PFR Reviewer (Dela Cruz, B2023)

PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS
PROF. ELIZABETH AGUILING-PANGALANGAN
FINALS REVIEWER
Marc Cedric N. Dela Cruz

University of the Philippines College of Law
B2023
Sources:
Faye Bengzon, B2023
LA Manlangit, B2023
UP Law B2022
Matthew Dayday, A2022
Karichi Santos, B2012
I N TRO D U C TI O N ii. Mercantile law – special relations produced by
commercial transactions
The term law maybe understood in two concepts: iii. Procedural law – provides for the means by which
• General/abstract sense (derecho) – the mass of private rights may be enforced
obligatory rules established for the purpose of governing
Specific laws are classified into three types:
the relations of persons in society; “the science of moral
• Mandatory – commands something to be done
rules, founded on the rational nature of man, which
• Prohibitory – commands something not to be done
governs his free activity, for the realization of individual
• Permissive – commands that what it permits to be done
ad social ends, of a nature both demandable and
should be tolerated or respected
reciprocal.”
• For Savigny, a more appropriate classification is that
• Specific/material sense (ley) – a norm of human conduct
between absolute and suppletory.
in social life, established by a sovereign organization and
o Absolute – obligatory character
imposed for the compulsory observance of all; “a
o Suppletory – leaves the will of the individual free
juridical proposition or an aggregate of juridical
to act
propositions promulgated and published by the
competent organs of the State in accordance with the Codification is the systematic organization of the law into
Constitution” one or more codes.
Law is a product of social life and human nature. • A code is a collection of laws of the same kind; a body
of legal provisions referring to a particular branch of the
• Regulates the relations between persons so that
law.
harmony can be maintained by placing limitations on
individual liberty in order to make co-existence • Reasons for codifying the law:
possible.” o To simply and arrange the many juridical rules
scattered in several laws and customs
• Law rests on the concepts of order, existence, and
o To unify various legislations in the same country.
liberty.
o To introduce reforms occasioned by social
The characteristics of law are: changes.
1. It is a rule of human conduct
The best codes of the world today underwent several
2. Promulgated by a competent authority
revisions before taking their present form.
3. Obligatory
4. Of general observance • First civil code – French civil code by Napoleon, known
as the Napoleon code, promulgated in 1804.
Human conduct is not only regulated by law but also by • Three years to draft the French civil code
morals and religion. • Fourteen years for the first draft of German civil code
• But only law has legal sanction and can be enforced by • Swiss and Chilean codes took eight years
public authority. • Argentine code took five years
• Laws and morals both spring from social conscience. • Philippine code was completed in only seven months
• Many laws take moral concepts, but not all moral duties
have been converted into judicial obligations because if The move to make laws in Spain was started by Alfonso X
this happens morals would lose their essence of being with the promulgation in 1255 of the Fuero Real.
voluntary. • The first step towards the codification of different
• The purpose of law and morals is happiness. branches of law started with the 1812 Constitution which
mandated the need for a civil code in the dominion of
Laws are divided into two general groups: Spain.
1. Divine law – God Himself legislated and promulgated • 1851 – Proyecto de Codigo Civil, not approved nor
2. Human law – law promulgated by man to regulate human promulgated
relations • May 11, 1888 – Ley de Bases promulgated; final form
a. General or public law took effect on July 24, 1889
i. International law – relations between nations or
states (human beings in their collective concept) The first step towards codification of private law in the
ii. Constitutional law – relations between citizens Philippines was taken by President Manuel L. Quezon in
and their government 1940, when he created a Code Committee to formulate a
iii. Administrative law – relations between the civil code for the Philippines.
officials and employees of the government • Committee was headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice
iv. Criminal law – guarantees the coercive power of Ramon Avanceña, with members including Justices
the law so it will be obeyed Jose P. Laurel and Antonio Villareal, Dr. Jorge Bocobo,
v. Religious law – regulates practice of religion and Dr. Pedro Ylagan.
b. Individual or private law • Records were destroyed in the battle for the liberation of
i. Civil law – relations of individuals with other Manila in 1945.
individuals for purely private ends • March 20, 1947 – President Manuel A. Roxas issued EO
48, creating a new Code Commission composed of five
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

DELA CRUZ, MARC CEDRIC N. | B2023
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members to immediately revise the substantive laws of PR E LI MI N AR Y PRO VI SI O N S
the Philippines and codify them in conformity with the
customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipinos, Article 1. This Act shall be known as the Civil Code of the
and with the modern trends in legislation and principles Philippines.
of law.
• May 8, 1947 – Commission started writing • A civil code is a collection of laws which regulate the
• October 22, 1947 – first draft was finished private relations of the members of civil society,
• December 15, 1947 – final draft was completed determining their respective rights and obligations, with
• January 1948 – submitted for the approval of the reference to persons, things, and civil acts.
Congress • Became effective on July 30, 1950
• June 18, 1949 – RA 386 approved
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
Under Roman law, the term civil law was used in four completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or
different concepts: in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
• National law, applicable to the individuals of the city it is otherwise provided.
• Body of law composed of plebiscites, imperial
constitutions, and others; in contrast to magistrate or • Tolentino argued that the need for publication applies
praetorian law. only to those laws that do not provide their own date of
• Law applicable to citizens of Rome, in contrast to that effectivity.
applicable to foreigners (jus gentium). o Still needs to be publish regardless.
• Opinions of authorized jurisconsults. • Newspapers of general circulation – regularly issued
or published in the main islands of the Philippines
Civil law is the branch of the law which organizes the family • EO 200 – amends Article 2 of the Civil Code so the laws,
and regulates property. to be effective, must be published either in the Official
• “The mass of precepts which determine and regulate the Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
assistance, authority, and obedience among the country.
members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private TAÑADA V. TUVERA (1985)
interests.” Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
The immediate sources of Philippine civil law are: public officials to publish various presidential issuances by
Marcos.
• The New Civil Code
• Statutes, such as the Copyright Law, Patent Law, Law of Held: The writ of mandamus was granted, given that the subject
Waters, and various labor and social legislations of the petition concerns a public right, and its object is to
• Great bulk of our civil law is derived from Spanish and compel the performance of a public duty. The publication of all
American law (indirect or remote sources) presidential issuances of “public nature” is mandated by law to
give the public adequate notice of the laws. People cannot be
Influences on Spanish civil law includes:
expected to obey laws which are unknown and unknowable.
• Roman Law, Germanic Law, canon law, scientific
evolutionary thought, foreign legislation, and doctrines in
jurisprudence. Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
In many countries, there is a distinction between civil and
commercial law. • Once the law has been promulgated and has taken
• There have been movements to unify these two effect, it is the duty of everyone to know it. Compliance
branches, including the Swiss federal code of with it becomes unavoidable, and nobody can escape its
obligations, civil code of USSR in 1942, and the Franco- effects by alleging that he does not know its provisions.
Italian project in 1928. • Evasion of the law would be facilitated and the
o Muñoz: complete unification is impossible administration of justice defeated if persons could
▪ The disintegration of commercial law into successfully plead ignorance of the law to escape the
definite independent branches, such as the legal consequences of their acts or to excuse non-
law on negotiable instruments, securities, performance of their legal duties.
banking, maritime commerce, and • The laws referred to by this article are those of the
corporations presents barriers. Philippines. Ignorance of a foreign law will be a mistake
o Partial unification is however possible, and the of fact. There is no presumption of knowledge.
Philippine Civil Code is a step towards this • Mistake of law – not aware that a religious brother
objective. It has repealed many provisions of the cannot solemnize a marriage
code of commerce and unified the law on sales, • Mistake of fact – aware of the law, but mistaken the
partnership, agency, deposit, and guarantee. religious brother as a priest

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Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
contrary is provided. to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
• A retroactive law is intended to affect transactions
which occurred, or rights accrued, before it become • Right has three elements:
operative, giving them effects not inherent in their nature 1. Subject – persons are the subjects of rights
in view of the law at the time of their publication. a. Active subject – entitled to demand the
o Affects a present right by going behind and giving enforcement of the right
efficacy to anterior circumstances to defeat it. b. Passive subject – duty-bound to suffer
o Creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, its enforcement
attaches a new disability to transactions or 2. Object – things and services intended for the
considerations already past. satisfaction of human wants, physical or spiritual
• Necessarily related to Article 3 – a law that has not yet 3. Efficient cause – fact that gives rise to the legal
become effective cannot be considered as conclusively relation. It may spring from the will of man or
known by the people independently of such will.
• All statutes are to be construed as having only a • Rights may be classified into political and civil. Civil
prospective operation unless it is expressly declared or rights may be further classified into
necessarily implied. o Rights of personality – human rights
• Family Code has retroactive effect (Article 256, FC). o Family rights – as a member of a family
• Exceptions o Patrimonial rights – have property for their object;
1. Expressly provided tend to the economic satisfaction of men; can be
2. Remedial statutes – procedural law generally waived
3. Penal laws – in favor of the accused • Waiver is the relinquishment of a known right with both
4. Curative statues – cure errors and irregularities knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it.
5. Interpretative laws – clarify existing laws o Voluntary choice is the essence of a waiver.
6. Laws that create new rights • Requirements of waiver:
1. He must actually have the right he renounces.
BUYCO V. PNB (1961) 2. He must have the capacity to make the
Petitioner filed a mandamus case against PNB Iloilo after the renunciation.
latter refused to accept his backpay acknowledgment 3. The renunciation must be made in a clear and
certificate as payment for his obligation following an unequivocal manner.
amendment of their charter.
RB MICHAEL PRESS V. GALIT (2008)
Held: The amendment of their charter does not nullify the right Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal after he was
of the petitioner to pay his obligation with his backpay terminated by the petitioner on the ground of habitual tardiness,
certificate. Before the Charter was amended, the right to have serious misconduct, and insubordination.
his certificate applied for the payment of his obligation was
already vested in Buyco. Held: There was just cause to terminate the employment of the
respondent, such as his refusal to work overtime despite a valid
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or order. The lack of immediate sanctions for the respondent’s
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself infractions cannot be construed as a waiver of the company to
authorizes their validity. enforce rules. The company’s prerogative to enforce
punishment is a legal right that cannot be impliedly waived.
• Mandatory statutes are those which relate to matters of
substance, affect substantial rights, and are the very Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
essence of the thing required to be done. violation and non-observation shall not be excused by disuse,
• The violation of a mandatory or prohibitory statute or custom or practice to the contrary.
renders the act illegal and void.
• Three exceptions according to Manresa: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
1. Where the violation does not refer to an essential Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
matter, the law considers that nullity may be more
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
disadvantageous than validity (e.g., marriage
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
solemnized outside of the officer’s jurisdiction).
Constitution.
2. The validity of the act depends upon the consent
of the party directly interested in the nullity of such • Laws cease to have effect only through the will of the
act (e.g., voidable marriages may be ratified). State—as long as a law remains in the statute books,
3. The law may declare the nullity of an act but at the its legal force and effect subsists.
same time recognize its effects as legally existing • Laws may lapse by their own terms because they are
(e.g., children conceived or born prior to the only effective for a fixed period.
annulment of marriage are legitimate).

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• There are two kinds of repeal: o Principle of policy and not a mechanical formula
o Express or declared repeal – contained in a of adherence—the doctrine is flexible.
special provision of the subsequent law o The principle does not and should not apply when
o Implied or tacit repeal – when the provisions of the there is conflict between the law in force and the
subsequent law are incompatible with those of an precedent.
earlier law, the conflict is resolved in favor of the
later law. Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
▪ Can take place without any special reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
declaration in the subsequent law.
• Requisites for implied repeals: • The court has a duty to decide—this means that
1. The laws cover the same subject matter regardless of whether or not they have knowledge
2. The latter is repugnant to the earlier regarding the law applicable to a case, or whether or not
• In case of conflict between general and special laws, they know where to find the law relative to the case, the
the special must be taken as intended to constitute an court must always decide and not dismiss the case
exception to the general act or provision. Thus, a without discussing the issues.
subsequent general statute will not be held to repeal a o Example: the fact that a judge does not know the
prior special one. rules of cockfighting does not justify his
• The repeal of a statute cannot affect or impair any vested immediate dismissal of a case before him.
right, act done, penalty accrued, or judgment already o This article does not apply to criminal
final before the repeal. prosecutions because when there is no law
punishing an act, the act cannot be considered
SPOUSES PUERTO V. CA (2002) criminal and therefore the case must be
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of dismissed.
Appeals holding their Deed of Real Estate Mortgage valid • Silence, obscurity, and insufficiency of the law:
despite being usurious. o If the law is vague or obscure, the court should
clarify it through the rules of statutory
Held: The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was usurious and construction.
therefore void. The P50,000 interest payment of the P200,000 o If the law is silent or insufficient, the court should
loan is clearly in excess of the 12% per annum rate. Even if a fill the deficiency by resorting to customs or
circular was passed removing the ceiling on interest rates, the general principles of law.
deed was executed before that so the deed is still usurious and o The court can only create a rule on the facts if all
therefore void because the repeal cannot retroact. the rules of interpretation have been exhausted.
• In applying the law, the court should discover and give
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws effect to its spirit. The spirit of the law may be found in
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the the precedents which served as its basis as well as in the
Philippines. history of its formulation.
• Dura lex sed lex. The court cannot adopt a policy
• The Court’s interpretation of a statute becomes a part different from that of the law. If the law is clear, it must
of the law by establishing the legislative intent of the law be applied, regardless of whether the judge thinks that it
when it came into effect and by determining whether is unjust.
such statues conform with the fundamental law of the • While there is no express provision in the Code with
land. respect to suppletory rules in case of deficiency in the
• Jurisprudence is not a source of law: judges cannot law, such suppletory rules are considered as existing in
create laws because of the principle of separation of the form of custom, general principles, and
powers. But a judge can still interpret and declare laws jurisprudence, as well as the opinions of jurisconsults
as applied concretely to the case before him. and commentators.
• Double function of judges:
o Fill the deficiencies of legislation and provide a
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
rule for the facts of a given case wherein there is
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
no positive provision of law nor established
and justice to prevail.
custom.
o Adapt and adjust rigid and inflexible provisions of • The rule is to be applied only in case of doubt, and
law to the changing conditions of life and society. when all other rules of interpretation fail—if the law is
• Stare decisis: to stand by judicial precedents. Requires clear, the judge must apply it, even if it does not
courts in a country to follow the decisions of the supreme conform to his concept of right and justice.
court thereof. • Equity is an attribute of justice, and there can be no
o Basis: Once a question of law has been examined justice if the application of the law is not made with
and decided, it should be deemed settled and equity.
closed to further arguments.

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Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order, or Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
public policy shall not be countenanced. nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each,
months of 30 days, days of 24 hours, and nights from sunset to
• Customs are juridical rules which result from a constant sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be
and continued uniform practice by the members of a computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
social community, with respect to a particular state of In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
facts, and observed with a conviction that is deemed last day included.
obligatory.
• Customs and laws are different in origin and form. • Meaning of week is:
o With reference to the calendar: 7 days, from
Custom Law Sunday to Saturday
Origin Society State o Without reference to the calendar: a period of 7
Creation Spontaneous Conscious consecutive days, regardless of where it starts.
Form Tacit Express • Meaning of month:
Codification Unwritten Written o Lunar month: 28 days
o Calendar month: month as designated in the
• No person or a group can create a custom for their calendar
own benefit or convenience and give it force equivalent o Code, legal month: 30 days
to that of an express law. Customs contrary to positive ▪ Calendar month vs. legal month – calendar
law will not be recognized by the Court. month has unequal portions of time
• Magna Carta of Women, Section 19 • Computation of time:
o The State shall take all appropriate measures to o The last day is to be included, unless it is a
eliminate discrimination against women in all Sunday or a legal holiday.
matters relating to marriage and family relations o Applicable only where a given period of time must
and shall ensure be counted from a certain date; not necessary
a. Same rights to enter into and leave when the date is fixed or when the act is to take
marriages place is at a specified future date.
b. Same rights to choose freely a spouse and • Rule 28, Rules of Court: creates an exception for
to enter into marriage only with their free Sundays and legal holidays (only applies when act and
and full consent period are contractual/judicially ordered).
c. Joint decision on the number and spacing • Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 31
of their children • EO 292, Book 1, Sec. 31
d. Right to choose freely a profession
e. Same rights with respect to ownership and Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety
management of property shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine
f. Same rights to inheritance territory, subject to the principles of public international law and
g. Women shall have equal rights with men to to treaty stipulations.
acquire, change, or retain their nationality.
• Articles 14-18 are considered the Private
o Customary laws shall be respected, provided that
International Law Provisions
they do not discriminate against women.
• General Rule: Territoriality
• Examples of customs contrary to public order:
• Every sovereign state has absolute and exclusive
1. Nganga (Ifugao)
power of government within its own territory—aliens
2. Dog-cooking and eating practices
are bound to respect its laws.
3. San Juan water dousing festival
o They owe a local and temporary allegiance to
the government of the country where they
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the currently are.
rules of evidence. o Aliens also enjoy the civil right guaranteed by
the Constitution to all inhabitants of the State.
• Customs cannot be presumed but must be proved as a
They come under the protection of the Bill of
fact.
Rights.
• Non-existence of custom. When the alleged custom is
o The enjoyment of civil rights is independent
not known to those who have the best means of knowing
of citizenship (codes of France, Romania,
it, this ignorance is a positive evidence of the custom’s
Greece, Serbia, Chile, and Brazil).
non-existence.
• Exemption: under the theory of extraterritoriality,
foreigners may be exempted from the operation of the
laws of the Philippines (e.g., foreign sovereigns,
diplomatic representatives, public or armed vessel).

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Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding to the law of the land where it is situated.
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
• Involves family laws: family rights and duties, status, respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
condition, or legal capacity. successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
• Theories on personal law: provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person
o Domiciliary – individual is domiciled in the State in whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
question; involves factum et animo, or fact and nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
spirit/intent said property may be found.
▪ Different from residence
▪ How do we determine intent? There is no • Property – where property is located (lex situs)
legal basis. o Property is subject to the laws of the country
o Nationality – nationality or citizenship is the basis; where it is situated; this is based on a voluntary
more permanent submission to local laws implied in the holding of
▪ Established in the beginning of the 19th a property within the country.
century in the Code Napoleon. o Both real and personal property are governed by
▪ Rights are determined not by physical lex situs.
location but by political allegiance. • Succession – order of succession, amount of
• Involves purely personal relations and the status and successional rights, intrinsic validity (lex nationali)
capacity for juristic acts—all questions relating to o The law governing succession is the law of the
marriage and divorce or legal separation, conjugal nation of the deceased, irrespective of the nature
partnership, support between members of a family, and and location of the properties left by him at the
martial authority, are governed exclusively by the laws of time of his death.
the PH when Filipinos are involved. • The distribution of the estate may involve various
• Applications: considerations:
o Capacity to contract – if under the law of one state 1. order of succession in cases of intestacy
of which a party to a contract is a citizen, he is 2. the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
already of age at the time of the contract, he in case of testate succession
cannot set such contract aside on the ground of 3. extent or amount of property which each heir is
minority. entitled to inherit
o Renunciation of allegiance – governed by national 4. the capacity of certain heirs to succeed
law. 5. questions of preterition, disinheritance, and
o Foreign adoption – the status of adoption will be collation.
given the same effect in another state as is given • The second paragraph of the article can only be
by the latter to the status of adoption when invoked when the deceased was vested with a
created by its own law. descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of
▪ Lex fori - the law of the country in which an the Philippines.
action is brought. o The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will of
• Article 213, Family Code. No child under seven years of a foreigner who dies in the Philippines is said to
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court be determined by the laws of his own state or
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. country.
o When a foreign law is involved, it must be alleged
and proved.
DACASIN V. DACASIN (2010)
Petitioner and respondent obtained a divorce from Illinois, ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (2006)
which granted sole custody of their daughter Stephanie to Petitioner requests for appeal over a ruling which annuls the
respondent Sharon. Petitioner and respondent executed an partition of will that was already granted and approved.
agreement for joint custody, which was dismissed by the trial Respondent alleges that petitioner acted fraudulently and the
court for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the divorce partition also goes against the law of the foreign national and is
decree was void because there is no divorce in the Philippines. therefore not truly following the will of the decedent.
Held: RTC cannot enforce the Agreement because it is contrary Held: Being a foreign national, Audrey’s national laws are what
to law by default, since Article 213 states that no child under 7 should be followed as stated in Article 16 with respect to her
years of age shall be separated from the mother. The divorce successional rights. Petitioner committed extrinsic fraud in
decree is also binding on the petitioner following the nationality failing to execute the decedent's will with respect to the
rule, since their divorce is valid according to the law of Illinois, applicable law of the State of Maryland.
and thus recognized as valid as well in the Philippines. The case
was remanded to trial court for further trial since Stephanie was
15 by then.

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Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and I N TER SEC TI O N O F M O D ERN
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the C O N STI TU TI O N A L AN D TR AD I TI O N AL
country in which they are executed. FA MI L Y LA W
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or 1987 CONSTITUTION
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be Section 12, Article II. The State recognizes the sanctity of
observed in their execution. family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
those which have, for their object, public order, public policy natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions character shall receive the support of the Government.
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Section 14, Article II. The State recognizes the role of women
• Governed by lex loci contractus, or the laws of the in nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality
country in which the contract is executed before the law of women and men.
• Contract – meeting of two minds
• Forms – format, the rules on presenting the contract Section 1, Article III. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
• Solemnities – number of witnesses, etc. or property without the due process of law, nor shall any person
• Matters concerning the performance of contracts are be denied the equal protection of the laws.
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of their
Article XV. The Family.
performance.
Sec 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
• Matters and remedies concerning their enforcement,
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
actively promote its total development.
and the statute of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the action is brought. Sec 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
• When it comes to the law which shall govern the validity foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
and effects of obligations, the rule contained in this
article follows the Italian Code: Sec 3. The State shall defend:
o The law designated by the parties shall be applied (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
o If no stipulation, and both parties are of the same with their religious convictions and the demands of
nationality, their national law shall be applied responsible parenthood;
o If not, the law of the place of perfection of the (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
obligation shall govern its essence and nature, care and nutrition, and special protection from all
and the law of the place of the performance shall forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
govern its fulfilment conditions prejudicial to their development;
o If these are not specified and cannot be deduced, (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and
then the law of the domicile of the passive subject income;
shall apply. (4) The right of families or family associations to
• Article 804, Civil Code. Every will must be in writing and participate in the planning and implementation of
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. policies and programs that affect them.
• Article 818, Civil Code. Two or more persons cannot
Sec 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members
make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
but the State may also do so through just programs of social
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a person
security.
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of • The family is a social institution in which the State has
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied an interest.
by the provisions of this Code. o Family as the foundation of society.
o The State has a stake in the welfare of the family.
• Commercial law – Civil Code applies suppletory • “Life of the mother and the unborn from conception”
• Where there is no deficiency in special law, the o Life begins upon implantation (WHO)
provisions of the Civil Code cannot be applied. • Magna Carta of Women provides protection to men
and women; customs which are contrary to law or
equality of gender shall not be countenanced.
SUMMARY
• Bill of Rights
Articles 1-15 → Philippine law
1. Due process clause – there must be a procedure
Articles 14-18 → element of foreigners
before one is deprived of his or her rights
2. Equal protection clause – if not provided by law,
the state shall not differentiate among its citizens

8
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT (1964) C I VI L PE RSO N A LI T Y
Appellants were convicted for giving married persons
information on how to prevent conception and prescribing A PERSON is any being, physical or moral, real or juridical,
contraceptives. The General Statutes of Connecticut makes it a susceptible of rights and obligations, or being the subject of
crime for married people to use contraceptives and to assist legal relations.
another to do the same.
Persons could be natural or juridical.
Held: The Court ruled that the contraceptive ban statute violates 1. Natural persons refer to individuals or human beings
the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. The who are created by procreation.
right of marital privacy falls within the penumbra of the specific 2. Juridical persons are artificial, abstract entities created
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to free through laws.
association, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to
STATUS is the legal condition or class to which one belongs in
be secure from all governmental invasions with respect to one’s
society or the legal and juridical position of the individual in
private life. The questioned statute was struck down for being
society, which determines the nature and number of rights of
unconstitutional.
an individual. Status can be political and civil, and civil status
• Penumbra of rights would have to come from a may be grouped into three classes:
fundamental guarantee → decisional privacy, or 1. As a member of society
decisions cannot be intruded into by the state a. Resident or non-resident
• Right to use contraceptives emanates from the right of b. Citizen or alien
liberty 2. As a member of family
• Strict scrutiny a. Single, married, widowed, divorced
1. Compelling state interest – because it affects a right b. Parent, child, brother or sister
a. Extramarital sex c. Legitimate, illegitimate, adopted
2. Narrowly-tailored means – in line with the state 3. As himself
interest a. Age, whether minor or major
a. The contraceptive ban was oversweeping: it b. Sex, whether male or female
prevents couples from using birth-control c. Mental condition, whether sane or insane
devices for the prevention of disease.
Characteristics of status:
1. inalienable
EISENSTADT V. BAIRD (1971) 2. imprescriptible
Baird was convicted under Massachusetts General Laws for 3. can’t be renounced
giving a young woman a contraceptive. Under the said law, only 4. can’t be subject to compromise
married persons (to prevent pregnancy) or married and single 5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors
persons (to prevent the spread of disease) may obtain
PERSONALITY is the aptitude of a person of becoming the
contraceptives. He was discharged upon his appeal to the
subject of legal relations, inherent in every natural person and
Court of Appeals. Hence the appeal by Sheriff Eisenstadt.
is lost only through death.
Held: The Court ruled that the statute violates the equal
Characteristics of civil personality:
protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment because
1. not a being, but a quality of certain beings
the law provides dissimilar treatment to married and unmarried
2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept
people. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
3. not an object of contract, or of possession, cannot be
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
impaired by agreement
governmental intrusion into private matters concerning whether
4. matter of public interest
or not to bear a child.
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
• State interests
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and
1. Premarital sex
is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power
2. Prevention of STDs
to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
• Means of the state was oversweeping
o Only married people would be protected from the
evil which it intends to suppress, STDs. Juridical capacity Capacity to act
o Depriving unmarried people with contraceptive Aptitude to holding and Aptitude to exercise of rights
devices is tantamount to punishing them with the enjoyment of rights
risk of having illegitimate children for fornication. Fitness to be the subject of Power to do acts with legal
So, all the more that unmarried people should be legal relations effect
given access to contraceptives. Indivisible and inherent Conditional and voidable
• Right inheres in the individual – should not distinguish Can exist without capacity Requires both intelligence
between married or unmarried people act and will
Capacity always presumed

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Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived shall GELUZ V. CA (1961)
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, Private respondent's wife, Nita Villanueva, got three abortions
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the from petitioner Antonio Geluz. Her husband sued for damages
following article. against Geluz and won in the trial and appellate courts.
• Birth means the removal of the fetus from the Held: The Supreme Court held that the spouses cannot recover
mother’s womb, which may be done naturally or damages from the physician. According to Article 40, birth
artificially by surgery. determines personality. Hence, an aborted child lacks juridical
o Before birth, the fetus is not a person but merely personality and thus cannot sue for damages through an agent.
a part of the internal organs of the mother. Moral damages could not also be recovered because the wife
o Because of the expectancy that it may be born, willingly had the abortions, and the father, despite knowledge
the law protects it and reserves its rights, thereof, did not investigate or prevent the abortions. The
making its legal existence, if born alive, retroact decision of the CA was reversed.
to the moment of its conception.
• Characteristics of fetal personality Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect
1. Limited – because it only has rights for purposes of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
favorable to it determined by law, by contract, and by will.
2. Provisional/conditional – because it should be
born alive later before the rights can be claimed. • Only natural or physical death. The law does not
a. Birth = total separation from the mother recognize “civil death,” or death due to conviction or a
or removal of fetus in from mother’s religious profession.
womb by cutting off the umbilical cord • Upon death, the subject of legal relations disappears.
3. Can enjoy rights – inherit from will or intestacy and Some rights and obligations are completely
be given donations even before birth extinguished, while others are transmitted to successors
• Legally, in a normal child, the period of conception is the → determined by the law, contract, or the will involved.
first 120 days of the 300 days preceding the birth of the • For certain purposes, after the death of a person, his
child. personality continues in his estate—the estate of a
deceased person is also considered as having legal
personality independent of the heirs, wherein the mass
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it
of property, rights, and assets left by the decent
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s
becomes directly vested and charged with his rights and
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
obligations.
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within 24 hours
• A corpse can no longer be considered a subject of legal
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
relations.
• Separation from mother involves the cutting of the
PEOPLE V. TIROL (1981)
umbilical cord whether naturally or surgically.
Accused Baldesco and Tirol convicted for seven counts of
• The duration of extra-uterine life does not matter—as
murder and two counts of frustrated murder. While their appeal
long as the child is born alive, even for an instant, it gains
was pending, Baldesco died.
juridical personality.
• Complete respiration is necessary to determine if a Held: The Court dismissed the criminal case against Baldesco
child has an independent life necessary for it to gain because he was already dead and can no longer be prosecuted.
juridical capacity. Pursuant to Article 42, juridical personality is extinguished upon
o Crying of the child or floating of the lungs. death, but a person’s estate is considered as having an
• Viability is not required—the law presumes viability if independent legal personality. Therefore, Baldesco’s
the fetus is alive when born. personality is continued in his estate and his civil liabilities will
• If the child had an intra-uterine life of less than seven be recovered from the same.
months, the child must live at least 24 hours after
complete separation from the mother’s womb, otherwise Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
it does not acquire juridical capacity. who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
o Does not matter if the child is killed willfully or first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other shall
through an accident. prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
o Difficult to apply in many cases because it is they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
difficult to know the exact date when conception of rights.
began.
• The presumption is that the baby was born alive, and • This article applies only in cases of doubt in
the burden of proof lies on those who allege the contrary. succession, when survivorship involves persons “who
• Mother can recover moral damages for the death of a are called to succeed each other.”
fetus. • When the persons involved succeed each other, this
article applies, whether the death be actual or merely
presumed.

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o If absent for over ten years, one is presumed to be o Its personality is manifested only in the realm of
dead (Article 391, CC). patrimonial relations—it has no family and
• Rule 131, section 3, paragraph (jj) provides that if there personal rights.
are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to be inferred • Juridical persons may
from, it can be presumed that when two persons perish 1. Acquire and possess property of all kinds
in the same calamity, and it is not shown who died first, 2. Incur obligations
the survivorship is determined from the probabilities 3. Bring civil or criminal actions.
resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes: • Three groups of juridical persons:
o The State and its political subdivisions, such as
Presumed to provinces, cities, and municipalities.
Deceased A Deceased B
have survived o Juridical persons for public interest.
Under 15 Under 15 Older o Juridical persons for private interest.
Above 60 Above 60 Younger • A corporation is an artificial being created by operation
of law, having the right of succession and the powers,
Under 15 Above 60 Under 15 attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or
Above 15 but Above 15 but Diff sex: Male incident to its existence.
under 60 under 60 Same sex: Older • A private corporation may be constituted by five or
Under 15 but over Between 15 and Between 15 and more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom
60 60 60
are resident of the Philippines, by filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission article of
• In case of doubt and in absence of proof, the Civil Code
incorporation.
establishes a presumption of simultaneous death,
o Articles of incorporation must state (1) the name
while the Rules of Court establishes a presumption of
of the corporation, (2) the purpose or purposes for
priority of death.
which it formed, (3) the duration of its existence,
o Differences:
which shall not exceed 15 years, (4) names and
1. Use of age and sex
addresses of its directors, and (5) the capital stock
2. Calamity
and number of shares which it is divided into.
3. Called to succeed each other
• Corporations may be public or private.
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO (1953) o Public corporations are those formed or
This case deals with the sequence of death of family members organized for the government of a portion of the
during the Battle of Manila. Upon exiting the building, Navarro State for the purposes of general good and
Jr. was shot and immediately fell down. Minutes after, the welfare.
building also collapsed, presumably killing Angela. The central o Private corporations are those formed for some
issue is whether the mother died before the son. private purpose, benefit, aim, or end.
▪ Stock corporation – those that have a capital
Held: The Court held that Navarro Jr. died before his mother stock divided into shares and are authorized
Angela. There is circumstantial evidence based on the to distribute to the holders of shares
testimony made by Francisco Lopez, one of the survivors who dividends or allotments of the surplus profits.
were alongside the family, and it trumped the presumptions of
simultaneous and priority of death set forth by the Civil Code Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
and the Rules of Court, respectively. preceding article are governed by the laws creating or
recognizing them. Private corporations are regulated by laws of
Article 44. The following are juridical persons: general application on the subject. Partnerships and
(1) The State and its political subdivisions; associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
(2) Other corporations, institutions, and entities for public provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property
begins as soon as they have been constituted
of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
according to law;
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
organization.
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of • Juridical persons are not completely at par with natural
each holder, partner, or member. persons as to capacity because it cannot exercise rights
which presuppose physical existence, such as family
• A juridical person is an abstract being, formed for the rights, making of wills, etc.
realization of collective purposes, to which the law has • But like natural persons, it can have a nationality, a
granted capacity for rights and obligations. The entity domicile, a name, and a right to reputation. It can own
must be recognized as having its own rights and and possess property, dispose such property, enter into
obligations which are not that of its component contracts, and inherit by will. It can also incur obligations.
members.

11
CAPACITY TO ACT Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify
or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of
Presumption of capacity means that capacity to act must be
being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
for so long as the contrary is not proved.
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
STANDARD OIL CO. V. ARENAS (1911) Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or
Villanueva signed a bond as surety for Arenas in favor of the political opinion.
plaintiff company. The debtors defaulted, and Villanueva’s wife
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified
prayed to the court that her husband be relieved from the debt
for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.
since he was suffering from a monomania, or insanity of great
wealth, when he executed the bond. • Modify, limit, or restrict capacity to act:
1. Age (minority) → age of majority is 18 (amended
Held: The Court held that monomania of wealth does not
by RA 6809)
necessarily imply that Villanueva was incapable of executing a
2. Insanity → includes the various forms of mental
contract of bond. According to the Court, Villanueva was not
disease, either inherited or acquired, in which
permanently insane at the time of the subscription to the
there is a perversion of the mentality, as when the
obligation. Capacity to act is presumed, and claims to the
person suffers from hallucinations, etc.
contrary must be proven by the party making the allegation.
3. Imbecility → not insane, but mentally deficient
Villanueva's incapacity was not proven by his wife therefore his
(mental age of 2-7)
contract as a surety subsists.
4. State of being deaf-mute → a deaf-mute can
make a valid will, so long as its contents have
RESTRICTIONS TO CAPACITY been communicated or made known to him in a
practicable manner.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary 5. Penalty → required guardianship for
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or “incompetents”
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 6. Prodigality → a person who by excessive
drinking, gambling, idleness or debauchery who
Article 38. Minority, insanity, or imbecility, the state of being
spends, wastes, or lessens his estate
deaf-mute, prodigality, and civil interdiction are mere
7. Alienage → certain rights are limited to Filipino
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
citizens only, such as the right to acquire private
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
agricultural/residential lands.
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
8. Absence → a person is absent when he
easements.
disappears from his domicile and his whereabout
are unknown, and he cannot properly administer
Under the Code, obligations arise from:
his properties.
1. Law → such as those imposed by the law on family
9. Family relations → certain family relations limit the
relations or the law on taxation
capacity of persons for some juridical acts such
2. Contracts → an incapacitated person cannot bind
as marriage
himself by contract, neither can he receive payment of
10. Trusteeship and insolvency → cannot dispose of
an obligation without the intervention of his legal
properties
representative
• Only religious belief and political opinion are the
3. Quasi-contracts → nobody can unjustly enrich himself
circumstances which do not limit capacity to act
at the expense of another.
according to the Code.
4. Crimes/delicts → incapacitated persons are civilly
liable for crimes they commit, even if they are
exempted from criminal liability MINORITY
5. Quasi-delicts or torts and damages → under the
express provisions of articles 2181 and 2182 within the Republic Act No. 6809. An Act Lowering the Age of Majority
Code from Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose
Executive No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines
Reintegration of capacity:
1. For minors → upon reaching the age of majority • Article 234 of the Family Code is amended, lowering
2. For civil interdiction → upon the service of principal the age of emancipation/majority from 21 to 18 years.
penalty o Articles 235 and 237 are repealed.
3. In some cases, a judicial decree of competence is • Article 236 is amended to read as follows:
required to terminate incapacity (for the first two, no
need for court proceedings) “Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in
special cases.

12
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of • Art. 1397 – capacitated party cannot allege the
twenty-one. incapacity of other parties in a contract
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or • Art. 1399 – restitution is not obliged from the
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below incapacitated person if the same is not benefited
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs
• Art. 1426 – when a contract is annulled, a minor is not
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has
been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1)
However, should he voluntarily return the thing or price
unemancipated minors; (2) insane or demented persons, and deaf-
received although he has not been benefited thereby, he
mutes who do not know how to write.
cannot recover what he has returned.
Article 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, • Art. 1427 – voluntary payment by a minor over eighteen
even though there may have been no damage to the contracting years of age under annullable contract exists and is
parties: (1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving enforceable unless it is set aside or annulled by a
consent to a contract. competent court. It is not the voluntary payment that
Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless prevents recovery under this article, but the fact that the
they are ratified: (3) Those where both parties are incapable of obligee has consumed it in good faith.
giving consent to a contract.
MERCADO V. ESPIRITU (1917)
Article 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be Plaintiff siblings misrepresented themselves to be of legal age
instituted by all who were thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. in a deed of sale for the land they inherited from their mother.
However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of They sought for the annulment of the said contract by appealing
those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted
to the court that they were minors at that time.
intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or
caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. Held: The Court held that minors cannot enter into a contract,
but because the plaintiffs willingly lied about their age, they
Article 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the
were estopped from reneging from a contract they entered
incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been through misrepresentation, which the defendant relied on.
benefited by the thing or price received by him. Contract of sale was deemed valid.
Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one BAMBALAN V. MARAMBA (1966)
years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent Plaintiff executed a deed of sale of land to the defendant,
of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract despite the latter knowing that the plaintiff was still a minor at
voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, that time. Plaintiff seeks the annulment of the deed of sale for
notwithstanding the fact that he has not been benefited thereby, lack of capacity.
there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.
Held: The court held that the sale is void because the plaintiff
Article 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one
was a minor at the time of its execution. The Mercado doctrine
years of age, who has entered into a contract without the consent
is not applicable because there was no reliance since the
of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and the defendant knew
delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall
be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or him to be a minor as he was the one who purchased his cedula.
consumed it in good faith.
BRAGANZA V. VILLA ABRILLE (1959)
Article 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to Petitioner along with her two minor sons loaned money from the
obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the respondent. They defaulted on the loan, and were sued to pay
modifications contained in the following articles. the full amount plus interest as per loan contract. Petitioner
prayed that the Court consider the minority of her sons at the
Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other
person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price time that the contract was signed.
therefor. Necessaries are those referred to in article 290.
Held: The court held that the failure of the minors to disclose
their age does not constitute a fraud. Because it was merely a
EFFECTS OF MINORITY ON CONTRACTS passive misrepresentation, they were not estopped and cannot
• Art. 1327 (1) – unemancipated minors cannot give be legally bound by their signatures in the contract. Sons do not
consent to contract; but there is no more concept of have to pay the interest, only return their portion of the loan (1/3
unemancipated minors because age of emancipation is for each).
equal to age of majority.
• Art. 1390 (1) – if ONE is incapable of contract, the Although the written contract was unenforceable, the minors
contract is valid unless the court says otherwise → shall still make restitution to the extent that they may have
voidable profited from what they received, according to Art. 1399 of the
Civil Code (since money was used to buy necessaries).
• Art. 1403 (3) – if BOTH parties are incapable, the contract
is unenforceable unless ratified

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EFFECT OF MINORITY ON MARRIAGE INSANITY
Article 5, Family Code. Any male or female of the age of Article 1327, Civil Code. The following cannot give consent to
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments a contract: (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. who do not know how to write.
Article 35, FC. The following marriages shall be void ab initio: Article 1328, CC. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval
are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years during a hypnotic spell are voidable.
of age even with the consent of parents or guardians.
Article 1399, CC. When the defect of the contract consists in
• Article 5 of the Family Code states that male or female the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is
persons of 18 years above may contract marriage. not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has
• Article 35 states that any marriage entered into by those been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
below 18 years of age, even with the consent of parents,
is void ab initio. • Article 1327 states that the insane/demented cannot
give consent to contract.
EFFECT OF MINORITY ON CRIMES • Article 1328 states that contracts entered while in a lucid
interval is valid, but the burden to prove lucid interval lies
RA 9344. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. in the prosecution.
• Article 1399 states that restitution from the insane is not
• Section 6 states that a child fifteen (15) years of age or obliged if the same is not benefited.
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability, but will be subject to an
LAVAREZ V. GUEVARRA (2017)
intervention program.
Rebecca Zaballero, aged 75, signed a deed of donation
o A child above 15 but below 18 shall also be
granting her properties to the respondents. Upon her death, she
exempted from criminal liability and be subjected
left all of her properties to her nearest of kin, the petitioners.
to an intervention program, unless the child has
Petitioners sought the nullification of the donation documents
acted with discernment.
because it was executed while Rebecca was suffering from
o Exemption from criminal liability does not include
dementia.
exemption from civil liability.
• Section 7 states that a child in conflict with the law shall Held: The deed of donation was void. The Court took
enjoy the presumption of minority and shall enjoy all the cognizance of the testimony of Rebecca’s doctor that she had
rights until he or she is proven to be 18 years old or older. been suffering from permanent dementia and had been taking
• Section 20 states that if the child taken into custody is medication for years. Hence, because of her dementia, it can
15 years old or below, the authority which had the initial be reasonably assumed that her consent was impaired, and
contact with the child has the duty to immediately that fraud or undue influence would have been employed in
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, order to procure her signature on the questioned deeds.
guardians, or nearest relatives.
o If those cannot be located, the child may be EFFECT OF INSANITY ON MARRIAGE
released to a duly registered NGO or religious
organization, a barangay official or member of the Article 45 of the Family Code states that a marriage is voidable
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children, if one of the spouses is insane at the time of the marriage.
or to the DSWD.
Article 47 states that an action for annulment must be filed by:
• Section 57 states that any conduct not considered an
• The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other’s
offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall
insanity or the guardian of the insane spouse, before the
not be considered an offense and shall not be punished
death of either party; or
if committed by a child.
• The insane spouse, during a lucid interval.
• Section 58 states that persons below 18 years of age
shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of
EFFECT OF INSANITY ON CRIMES
vagrancy and prostitution, mendicancy, and sniffing of
rugby, as such are inconsistent with the United Nations Article 12, Revised Penal Code. The following are exempt
Convention on the Rights of the Child. from criminal liability: (1) An imbecile or an insane person,
• Section 59 states that no death penalty shall be imposed unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
upon children in conflict with the law.
• Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code states that an
insane person is not exempt from criminal liability if a
criminal act is committed by the same during a lucid
interval.

