted
in Doctrinal Departures, Washington, DC, July 2001 (p. 20), Department of Defense News Briefing,
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1999, available on-
line: www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999/t03241999_t0324sd.html, as well as ‘President Clinton
Address to the Nation Regarding NATO Air Strikes Against Serbia’, 24 March 1999, available on-
line from http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/24/8.text.1, ac-
cessed 13 April 2000, and Transcript of press conference given by NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana and SACUER General Wesley Clark, 1 April, 1999 in Brussels, Belgium, accessed 1 Oct 2003 at
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/s990401c.htm.
9
‘Integration of Air and Space in Operational Planning’, briefing to AF Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell
AFB, Ala., 1 March, 1999. Officer requested his name be withheld.
10
The process of building up the target list to the 2,000 targets General Clark demanded of the staff
became known as ‘T2K’ and for many people became the sole focus of their work. Personal interviews
with Colonel Scott Bethel, then Chief of Targets Intelligence, NATO Headquarters Intelligence
Directorate. Series of interviews between April 1999 and Jun 2002.
11
Three major doctrine documents had been updated since Allied Force. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare
of the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14
November 2000, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washington, DC:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001.
12
Chief, Target Development, Headquarters, US Central Command, personal interview with author, 6
November 2003. Officer cannot be named due to the nature of his position and the ongoing operations
in his theater of operations.
13
Chief, Target Development, US Central Command.
14
In his personal papers, Clark discussed what he perceived the Administration’s attitude to be towards the
Serbian threat. ‘That’s the flavor of it. ‘‘It’s not like this is a really serious problem’’. It’s like, ‘‘Hey, let’s
jerk this guy’s [Milosevic’s] chain’’. [Then,] ‘‘Okay, we can’t stand [it] anymore, it’s too embarrassing
politically’’’, Clark said, adding: ‘I don’t take it that way. I take it as a very serious threat to European
security’. See R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Clark Papers Talk Politics and War’, Washington Post , 7 February
2004 (p. A01).
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Biography
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Ruby is an Assistant Professor of Joint Warfare
Studies on the faculty of the Air Command and Staff College, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He instructs courses in joint aerospace operations,
joint campaign planning, and morality in warfare. Colonel Ruby has served
as the Chief of the 363 Tactical Fighter Wing Mission Planning Cell during
Desert Storm, as a liaison to the Royal Swedish Air Force, and on the staff of
the Multi-National Force Iraq, in Baghdad, where he conducted the strategic
campaign progress review ahead of Iraq’s first democratic elections. He
earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kentucky.

(06a) Making Moral Targeting Decisions in War

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On: 9 April 2008

Journal of Military Ethics

Online Publication Date: 01 March 2006

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Vol. 5, No. 1, 12 31, 2006

Making Moral Targeting Decisions in

KEY WORDS: Morality, targeting, principal-agent motivations, just war

1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/06/0100012 /20 # 2006 Taylor & Francis

expression of national values; desire to follow international law; gain

A model to achieve moral decisions

No constraining doctrine and principal-agent No constraining doctrine and aligned

Yet neither of these two variables by themselves can ensure morality in

Defining moral decisions in war

Aligning principal and agent motivations

planners and more frequent turnover among senior leaders, opportunities

(Wilson 1989). In this section, I describe how each affects principal-agent

squadrons called them ‘‘wussies’’’, which would indicate that in other

Beliefs and interests

restore the sovereignty of the government of Kuwait; degrade Iraqi offensive

Such friction could hinder coordination that would prevent disproportionate

Describing military doctrine

expect to order hamburger or pizza at a Chinese restaurant. Likewise, one

For those reasons, doctrinal procedures are established to constrain discretion

civilians, or to a wonton disregard for the safety of the civilian population’

Summary of case study findings

decisions indeed varied with doctrine and alignment of principal-agent

anything wrong with the targeting strategy, there was no attempt at a

assumptions of building occupancy to lower the numbers below 25 simply

planned target mid-way through the war.

War on Terror (Afghanistan and Iraq)

objective in both campaigns. This decision was made by the combatant

were aligned prior to commencement of operations. When planners were

Alternative explanations of findings

for non-combatant casualties and in discriminating between the combatant

However, without a detailed quantitative analysis of internalization of norms,

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