JD 106 (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)

PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 175602

February 13, 2013
Ponente:
Associate Justice LUCAS R. BERSAMIN
Mode of Appeal:
Motion to withdraw appeal
Facts:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim actual damages, civil indemnity,
and as moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC, subject to the modification that each of the accused
pay to the heirs of each with less damages as what the RTC ruled, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to
withdraw appeal, which the Court granted, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and
terminated.
The Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty
of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each
count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Issue:
Whether an accused that withdraws an appeal be applied with a judgement promulgated with
lesser penalty?
Ruling:
Yes, based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides which
provides the Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Doctrine:
Rules of Court Rule 122 (Sec 11 a.)
Application to the doctrine of the case:
Although it is only the appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established
rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had
withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that “an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.”
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged,
prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them
to pay to the heirs of each victim ₱93,000.00 _as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that
each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus costs of suit.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed
a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated.1

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez,
finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on
him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,2 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED
by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE,
and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective
heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory letter3 dated March 12,
2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18,
2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads
as follows:

HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila

SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the
subject mentioned above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-
0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3)
offense.

Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals
with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals
Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory
Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On
my part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me,
but I was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court, dated
January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona and finally I found
hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the
Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the
undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the
latter: x x x"

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.

Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.

Respectfully yours

EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition
to the plea for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of
Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.

The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by
Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed
lighter penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only
an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in due course by virtue of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.

The Court rationalized the result as follows:

x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established
facts and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had
gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the
betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused
were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but
one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises
replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the
ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another
victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling
his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also
shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired
at the three victims were apparently fired from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence.
Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head;
that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo
Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the
points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that
physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical
evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit
the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts.
Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and
manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was
warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal
shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to
have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims
with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to
the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2
Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by
Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that
they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their
common purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2
Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative
of their common purpose and community of interest.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the
offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a
wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a
crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as
aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular
acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in
the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there
shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the
direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and
circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be
difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed,
the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing
but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of

the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his
defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor,
pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x
x x.
 xxxx

x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its
medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken
from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the
Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006
is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr.,
and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of
the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for
three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes
committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the
benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court
had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims,
warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

xxxx

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this
provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s
acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch
as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be
applicable only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not
give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its
reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where
the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the
foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so
long as the judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite
the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the
evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is
that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects,
including those not raised by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his
appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to
the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable
to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide. Such verdict
1âw phi 1

was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court
of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellant’s
brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability although the additional monetary award
imposed on Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did
not pursue the appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial
court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew
his appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas’
co-accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found
Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.

In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying
that the Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana
and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the
trial court but later withdrew the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one
reason or another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still
applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the
Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt with respect
to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court
cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is
favorable to him and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated September
30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and
Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice."7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of
the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three
counts of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to
the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late
Joselito Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Section 7, Rule II of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court.

1 Rollo, p. 57.

2 Id. at 81.

3 Id. at 87.

4 Id. at 101.
5 Id. at 72-79.

6 G.R. No. 147524, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 385.

7 ld. at 393-395.
 JD 106 (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)

PEOPLE VS BRILLANTES
Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 175602

February 13, 2013
Ponente:
Associate Justice JOSE P. PEREZ
Mode of Appeal:
Notice of Appeal
Facts:
Two people were convicted (Brillantes and De La Cruz) for violating RA 9165. During
arraignment, they pleaded Not Guilty of the crimes charged but were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Brillantes filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. His
co-accused did not file an appeal. While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security
Division Officer-in-Charge Romeo F. Fajardo informed the Court that accused-appellant
Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections. Hence, we resolve the effect of
death pending appeal of his conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his
criminal and pecuniary liabilities.
Issue:
Whether the extinguishment of the criminal and civil liabilities of the deceased accused
applicable to co-accused?
Ruling:
No. The death of the accused extinguishes only his criminal and civil liabilities and not with
the co-accused.
Doctrine:
Rules of Court Rule 122 (Sec 11 a.)
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter;
Application to the doctrine of the case:
The extinguishment of Brillantes’ criminal and pecuniary liabilities is predicated on his death
and not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent
extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190610 April 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, Accused.
JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez (Brillantes)
assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558 convicting
accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz) for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of
2002."3

In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged as follows:

Criminal Case No. 11556

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody one (1) plastic sachet
containing shabu weighing more or less 0.1 gram including plastic container without prescription
or authority to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.4