14
STATE OF BEING DEAF-MUTE CIVIL INTERDICTION
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: Article 34, RPC. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental
know how to write. authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of
any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his
Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or deaf-mute, he must property, and of the right to dispose of such property by any
personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall act or any conveyance inter vivos.
designate two persons to read and communicate to him, in
some practicable manner, the contents thereof. Article 135, FC. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient case of judicial separation of property: (1) That the
Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb, and able carries with it civil interdiction.
to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in Article 805. Article 142, FC. The administration of all classes of exclusive
property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the
• Article 1327 states that persons who are deaf-mute and other spouse: (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty
cannot read nor write cannot give consent to a contract. which carries with it civil interdiction.
• Article 807 states that a deaf-mute may write a will, but
if the same cannot read nor write, he shall designate two • Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code states that a
persons who would communicate to him the contents of person under civil interdiction is deprived of rights to:
the contract. 1. parental authority
• Article 820 states that a deaf-mute cannot be a witness 2. guardianship
to a will because he would not be able to testify properly 3. marital authority
in court if ever the need arises. 4. manage his property, and
5. to dispose of such property.
• Article 135 of the Family Code states that the civil
PRODIGALITY interdiction of one spouse is a sufficient case for a
judicial separation of property.
Rule 92, Section 2, RC. Under this rule, the word
• Article 142 of the Family Code states that the civil
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction of one spouse could be used as a
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
justification of the court to transfer all classes of
dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
exclusive property to the other spouse.
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without FAMILY RELATIONS
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. Article 11, RPC. The following do not incur any criminal liability: (2)
Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
• Rule 92 of the Rules of Court defines prodigality as the ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
wanton waste of one’s estate; without regard for family, brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees,
exposing them to want and depriving inheritance; morbid and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided
state of mind and disposition to spend. that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
MARTINEZ V. MARTINEZ (1902) provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
Petitioner, the son and compulsory legal heir of the respondent, defense had no part therein.
brought an action against his father for a declaration of Article 13, RPC. The following are mitigating circumstances: (5)
prodigality. Petitioner alleged that the respondent was That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
squandering the estate by making donations and handing over offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse,
the administration of the estate to his second wife. ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers
or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
Held: The court held that the defendant was not a prodigal, and
was still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the Article 1109, CC. Prescription does not run between husband and
industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. In fact, the wife, even though there be a separation of property agreed upon in
father had increased profit while the son himself possesses the marriage settlements or by judicial decree. Prescription does
propensity to be prodigal. not run between parents and children, during the minority or
insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the
continuance of the guardianship.
Article 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to
each other, except: (1) when a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) when there has been a
judicial separation of property under Article 191.

15
Article 37, FC. Marriages between the following are incestuous and heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the aeroplane;
parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) between ascendants and (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in
descendants of any degree; and (2) between brothers and sisters, war, and has been missing for four years;
whether of full or half blood. (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
Article 87, FC. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
circumstances and his existence has not been known
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be for four years.
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other
Article 41, FC. A marriage contracted by any person during
on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
marriage.
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
Article 215, FC. No descendant shall be compelled in a criminal spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
such testimony is indispensable in a crime, against the descendant there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
or by one parent against the other. the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
• Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides
justifying circumstances for acts done in defense of For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
family (e.g., ascendants, descendants, brothers, sisters, the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
relatives, etc.) summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
• Article 13(5) of the RPC provides mitigating declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
circumstances for the immediate vindication of family prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
members.
• Article 1109 of the Civil Code states that prescription Art. 42, FC. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
does not run between husband and wife, parent and preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
child, and guardian and ward. recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
• Art. 1490 states that spouses can’t sell property to each unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
other unless: declaring it void ab initio.
a. There is a separation of property in marriage
• Article 390 states that after 7 years of absence a person
settlement
is presumed dead for all purposes except succession; if
b. There is a judicial separation of property
the person absent is 75 years old or above, the absence
• Article 37 of the Family Code states that incestuous
has to be 5 years only.
marriages between ascendants and descendants and
• Article 391 states that if the following persons are absent
between brothers and sisters, whether legitimate or
for 4 or more years and if there is a danger of death, the
illegitimate, is void ab initio.
same shall be presumed dead for all purposes:
• Article 87 of the Family Code states that donation inter
1. vessel lost at sea or missing airplane
vivos is not allowed between spouses, or between
2. member of military or armed force in war
persons living together.
3. other circumstances of danger of death
• Article 215 of FC disqualifies descendants from
• Article 41 of the Family Code states that a marriage
testifying against their grandparents unless such is
contracted by any person during the subsistence of the
indispensable to crime against him, another parent or
previous marriage shall be void, unless before the
grandparent.
celebration of the subsequent marriage:
o the prior spouse had been absent for four
ABSENCE consecutive years
o the prior spouse had been absent, and there is
Article 390, CC. After an absence of seven years, it being danger of death, for two years.
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be o the spouse has a well-founded belief that the
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of absent spouse is already dead
succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the o the present spouse institutes a summary
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an death of the missing spouse.
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his • Article 42 of the Family Code states that the
succession may be opened. subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless
purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, declaring it void ab initio
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been

16
D EFI N I TI O N A N D N A TU RE O F MA RRI AG E 4. The family relationship, from which flow various juridical
consequences.
Article 1, Family Code. Marriage is a special contract of 5. Emancipation of the spouses from parental authority.
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in 6. Incapacity of the spouses to make donations to each
accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and other.
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable 7. Disqualification of the spouses to testify against each
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents other.
are governed by law and not subject to stipulations, except that 8. Modification of criminal liability, by way of exemption,
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the mitigation, or aggravation.
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Article XV, The Family
Marriage is a social institution. Marriage is a contract in form, Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
but in essence it is an institution of public order founded on foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
custom and morality. It is a contract sui generis which cannot solidarity and actively promote its total development.
be compared to any other contract.
• It is the foundation of the family and the origin of Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
domestic relations of the utmost importance to foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
civilization and social progress; the State is deeply
Section 3. The State shall defend:
concerned in its maintenance in purity and integrity.
1. The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
Characteristics of marriage. their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
• An institution of civil character, it is established by the
2. The right of children to assistance, including proper care
State independently of its religious aspect.
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
• An institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by prejudicial to their development;
the stipulation of the parties. 3. The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
• An institution of natural character, one of its objects is and
the satisfaction of needs of humans for procreation. 4. The right of families or family associations to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and
Purpose of marriage. programs that affect them.
• General
o Reproduction Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members
o Education of offspring but the State may also do so through just programs of social
o Mutual help security.
• Immediate
o Creation of complete perfect community • Section 1 → State has a role in strengthening and
• Remote promoting the development of the family as the
o Preservation of human race foundation of the nation.
• Section 2 → State shall protect marriage as an inviolable
Difference with ordinary contracts. social institution and the foundation of the family.
• Section 3 → lists down some of the rights accorded to
Marriage Ordinary Contracts families, such as the:
Only between 1 man and 1 May be same sex; any 1. right of spouses to establish a family
woman number 2. right of children to assistance and protection
Law fixes the duties and Agreement of parties on 3. right of a family to an appropriate living wage,
rights of parties rights and duties will fix 4. right of families to have a say in policies and
May not be subject to programs that affect them.
stipulation or terminated Can be terminated at the • Section 4 → State can care for the elderly members of
even if one becomes agreement of parties the society through just programs of social security.
incapable of fulfilling duties
Marriage, per the Family Code, has a dual character:
Breach of obligation not • A private covenant between two individuals committed
Breach of contract gives
actionable but gives rise to
rise to action for damages to making a life together;
civil and criminal sanctions
• An institution which serves a vital societal purpose.
Principal effects of a valid marriage. As a contract, only two persons, one man and the other a
1. Personal and economic relations between the spouses, woman, can enter into it.
which become sources of important rights and duties. • It differs from ordinary contracts wherein parties, with no
2. Legitimacy of sexual union and of the family. restriction as to number and sex, have rights and duties
3. Personal and economic relations between parents and arising from their agreement; instead, the law decrees
children. the duties and rights of the spouses and the breach
thereof are subject to penal and civil liabilities.

17
As a social institution, it is deemed the bedrock upon which REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
a stable family is founded.
• It is the second part of the Family Code definition that Article 2, FC. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
finds basis in the Constitution, that marriage “as an requisites are present.
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be
and shall be protected by the State.” a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
Article XV of the Constitution dispels any doubt that our solemnizing officer.
laws privilege families built on marriage.
• This explains the disparate rights of spouses in contract Article 3, FC. The formal requisites of marriage are:
to persons cohabiting but are not married. (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
• There is a belief that changing laws to equalize the rights (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided
of unmarried cohabitants with those of married couples for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
will destabilize the institution of marriage. (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
• Also used to rationalize the limited rights of illegitimate appearance of the contracting parties before the
children, which has repercussions on the Constitutional solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
right of children to equal protection, and the right to be they take each other as husband and wife in the
free from discrimination on the basis of status, mandated presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
There are essential and formal requisites for a valid
The State’s support for marriage assumes that a family is marriage.
stronger and children are better reared when parents are • Essential requisites are those inherent in marriage and
married to each other. are considered personal to the parties.
• A stable family life underpins a secure and just society, • Formal requisites are those prescribed by law and are
which is the rationale for Article 1 of the Family Code, external to the parties contracting marriage.
disallowing contractual stipulations on the nature,
The difference between these two kinds of requisites lies in
consequences, and incidents of marriage that might
the effect of a flaw in the requisite.
unwittingly alter these closely held customs.
• If there is a defect in the essential requisite, the marriage
• The state cannot justify preservation of the idealized
is voidable and may be annulled.
notion of the family at the expense of children who had
• If there is an irregularity in a formal requisite, the validity
no say in their parents’ decision to marry or not to marry.
of the marriage is not affected and instead the party
The choice of entering into marriage, whom and when to responsible for such irregularity will be civilly, criminally,
marry, is made by individuals in the exercise of their right to or administratively liable.
liberty.
• The constitutional duty to support marriage must be read LEGAL CAPACITY

in the context of two constraints upon State power:
MALE AND FEMALE
1) Inherent limits of police power → measures taken
by the State, to be valid, require (1) a public
Article 2, FC. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
purpose; and (2) a valid means, or the means must
requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting
bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose.
parties who must be a male and a female.
Thus, if the State wants to take a measure
regulating marriage or family, it should explain Under Article 2 of the Family Code, the parties to a marriage
what particular public interest is at stake. must be a male and a female.
2) If the police power measure will impinge upon a • Traditional basis: To realize the perceived purpose of
constitutionally protected right (e.g. right to marriage, procreation. However, reference to Article 1 of
privacy or liberty), there must be a compelling or the Family Code will show that it expands the purpose of
substantial interest and a narrowly-tailored means marriage beyond procreation.
to achieve the compelling purpose.
• State intrusion into constitutionally-protected rights may JONES V. HALLAHAN (1973)
be justified only to uphold substantial State policies that Petitioner and her female partner were not issued a marriage
impact on other individuals’ rights. license in Kentucky. Petitioner filed a petition claiming that the
• Caution must be taken to prevent the State from failure to issue the marriage license deprived them of basic
becoming the third party in the marriage. constitutional rights to marry, associate, and exercise religion.
Held: Same-sex marriage does not violate any constitutionally

protected right because there is no constitutional sanction
which protects the right of marriage between persons of the
same sex. Petitioners are prevented from marrying by their own
incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined.

18
GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) Held: The Court held that acquiring the physical features of a
This landmark case constitutes the first recognized same-sex female through a sexual reassignment surgery does not entitle
marriage in the United States. In this case, seven same-sex the petitioner to a change of name. According to RA 9048 or
couples filed a complaint against the public respondent after the Clerical Error Law, the grounds for change of name are (1)
being deprived of marriage license because Massachusetts law difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name; (2) habitual and
did not recognize same-sex marriage, with the view that only continual use; and (3) to avoid confusion. In this case, however,
heterosexual unions can provide an optimal setting for child petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and does not
rearing. show that his name may prejudice him.
Held: The Court ruled in favor of the same-sex couples and The Court also held that there is no law that authorizes the
affirmed that the Massachusetts Constitution promotes the change of sex in the civil registry due to sex change. Under the
equality of individuals. According to the Court, the state Civil Register Law, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
purposes of promoting procreation, optimal child-rearing, and visually done by examining the genitals of the infant; and
conservation of resources are not met by denying same-sex without a law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the sex of
union. Massachusetts legalized same-sex unions. a person determined at birth is considered immutable.
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES (2015) REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN (2008)

Petition for certiorari by 14 same-sex couples, and two men The case involves respondent Jennifer Cagandahan, an
with deceased same-sex partners from Michigan, Kentucky, intersex person diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
and Ohio who claim that respondent state officials violate both (CAH), where the respondent is genetically a female but
the due process and equal protection clause under the 14th because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or have their did not develop normally and she has two sex organs. She filed
lawful marriages in one state recognized in others. a petition for change of name and sex in her birth certificate
because she alleged that she has become a male person.
Some of the couples involved:
1. Jim Obergefell and John Arthur – Arthur was diagnosed Held: The Court stated that there is no basis for change of entry
with ALS; they were married in a tarmac in Maryland; but for sex in the birth certificate. However, unlike Silverio,
upon his death, Ohio refused to recognize Obergefell as Cagandahan was born intersex and as such, the determining
his surviving spouse factor in her gender classification would be what she, having
2. April DeBoer and Jayne Rouse – Michigan laws do not reached the age of majority, thinks of her sex. She has let nature
allow same-sex couples to adopt; both were forced to take its course, has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
adopt as single individuals, which is problematic interfere with what he was born with, and accordingly, he has
3. Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura – DeKoe is a member already ordered his life to that of a male. The Court granted her
of the army who is married to Kostura in New York (where petition for change of name and sex in the birth certificate.
same-sex marriage is legal); but upon crossing state
lines to Kentucky, their marriage becomes unlawful and Rule 103 Rule 108 RA 9048
Cancellation
not recognized
or Correction
Change of Clerical Error
Held: The 14th Amendment requires a state to license a Name of Entries in
Name Law
the Civil
marriage between two people of the same sex, given certain
Registry
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy.
Subject Substantial Substantial Clerical or
The Court gave four principles that demonstrate why marriage
Matter corrections corrections typos
is fundamental under the Constitution, and in light of the 14th
Person Any person
Amendment, should apply also to same-sex couples.
desiring to Any person with direct
Who may file
1. Personal choice regarding marriage is fundamental in the change his interested and personal
name interest
concept of individual autonomy.
Civil registrar
2. Marriage supports a two-person union unlike any other Venue RTC RTC
or consulates
in the importance to the committed individuals. Good and *See Silverio
3. Marriage safeguards children and families, and thus Grounds 6
valid grounds v. Republic
draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, Proceeding Judicial Judicial Administrative
procreation and education.
Signed and
4. Marriage is a keystone of the nation's social order. Verified
What to file verified Affidavit
petition
petition
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC (2007) Notice and Three con. Three con. Two con.
Petitioner, who identifies as a male transsexual, filed a petition Publication weeks weeks weeks
after the Court of Appeals overturned the trial court decision Posting None None Yes
allowing the said petitioner to change his first name and sex in
Participation Civil Reg is a Civil Reg or
the birth certificate after undergoing sex reassignment surgery. SolGen
from Govt party Consul
Where to
CA CA Civil Reg
appeal

19
LITTLETON V. PRANGE (1999) CONSENT FREELY GIVEN
Petitioner Christie Littleton is a transsexual who had undergone
a sex reassignment surgery. Upon the death of her husband, Article 4, FC. The absence of any of the essential or formal
she filed a medical malpractice suit as her husband’s surviving requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
spouse. The sued doctor challenged Christie's status as a stated in Article 35(2).
proper wrongful death beneficiary, asserting that Christie is a
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
man and cannot be the surviving spouse of another man.
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
Held: The Court held that despite having been medically
Article 45(3), FC. That the consent of either party was obtained
diagnosed with gender dysphoria and subsequently completing
by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of
sex reassignment from male to female, Texas law did not
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
recognize that any individual can successfully change his or her
as husband and wife.
sex, which is determined at birth. Her marriage to was void and
she could not be considered his surviving spouse. • Article 4, FC → Where a party gives his consent to be
husband or wife, but not knowingly and voluntarily or
IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS ARAGUZ III (2014) freely, or is misled, there is merely a defect in the
Petitioner Nikka Araguz, a transwoman, married a firefighter. essential requisite of consent. The consent, although
Shortly after the wedding, she underwent sexual reassignment present, is vitiated or defective and the marriage is not
surgery. When her husband died in the line of duty, his mother void ab initio but only voidable or annullable.
and his ex-wife filed a suit to declare his marriage to Nikki void • Article 45(3), Family Code → Want of Parental Consent.
on the ground that it constituted a same-sex marriage. The absence of parental consent to a marriage
Held: The Court held that the Littleton ruling cannot be used as contracted by a party between eighteen and twenty
precedent because it was legislatively overruled by the 2009 years of age, renders the marriage voidable. The
amendment to the Texas Family Code, which added court marriage, however, may be ratified, and may become
orders relating to the name or sex change to the list of valid when the party whose parent did not consent to the
acceptable proof of identity for purposes of obtaining a marriage, continues, after reaching the age of twenty-
marriage license. Thus, Texas law recognizes that an individual one to cohabit with the other as husband and wife.
who has gone through sex reassignment is eligible to marry a
person of the opposite sex. PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO (1927)
The accused, Felipe Santiago, raped his niece Felicita and after
MINIMUM AGE OF MARRIAGE a few hours, married her. When the latter filed a case for rape,
Santiago defended himself by saying that he was married to
Article 5, FC. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years Felicita and thus there was no such crime or rape.
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Held: The Court held that the marriage was void for Felipe’s
Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
absence of bona fide intent to marry Felicita, which is equivalent
In the old Civil Code, the minimum age of marriage was 14 for to the absence of consent. The marriage was a mere ruse to
females and 16 for males. It was physiological capability to avoid the criminal consequences of his act. It is clearly shown
procreate which determined the minimum age to marry. that he had no good faith of making Felicita his wife, and the
• The FC increased the minimum age for marriage and marriage could not also be considered binding to Felicita
made it uniform for both male and female to avoid because it was performed under duress.
premature marriages. The new law increased the age of
consent for marriage to the age of majority, or at age 18. BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
• The marriage of a person below the minimum age makes
Article 19, CC. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
the marriage void ab initio for want of capacity.
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
EIGENMAN V. GUERRA (1964)
Plaintiff, despite being a minor, stated that he was 25 years old Article 20, CC. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
in the marriage license and married respondent. Two years negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
after, plaintiff filed an action for annulment of the marriage on the same.
the ground that he was a minor at the time of marriage.
Article 21, CC. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
Held: The Court held that since the plaintiff misrepresented his another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
age, he is estopped from filing for its annulment. Defendant was public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
16-20 years old, but indicated that he was 25 years and 8 Article 2176, CC. Whoever by act or omissions causes damage to
months old. He would now be precluded from asserting or another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
proving otherwise under the doctrine of equitable estoppel in damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
accordance with Article 1431 of CC. If it were decided today, contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
the estoppel would not lie and the marriage will be void because is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
there are no exceptions for minors.

20
• Article 19 pregnant, he refused to marry her and she was forced to quit
o A person should be protected only when he acts her job. Respondent filed a complaint for recognition of the
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when child and for support and moral and exemplary damages.
he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse. Held: The Court held that the petitioner did not seduce the
o Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from woman to entitle her to damages. The facts stand out that for
taking any unconscientious advantage of another. one whole year, the respondent, a woman of adult age,
• Article 20 maintained intimate and sexual relations with petitioner. Such
o Actions, whether committed willfully or conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there
negligently, which harm another person, shall is voluntariness and mutual passion.
provide for damages to the same.
o A person is required to act with prudence towards DE JESUS V. SYQUIA (1933)
others, but not with charity; hence, the law Defendant courted plaintiff, and their relationship resulted in the
imposes diligence, and not altruism. The failure to latter giving birth to a baby boy. They lived together for one year
make sacrifices, or egoism, does not constitute a until Antonia got pregnant again, after which Cesar left to marry
source of liability. There is no civil liability for moral another woman. Plaintiff filed an action for damages for breach
fault or negligence. of promise and recognition of the two children.
• Article 21 Held: The Court held that the promise to marry was not
o Liability may arise from acts which are in actionable, so the plaintiff could not recover damages for the
themselves legal or not prohibited, if such acts are breach of promise. The Court ruled that plaintiff was only
contrary to morals, public order, or public policy. entitled to the support of the first child because of the evidence
A person cannot exercise his right without regard of Cesar’s prior recognition through his letters. The second
for good morals or customs. child was not entitled to support for the second child because
Heart Balm Statute there was no proof of paternity or recognition presented.
Prevents grant of damages based on emotional anguish. The
bases of such statute are: PICCININNI V. HAJUS (1980)
1. Property Defendant induced the plaintiff to spend approximately $40,000
2. Expectation (cultural and societal) - they used to value in renovating, improving, and furnishing her house after
marriage as the only goal. Impairs honor and purity of promising that she would marry him and the house would be
the deserted party. their marital home. The plaintiff sued the defendant on the
grounds of breach of contract, false representation, and unjust
There is no legal basis for obligation on a breach of promise enrichment.
to marry out of love.
o Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict. Held: The Court ruled that the plaintiff could still file for damages
o No source of obligation because marriage is purely because the man did not sue her for not marrying him but for
voluntary and not compulsory. It should be freely cajoling him into transferring property in her name upon the
entered into without any threat. defendant’s fraudulent representations and for her unjust
o People marry because of love, so it cannot be imposed enrichment. The properties are still recoverable because marital
and thus there is no legal basis for action. gifts are conditional until after the celebration of marriage.
WASSMER V. VELEZ (1964) FORMAL REQUISITES

Two days before their wedding—which means that at that point,
everything about the wedding was already set, a bridal shower Article 3 of the Family Code enumerates three formal
had been conducted and gifts were already given)—the groom requisites that make a marriage binding.
Francisco left Beatriz Wassmer. Wassmer sued for actual, 1. Solemnizing officer
moral, and exemplary damages against Velez. 2. Marriage license
3. Marriage ceremony
Held: The Court held that the present case is not a mere breach
of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through These formal requisites are prescribed by the law and are
all the preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the external to the contracting parties. The absence of formal
matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, while an
contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held irregularity or defect shall not affect the validity of the marriage
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the but the party or parties responsible for such shall be civilly,
Civil Code. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to criminally, and administratively liable.
moral and exemplary damages.
Marriages validly solemnized outside the Philippines, having
TANJANCO V. CA (1966) complied with all the requisites therein, may be considered valid
Petitioner and respondent were sweethearts. Because of the in this country, following the conflict of laws principle of lex loci
man’s promise of marriage, they continually had sexual celebrationis.
relations for a span of one year. However, when she got

21
Art. 26, FC. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, c. Acting within the limits of the written authority
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they granted by his church or sect
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in d. At least one of the contracting parties belongs to
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), the solemnizing officer’s church.
(5) and (6), 36, 37, and 38. • Absence of (a) or (b) will render the
marriage void on the ground of absence of
This is consistent with the Article 17 of the Civil Code, which authority of the solemnizing officer
provides that “forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and because the authority of a religious clergy
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the to officiate a wedding is determined by the
country in which they are executed.” However, Philippine laws church to which he or she belongs.
govern marriages celebrated within the embassy or consulate • Absence of (c) or (d) is merely considered
grounds as they are considered within the territorial jurisdiction an irregularity and thus will not affect the
of the Philippines. validity of the marriage. This is because it
is unreasonable to burden the couple
Though Philippine law allows the Consul General, Consul, or
whose marriage is solemnized to ascertain
Vice Consul to solemnize marriages; the marriage solemnized
the limits imposed by a church since such
by these consular officials are considered valid according to the
limitations are not usually of public
laws of the country where the consular office is located.
knowledge.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF ANTONIA REYES MEDINA V. GIL 3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases
RAMOS MEDINA (2018) mentioned in Article 31.
In this case, which was decided by the Superior Court for the A marriage between passengers or crew members may
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the issue be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane chief
resolved was whether a marriage ceremony performed in a while the ship is at sea or the plain is in flight, and during
foreign consulate, not in compliance with local law, is valid and stopovers at ports of call only if the marriage is in articulo
enforceable by the local Court. mortis.
The Mariana Islands Superior Court referred to their law which
stated that only the governor and mayor, not consular officials, 4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
are allowed to issue marriage licenses. Thus, for the purpose of assigned in the absence of the latter, during a military
marriage, the Consulate is not sovereign territory and the operation, only in the cases mentioned in Art. 32.
parties are deemed to have been married in the CNMI. The A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned
Court held that the marriage of Virginia and Gil, who are both officer, shall also have the authority to solemnize
Filipinos, under the Philippine Consulate in Saipan was void, marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the
and Gil’s subsequent marriage with Antonia is valid. The Court zone of military operation, whether members of the
disregarded Article 10 of the Family Code which grants consuls armed forces or civilians. The presence or absence of the
the duties of the solemnizing officer and the civil registrar. chaplain should not have to be established before the
military commander may be allowed to solemnize the
marriage.
AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
5) Any consul-general, consult, or vice-consul in the case
Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the provided in Article 10.
beginning: (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally The marriage should be within the Philippine embassy
authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were grounds which is likewise the extent of the consul’s
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that authority. A consul may not solemnize a marriage of
the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. Filipinos abroad outside of the embassy or consular
premises, over which foreign laws will govern. Consuls
Article 7 of the Family Code states that marriage may be on home assignments in the Philippines cannot
solemnized by: solemnize marriages.
1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary acting within the Sections 444 and 445 of the Local Government Code revived
court’s jurisdiction. the authority of city and municipal mayors to solemnize
Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court marriages.
of Tax Appeals and the Sandiganbayan can solemnize
marriage anywhere in the Philippines. However, judges NAVARRO V. DOMAGTOY (1996)
from inferior courts may only solemnize marriage within Administrative case was filed against respondent judge for
their jurisdiction.
solemnizing two marriages. One was solemnized without the
declaration of presumptive death of the first wife, which made
2) Members of the religious clergy, or any priest, rabbi,
the subsequent marriage bigamous. The second was
imam or minister of any church or religious sect.
solemnized outside the judge's jurisdiction.
a. Duly authorized by his church or sect
b. Registered with the civil registrar

22
Held: The Court noted held that judges who are appointed to MARRIAGE LICENSE
specific jurisdictions may officiate weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Article 8 of the Family Code provides Art 9 ML obtained in the civil registrar located in the habitual
that a marriage can be held outside the judge’s office only at residence of one of the parties
the point of death, in remote places, and upon the request of Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled in
both parties in writing. Nonetheless, the solemnization outside the consular office which will take over the duties of
the judge’s territorial jurisdiction did not invalidate the marriage, local civil registry and the solemnizing officer.
as it is only an irregularity in a formal requisite. The judge was
suspended for 6 months. Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage license
which shall specify the following:
ARAÑEZ V. OCCIANO (2002) 1. full name
Petitioner and her husband were married by respondent judge 2. age, date, and place of birth
without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. 3. civil status
When her husband died, she learned that their marriage was 4. if previously married, how, when, where the
void for want of marriage license—she lost her right to inherit previous marriage was dissolved or annulled
the property left by her husband and to receive his pension. 5. present residence and citizenship
Petitioner charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law. 6. degree of relationship of the contracting parties
7. full name, residence and citizenship of the father
Held: The Court stressed that the authority of judges of inferior and mother, and/or guardian
courts to solemnize marriage is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction. The Court also held that it is the marriage license Art 12 Proof of age
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a a. original or certified copy of birth certificate
marriage. Without such, the judge acted in gross ignorance of b. original or certified copy of baptismal certificate
the law and was fined P5,000 with a stern warning. c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses,
preferably next of kin
PALMA V. OMELIO (2017)
Involves a “marriage scam” in Davao City allegedly perpetrated Proof of age may be dispensed with if:
by MTCC Judge Omelio and Murcia, and Omelio’s wife as the a. parents appear personally
Clerk of Court. A marriage in Samal was officiated by Murcia, b. local civil registrar convinced by mere looking
and was re-enacted later for picture-taking by Omelio. c. previously married (but if 18-21, parental consent
is still necessary according to RA 6809)
Held: The Court found that Murcia lied about solemnizing the
marriage; he only affixed his signature in the marriage license. Art 13 If previous marriages, birth certificate is not required:
Omelio solemnized the marriage without signing the marriage a. death certificate of deceased spouse; if no death
certificate. Even if he was only re-enacting the marriage, the certificate is available, affidavit about
sanctity of marriage should not be trifled with. Murcia and Mrs. circumstance and civil status
Omelio were also administratively liable for failing to collect the b. judicial decree of absolute divorce/judicial decree
solemnization fees. Both judges held administratively liable. of annulment/declaration of nullity
c. declaration of presumptive death
KEUPPERS V. MURCIA (2018) Art 14 If 18-21, then parental consent (voidable)
A couple wanted to get married in short notice, but was told of
its impossibility because of the posting requirements. Instead, Art 15 If 21-25, then parental advice (delay for 90 days)
they were married by Judge Murcia in the office of DLS Travel
and Tours Corporation in Davao City under falsified documents. Art 16 If anyone is required with parental consent or advice,
The couple filed an estafa complaint against the judge. both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure to
attach certificate of accomplishment suspends
Held: The Court held the respondent Judge guilty of grave issuance for 90 days.
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the • PD 965 (1976) - mandatory family planning and
service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her responsible parenthood; failure to receive
husband outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction. There was instructions delays the issuance of the marriage
no justification because none of the exceptions mentioned in license for two weeks to enable the Family
Article 8 are present in the marriage in question. The Court Planning Office to give the instructions.
forfeited all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves. • The controlling law on this matter is the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act (RA 10354), which provides that no
marriage license shall be issued unless the
applicants present a Certificate of Compliance.
Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board
Art 18 Impediments noted in the application for marriage

23
Art 19 Pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted Art 34 Ratification of cohabitation
1. Living together as husband and wife for more than
Art 20 Valid for 120 days anywhere in the Philippines, 5 years.
automatically cancelled at expiration 2. Must have no legal impediment to marry.
Art 21 Either/both are foreigners: certificate of legal capacity 3. No legal impediment at time of the marriage.
to marry from consular officials. Stateless persons or 4. Must execute an affidavit stating they have lived
refugees: affidavit showing capacity to marry. together for at least 5 years without impediment.
5. Solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
Art 22 Marriage certificate should state the following: statement ascertaining the qualifications.
a. full name, sex and age of each contracting party
b. citizenship, religion and habitual residence IMBONG V. OCHOA (2014)
c. date and time of the celebration of marriage Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RH Law,
d. marriage license number particularly Section 15 thereof, which requires the certificate of
e. secured parental consent if needed compliance with the family planning and marriage counseling
f. complied with parental advice if needed sessions before being issued a marriage license. According to
g. if entered into marriage settlement, attach copy the petitioners, this violates the free exercise of their religion.
Art 23 Duties of solemnizing officer Held: Provision does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
a. furnish couple with original marriage certificate religious freedom since the attendees retain the freedom to
b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
triplicate within 15 days after the marriage state. Attendees are still free to accept or reject whatever
c. keep with him the original marriage license, instructions are given to them, and hence there is no coercion.
quadruplicate of the marriage certificate and
affidavit of the contracting party to hold marriage SALGADO V. ANSON (2016)
elsewhere as said in Art 8 Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner spouses
seeking the annulment of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the
Art 24 Duties of local civil registrar Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased
a. prepare documents required by this Title who was allegedly his wife. The spouses assailed the validity of
b. administer oaths to all interested parties without the marriage of Anson for lack of marriage license.
any charge
c. exempt from documentary stamp tax Held: The marriage is considered ab initio. No marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and the marriage was
Art 25 Log in registry book every marriage and details not of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil
Code, which exempts parties from the license requirement if
Art 26 Marriages validly solemnized in other countries are
they were already married in civil rites and the ratifying
valid here except for the following:
ceremony is purely religious in nature.
• 35(1) - under 18
• 35(4) - bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41
VITANCOL V. PEOPLE (2016)
• 35(5) - mistake of identity
Wife filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against petitioner with
• 35(6) - void under Art 53
the first marriage contract as proof. The petitioner claimed that
• 36 - psychological incapacity
the first marriage does not exist and presented a certification
• 37 – incestuous
from the Civil Registrar that no record can be found of the
• 38 - public policy
license issued for the first marriage.
MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER
Held: The certification does not prove the nullity of the first
The following are exempted from obtaining marriage license.
marriage. The marriage contract, which indicated the marriage
Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo mortis, license number and bore the signatures of the parties married
even if the ailing survives. and the solemnizing officer, is enough positive evidence to
prove that the petitioner has a previous subsisting marriage.
Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a remote location
and transportation is impossible (horse ride and
ZABLOCKI V. REDHAIL (1978)
distant walking does not count).
Appellee filed a complaint assailing the constitutionality of
Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or Wisconsin Statue 245 which prohibits the issuance of marriage
crews by ship captain or airplane chief, whether in sea, licenses to persons who are behind in their child support.
in flight or stopovers.
Held: The Court subjected the statute to a strict scrutiny and
Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo mortis,
found that despite the legitimate and substantial interests of the
between civilians or members of armed forces within
State, such as the counseling of applicants and protection of
the zone of military operations.
out-of-custody children, the means employed by the state for
Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as long as in achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to
accordance with their custom law. marry, therefore the statute was unconstitutional.

24
REPUBLIC V. CA AND CASTRO (1994) them that the marriage contract could not be issued in the
Respondent and her husband were married in a civil ceremony absence of a marriage license.
without the knowledge of her parents. She filed a judicial
declaration of nullity after discovering that they were married Held: The marriage was void. Bernabe was found liable for
without a marriage license. Castro offered in evidence a grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for
certification of due search and inability to find despite diligence. solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. The Court
ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 with a stern warning that
Held: The certification of “due search and inability to find” a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It
was sufficiently proved that the civil registrar’s office did not DE CASTRO V. ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (2008)
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. The failure Petitioner and respondent applied for a marriage license but it
of Castro to offer witnesses to corroborate her testimony is due had already expired. To avoid the license requirement, they
to the peculiar circumstances of her secret marriage. falsely executed an affidavit stating that they have been
cohabiting for at least five years. When respondent demanded
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS (2006) support, petitioner claimed that their marriage is void ab initio.
Petitioner and respondent were married and executed a
marriage contract. Sevilla filed a petition for annulment, Held: The Court held that the marriage is void and the falsity of
claiming that he was only forced to sign the marriage contract. the affidavit is not a mere defect in the formal requisites of
He alleged that neither of them ever applied for a marriage marriage. The parties were not exempt from the marriage
license and this was verified by the certification from the Local license requirement because they never cohabited at all, and
Civil Registrar to the effect that no such license was issued. the lack thereof renders their marriage void ab initio.
Held: The Court held that the certifications did not categorically BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ (2001)
say that no such license was issued, only that the person who Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant judge for
was originally in charge of handling the registry book had solemnizing a bigamous mirage of her husband since both
already retired and thus the book could not be located. contracting parties of the subsequent marriage were only
Presuming the regularity of performance, the Court resolved the separated from their previous spouses. The judge claimed that
case in favor of the validity of the marriage. when he officiated the marriage, he did know that the husband
was legally married—what he knew was that he had been
ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA (2007) cohabiting with the woman for seven years already.
Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage alleging that he
and respondent only paid a “fixer” to arrange a marriage for Held: For cohabitation to be ratified, the man and the woman
them, as they had not then secured a marriage license prior. He must have been living together for at least five years without
alleged that the marriage license in their contract was actually legal impediment to marry each other. However, such is not the
a sham and filled with numerous irregularities. case here because both parties were merely separated from
their previous spouses, and a legal separation does not dissolve
Held: The Court held that the couple was indeed issued a the marriage, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
license, albeit one from Cavite where neither of them resides.
This is a mere irregularity which does not affect the validity of
the marriage, but only subjects the parties responsible to civil, CEREMONY
criminal, and administrative liability. Art 3 Marriage ceremony takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
SEGUISABAL V. CABRERA (1981) officer and their personal declaration that they take
Respondent judge solemnized a marriage without a marriage each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
license because he presumed that the papers were in order less than two witnesses.
since the parents of the parties were present and the woman
was already pregnant. Art 6 No prescribed form or religious rite for the ceremony,
aside from the personal appearance of the parties.
Held: The marriage was void because under the old Civil Code Declaration shall be contained in the marriage
a marriage license was required at the time of the solemnization certificate. If articulo mortis, sufficient for one of the
unless the marriage was of an exceptional character. He also witnesses to write the name of the said party.
failed to send to the Local Civil Registrar a copy of the duly
signed marriage contract within 15 days from the date of the Art 8 Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
solemnization of the marriage. For gross neglect of duty, of the judge or in open court, church, chapel or temple,
Cabrera was fined a sum equivalent to three months of salary. or in the office of the consul-general, consul, and vice-
consul, except if the marriage is in articulo mortis or in
MORENO V. BERNABE (1995) remote places, or if both parties request in writing a
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent judge who different venue in a sworn statement.
solemnized the marriage without a license upon the promise of
the couple that a license was forthcoming. Judge later informed Art 28 Residence of either party is so located that there is no
means of transportation.

25
Art 29 Solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed MUSLIM FILIPINOS
before the local civil registrar that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis, or that the residence of CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS
either party is so located that there is no means of Article 16. Capacity to contract marriage.
transportation. (1) Any Muslim male at least 15 years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and
Art 22 Content of marriage certificate not suffering from any impediment under the
1. Full name and sex of each contracting party provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A
2. Citizenship, religion, habitual residence female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
3. Date and time of marriage reaching the age of 15.
4. Proper marriage license has been issued (2) However, the Shari’a District Court may, upon petition
5. Parental consent and parental advice of a proper wali, order the solemnization of the
6. Marriage settlement marriage of a female who though less than 15 but not
below 12 years of age, has attained puberty.
Art 23 Duty of solemnizing officer → furnish the contracting
(3) Marriage through a wali by a minor below the
parties the original of the marriage certificate and send
prescribed ages shall be regarded as betrothal and
copies not later than 15 days to the local civil registrar.
may be annulled upon the petition of either party within
Art 24 Duty of local civil registrar → prepare the documents four years after attaining the age of puberty, provided
required by the law and to administer oaths to all no voluntary cohabitation has taken place and the wali
interested parties. who contracted the marriage was other than the father
or paternal grandfather.
NAVARRO V. DOMAGTOY (1996)
Article 17. Marriage ceremony. No particular form of marriage
Under Article 8, a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s
ceremony is required but the ijab and the gabul in marriage shall
chambers or courtrooms only in the following instances: (1)
be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing
where at least one of the parties is at the point of death, (2) in
the marriage and two competent witnesses. This declaration
remote places where there is no means of transportation, or (3)
shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked
upon the request of both parties in a sworn statement. It is only
by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by
a directory provision referring to the venue of marriage and does
the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given
not alter the authority of the solemnizing officer.
to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit
Held: While in this case the marriage could not be considered Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
an exception under Article 8, the marriage is still valid because
Article 18. Authority to solemnize marriage.
it is only an irregularity in a formal requisite.
(a) By the proper wali of the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon authority of the proper wali, by any person who
MADRIDEJO V. DE LEON (1930) is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage;
Defendants assailed the validity of the marriage between a (c) By the judge of the Shari'a District Court of Shari'a
couple, conducted in articulo mortis, because the parish priest Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge,
who married the couple failed to send a copy of the marriage should the proper wali refuse without justifiable
certificate to the municipal secretary. reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Held: The failure to transmit the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo • The Code of Muslim Personal Laws applies to marriage
mortis, because there is no evidence pointing to the lack of and divorce where:
essential requisites in the ceremony required by the law for the o both parties are Muslims
validity of marriage, and the forwarding of a copy of the o if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
marriage certificate is not one of the said essential requisites. performed in accordance with the Muslim Law in
any part of the Philippines.
MARTINEZ V. TAN (1909) • If the marriage is between a Muslim and a non-Muslim
Plaintiff and defendant signed a document containing a petition that is not solemnized in accordance with Muslim law,
directed to the Justice of the Peace stating that they have the Family Code will be applicable.
mutually agreed to marry. The Justice then announced that the
• One notable difference between the Muslim Code and
two were already married. The couple never cohabited and the
the Family Code is with regard to the essential
plaintiff filed a complaint assailing the validity of the marriage.
requisites of marriage. Article 15 also requires:
Held: The marriage is valid. There is no specific form of o Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed
ceremony so long as the declaration of two parties’ intent to by at least two competent persons after that
marry is made in the presence of a duly authorized solemnizing proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his
officer and two witnesses, which are present in this case. consent; and
Although the parties never lived together, they were considered o Stipulation of customary dower (mahl) duly
as legally married by virtue of the marriage certificates which witnessed by two competent persons.
both of them signed.

26
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
1987 CONSTITUTION Article 220, NCC. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
Section 22, Article II. The State recognizes and promotes the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
of national unity and development. marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
Section 17, Article XIV. The State shall recognize, respect, and children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to family in case of unlawful aggression.
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions.
It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans Section 3 (aa), Rule 131. Disputable presumptions. The
and policies. following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (aa) That
RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. The State shall have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural
• Article 220 → in case of doubt, solidarity of the family
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder
and validity of the marriage must be presumed.
enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
• Section 3, Rule 131 → unless there is evidence to the
(c) The state shall recognize, respect, and protect the contrary, it is to be presumed that a man and a woman
rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cohabiting as husband and wife have entered into a
cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider lawful marriage.
these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies. PEOPLE V. BORROMEO (1984)
Defendant was found guilty of parricide for killing his wife and
Section 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, Traditions, and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His lawyer claimed that
Institutions. The State shall respect, recognize, and protect the the trial court erred in its judgment in that Borromeo should only
right of ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their culture, be held liable for homicide because he was never legally
traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the married to the deceased.
formulation and application of national plans and policies.
Held: The defendant is guilty of parricide. Borromeo himself
Section 32. Community Intellectual Rights. ICCs/IPs have the admitted that the deceased was his legitimate wife. Judgment
right to practice and revitalize their own cultural traditions and was affirmed based on the presumption of marriage, that
customs. The State shall preserve, protect and develop the persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
past, present, and future manifestations of their cultures as well the absence of any contrary evidence, to be in fact married.
as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious,
and spiritual property taken without their free and prior informed TRINIDAD V. CA (1998)
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions, and customs. Arturo Trinidad filed an action for partition of land as the
compulsory heir of Inocente. Inocente's siblings contend that
• The 1987 Constitution pledges to recognize, promote, he died single. Arturo has to prove that his mother and Inocente
and protect the rights of indigenous cultural were married and that he was born from said marriage.
communities. In line with this national policy, the
Congress enacted RA 8371, which aims to promote the Held: Plaintiff proved the marriage of his parents by presenting
rights of indigenous cultural communities. a witness to the marriage ceremony. The Court stated that
o As part of promoting their cultural traditions, the marriage may be proven by relevant evidence such as
State shall develop and protect manifestations of testimony of a witness to the matrimony and the birth and
their culture that may include customs related to baptismal certificates of children born during such union. There
marriage. is a prima facie presumption that a man and woman living
maritally under same roof are legally married.
• This policy of the State to protect indigenous culture is
reflected in the Family Code. Specifically, Article 33 of
VDA. DE JACOB V. CA (1999)
the Family Code does away with the license
Petitioner claimed to be the surviving spouse of the deceased
requirement for marriages among members of the
and was appointed Special Administratrix for his various
indigenous communities provided that said marriage is
estates by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract.
performed in accordance with their customs.
Defendant, who claimed to be the legally-adopted son of the
• Respect for customary laws is stressed in the Magna deceased, questioned the validity of the marriage for want of
Carta of Women with the caveat that they do not marriage license. The trial court declared the reconstructed
discriminate against women (Section 19). Marriage Contract as spurious due to a number of irregularities,
such as the use of thumbmark by Alfredo and that there was no
record in the books of the church where it was allegedly
solemnized.

27
Held: The marriage was valid since the contracting parties have VO I D M AR RI A GE S
been living together as husband and wife for more than five
years before the solemnization of the marriage so that they were GROUNDS UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
exempt from the marriage license requirement under Article 76
Art 4 Absence of essential and formal requisites = void ab
of the Civil Code.
initio; defect in essential requisites = voidable;
The Court explained that although the primary evidence of a irregularity in formal requisites = valid marriage, but
marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract, imposes liability.
secondary evidence proving the same is admissible provided
Art 35 Marriages that are void ab initio
that (1) due execution of the document and (2) subsequent loss
of the original instrument are first proven. Due execution was Essential –
established by the testimonies of a witness to the wedding and 1. One is below 18 years old
Legal capacity
of the petitioner herself, while subsequent loss was shown by
the affidavit of the solemnizing officer. The petitioner then 2. Solemnized by a person not
Formal –
adduced secondary evidence such as photographs of the authorized, except when either or
solemnizing
both spouses believe in good faith
wedding and the statement of the officer that the marriage officer
that he has the power to do so
certificate was lost to prove the fact of the marriage.
Formal –
3. Solemnized without a marriage
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS (2006) marriage
license
Petitioner and respondent were married and executed a license
marriage contract. Sevilla filed a petition for annulment,
Essential –
claiming that he was only forced to sign the marriage contract. 4. Bigamous or polygamous except
legal capacity
He alleged that neither of them ever applied for a marriage under Article 41
and impediment
license and this was verified by the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar to the effect that no such license was issued. Essential –
5. Mistake of identity
consent
Held: Certifications did not categorically say that no such
6. Subsequent marriages void under
license was issued, only that the person who was in charge of Article 53
handling the registry book had already retired and thus the book
could not be located. In the absence of sufficient evidence
against the contrary, the marriage is presumed to be valid. • The grounds for void marriage demonstrate both the
absence of essential (1st and 4th, 5th) and formal (2nd
ABBAS V. ABBAS (2013) and 3rd) requisites.
Petitioner filed a declaration of nullity of his 10-year marriage • An exception to Art. 4 is provided in Art 35(2), to those
with respondent for want of marriage license. He claimed that persons in good faith who, out of deference to the priest
he did not apply for a marriage license, and the Civil Registrar or judge, do not question the authority of the latter to
certified that no such license was issued to the couple, and that solemnize marriages. Good faith means that a
the license was actually issued to another couple. reasonable inquiry has been conducted by the parties
Held: The marriage is void ab initio since the evidence and from which they would have acquired knowledge
presented by the respondent to show that a marriage was about the solemnizing officer.
conducted, such as the marriage contract, photos of the o Distinguished from a situation where the parties
wedding and testimonies from the witnesses, does not operate believed that a governor is authorized to celebrate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. a marriage. Art. 35(2) only covers mistakes of fact,
not mistakes of law.
However, the parties were also married in Taiwan prior to their • Another ground that will result in a void marriage is
marriage in the Philippines. Respondent should have proved mistake as to identity of the other party. A question of
the validity of their marriage in Taiwan, because a marriage valid identity is not relevant in case of romantic marriages that
where it was celebrated is valid everywhere according to Article proceed from courtship. It may only arise in cases where
26 of the Family Code. This would have been more consistent the marriage is entered through family arrangements or
with the presumption in favor of marriage. between pen pals.
o Since the emergence of the Internet, there are
more instances of people marrying individuals
other than those they fell in love with virtually.
o Tolentino also gave an example of a person who,
unbeknownst to the groom, substituted her
identical twin during the wedding (mistake as to
the person)
o This principle will not apply where the mistake is
in the qualities or attributes of the person married.

28
Hence, where a person exaggerates his standing INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES AND MARRIAGES VIOLATING
in society, his academic and professional PUBLIC POLICY
achievements, assumes a fake name or pretends
he is good when he is actually an embezzler, the Art 37 Incestuous marriages and therefore void ab initio:
marriage is not void ab initio. These situations will (1) between ascendants and descendants, any
not even constitute fraud to make the marriage degree
voidable under Articles 45 and 46. (2) between brothers and sisters, full or half blood.
• A person who enters a bigamous marriage has no legal
• Incest is the sexual relations between persons so closely
capacity. Article 41 states that a marriage contracted
related that they are forbidden by law to marry. There is
during the existence of a previous one shall be null and
universal recognition that marriage between parents and
void. The RPC is also applicable in determining whether
children is forbidden because the reverential relation
a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage without
between them is incompatible with the equality in marital
a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage,
relations.
is guilty of bigamy.
o Promote natural feeling of respect.
• Subsequent marriages that did not comply with the o Inbreeding creates a gene pool for hereditary
requirements of Art 52 and 53 are likewise void. This is disorders.
the only ground listed under Art 35 where all requisites • Under the Family Code, an incestuous marriage is
are present, yet the marriage is void. between ascendants and descendants and brothers and
o Article 52 – register the judgment terminating the sisters, whether full or half-blood.
previous marriage, partition and distribution of the o Civil Code used to include marriages between
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the collateral blood relatives within the 4th civil degree.
children’s presumptive legitimes.
Art 38 Marriages void ab initio for reasons of public policy
Art 41 Marriage contracted during the subsistence of a (1) Marriages within the 4th degree of consanguinity
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless the (2) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive (3) Those involving adoption (adopting parents &
years and there is a well-founded belief that the adopted child, surviving spouse of the adopting
spouse is already dead. If there is danger of death, two parent & adopted child, surviving spouse of the
years shall be sufficient. The present spouse must adopted child & adopter, adopted child &
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of legitimate child of adopter, adopted children of
presumptive death of the absent spouse. same adopter)
(4) Between parties where one killed one’s own or the
Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
other party’s spouse.
bad faith the marriage shall be void ab initio; all
donations and testamentary dispositions are revoked
• Though no longer considered incestuous, marriages
by operation of law.
within the 4th degree of consanguinity have remained
Art 390 After an absence of 7 years, person shall be presumed void for violating public policy because of the
dead for all purposes except succession; for scientifically-proven negative effects of such
succession, absence of 10 years; if person is more marriages on the health of the offspring. The marriage
than 75, absence of 5 years shall be sufficient. between collateral relatives also has implications on their
civil rights.
Art 391 Presumed dead for all purposes (all absent for 4 years) • The Family Code has also proscribed the marriage
(1) Person on a lost vessel or airplane between parents-in-law and children-in-law for
(2) Missing person who has taken part in war reasons of public policy. Marriages between in-laws are
(3) Person who is absent with danger of death void because they are seen as scandalous. Likewise, if
there were grandchildren, there would be confusion
ANTONE V. BERONILLA (2010) about the relationship between the parties.
Wife filed a complaint for bigamy against husband after the
• The Family Code now permits marriages between
latter contracted a marriage with another woman while their
stepbrothers and stepsisters, because the Committee
marriage had not yet been legally dissolved. The bigamy case
saw no valid reason for prohibiting such marriages as
was quashed since the husband obtained a judicial declaration
there is no common parent.
of nullity of marriage two months before the information was
filed, and thus a crime of bigamy could not be established. • Adoption also provides a barrier to marriage since a
filial relationship is created by legal fiction. Hence,
Held: According to Article 40, a judicial declaration of nullity of marriages between members of the adopting family and
a prior marriage was needed in order for a subsequent marriage the adopted children, as well as between two adopted
to be considered valid. Hence, a judicial declaration of nullity of children, are void ab initio for being contrary to public
the first marriage obtained after the second marriage had policy.
already been celebrated is immaterial in a bigamy case because o The only relationship in adoption is parent-child.
by that time the crime had already been committed.

29
• Lastly, marriages between parties where one killed REPUBLIC V. ROMERO (2016)
one’s own or the other party’s spouse in order to Reghis and Olivia Romero were married and have two children.
marry are void because of the complete moral Their relationship was estranged when the husband became so
perversion of the parties. engrossed in his career that he spent very little time with his
own family. He was diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive
MATTER OF BAUTISTA: IN VISA PETITION PROCEEDINGS Personality Disorder and filed a petition for declaration of nullity
Petitioner appealed from the decision of the Immigration Officer of marriage on the ground of his own psychologically incapacity
denying the visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary as his to comply with essential marital obligations.
wife, on the ground that the petitioner and his wife were cousins
and therefore the marriage between them is null and void under Held: The requisites of psychological incapacity, namely
Article 81 of the Civil Code, the law in force at that time. gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability, are not present.
Reghis was able to comply with his marital obligations as he
Held: The records showed that the wife was actually the and Olivia lived together for fourteen years and have two
daughter of petitioner’s cousin and as such, she was a fifth children. There was also no juridical antecedence as there were
degree relative. Because their degree of affinity was beyond the no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that
degree proscribed by law, their marriage was declared valid manifested OCPD. The medical report also failed to establish
pursuant to Philippine law, and the visa petition was approved. the incurability of his condition.
REPUBLIC V. DAGDAG (2001)

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag were married with two
children. The husband would go away for months on end and
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party, who, at the time
would come back to abuse wife. When he finally left for good,
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
the wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization (amended by EO 227). Held: The marriage was incorrectly declared null and void
because the respondent failed to provide appropriate evidence
• Article 36 provides that a marriage contracted by any supporting her husband’s psychological incapacity. The
party who is psychologically incapacitated at the time of respondent failed to comply with the second requirement set
its celebration is void. by Molina, which provides that the root cause of the incapacity
• According to Justice Sempio-Dy, the Family Code must be psychological in nature and must be (1) medically or
adopted the Canon Law concept of void marriage to a clinically identified, (2) alleged in the complaint, (3) sufficiently
certain extent. It was made to apply in civil law for three proven by experts, and (4) clearly explained in the decision.
reasons:
1. As a substitute for divorce PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY VS. INSANITY
2. As a solution to the problem of church-annulled Insanity is a vice of consent and is merely a ground for
marriages annulment, while psychological incapacity renders the
3. As an additional remedy for problematic marriage void.
marriages that do not fall under the void and • It is not concerned with consent per se but with the
voidable marriage provisions of the Family Code. inability to comply with essential obligations of the
marriage that one is giving consent to.
• No specific cases of psychological incapacity were
• Marriages entered into by the insane may be ratified by
given in Article 36 to uphold the principle of ejusdem
the same spouse upon coming to reason, in contrast to
generis and to enable courts to decide on a case-to-case
psychological incapacity which must be incurable and
basis.
thus cannot be ratified.
o However, examples of psychological incapacity
can be derived from the Canon Law, such as CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
homosexuality, satyriasis and nymphomania, In Santos v. Bedia-Santos, the Court explained the three
epilepsy with permanent recurring maladaptive characteristics of psychological incapacity:
manifestations, extremely low intelligence,
habitual alcoholism, and criminality (Dr. Veloso, 1. Gravity – the party’s inability, not just refusal, to comply
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic with the basic duties of marriage.
Archdiocese of Manila). 2. Juridical antecedence – the incapacity is deeply
• Psychological incapacity is a ground for nullity of ingrained, typically since adolescence, and is present at
marriage, not annulment. the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if it
• Psychological incapacity refers to personality manifested only after the solemnization.
disorders, which are disorders defined by problems with 3. Incurability – need not be absolutely medically
forming a stably positive sense of self and with untreatable; if treatment is inaccessible or beyond the
sustaining close and constructive relationship, and these financial means of the spouses, it will be considered
problems are sustained for years. incurable for the purposes of Article 36.

30
SANTOS V. BEDIA-SANTOS (1995) MARCOS V. MARCOS (2000)
Leouel and Julia were married with one child. Julia went to the Wilson and Brenda were married with five children. Wilson left
USA to work as a nurse despite the objections of her husband. his job and entered into a series of failed business ventures. He
Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the refused to work, started abusing his wife and mistreated his
first time and told him that she will be returning after the own children. He left his family without support. Brenda filed a
expiration of her contract, but she never did. Leouel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
petition to have his marriage declared as void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36. Held: There is no showing that Wilson’s defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage. His defects were also
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by curable, since he was employed as a taxi driver. An examination
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The phrase is not from a physician is not required to declare a person
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses but only psychologically incapacitated if the totality of evidence is
the most serious cases of personality disorders which clearly enough to establish his condition. But an expert witness would
demonstrate an utter inability to give meaning and significance still be valuable in proving psychological incapacity.
to the marriage. Since Julia did not show any sort of
psychological incapacity, the marriage is deemed subsisting. ANTONIO V. REYES (2006)
Petitioner married respondent a year after meeting each other.
REPUBLIC V. CA AND MOLINA (1997) Antonio filed a petition to have their marriage declared void,
Roridel and Reynaldo were married with one child. Roridel filed alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the comply with the essential obligations of marriage because of
ground of Reynaldo's psychological incapacity to comply with her habitual lying (e.g., concealed her illegitimate son,
essential marital obligations because he was highly immature misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist, claimed to be a free-
who thought of himself as a king to be served. lance singer for a recording company).
Held: Psychological incapacity only refers to the most serious Held: The marriage is void ab initio because sufficient evidence
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an was presented to show the psychological incapacity of the wife.
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
marriage. Evidence adduced by Roridel only showed that she medically identified and was found to have existed even before
and her husband could not get along with each other. Mere the marriage. The respondent’s habitual lying also disables her
showing of incompatible and conflicting personalities do not to assume the essential obligations of marriage based on love,
constitute psychological incapacity. Marriage is subsisting. trust, and respect. The Court also recognized that the marriage
was already annulled by the Catholic Church.
The Court established eight guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: REPUBLIC V. MELGAR (2006)
1. Burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to investigation Norma and Eulogio Melgar were married with five children.
for collusion. Norma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
2. Root cause must be psychological in nature and: marriage on the ground of Eulogio's psychological incapacity to
a. medically/clinically identified comply with his essential marital obligations because of his
b. alleged in the complaint habitual alcoholism, jealousy, laziness, maltreatment, and
c. sufficiently proven by the experts, and abandonment of the family for more than ten years.
d. explained clearly in the decision
3. Incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of Held: Marriage is valid. The totality of evidence presented by
marriage; not necessarily perceivable during the the wife was insufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
celebration, but must have attached by then. While a personal psychological examination is not a sine qua
4. Incurable non condition to prove psychological incapacity, an expert
5. Grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill witness would have strengthened Norma's claim, and her
marital obligation. failure to present such turned out fatal to her position.
6. Cannot perform Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225
a. 68-71 (spousal obligations) DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. CA (2008)
- Live together, observe mutual love, respect Petitioner filed a petition of declaration of nullity of her marriage
and fidelity, render mutual help based on the psychological incapacity of her respondent
- Fix the family domicile. husband. She claimed that during their honeymoon, her
- Jointly responsible for family support husband allowed their 15-year old companion to sleep in their
- Management of the household. room. He also prioritized his parents over the needs of his own
b. 220 – rights and duties of parents with respect to family and even tried to convert her to his religion. He is also
their unemancipated children effeminate but a womanizer at the same time.
c. 221 – civil liability of parents
d. 225 – legal guardianship over property Held: Sexual infidelity, homosexuality, forcing partner to change
7. Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal religion, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but
of Catholic Church should be observed. not for the nullity of a marriage. Petitioner failed to identify the
8. State must participate through the fiscal or OSG root cause and ascertain the incurability of his psychological

31
incapacity. While not required, an expert witness would have • Husband's failure to comply with the alleged obligation
strengthened her claim over the respondent's incapacity. was considered a psychological incapacity but had Tsoi
been impotent, his marriage would only be voidable.
TE V. TE (2009)
Respondent Rowena forced petitioner Edward to elope with CHOA V. CHOA (2002)
her. After threatening to commit suicide, petitioner was forced Alfonso Choa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
to marry respondent. Edward was held captive in the house, but based on his wife's psychological incapacity. The husband
was able to escape. He filed a petition of declaration of nullity alleged that his wife's lack of procreative sexuality was
of their marriage on the ground of her psychological incapacity. indicative of her psychological incapacity.
Held: The marriage is void ab initio. The Court considered the Held: The marriage is valid. The evidence adduced by husband
expert’s opinion as evidence and found both parties to be merely showed that he and his wife could not get along. There
afflicted with severe and incurable psychological incapacity— was absolutely no showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence,
Edward had dependent personality disorder, while Rowena had or incurability of their marital problems. In fact, the couple
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. In an obiter, the already have two children, which proved that the alleged
Court avers that the Molina doctrine has become a straitjacket, absence of procreative sexuality was not present at the time of
forcing every case to be bound by its rules. the celebration of the marriage.
TING V. VELEZ-TING (2009) CASTILLO V. REPUBLIC (2017)

After more than 18 years of marriage, Carmen filed a petition for Mirasol and Felipe Castillo were married with two children.
declaration of nullity of her marriage from Benjamin on the Mirasol filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of her
ground of his psychological incapacity. She alleged that he is marriage, alleging that their marriage was interrupted by
an alcoholic and compulsive gambler, with violent tendencies Felipe’s philandering, cohabitation with another woman, and
when intoxicated, and does not want to support their family. failure to support their children, which she attributes to severe
psychological disorder.
Held: The marriage is valid. Respondent failed to prove that
petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration Held: The marriage is valid. The totality of evidence presented
of their marriage or incurable. Greater weight was given to by petitioner failed to establish Felipe’s psychological
husband's defense, as he was actually examined by a incapacity. Mirasol and the psychologist’s testimonies and
psychologist while the wife's allegations were based only on indirect evaluation of Felipe were insufficient to establish his
transcripts. The Court clarifies that it is not abandoning the incapacity. The Court stressed that irreconcilable differences,
Molina doctrine, merely relaxing it because not all litigants may sexual infidelity, and perversion do not warrant a finding of
be able to afford to a psychological examination. The necessity psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
of psychiatric evaluation to be determined by Court in pre-trial.
TSOI V. CA (1997) PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE DEFENSE

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married but separated a Art 39 An action or defense for the declaration of
year after not consummating their marriage. She filed a petition absolute nullity of marriage shall not
for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of her prescribe.
husband’s psychological incapacity, alleging that her husband
is impotent and a closet homosexual. The husband defended RA 8533 Amends Article 39 of the Family Code. Before
that he has no defect and is physically and psychologically RA 8533, actions for the declaration of
capable. He admitted that they never had sex, but it was his absolute nullity of marriage for those
wife who avoided him. celebrated before the effectivity of the FC and
falling under Article 36 shall prescribe in ten
Held: Marriage is void ab initio. Chi Ming Tsoi’s abnormal years after the effectivity of the Code. Now,
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate the marriage there is absolute imprescriptibility for an
strongly indicates a serious personality disorder which prevents action or defense for the declaration of nullity
him from giving due meaning and significance to the marriage. of marriage.
The Court stated that one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children, and constant • The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
non-fulfillment of such will destroy the integrity of the marriage. nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
• Before, actions for the declaration of absolute nullity of
Notes on Tsoi v. CA
marriage for those celebrated before the effectivity of the
• No mention of procreation as a right or duty under the FC and falling under Article 36 shall prescribe in ten
Rights and Obligations between the Spouses in FC
years after the effectivity of the Code.
• The Court conflated the right and duty to live together o This was obviously anomalous given that a
with a duty to procreate → engaging in sexual relations marriage that is void from the beginning does not
is not the same as having children. gain validity as a result of delay in questioning it.

32
• An amendment was introduced on February 23, 1998, • Under the old Civil Code, there was no need for a
removing the prescriptive period of the action or defense judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. marriage in order to remarry.
NIÑAL V. BAYADOG (2000) PEOPLE V. MENDOZA (1954)

Pepito Niñal married Teodulfa Bellones and they had four Mendoza was charged with the crime of bigamy. He claimed
children (petitioners). After the death of Teodulfa, Pepito that his marriage to Lema was null and void for having been
married respondent without any marriage license; instead, they contracted while his first marriage was still existing, and his
executed an affidavit stating that they cohabited together for at third marriage with Panlilio was not bigamous because it took
least five years. When their father died, the children filed a place after the death of Jovita.
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma. Norma assailed the standing of the petitioners. Held: Marriage with Lema was void for bigamy because under
the law at that time, subsequent marriages contracted during
Held: The marriage between Pepito and Norma is void ab initio the lifetime of the first spouse are void ab initio, so when De
because of the absence of a marriage license, and their Asis died and he married Panlilio, it was a valid marriage
cohabitation had only been for 20 months with the legal because there was no longer any marriage subsisting.
impediment of a subsisting marriage. The Court also noted the
silence of the Code on who can file a petition to declare the TOLENTINO V. PARAS (1983)
nullity of a marriage and inferred that since the action or defense Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with Clemente
for nullity is imprescriptible, void marriages can be questioned while his marriage with Serafia was still in effect. He was
even after the death of either party. charged with bigamy but lived with Clemente afterwards. Upon
his death, Clemente was indicated as surviving spouse. Serafia
The Court provided a distinction between a void marriage and filed a petition for the correction of the death certificate.
a voidable one. They posited that a voidable marriage can only
be attacked in a direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime Held: Serafia is the lawful surviving spouse of Amado. His
of the parties, while a void marriage can be collaterally attacked conviction for bigamy proved the nullity of the marriage
even after the death of either party. A collateral attack means between him and Clemente, and no judicial decree is necessary
that for other purposes, such as heirship, legitimacy of children, to establish its invalidity. Because Clemente was not the
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a surviving spouse, the Court ordered the correction of the
criminal case, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage erroneous entry in the death certificate.
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same.
WIEGEL V. SEMPIO-DIY (1986)
ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC (2010) Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the Oliva on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Maxion.
marriage between his late brother Cresenciano and Leonila Oliva admitted the existing marriage, but claimed that the first
Honato for lack of marriage license. He insisted that as his marriage was void for being vitiated by force.
surviving brother he is entitled to one-half of the real properties
acquired by his brother before death. Held: Her first marriage is only voidable. Vitiation through force
only constitutes a voidable marriage and as such, a judicial
Held: According to the Court, Section 2, paragraph (a) of AM declaration of nullity is necessary to contract a subsequent
No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. Since no annulment has been made, it is clear that
void marriage may be filed only by the husband or wife. Such when she married Karl, she was still validly married to Eduardo,
limitation extends only to marriages covered by the Family consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.
Code and to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Because the marriage was contracted under the old Civil Code, TERRE V. TERRE (1992)
the limitation on who can file a petition for declaration of Dorothy charged Jordan with bigamy, but he argued that their
absolute nullity does not apply and the petitioner has standing. marriage was null and void since her first marriage with another
man is subsisting. Allegedly, he entered the second marriage
believing in good faith that his prior marriage with Dorothy was
FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID void and no judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be Held: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. marriage to Jordan is void for being bigamous. If his first
marriage to Dorothy is deemed valid then his second marriage
• This provision is intended to prevent any person from
to Vilma must be regarded as bigamous. Even for void
assuming that his or her marriage is void and from
marriages, a judicial declaration of nullity is still necessary.
marrying again based on that assumption.
o It is also a fitting occasion for the Court to rule on Note: Marriage took place before the Family Code became law
matters involving properties as well as the but Article 40 was applied retroactively.
custody and support of children.

33
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES (1995) Art 50 Effects in Art 43 (except 1) and Art 44 shall also apply
Brillantes married Ongkiko without marriage license before the to void and voidable marriages.
effectivity of Family Code. He then married de Castro in 1991,
saying that the first marriage was void and there was no need Art 51 The presumptive legitimes of all common children,
for a judicial declaration of nullity. computed as of the date of the final judgment, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities.
Held: Second marriage is void. He still had to secure declaration
of nullity because under Article 40, the time in which second Children or their guardian or the trustee of their
marriage was entered into is the operative fact that determines property may ask for its enforcement.
the need for a prior declaration of nullity for remarriage; in this Delivery of the presumptive legitimes shall not
case, the marriage was in 1991. Article 256 also says Article 40 prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the
applies retroactively as long as it does not impair vested rights. children upon the death of either or both parents; value
of the properties already received shall be considered
APIAG V. CANTERO (1997) as advances on their legitime.
Wife filed a case of bigamy against her husband after learning
that he had contracted a second marriage during the Art 52 Register in the appropriate registries, otherwise, shall
subsistence of theirs. not affect third persons:
1. Judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
Held: There is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage
marriage for the purpose of contracting second marriage 2. Partition and distribution of the properties of the
because both marriages took place before the promulgation of spouses
the Wiegel doctrine and the effectivity of the Family Code. 3. Delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes
Hence, Article 40 of the FC cannot be applied. shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY Art 53 Nonfulfillment of Art 52 shall render the subsequent
The law provides same effects in case of defective marriages, marriage null and void.
whether void or voidable, or subsequent marriages terminated Art 54 Children conceived or born before the judgment of
upon the reappearance of the spouse presumed dead. annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
PROPERTIES Article 36 has become final and executory shall be
considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of
Art 43 Termination of the subsequent marriage shall produce the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
the following effects: likewise be legitimate.
(1) Children of the subsequent marriage conceived or
born prior to its termination shall be considered DOMINGO V. CA (1993)
legitimate Delia Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
(2) Absolute community of property or the conjugal marriage to Roberto because of his previous subsisting
partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated; if marriage. Roberto claimed that a judicial declaration of nullity
either spouse contracted marriage in bad faith, his was superfluous since their marriage was void ab initio, but
or her share of the net profits shall be forfeited: Delia insisted on its necessity as a basis for the separation and
a. Common children distribution of the properties acquired during their coverture.
b. Children of guilty spouse by a previous
marriage Held: Delia’s prayer for separation of property will be one of the
c. Innocent spouse necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
(3) Donation propter nuptias shall remain valid except nullity of their marriage. There was no further need to file an
if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, ordinary civil action for separation of properties.
then the same shall be revoked;
Obiter: A final judgment declaring a previous marriage void is
(4) Innocent spouse may revoke the designation of important because the nullification of a marriage cannot be
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of one or
beneficiary in any insurance policy; both parties.
(5) Spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
innocent spouse by testate and intestate.
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
revoked by operation of law. ownership.

34
Article 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the VO I D A B L E MA RRI AG ES
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in Art 45 Grounds for annulment that must exist at the time of
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of the marriage
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and (1) One of the parties is 18-21 years old, without the
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and consent of the parents, UNLESS the party freely
evidences of credit. cohabited with the other upon reaching 21.
(2) Either party is of unsound mind, UNLESS such
NICDAO-CARIÑO V. YEE- CARIÑO (2001) party freely cohabited with the other upon coming
Santiago married two Susans: first with Nicdao and second with to reason.
Yee. Upon his death, both spouses claimed death benefits. Yee (3) Consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
tried to get more benefits from Nicdao as legal wife despite UNLESS such party freely cohabited with the
Santiago’s then subsisting marriage to Nicdao. She alleged that other after gaining full knowledge of the fraud.
his first marriage is void ab initio for want of marriage license. (4) Consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation, or undue influence, UNLESS the
Held: Nicdao’s marriage is void for lack of marriage license, but same having disappeared or ceased, such party
so is Yee’s because Santiago did not obtain a judicial thereafter freely cohabited with the other.
declaration of nullity before getting married. Because both (5) Either party is impotent or physically incapable of
marriages are void, property regime is co-ownership for live-in consummating the marriage, and such incapacity
partners. Specifically, Nicdao is under Article 147, while Yee is is incurable.
under Article 148. Since Yee did not contribute anything to the (6) Either party is afflicted with a serious and
properties, she did not get anything. Meanwhile, Nicdao got ½ incurable sexually-transmitted disease (STD).
of the death benefits, while ½ went to Santiago’s legal heirs.
Grounds for annulment in CC were expanded to include:
1) Affliction with serious and incurable STDs
STATUS OF CHILDREN 2) Other manifestations of fraud (concealing STD or drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, and homosexuality)
Article 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of
annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 Instead of state recognition for church annulments, the
has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Committee opted to liberalize the grounds for annulment of
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under marriage. If there were such provisions, there would be issues
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. arising from the separation of church and state. There would
also be excessive entanglement.
Article 43. Children conceived prior to the termination of the
subsequent marriage that was entered by the spouse present
LEMON V. KURTZMAN (1971)
after the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
Establishment doctrine:
shall be considered legitimate.
1. Have a secular legislative purpose
• The general rule is that children are illegitimate 2. Not advance or inhibit religion
though conceived or born prior to the judgment declaring 3. Not excessively entangle church and state.
the absolute nullity of a marriage under
o Article 35 - void ab initio LACK OF PARENTAL CONSENT
o Article 37 - incestuous marriages
o Article 38 - against public policy Article 45(1) provides the first ground for a voidable marriage,
• The exception are those children conceived or born which is the solemnization of a marriage of a party between 18-
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage 21 years of age without the consent of their parents.
under Article 36 has become final and executory, and
those conceived or born of the subsequent marriage Article 14 specifies that the contracting parties need to exhibit
under Article 53. the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving
• The status of legitimacy is given only to children: parents or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in
1. C/B before the judgment of annulment. the order mentioned. This means that even if the mother
2. C/B before the judgment of absolute nullity of consents to marriage of her daughter, but if the father does not,
marriage under Article 36 (psychological the marriage is voidable. This bias in law in favor of the father’s
incapacity) decision violates the constitutional mandate of equality before
3. C/B of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 the law of women and men, as well as the Magna Carta
(failure to register Article 52) provisions on equal rights for women and men in all matters
4. C/B prior to the termination of the subsequent involving marriage and family life. There is no legal basis for
marriage under Article 42 (when the absent this hierarchy.
spouse files an affidavit of appearance)

35
Only the spouse who did not obtain parental consent can KATIPUNAN V. TENORIO (1937)
ratify the marriage by freely cohabiting with the other spouse Husband filed an annulment against his wife, alleging that the
upon reaching the age of 21. latter was not of sound mind when he married her.
Parental consent is required to avoid hasty and ill-advised Held: Marriage is still valid. There was no ample showing that
marriages. Rita was mentally unsound when the marriage was celebrated.
The spouses cohabited continuously for about seven years and
have four children. Petitioner also admitted that Rita had lucid
MOE V. DINKINS (1981) intervals. The insanity of one spouse which occurred after the
15-year-old girl wanted to marry her 18-year-old boyfriend but celebration of the marriage cannot be a ground for nullity.
could not because a New York law required parental consent
for minors to marry. The girl’s mother refused to give her SUNTAY V. COJUANGO-SUNTAY (1998)
consent because she would lose welfare benefits. Husband and wife’s marriage was declared void on the ground
of husband’s schizophrenia. Later on, their daughter wanted to
Held: The law is constitutional. Even though mother had wrong
inherit the estate of her grandmother, but her grandfather
reasons in this case, there are legitimate state interests in
opposed and claimed that she is an illegitimate child and
requiring the consent of parents before entering into a marriage,
cannot be a successor.
such as (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner, Held: The marriage between Emilio and Isabel was only
and (3) the importance of parental role in child-rearing. voidable, pursuant to Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides
that a marriage may be annulled on the ground of insanity.
Levels of review: Therefore, since the daughter was conceived and born prior to
1. Rational basis – law has to be at least relevant the decree of annulment of the court, she is considered
2. Intermediate scrutiny – important interest legitimate and may invoke her successional rights.
3. Strict scrutiny – compelling interest
The State has interest in preserving marriage by preventing CONSENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD
immature persons from entering it. Instead of using maturity
Article 45(3) provides the third ground for a voidable marriage,
as the test or qualifier for marriage, it used age as a proxy.
wherein consent to the marriage was obtained through fraud.
Psychological testing would be expensive, time-consuming,
The party who was the victim of the fraud may, however, ratify
and inconvenient which could discourage people from getting
the detect in the marriage by voluntarily cohabiting with the
married. There are also credible studies establishing that as a
party after knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud.
rule, a person becomes mature as he or she ages.
Article 46 specifies the circumstances of fraud that are
What about those who are 18 to 21?
sufficient as ground for annulment:
They are no longer under parental authority as they are already
of majority age and considered emancipated. We cannot (1) Concealment of a crime involving moral turpitude
presume them to be incapable of making critical decisions. (2) Concealment of pregnancy by another man
Parental consent should be changed to parental advice, or (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease
remove the right of the parents to annul the marriage. (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
and homosexuality or lesbianism
INSANITY It also provides that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute
Article 45(2) provides the second ground for a voidable
as fraud or a ground for annulment.
marriage, which is a marriage entered into by an insane party or
a person of unsound mind.
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
For Senator Tolentino, the test of insanity as a ground to annul A crime involves moral turpitude when it pertains to an act of
the marriage is "whether the party at the time of marriage was “baseness, vileness, depravity in the private and social duties
capable of understanding the nature and consequences of which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general,
marriage itself." For Justice Sempio-Diy, even if the party is contrary to the accepted and customary rules of right and duty
mentally weak, so long as he or she still understands the between man and man.”
consequences of his or her action, then the marriage is valid.
The conviction referred to in Article 46, to constitute fraud, must
Intoxication amounting to lack of mental capacity and have been prior to the time of the celebration of the marriage. A
somnambulism are considered unsoundness of mind, as there conviction that takes place ten years after the marriage but was
was no knowledge of what he or she was giving consent to. successfully concealed from the other spouse is not a ground
for annulment.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who
has not previously been declared incapable. Such capacity
continues as long as there is no evidence to the contrary. The
one alleging insanity has the burden of proving it.

36
TEVES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (2009) Note: In short, the Court was saying that the fact of pregnancy
In the concurring opinion of Justice Brion, he criticized the could have been successfully concealed by the wife from the
definition as one that assumes the existence of a universally husband if she were only four months pregnant but not if she
recognized code for socially acceptable behavior but does not were already in her 7th month of pregnancy.
state what these duties are or provide examples of acts which
violate them. He then gave a list of crimes that could be
SEXUALLY TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASE
classified as crimes involving moral turpitude, such as:
The STD that was concealed from the other spouse need not
(1) Forgery
be serious and incurable. When the ground for annulment falls
(2) Smuggling
under Article 46(3) vis-à-vis Article 45(3), the healthy spouse
(3) Rape
through cohabitation can still ratify the marriage because the
(4) Attempted bribery and bribery
defect is in the fact of the concealment and not the gravity of
(5) Robbery
the disease. Hence, even if the STD is treatable, the fraud gives
(6) Theft
the unsuspecting spouse the right to file for annulment.
(7) Estafa through falsification of a document
(8) Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 Curable Incurable
(9) Perjury
Syphilis HIV/AIDS
Gonorrhea HPV
PREGNANCY BY ANOTHER MAN
Chlamydial infection Hepatitis B
Non-disclosure by the woman that she is pregnant by another
man at the time of the marriage is a ground for annulment. Trichomoniasis Genital herpes
According to Tolentino, a husband has a right to require that his
wife shall not bear to his bed aliens to his blood lineage.
DRUG ADDICTION, HABITUAL ALCOHOLISM,
The law does not give the wife the right to file for annulment if HOMOSEXUALITY OR LESBIANISM
at the exact time of their marriage, one or more women were The non-disclosure of the drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
made pregnant by her husband. It is possible that the wife homosexuality or lesbianism must have been done prior to the
would not have given her consent to marry such man. marriage. Recovery or rehabilitation will not remove the ground
for annulment. Neither does the law require that the
The illegitimate children of one’s spouse have a right to be homosexual or lesbian spouse enter into any kind of
supported from the spouse’s separate property, which if relationship with a person of the same sex. It is the concealment
inadequate or non-existent will be charged against the absolute of the material fact that provides the ground for annulment
community property of the spouses. The emotional and given that knowledge of such could have dissuaded the other
financial strain on the innocent spouse brought about by this spouse from giving consent to the marriage.
fraudulent concealment are dreadful and should be considered
serious enough as a basis for annulment.
ANY OTHER MISREPRESENTATION
This is another area that requires amendment in the light of the Article 46 categorically states that any other misrepresentation
provisions of the Magna Carta of Women on equal treatment as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity shall not be a
before the law. manifestation of fraud sufficient to be a ground for annulment
of marriage.
BUCCAT V. MANGONON-BUCCAT (1941)
After living together for only 89 days, respondent gave birth to ANAYA V. PALAROAN (1970)
a son. Plaintiff filed a suit for annulment of their marriage on the Wife filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage on the
ground that his consent was vitiated because he did not know ground of fraud, claiming that her husband concealed to her the
that Luida was no longer a virgin at the time of their marriage. fact that he had another relationship with a close relative of his
prior to their marriage.
Held: Marriage is still valid. There was no clear proof that the
defendant committed fraud. The Court stated that it was Held: Marriage is still valid. The non-disclosure of a husband’s
unlikely for Godofredo to not notice the pregnancy considering pre-marital relationship with another woman does not
that it was already in the advanced stage. constitute fraud. It was expressly stated in Article 46 that
misrepresentation or deceit as to one’s chastity shall not be a
AQUINO V. DELIZO (1960) basis for an action to annul a marriage.
Four months after their marriage, respondent gave birth to a
son. Petitioner filed for annulment of his marriage to respondent
on the ground of fraud committed by the latter when she
concealed her pregnancy by another man before the marriage.
Held: Respondent was naturally plump and could have

successfully hidden her four-month pregnancy. According to
medical opinion, it is only on the sixth month that the roundness
of the woman's abdomen becomes apparent. Case remanded.