On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558
with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The two separate
Informations follow:

Criminal Case No. 11557

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to a Public Officer, who acted as poseur buyer 0.1
gram including plastic container of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, without any license or authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited
law.5

Criminal Case No. 11558

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of Laoag, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody two (2) big plastic sachet
containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams including plastic container without being
authorized and permitted by law to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.6

When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, in this case methamphetamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu." The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty of the police officials who conducted the buy-bust operation. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the] accused Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu
with a weight of 0.0619 gram and is therefore sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal
Case No.11557 for illegal sale of shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11558 for illegal possession of shabu
with an aggregate weight of 0.2351 gram and is therefore further sentenced to serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the same to be disposed of as the
law prescribes. 7

The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court. It upheld that all
the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs were present and the finding against Brillantes
well established by the prosecution. Further, it also found that all the elements constituting illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs were established beyond reasonable doubt to
convict De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the three charges, great weight was given to the
testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3 Rovimanuel
Balolong and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer.

On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal8 was filed by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme
Court. His co-accused De la Cruz, did not appeal his conviction.

While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division Officer-in-Charge Romeo F.
Fajardo9 informed the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau
of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report10 signed by New Bilibid
Prison Hospital’s Medical Officer Benevito A. Fontanilla, III.

Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his conviction of accused-appellant
Brillantes with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities.

The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of
Brillantes were extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,11 to wit:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

xxx

There is no civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.12 No private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the
decision of the trial court.

The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal liability does not have
any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the matter states:

RULE 122 - Appeal

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
(emphasis ours)

xxx

The extinguishment of Brillantes’ criminal and pecuniary liabilities is predicated on his death and
not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent
extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz. 1âwphi 1

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal of accused-appellant Jose
Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal
Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having
been extinguished. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo pp. 40-41.

2
Id. at 2-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.

3
Promulgated on June 7, 2002.

4
Rollo, p. 3.

5
Id. at 3-4.
6
Id. at 4.

7
CA rollo, p. 250.

8
Rollo, p. 40-41.

9
Through a Letter dated 3 January 2012 of OIC Romeo F. Fajardo to the Clerk of Court,
Second Division of the Supreme Court, id. at 88.

10
Id. at 89.

11
G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.

12
R.A. 9165.
 JD 106 (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)

MOLL VS BUBAN
Petitioner Respondent

G. R. No. 136974
August 27, 2002
Ponente:
Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Mode of Appeal:
Petition for Certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner Moll filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals for a case that was decided by the RTC
for his case. Subsequently, he withdraws his appeal for the reason that he intends to file it to
the Sandiganbayan instead. The respondent countered the motion of the petitioner by filing a
motion of reconsideration.
Contention:
The respondent prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and a Motion for
Issuance of Mittimus praying that the Order be set aside on three grounds. First, the accused
perfected his appeal upon filing the first notice of appeal, and therefore, the respondent court,
under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, lost jurisdiction over the case. Second, the
accused failed to serve a copy of his "Manifestation/Motion" and second notice of appeal to
the prosecution in violation of Section 3(a), Rule 122 and Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. Third, the "Manifestation/Motion" did not contain a notice of hearing and proof of
service to the prosecution. The prosecution further prayed that the trial court declare the
Decision of RTC be final because of the withdrawal of the first notice of appeal. Alternatively,
the prosecution prayed that the record of the case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the trial court’s earlier order.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent court erred when it granted due course to the second notice of appeal
filed by the accused.
Ruling:
The Court grants this petition.
The assailed Orders of the trial court direct petitioner, over his vigorous objections, to bring his
appeal to the Court of Appeals where the appeal is bound to be dismissed outright for being
filed in the wrong court. Petitioner asserts that the trial court, in directing him to bring his
appeal to the wrong court, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
Rules of Court Rule 122 (Sec 5)
"Sec. 5. Notice waived. – The appellee may waive his right to a notice that an appeal has been
taken. The appellate court may, in its discretion, entertain an appeal notwithstanding failure to
give such notice if the interests of justice so require."
Application to the doctrine of the case:

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright. In this case, the records had not yet been forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner corrected his notice of appeal before the lapse of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal. Petitioner’s failure to serve the prosecution a copy of
the correction, contained in the second notice of appeal, did not invalidate what was already a
perfected appeal under the first notice of appeal.