37
VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, OR UNDUE INFLUENCE Impotency is different from sterility. Impotency means no
erection or small vagina, so no sex is possible. Sterility is
Article 45(4) provides the fourth ground for a voidable marriage, characterized by low spermatozoa count. However, the fact
wherein the consent of one party was obtained by violence, that intercourse is possible, there remains a possibility, no
intimidation, or undue influence. matter how low or tiny, for the husband to sire a child.
Under Article 1335 of the Civil Code, there is violence when Old age is not a ground because one who marries an old
serious or irresistible physical force is employed in order to person should have been prepared for the other’s impotence.
extract acquiescence, while there is intimidation when one of
the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded Doctrine of triennial cohabitation: If wife remains a virgin after
fear of an imminent and grave threat upon his person or three years of living together, the presumption of impotency
property, or upon the person and property of his spouse, commences unless proven otherwise.
descendants or ascendants, to consent to the marriage. To
determine the genuineness and magnitude of the intimidation, SARAO V. GUEVARA (1940)
the person’s age, sex, health, and condition have to considered. Plaintiff and defendant were unsuccessful in having coitus due
to the tumor in her ovaries. The surgery rendered her incapable
Under Article 1337 of the Civil Code, there is undue influence of procreation but not of copulation. Plaintiff however claimed
when a person takes improper advantage of his power or that he lost all desire to have sex with his wife, so he filed a
position over the will of another, depriving the latter of a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency.
reasonable freedom of choice. Among the circumstances that
define improper advantage are the (1) confidential, (2) family, (3) Held: Marriage is still valid. Impotency deals not with the ability
spiritual, (4) professional or other relationship between the to procreate but the ability to copulate. Pilar was not impotent
parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly because the tumor in her ovaries did not necessarily render her
influenced was suffering from (5) mental weakness, (6) incapable of copulation. The removal of the tumor may have
ignorance, or (7) was in financial or emotional distress. rendered her sterile, but not impotent.
JIMENEZ V. CAÑIZARES (1960)

RUIZ V. ATIENZA (1941)
Husband discovered that his wife’s vagina was too small to
Four days after their marriage, Ruiz filed for annulment, claiming
allow for the penetration of his penis for copulation. A day after
that his consent was not freely given because he was only
their marriage he filed a petition for annulment. The court
forced and threatened into wedlock by Atienza’s father.
granted the petition on the ground of the failure of Remedios to
Held: Marriage is still valid. He may be unhappy, but there was submit to a medical examination.
no evidence that his consent was obtained through force or
Held: Because the law presumes potency, the lone testimony
intimidation. There were a lot of opportunities for him to escape,
of Joel is insufficient as a ground for annulment of their
and the words of Atienza’s father were merely admonitions from
marriage. Whether the wife was impotent cannot be sufficiently
a concerned father.
established because she had abstained from taking part in the
proceedings. The women of the country are by nature coy,
IMPOTENCE bashful, and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled by a competent authority.
Article 45(5) provides the fifth ground for a voidable marriage,
which pertains to the non-consummation of marriage due to the Doctrine: Importance of marriage as an institution. The
physical incapacity of one of the spouses. incidents of marriage, including its grounds for annulment, are
governed by law and not by the will of the parties.
Physical incapacity refers to impotence or the total inability to
have sexual intercourse with one’s spouse. Impotence is the In Tsoi v. CA, the Court characterized the husband’s refusal to
lack of power to copulate and is not synonymous with sterility. have sexual relations with his wife as a manifestation of his
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital obligations. In
For impotency to annul the marriage, the impotence must be:
Jimenez, however, where it was the wife who refused to have
(a) present at the time of the marriage;
sexual relations with the husband, the Court declared that this
(b) incurable; and
was normal given the nature of Filipino women.
(c) continuous.
The Court was not consistent in the standard it
This means that if one of the parties is impotent but its cause,
employed in deciding the effects of failure to
which could be emotional or physical, is treatable by some
consummate the marriage. A marriage cannot be void
medical intervention, there is no ground for annulment.
or voidable depending on the sex of the spouse
In case of doubt, the law presumes potency. The action will providing the ground for its dissolution.
not prosper if one spouse was aware of the impotency of the
other before marriage. Likewise, the action is barred when both A voidable marriage under Article 45(6) cannot be ratified
parties are impotent. An impotent party cannot file an action to because by its very nature the impotent party cannot cure the
annul a marriage based on the principle of estoppel. defect of the marriage since ratification is done by cohabitation.

38
HAVING A SEXUALLY TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASE MARRIAGE WHEN ONE SPOUSE IS ABSENT
The STD that must have been present at the time of the Art 41 Subsequent marriages shall be void unless the spouse
celebration of the marriage must be serious and incurable. had been absent for four consecutive years and there
The law does not consider the voluntary cohabitation by the is a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
healthy spouse with the afflicted spouse for public health already dead. If there is a danger of death, two years
concerns. Instead, the law offers the healthy spouse a way out shall be enough.
of the marriage in order to shield the latter and any possible
offspring from acquiring the disease. For contracting subsequent marriages, the present
spouse must institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS without prejudice to the reappearance of the latter.
Art 47 Action for annulment must be filed by the following Article 41 and Article 35(4) of the Family Code set the general
persons and within the periods: rule on the status of a marriage contracted during the
(1) Lack of parental consent – by the party without subsistence of a previous marriage. Due to the absence of legal
consent within five years after reaching the age of capacity, such subsequent marriage is void for being bigamous.
21, or by the parent or guardian of the minor at The exception is when the spouse who remarries does so after
any time before the minor reaches the age of 21. complying with the requisites in Article 41. Nonetheless, upon
(2) Insanity – by the sane spouse or by any relative or the filing of an affidavit of reappearance of the first spouse, the
guardian of the insane spouse at any time before subsequent marriage is automatically terminated.
the death of either party in the marriage, or by the
insane spouse during a lucid interval or after Three possible status of marriage
regaining sanity.
(3) Consent obtained through fraud – by the injured Of binding force and is legally sufficient or
Valid
party within five years after the discovery of the efficacious. Cannot be voided.
fraud.
Considered to never have taken place and
(4) Consent obtained through force, intimidation or Void ab
cannot be the source of rights. Cannot be
undue influence – by the injured party within five initio
ratified nor given validity.
years after the force, intimidation or undue
influence disappeared or ceased. A valid and subsisting marriage until
(5) Impotence – by the injured party within five years Voidable
annulled.
after the marriage.
Prescriptive periods limit the time in which the action for

The characterization of a subsequent marriage entered into
annulment can be filed. This is to encourage parties to be
when the spouse has been absent is tricky.
vigilant of their rights as well as to give the status of marriage
• If it followed the substantive and procedural requirement
certainty so that beyond these periods, the marriage will be
of law, then it is legally sufficient, in which case it could
deemed valid.
not be voided.
Prescription should be distinguished from ratification. • If it were void, then it never had not will have any legal
• Ratification cures the defect existing at the time of the effect even if the absent spouse does not resurface and
marriage and validates that marriage. file the required affidavit.
• Prescription bars the action for annulment of marriage • Without the affidavit of reappearance of the previous
because of the lapse of the period for bringing an action. spouse, the subsequent marriage remains valid.
• If such affidavit is filed, then the subsequent marriage is
Art 48 In cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity automatically terminated and the rights and obligations
of marriage, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal shall in the first marriage shall resume.
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties or
fabrication of evidence.
REQUIREMENTS FOR REMARRIAGE
No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts
or confession of judgment. Art 41 Requisites for subsequent marriage
(1) Prior spouse had been absent for four
A stipulation of fact is the agreement by both parties on the consecutive years; two years if there is a danger
facts of the case, admitting them into evidence without needing of death.
any more proof. (2) Present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead.
A confession of judgment, on the other hand, is a written
(3) Present spouse must institute a summary
admission by a party that he has no legal defense to a cause of
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
action and that upon such default he authorizes judgment to be
death of the absent spouse.
entered against him.

39
Art 83 Subsequent marriages entered into during the lifetime VALDEZ V. REPUBLIC (2009)
of the first spouse shall be illegal and void ab initio, Petitioner contracted subsequent marriage believing first
unless: husband was already dead. When husband applied for
(1) First marriage was annulled or dissolved; naturalization in the US, he was denied because his wife’s first
(2) First spouse had been absent for seven marriage was subsisting. Petitioner filed for declaration of
consecutive years at the time of the second presumptive death but was denied for lack of a well-grounded
marriage without the present spouse having news belief according to Article 41 of the Family Code.
of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee is
generally considered as dead and believed to be Held: Presumptive death applies and petitioner’s subsequent
so by the spouse, or if the absentee is presumed marriage is valid. The Civil Code applies since both marriages
dead. Marriages in such cases shall be valid until were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Thus,
declared null and void by a competent court. to retroactively apply the provision of the Family Code requiring
petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief would result in the
Art 85 A subsequent marriage may be annulled of the former invalidation of her second marriage when no such requirement
husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact alive was imposed by law at the time the marriage was solemnized.
and the previous marriage was then in force.
Art 87 Action for annulment of marriage involving an REAPPEARANCE OF THE ABSENT SPOUSE
absentee spouse must be commenced by the spouse
who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by Art 42 Subsequent marriage shall be automatically
either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
lifetime of the other. reappearance of the absent spouse, unless the
previous marriage has been annulled or declared void.
JONES V. HORTIGUELA (1937) Sworn statement of the reappearance shall be
Marciana contracted a subsequent marriage with respondent recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the
after the absence of her first husband. Her daughter claimed parties of the subsequent marriage by the absent
that the subsequent marriage was void because the declaration spouse or any interested parties.
of absence was made only six years after her father’s absence.
Held: Subsequent marriage is valid. It was not necessary under SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. JARQUE (2006)
the Civil Code to have the former spouse judicially declared an Bailon filed for a petition to declare his first wife presumptively
absentee before remarrying. The seven-year absence of Arthur dead. He married respondent and upon his death, she was able
was counted from the date Marciana last received news of him, to claim benefits from SSS. However, Alice reappeared and
and not from the date the court issued the order. filed an affidavit claiming that she is the widow of Bailon. SSS
cancelled the pension and declared her marriage void.
Under the Civil Code, a period of seven years was required for Held: The termination of the subsequent marriage by the
presumptive death and four years if there is presence of danger affidavit of reappearance does not preclude the filing of an
of death. Under the Family Code, the period of absence was action in court to dissolve the subsequent marriage. Mere
reduced to four years and two years for extraordinary absence reappearance by the absentee, even if made known to the
due to the developments in communication and transportation spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate the
technologies. There is little to no excuse for a spouse not to subsequent marriage. Former spouse must still be regarded as
contact his family for a long time. legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated.
Subsequent marriages can only be assailed during the lifetime
Under the Civil Code, the absent spouse must be generally of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse before parties and their children will be left as if the marriage had been
the present spouse may remarry. However, the Family Code perfectly valid. Since no step was taken to nullify the
now merely requires that the present spouse has a well- subsequent marriage, Teresita was deemed the rightful spouse.
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. A well-
founded belief entails inquiring into and searching for the REPUBLIC V. GRANADA (2012)
whereabout of the missing spouse. The present spouse has no Respondent’s husband went to Taiwan and did not return so
duty to continue looking for the absent spouse through the she filed a petition to have him declared presumptively dead,
entire four or two years before filing for a declaration of which was granted by the trial court. Republic (OSG) elevated
presumptive death. the case to the Court of Appeals through a notice of appeal
claiming that she failed to exert reasonable efforts to locate
Article 41, FC Article 83, CC
Cyrus. The appeal was dismissed.
4 yrs; 2 yrs with 7 yrs; 4 yrs if
Absence
danger of death extraordinary Held: Republic’s arguments that Yolanda did not exert diligent
efforts are well-taken, but the Court was constrained to deny
Belief Well-founded General belief
the Republic’s petition since the RTC ruling on the presumptive
death of Cyrus was already final and can no longer be modified
Summary proc. Yes No
or reversed as it is indeed a summary judicial proceeding.

40
REPUBLIC V. TAMPUS (2016) EFFECTS OF TERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
Nilda Tampus was married to Dante Del Mundo. Dante went to
Sulu as a member of the AFP and after 33 years of no Art 43 Effects of the termination by reappearance
communication, Nilda filed a petition declare Dante as (1) Children of the subsequent marriage conceived
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, which was prior to its termination shall be considered
granted by the trial court. OSG filed a petition for certiorari legitimate.
before the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the RTC. (2) The absolute community of property or the
Held: Nilda was not able to establish a well-founded belief that conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
Dante is already dead. “Well-founded belief” should be the liquidated. If one spouse contracted the marriage
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent I bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
spouse, which requires exertion of active effort. Her attempts ACP or CPG shall be forfeited in favor of:
to find her husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and a. The common children
neighbors were insufficient. She should have proceeded to the b. Children of the guilty spouse by a previous
AFP to request information about her husband, sought the help marriage
of the authorities, and presented Dante’s family, relatives, or c. If no children, the innocent spouse
neighbors as witnesses who could have testified and (3) Donations made in marriage shall remain valid;
corroborated her claims that she earnestly looked for Dante. unless the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith then such donations shall be revoked.
REPUBLIC V. CATUBAG (2018) (4) Innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
Respondent’s wife left their house and never returned. the spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary
Respondent returned to the Philippines to look for his wife, in any insurance policy, even if irrevocable.
inquired about her whereabouts from close friends and (5) Spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
relatives, and even travelled as far as Bicol, but he could still in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
not locate her. He also sought the help of Bomba Radyo and innocent spouse by testate and intestate.
searched various hospitals and funeral parlors but to no avail. Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
After 7 years, he filed a petition in the trial court to have his wife bad faith, the marriage shall be void ab initio and all
declared presumptively dead, which was granted. OSG donations and testamentary dispositions made during
elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. the marriage are revoked.
Held: Resort to certiorari to challenge the summary proceeding Donation propter nuptias are those:
order was proper. Respondent failed to establish a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead according to Article 1. Made before the celebration of the marriage
41. His efforts were not diligent enough and are merely passive 2. In consideration of the marriage
since he failed to corroborate his supposed inquiries and to 3. In favor of one or both the future spouses.
seek the help of local police authorities and the National Bureau
of Investigation to look for his wife. While Article 43(4) and the Insurance Code are contradictory
when it comes to the designation of the beneficiary (in the
TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC (2018) Insurance Code the designation is irrevocable), the Civil Code
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive provision takes effect over the Insurance Code since in
death of her husband, a member of the Philippine Constabulary statutory construction, the specific law (in this case, the spouse
who was declared missing in action after being assigned to an entered the marriage in bad faith) takes effect over the general.
NPA-heavy area. She filed the petition to be able to claim
financial benefits from her missing husband’s service given her EFFECTS OF PENDING ACTION
meager source of income and advanced age. The RTC granted
the petition under Article 41, but the OSG questioned the Art 49 During the pendency of the action for annulment and
decision before the CA, which then annulled the RTC decision. in the absence of a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
Held: RTC erred in declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead under
spouses and the support and custody of the children.
Article 41. Petition is based on Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code as petitioner was not seeking to remarry, but to claim In determining which parent should have custody of
financial benefits as accorded her missing husband. The them, their moral and material welfare shall be given
petition was denied, but the Court declared that a judicial paramount consideration. Their choice of parent shall
decision declaring presumptive death is not a requirement for also be considered. The Court shall also provide for
the granting of benefits to personnel of the military service. appropriate visitation rights for the other parent.
Custody of the child

• Below 7 years old – mother, because of the tender years
presumption or maternal preference rule.
• Over 7 years old – all relevant considerations, including
the choice of the child.

41
According to the Rules on Provisional Orders (AM No. 02-11- Art 53 Subsequent marriages which failed to register the
12-SC, March 15, 2003), the court may likewise consider the preceding requirements shall be void.
following factors:
Art 54 Children conceived or born before the judgment of
(a) Agreement of the parties annulment or absolute nullity under Art 36 has become
(b) Desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and final and executory are legitimate. Children conceived
loving relationship between the child and the other or born of the subsequent marriage under Art 53 are
parent also legitimate.
(c) Child’s health, safety, and welfare
(d) Any history of child or spousal abuse by the person Article 50 of the Family Code requires the final judgment to
seeking custody provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
(e) Nature and frequency of contact with both parents properties of the spouses. In the partition, the conjugal home
(f) Habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances and the lot where it is situated shall be adjudicated in
(g) Marital misconduct accordance with the provisions of Article 102(6) on liquidation
(h) Most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, of the absolute community property and Article 129(9) on
psychological, and educational environment liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains. These articles
(i) Preference of the child, if over 7 years old and of provide that the conjugal dwelling shall be adjudicated to the
sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is spouse with whom majority of the common children choose to
unfit. live. Article 50 also states that children below the age of seven
are deemed to have chosen their mother.
Because custody of the children is only temporary, the
designated custodian-parent must give the court and the This is in line with Article 213 which provides that when the
parents five-day notice of any plan to change the residence of parents separate, the Court shall look at all relevant
the child or take him out of his residence for more than three considerations, especially the choice of a child over seven years
days, provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the of age, unless the parent is deemed unfit. Thus, the conjugal
parent not awarded provisional custody by the Court, pursuant dwelling will most likely be resolved in favor of the woman if
to Section 5 of the Rules on Provisional Orders. majority of their common children are below seven years old.
The decree of annulment and its effects are governed by the Article 51 requires the delivery of the presumptive legitimes to
following articles of the Family Code: the children in the form of cash, property, or sound securities,
while Article 52 requires its recording, along with the judgment
Art 50 The effects of the annulment of subsequent marriages of annulment and partition and distribution of properties, in the
shall also apply to marriages which are void ab initio appropriate civil registry. It is only upon compliance with this
or annulled by final judgment. recording requirement that the former spouses may enter into
another marriage.
Final judgment in such cases shall provide for:
Article 54 provides that children conceived or born prior to the
(1) liquidation, partition, and distribution of the judgment of annulment are legitimate. Those who are
properties of the spouses, conceived and born after the decree of annulment are
(2) custody and support of the common children illegitimate children.
(3) delivery of third presumptive legitimes
Legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the ACP/CGP father and mother, pursuant to Article 174. Thus, an annulment
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. decree will not disturb the right of legitimate children to
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot in continue using the surname of their father as their own
which it is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance username.
with Arts 102 and 129. In contrast, since by law and practice Filipino married women
Art 51 In partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of attach their husbands’ surname to their maiden surname
all common children shall be delivered in cash, (Article 370), the decree of annulment affects the woman’s
property, or sound securities, unless the parties had continued use of the former husband’s surname. The Civil Code
already decided for such matters in a judicially- governs the matter of what name the woman can use, which
approved mutual agreement. depends on her being the innocent or guilty party.
Art 52 Registration in the appropriate civil registry

(1) judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of Art 371 If the wife is the guilty party = shall resume her
marriage maiden name and surname.
(2) partition and distribution of the properties of the If the wife is the innocent party = may resume her
spouses maiden name and surname or continue using her
(3) delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes former husband’s surname, unless:
(1) the court decrees otherwise, or
(2) she or the former husband remarries another.

42
YU V. YU (2006) Ratification and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
Husband filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Pasig RTC and prayed for the award of sole custody Who annuls and
Ground Who ratifies
of his daughter, wife filed before the Pasay RTC a petition for when
habeas corpus and custody of her daughter. Minor, within 5
yrs after reaching
Held: When husband filed a petition for declaration of nullity of Minor who did not get 21 years old
Lack of
marriage, he automatically submitted the issue of the custody parental consent by
parental Parents or
of Bianca as an incident thereof. There was no need for Eric to freely cohabiting upon
consent guardian of the
reaching the age of 21
replead his prayer for custody as it is already deemed pleaded minor, before the
in an annulment case, based on Section 21 of the “Rule on party reaches
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.” Pasig RTC has jurisdiction Sane spouse who
had no
over the parties and the subject matter.
knowledge or any
relative or
JURISDICTION guardian of the
Insane spouse freely insane spouse
Insanity cohabits with the other before the death
Republic Act 8369, or the Family Courts Act of 1997, provides
upon coming to reason of either parties
for the establishment of family courts and the causes of action
under their jurisdiction. Insane spouse
during a lucid
Sec 5 Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction interval or after
to hear and decide over: coming to reason
(b) petitions for guardianship, custody of children, Consent Injured party cohabits Injured party
and habeas corpus in relation to the custody of obtained with the other after full within five years
children through knowledge of the facts after discovery of
(c) complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration fraud constituting the fraud the fraud
of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital
status and property relations of husband and wife Consent Injured party
or those living together under different status, and obtained Injured party cohabits within five years
petitions for dissolution of CPG through with the other after the from cessation or
force, force, intimidation, or disappearance of
(d) petitions for support and acknowledgment
intimidation, undue influence have the force,
The SC designated Family Courts from among the branches of undue disappeared or ceased intimidation, or
RTCs in major cities. In areas without Family Courts, the cases influence undue influence
shall be decided by the RTCs. Injured party
within five years
TAMANO V. ORTIZ (1998) Impotence Cannot be ratified after the
Tamano and Zorayda married in civil rites. Before Tamano died, celebration of the
he married respodent in civil rites too. Zorayda filed a petition marriage.
for the declaration of nullity of the subsequent marriage Injured party
because it was bigamous. Estrellita argued that since Tamano within five years
and Zorayda were also married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction Having STD Cannot be ratified after the
to hear the case is vested in Sharia courts. celebration of the
marriage.
Held: RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving
marriages, including petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Since Article 13 of the Muslim Personal Laws does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites, Sharia courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Obiter: It was only in her motion for reconsideration that

Estrellita mentioned her marriage with Tamano under Muslim
laws, and as such the trial court could not be divested of
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case.

43
LE GA L SE PA RA TI O N Repeated Physical Violence and Grossly Abusive Conduct
versus Attempt on the Life of the Other Spouse
Legal separation or relative divorce is separation of bed and
board. In such a case, the marriage bond is still in full force MUÑOZ V. DEL BARRIO (1955)
although there is a suspension of common marital life. A legal Felicidad Muñoz and Jose del Barrio were married. The couple
separation can only be obtained through a valid judicial decree. often quarreled, with the husband maltreating his wife, which
led to their separation. Later on, despite their separation, Jose
Under Article 97 of the Civil Code, there are only two grounds maltreated his wife again, which involved the husband giving
for legal separation. the wife a fist blow to the face, boxing her in the abdomen,
pulling her hair, and twisting her neck. The wife filed a complaint
(1) Adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on
for legal separation, which was denied by the trial court.
the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code
(2) Attempt by one spouse against the life of the other Held: Legal separation was no granted. Despite such abuses,
the husband only used his bare fists and desisted from giving
Under Article 55 of the Family Code, the grounds for filing a
further chastisement after the first blows were given at the spur
petition for legal separation was expanded to include:
of the impulse. An attempt on the life of a person implies an
Art 55 Grounds for petition for legal separation intent to kill, but in this case, the maltreatment of the husband
to his wife was not indicative of such malicious intent and could
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive not constitute as attempts on the life of the wife.
conduct against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner Note: This is a ridiculous decision with the Court ignoring the
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel gravity of the assault and ignoring the fist as a powerful weapon.
change religious or political affiliation
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt the petitioner, a Under the Family Code, violent conduct by the respondent
common child, or a child of petitioner, to engage against the petitioner is a ground for legal separation without
in prostitution; or connivance in such corruption necessity of proving the intent to kill.
or inducement
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to ONG ENG KIAM V. ONG (2006)
imprisonment of more than 6 years, even if William and Lucita Ong were married. Lucita filed a complaint
pardoned for legal separation under Article 55(1) of FC, alleging that her
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism marriage was marked by physical violence and grossly abusive
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality conduct. She claimed that they quarreled all the time, with
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent physical and verbal abuse being inflicted upon her. He would
bigamous marriage in the Philippines or abroad slap and kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against the wall,
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion and throw at her whatever he could find. He also maltreated the
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the children by whipping them with his belt. One time, they had a
petitioner violent quarrel wherein he pointed a gun at her, forcing her to
(10) Abandonment without justifiable cause for more leave their house. She filed a petition for legal separation, which
than one year was granted by the RTC and affirmed in toto by the CA.
The term “child” shall include natural or adopted Held: Legal separation was granted. Based on the credible
children. medical evidence and testimonies presented by Lucita, William
indeed inflicted physical violence on her during the marriage
Instead of adultery and concubinage as used in the Civil Code, and that she has been subjected to grossly abusive conduct.
the Family Code provides for sexual infidelity, a gender-neutral There is also no merit in William’s argument that having left their
ground for legal separation. According to Justice Sempio-Diy, home, Lucita should be found to have abandoned him and
this change satisfies the demands of Filipino women for equal could not file for legal separation. The abusive conduct of the
treatment because concubinage is harder to prove compared husband is a just cause for leaving her family and therefore
to adultery. It also gives more leeway for the court to determine there is still a ground for legal separation.
the extent of the sexual infidelity that would justify an action for
legal separation.
Physical Violence or Moral Pressure to Compel Change in
Religious or Political Affiliation
The law does not require the violence or moral pressure to

be repeated. According to Senator Tolentino, a single act of
violence is sufficient as a ground for legal separation since
religious and political beliefs are human rights.
In instances of physical violence, the victims are usually

women. The Philippines has agreed to several human rights
instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination of All

44
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which tasked the state This can be distinguished from the grounds for annulment
to protect the comprehensive rights of women, such as the based on consent obtained by fraud, which must be present
protection of their bodily integrity and freedom from abuse and at the time of the celebration of the marriage. As grounds for
non-discrimination. Whether the physical abuse is done to legal separation, the conditions must have arisen only during
compel a spouse to change her religion or to do her chores the marriage, in which case, the prescriptive period is five years
better, it is the gravity of the physical abuse which is sufficient from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
to give the victim a reason to file for legal separation.
However, if the conditions existed at the time of the celebration
In both the first and second grounds, a single grave of the marriage but was concealed from the other spouse, the
act of violence should be enough to constitute a action for annulment will have prescribed if there had already
ground for legal separation because it is the severity been even one incident of voluntary sexual relations after the
of the attacks and the continued exposure of the innocent spouse acquired knowledge of the fraud. The fact that
petitioner to grave harm, regardless of the motive, that the five-year period counted from the time the fraudulent
violates the duty of the spouse to love and respect the conduct occurred has not yet ended is immaterial. But if the
other spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code. ground recurs during the marriage, it may be a new basis for
legal separation.
Attempt to Corrupt or Induce the Petitioner, Common Revisions should be made in these two grounds. With
Child, or a Child of the Petitioner, to Engage in Prostitution respect to the fifth ground, the similar vice of
excessive gambling should also be included. The
Only the respondent spouse must have been guilty of legislators should also rethink the sixth ground. All the
corrupting or inducing the petitioner, a common child, or a child other grounds involve the commitment of a marital
of the petitioner to engage in prostitution. If both the spouses offense, but if the homosexual or lesbian spouses can
are guilty, there is no logical reason for one spouse to desist still carry out the obligations of a loving and faithful
from living with the other. spouse and a devoted parent to the children, then
The law should include the attempt of the respondent there is no such offense. If the gay spouse enters into
to corrupt or induce his or her own child. This would a sexual relationship with another person or does acts
show the respondent’s depravity and the other spouse of perversity, the ground of sexual infidelity or
should not stand idly by until the respondent targets perversion under Article 55(8) is readily available.
the other spouse’s child or their common children.
Contracting by the Respondent of a Subsequent Bigamous
Marriage
Final Judgment Sentencing Imprisonment of More Than
Six Years For bigamy to be prosecuted in the Philippines, all the
requisites of the crime must have taken place within our
The reason for including this ground is unclear. There is no jurisdiction. These requisites are:
requirement that the crime for which the respondent spouse
was imprisoned for had anything to do with the ability to carry (1) Offender has been legally married
out the responsibilities of a good spouse. (2) The marriage has not been legally dissolved or the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
For example, a public officer who commits the crime of (3) Offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage
arbitrary detention of a person for more than 15 days suffers (4) The second or subsequent marriage has all the
a penalty of prision mayor, pursuant to Article 124 of the RPC. essential requisites for validity
Thus, a final judgment sentencing him with imprisonment of
more than six years is a sufficient ground for his spouse to For legal separation, there is no need for a criminal conviction
secure a legal separation decree. Presumably, that spouse no for bigamy. Also, there is still a bigamous marriage even if the
longer wants to live with or feels safe with a convicted felon as second or subsequent marriage takes place in another country.
a spouse. Even if the respondent has been extended a
presidential pardon, there is still a ground for legal separation. The absent spouse who returns and files an affidavit of
reappearance, automatically terminating the subsequent
Other felonies punishable by prision mayor: sedition; marriage, has a right to file for legal separation on the ground of
conspiracy to commit coup d’état, rebellion or insurrection bigamy. Subsequent marriages involving an absent spouse in
line with Article 41 of the Family Code are still characterized as
bigamous under Article 35 and will therefore fall under the
Drug Addiction, Habitual Alcoholism, Lesbianism or seventh ground for legal separation.
Homosexuality of the Respondent
Articles 55(5) and (6) provide separate grounds for legal

separation involving drug addiction and habitual alcoholism,
and lesbianism or homosexuality, respectively.

45
Sexual Infidelity or Perversion Abandonment by Respondent without Justifiable Cause
for More than One Year
Article 55(8) provides the eighth ground for legal separation,
which involves sexual infidelity or perversion from the DE LA CRUZ V. DE LA CRUZ (1968)
respondent. Estrella and Severino De la Cruz were married with six children.
Estrella filed a complaint against her husband for abandonment
PEOPLE V. ZAPATA (1951) and mismanaging of their conjugal properties with prayer for
Andres Bondoc filed a complaint for adultery against his wife separation of property and monthly support. She alleged that
Guadalupe Zapata and her lover Dalmacio Bondoc for having her husband had not slept in their conjugal home and also had
repeated sexual intercourse. The wife was convicted, and upon a concubine in Manila. She also claimed that Severino abused
release, she continued having sexual relations with Dalmacio, the administration of their conjugal partnership by not
so Andres filed another complaint for adultery. The trial court discussing with her the partnership’s business activities. On the
quashed the second complaint on the ground of double other hand, Severino denied abandoning his family, but
jeopardy, ruling that the acts charged in the two complaints admitted that he started to live separately from his wife because
must be deemed one continuous offense, there being the same of her quarrelsome attitude. He averred that he has never failed
defendants and offense charged. to give his family financial support. He also denied having a
Held: The trial court erred in quashing the second mistress in Manila and said that his constant presence there
complaint. There is no legal provision which bars the filing of was required by their growing business.
as many complaints of adultery as there were adulterous acts Held: Defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife,
committed, because adultery is a crime of result which is because abandonment must be understood as the absolute
instantaneous and completed at the moment of carnal union. cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the
Adultery is punishable for every sexual intercourse of the wife intention of perpetual separation. Severino did not intend to
and her paramour. Likewise, the second complaint does not leave his family permanently, as shown by the fact that he
also violate the protection from double jeopardy because if the continued to give support to his family despite his absence from
second complaint places the defendants in double jeopardy for the conjugal home. The evidence presented by Estrella also
the same offense, the adultery committed by the male failed to preponderate in favor of her concubinage allegation.
defendant charged in the second complaint would remain
unpunished. And even if the husband pardons his adulterous LAPUZ V. EUFEMIO (1972)
wife, such pardon would not exempt the defendants from Carmen Sy and Eufemio Eufemio were married. They lived
subsequent adulterous acts committed after the pardon together until Eufemio abandoned his wife and cohabited with
because they refer only to previous acts. another. Carmen filed for legal separation on the ground of
abandonment, with a prayer that her husband be deprived of
GANDIONCO V. PEÑARANDA (1987) his share in the conjugal partnership profits. However, before
Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed a complaint the trial could be completed, Carmen died. Eufemio moved to
against her husband and petitioner Froilan Gandionco for legal dismiss the petition on the ground of Carmen’s death. Her
separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for father, however, asked to substitute for her in order to pursue
support and payment of damages. Teresita also applied for a the effects of legal separation, including the loss of right by
provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending the Eufemio to any share of the profits earned by their properties,
decision in the action for legal separation. Public respondent his disqualification to inherit by intestacy, and the revocation of
Judge Peñaranda then rendered a decision ordering the testamentary provisions in his favor.
payment of support pendente lite. The husband filed an action
for certiorari to annul the said order of the judge, contending Held: Legal separation cannot prosper. An action for legal
that the civil action for legal separation and its incidents, separation involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
including the support pendente lite, should be suspended separation of the spouses. Thus, upon her death, the petition
because of the pendency of the criminal case for concubinage. she filed against her husband on the ground of abandonment
was deemed abated. The effects sought by the father are all
Held: No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary for rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively in the persons
the action for legal separation to prosper. A civil action for of the spouses, and by nature are difficult to conceive as
legal separation may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, assignable or transmissible. They are mere effects of a decree
a criminal action for concubinage because such civil action is of a separation, their source being the decree itself, so in the
not primarily to recover civil liability but to obtain the right to live absence of such they are merely rights in expectation. If death
separately with the legal consequences thereof. A decree of supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued be forthcoming because death produces a more radical and
upon proof by mere preponderance of evidence in the action definitive of separation; as a result, the expected consequential
for legal separation. rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

46
DEFENSES OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO (1960)
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married. Jose
Article 56 lays down the defenses to petitions for legal discovered his wife to be having sexual relations with one Jose
separation. Arcalas. He sent her to Manila to study beauty culture, where
Art 56 Petition shall be denied on any of the following she stayed for one year. While in Manila, Jose found that his
grounds: wife was going out with several other men; later on, Serafina left
(1) Aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act her husband and since then they had lived separately. Jose
complained of then caught his wife having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame,
(2) Aggrieved party has consented to the commission and he said his intention to legally separate with her, to which
of the offense or act complained of she conformed. A month after, Jose filed a petition for legal
(3) Connivance between the parties in the separation, which was dismissed on the ground, among others,
commission of the offense or act of condonation of the adultery.
(4) Both parties have given ground for legal Held: There was no condonation. The failure of the husband
separation to actively search for his wife after she left their conjugal home
(5) Collusion between the parties to obtain the was not tantamount to condonation. It was the wife who left him
decree of legal separation after having sinned with Arcalas and after the husband
(6) Action is barred by prescription discovered her relations with other men. Thus, it was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. It was the wife’s
obligation to return.
CONDONATION
Condonation means forgiveness of the martial offense and is BUGAYONG V. GINEZ (1956)
considered as a defense in legal separation since resuming Benjamin Bugayong, a US Navy serviceman, married Leonila
conjugal life together is contrary to the reason behind legal Ginez while he was on leave. Before reporting back to work, the
separation. For it to be a valid defense, the condonation must couple agreed for the wife to stay in the house of his sisters.
be done after the offense was committed, with the condoning Leonila stayed with her mother in Pangasinan, and shortly after,
spouse having full knowledge of the offense and intent to Benjamin claimed to begin receiving letters informing him of
forgive. If the innocent spouse stays with the erring spouse in alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. His wife also allegedly sent
him a letter saying that a man kissed her. A year later, Benjamin
order to save the family, the continued cohabitation cannot be
returned to Pangasinan and met with his wife. For two days and
considered as condonation because otherwise this would
nights, they slept together as husband and wife. When he asked
punish the innocent spouse for his or her patient forbearance
and instead encourage that spouse to file a legal separation her about her alleged adultery, Leonila just packed her bags and
case post-haste. left, which Benjamin construed as an admission of guilt.
Nonetheless, he still tried to look for her but to no avail. He filed
Condonation may be given a petition for legal separation but was dismissed.
1. Expressly – for instance, by saying “I forgive you” Held: There is condonation. Condonation is the forgiveness of
2. Implicitly – through the acts of the offended spouse a marital offense—it is the conditional forgiveness or remission,
by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter
WILLAN V. WILLAN (1960) has committed. In the case at bar, there was a condonation on
The parties were married and have two children. The husband the part of Benjamin for the acts of infidelity amounting to
was away on military service during the war, but upon his return adultery committed by his wife. A reconciliation was effected
he continued living with his wife until he left the conjugal home. between the spouses when Benjamin persuaded Leonila to
According to the husband, she frequently demanded sexual come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
intercourse with him at times when he did not want it, forcing consented to sleep with him for the next two nights as husband
him to conform to her wishes by subjecting him to various types and wife. Such reconciliation occurred almost ten months after
of violence. The wife would pull his hair, catch hold of him by he learned about her acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
the ears, shake his head violently, and there was even one Thus, the conduct of the husband despite his belief that his wife
occasion where she kicked his injured leg. On the night before was unfaithful deprives him of any action for legal separation
he left the conjugal home, sexual intercourse occurred between against the offending wife, pursuant to the restriction of Article
the parties when the wife rolled on top of her husband and he 100 of CC. This is in line with American jurisprudence which
eventually acquiesced to her wishes. provides that any cohabitation with the guilty party—even with
just a single voluntary act of marital intercourse—after the
Held: There was condonation. A husband who repeatedly commission of the offense and with the knowledge or belief on
yielded to the unreasonable demands of his wife for sexual the part of the injured party on its commission, is sufficient to
intercourse is deemed to have condoned these acts of cruelty. constitute condonation.
Intercourse with the wife will amount to condonation of the
wife’s cruelty even though the husband was driven to it by her
violence. Even if he was unwilling to have sexual intercourse
with her, he did not act involuntarily and he was free to submit
or resist.

47
CONSENT CONNIVANCE
Consent is different from condonation in that it is given before While consent is a unilateral act of one spouse for the
the commission of a marital offense while the latter is given commission of a marital offense by the other, connivance
after. There are two types of consent: indicates agreement between the spouses to commit a
ground for legal separation. It is the willingness to secretly allow
1. Express consent – telling the other spouses in clear or be involved in wrongdoing, especially an immoral or illegal
terms that he or she is free to have other liaisons act. It is inferred from the conduct of one spouse that he or
2. Implied consent – acts of indifference or giving of corrupt she desires the other spouse to commit the offense.
counsel by one spouse to other from which the latter may
infer that commission of a marital offense in acceptable SARGENT V. SARGENT (1920)
to the other spouse Donald and Frances Sargent, a white and educated couple,
were married. The husband hired Charles Simmons, a black
MATUBIS V. PRAXEDES (1960) person, as their driver. Donald filed a suit for divorce against his
Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married. A year after, wife on the ground of adultery, alleging that the latter engaged
the couple agreed to live separately from each other for failing in repeated sexual acts with their driver.
to agree on how they should live as husband and wife. The Held: The husband was guilty of connivance. He had
couple then entered into a written agreement, one of which received reports from his servants and investigators for two
stipulating that the parties are free to live with anyone as months prior to the third circumstance of adultery, which gave
husband and wife without any interference by either of them, him reason to suspect that his wife was having an affair with
nor can they prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or their driver, and yet he did nothing. He retained Charles in their
any other crime. When Zoilo began cohabiting with another employ and gave him the opportunity to spend more time with
woman who then gave birth to a son, Socorro filed a complaint his wife, and even intentionally absented himself from their
for legal separation on the ground of abandonment and home to facilitate their adultery. He threw no protection around
concubinage, which was dismissed by the trial court. his wife nor gave her any warning against intimacy with Charles;
Held: There was consent on the part of Socorro. The written instead, he left her in danger. Therefore, if consent that the wife
agreement between the spouses, which provide the said should commit adultery is to be inferred from the conduct, it is
stipulation, amounts to express condonation of and consent to clear that the husband desired his wife to commit adultery and
the adulterous acts of the wife. Because Article 100 of CC that he was also consenting thereto.
provides that legal separation may only be claimed by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or RECRIMINATION OR MUTUAL GUILT
consent to adultery or concubinage, the plaintiff wife is now
barred from seeking legal separation. The fourth defense to a suit of legal separation is the
commission by the complaining spouse of a marital
PEOPLE V. SENSANO AND RAMOS (1933) offense. A suit for legal separation presupposes that continued
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married. After the life together with the other spouse is unbearable due to a
birth of their child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan serious marital wrong that the petitioner spouse finds offensive.
where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or However, if that spouse is likewise guilty of dishonoring their
sending her anything for their support. Eventually, she met marital vows, then he or she is not considered an offended
Marcelo Ramos, who took her and the child to live with him. spouse.
When Mariano returned, he filed a charge against his wife and
Marcelo for adultery and both were sentenced to four months
of imprisonment. After completing her sentence, Ursula left her COLLUSION
paramour and begged her husband to take her back. Mariano Collusion is the act of married persons in procuring a legal
refused to pardon her and told her to do as she pleased since separation by mutual agreement or consent, whether by:
he would have nothing more to do with her. Without any means
to support herself and her son, she returned to Marcelo. Seven 1. Agreeing ahead of time for one of the spouses to
years after, Mariano came back from Hawaii and filed a second commit a marital offense
charge of adultery against his wife and Marcelo. The co- 2. Feigning the commission of a ground under Article 55
defendants were convicted of adultery; hence, this appeal. 3. Failing to present evidence to defeat the suit for legal
separation
Held: The husband gave his consent to his wife. The husband
acquiesced to his wife’s adulterous act by his refusal to take The participation of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in legal
her back after she served her sentence for adultery and his separation proceedings is necessary to determine whether
subsequent absence for seven years. Such conduct warrants collusion exists between the parties and to guarantee that the
the inference that he consented to the adultery and therefore he evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. This agreement, if not
is not authorized by law to institute another criminal proceeding. express, may be implied from the acts of the parties.

48
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC (2011) The trial court was likewise correct in holding that the suit
Prior to his death, Senator Mamintal Tamano married Estrellita had already prescribed since William only filed the petition ten
Juliano-Llave in both Muslim and civil rites. Zorayda Tamano years after he learned of her adultery. Under Article 102 of CC,
and her son filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of action for legal separation could not be filed except within one
marriage between Estrellita and Tamano for being bigamous year from the time plaintiff learned of the cause and within five
because the two were married during the latter’s subsisting years from the date when such cause occurred. Although
marriage with Zorayda. The RTC declared Estrellita’s marriage Juanita did not interpose prescription as a defense, the courts
with Tamano as void ab initio on the ground of bigamy, which motu propio can take cognizance of it because of the State’s
was affirmed by the CA. Estrellita claims that the CA erred in interest in the preservation of marriage.
affirming the judgment of the RTC even though it was rendered
prematurely because the public prosecutor failed to conduct an
investigation to determine collusion. PRESCRIPTION
Held: The CA did not err in affirming the judgment of RTC. Art 57 An action for legal separation shall be filed within 5
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-SC) Art 58 An action for legal separation shall not be tried before
requires the participation of the public prosecutor in cases 6 months have elapsed since the petition was filed.
involving void marriages and mandates the prosecutor to
submit his investigation report to determine the presence of Art 59 No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court
collusion between the parties. In this case, the trial court has taken steps towards the reconciliation of the
immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that
required report, which was sufficiently complied with by the reconciliation is highly improbable.
Assistant City Prosecutor in his Manifestation, where he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties Art 60 No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
spouse of any of the private respondents. Likewise, even
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal shall take steps to
assuming the lack of participation of a fiscal, the decision could
prevent collusion between the parties and fabrication
not be invalidated because the opposition between the parties
or suppression of evidence.
in an adversarial proceeding negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between them. Under Article 102 of the Civil Code, the prescription period for
filing of a petition for legal separation is:
BROWN V. YAMBAO (1957)
William H. Brown filed a suit to obtain legal separation from his 1. Within one year from the date the plaintiff became
wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged that while he was interned by cognizant of the cause; and
the Japanese at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp, his wife 2. Within five years from the date the cause occurred.
engaged in adulterous relations with another man of whom she
The first period has been found to be too short since in
begot a daughter, and that he only learned of such misconduct
Philippine culture, the innocent spouse is expected to seek
upon his release. Thereafter, they lived separately and later
advice from family members and guidance from spiritual
executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership. The
advisers. As a result, many aggrieved spouses could not
said complaint also prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
comply with the requirement of filing a case within one year
agreement, custody of their children, and for his wife to be
from cognizance of the ground. Under Article 57 of the Family
disqualified from succeeding him. Despite his wife being in
Code, only the second prescriptive period remains.
default, the trial court denied his complaint for legal separation
after the Assistant City Fiscal discovered that William also
CONTRERAS V. MACARAIG (1970)
cohabited with another woman and also had children with her.
Elena Contreras and Cesar Macaraig were married. Cesar was
Held: The trial court did not err in permitting the Fiscal to employed as a manager of a printing establishment, where he
act as counsel for Juanita. Collusion in matrimonial cases met Lily Ann Alcala. Shortly thereafter, he became a special
refers to the act of married persons in procuring a divorce either agent at Malacañang and began to be away often and came
by mutual consent to commit a matrimonial offense or by failure home very late. In September 1962, Avelino Lubos, the family
to defend divorce proceedings. It was legitimate for the Fiscal driver, told Elena that Cesar was living with Lily Ann in
to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the Singalong. However, when he returned to the conjugal home on
inference that the wife’s default was calculated or agreed upon October of the same year, she refrained from verifying Lubos’
to enable William to obtain the decree of legal separation. One report in her desire not to anger and drive her husband away.
such circumstance is his cohabitation with a woman other than In April 1963, she once again received news that Lily Ann was
his wife, which bars him from claiming legal separation pursuant already pregnant, but because Cesar returned again to their
to Article 100 of CC. Therefore, evidence of such misconduct, home on May, she desisted from discussing the matter with
and the failure of the wife to set it up by way of defense, were him. Finally, in October 1963, Elena received reports that Cesar
proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered and Lily Ann already gave birth to a baby, and this was
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses. confirmed by the baptismal certificate of the daughter. In
November 1963, she met with Lily Ann, who promised to give

49
up Cesar because she had no desire to be accused criminally. The lower court, through the respondent Judge, granted the
In the early part of December 1963, Elena met with her husband motion of the husband to suspend the hearing of the petition
where she pleaded with him to leave Lily Ann and return to their for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Hence, this
home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. appeal.
However, the husband ignored her pleas and refused to return
to his legitimate family. On December 14, 1963, plaintiff Held: Article 103 of CC is not an absolute bar to the hearing
instituted this action for legal separation, which was dismissed of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration
by the trial court on the ground of prescription, since the court of the six-month period. The law remains cognizant of the
held that she became cognizant of her husband’s infidelity in need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself, such as
September 1962 but only started the action in December 1963. in cases involving the management of conjugal partnership
property of the spouses where the court may appoint another
Held: The prescription period of one year should be counted administrator to manage said property. Thus, there is
from December 1963. The only time when Elena really became justification for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for
cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part preliminary injunction should not be ignored by the lower court.
of December 1963 when she finally confronted her husband. It There is all the more reason for this response from respondent
was only during this time when her husband admitted to her Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of
that he was living with Lily Ann and would no longer return to concubinage and an attempt against her life would continue
his legitimate family that Elena must be deemed to be under managing what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
obligation to decide whether to file for legal separation, and it assertion which the husband did not specifically deny.
was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed Therefore, the hearing for the motion for preliminary mandatory
to have commenced. injunction must proceed.
There is a discrepancy between the present case and

Bugayong v. Ginez, in terms of what constitutes knowledge MEDIATION BETWEEN SPOUSES
that triggers the start of the prescriptive period. In Bugayong, In addition to the cooling-off period, Article 59 of the Family
the Court held that the innocent spouse already acquired Code requires that steps be taken so parties may settle their
knowledge from the time he received reports from various differences. The Court refers the case to mediation, a voluntary
individuals about his wife’s alleged infidelity, which she never process in which a mediator, selected by the spouses seeking
admitted. In Contreras, the Court pegged knowledge by the legal separation, facilitates negotiation in order to reach a
innocent spouse of her husband’s infidelity only from the time voluntary agreement between the spouses.
he admitted to the affair even though the wife already had
received reports regarding his having a child by another woman Under the Section 13 of the SC Rules on Legal Separation
and had previously spoken with the mistress. (AM No. 02-11-11-SC, March 15, 2003), care should be taken
to limit conciliation to matters that are subject to compromise,
This inconsistency in the Court’s characterization of which excludes any ground for legal separation, the validity of
the point at which “knowledge” is obtained, makes the a legal separation, future support, and future children.
Family Code provision that requires only that actions
for legal separation be filed within five years from the Under AM No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA or the Consolidated and
time of occurrence, all the more appropriate. Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage
of Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) And Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR), when the spouses agree to undergo
WHEN TO TRY ACTIONS mediation, among the things that they can agree upon are
Under Article 58 of FC, the actions shall not be tried before six matters relating to the custody of minor children, separation of
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. The property, or support pendente lite.
six months period refers to a “cooling-off period” during which Mediation involves a three-stage process.
the parties are encouraged to find forgiveness and
reconciliation. During this period, the court must provide for the 1. Court-Annexed Meditation (CAM) – the judge will refer
support of spouses and children and for the latter’s custody. the spouses to the Philippine Mediation Center for the
mediation of their dispute by trained and accredited
SOMOSA-RAMOS V. VAMENTA, JR. (1972) mediators. The parties themselves may mutually agree
Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a petition before the respondent in the selection of an accredited mediator.
Judge for legal separation from her husband, Clemente Ramos, 2. Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) – the JDR judge
on the grounds of concubinage and attempt on her life. She also becomes a mediator-conciliator. If the spouses still fail
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory to agree in this stage, the mediator-judge must turn
injunction for the return of her paraphernal and exclusive over the case to another judge who will try the
properties, then under the administration of her husband. unsettled case.
Clemente opposed the setting of the hearing for the injunction, 3. Appeal – covered cases are referred to the PMC-
claiming that the court cannot try cases for legal separation Appeals Court Mediation unit. Mediation may still be
within the six-month cooling-off period under Article 103 of CC conducted while the case is on appeal.
because it would reduce the prospect of their reconciliation.

50
The spouses who are parties to a CAM are required to EFFECTS OF FILING OF PETITION
personally appear in the mediation. In the event they cannot
do so, they can send their authorized representatives. In order Art 61 After the filing of the petition, the spouses shall be
to determine the interests of each spouse, the mediator may entitled to live separately from each other.
also conduct separate caucuses. Joint conferences will follow The court, in the absence of a written agreement, shall
to allow the parties to negotiate their positions. designate either of them or a third person to administer
If settlement has been reached on any aspect of the legal the ACP or CPG. The administrator appointed by the
separation, a compromise agreement shall be drafted by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those
parties which will be submitted to the court for proper action. In of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
accordance with the confidentiality rule on mediation Art 62 During the pendency of the action, the provisions of
proceedings, the mediator or a JDR judge is prohibited from Article 49 shall also apply to the support of the
recording the conferences or caucuses. Any record that might spouses and the custody and support of the common
be obtained from the mediation proceedings shall not be children.
admissible in evidence.
The law allows the spouses to make a written agreement
Efforts to reach amicable settlement should not deter the Court regarding the administration of their properties, which is
from issuing protection orders pursuant to the Anti-VAWC enforceable by the Court. If there is no written agreement, the
Law. Protection orders are issued for the purpose of Court shall designate either of the spouses or a third person to
preventing further acts of violence against women and their administer the absolute community or conjugal property.
children and may order the respondent to stop harassing or
threatening to commit an act of violence, excluding him from
DE LA VIÑA V. VILLAREAL AND GEOPANO (1920)
the residence of the woman or directing him to stay away from
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint for divorce against her
the school or place of employment by the petitioner.
husband Diego de la Viña, alleging that he had been maintaining
acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, and that because of such
PARTICIPATION OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY illicit relations, her husband ejected her from their conjugal
home without any means of support. Along with the divorce,
Article 60 of the Family Code requires the participation of the Narcisa also prayed for the partition of the conjugal family,
prosecuting attorney or fiscal in legal separation cases. It also alimony pende lite in the sum of P400 per month, and a
prohibits the decree of legal separation on the basis of preliminary injunction prohibiting her husband from alienating
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the
pendency of the action. The respondent Judge granted the
A stipulation of fact is the agreement by both parties on the preliminary injunction prayed for by Narcisa. Diego filed the
facts of the case, admitting them into evidence without needing present petition for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the
any more proof. Judge in taking cognizance of the action and in issuing the
A confession of judgment, on the other hand, is an admission preliminary injunction.
by a party that he has no legal defense to a cause of action and Held: A married woman may acquire a separate domicile
that upon such default he authorizes judgment to be entered from her husband. While the general rule at that time is that
against him. In Ocampo v. Florenciano, the Court explained that the wife should follow the domicile of her husband, the rule was
there is confession of judgment when the defendant appears in not absolute. One such exception is when one spouse has
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a given cause for divorce, as in this case.
pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff’s demand.
The Court may also enjoin the disposition of the properties
OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO, supra belonging to the conjugal partnership if it will be injurious
Jose caught his wife having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame, to the interests of the other spouse. The law making the
and there he signified his intention to legally separate with her, husband the sole administrator of the conjugal property is
to which she agreed. Despite the fiscal’s finding that there was founded upon the presumption that the husband will promote
no collusion, the lower court dismissed the case holding that and not injure the interests of the wife. When such harmonious
there was a confession of judgment. The appellate court relation intended by law ceases, and the wife seeks to dissolve
affirmed the dismissal, hence this appeal. the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is but just
and proper to curtail the administrative power of the husband
Held: There is no confession of judgment. Even if the to protect the interests of the wife. Therefore, the respondent
defendant told the Fiscal that she “liked also” to be legally judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary
separated from her husband, there is no confession of injunction since there would be injustice to the wife and her
judgment since there is also evidence of the adultery rights if her husband disposes all or any part of the conjugal
independent of her statement. What the law prohibits is a property and squanders its proceeds during the pendency of
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant’s the action for divorce. After all, the wife was not asserting her
confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any right to administer the property, but merely her right to share in
defendant who opposed the separation will immediately the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal
confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. partnership once the divorce is decreed.

51
REYES V. INES-LUCIANO (1979) EFFECTS OF DECREE
Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed a complaint for legal separation against
her husband, Manuel, on the ground that the latter had In the decision granting the legal separation, the Court must
attempted to kill her at least twice. Celia prayed for support declare therein that the Decree of Legal Separation shall be
pendente lite, which Manuel opposed on the ground that she issued only after full compliance with the liquidation of
committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge properties under the Family Code. Specifically, Section 19 of
granted Celia’s prayer for alimony in the amount of P4,000 a the SC Rules on Legal Separation provides that the Court
month. However, Manuel filed a petition for certiorari in the CA shall issue the Decree of Legal Separation after:
seeking the annulment of the order granting the support 1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the
pendente lite to his wife, alleging Celia’s adultery and the petition in the civil registry where the marriage was
excessiveness of the amount of support. celebrated and in the civil registry where the Family
Held: While the adultery of the wife is a valid defense in an Court is located; and
action for support, the act must be established by 2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of
competent evidence. Mere allegation that she committed the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of
adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support Deeds where the real properties are located
pendente lite. Manuel did not present any evidence to prove the The court shall also quote in the Decree the dispositive
allegation that his wife had committed adultery with any person. portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the
In determining the award of amount to be awarded as approved deed of partition. Once the decree is issued, the rules
support pendente lite, it is not necessary to go fully into the require the party who secures it to have it registered in three
merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain government offices:
the kind and amount of evidence to enable it to justly resolve 1. Civil Registry where the marriage was registered
the application in view of the merely provisional character of the 2. Civil Registry where the Family Court is situated
resolution. Mere affidavits and other documentary evidence 3. Census and Statistics Office
may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support
Art 63 Effects of legal separation decree
pendente lite. Celia has submitted documents showing that the
(1) Spouses shall be entitled to live separately, but
corporations controlled by her husband have entered into multi-
the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways.
(2) ACP or CPG shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the the offending spouse shall forfeit his or her share
financial ability of Manuel, the amount of P4,000 as support of the net profits earned by the properties,
pendente lite to the wife is not excessive.
pursuant to the provisions of Article 43(2)
(3) Custody of minor children shall be awarded to
The Supreme Court rules also enhanced the remedies available innocent spouse, subject to Article 213
to the offended spouse upon filing of the petition for legal (4) Offending spouse shall be disqualified from
separation. Under the Rule on Provisional Orders, the Family inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate.
Court, motu propio or upon application under oath of any of the Testamentary provisions in favor of the offending
parties, guardian or designated custodian, may issue spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
provisional orders and protection orders with or without a
hearing. These include orders of spousal support, child BAÑEZ V. BAÑEZ (2002)
support, child custody, visitation rights, hold-departure order, RTC decreed the legal separation between petitioner Aida
order of protection, and for administration of common property. Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the
latter’s sexual infidelity, the dissolution of their conjugal
GANDIONCO V. PEÑARANDA, supra property, and the surrender by respondent of the use and
The husband’s attempt to resist payment of support pendente possession of a vehicle and a residential house. Aida filed a
lite to his wife must fail, since it is one of the remedies available motion for execution pending appeal of the surrender of the
in an action for legal separation which may be granted at the residential house, which was granted by the trial court. On
discretion of the judge. Considering the provisional nature of notice of appeal by Gabriel, the CA set aside the motion for
support orders, if the husband finds the amount of support execution. Hence this petition, where Aida avers that the trial
pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a court erred in not dismissing the husband’s ordinary appeal.
motion to modify or reduce the same.
Held: Legal separation does not allow multiple appeals. The
effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the ACP or CPG, and
custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal
separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may
resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from
the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation and thus they may not be subject to multiple
appeals.

52
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF ACP OR CPG net assets results to the net profits. This definition also applies
to the conjugal partnership regime under Article 63.
Article 63(2) of the Family Code provides that the ACP or the
CPG of the separating spouses shall be dissolved once the On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of
decree of legal separation is issued. Additionally, the offending conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil
spouse is deprived of any right to his or her share of the net Code, the husband and wife place in common fund the fruits of
profits earned by the properties. their separate property and income from their work or industry,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or partnership, they shall
QUIAO V. QUIAO (2012) divide equally the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
Respondent Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation by either spouse during the marriage. Thus, each of the couple
against petitioner Brigido Quiao. The RTC granted the legal has his and her own property and debts. The law does not
separation between the spouses and the custody of the minor intend to effect a merger of those debts and properties. Instead,
children went to Rita as the innocent spouse. It ruled that their it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
properties, which include several coffee mills and agricultural
lands in Mindanao, shall be divided equally, subject to the The following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties
legitimes of the children. Brigido, as the guilty spouse, shall of the spouses:
have no share in the net profits which will be forfeited in favor 1. An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
of their common children. Rita filed before the RTC a Motion for separately listing the couple’s conjugal properties and
Clarification asking the court to define the term “net profits their separate properties—in this case, the couple has no
earned.” The trial court ruled that it refers to “the remainder of separate properties when they married.
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate 2. The benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
properties of each of the spouse and the debts.” Brigido was partnership during the marriage is returned in equal
dissatisfied with this ruling and moved to reconsider. amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; if the
Issue: What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code? such shall be made to their respective owners.
3. The conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
Held: The Court differentiated the absolute community regime conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of
from the conjugal partnership regime. On the one hand, when a each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective
husband and wife enter into an absolute community regime, separate properties. If the conjugal partnership cannot
they become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses shall be
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and solidarily liable through their separate properties.
those acquired during the marriage (except those under Article 4. What remains of the separate or exclusive properties of
92) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of
when the marriage or community is dissolved, that common them.
mass is divided between the spouses or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, In the case at bar, since the spouses have no separate
irrespective of the value of each one may have originally owned. properties, there is nothing to return to any of them, and all their
properties will be considered as part of the conjugal
Under Article 102 of the FC, upon dissolution of marriage, an partnership. Hence, such should be divided equally between
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the the spouses and/or their respective heirs. But because the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each husband is the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
spouse; then, the debts or obligations of the community are conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of the common
paid out of the absolute community’s assets and if such is children. Therefore, nothing will be returned to Brigido under the
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will CPG regime because there is no separate property which may
be solidarily liable. Whatever is left of the separate properties be accounted for in his favor. Judgment of the RTC affirmed.
will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the
absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided
between the spouses; and the net profits shall be computed by SUPPORT AND CUSTODY
the increase in value between the market value of the Article 63(3) provides for the support and custody of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the legitimate children. During the Code deliberations, Justice
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Sempio-Diy resolved to not include illegitimate children from
Applying the foregoing, the “net profits” first requires finding the support out of the community net assets in case of forfeiture
market value of the properties at the time of the community’s because of unfairness to the legitimate family.
dissolution. From the total market value of all the properties, the As to the custody of children, Article 213 of the Family Code
debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be states that the parent designated by the Court shall exercise
subtracted, which results to the net assets. Deducting the parental authority over the children. Such designation shall be
market value of the properties at the time of marriage from the based on relevant considerations, including the age of the child.
If the child is under 7, he or she shall not be separated from the

53
mother, unless there are compelling reasons in not awarding INHERITANCE, DONATIONS, AND DESIGNATION IN
the custody. In other jurisdictions (e.g., United States and INSURANCE POLICIES
Europe), the preference for the mother has been declared
unconstitutional since it uses the parent’s sex as the The conviction of one spouse for a crime that is also a ground
determinant for custody instead of the fitness of each of parent. for legal separation does not by itself disqualify him or her from
In this Philippines, nonetheless, the tender years presumption inheriting from the other spouse. It is the decree of legal
remains in law. But if the child is over 7, he or she shall be separation that excludes the guilty spouse from inheriting
allowed to make a choice, which the Court will consider, unless from the innocent spouse—in such case, although the
the chosen parent is unfit. innocent spouse forgets or fails to revoke the will, it is ipso jure
revoked. Nonetheless, there is no law preventing the innocent
MATUTE V. MACADAEG (1956) spouse from executing a will in favor of the guilty spouse after
Armando Medel obtained a decree of legal separation from his the legal separation decree is issued.
wife, Rosario Matute, on the ground of adultery, and was also Once the decree is issued, the aggrieved spouse shall also have
awarded the custody of their four minor children. When he went a right to revoke the donations made in favor of the offending
to the US, he left the children under the care of his sister in spouse, as well as the latter’s designation as beneficiary in an
Davao; thereafter, Rosario went to Davao to live with her insurance policy. For the revocation of the donations to take
children. Upon his return, the children went back to their father effect, it shall be recorded in the registries of the property
in Cebu. Later on, Rosario obtained the permission of Armando where they are located.
to bring the children to Manila to attend her father’s funeral, with
the condition that she would return the children to him within Section 22 of the Rules on Legal Separation (AM No. 02-11-
two weeks. However, she did not do so and instead filed a 11-SC, March 15, 2003) state that:
motion praying for the custody of her children. Armando
opposed and countered that Rosario be cited with contempt for (a) Within 5 years from the date the legal separation decree
her refusal to restore the custody of their children to him. In has become final, the innocent spouse may file a petition
June 1955, respondent Judge issued an order absolving under oath to revoke the donations in favor of the guilty
Rosario from contempt but denying her motion for custody and spouse.
ordering her to deliver the children to Armando. Hence this (b) Revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the
present petition for certiorari and injunction, where she claims Register of Deeds where the properties are located.
that the children should be under her custody because: (c) Alienations, liens, and encumbrances registered in good
faith before the recording of the petition for revocation in
1. She is their legitimate mother and the children wish to the registries of property shall be respected.
stay with her and not with their father. (d) After the issuance of the legal separation decree, the
2. Three of the children are over ten years of age, and thus innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
their wish must be heeded, pursuant to Rule 100 of RC, offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy
unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of them even if such is irrevocable. It shall take effect upon
by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, written notification thereof to the insurer.
incapacity, or poverty.
3. The act of infidelity of which she had been found guilty Under the Insurance Code, the revocation of insurance policy
does not involve moral depravity. is expressly allowed, unless the insurer waives the right to
4. It is a thing of the past, not a present reality. revoke. However, Article 64 of the Family Code states that
5. Armando is now unfit to have the children under his case even if the designation is irrevocable, the innocent spouse shall
because he is cohabiting with another woman. retain the right to revoke the designation in favor of the guilty
6. Although he had married the latter after securing a spouse. Applying the rules on statutory construction, the
divorce decree in the US, the said decree is null and void conflict between the two shall be resolved in favor of the Family
and thus he is guilty of bigamy. Code, being the more specific law.
Held: Custody should not be awarded to Rosario. Since

custody of the children had been earlier granted to Armando, WIFE’S SURNAME
Rosario only obtained his permission to bring them to Manila to
Art 372 When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
attend the funeral of her father. Hence, she had to file for a
continue using her name and surname employed
modification of the order to allow the Court to determine if the
before the legal separation.
transfer of the custody to her would be for the best interest of
the children. However, custody could still not be granted to her
LAPERAL V. REPUBLIC (1962)
because the fact remains that Rosario is without means of
Elisea Laperal Santamaria filed in the Court of First Instance of
livelihood and by her own admission, she lives on the charity of
Baguio a petition to allow her to resume using her name of
her brothers. She has no home of her own to offer to her
Elisea Laperal. She claimed that her husband was given a
children but would shelter them under the roof of her brothers.
decree of legal separation from her and that they had stopped
Therefore, a grave abuse of discretion was not committed when
living together for many years already. The court denied the
the lower court decided that poverty, among other causes,
petition based on Article 372 of CC, which provides that even
rendered Rosario unfit to take charge of her children.
when legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue

54
using her name and surname prior to the legal separation. Upon Under Article 65 of the Family Code, if the spouses reconcile,
Elisea’s motion, however, the court treated the petition as one they should file a joint manifestation under oath, with the
for a change of name and granted the petition in order to allow Family Court having jurisdiction over the proceeding for legal
the petitioner, a businesswoman, to avoid confusion in her separation. Once the spouses have manifested their
finances and prevent the liquidation of her conjugal assets. reconciliation, the separation of property and the forfeiture of
Hence, this appeal. the share of the guilty spouse, both consequences of the legal
separation, shall subsist unless the spouses agree to revive
Held: Elisea is not entitled to resume her maiden name. The their formal property regime.
language of Article 372 is mandatory, as it uses the word
“shall.” The reason for this is because her married status is The Family Code provisions regarding the revival of the property
unchanged by the decree of legal separation and them living regime are ambiguous as to whether the spouses may choose
separately from each other for many years does not severe the a new regime different from the former regime. Article 66(2)
vinculum of marriage. Likewise, her claim that the reason for the speaks of revival of the property regime, which should mean
change of name was to avoid confusion in her finances and the a return to the regime in place before the decree of legal
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets is untenable, separation. Yet, Article 67 provides that the spouses may
because with the issuance of the legal separation decree in choose which properties should be contributed anew to the
1958, the conjugal partnership had also been dissolved and restored regime. The Rules on Legal Separation allow the
liquidated and thus there was no basis for her apprehension of parties who have reconciled to go back to their property regime
an eventual liquidation of conjugal assets that no longer exist. prior to the filing of the suit or choose a new one.
Logically, if in the first place the wife did not append The reconciliation of the spouses may occur while the
her husband’s surname to hers upon marriage, then proceeding for legal separation is still pending or even after
there would be no bar to her continued use of her the issuance of the decree for legal separation. Pending
maiden name after legal separation. proceedings shall be automatically terminated at whatever
stage. If the reconciliation happens after the judgment of legal
separation but before the issuance of the decree, the spouses
RECONCILIATION shall express in their manifestation whether or not they are
Art 65 If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint reviving their former regime or choosing a new regime.
manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be Under Section 24(a) of the Rules on Legal Separation, the
filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal reconciling spouses shall file a verified motion for revival of their
separation. property regime or the adoption of a new one in the same
Art 66 Consequences of the reconciliation; shall be recorded proceeding as the legal separation. If the court approves it, the
in the proper civil registries. parties must record the Order in the proper registries within 30
(1) Pending legal separation proceedings shall be days from receipt of a copy of the Order. The Court will then
terminated at whatever stage. immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that
(2) Final decree of legal separation shall be set aside the legal separation proceeding is set aside and specifying the
but the separation of property and any forfeiture regime that the spouses have chose to govern their property
of the share of the guilty spouse already effected relations. Section 23(f) of the Rules require the recording of
shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive this Decree of Reconciliation in the Civil Registries where the
their former property regime. marriage and the decree of legal separation were registered.
Art 67 The agreement to revive the former property regime in

Art 66 shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) Properties to be contributed anew to the restored
regime;
(2) Properties to be retained as separate properties
of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their
addresses, and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its

approval shall be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both
furnished to the creditors, whose interest shall be
protected by the court.
Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to

the conjugal union or commits acts which bring
danger, dishonor, or injury to the other or to the family,
the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.

55
D E F AC TO SE P AR ATI O N spouses enter into marital relations. This union is moral and
EFFECTS ON PERSONAL RELATIONS binding among all their congregations all over the world except
in countries where divorce is legal. Only couples who have been
Relations between the Spouses in De Facto Separation baptized and in good standing can execute the Declaration
• Spouses are estranged but did not obtain a judicial which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
decree of legal separation. Upon the execution of the Declaration, the couple cannot
• They are still spouses who are entitled to the rights and secure civil authorities’ approval due to the legal impediments
bound by obligations between husband and wife in FC. but as soon as these are absent, they should legalize their
o If either spouse enters into a relationship with a union. Although there is no longer any legal impediment on the
third person, they may be subject to civil, criminal, part of Soledad, Luciano was still not capacitated to marry.
or administrative liability. Their congregation does not find their union in any way immoral.
The Solicitor General argued that the conjugal arrangement
LACSON V. SAN JOSE (1968) under the Declaration is detrimental to the stability and peace
Alfonso and Carmen San-Jose Lacson were married with four of marriage, family, and the nation. It reduces to a mockery the
children. The two separated when Carmen left the conjugal institutions of marriage and family.
home in Bacolod and resided in Manila, where she filed a
complaint for custody of all their children as well as support for Held: Soledad is not guilty of disgraceful and immoral
them and herself. However, the spouses reached an amicable conduct since she invoked the freedom of religion under
settlement regarding the custody of their children, wherein the the Constitution. In her congregation, her relationship with
two elder children will go to Alfonso while the younger children Luciano is accepted. The only time when the law overrides this
will go to Carmen; support; and the voluntary dissolution of their right is when there is a compelling state interest that would
conjugal partnership and separation of property. The affect rights of others. Disgraceful and immoral conduct refers
compromise agreement was sent to the court for judicial to an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality
approval. The court approved the agreement between the and decorum abhorred and condemned by society; it is
spouses, finding it conformable to law. Later on, Carmen filed a conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
complaint praying for the custody of the two elder children shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and
under Alfonso. This was granted by the CA who declared the respectable members of the community.
compromise agreement null and void insofar as the custody
Soledad's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized due to
over Enrique and Teresa was concerned.
exemption from the law based on fundamental right to freedom
Held: The compromise agreement was valid with respect to of religion. Because cohabitation without marriage is not
the separation of property of the spouses and the immoral under her religion, there is no disgraceful and immoral
dissolution of the conjugal partnership. The couple have conduct on the part of Soledad. Here, the Court did not decide
been separated in fact for at least five years. Therefore, on the legality of the extramarital cohabitation, only on the
inasmuch as a length separation has supervened between presence of immoral conduct. In a predominantly Catholic
them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary country, morality is shaped mostly by Catholic religion. But
interests is manifest. Besides, the Court cannot constrain the Courts only deal with secular morality, that is, morality outside
spouses to live together. However, in so approving the regime the scope of religion. Therefore, her act is not immoral.
of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership, the Court does not accord BANAAG V. ESPELETA (2011)
recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the Evelina Banaag filed before the Office of the Court
spouses. Administrator a complaint against Olivia Espeleta with Gross
Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Based on law and jurisprudence, if either spouse enters into a Service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with
relationship with a third person, he or she may be found civilly liable her husband, Avelino Banaag. Olivia introduced herself as an
under the Family Code, criminally liable for adultery or concubinage
RTC interpreter. Evelina thought Olivia can help her and her
under the Revised Penal Code, or administratively liable for immortality
husband in their cases. Husband learned that they were both
under the Administrative Code.
from Batangas and asked for Olivia’s number. A year later,
Evelina finds out about the affair. One time, Avelino asked to
ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR (2003)
withdraw P180k from their joint bank account to lend his brother
Alejandro Estrada requested an investigation on Soledad
Reynaldo who was in the hospital. Evelina found out that only
Escritor and was charged with disgraceful and immoral
P80k went to the brother, and learned from a friend that the
conduct. Soledad testified that when she was employed as a
husband went to Olivia in Bulacan. When he was drunk, Avelino
court interpreter, she was already a widow. But she admitted
told Evelina’s friend that he had been seeing Olivia and giving
living with Luciano Quilapo, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
her P5,000 for groceries. Evelina confronted her husband, who
and even had a child with him even when her husband was still
admitted that he has been taking from their conjugal funds and
alive but living with another woman. As a member of Jehovah’s
depositing it into Olivia’s account for 3 years, and Olivia’s
Witnesses, her conjugal arrangement was in conformity to their
daughter and her colleagues accounts. Olivia resigned and
religious belief. After ten years of living together, she executed
went to the US.
a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness wherein it allows
members of their congregation who was abandoned by their

56
Held: Olivia Espleta is guilty of immoral conduct. Disgraceful Leouel abducted his son and spirited him away to Negros
and immoral conduct means suspension from service, 6 Oriental. The Bedias then filed a petition for care, custody, and
months & 1 day to a year for 1st offense and dismissal for 2nd control of Leouel Jr. before the RTC, alleging that they paid the
offense. Respondent filed no comment, even though she was hospital bills and had been supporting the boy ever while
given opportunity to be heard and refute the charges. She ran petitioner had never given a single centavo to support his son.
away to escape accountability, as she left for the US right after His mother was also giving the grandparents support for him.
she resigned. This strongly indicate her guilt, not to mention the They averred that the use of trickery to abduct the child does
fact that deposit slips from Avelino were shown by Evelina. The not speak well of Leouel’s suitability as a parent. The trial court
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is granted custody to his grandparents, and CA affirmed, holding
reasonable ground to believe that Olivia is responsible, even if that the grandparents are well off financially and mother
it is not overwhelming. Therefore, Olivia’s maintenance of an supports the child as well, while Leouel Sr. is a military
illicit relationship with a married man is considered disgraceful personnel and has to move frequently and has never given any
and immoral. financial support to his child.
Held: Leouel Sr. should have custody over his child. Parental
RELATIONS WITH CHILDREN authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
ART. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise When a parent entrusts a minor to another, what is given is
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In merely temporary custody, and even if renunciation is manifest,
case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless the law disallows it. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence,
there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised
observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are by the surviving grandparent. In this case, Leouel Sr. is the
obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental present parent. The aforementioned considerations are
authority. insufficient to defeat his parental authority and right to have
custody over the child because he has not been shown to be
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental unsuitable or unfit. The Bedias demonstrated love and affection
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the for the boy; nonetheless, the legitimate father is still preferred
court. The Court shall take into account all relevant over the grandparents. Wealth is not a deciding factor since
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven there is no proof that petitioner cannot support his son. The fact
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under that he did not provide financial support in the past is not
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless enough to remove his permanent right of custody. Likewise, his
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. past inattention to the child does not mean abandonment and
his efforts now to keep his child may be regarded as serious
CHILD CUSTODY attempt to rectify his past misdeeds. His being a soldier is no
• Parents in de facto separation continue to have joint bar to custody as well. Soldiers cannot be deprived of authority
parental authority. and custody over their children just because of their duties.
o If parents are unable to reach a custody Finally, his abduction is also not enough to deprive him custody.
agreement, Court will decide pursuant to Art. 213.
▪ Tender years → below 7 years old. Based on SY V. CA (2007)
presumption that only a mother can provide Mercedes Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against Wilson
the love and other basic needs of a child of Sy to get custody of her minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah
tender years. as their mother. Wilson opposed, claiming that Mercedes was
• Court needs to determine compelling reasons if unfit to take custody of the minors as she abandoned their
awarding child below 7 to the father OR if awarding child family, is mentally unstable, and cannot provide proper care to
above 7 to the parent not chosen. the children. The RTC and CA granted custody of the children
• Foremost consideration, when Court is determining to Mercedes and ordered Wilson to pay support.
custody, shall always be the welfare and best interest of
Held: Mercedes should have custody over her children. The
the child.
law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have
• When do parents lose parental authority?
custody of her children so that they may have the benefit of a
o Death
mother’s love and devotion for which there is no substitute.
o Absence
Likewise, no children below the age of seven shall be separated
o Unsuitability
from their mother, unless there are compelling reasons to the
contrary. In this case, Wilson’s allegation of the unfitness of
SANTOS SR. V. CA (1995)
Mercedes were refuted by the latter. She left the conjugal home
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia
to work in Taiwan and earn money to reclaim her children. Her
Bedia, a nurse by profession were married. They had one child,
act of praying in the rain is a mere expression of her faith
Leouel Santos, Jr. From his release from the hospital until when
different from that of Wilson’s family, which is also the reason
he was 3 years old, he had been staying with his maternal
for their separation. She is also financially able to provide her
grandparents. Julia left for the US to work and Leouel alleged
children with the necessities of life. The SC deferred to the trial
he is not aware of her whereabouts despite efforts to locate her.
court’s determination over the issue of unfitness.