The Sandiganbayan may, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, give due course to
petitioner’s appeal despite his failure to serve a copy to the prosecution of the notice of appeal.
It may also allow the appeal in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
 THIRD DIVISION

G. R. No. 136974 August 27, 2002

SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAMERTO M. BUBAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay,
Branch 18 and ATTY. NICETO N. VILLAMIN, Prosecutor II, Tabaco Albay, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.

The Case

In this special civil action for certiorari,1 petitioner seeks to set aside the Orders dated December
10, 1998 and January 5, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, issued in
Criminal Case No. T-2685. Petitioner prays for the reinstatement of the Order dated November
12, 1998 of the trial court allowing petitioner to withdraw his first notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals and giving due course to his second notice of appeal directed to the Sandiganbayan.

The Antecedent Facts

The trial court rendered a Decision2 on October 28, 1998 in People of the Philippines vs. Salvador
K. Moll and Ysmael Zepeda, finding petitioner Salvador K. Moll, former Vice Mayor of Malinao,
Albay, guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:

"ACCORDINGLY, we find from the totality of the evidence, oral and documentary, unfolded
before us that the GUILT of the accused, Salvador K. Moll, for VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (e), RA
3019, AS AMENDED, alleged and recited in the information, had been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason he is hereby SENTENCED to an imprisonment of six
(6) Years and one (1) month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office.

"Accused, YSMAEL ZEPEDA, whose GUILT has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, is
hereby ACQUITTED. Consequently, the property bailbond for his provisional liberty is ordered
cancelled.

"SO ORDERED."3

On November 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal,4 stating that he was
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner furnished a copy of his notice of appeal
to respondent Prosecutor Niceto Villamin. The trial court gave due course to the appeal in an
Order5 dated November 4, 1998. However, on November 12, 1998, the last day of the
reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed a "Manifestation/Motion"6 withdrawing the notice of
appeal dated November 3, 1998 and filing in its stead a second notice of appeal.7 This second
notice of appeal sought to bring the appeal to the Sandiganbayan. In its Order8 of November 12,
1998, the trial court gave due course to petitioner’s "Manifestation/Motion," set aside its earlier
Order, and ordered the entire record of the case forwarded to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition.

On November 19, 1998, the respondent prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of November 12, 1998 and a Motion for Issuance of Mittimus9 praying that the Order of
November 12, 1998 be set aside on three grounds. First, the accused perfected his appeal upon
filing the first notice of appeal, and therefore, the respondent court, under Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, lost jurisdiction over the case. Second, the accused failed to serve a copy of
his "Manifestation/Motion" and second notice of appeal to the prosecution in violation of Section
3(a), Rule 122 and Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Third, the "Manifestation/Motion" did
not contain a notice of hearing and proof of service to the prosecution. The prosecution further
prayed that the trial court declare the Decision of October 28, 1998 final because of the
withdrawal of the first notice of appeal. Alternatively, the prosecution prayed that the record of the
case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the trial court’s earlier Order of
November 4, 1998.

On December 10, 1998, the trial court issued an Order10 giving due course to the prosecution’s
motion and reinstated its Order of November 4, 1998 giving due course to the appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court on January 5, 1999
affirmed11 its Order of December 10, 1998.

On January 20, 1999, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent prosecutor later filed his Comment, and the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment recommending that petitioner’s second
notice of appeal to the Sandiganbayan be given due course.

The Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED DUE COURSE TO

THE SECOND NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 12,
1998.

2. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTION ON NOVEMBER
19, 1998.

3. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS ORDERS OF
DECEMBER 10, 1998 AND JANUARY 5, 1999.

These issues can be reduced into one central issue - whether the first notice of appeal is valid,
rendering the second notice of appeal unnecessary.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court grants this petition.

The assailed Orders of the trial court direct petitioner, over his vigorous objections, to bring his
appeal to the Court of Appeals where the appeal is bound to be dismissed outright for being filed
in the wrong court. Petitioner asserts that the trial court, in directing him to bring his appeal to the
wrong court, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
At the time of the alleged commission of the offense, petitioner was the municipal vice-mayor of
Malinao, Albay, a position corresponding to Salary Grade "25" pursuant to Republic Act No.
7160.12 Under Republic Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over petitioner’s case, to wit:

"SECTION 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

xxx xxx xxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27'
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided."13 (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1861,14 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606 and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 relative to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, also provides:

"Sec. 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:

'Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts
in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in
their respective jurisdiction.’"