57
PEREZ V. CA (1996) FC, both Loran and Marie have joint parental authority and
Ray Perez and his wife, Nerissa, were married. She began to custody. Art 213 FC says nothing on disallowing a father from
work in New York as a resident alien while husband, on tourist seeing or visiting his child under 7 years old.
visa, stayed with her to attend to her pregnancy. After six
miscarriages, two operations, and a high-risk pregnancy,
Nerissa gave birth to Ray Junior (RJ) in New York. They went to EFFECT ON PROPERTY RELATIONS
Cebu for a five-week vacation but only Nerissa came back to
US. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently The de facto separation will not affect spouses’ property
in the Philippines but Nerissa changed her mind and decided to relations except in the cases provided in the following
stay in New York. When she came home a few days before the provisions:
first birthday of RJ, the couple was no longer on good terms.
ART. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife
Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and depend on her
shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
husband’s meager income, so she was forced to move to her
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
parents’ home. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus
live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
asking respondent to surrender the custody of their child to her.
be supported;
The RTC granted the custody of the child to Nerissa on the
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
ground of Article 213(2) of FC. On appeal, the CA reversed the
the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
RTC and gave the custody of the now two-year old child to Ray.
be obtained in a summary proceeding;
Held: The CA erred in awarding the custody of the child (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the
under seven years of age to Ray. Separation in Article 213 of separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
FC does not mean “legal separation,” so it shall also be applied liable for the support of the family. The spouse present
to those who are separated in fact. Article 213 is mandatory in shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
character as it uses the word “shall.” Its intent is to prevent a given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
tragedy where a mother sees her baby torn away from her. The specific separate property of the other spouse and use
exception for this has to be for ‘compelling reasons’ for the the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
good of the child such neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, ART. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife
maltreatment of the child, insanity and illness on the part of the shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership except that:
mother. However, in this case, there is no showing of Nerissa’s
unfitness. She is still employed in a hospital in US, and nurses (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
are in demand so she can easily find jobs there. The argument live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
that petitioner has no time to care for her child because of her be supported;
twelve-hour shift thrice weekly was unfounded. Her present (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
schedule is not so unmanageable as she can always arrange a the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
schedule that may accommodate the needs of her child. She be obtained in a summary proceeding;
can also delegate child care temporarily to qualified persons (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership
like her mother, a yaya, or those who run daycare centers. property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
SALIENTES V. ABANILLA (2006) present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are parents to two-year-old proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
boy Lorenzo. They reside at Marie’s parent’s home. Due to encumber any specific separate property of the other
disputes with Marie’s parents, Loran left. From then, Loran was spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy
prevented from seeing his son. Loran filed a petition for habeas the latter’s share.
corpus and custody at the RTC. The RTC and CA ruled in favor
Solidary Liability → 1 spouse is liable solely to the obligations
of Loran as to the habeas corpus but did not award custody of
the child. Marie and her parents file for certiorari in the SC. Joint Liability → liability is divided equally
Held: CA is correct in affirming that there be no granting of LIABILITY OF PROPERTIES FOR SUPPORT
custody to any party. Since parents are separated de facto,
Support is everything indispensable to sustenance, dwelling,
the issue of custody is yet to be adjudicated. No judicial grant
clothing, transportation, and medical expenses in keeping with
of custody means that both parents are still entitled to the
custody. Art 213 and tender years presumption may be used the financial capacity of the family.
only to counter the claim of custody and not habeas corpus. • CC: husband has sole responsibility to support the family
• FC: joint responsibility of the spouses to render mutual
Habeas corpus is the correct remedy when rightful custody help and support → support usually comes from
is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Proper to direct community property, but spouse will be solidarily liable
Marie to merely produce minor in court and explain why they in the absence of sufficient community property
are restraining his liberty. There is no grant of custody in habeas • Entitlement to Support → rests on whether or not that
corpus, only presentation of the person in court. Under Art 211 spouse left with justifiable reasons

58
DADIVAS V. VILLANUEVA (1929) Pilar is not entitled to support from her husband on the
Aurelia Dadivas and Rafael Villanueva married with three kids. ground because of some misunderstandings with her in-
Despite the infidelity of her husband, Aurelia still continued laws. While she was adamant on separating with her husband,
marital relations in hopes of keeping the family intact, hoping he Chua had adopted a conciliatory attitude by acknowledging his
will change. Later on, she withdrew from the family home and obligation to support her and by expressing his intent to
lived separately with the 2 younger children because of the establish a separate conjugal home. Under Article 299 of CC,
husband’s brutality and lack of consideration. In her suit, Aurelia the husband is given the option to fulfill his obligation by paying
asked for P750 monthly allowance. an allowance fixed by the Court, or by receiving and maintaining
his wife in their home, unless there is a moral or legal obstacle
Held: Repeated acts of conjugal infidelity and Rafael’s thereto. Misunderstanding with in-laws is not the moral or legal
disregard of the sanctity of marriage gives the wife an obstacle contemplated in the said provision. The law does not
undeniable right to relief. The law is not so unreasonable as prohibit the husband from establishing their conjugal residence
to require a wife to live with a husband whose infidelity makes at his patriarchal home, nor is it immoral to meet his obligation
common habitation with him unbearable. In order to entitle a with the aid of his elders. Therefore, there is no legal justification
wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate for Pilar to live separately from her husband, and thus, there
maintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the would also be no reason to compel him to pay her allowance
husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. when he already offered the alternative.
Perverse and illicit relations outside the marriage are enough.
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO (1949)
GARCIA V. SANTIAGO (1928) Held: The wife is entitled to support. Both parties agree that
Garcia was married to Santiago and lived together under one they have no trouble or misunderstanding as between
roof with their children from their previous marriages. In her themselves, plaintiff claiming that she could live with defendant
complaint for administration of their conjugal property, Garcia were it not for the latter’s mother. Defendant was evidently not
alleged that Santiago’s son, Alejo, seduced her daughter who willing to stop living with his mother in order to live with his wife.
gave birth to a child. Garcia claimed that Santiago started As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the
conveying properties belonging to their conjugal partnership to in-laws, there is legal justification for the wife’s refusal to live
his son, to her detriment. Because of this, they often fought with her husband, taking into account the traditional hatred
which led to Garcia abandoning the conjugal home. Thereafter, between a wife and her mother-in-law. While a wife is obliged
Santiago publicly maintained illicit relations with Geronima Yap. to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his
Garcia alleged that Santiago’s immoral conduct and acts shows residence under Article 58 of CC, such right does not include
his unfitness to administer the conjugal partnership. compelling the wife to live with her mother-in-law, if the two
Held: The separation is justified. To keep the two young cannot get along together.
people under the same roof with the opportunity to continue
their illicit relations would create a very embarrassing situation CONSENT TO TRANSACTIONS
for Garcia. Since she was also virtually driven out of their home
and threatened with violence if she were to return, to compel The administration and enjoyment of properties belonging to
her to live with Santiago can only lead to further quarrels and the absolute community of properties or to the conjugal
would be unfortunate for both parties. Since the separation was partnership property belong to the spouses jointly. Acts of
necessary, the wife was granted maintenance allowance. ownership, such as the sale or mortgage of the community or
conjugal properties require the written authority of both
ATILANO V. CHUA CHING BENG (1958) spouses without which the disposition or encumbrance shall
Pilar Atilano and Chua Ching Beng were married. After their be void. Likewise, the spouse may not donate any property
marriage, they resided with the husband’s parents in Manila. without the consent of the other, save for moderate gifts
After visiting Pilar’s parents, Chua was told by his in-laws to go during times of happiness or grief.
to Manila alone and Pilar would follow him later, which she failed
to do so. Pilar then filed a complaint for support against her Therefore, when the husband and wife are separated de facto
husband, alleging that they separated because of her aversion and one spouse has been abandoned by the other or where the
to live with her in-laws. She prayed that her husband be ordered spouse refused to give consent, the Court requires that a
to give her a monthly allowance. Meanwhile, Chua responded judicial authorization to enter any of the aforementioned
that their marital life was peaceful and it was only when they transactions to be secured instead. The law affords the spouse
went to Zamboanga that she became alienated from him. He the chance of selling or leasing out properties to be able to pay
averred that he would prefer to fulfill his duty of supporting his for the needs of the family.
wife by living with her in Manila and that he would be willing to Procedure for transacting without spousal consent under FC:
establish a conjugal home separate from his parents. In the
meantime, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite, which ART. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or
the court granted. Chua filed another petition electing to fulfill one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial
his obligation by living with his wife in his own residence, with authorization for a transaction where the consent of the
the prayer that if his wife refuses to receive support this way, he other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld
should not be compelled to remit the allowance to her.

59
or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court PARTOSA-JO V. CA (1992)
alleging the foregoing facts. Prima Partosa-Jo filed a case for support and judicial
separation of property against her husband Jose Jo. As Jose
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying cohabited with three women and sired 15 children, the trial
the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said court awarded the support, but the decision was silent on the
transaction and state the reason why the required consent judicial separation of property. The wife appealed to the CA,
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly which dismissed the complaint on the ground that separation
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by by agreement is not covered by Article 178 of CC. The CA held
the court. that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement
and not because of abandonment, and thus the only remedy
ART. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify available to the petitioner was legal separation, by virtue of
the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is which the conjugal partnership would be terminated.
required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause
why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date Held: Prima is entitled to a judicial separation of property.
set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be The agreement between her and Jose was only for her to
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
the last known address of the spouse concerned. pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. Under Article
128 of FC, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation of property upon abandonment by the other spouse
ART. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference,
without just cause or failure of one spouse to comply with his
said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the
or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if he or
basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral
she does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies an
testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with
needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard
the intention of perpetual separation. As early as 1942, Jose
and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the
had already denied Prima admission to their conjugal home,
parties to present said witnesses.
which shows that he had no intention of resuming their
relationship. Prima may also invoke the second ground allowed
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final by Article 128, for the fact that Jose failed to comply with his
and executory. obligations as husband or parent when he cohabited with other
women and sired many children by them. Lastly, their
separation also falls under Article 135(6) of FC, which includes
ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON PROPERTY
as a sufficient cause for judicial separation of property the de
The FC provides that in case one spouse is incapacitated or facto separation of the spouses for at least one year at the time
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal of the petition with reconciliation being highly improbable.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration.
SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF
• Powers of disposition or encumbrance cannot be PROPERTY
exercised by the spouse without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. Article 135(4) of FC provides that a person whose spouse had
abandoned him or her, or Article 135(6) where a spouse failed
The SC Rule on Provisional Orders provides: to comply with his or her obligations to the family, may ask
for a judicial separation of property.
SECTION 8. Administration of Common Property. - If a spouse
• Abandonment → when spouse has left the conjugal
without just cause abandons the other or-fails to comply with
dwelling without any intention of returning.
his or her obligations to the family, the court may, upon
o Absolute cessation of all forms of communication
application of the aggrieved party under oath, issue a
• No intention of returning → any spouse who has left
provisional order appointing the applicant or a third person as
the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
receiver or sole administrator of the common property subject
failed within the same period to give any information as
to such precautionary conditions it may impose.
to his whereabouts shall be presumed to have no
The receiver or administrator may not dispose of or encumber intention of returning.
any common property or specific separate property of either • Effects
spouse without prior authority of the court. o Each spouse may exclusively own earnings and
fruits of separate property.
The provisional order issued by the court shall be registered in o Obligation to support children continues.
the proper Register of Deeds and annotated in all titles of ▪ Contribution → proportionate to income
properties subject of the receivership or administration. or property
o Mutual obligation to support each other continues
unlike in a case of legal separation.

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ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF THE AB SO LU TE D I VO R C E
OTHER SPOUSE
BRIEF HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
ART. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive
property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the The Siete Partidas, originally known as Libro de las Leyes, was
other spouse: first compiled during the reign of Alfonso X of Castile.
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; • Due to the expansion of Spain, the Partidas was
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; extended to Spanish colonies, including the Philippines.
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which • The Partidas governed rights pertaining to marriage,
carries with it civil interdiction; or among others, and provided for relative divorce or legal
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is separation on the grounds of:
in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. 1. One of the spouses wanted to enter a religious
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, order with permission from the other
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall 2. Adultery is committed by either spouse
appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. 3. One of the spouses had become a heretic.
In 1917, Act No. 2170 or the Divorce Law was passed by the
Article 142 of FC also allows the abandoned spouse to file for
legislature providing as grounds for absolute divorce the
administration of exclusive property of other spouse who has
criminal conviction of the wife for adultery and the husband for
been judicially declared an absentee, or when one spouse
concubinage.
becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused
in a criminal case. During the Japanese occupation, a new divorce law contained
• The court shall appoint a third person if the other in Executive Order 141 was issued, increasing the grounds of
spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, divorce to 11, similar to our current grounds for legal separation:
conflict of interest, or any other just cause.
• Since it is separate property of the other spouse, then 1. Adultery or concubinage
the present spouse has no right whatsoever → 2. Attempt on the life of one’s spouse
spouse must get court approval 3. A subsequent marriage contracted before the dissolution
of the prior marriage
4. Loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either
OTHER REMEDIES spouse
5. Incurable insanity
In a de facto separation, a wife may also resort to the
6. Impotency
application of a protection order under RA 9262.
7. Criminal conviction of a crime in which the minimum
Acts of Violence Against Women penalty is not less than six years imprisonment
(1) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her 8. Repeated bodily violence
children of financial support legally due her or her family 9. Intentional or unjustified desertion for one year
(2) Deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient 10. Unexplained absence from the last conjugal dwelling for
financial support three consecutive years
a. Must be committed with the purpose or effect of 11. Slander by deed or gross by one spouse against the
controlling or restricting the woman’s or her other to the extent that further living together has
child’s movement or conduct become impracticable.
(3) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
Upon the liberation of the Philippines, General Douglas
humiliation to the woman or her child, including denial of
MacArthur proclaimed null and void all laws other than those
financial support or custody of the minor child
passed by the Philippine Commonwealth. Act No. 2170 again
The court may issue a protection order which has the purpose became the prevailing law. Although provisions for divorce were
of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any contemplated in the drafting of the Civil Code, these were not
disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the passed into law.
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain
Aside from the Holy See, the Philippines is the only other
control over her life. This includes:
country in the world that does not grant divorce. Unhappily
• Barangay Protection Order (BPO)
married persons were expected to stay together, mainly for the
• Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
sake of their children, given that there was no legal way to
• Permanent Protection Order (PPO
terminate their marriage. The legal separation that is allowed
• These will compel the husband to provide support for his
in the Civil Code does not sever marriage ties. Article 15 of the
wife and children → failure to do so will render
Civil Code explicitly applies the nationality principle on all
respondent liable for indirect contempt of court.
issues involving family rights and duties, or the status, condition
Note: In de facto separation, the spouse must file ONE SEPARATE and legal capacity of persons, and are binding upon citizens
CASE for EACH remedy (custody, separation of property, even though living abroad. Given that there is no Philippine law
appointment as sole administrator), unlike in legal separation, where granting divorce, this law follows all Filipino citizens though they
the decree gives rise to all grounds are domiciliaries of a country that grants divorce.

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In 1988, the Family Code became law and recognized divorce Similar to annulment, the grounds for nullity found in Articles
secured abroad by a foreigner from his or her Filipino spouse. 35 to 38 must have already existed at the time the marriage was
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws likewise recognizes contracted. Although it sounds simple, Article 36 states that:
divorces obtained by Muslims from Sharia courts. These are the
only two situations where divorce involving a Filipino citizen is A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
recognized in the Philippines. the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
DIVORCE VS. LEGAL AND DE FACTO SEPARATION becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In the Philippines, there is only relative divorce or legal The last line of Article 36 is often misunderstood as allowing
separation. Legal separation, which is mere separation from grounds that occurred after the solemnization of the marriage,
bed and board (divorce a mens et thoro), does result in the instead of grounds already there at the time the marriage was
dissolution of the marital ties but modifies the incidents of the celebrated but only became manifest during the marriage. This
marriage relationship by relieving the spouses of the duty of misconception, together with the ease by which a decree of
living with each other. It does not necessarily affect their nullity based on psychological incapacity could be obtained,
economic rights and duties since the Court may order the has led to the dubbing of Article 36 as “divorce, Philippine
spouse who gave cause for the separation to provide for the style.” This erroneous interpretation can be traced to the work
support of the innocent spouse and their common children. of the committees that prepared the Family Code when they
In contrast, absolute divorce (divorce a vincula matrimonii) is opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
the judicial termination of the legal marriage after which the marriage based on Canon Law to avoid strong opposition from
marriage vows are permanently severed. As a rule, erstwhile the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector. It was made to
spouses will have no rights or obligations unto each other. apply in civil law for three reasons:
Thus, it is essential that the court has personal jurisdiction over 1. As a substitute for divorce
the respondent spouse and the spouses’ community or 2. As a solution to the problem of church-annulled
conjugal properties that it seeks to affect by its decree. marriages
The Family Code also has provisions that govern de facto 3. As an additional remedy for problematic marriages
separation. Articles 100 and 127 of the Code provide that in that do not fall under the void and voidable marriage
case of de facto separation between husband and wife, the provisions of the Family Code.
regime of absolute community or conjugal partnership of the Perpetuating this error distorts the conceptual and legal
spouses shall not be affected. The Code enumerates distinctions between divorce and nullity and unwittingly lends
qualifications for this rule: support to those who object to a divorce law by arguing that
1. A spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live there is no need for such since Article 36 already exists.
therein, without just cause, shall lose the right to be Thus, in Marcos v. Marcos, the Court explained that Article 36
supported. is not a divorce law that dissolves the marriage when the causes
2. As to transactions entered by one spouse during the de manifest themselves; it refers to a serious psychological
facto separation, if the law requires consent, judicial illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
authorization shall be obtained in a summary marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent to deprive one
proceeding. from fulfilling his or her marital obligations provided under
3. As to support of the family, if the community or conjugal Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code.
property is insufficient, the spouses’ separate properties
shall be solidarily liable. The spouse present may be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber any FOREIGN DIVORCE OBTAINED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
specific property of the other spouse to satisfy the
latter’s share. Two important provisions form the bases for judicial decisions
on foreign divorces involving Filipino citizens. These are:
DIVORCE VS. ANNULMENT AND NULLITY OF MARRIAGE Article 15, CC. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or
the status, condition and legal capacity of
A divorce decree is granted for grounds that arose only during persons are binding upon citizens of the
the married life of the spouses and presumes a valid marriage. Philippines, even though living abroad.
In contrast, annulment is for specific grounds enumerated in Article 26, FC. … Where a marriage between a Filipino
the Family Code which already existed during the marriage citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
ceremony. These are voidable marriages considered valid until and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
annulled. If the parties granted by law the right to file for abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
annulment fail to do so within the prescribed period or ratify the or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
defect in the marriage, then the marriage will be considered have capacity to remarry under Philippine
valid and can no longer be disturbed. law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

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DIVORCE BETWEEN TWO FILIPINO CITIZENS MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO AND AN ALIEN
Article 15 of the Civil Code applies to all Filipinos wherever Two decades after the case of Tenchavez v. Escaño and before
they are residing. It does not matter that the Filipino spouses the amendment to Article 26 was made, the Supreme Court
have been long domiciled in a country which allows divorce. decided the landmark case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., that gave
Although the courts of competent jurisdiction in the place of recognition to a foreign divorce decree obtained by an alien
domicile grant a divorce decree, such will not be recognized in spouse married to a Filipino. In this case, the Court ruled that
the Philippines given that the Philippine law does not have a the dissolution of the marriage brought about by a foreign
divorce law and therefore does not give Filipinos the legal divorce decree should also bind the Filipino spouse. The
capacity to obtain a divorce, much less enter into a subsequent amendment of Article 26 was designed to put an end to the
marriage. bizarre situation of a Filipino still being married to a foreigner
who, by the latter’s own law, is no longer married to the Filipino.
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO (1965)
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño, both Filipino citizens, VAN DORN V. ROMILLO JR. (1985)
were married. Vicenta left for the US and filed for divorce in the Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino while private respondent
state of Nevada on the ground of extreme mental cruelty. She Richard Upton is an American. They were married in Hong Kong
subsequently contracted a second marriage with Russell Leo and established their residence in the Philippines. Later on, they
Moran, an American citizen. Tenchavez then filed for legal obtained a divorce in Nevada. Alice thereafter remarried
separation, citing the divorce obtained by the wife in the United Theodore Van Dorn. Richard filed a suit against Alice, stating
States. that her business in Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal
property and asking that he be declared with right to manage
Held: The divorce decree obtained by Vicenta is void. The the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the
divorce has no effect and the valid marriage between them ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment
subsists, although the husband is entitled to a decree of legal in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
separation. The prohibition of the Philippine law against divorce Richard acknowledged that they had no community property.
cannot be circumvented by obtaining a divorce decree from a The respondent Judge, denied her motion on the ground that
foreign country. The Court also provided some rules with regard the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
to foreign divorces: divorce decree has no bearing. Richard avers that the divorce
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought decree obtained in Nevada cannot prevail over the prohibitive
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil laws and national policy of the Philippines and that the acts and
Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this Held: The divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. The
country; Nevada divorce is valid in any of the States in the US and is
(2) That the remarriage of the divorced wife and her binding on Richard as an American citizen. In the Philippines, it
cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband is true that because of the nationality principle embodied in
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation Article 15 of the Civil Code Philippine nationals are covered by
conformably to Philippine law; the policy against absolute divorces, the same being deemed
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce contrary to public policy and morality. However, aliens may still
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
damages; Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the law. Thus, in this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of from his marriage from the standards of American law, under
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. which divorce dissolves the marriage. Therefore, pursuant to his
In refusing to recognize the foreign divorce, the Court added national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He
that to give effect to foreign divorce decrees would give rise to would have no standing to sue her and would not be entitled to
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens who have the exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
means to travel abroad and obtain divorce decrees. decision of the Nevada Court, he is estopped by his own
representation before the said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
Consequently, the divorce decree is also binding on Alice.

To maintain that she is still married to Richard and still subject
to the obligations of a wife cannot be just. Alice should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to Richard. He should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. Alice should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.

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PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA (1989) or spirit of the law is the law itself. The purpose of Article 26(2)
Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino, and Erich Geiling, a German, were is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
married in Germany. They lived in Manila and begot a daughter. remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
Thereafter, marital discord set in and they separated. Geiling divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is
instituted a divorce proceeding against his wife in Germany, rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
alleging the failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart for a year already. The German court issued a Ma’am finds it difficult to navigate around the plain
divorce decree and granted custody of the child to Pilapil. meaning of the law. When Article 26(2) states that “a
Afterwards, Geiling filed two complaints of adultery against divorce is thereafter validly obtained by the alien
Pilapil, alleging that while they were still married, she had affairs spouse,” this clearly refers to the alien spouse filing
with two other men. Pilapil moved to quash the complaint, but for divorce. If it does not, then that phrase should not
was denied by the respondent Judge. Hence this petition. have been written at all. Instead, it should have merely
said: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
Held: Geiling has no legal standing to sue Pilapil. The divorce a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
decree obtained by Geiling in Germany is valid and its effects thereafter validly obtained abroad, the Filipino spouse
are recognized in the Philippines insofar as he is concerned, in shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
view of the nationality principle in the Civil Code. Therefore, The Court should have followed the principle of
where a foreign court has granted a divorce decree filed by the separation of powers instead of resorting to
alien spouse against the Filipino, the decree binds the Filipino judicial overreach.
spouse as well. Because the person who initiates an adultery
case must be the offended spouse, Geiling, who is no longer
the husband of Pilapil, has no legal standing to commence an MARRIAGE BETWEEN FILIPINOS WITH ONE
adultery case as he could not be considered an offended SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGING CITIZENSHIP
spouse at the time he filed the suit. Apart from foreign divorces between an alien and a Filipino, the
Supreme Court had also discussed the effect of foreign divorce
REPUBLIC V. MANALO (2018) to spouses who are both Filipino citizens at the time of the
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, a Filipino citizen, and Yoshino Minoro, celebration of their marriage but where one of the spouses
a Japanese national, were married in the Philippines. A year subsequently acquires a foreign nationality.
after, Manalo filed a case for divorce in a Japanese court, which
rendered a divorce decree. Consequently, Manalo filed a QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND DANDAN (1998)
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
of Manila by virtue of the divorce decree granted by the Philippines. Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce in
Japanese court. The trial court denied the petition for lack of California, and shortly thereafter she married Felix Tupaz but
merit, but was later overturned by the CA, citing that the person their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the USA, she
filing for the divorce is inconsequential with respect to Article married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. In the
26 of the Family Code because the decree they obtained makes intestate proceedings of Arturo, Blandina Dandan and her
Yoshino no longer married to his wife and thus capacitated to
children appeared, claimed to be the surviving spouse and heirs
remarry. Hence, this petition.
of the deceased. In support of their claim, they submitted
Held: A foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a certified photocopies of the final judgment of divorce between
foreign spouse is also considered as valid in the Philippines, Fe and Arturo. The trial court disregarded the divorce between
even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad. Fe and Arturo and ruled that their marriage subsisted until the
According to the Court, there is no real and substantial death of Arturo in 1972. Meanwhile, it averred that there was no
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce showing that marriage existed between Blandina and Arturo,
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the been acknowledged by the deceased. On appeal, the CA
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos reversed, ruling that the trial court erred in deciding the case
who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land, and without first conducting a hearing as to controversies regarding
to make a distinction between them based on who initiated the the lawful heirs of the deceased person and the distributive
divorce proceeding is unfair. shares to which each person is entitled to.
Held: In her commend to petitioner’s motion, Blandina raised,

In this case, the second paragraph of Article 26 was interpreted among others, the issue as to whether Fe was still entitled to
as requiring only that there be a divorce validly obtained inherit from Arturo considering that she had secured a divorce
abroad, and did not demand that the alien spouse should be in the USA and in fact had twice remarried. Fe replied that
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
decree was granted. her in spite of the divorce they obtained. This implies that Fe
The Court went beyond the letter of the law and ruled that was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time she obtained the first
assuming that the word “obtained” is interpreted to mean that divorce. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien hearing to establish her citizenship—instead, the lower court
spouse, the Court will bear in mind the principle that the intent carelessly settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the

64
ruling in Tenchavez. While Blandina tried to raise the issue of at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
citizenship of Fe in light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad which are recognizable
in the Philippines, the trial court did not grant her prayer for a When Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
hearing and proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding there was still a valid marriage between her and Cipriano. But
that both Fe and Arturo were Filipino citizens married in the subsequently, she obtained a valid divorce decree capacitating
Philippines and that their California divorce is not valid. her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Article 26(2) are both present, and thus Cipriano, the divorced
The trial court therefore overlooked the materiality of the Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However,
issue of whether Fe was still a Filipino citizen when their because the records are bereft of evidence regarding the
divorce was decreed. Once proved that she was no longer a divorce decree and the naturalization of his wife, the Court is
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would unable to declare him capacitated to remarry. Thus, Cipriano
become applicable and petitioner would lose her right to inherit must first prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
from Arturo. In the present proceeding, Fe’s citizenship is an American citizen. He must prove the divorce as a fact and
brought anew to the fore by Blandina. She furnished the Court demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
with the transcript of stenographic notes taken in 1995, wherein foreign law must also be proved, as Philippine courts cannot
Fe said that she was an American citizen since 1954, the same take judicial notice of foreign laws. Likewise, Cipriano must also
year she obtained the decree of divorce from Arturo. Fe did not show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry
even bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty as specifically required in Article 26(2); otherwise, there would
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, which is a be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial enter into another marriage.
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in ordering the
case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. Obiter dictum: The Court did not sustain the OSG’s theory that
the proper remedy for Cipriano is to file either a petition for
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO III (2005) annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married be a long and tedious process, and would not be feasible in this
in the Philippines. The wife left for the US bringing along their case. Legal separation would also not be a sufficient remedy
son Kristoffer. Later on, Cipriano discovered that Lady Myros because it does not sever the marriage tie; hence, Cipriano
had been naturalized as an American citizen. He also learned would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
from his son that his wife had already obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried, and that they are currently living in Though intended to liberalize the law on recognition of foreign
California. Cipriano thereafter filed a petition for capacity to divorce, the requirements under Article 26 of the Family
remarry, invoking Article 26(2). The trial court granted his Code are stricter than those under Article 15 of the Civil
petition; consequently, the Republic, through the OSG, sought Code, which does qualify the citizenship of the contracting
reconsideration, but was denied. parties at the time of the marriage nor does it require that the
petitioner be the foreigner. On the one hand, all that Article 15
Brief History: On July 17, 1987, EO 227 was likewise signed into applies is the nationality principle which can refer to the
law, amending Article 26 of the Family Code by adding the nationality of the parties at the time of divorce. On the other
second paragraph of Article 26. hand, under Article 26, the divorce must have been obtained
by the alien spouse and such decree must allow the alien to
Held: Article 26(2) should be interpreted to include cases remarry for the Filipino to have the same capacity. Orbecido
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the affirmed that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse also be allowed to remarry alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to By applying Article 15 of the Civil Code, the Court
sanction absurdity and injustice. A statute may therefore be could have arrived at this conclusion without
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so straining the application of Article 26 beyond its
long as they come within its spirit or intent. Hence, the instant outer limits. This is the reason why Ma’am critiques the
case must be deemed within the contemplation of Article 26(2). Court’s interpretation of Article 26 in the Manalo case.
The Court gave the twin elements for the application of Article The validity of a divorce decree also impacts on other rights of
26(2) as follows: parties in the subsequent marriage and children of that
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated marriage.
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
Thus, the operative fact is not the citizenship of the parties at

the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship

65
LLORENTE V. CA (2000) contains a restriction which reads that “a party to a marriage
Lorenzo Llorente married Paulo Llorente before World War II. who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
After the war, he went to the US and acquired American the other party has died) commits the offense of bigamy. It did
citizenship. Upon returning to the Philippines, he found that not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
Paula was pregnant with the man she cohabited with while he to Australian law. Thus, the trial court erred in assuming that the
was away. The spouses agreed to separate amicably. In the US, Australian divorce ipso facto restored Recio’s capacity to
Lorenzo filed for divorce, which was granted. Later on, he remarry despite the paucity of evidence. The case was
married Alicia Llorente. The two lived together as husband and remanded to the trial court to receive evidence as to the effect
wife for 25 years and had three children. In his last will and of the foreign divorce given that if under Australian law, he was
testament, he named Alicia and their children as his heirs, with really capacitated to remarry as a direct result of the divorce
Alicia as executor of the will. However, upon Lorenzo’s death. decree he obtained from his first marriage, then his marriage to
Paula filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging that Garcia is valid.
she is the surviving spouse of Lorenzo and that his will, in favor
of Alicia and her children, is encroaching on her legitime and ½ The requirement to plead and prove foreign law, including case
share in the conjugal property. law or court decisions, stems from the principle that laws have
legal effect only within their territory. Thus, Philippine courts
Held: Alicia is the surviving spouse of Lorenzo. Lorenzo cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws
became an American citizen before and at the time of his enacted in foreign countries. The divorce obtained by an alien
divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
death. For failing to apply the doctrines in Van Dorn and Quita, divorce is valid according to his or her personal law, whether
the decision of the CA must be reversed. The divorce obtained national or domiciliary. Proof of the foreign judgment and its
by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in authenticity as fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Nonetheless, the effects relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) must be submitted in evidence
of this divorce as to the succession to the estate of Lorenzo are as well as proof of the alien’s applicable personal law to show
matters best left to the determination of the trial court. the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition of the foreign judgment may be made in action
GARCIA V. RECIO (2001) instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
Australian citizen. After two years, they obtained a decree of aspect of his claim or defense.
divorce from an Australian family court. Two years after Recio
became an Australian citizen, he married petitioner Grace In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court reiterated the
Garcia, a Filipina. In their application for a marriage license, requisites for the recognition the foreign divorce
Recio was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” However, Recio decrees in the Philippines. The Court also explained
and Garcia separated without securing any judicial dissolution that Article 26 of the FC was intended for the benefit
of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal of the Filipino spouse, hence, only that Filipino
assets were divided in accordance with Australian law. Garcia spouse can invoke the benefit under the provision.
filed for Declaration of Nullity in the Philippines on the ground
of bigamy, citing Recio’s prior marriage to Samson. During the
pendency of the suit, Recio filed for divorce from Garcia in a CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS (2010)
family court in Sydney, claiming that their marriage has Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen and was later
irretrievably broken down. The Philippine trial court dismissed naturalized as a Canadian national. He married Daisylyn Sto.
Garcia’s case, holding that there was no longer any marriage to Tomas, a Filipina, in the Philippines. Due to his profession,
nullify following the issuance of the Australian divorce decree. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. Upon his return,
he found his wife to be having an affair with another man. He
Held: The Court focused on the procedural aspects of went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was
pleading and proving a foreign divorce before a Philippine granted, with the divorce decree taking effect a month later.
court. A person who wishes to rely on a foreign divorce decree Two years after the divorce, Gerbert wanted to remarry another
must first present the divorce decree before it is given Filipino woman. He went to the Pasig City Civil Registry and
presumptive evidentiary value; and second, prove that the registered the Canadian divorce decree on his first marriage
divorce is of a type that legally dissolved the marriage and certificate. However, the NSO informed Gerbert that his first
capacitated him to remarry. This is based on Rule 39, Section marriage to Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, and to
38 of RC, which states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the said judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
judgment, is presumptive evidence of a right as between the Accordingly, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
RTC, which was consequently denied on the ground that he
In the present case, the divorce decree between respondent was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
and Editha Samson was admitted in evidence and accorded recognition of the foreign divorce decree. It ruled that only the
weight by the trial court when Garcia failed to object its Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Article 26(2).
admissibility. However, Recio failed to prove that his divorce
capacitated him to remarry. The Australian divorce decree

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Held: Only Filipinos may invoke Article 26(2) of FC. The said Held: Fujiki can file a petition to have the Japanese court’s
provision was intended only for the benefit of the Filipino decision declaring as bigamous the second marriage of
spouse. While Article 26(2) may be invoked to declare the Marina recognized in the Philippines. The Rule on Declaration
Filipino spouse divorced and capacitated to remarry, the alien of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
spouse cannot claim a right under this provision. Nonetheless, Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
it does not prevent the alien spouse from instituting action with judgment relating to the status of marriage where one of the
respect to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree in this parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, the rule that
jurisdiction as a foreign judgment. The part that the alien spouse only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity of
has a direct involvement in the foreign judgment clothes him marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
with interest to file a suit but only with respect to recognition of bigamy. In the recognition of foreign judgments relating to the
the foreign judgment. status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, the
only question before the Philippine courts is whether or not to
The practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign divorce extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
decrees between nations is grounded not only on the principle nationalii in Article 15 of CC. In this regard, the requirement that
of comity but also for considering the alien spouse bound by its the validity of a marriage can be questioned only in a direct
terms. To recognize foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines, action and not in a Rule 108 proceeding (Cancellation or
certain requirements must be met, including the foreign divorce Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) does not apply in a
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry based on
alien’s national law had been duly proven, serves as a the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse. However, where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
such final judgment or order may be repelled by evidence of: Finally, the requirement that the petition for declaration of nullity
1. A want of jurisdiction be filed “solely by the husband or wife” refers to the husband or
2. Want of notice to the party wife of the subsisting marriage since the parties in a bigamous
3. Collusion marriage are neither husband nor wife under the law. The
4. Fraud husband or wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
5. Clear mistake of fact or law has personality to file a petition for declaration of void marriage.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce is the MEDINA V. KOIKE (2016)
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice Petitioner Doreen Medina, a Filipino citizen, and respondent
of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign Michiyuki Koike, a Japanese national, were married in the
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our Philippines. However, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or City in Japan. They were divorced on the same date as
herself. Here, Gerbert was able to the attach to the petition a indicated in their Divorce Certificate and in the Official Family
copy of the divorce decree proving its authenticity. However, he Register of Michiyuki. Doreen filed a petition before the RTC for
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
Nonetheless, the Court allowed the case to be remanded so capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2). She presented
that evidence proving the Canadian law on divorce may be several foreign documents, including the:
admitted, because this is the more appropriate course of action
1. “Certificate of Receiving/Acceptance of Divorce” and the
especially since it will serve the interest of Gerbert’s former wife
“Family Register of Michiyuki Koike," both issued by the Mayor
who has agreed to the filing of the petition. of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
FUJIKI V. MARINAY (2013) 2. Certified machine copy of the “Divorce Certificate” issued by the
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was
respondent Maria Paz Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage authenticated by the DFA.
was disapproved by his parents, so Fujiki could not bring his 3. Certification issued by the Manila Civil Registrar that the original
wife to Japan, until they lost contact with each other. Later on, of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said
Office.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without their
4. Photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding
first marriage being dissolved, they were married in the English translations, as well as two books entitled “The Civil
Philippines. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009.”
abuse from Maekara, so she left him and reconciled with Fujiki.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in However, the RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling that in action
Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and for recognition of foreign divorce, the foreign divorce decree
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. A year after, Fujiki filed and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity
a petition in the RTC, praying for the recognition of the to obtain a divorce must be proven according to our rules on
Japanese Family Court judgment and the declaration of the evidence. The trial court found that Doreen failed to prove the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void ab national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law
initio. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that only on divorce, and that she failed to present qualified expert
the Marinay or Maekara, and not Fujiki, can file the petition to witness on the family and divorce laws of Japan alongside the
declare their marriage void. documents she presented to the court.

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Held: Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven followed whether the choice-of-law approach is traditional or
as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the policy-centered.
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. Thus, it must be There is no provision of law requiring the Philippine courts to
shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national recognize a foreign divorce decree between non-Filipinos.
law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing Nonetheless, the Philippine courts recognize foreign divorce
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must decrees based on the principle of international comity for as
be proven, since our law on evidence requires that both must long as it does violate a strongly held policy of the Philippines.
be alleged and proven as facts. Comity is the recognition which one nation allows
In this case, the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of juridical acts of other nations, having due regard
Japan on the matter, are essentially questions of facts that calls both to international duty and convenience, and to the
for a reevaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC. rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
Since the Court may exercise discretion to either dismiss the under the protection of its laws.
appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved
in the instant appeals and substantial ends of justice warrant MUSLIM DIVORCES
that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate
proceedings. Procedural rules were intended to ensure proper In addition to the recognition of foreign divorce under Article
administration of law and justice, and ought not to be applied 26(2) of FC, another instance of recognition of divorce in the
in a very rigid, technical sense. A derivation from such rigid Philippines is found in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
enforcement may thus be allowed for the proper dispensation
of justice, the core reason for the existence of the courts. Article 13 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws lists down
the scope of application of Muslim divorce:
From these cases, we can observe the restrictive
substantive and procedural rules that attend the (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and
recognition of foreign divorce decrees involving divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
Filipinos. To simplify these convoluted laws and avoid only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
the unjust results of an unrecognized foreign solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
judgment, our laws should give legal effect to a in any part of the Philippines.
divorce decree obtained abroad, regardless of (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
whether it was the alien or Filipino spouse who filed the solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
petition, for as long as their marital domicile was in Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
that foreign state. (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs,
the essential requisites and legal impediments to
marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship
FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN ALIENS and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims
for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of
Most countries exercise divorce jurisdiction on the basis of the contract to marry, solemnization and registration of
domicile of one of the parties or the matrimonial domicile. marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between
The rationale for this is that divorce, being a matter of concern husband and wife, parental authority, and the property
of the state, should be controlled by the law of the place with relations between husband and wife shall be governed
which the person is most intimately concerned. Likewise, due by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
process requires that the forum court has substantive
contact with the seat of the marriage which, by its own laws Divorce or Talaq, under Muslim law, is defined as the formal
it may decide to dissolve. dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code
to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of
The Hague Convention Relating to Divorce and Separation reconciliation between the spouses.
of 1902 provides that the granting of divorce or separation must
comply with the national law of the spouses and the law of the Article 45 of the Muslim Code enumerates the ways through
place where the application for divorce was made. Some laws, which Muslim divorce may be done:
such as the Codigo Bustamante and Siamese Law in private
international law have made the right to separation or divorce (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
depend on the national law of the spouses and the grounds (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
for divorce subject to the law of the forum provided the parties (c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
were domiciled there. (d) Acts of imprecation (li’an);
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul’);
The grounds for divorce are dictated by lex fori. Hence, a (f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate
court will not grant a divorce based on a ground in a foreign (tafwid); or
country where the marriage was celebrated or where the parties (g) Judicial decree (faskh).
are domiciled if different from the forum court. This practice is

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The last ground provided in Article 45 is through a judicial Held: The true and real name of a person is that given to him
decree or divorce by faksh. Under Article 52, the wife may and entered in the civil register. While it is true that under Article
petition the court for divorce on the following grounds: 376 of CC no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority, the only name that may be changed is the true
(1) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for and official name recorded in the Civil Registry. In this case, the
the family for at least six consecutive months; petitioner’s registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. She does
(2) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing not seek to change her registered maiden name, instead, she
him to imprisonment for at least one year; prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden
(3) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without name in view of the dissolution of her marriage by virtue of a
reasonable cause his marital obligation in accordance decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
with this code;
(4) Impotency of the husband; Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband’s surname
(5) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable during the marriage (Article 370), after annulment of the
disease which would make the continuance of the marriage (Article 371), and after the death of the husband
marriage relationship injurious to the family; (Article 373), is permissive and not obligatory except in case
(6) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next of legal separation (Article 372).
succeeding article; or
(7) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the Art 370 A married woman may use:
dissolution of marriage by faskh either at the instance of (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
the wife or the proper wali. husband’s surname;
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s
When talaq or faksh becomes irrevocable, the marriage bond surname; or
of the spouses shall be severed and they will have the (3) Her husband’s full name, but with a prefix of Mrs.
capacity to remarry. They will also lose their rights to inherit
from each other. If the divorce is obtained in case of talaq, the Art 371 In case of annulment of marriage…
wife may be entitled to her entire or half of the dower (1) If the wife is the guilty party = shall resume her
depending on whether the talaq was effected before or after the maiden name and surname.
consummation of the marriage. (2) If the wife is the innocent party = may resume her
maiden name and surname or continue using her
However, for the wife to exercise her right to remarry, whether former husband’s surname, unless:
the marriage was dissolved by death of the husband or by a. the court decrees otherwise, or
divorce, she has to observe the period of ‘idda. The periods b. she or the former husband remarries
to be observed are provided in Article 57: another person.
(1) Every wife shall be obliged to observe ‘idda as follows: The use of the word “may” indicates that the use of the
(a) In case of dissolution of marriage by death, four husband’s surname is permissive rather than obligatory. There
months and ten days counted from the death of is no law providing that the wife shall change her name to that
her husband; of the husband upon marriage. This is in consonance with the
(b) In case of termination of marriage by divorce, for principle that surnames indicate descent. Thus, a married
three monthly courses; or woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has
(c) In case of a pregnant woman, for a period an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in
extending until her delivery. any of the ways provided by Article 370.
(2) Should the husband die while the wife is observing ‘idda
for divorce, another ‘idda for death shall be observed in Therefore, when the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case
accordance with paragraph 1(a). of divorce authorized by the Muslim Code, the divorcee need
not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in
The effect of a Muslim divorce on the divorcee’s right to order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former
revert to her maiden surname was deliberated on in Yasin v. husband’s name is optional and not obligatory for her. When
Sharia District Court. the petitioner married her husband, she did not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to
YASIN V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995) secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband
Hatima Yasin filed in the Sharia District Court a petition to after the marriage as no law requires it. In view of the foregoing,
resume the use of her maiden name. She claimed that she had the Court deemed the petition to resume the use of petitioner’s
been formerly married but had been granted a decree of maiden name a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since
divorce. She also asserted that her husband has already the law requires her to do so as her former husband has already
remarried. The Sharia court, however, denied the petition for remarried after obtaining a divorce decree in accordance with
lack of some formal requirements in accordance with Rule 103 Muslim laws, pursuant to Article 371 of the Civil Code. Petition
of the Rules of Court. The Court claimed that substantially, the is granted and Hatima is authorized to resume her maiden name
petition was one for a change of name, and thus compliance and surname.
with Rule 103 was necessary as it would result in the
resumption in her use of maiden name and surname.

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PACASUM V. ZAMORANOS (2017) RI GH T S AN D O BLI GA TI O N S O F S PO U SE S
Petitioner Samson Pacasum and respondent Atty. Marietta D.
Zamoranos were married. However, Pacasum discovered that REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10354, RH LAW
his wife was previously married to one Jesus De Guzman, so he
filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
Commission for disgraceful and immoral conduct against
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
marriage. In her defense, Zamoranos said that prior to her first health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose
marriage, she converted to Islam, and then her previous and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
marriage was dissolved under the Code of Muslim Personal convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
Laws of the Philippines, as evidenced by the Decree of Divorce parenthood.
issued by the Sharia Circuit Court of Basilan. The CSC
Pursuant to the declaration of State policies under Section 12, Article II
dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is the duty of the State to protect
existence and validity of the divorce decree. He moved for and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution and
reconsideration, but was denied by the CSC. On appeal, the CA equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
initially granted the petition, but later on corrected itself and conception. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
found that the previous marriage of Zamoranos was solemnized women especially mothers in particular and of the people in general and
and entered into under Muslim rites. The CA held that a instill health consciousness among them. The family is the natural and
collateral attack against the divorce decree, much less one from fundamental unit of society. The State shall likewise protect and
advance the right of families in particular and the people in general to a
an administrative complaint, cannot be countenanced.
balanced and healthful environment in accord with the rhythm and
Issue: W/N the divorce decree obtained by Zamoranos is valid harmony of nature. The State also recognizes and guarantees the
promotion and equal protection of the welfare and rights of children, the
Held: The divorce decree is valid. The decree issued by Judge youth, and the unborn.
Kaudri L. Jainul, presiding judge of the Sharia Circuit Court of Moreover, the State recognizes and guarantees the promotion of
Basilan, states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman converted gender equality, gender equity, women empowerment and dignity as a
to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it health and human rights concern and as a social responsibility. The
was Zamoranos who sought divorce by tafwid, with De Guzman advancement and protection of women’s human rights shall be central
having previously delegated his authority to exercise talaq. to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care.
Thus, on its face, the divorce appears valid, having been issued
The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
for a cause recognized under the Muslim Code by a competent foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation.
Sharia court. And because neither party interposed an appeal, Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
the divorce has attained finality. As a corollary, the divorce
decree cannot also be the subject of a collateral attack because (a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
the collateral unassailability of the divorce is a necessary their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
consequence of its finality. Therefore, Pacasum cannot impugn
(b) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
the validity of Zamoranos’ divorced status in an administrative nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
case filed with the CSC, where the sole purpose of the abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
proceedings is to determine her administrative liability, if any. to their development;
(c) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(d) The right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs
The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-

abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health
care services, methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the
implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and relevant information and education thereon
according to the priority needs of women, children and other
underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified
through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty
Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government measures of identifying
marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive
health care, services and supplies for free.
The State shall eradicate discriminatory practices, laws and policies

that infringe on a person’s exercise of reproductive health rights.
The State shall also promote openness to life; Provided, that parents
bring forth to the world only those children whom they can raise in a
truly humane way.
SECTION 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. This Act declares

the following as guiding principles:

70
(a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into
to the exercise of any right, shall not be subjected to any form consideration the State’s obligations under various human
of coercion and must be fully guaranteed by the State, like the rights instruments;
right itself; (i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs),
(b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and women’s and people’s organizations, civil society, faith-
rights which seek to promote the rights and welfare of every based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
person particularly couples, adult individuals, women and crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
adolescents; development policies, plans, and programs will address the
(c) Since human resource is among the principal assets of the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized;
country, effective and quality reproductive health care services (j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and
must be given primacy to ensure maternal and child health, the punishable by law, the government shall ensure that all
health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children, women needing care for post-abortive complications and all
and sound replacement rate, in line with the State’s duty to other complications arising from pregnancy, labor and
promote the right to health, responsible parenthood, social delivery and related issues shall be treated and counseled in
justice and full human development; a humane, nonjudgmental and compassionate manner in
(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, accordance with law and medical ethics;
affordable, non-abortifacient, effective and quality reproductive (k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family
health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion size: Provided, however, That the State shall equip each
of people’s right to health, especially those of women, the poor, parent with the necessary information on all aspects of family
and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component life, including reproductive health and responsible
of basic health care; parenthood, in order to make that determination;
(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, (l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the
without bias, to all methods of family planning, including mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization of the population
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in health;
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical (m) Gender equality and women empowerment are central
research standards such as those registered and approved by elements of reproductive health and population and
the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the development;
NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying (n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide entire population, especially the poor, and allocations thereof
funding support to promote modern natural methods of family must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent unborn is protected;
with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions; (o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the
(f) The State shall promote programs that: harmonization and integration of policies, plans, programs
a. enable individuals and couples to have the number of and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people,
children they desire with due consideration to the health, more particularly the poor, the needy and the marginalized;
particularly of women, and the resources available and and
affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, (p) That a comprehensive reproductive health program
public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, addresses the needs of people throughout their life cycle.
That no one shall be deprived, for economic reasons, of
the rights to have children; SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Act, the
b. achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; following terms shall be defined as follows:
c. ensure effective partnership among national
(g) Gender equality refers to the principle of equality between
government, local government units (LGUs) and the
women and men and equal rights to enjoy conditions in realizing
private sector in the design, implementation,
their full human potentials to contribute to, and benefit from, the
coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of
results of development, with the State recognizing that all
people-centered programs to enhance the quality of life
human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. It entails
and environmental protection;
equality in opportunities, in the allocation of resources or
d. conduct studies to analyze demographic trends
benefits, or in access to services in furtherance of the rights to
including demographic dividends from sound
health and sustainable human development among others,
population policies towards sustainable human
without discrimination.
development in keeping with the principles of gender
(h) Gender equity refers to the policies, instruments, programs and
equality, protection of mothers and children, born and
actions that address the disadvantaged position of women in
unborn and the promotion and protection of women’s
society by providing preferential treatment and affirmative
reproductive rights and health; and
action. It entails fairness and justice in the distribution of
e. conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and
benefits and responsibilities between women and men, and
efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for
often requires women-specific projects and programs to end
reproductive health care development;
existing inequalities. This concept recognizes that while
(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and
reproductive health involves women and men, it is more critical
supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries as identified
for women’s health.
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
(i) Male responsibility refers to the involvement, commitment,
identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility
accountability and responsibility of males in all areas of sexual
of the national government consistent with its obligation to
health and reproductive health, as well as the care of
respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right
reproductive health concerns specific to men.
to life;
(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete
(h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
family planning methods that are in accordance with their
absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the

71
reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This option to provide such full range of modern family planning methods:
implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the
consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the capability person seeking such care and services to another health facility which
to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often is conveniently accessible: Provided, finally, that the person is not in an
to do so. This further implies that women and men attain equal emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No.
relationships in matters related to sexual relations and 8344.
reproduction.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, that minors will not be
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the
SECTION 8. Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review.
following:
All LGUs, national and local government hospitals, and other public
(1) Family planning information and services which shall
health units shall conduct an annual Maternal Death Review and Fetal
include as a first priority making women of reproductive
and Infant Death Review in accordance with the guidelines set by the
age fully aware of their respective cycles to make them
DOH. Such review should result in an evidence-based programming
aware of when fertilization is highly probable, as well as
and budgeting process that would contribute to the development of
highly improbable
more responsive reproductive health services to promote women’s
(2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including
health and safe motherhood.
breastfeeding;
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
(4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and
counseling; RELATIONS
(5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive
A nation’s legal history and prevailing legal system define the
tract infections (RTIs), HIV and AIDS and other sexually
transmittable infections (STIs); roles of the husband and wife in marriage and family life, and
(6) Elimination of violence against women and children and inevitably their rights and duties onto each other.
other forms of sexual and gender-based violence;
(7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive The Family Code contains several provisions aimed at
health; guaranteeing the equality of husband and wife consistent with
(8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and the Constitutional mandate that the State shall ensure the
other gynecological conditions and disorders; fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
(9) Male responsibility and involvement and men’s
reproductive health; However, compliance with the Convention on the Elimination
(10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to
sexual dysfunction; which the Philippines is a state party, and the Magna Carta of
(11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and Women (MCW) enacted to implement it, demand not only
(12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care.
formal but also substantive equality. Substantive equality
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals
and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not refers to the right of women to full and equal enjoyment of all
to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their freedoms and encompasses both equality in law (de jure
children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, equality) and equality in results (de facto equality). Thus, the
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the Philippines is bound to take all appropriate measures to
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, marriage and family relations.
however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients. The CEDAW defines discrimination as “any distinction,
(v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
their own family life aspirations, taking into account rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and social, cultural, civil, or any other field.” This means that the
economic concerns consistent with their religious State is duty-bound to eliminate any measures in law and
convictions. practice that discriminates against women irrespective of their
marital status.
SECTION 7. Access to Family Planning. All accredited public health
facilities shall provide a full range of modern family planning methods,
which shall also include medical consultations, supplies and necessary
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
and reasonable procedures for poor and marginalized couples having
infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided, That family
According to Article 68 of the Family Code, the husband and
planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
to paying patients with the option to grant free care and services to
indigents, except in the case of non-maternity specialty hospitals and and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. This is an all-
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group, but they have the encompassing right and duty, serious adherence to which will

72
not necessitate fulfillment of the other more specific duties in This is important because Philippine society remains
the Code. patriarchal as evidenced by various Family Code
provisions that prioritize the husband’s decisions
These rights and duties are not subject to stipulation between regarding marital relations and parental authority.
the spouses. Although they may voluntarily agree to any change Hence, women’s voices are not heard even in
in their personal relations, this will have no legal effect and matters directly affecting their bodies and health,
cannot be enforced by the courts. especially when to engage in sexual relations and
when and how often to bear children.
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940)
Ernesto Baniquit, who was separated with his wife for nine Sexual relations have been interpreted to be limited to normal
consecutive years, wanted to remarry. He consulted Atty. sexual intercourse. However, the Courts did not define what
Roque Santiago, who then prepared for Baniquit and his wife a constitutes normalcy. Thus, it is sensible to conclude that such
document, which stipulated that they authorize each other to normalcy is based on what both spouses find acceptable.
remarry and renounce any right of action against the other. After
the execution and acknowledgment of the document, Atty. GOITIA V. CAMPOS RUEDA (1916)
Santiago asked the spouses to shake hands ad assured them Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married. After a
that they were again single and as such could contract another month of living together, Eloisa returned to her parents’ home
marriage. He guaranteed the correctness of his advance by and filed a complaint against her husband for support outside
promising to tear his law school diploma if he was wrong. of the conjugal home. She alleged that Jose kept on demanding
Relying upon this, Baniquit indeed had a second marriage. that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
Held: The contract was contrary to law, morals and tends to organs, and when she refused, he would maltreat her by word
subvert the vital foundation of the family. By reason of and deed and inflict physical injures upon her. The lower court
Santiago’s recklessness and sheer ignorance of the law, he was sustained Jose’s demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged
found to be unfit to carry out the responsibilities and obligations in the complaint did not state a cause of action. It held that the
of a lawyer. However, since it was proved that he immediately defendant could not be compelled to support his wife, except
informed the parties after learning of his mistake and made in his own house, unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
them sign another document canceling the previous one, he granting her a divorce or separation from the husband.
was merely suspended from law practice for one year. Held: Eloisa is entitled to support from her husband. Under
Article 149 of CC, the husband who is obliged to support his
RIGHT TO LIVE TOGETHER wife may choose to do so by paying her a fixed pension or by
receiving her in his own home. However, this rule is not
The Family Code goes beyond the act of choosing the place in absolute. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the
which the spouses will establish their home, which is already part of the husband to support his wife, which is founded on his
provided by Article 69. Instead, the right to live together refers natural and legal duty as the husband. The enforcement of such
to the right of consortium, which, broadly speaking, is the obligation will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful
combination of companionship, love, affection, comfort, mutual acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
services, and sexual intercourse. Therefore, a judgment for separate maintenance of the wife is
not a payment for damages or penalty, but a judgment calling
There is a definite duty for spouses to live together and the for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
exceptions thereto are specified in Article 69. Hence, leaving the sovereign. This is done from necessity, to preserve the
the conjugal home, if unjustified, results in the loss of support. public peace and protect the wife from the base demands and
However, support may be allowed if the wife was driven out of abuse of the husband. The pro tanto separation resulting from
their home by her husband and threatened with violence if she a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of the
should return. sanctity of marriage, but a mere stronger policy overruling a
weaker one. No way does it impair the marriage contract or
The right of consortium also includes sexual relations between
place the wife in the situation of a feme sole (without husband).
the spouses. The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Rights Act of 2012 or the RH Law recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including the right Another limitation on the right and duty of spouses to each
to reproductive health, which implies that people are able to other’s company and to engage in sexual relations is found in
have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law, which defines rape as:
they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide Art 266-A, RPC Rape is committed
if, when, and how often to do so. The law also makes it possible
for spouses to determine their ideal family size, as well as the (1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of
number, spacing and timing of their children and to make other a woman under these circumstances:
decisions concerning reproduction without coercion or (a) Through force, threat, or
violence, which entails access to necessary information and intimidation
modern family planning services. Under Section 3(m), the law (b) When the offended party is deprived
also emphasizes gender equality and women’s empowerment of reason or is unconscious
as central elements to reproductive health.

73
(c) By means of fraudulent machination her. The wife’s testimony was corroborated by their two
or grave abuse of authority children who were in the house when the incidents occurred.
(d) When the offended party is under 12 They testified that they heard their mother pleading and crying
years old or is demented, even and when they helped her leave the bedroom, they saw her torn
though none of the circumstances underwear. Afterwards, she charged Jumawan with rape, in
above are present. addition to grave threats and physical injuries. Jumawan denied
(2) By any person who, under any raping his wife and claimed that the latter was only suing him
circumstances mentioned above, shall for revenge after he took over the management of their
commit an act of sexual assault by businesses. He also alleged that his wife was having extra-
inserting his penis into another person’s marital affairs. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled in favor of the
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument wife and found Jumawan guilty of rape. The CA later affirmed
or object, into the genital or anal orifice in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
of another person.
Held: Jumawan is guilty of raping his wife. The Court
There is nothing in the law that expressly provides a marital abandoned the traditional view that a man cannot rape his
exemption from committing the crime of rape. Article 266-C on spouse and ruled that rape can exist within a marriage. A man
Effect of Pardon is also unmistakable in meaning that the who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
husband must have committed the crime against his wife that commits sexual violence upon her, and as a state party to the
necessitated a pardon. This veers from the outdated view that CEDAW, the Philippines penalizes such act. A woman is no
the husband cannot commit rape against the wife. longer a chattel or property traditional practices labeled her to
be. Thus, a husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is
WARREN V. STATE (1985) not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium
Daniel Steve Warren was indicted by a US court for the rape with a fellow human being with equal dignity. He cannot be
and aggravated sodomy of his wife when they were still living permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
together. He filed a demurrer and a motion to dismiss to sexual act without her full and free consent.
indictment. The motions were denied, hence, this appeal.
While the FC obligates the spouses to love one another, this
Issue: W/N a husband is exempt from raping his wife rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy as expressions of
love that are both spontaneous and mutual, and not the kind
Held: A husband is not exempted from the crime of rape which is unilaterally obtained by force or coercion. Sexual
against his wife. Rape is not merely a sexual act of an ardent intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and
husband performed upon an initially apathetic wife, but an act a participation in the mystery of creation; a deep sense of
of violence. There never has been an express or implied marital spiritual communion; a function which enlivens the hope of
exemption included in the Georgia rape statute and that the US procreation and continuation of the family; and an expressive
Constitution guaranteed all citizens, men and women alike, interest in each other’s feelings. When it is egoistically utilized
protection from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without to obtain coitus by force or intimidation, the Court will step in to
due process. Such guarantees are not reduced in marriage. protect the sanctity of sexual union in marriage. Besides, if a
husband is aggrieved by the absolute refusal of his wife to
Note: The Court also discussed the three main theories used in
engage in sexual intimacy, he may legally seek the intervention
defense of the marital exclusion in rape. These theories are
of the court to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
already regarded as archaic and unconstitutional.
an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not
1. Lord Hale’s contractual theory – husband cannot be demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful
Likewise, to treat marital rape different from non-marital rape in
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
terms of its elements and rules of proving the crime infringes on
contract the wife has given up herself to her husband.
the equal protection clause. This guarantees that similar
2. Wife as the husband’s chattel or property – prominent
subjects will not be treated differently and that no person shall
belief during the medieval period; rape was nothing more
be denied the same protection of the laws. The definition of
than a man making use of his own property.
rape under Section 1 of RA 8353 pertains to rape, sexual
3. Unity in person – legal existence of wife is incorporated
assault, and marital rape. The single definition for these three
into that of her husband; husband cannot rape himself.
forms shows that the law does not distinguish between marital
and non-marital rape; thus, equal protection must be afforded
PEOPLE V. JUMAWAN (2014)
to women raped by their husbands.
Edgar Jumawan and his wife were married with four children.
They had several businesses which the wife managed. Initially, A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
the spouses had no problem with the intimate aspects of their husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
relationship. However, later on the wife complained that woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
Jumawan had become brutal in bed and sex had become unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a
painful. In two instances, the wife claimed that her husband sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
raped her in their home, because when she refused his desire wrestle her consent in case she refuses. The rights of women
to have sex as she was not feeling well, he forced himself on

74
on matters related to their sexuality are inalienable human rights OBSERVE MUTUAL LOVE AND RESPECT
and cannot be divested when they contract a marriage.
A marriage founded on mutual love and respect has no room
Finally, there are no stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape. for violence and abuse.
The element and quantum of proof that support a moral
certainty of guilt in rape cases apply uniformly regardless of the THURMAN V. CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984)
legal relationship between the accused and his accuser. Tracey Thurman and her son brought civil rights action against
city and police officers of the city of Torrington, alleging that
It is significant that we have jurisprudence that their constitutional rights were violated by the nonperformance
recognizes rape as the ultimate violation of self and of official duties by the officers in regard to threats and assaults
that this violation is not in any way reduced when the by the wife’s estranged husband Charles. Tracey experienced
husband is in fact her violator. It shakes the foundation harassment and physical abuse from her husband despite their
of an ignorant thinking that a wife should not be separation, which culminated when Charles stabbed Tracey
allowed to sue her husband for rape because such while the officers merely permitted Charles to wander about the
will dim the possibility of reconciliation between them. crowd and continue to threaten Tracey.
PEOPLE V. LIBERTA (1984) Held: Police action is subject to the equal protection clause,
Mario and Denise Liberta were married. Shortly after the birth which applies equally to married and unmarried women.
of their son, he began to beat his wife. Denise obtained a The duty of the police to protect applies equally to women in
temporary order of protection from the Family Court which domestic relationship and to those not involved in such. If
ordered Mario to move out and to stay away from Denise and officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in
the family home. The order also provided visitation rights to him. domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an
One time, Mario asked Denise if he could visit his son. Denise affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the
agreed with the condition that a friend was to accompany them personal safety of such persons in the community. Failure to
to his motel at all times. However, when they arrived at the perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection
room, his friend immediately left and Mario, threatening to kill of the laws. Today, any notion of a husband’s prerogative to
her, forced Denise to have sexual intercourse with him. The physically discipline his wife is an outdated misconception and
defendant even forced Denise to tell their son to watch what he thus must join other archaic and overbroad premises which
was doing to her. Shortly thereafter, Denise filed a complaint have been rejected as unconstitutional. A man is not allowed to
against Mario, who was later convicted for rape. physically abuse a woman merely he is her husband. Therefore,
a police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in
Held: There is no rational basis for distinguishing between such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an
marital and non-marital rape. The rationales used in defense arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married
of the marital exemption are based upon archaic notions of to each other.
women that are no longer tenable. Any argument that is based
on a supposed consent is invalid because rape is not merely a If a similar case were filed in the Philippines, the outcome will
sexual act to which one party does not consent; rather, it is a not be different considering Article 34 of CC, which makes a
degrading, violent act which violates the person and causes member of a city or police force who refuses or fails to render
severe and long-lasting physical and mental harm. The Court aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
also discussed other rationales for the marital exemption: property to be primarily liable and the city or municipality
1) Protects against governmental intrusion into marital subsidiarily answerable for damages. The civil action shall be
privacy – No, marital privacy protects consensual, not independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance
violent sexual acts. of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
2) Promotes reconciliation of the spouses – No, if the
marriage has already reached the point where In the Magna Carta of Women, the State:
intercourse is accomplished by violent assault, it is • Has the duty of ensuring that all women are protected
doubtful that there is anything left to reconcile. from all forms of violence as provided for in existing laws.
3) Marital rape is difficult to prove – No, the criminal justice • Mandates government agencies to give priority to the
system, with all its built-in safeguards, is presumed to be defense and protection of women against gender-based
capable of handling any false complaints. offenses and help them attain justice and healing.
4) Marital rape is not as serious as other rape – No, studies o Failure or neglect of a public servant to perform
show that marital rape is frequently more violent and has his official duties may give rise to damages and
more severe, traumatic effects on the victim. administrative sanctions.
The Congress also enacted RA 9262 or the Anti-VAWC Law

that governs these and other acts of cruelty and abuse.
- Section 3(a) of the Anti-VAWC law defines VAWC as any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating

75
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or Held: The Anti-VAWC Law is constitutional
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to Whether the Family Court or RTC has jurisdiction over the
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, constitutionality of a statute
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, Yes, Family Courts or RTCS are vested with exclusive
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
deprivation of liberty. violence against women and children. RTCs have jurisdiction
Under the Anti-VAWC Law, violence takes many forms and are to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, having judicial power
classified into four categories: to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion
1) Physical violence - bodily or physical harm of their conformity to the fundamental law. Therefore, the issue
2) Sexual violence - sexual in nature, committed against a of constitutionality of RA 9262 should have been raised at the
woman or her child earliest opportunity in his opposition to the petition for
3) Psychological violence - mental or emotional suffering protection order before the RTC. The appellate court also
of the victims such as intimidation, harassment, stalking, correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
damage to property, public humiliation, repeated verbal injunction and TRO. The function of injunctions is to preserve
abuse and mental infidelity the status quo until the court hearts the merits of the case.
4) Economic abuse - make or attempt to make a woman However, protection orders are granted ex parte to protect
financially dependent women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an
injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of
GARCIA V. DRILON AND JAYPE-GARCIA (2013) the law against VAWC.
Jesus Garcia and Rosalie Jaype-Garcia were married. They had
three children. Rosalie is a dutiful wife, whose life revolved Whether RA 9262 violates the guaranty of equal protection of
around her husband, while Jesus is dominant and controlling, the laws
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children.
He forbade his wife to pray, isolated her from her friends, and Jurisprudential yardstick in determining equal protection:
when she took up law, he trivialized her ambitions and forced (1) Substantial distinctions
her to stay at home. Things turned for the worse when petitioner (2) Classification is germane to the purpose of the law
had an affair. He admitted the affair to his wife but boasted to (3) Not limited to existing conditions only
the household staff his sexual relations and told her that he was (4) Applies equally to all members of the class
just using her because of their accounts with the bank.
Petitioner's infidelity led to a series of fights that left Rosalie RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
physically and emotionally wounded. Sometimes, Jesus would There is an unequal power relationship between men and
also hurt their daughter instead of his wife. Even the small boys women. Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
were aware of the suffering of their mother. All the emotional that men are the leaders, pursuers, and providers, while women
and psychological turmoil drove the wife to the brink of despair are merely nurturers, companions, and supporters. Such
when attempted suicide. He was found by her son bleeding on perception leads to men gaining more power over women,
the floor, but the husband did not help her. She was in the which gives them the need to control or retain that power.
hospital for about a week, but the husband did not even show Hence, VAWC is a form of men's expression of controlling
up. Since the incident, respondent has been undergoing women.
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressants. The
husband also refused to give support to his family despite Women are also the usual and most likely victims of violence.
earning about P60,000 a month from numerous companies of In the Philippines, female violence comprised more than 90%
which he is the president. In light of all the abuse she suffered, of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
Rosalie filed, for herself and in behalf of their minor children, a reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
verified petition for the issuance of a Temporary Protection partners. Comparative statistics across an eight-year period
Order (TPO) against Jesus, pursuant to RA 9262. The RTC reveal that violations under RA 9262 rank first among the
granted the petition and issued a TPO for thirty days, which was different VAW categories. No reliable estimates may be
renewed or extended for four times. obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the
Philippines because such incidents are relatively low and
During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed before the CA perhaps men will not even attempt to report the situation. Thus,
a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO, while there are few cases of violence and abuse against men,
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative they cannot render RA 9262 invalid because their number must
of the equal protection and due process clauses and the validity be negligible and their appearance merely occasional.
of the TPOs issued. CA initially issued a 60-day TRO against
the enforcement of the TPOs, but later on it dismissed the There are also gender bias and prejudices. Crimes against
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue women are treated differently and less seriously than other
in the RTC. Likewise, the challenge to the validity of RA 9262 crimes. Women experience double victimization—first at the
through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection hands of the offender and then of the legal system. The
orders constituted a collateral attack on said law. enactment of RA 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women.

76
Addressing or correcting discrimination through specific GO-TAN V. TAN (2008)
measures focused on women does not discriminate against Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Sharica
men. As a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines must take filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a TPO against
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural Steven and her parents-in-law Perfecto and Juanita, herein
patterns of conduct of men and women to ultimately eliminate respondents, alleging that Steven, in conspiracy with his
prejudices on the basis of sex, which involves the development parents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, prosecution, and abuses upon her in violation of RA 9262. The RTC granted her
the judges. petition and prayer for a TPO. The respondents then filed a
motion to dismiss claiming that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
Classification is germane to the purpose of the law. them since they are not covered by RA 9262, which was
The distinction between men and women is germane to the granted by the court. It also denied her motion for
purpose of RA 9262 in addressing violence committed against reconsideration, holding that to include parents-in-law would
women and children. The Philippines is bound by numerous be a strained interpretation of the provisions of RA 9262.
conventions, such as the CEDAW and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, as well as their protocols. Held: The parents-in-law are liable under RA 9262. While the
law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
Classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and victim by marriage, former marriage, or sexual or dating
applies equally to all members relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
The law also applies to future conditions for as long as the of conspiracy under the RPC. Under Section 10 of the RPC,
safety and security of women and their children are threatened legal principles from the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
by violence and abuse. Moreover, RA 9262 applies equally to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262, in which
all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. There is the special law is silent on the matter. Thus, the principle of
no merit to the contention that RA 9262 singles out the husband conspiracy may be applied to RA 9262, and once conspiracy is
or father as the culprit, because the law uses the gender-neutral shown, the act of one is the act of all, and the precise extent or
term "person." Finally, it does not preclude the application of modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. since all the conspirators are principles. However, because
conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be heard fully
in a trial, it is thus premature for the petitioner to argue
Whether RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause
evidentiary matters. The court did not grant the TPO against the
No, the grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as parents-in-law because they were only answering the question
violative of the right to due process. Protection order is an of law. They only set aside the dismissal, it is still up to the RTC
order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women to decide on their inclusion based on the facts and evidence
and their children and to grant other necessary reliefs. It is a presented.
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
Note: Section 5 of the law also expressly recognizes that the
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
acts of violence against women and their children may be
protecting vital interests, such as the protection of women and
committed by an offender through another. Under Section 8,
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
protection orders may be issued for the purpose of preventing
security. The issuance of a TPO also necessitates that the
further acts of violence against the woman or her child may
respondent of such order be apprised of the charges imputed
include individuals other than the offending husband. Finally,
against him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. In
Section 4 of RA 9262 also calls for a liberal construction of the
the case at bar, Rosalie did not file the required comment after
law to the extent that it better promotes the protection and
receiving of the notice, believing that it would be just an
safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
exercise in futility, disregarding the fact that the questioned
TPO only lasts for thirty days and could be prevented from
being renewed upon sufficient cause. Article 247 of the RPC, mitigating the killing or physical injuries
inflicted on a spouse who surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, must be
Whether RA 9262 erodes the family as a basic autonomous
amended.
social institution
Although the law appears to be gender-neutral since
No, violence is not subject to compromise
it speaks of a legally married person, its subsequent
use of the masculine pronoun shows that it is the
Whether there is undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
male spouse who does the surprising and the
officials
killing of his spouse.
No, the function of the Punong Barangay to issue BPOs is
purely executive in nature in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances and RENDER MUTUAL HELP AND SUPPORT
maintain public order in the barangay.
Art 68 Spouses have the duty of rendering mutual help and
support.

77
Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of PELAYO V. LAURON (1909)
the family. The expenses for such support and other Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against the
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community spouses Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He alleged that he
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income was called to the house of the defendants to render medical
or fruits of their separate properties. In case of assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such to a child. For his services, the just compensation would be
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate P500, which the defendants refused to pay without any good
properties. reason therefor. He prayed that judgment be entered in his favor
against the respondents for the sum of P500. The defendants
- This is an amendment to the Article 111 of CC that denied the allegations and claimed that before the death of their
the husband is obliged to support his wife and the daughter-in-law, she was living with her husband and had no
rest of the family. whatsoever relation with them, and at the time of birth, she was
- Under Article 112 of CC, husband alone was the in their house due to fortuitous circumstances. The lower court
administrator of conjugal properties unless there absolved the defendants, ruling that Arturo failed to adduce
was a pre-nuptial agreement expressly conferring sufficient evidence to establish a right of action.
the right to the wife.
- In the Family Code, however, the duty to support Held: The husband of the wife is liable for the bill. The
is a joint responsibility of the spouses given that rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the
the wife is co-administrator of the community or mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of
conjugal properties. mutual support. When either of the spouses should be in need
of medical assistance, the other is under the obligation to
Art 70 Expenses for support of the family are to be incurred furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
in the following order: may be restored and life may not be jeopardized. In this case,
(1) From the spouses’ community or conjugal the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff would be
properties the husband of the patient and not her father and mother-in-
(2) Income or fruits of their separate property, in law. Even if it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and
proportion to their separate property requested assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of
(3) From their separate properties the said obligation considering the precarious situation of the
woman. Pelayo must therefore redirect his action against the
Other provisions on support in the FC also fix a particular order husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance
of person to give support and to be supported: to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
Under the FC, those that constitute family relations are:
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided: Art 150 Family relations include those:
(1) The spouse; (1) Between husband and wife
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (2) Between parents and children
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether full or half-
(4) The brothers and sisters. blood
Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or Family relations does not extend to parents-in-law and
more persons, the payment of the same shall be children-in-law, who are legally considered strangers.
divided between them in proportion to the resources
of each. The law does not reflect Philippine culture where the
spouse's relatives are treated as one's own family
However, in case of urgent need and by special members.
circumstances, the judge may order only one of them
to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice MANAGEMENT OF THE HOUSEHOLD
to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them. Article 115, CC Article 71, FC
The wife manages the affairs of the The management
When two or more recipients at the same time claim household. She may purchase things of the household
support from one and the same person legally obliged necessary for the support of the family, shall be the right
to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means and the conjugal partnership shall be and the duty of
to satisfy all claims, the order established in the bound thereby. She may borrow money both spouses.
preceding article shall be followed, unless the for this purpose, if the husband fails to The expenses for
concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child deliver the proper sum. The purchase of such management
subject to parental authority, in which case the child jewelry and precious objects is shall be paid in
shall be preferred. voidable, unless the transaction has accordance with
been expressly or tacitly approved by the provisions of
Liability shall devolve upon the spouse before anyone the husband, or unless the price paid is Art. 70.
else. from her paraphernal property.

78
Article 71 of FC amends Article 115 of CC that says that the • The law was silent about the wife having any right to
wife shall manage the affairs of the household. object to the practice of any profession or occupation of
• According to Senator Tolentino, this provision is carrying the husband no matter how immoral or destructive of the
the principle of equality of the spouses a little too far. family it was.
• In case of disagreement, the custom of giving priority to • Issues:
the wife's position in the management of the household o Thinks that work is only because of money
should be followed. o Work may be for societal change, self-fulfillment
Tolentino is NOT a feminist and misses the point. Article 73 of FC corrected the disparity in the spouse's right
• The joint management of the household is intended to to exercise a profession.
free the wife, who is equally responsible for support of • Issues:
the family, from the sole burden of household tasks o Benefit is used by the family
including cleaning, doing the groceries and cooking, o Benefit has been taken already and you just
washing and ironing the family's clothes, and attending object after
to the myriad needs of the family.
An amendment to Article 73 was introduced by RA 10572 which
This is a step towards meeting state parties' obligations under established the liability of the community or conjugal
the CEDAW to modify the social and cultural patterns of partnership properties for obligations arising from a
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the spouse's exercise of profession. The second paragraph of
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices Article 73 now reads:
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
women (1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection
or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
EXERCISE OF PROFESSION the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the
community property. If the benefit accrued thereafter,
Article 117, CC Article 73, FC
such obligation shall be enforced against the separate
The wife may exercise any Either spouse may exercise
property of the spouse who has not obtained
profession or occupation or any legitimate profession,
consent.
engage in business. occupation, business or
activity without the • Issue: Punished for not getting the consent
However, the husband may
object, provided: consent of the other. The
latter may object only on RA 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act
(1) His income is valid, serious, and moral recognizes the fundamental equality between men and women
sufficient for the grounds. by providing equal opportunities to both sexes.
family, according to
its social standing, In case of disagreement, the • Section 5 states that regardless of legal status, women
and court shall decide whether of legal age shall have the same capacity to act and to
or not: enter into contracts as men do.
(2) His opposition is
founded on serious • The objection is • Section 8 directs the PAG-IBIG, GSIS, and SSS
and valid grounds. proper; and coverage of married persons who devote their full time
In case of disagreement on • Benefit has accrued to managing the household and family affairs.
this question, the parents to the family prior to o Coverage shall be upon the working spouse's
and grandparents as well as the objection or consent because the contributions that will be
the family council, if any, thereafter. due shall be deducted from the salary of the
shall be consulted. If no If the benefit accrued prior working spouse to the extent of one-half of the
agreement is still arrived at, to the objection, the salary and compensation of the working spouse.
the court will decide resulting obligation shall be
whatever may be proper enforced against the The demand for equal opportunities for women and men was
and in the best interest of separate property of the also addressed in the Magna Carta of Women, which provides
the family. spouse who has not for State promotion of the rights of women to education (Sec.
obtained consent. 13), to credit, capital, and livelihood (Sec. 23), and to decent
work (Sec. 22).
Under Article 117 of CC, the wife may practice any lawful • In Section 12, the State is mandated to take steps to
profession but the husband has the right to object to her amend or repeal laws that are discriminatory to women
working outside of the home. within three years from the effectivity of the law.
• The husband could prevent the wife from exercising her • Given that it was enacted in 2009, the three-year period
profession if: has gone without the Congress having met this deadline.
o His income is sufficient
o His opposition is founded on valid grounds

79
BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS (1880) SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC (2007)
Myra Bradwell applied for a license to practice law in the State A "birth certificate is a historical record of facts as they existed
of Illinois. She completed all appropriate forms and documents at the time of birth” and aside from clerical errors, no entry shall
as to both her character and training. However, Illinois law be changed without a judicial order. The absence of judicial
afforded the Supreme Court discretion in bar admissions, imprimatur for change of name, coupled with the presence of a
including restrictions on classes of persons not intended for law that merely gives married women options as to the name
membership. The Illinois Supreme Court determined it had the she may use, a married woman's legal name continues to be
authority to deny women a law license. Accordingly, her her name in the birth certificate.
application was denied. Bradwell brought suit against the State
of Illinois, alleging that she was being denied one of the DUNN V. PALERMO (1975)
Privileges and Immunities of citizenship through refusal to grant Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty
a law license after proper application. The State Supreme Court Cheatham, also a lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy
refused to admit her, citing the strife that would result from her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all
practicing law and the attendant threats to femininity. other purposes. Tennessee then had a state-wide compulsory
Registration Law. After her marriage, she lodged with the
Held: States have the authority to regulate the practice of Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo.
law, including denial of licenses to women on the basis of She was advised that she was required to register anew under
sex. US Constitution gives States the right to bar women from the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from the
practicing law and this is unaffected by 14th Amendment rights. registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was
The right to admission to practice in the courts of a state is not purged from the registration list. Hence this action.
within an individual’s federal rights. Myra Bradwell was denied
license to practice law just because she is a female. That God Held: It is not mandatory that married women assume the
designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action and name of her husband. Tennessee has no statutory enactment
that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute the laws, providing that a woman automatically assumes her husband's
was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth. surname upon the event of marriage. The statute does not
mandate a change of name by marriage; it merely recognizes
the prevalence of the virtually universal custom under which a
USE OF SURNAME woman normally adopts the surname of her husband. It is also
There are several provisions in the Civil Code that govern the possible that when either party to the marriage elects to use the
use of name but this issue is more relevant to women because name of the other, registration will be changed.
it is they who by tradition and practice are presumed to
assume their husband's surname from the time of marriage. If Article 370 becomes mandatory and limits the use of name to
the three options, it may be attacked by way of equal
Art 370 A married woman may use: protection.
(1) Her maiden first name and surname + husband's
surname Requiring a married woman to assume the name of her
(2) Her maiden first name + husband's surname husband is form of gender discrimination, since a
(3) Her husband's full name + prefix "Mrs." man is not compelled to change his name and use his
wife's surname upon marriage.
Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's surname
as though he were still living, in accordance with It can also be argued that by imposing a surname on
Article 370. a married woman without regard to her individual
factual situation, the state is arguably depriving her of
Art 376 No person can change his name or surname without a property right (her name and reputation) without
judicial authority. due process of law.
Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject

of an action for damages and other relief. TOLENTINO V. COURT OF APPEALS (1988)
In 1931, respondent Consuelo David legally married Senator
Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's Arturo Tolentino. However, the marriage was dissolved during
surname gives a right of action to the latter. the Japanese occupation on the ground of abandonment for
three consecutive years. In 1945, Arturo married Constancia. In
• Women are not required to adopt her husband’s name
1972, Constancia brought a suit to enjoin Consuelo from using
by operation of law → Article 370 is merely directory
the last name Tolentino. The lower court granted the prayer but
• Woman does not register her married name, nor file a
the CA reverse on the ground of prescription.
petition for change of name to use her husband’s
surname Held: Consuelo may continue using the surname Tolentino.
• A married woman’s name continues to be her name in Philippine law is silent on whether or not a woman should drop
the birth certificate (her maiden name) or keep her ex-husband’s surname after divorce because we
do not have a divorce law. However, according to the Court, the
effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where

80
the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of RI GH T S O F U N MA RRI ED C O H A BI TAN TS
her husband even if the latter has remarried. Consuelo has
established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner would The legal position of persons in unions without marriage is
be an act of serious dislocation to her. She entered into weak in comparison to that of legally married couples.
contracts with third persons, acquired properties, and entered • Legally married individuals enjoy rights such as the
into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. She also legitimacy of sexual union, establishment of personal
has legal children with Arturo who have every right to use the and property relationships, and disqualification from
surname Tolentino, and she could not be compelled to use a testifying against each other.
surname different from those of her children. • There are insufficient legal safeguards for unmarried
cohabitants:
There is also no usurpation of the petitioner's name and
o Government's apprehension that upholding their
surname in this case so that the mere use of the surname
rights might encourage unmarried cohabitation.
Tolentino by Consuelo cannot be said to have injured the
o The level of commitment of unmarried
petitioner's rights. Usurpation of name implies some injury to
cohabitants is inferior to that of married couples
the interests of the owner of the name. It exists when a person
and thus not worth of protection.
designates himself by another name. Its elements are: (1) there
is an actual use of another's name by the defendant; (2) The use As of 2010, there were close to 4M people living together
is unauthorized; and (3) the use of another's name is to outside of marriage. By 2015, this number reached 7M.
designate personality or identify a person. None of these
• The government must give attention to the increasing
elements exists in the case at bar and neither is there a claim
number of unmarried cohabitants in the Philippines.
by the petitioner that the respondent impersonated her.
• Law reforms so that their rights and duties toward each
other and their children are spelled out, specifically in
REMO V. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2010)
case of separation or upon the death of either party.
Petitioner Maria Virginia Remo is a married Filipino citizen. Prior
• At the present, if an exclusive live-in relationship fails, the
to the expiration of her passport, she applied for the renewal of
woman is left vulnerable since she is not entitled to
her passport with the DFA office in Chicago, Illinois with a
maintenance no matter how long she has lived with her
request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
partner.
replacement passport. The DFA denied her request on the
• Her property rights are also at stake since without funds
ground that the use of maiden name is allowed in passport
of her own, the cost of litigation will present an
application only if the married name has not been used in
immediate and insurmountable problem.
previous application. She filed an appeal to the Office of the
President, which was consequently denied, arguing that the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996 allows a person to revert to her LIVE TOGETHER
maiden name only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration
of nullity of marriage. The CA also denied her petition; hence • No law barring two individuals from cohabiting
this appeal. without marriage.
o FC encourages them to marry by waiving the
Held: She may not resume her maiden name in the marriage license requirement for as long as they
replacement passport. The law governing passport issuance have lived together as husband and wife for at
is RA 8239, which states that only in case of a death of least 5 years without impediment to marry during
husband, divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage that entire period.
as void may the woman applicant revert to the use of her • No right of consortium or the duty of the partner to
maiden name. Because her marriage is subsisting, she may not share his or her company, love, comfort, mutual service
revert to the use of her maiden name. RA 8239 does not conflict or engage in sexual relations.
with Article 370 of the Civil Code because the former does not • Agreement to live together is purely voluntary and
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her continues only as long as both parties are willing to do
passport. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her so.
husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the • Nothing prevents them from entering into an agreement
use of her maiden name except in the instances mentioned that spells out their responsibilities while they are
above. Simply put, a married woman's reversion to the use of together and even after separation.
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the o Also known as cohabitant contract or cohabitation
marriage. Lastly, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special agreement
law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail o Parties agree on:
over the general provision of the Civil Code on the use of ▪ Division of labor on matters pertaining to
surnames. management of household and childcare
▪ Pooling of resources
▪ Division of properties in the event of
separation