Under the law, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner
seeks to appeal. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, this will have a fatal
effect on the petitioner’s appeal, thus:

"While respondent court gave due course to petitioner’s first notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the fact remains that said appeal is likely to be dismissed by the Court of Appeals for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the net effect of respondent court’s assailed orders is the denial of
petitioner’s right to appeal."15
Petitioner’s first notice of appeal, filed well within the requisite fifteen-day period and with notice
duly furnished to the prosecution, was valid. The designation of the wrong court does not
necessarily affect the validity of the notice of appeal. The Court has held that the rule requiring a
party to specify the court where the appeal is being taken is merely directory. An error in
designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal.16

Further, petitioner’s "Manifestation/Motion" and second notice of appeal, in substance, merely

sought a correction of where to bring the petitioner’s appeal. The "Manifestation/Motion" is not
the withdrawal of appeal contemplated under Section 12 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
results in the finality of the judgment of the trial court. Petitioner’s intent is clear - to appeal the
trial court’s decision. Petitioner had no intention to abandon his appeal and to serve the sentence
imposed by the trial court. Once validly perfected, the appeal, if not abandoned, continues.

Upon perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case under appeal subject
to the last paragraph of Section 9, Rule 41, to wit:

"Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. –

A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time.

xxx

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

xxx

In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of
the appeal." (Emphasis supplied)

The right to appeal, which petitioner availed of on time, is a right not litigated by the appeal.17 The
correction of the court where petitioner’s appeal is to be taken merely preserves petitioner’s right
to an appeal he has already perfected within the reglementary period. The trial court retains
jurisdiction to make such correction before actual transmittal of the records to the proper
appellate court.

It is the law, not the choice of the parties, which determines jurisdiction.18 The trial court knew that
the law grants to the Sandiganbayan exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner’s case.
Petitioner correctly and timely informed the trial court that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction over the appeal. Despite the vigorous objections of petitioner, the trial court still
directed the appeal to be taken to the Court of Appeals. The trial court also knew that the appeal,
if brought to the wrong court, would for certain be dismissed outright, effectively depriving
petitioner of his right to appeal. Manifestly, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

We emphasize, however, that the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be
made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of
the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant
portion of which states:
"Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – xxx

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright."

In this case, the records had not yet been forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Moreover,
petitioner corrected his notice of appeal before the lapse of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal.19 Petitioner’s failure to serve the prosecution a copy of the correction, contained in the
second notice of appeal, did not invalidate what was already a perfected appeal under the first
notice of appeal.

Besides, failure of service to the adverse party or prosecution in a criminal proceeding is not
always fatal. Section 5, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that:

"Sec. 5. Notice waived. – The appellee may waive his right to a notice that an appeal has been
taken. The appellate court may, in its discretion, entertain an appeal notwithstanding failure to
give such notice if the interests of justice so require."20 (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan may, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, give due course to
petitioner’s appeal despite his failure to serve a copy to the prosecution of the notice of appeal. It
may also allow the appeal in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. As we ruled in Cojuangco, Jr.
1âw phi 1

vs. Court of Appeals21 :

"xxx when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice
the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court
may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction."

As for the other "lapses" in procedure attributed by the prosecution to the petitioner, the same
are not errors in law because there is no requirement to set for hearing the approval of a notice
of appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court’s Orders of December 10, 1998 and
January 5, 1999 are SET ASIDE, and the Order of November 12, 1998 giving due course to the
petitioner’s appeal to the Sandiganbayan is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2
Penned by respondent Judge Mamerto M. Buban.

3
Rollo, pages 57 and 58.

4
Ibid., page 14.

5
Ibid., page 15.
6
Ibid., page 17.

7
Ibid., page 18.

8
Ibid., page 19.

9
Ibid., page 20.

10
Ibid., page 32.

11
Ibid., page 44.

12
Section 445 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Section 445. Powers, Duties and Compensation. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to

Salary Grade twenty five (25) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.

Republic Act No. 8249 (1997) Entitled "An Act Further Defining The Jurisdiction Of The
13

Sandiganbayan, Amending For The Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As

Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes."

14
Presidential Decree No. 1861 (1983).

15
Rollo, page 92.

People v. Torres, G.R. No. 130661 (June 27, 2001) citing Valerio v. Tan, 97 Phil 558
16

(1955); Heirs of Pizarro, Sr. v. Consolacion, 161 SCRA 187 (1988).

17
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517 (1967).

18
Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51 (1999).

19
Rule 122, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

The same provision appears verbatim in the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal
20

Procedure.

21
Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602 (1999).