81
o These are considered valid where the stipulations from engaging in a profession, occupation,
are fair, not vitiated by fraud or coercion, and business or activity, commits economic abuse.
where parties are of equal bargaining power.
o In the Philippines, their legal enforceability will
most likely be determined on a case-to-case USE OF SURNAME
basis, considering whether such contract is The woman has neither the right to use the man's surname
contrary to law, public policy, public order, and nor the legal basis to represent herself as the man's wife.
good morals, or whether non-compliance with it
will violate laws requiring every person to act with • If she does not desist, she will be found to have usurped
justice and observe good faith and honesty. the wife's status, which may be subject to an action for
• Unmarried cohabitants may separate without State damages if proven that it was made in bad faith or
intervention. through culpable negligence.
o MCW states that elimination of discrimination • Based on the possibility of confusion in identity or
necessitates the same rights to enter into and appearance of some family relationship between the
leave marriages or common law relationships owner and the usurper.
without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs.
SILVA V. PERALTA (1960)
Esther Peralta married Saturnino Silva, not knowing that Silva
OBSERVE MUTUAL LOVE AND RESPECT, RENDER
had a valid and subsisting marriage with Priscilla Isabel from
MUTUAL HELP AND SUPPORT
Australia. The marriage was solemnized by a priest on the
Parties must find peaceful ways to iron out their differences and occasion of a house blessing without any marriage documents
not resort to violence. prepared nor executed for lack of available printed forms. Silva
and Peralta lived together as husband and wife and begot a
GARCIA V. DRILON (2013) child, Saturnino Silva Jr. After sustaining serious wounds in
In light of all the physical, emotional, psychological, and battle, Silva was transferred to the US for medical treatment.
economic abuse she suffered, Rosalie filed, for herself and in While in the States, he divorced Priscilla Isabel and after three
behalf of their minor children, a verified petition for the issuance years, married plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. Upon his return
of a TPO against Jesus, pursuant to RA 9262. to the Philippines, appellee Peralta demanded support for their
child, and upon his refusal, instituted a suit for support. Elenita
Held: The Anti-VAWC law does not violate the equal Silva filed the present action that seeks to enjoin Peralta from
protection clause as it applies to all members of the class. using the last name Silva and to enjoin her further from
VAWC may also be committed against a woman with whom the representing herself as the wife of Saturnino.
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. The use of
the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or Held: Esther Peralta is not entitled to use the surname Silva
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian or represent herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva. Esther herself
relationships. While the law provides that the offender be admitted that she had never contracted a marriage with
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, Saturnino, and Saturnino himself vigorously denied that they
or sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the were ever married. Esther was only the common-law wife of
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Saturnino.
Elenita is not eligible for damages. Her claims of humiliation

EXERCISE OF PROFESSION and distress are not satisfactorily proved. An award of damages
in her favor would require a further finding that the assumption
MCW stipulates that State's duty to ensure equal rights of of the disputed status by Esther Peralta was made in bad faith
women and men in matters concerning marriage and the family or through culpable negligence, but no such finding has been
by ensuring that there are the same personal rights between made in this decision. Esther in good faith regarded herself as
spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose Saturnino's lawful wife, and that the man himself led her into
freely a profession and an occupation. this belief prior to his desertion. Saturnino's later marriage with
Elenita in the US is not sufficient to impose upon Esther any
The Anti-VAWC Act applies to acts committed by any person liability for damages or to destroy her original good faith, there
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or a previous being no proof that the existence of a valid marriage between
sexual or dating partner, or with whom he has a common child, Saturnino and Elenita was known to Esther before the case was
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or instituted. There was no way for Esther to know that Saturnino's
without the family abode that results in abuse. connection with Elenita was any more legitimate than his
• Article 2 provides that violence against women is previous one with Esther herself, considering his past history
understood to include economic abuse → Acts that and conduct.
make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent.
o A man in a live-in relationship who withdraws
financial support from his partner or prevents her

82
OTHER RIGHTS AND DUTIES the case; but she reinstituted it, explaining that she earlier
dropped the case because of her husband's continuous threats
• Unmarried cohabitants are not considered next of kin against her. Narag was recommended for indefinite suspension
and will neither be extended visitation rights nor the right from law practice, but was later increased to disbarment upon
to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner. Julieta's manifestation.
• Unmarried cohabitants do not automatically enjoy
welfare benefits or dependent status arising from the Held: The conduct of Atty. Narag warrants the imposition of
partner's employment. the penalty of disbarment. The Code of Professional
• A cohabitant also has no right to make funeral Responsibility requires that a lawyer neither engages in
arrangements for the deceased. dishonest or immoral conduct nor engage in conduct that
o Valino v. Adriano (2014) → This right and duty adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
remains with the surviving legal wife, Rosario whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
Adriano, notwithstanding their 30 year separation. to the discredit of the legal profession. This requirement of good
The spouse has the right to recover the corpse moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice
from the live-in partner of the deceased, Fe Valino. of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
• Unmarried cohabitants will not be allowed to adopt
jointly. There is also a line between being a good provider and a
o RA 8552 allows any Filipino citizen of legal age, in good parent. Parents not only have rights but also duties: to
possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, to support, educate, and instruct their children according to right
adopt and does not require that the person be precepts and good example, and to give them love,
married. companionship, understanding, as well as moral and spiritual
o Section 9 says that the consent of the spouse is guidance. Likewise, as a husband, he is obliged to live with his
necessary, if any of the person adopting or to be wife, to observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and to render
adopted. help and support. While Dominador claims that he is often away
o Thus, the longevity of the relationship between the from home due to his work, evidence shows that he abandoned
unmarried cohabitants will not transform their his family to live with his paramour, with whom he bore two
status to married, and only one of them will be children. Thus, he was hardly in a position to be a good
allowed to adopt a child. husband or a good father. A husband is not merely a man who
o The non-petitioning cohabitant will have no legal has contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly
authority or rights over the child, despite carrying sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her
out parental duties in the child's daily life. until death. For failing to do these, Dominador was disbarred.
PEREZ V. TUAZON DE PEREZ (1960)

RELIEF FROM COURTS Antonio Perez, in his own behalf and as guardian ad litem of his
son Benigno, filed a civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez,
The FC allows an aggrieved spouse to apply to the Court for the plaintiff's wife and Benigno's mother. He alleged that Angela
relief in case the other spouse neglects his or her duties to the was maintaining a lover and was wasting all of her estate on
conjugal union. him. Antonio prayed that Angela be declared a prodigal and
placed under guardianship so that a suitable person may be
• Under Article 72 of the FC, the spouses may also seek
appointed to administer her properties. The lower court issued
relief in case the other spouse commits acts that tend to
a preliminary injunction. A compromise agreement was arrived
bring danger, dishonor, or injury to the others or to the
at and submitted for approval of the court. The trial court
family.
ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO (1965) jurisdiction over the subject matter. On appeal, Antonio alleged
The wife's refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of that his wife's prodigality resulted in the dissipation of their
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law conjugal properties. He sought relief from courts in the face of
a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is this danger and material injury.
entitled to the corresponding indemnity. The husband was
Held: Jurisdiction lies in the Juvenile and Domestic
allowed to obtain a decree of legal separation against the wife.
Relations Court of the City of Manila. The Domestic Relations
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving
NARAG V. NARAG (1998)
guardianship, as well as those involving Article 116 for damages
Julieta Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
due to dishonor brought by one spouse to the other. The term
against her husband, Atty. Dominador Narag. She alleged that
material injury in Article 116 does not refer to patrimonial or
her husband, while teaching in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao,
economic injury to one of the spouses, since the provision lies
maintained a scandalous relationship with his 17-year-old
in the chapter concerning personal relations between husband
student, Gina Espita. In order for Gina to live with him,
and wife. If the wife were put under guardianship, she will not
Dominador used his influence as a member of the local council
be able to dispose of their properties in the future. However, the
to cause her employment at the Department of Trade and
properties she was claimed to have been dissipating were her
Industry. The SC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
paraphernal properties, over which she can fully control and
Philippines for investigation. Initially, however, Julieta dropped
alienate.

83
DE GUZMAN V. PEREZ (2006) to leave him because of the cruel treatment on the part of her
Roberto De Guzman was Shirley Aberde’s boyfriend while husband. She prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation
studying law at UST. Their studies were interrupted when of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
Shirley became pregnant. Shirley gave birth to De Guzman’s and permanent separate maintenance. The court ruled in favor
child, Robby, but the two never got married, and instead, of Dolores and she was granted alimony amounting to P400,
Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two also other fees. Mariano then asked for a restitution of conjugal
children. Roberto allegedly sent money for Robby’s schooling rights and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
only twice. He also gave Shirley P7,000 to help defray the cost defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as
of the child’s hospitalization. In order to make ends meet, his wife.
Shirley accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan. However,
her salary was still insufficient to provide for her and Robby’s Held: It is not within the province of the courts to compel
needs. Meanwhile, Roberto managed his family’s corporations one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
and led a luxurious lifestyle. Shirley filed a criminal complaint for rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an
abandonment and neglect of child under PD 603 (The Child action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no
Youth Welfare Code). In his answer, Roberto claimed financial other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together.
incapacity and insisted that the acts attributed to him did not Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant
constitute abandonment or neglect, explaining that it was his absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to
father who shouldered all the expenses of his family. The City return. She is also not entitled to support.
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for abandonment but
found probable cause to charge Roberto with neglect of child ANTI-VAWC LAW
punishable under Art 59 (4) of PD 603, in relation to Sec. 10 (a)
of RA 7610. An information was then filed before the RTC for The Anti-VAWC law also gives married and unmarried women
the crime of neglecting a minor. The Secretary of Justice and their children who are victims of domestic violence the right
affirmed the prosecution. Hence the petition. to avail of a protection order. As defined by Section 8 of the law,
a protection order may be issued to prevent acts of violence
Held: The trial court did not err in finding probable cause for against a woman or her child.
neglect of his child. Roberto acknowledged Robby as his son
and has admitted never contributing for his education except in • This relief serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim
1992 and 1993. This is despite the prima facie showing from the from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
evidence that Roberto is in fact financially capable of victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and
supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD ability of the victim to independently regain control over
Development Corporation indicates that Roberto owns her life.
P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company. His further
assertion that this is not evidence of his capability was rejected The protection order may be in the form of a:
by the Court. The Court likewise rejected the argument that
(1) Barangay protection order (BPO)
criminal liability for neglect of child under PD 603 attaches only
(2) Temporary protection order (TPO)
if both parents are guilty. Liability for the crime does not depend
(3) Permanent protection order (PPO)
on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The
irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the Under Article 8, the reliefs that may be granted under the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s protection order are specified:
faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties because
to allow such defeats the prescription that in all questions (1) Prohibition from threatening to commit or committing,
regarding the care, custody, education and property of the personally or through another, any acts.
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. (2) Prohibition from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or communicating with the petitioner.
However, while Roberto can be indicted for violation of (3) Removal and exclusion from the residence of the
Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be petitioner, either temporarily or permanently.
made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610. The law (4) Directing respondent to stay away from petitioner at a
expressly penalizes any person who commits other conditions distance specified by the court, and to stay away from
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered the residence, school, place of employment, or any
by PD 603 but not covered by the RPC. The “neglect of child” specified place frequented by the petitioner and any
punished under PD 603 is also a crime (known as indifference designated family member.
of parents) which is penalized under Article 277 (2) of the RPC. (5) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an
Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610. automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership.
ARROYO V. VASQUEZ (1921) (6) Temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married. They the petitioner.
lived together with a few short intervals of separation. Dolores (7) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
went away from their conjugal home and decided to live women and/or her child if entitled to legal support; court
separately from Mariano. She claimed that she was compelled shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or

84
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES
respondent's employer to be automatically remitted to
the woman. Art 74 The property relations between husband and wife shall
(8) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or be governed in the following order:
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order (1) By marriage settlements executed before the
him to surrender the same to the court, including marriage
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any (2) By the provisions of this Code
license. If law enforcement, must surrender his firearm (3) By the local customs
and undergo investigation.
(9) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence Marriage settlement is an agreement entered into before
inflicted, including property damage, medical expenses, marriage and, in consideration thereof, between an intended
childcare expenses, and loss of income. husband and wife to establish the conditions of their conjugal
(10) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to partnership with respect to present and future property.
provide needs of the petitioner. • Written agreement regarding matters of support,
(11) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems custody, property division and visitation upon separation
necessary of the couple → if none, the default is Absolute
Community of Property (ACP)
A protection order may be issued even without a decree of
legal separation, annulment, or declaration of absolute Family Code adopts the freedom of stipulation in determining
nullity of marriage. property relations
• Law is merely suppletory to will of the parties and will
• Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment only apply in the absence of a marriage settlement.
by filing a complaint in the municipal courts. • In issues not provided for in the marriage settlement,
• Violation of a TPO or PPO shall be considered as then the FC will apply.
contempt of the court.
Pursuant to Section 21 of the Anti-VAWC Law, these reliefs are GENERAL PROVISIONS
without prejudice to the filing of separate civil or criminal
actions for the violation of the protection order. Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete
separation of property or any other regime. In the
absence of MS, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community property as
established in this Code shall govern.
Why ACP? In marriage you share everything.

• Disadvantage → when the marriage the falls apart.
o “Gold digger” regime - equal share
PRINCIPAL REGIMES OF PROPERTY RELATIONS

Regime of Absorption
• Husband acquires the ownership of all property of the
wife at the time of marriage and all she acquires after
• Based on theory that the personality of the wife is
absorbed by that of the husband
Regime of Community
• Common patrimony is formed to answer for the family
and divided equally between the spouses upon
dissolution
Absolute or Universal Community

• All property acquired by onerous or gratuitous title form
a single patrimony
Relative or limited community

• There are properties belonging to each spouse while also
a common patrimony
• Community of Personal Property → real property belong
separately, regardless of how it was acquired
• Community of Acquisition → all the income of the
spouses and all acquisitions by onerous title form a

85
common mass; all property brought to marriage as well Art 76 In order that any modification in the marriage
as those acquired by lucrative title remain separate settlement may be valid, it must be made before the
• Community of Future Property → all future acquisitions celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions
form a common patrimony, everything owned before the of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
marriage continue to pertain to them separately
Property regime is unchangeable and cannot be altered once
Regime of Separation celebrated except during judicial separation.
• Spouses retain ownership of separate property Exceptions:
• Single Administration System → Husband administers 1. Reconciliation of spouses under Arts 66 and 67
the property of the wife a. Regime of separation will continue unless ACP is
• Dotal System → Property of the wife is divided into revived
dowry and paraphernal property; former given to 2. Abandonment without just cause under Art 128
husband while latter is retained by the wife a. Allows for sole administration or judicial
• Absolute Separation → Each spouse has ownership, separation of property
administration, and enjoyment of his or her own separate 3. Separation of Property under Art 135 and 136
property a. Petition of one spouse for just cause or by joint
petition
Renunciation of ACP b. All of the exceptions will still go through the court.
• If parties merely stipulate in contract that they will not be So, any change is still governed by law.
governed by ACP, then property will be governed by i. If court is changing it, party is not stipulating
custom
• If no custom, then the intention of the parties should be Reconciliation after legal separation: Separation of
the criterion and then adopt the system that is most Art property and forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse
equitable, protecting creditors 66 shall subsist, unless spouses agree to revive their former
property regime
Void Stipulations
Agreement to revive former property regime shall be
1. Those contrary to the nature of marriage, liberty and executed under oath and specify
rights of individuals, or to morals and good customs 1. Properties to be contributed anew to the restored
2. Violate legal provisions of a prohibitory or mandatory Art regime
character 67 2. Those to be retained as separated properties of
a. Those laws relating to public character intended each spouse
Names of all their creditors, address and amount owing to
to be superior to the will of the parties each
3. Derogatory to the authority of spouses, or contrary to
public order or public policy → E.g. wife shall not follow If spouse without just cause abandons the other OR fails
domicile, wife shall have patria potestas, third person will Art to comply with his/her obligations to the family: Petition
128 for judicial separation of property or authority to be the
be given administrative rights of property
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS Sufficient causes for voluntary judicial separation of
Void for being Contrary to Nature of Marriage property
1. Spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
• Consider union dissolved for extrajudicial reasons penalty with civil interdiction
• Relieve spouse of obligations to other or to children 2. Spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
declared an absentee
Void for being Contrary to Morals and Good Customs 3. Loss of parental authority of the spouse of
• Monetary penalty for infidelity Art petitioner has been decreed
• Depriving the other of right to ask for legal separation 135 4. Spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter
or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the
• Effecting the purchase of one of the spouses family
5. Spouse granted the power of administration in the
Void for being Contrary to Liberty and Rights marriage settlements has abused that power
• Prohibition to contract subsequent marriage upon death 6. At the time of the petition, the spouses have been
• Imposing isolation of wife separated in fact for at least one year and
• Preventing exercise of individual right reconciliation is highly improbable
Art Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary dissolution of

OTHER RULES 136 ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties
• Parties cannot validly stipulate that all profits shall
pertain to one spouse only.
o UNLESS that spouse will also bear all the burdens Art 77 Modifying marriage settlements:
of the marriage, pursuant to FC 75 and CC 1799 (1) In writing
• Void provisions will not nullify entire contract, only those (2) Signed by the parties
that relate to such provision (3) Executed before the celebration of the marriage

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Shall not prejudice against third persons unless Art 80 In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage
registered in the local civil registry where the marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall
contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
of property. place of the celebration of the marriage and their
residence.
In order to protect the rights of third parties
• Notify them, protect their interests, etc. This rule shall not apply:
• Must be a public instrument registered in the Registry of (1) Where both spouses are aliens
Property and local civil registry in order to be effective (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
against third persons affecting property not situated in the Philippines
and executed in the country where the property is
• Third persons should be able to know what regime of
located.
property the spouses adopted so they can know the
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
authority of each and the extent of the guaranty for
entered into in the Philippines but affecting
obligations
property situated in a foreign country whose laws
require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Nature of marriage settlements
• Marriage settlement produces its effects from the Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts
moment of celebration of marriage referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of
• Cannot be subject to a suspensive or resolutory period a future marriage, including donations between the
or condition since such period implies a change in the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered
property relations during the marriage void if the marriage does not take place. However,
o Required only to be in private writing and may be stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration
even oral insofar as the parties are concerned of the marriage shall be valid.
▪ If made orally, neither can compel the other
to execute the instrument if the latter If both aliens → their national laws or laws of domicile
objects to proof by oral evidence.
▪ If a private instrument, either may compel Extrinsic validity → forms (written or oral) and solemnities
the other to make a public instrument. Problem with application to mixed marriages → different
o When there is an error in date, contract will be countries might impose different laws—there is conflict of laws
valid if proven that it was executed prior to the
marriage LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RELATIONS
Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage • Both Filipinos/Mixed → marriage settlement, and in the
may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but absence of such, Philippine law
they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art o REGARDLESS of where they live and where the
14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to marriage is celebrated
the agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX • Properties in Foreign Countries (Contract executed
of this Code. abroad)
Minor = 18 to below 21 o Extrinsic validity → lex situs pursuant to Art. 80 (2),
• Must act personally in executing the settlement; parents FC and Art. 17, CC
merely give authorization by signing the same and act as o Intrinsic validity → lex situs pursuant to Art. 16, CC
PARTIES to the contracts themselves. o Marriage settlement must yield to laws of the
• Order in FC Art 14 should be followed foreign country when such laws are invoked
o Art 14, FC – father, mother, surviving parent or • Properties in foreign countries (Contract executed in
guardian, or persons having legal charge of them PH)
• While contrasting with Title IX (Parental Authority), Art 14 o Art 17 of CC states that forms and solemnities
should be followed because it is specifically and directly shall be governed by laws where they are
applicable to marriages. executed
o Art 14 which is specific provision for marriage o Art. 80 (3) of FC must be suppressed or
shall prevail. interpreted in light of conflict of laws principles in
• Even if both parents are alive but Court has appointed a relation to real property
guardian, then that person exercising substitute parental
authority shall intervene in the settlement COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER (1961)
Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British citizens were,
Art 79 For the validity of any MS executed by a person upon married in Manila where they lived until they established
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been permanent residence in California. When Walter died, he
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and personal properties
shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a acquired by them in the Philippines amounting to P130,792.85,
competent court to be made a party thereto. which were assessed for estate and inheritance tax. In the initial
determination of the tax, the Collector asked for a total of

87
P16,023.23. However, the respondent alleged that they DONATIONS EXCLUDED (governed by provisions on
overpaid the government because the latter considered the ordinary donations)
entire estate as subject to tax and did not deduct 1/2 of the 1. In favor of the spouses after the marriage (ordinary
share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal properties. wedding gifts)
2. In favor of future spouses, made before the celebration
Held: 1/2 of the net estate should be deducted as the share of marriage, but not in consideration
of the surviving spouse should be deducted from net estate. 3. In favor of persons other than the spouses, even though
Article 1325 of the Old Civil Code shall apply, whereby if one they may be founded on the marriage
spouse is a foreigner and there is no pre-nuptial agreement, it
is the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant WHO MAY DONATE?
law in determining the property relations of such spouses. But 1. The spouses to each other
since both spouses are foreigners, it is British law that should 2. The parents to one or both of the spouses
apply. However, in the absence of proof of what English law 3. By third persons to one or both of the spouses
says on the matter, Wharton’s processual presumption applies.
The court is justified to indulge in processual presumption that Donation propter nuptias Ordinary donations
the law of England on this matter is the same as our law. The
property could be treated as conjugal in nature and thus 1/2 of Does not require express Express acceptance
acceptance necessary
the properties shall be deducted as the share of Beatrice.
May be made by minors (Art
Cannot be made by minors
Computation: 78)
English law
If present property is
• [H] → W = wife inherits whole property = tax whole No limit to donation of
donated and property
Philippine law = CPG present property provided
regime is not ACP, limited to
• [H+] ½ legitimes are not impaired
1/5
• W ½ = wife inherits ½ = tax ½
Grounds for revocation in Grounds for revocation are
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS Art 86 found in law on donations
Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which are

made before its celebration, in consideration of the DOMALAGAN V. BOLIFER (1916)
same, and in favor of one or both of the future Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a verbal
spouses. contract wherein Jorge was to pay Carlos the sum of P500 upon
the marriage of the former’s son Cipriano with the defendant’s
Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary daughter, Bonifacia. Jorge paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as
donations established in Title III of Book III of CC, token of future marriage. However, Bonifacia married one
insofar as they are not modified by the following Laureano Sisi. Upon learning of this, Jorge demanded return of
articles. the said sum of P516 plus interest and damages arising from
the fact that he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol to
“IN CONSIDERATION” → NOT referring to the causa. “On the come up with the sum. Defendant denied the complaint and
occasion of marriage.” alleged that it did not constitute a cause of action. The RTC
• What is the causa? LOVE. ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return of P516 plus 6% interest.
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS Held: The verbal contract with regard to the delivery of the
• Marriage is an essential condition, donation propter money by reason of the prospective marriage was valid.
nuptias cannot happen without marriage. Correctness in form required is for evidential purposes only. If
• Takes effect only upon the celebration of the marriage. the parties permit a contract to be proven, without objection as
• NOT a condition to the form of the proof, it is just as binding as if it had been put
o Condition can be separated from the act into writing. The defendant made no objection to the
concerned without affecting its validity admissibility of oral evidence during the trial, thereby permitting
o Condition has a retroactive effect the contract to be proven by evidence other than writing.
However, the donation is not a donation propter nuptias
REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS since the payment was given to a third party.
1. Made before celebration of the marriage
2. Made in consideration of the marriage SERRANO V. SOLOMON (1959)
3. Made in favor of one or both of the future spouses Melchor Solomon executed a supposed deed of donation
propter nuptias, stating that their children out of the wedlock
If any one of the three requisites are absent, then it is NOT a will be the ones to inherit their properties with equal shares. if
donation propter nuptias. They will NOT be governed by these there were no children, it would be donated to his brothers or
provisions. sisters or their heirs if he dies before his wife, or ½ of such as
well as those acquired during the marriage to those who raised
and took care of her if she dies before him. The wife, Alejandria

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Solomon, died less than 9 months later without issue, upon The donation is also not onerous. In donations propter
which Estanislao Serrano, the uncle who reared her, instituted nuptias, the marriage is a consideration, but not in the sense of
this action to enforce the deed. The CFI then declared null and being necessary to give birth to the obligation. It presupposes
void the supposed donation propter nuptias and dismissed the the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or
petition on the grounds that it was not made in consideration of revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the
the marriage; and it was not made to one or both of the obligation. It may be revoked if the proper action were not
contracting parties, but to a third person. executed or if it were instituted after the lapse of the statutory
period of prescription. Marriage in a donation propter nuptias is
Held: The donation is not propter nuptias and is also null rather a resolutory condition which presupposes the existence
and void. The result would be the same whether Art. 1327 of of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not
CC or Art. 126 of NCC would be applied, since the donation a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
was not made in consideration of the marriage. The Deed of
Donation was executed on the occasion when they married, but Article 138, CC
the marriage in itself was not the only condition under which the There is no contract unless the following are present:
terms of the donation would be carried out. The marriage would 1. Consent
have to be childless and one of the spouses would have to die 2. Object
before the other before the donation would operate. The 3. Cause/consideration → compels the party to enter into
donation was also not made in favor of Alejandria, the wife, but an agreement
rather in favor of those who acted as her parents and raised her
in the absence of her father. In Manresa's commentary on Onerous donations → burdens or charges transferred to the
Article 1327 of CC, donations excluded are those granted to donee are greater than the value of the donated property. They
persons other than the spouses even though they may be had to do something burdensome in order to get the donation.
founded on the marriage.
Remuneratory donations → rewards to past or future services
Obiter dictum: It is not a donation inter vivos since it was never where the said services are valued less than the value of the
expressly accepted by the donee in either the same instrument donation
or separate one. It is also not a donation mortis causa since
for a donation to take effect after the death of the donor, it Inofficious donations → donations that prejudices the rights
should be executed in accordance with the requisites and strict of forced heirs
provisions governing the execution of wills. The donation failed
to fulfill the requirements since with the donor being still alive, MATEO V. LAGUA (1969)
the time and occasion has not yet arrived. Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land to their son
Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo.
SOLIS V. BARROSO (1928) This was executed in a public document. Alejandro and
Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation Bonifacia got married and took possession of the lots but the
of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo titles remained in the father’s name. After Alejandro died,
and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of Bonifacia and her infant daughter lived with her father-in-law,
their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that Cipriano. The latter continued tending the farm and giving the
in case one of the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated wife her share in the fruits. Later on, the sustenance stopped
would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would and the wife discovered that the father-in-law sold the land in
retain the other half. Alejo and Fortunata got married and favor of his other son, respondent Gervacio Lagua. The wife
immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of successfully moved for the annulment of the sale in a court
the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the proceeding. However, Gervacio filed an action for
same year, Juan also died. After Juan’s death, Maxima reimbursements based on the improvements made on the lot,
recovered possession of the donated lands. The surviving as well as for the annulment of the donation of the two lots,
donee, Fortunata, filed an action against Maxima (surviving alleging that those two were the only property of his father
donor) and demanded the execution of the proper deed of Cipriano so he neglected leaving something for his own support
donation according to law. The RTC rendered judgment based and prejudiced the legitime of his son and forced heir, Gervacio.
upon Article 1279 of CC, granting plaintiff’s prayer and ordering The CFI dismissed his complaint. On appeal, the CA did not
the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of her. sustain the dismissal of the action for annulment of the donation
saying that the area of the two lots donated exceeded
Held: The private document is not a donation propter Alejandro’s legitime and the disposable portion that could be
nuptias. Donation propter nuptias is governed by laws on freely given by will, thereby prejudicing the other heir, Gervacio.
donation. Art. 633 of CC provides that for a donation of a real The donation, therefore, is inofficious.
property to be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. The
only exceptions to the rule are onerous and remuneratory Held: The donation may be reduced for being inofficious.
contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the The action is not one exclusively for annulment of the entire
charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on donation but merely of the portion encroaching on the legitime.
contracts. Because the donation propter nuptias by the Donations propter nuptias are without onerous consideration.
spouses were made in a private instrument, it is not valid and The marriage is merely the occasion or motive for the donation
does not confer any rights. and not its cause. A donation propter nuptias, being a liberality,

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is subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor’s Encumbrances
death if they infringe the legitime of the forced heir. • If registered, can be enforced on the property against the
donee.
However, the CA erred in ordering the reduction of the • Donee may keep property by paying the obligation, but
donation for being inofficious. They considered only the area if he doesn’t, then the property shall be sold to pay the
and not the value of the properties. Before any conclusion about obligation.
the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary to determine first the partible estate to establish the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs and ascertain whether they GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION OF DONATION PROPTER
have been prejudiced. The CA decision is set aside and the trial NUPTIAS
court’s dismissal is sustained. However, the parties may still
litigate the issue of inofficiousness. Art 86 Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by
the donor in the following cases:
DONATIONS PROPER NUPTIAS OF PRESENT OR FUTURE (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially
PROPERTY declared void ab initio except donations made in
the marriage settlements, which shall be
Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than governed by Art 81
the absolute community of property, they cannot (2) When the marriage takes place without the
donate to each other in their marriage settlements consent of the parents or guardian, as required by
more than 1/5 of their present property. Any excess law
shall be considered void. (3) When the marriage is annulled and the donee
acted in bad faith
Donations of future property shall be governed by the (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty
provisions on the testamentary succession and the spouse
formalities of wills. (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition
Rule only applies if the present property is given by one spouse is complied with
to the other. If given by anyone other than the future spouses, (6) When the donee has committed and act of
then rules on ordinary donation applies. ingratitude as specified in the provisions of CC
Donations of What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent who did
• Present property → takes effect upon celebration of not give consent.
marriage What is a resolutory condition? The donation is already
• Future property → takes effect upon death (by will or received which enjoyment is subject to termination upon
mortis causa) happening of the future and uncertain event. In other words,
If Excess one is forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it will
be revoked if you use it anywhere outside NCR.)
• No limitation when the regime adopted is ACP.
• Law is based on policy that no spouse should be allowed Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation of law.
to take advantage of the other to acquire property. Those which are revoked by operation of law are the following:
• Thus, the one-fifth limit applies even if the donation is
outside a marriage settlement as long as it is made in 1. If the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlement and
view of the marriage. no marriage took place (Art 81)
Donations of Future Property ART 81, FC. Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts
• Take effect upon the death of the donor spouse referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future
• Made in a will or testament, and thus can be revoked marriage, including donations between the prospective
• Governed rules by on testamentary succession spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage
• Cannot be given by anyone other than the spouses does not take place. However, stipulations that do not
depend upon the celebration of the marriage shall be valid.
Two scenarios:
Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property subject to (a) If donation propter nuptias is in the prenup agreement
encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of and the marriage is not celebrated → VOID
the encumbrance, and the property is sold for less (b) If donation propter nuptias is not in the prenup
than the total amount of the obligation secured, the agreement and the marriage is not celebrated → ONLY
donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the REVOCABLE
property is sold for more than the total amount of said
obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.

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2. For void ab initio and subsequent marriages in a Donations to the stepchildren or to persons of whom the other
spouse’s presumptive death, provided the donee acted spouse is a presumptive heir are indirectly in favor of the other
in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation to Art 50) spouse, and are thus VOID.
• UNLESS the spouse could not expect to be the heir of
Art 765, CC – Acts of ingratitude the donee (e.g. donee already has legitimate children
1. If the donee should commit some offense against the who would be his heirs).
person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his
wife or children under his parental authority; NAZARENO V. BIROG (1947)
2. If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were married and begot a
or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he daughter, Alberta. Alberta then married Mariano Nazareno, with
should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been whom she begot Bonifacio Nazareno, herein plaintiff. When
committed against the donee himself, his wife or children Juan died, Andrea was remarried to Cirilo Braganza. Andrea
under his authority; and Cirilo had no child. Cirilo executed a deed of donation of
3. If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is land to his step-grandson Bonifacio, which was accepted by
legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. his parents. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land.
Later on, Cirilo sold portions of the land to the respondents,
RESOLUTORY CONDITION → if it happens, then the contract who immediately took possession of the land and cultivated
is terminated them. After Cirilo died, Bonifacio filed an action to collect
• Marriage in a DNP is not a suspensive condition payment from the respondents. Trial court ruled that the sales
made by Cirilo to the respondents were null and void. However,
Donor may or may not exercise the right to revoke, and can
petitioner has still lost ownership over these two portions as he
thus waive such right. There is an enforceable contract.
allowed respondents to remain possession over the lands for
more than ten years. Petitioner also signed the deed in favor of
VOID DONATIONS Ariola, and is now estopped from claiming the land back.
ART. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, Held: No, Bonifacio has no cause of action to claim the
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage lands, as the donation made by Cirilo to him was prohibited
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may by Article 1335 of CC. At the time of the donation, Cirilo was
give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The already married to petitioner’s grandmother, making petitioner
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as a grandchild of Cirilo where the prohibition still applies. The
husband and wife without a valid marriage. petitioner has also not acquired the lands through prescription,
as there was no evidence that he ever possessed them
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS adversely as against Cirilo. In fact, he signed as a witness to the
1) Between spouses during marriage deed in favor of Ariola, implying that he never claimed the lands
2) Direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the other for himself as against his grandfather.
spouse and a person whom the spouse is a presumptive
heir at the time of donation) MATABUENA V. CERVANTES (1971)
Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos over
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION a parcel of land in favor of Petronila Cervantes, his common-
1) Donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity of law wife. Felix and Petronila were married; but shortly after,
personality of spouses during marriage Felix died intestate. His sister Cornelia Matabuena filed a
2) Prevent weaker spouses from being abused by stronger complaint, claiming that the donation made by Felix to Petronila
spouse, whether by abuse of affection or threats of
while they were cohabiting was void and that the parcel of land
violence
in question belonged to her as his only sister and nearest
3) Protect creditors
4) Prevent indirect modification of the marriage settlement collateral relative. The CFI dismissed her complaint and upheld
the validity of the donation, reasoning that a donation under
PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO Article 133 of CC is void if made between the spouses during
1) common-law marriages the marriage, but since the donation was made when Felix and
2) parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage Petronila were not yet married, the foregoing provision does not
apply.
Reason: possibility of undue influence and that if ruled
Held: The ban on donation between married spouses also
otherwise, those living in guilt would be better off than those in
applies to common-law relationships. Policy considerations
legal union
and dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should
Do NOT refer to donation propter nuptias. apply to common-law spouses. If the intent of Article 133 is to
Direct → donation given to the other spouse proscribe donations from one spouse in favor of the other
Indirect → donation given to someone to which the spouse is a because of some undue influence, coercion, or even genuine
presumptive heir of. love and desire to please his or her consort, then the prohibitive
policy should also cover unmarried cohabitants to prevent
exploitation between the same. As long as marriage is the

91
cornerstone of Philippine family law, both reason and morality children of Goyanko and dela Cruz, discovered that ownership
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should of the property had already been transferred in the name of
likewise attach to concubinage. Ching. Thus, they filed a complaint for recovery of property with
damages. In her answer, Ching claimed that she is the actual
Nonetheless, while the donation was declared invalid, the Court owner of the property as she was the one who paid the price of
noted that Cornelia could still not have exclusive right to the the property. The deed of sale was also duly notarized. The trial
disputed property. Because the relationship between Felix and court dismissed the complaint against Ching, holding that the
Petronila was legitimated by their marriage, Petronila was parcel of land could not be considered as the conjugal property
entitled to 1/2 of his inheritance while Cornelia, as the surviving of the spouses or the exclusive capital property of Goyanko.
sister, to the other half, pursuant to Article 1001 of CC. The CA reversed the trial court's decision and declared the
deed of sale as null and void as the land is presumed to belong
HARDING V. COMMERCIAL UNION (1918) to the conjugal partnership and there is overwhelming evidence
Mrs. Harding bought an insurance policy for the car she that Ching and Goyanko have been living together as common-
received from her husband. A few days later, the car was law husband and wife.
totaled in a fire. Defendant has not given the insurance and
claims that the petitioner wife is not the owner of the Held: The conveyance of the land made by Goyanko in favor
automobile, and therefore has no insurable interest, since the of his common-law wife was null and void. The proscription
automobile was a gift to her by her husband and is thus void against sale of property between spouses applies even to
according to Article 1334 of CC. common-law relationships. A contract of sale made by a
husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his
Held: The car may be considered as a moderate gift. family is null and void for being contrary to morals and public
Whether a gift is moderate or not would depend upon the policy. Such sale is subversive of the stability of the family, a
circumstances of the parties, in this case, nothing was basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
disclosed by the record. Also, the insurance company is not the protects. Article 1409 of the CC states that contracts contrary
proper party to question the moderateness of the gift. It can to laws, morals, or public policy are void ab initio. Article 1352
only be raised by persons who bear such a relation to the also provides that contracts with unlawful cause produce no
parties making the transfer interfere with their rights or interest. effect whatsoever. The law emphatically prohibits the spouses
from selling property to each other subject to certain
SUMBAD V. CA (2006) exceptions. Such prohibition is done to prevent the destruction
George K. Tait, Sr. lived in common-law relationship with Maria of the system of conjugal partnership and the exercise of undue
F. Tait after the death of his first wife Agata B. Tait. He donated influence by one spouse over the other. The prohibitions apply
a certain parcel of unregistered land in Bontoc to Maria. After to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
George died, Maria sold a number of lots in favor of private marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt
respondents. Afterwards, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Beatrice Tait brought a suit alleging that they are the real
owners of the land as children and compulsory heirs of the Obiter: Ching's argument that a trust relationship was created
spouses George and Agata. The trial court dismissed the between Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary is also
complaint and on appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling. untenable. For petitioner's testimony that it was she who
provided the purchase price is uncorroborated. Although she is
Held: The deed of donation made by George to Maria is not considered the breadwinner of the family and earned for a living,
void. The petitioners were unable to present evidence that such do not conclusively clinch her claim.
George and Maria were married or cohabiting together when
the deed was executed. The evidence on record did not
establish that at the time the donation was made in 1974, their
father and Maria were still maintaining their common-law
relations since Beatrice only testified that in 1941 Maria became
their stepmother.
Obiter: The petitioners were admonished for raising for the first
time on appeal the invalidity of the donation based on the ban
on donations between those in a common-law relationship. This
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.
CHING V. GOYANKO (2006)

Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married and
begot seven children. The spouses acquired a parcel of land in
Cebu City, but since they were Chinese, the property was
registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura. Later on,
Ventura sold the property to Joseph Goyanko and the latter
executed a deed of sale in favor of his common-law wife, Maria
Ching. After Goyanko's death, the respondents, who were the

92
AB SO LU TE C O M MU N I TY O F PR O PER T Y GENERAL PROVISIONS
In ACP, the husband and wife are joint owners of all the ART. 88. The absolute community of property between
properties of the marriage. The properties which each spouse spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the
brings into the marriage, and those which they acquire during marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for
the marriage, all form a common mass, which, after the the commencement of the community regime at any other time
dissolution of the marriage or community, is divided between shall be void.
the spouses or their respective heirs, equally or in proportion
the parties have established, regardless of the value they each Under the CC, the property regime of the spouses shall
originally owned. commence precisely on the date of the celebration of marriage.
Under the Family Code, this was clarified to refer to the
While in the CPG, only the profits of the partnership are “precise moment” of the celebration of the marriage.
divided between the spouses, in the ACP it is the entire
common mass that is divided between them, each spouse The legal regime of ACP applies only to:
losing the ownership of the property brought to the marriage. 1. Marriages solemnized after the effectivity of the FC
where the spouses do not adopt a different system in a
No provisions on ACP although it marriage settlement.
Spanish code 2. Marriages where the ACP had been adopted by the
authorizes the adoption of such system
spouses before the FC took effect.
If the spouses adopt it in the marriage
settlement The legal regime of CPG commenced at the moment of
• Based on the custom that in marriage cannot be changed by the adoption of a different
majority of Filipino families, the system by a new law. The rights already vested in the parties
husband and wife consider would be impaired by giving retroactive effect to the ACP in
Civil Code themselves as co-owners brought violation of Article 256, FC. Article 105 supports this.
into and acquired during the
marriage CPG cannot be made to subject to a suspensive condition
• Spouses may choose this as their because the property relations of the spouses, especially as
property regime by stipulating it in regards third persons, cannot be left in a state of uncertainty
the marriage settlement even for a short time. The regime which will apply must be
determined in a clear and precise manner from the very
Family Code Automatic regime
moment the marriage began.
ART. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute

Advantages Disadvantages
community of property during the marriage can be made except
Inimical to the free circulation of in case of judicial separation of property.
property—loses freedom to dispose
Best responds to of what has always been his but is When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
the nature of lost by the celebration of marriage property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
marriage because it the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
brings about a Disadvantageous to parties with a
recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse
closer union in the greater amount of property at the
who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
life and interest of start of the marriage—could be an
aid to fortune hunters waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the
the husband and amount of their credits.
wife Indirect method of transferring
property to the other spouse, Distinction between waiver of the ACP and waiver of the
violating the limitations on DPR benefits thereof:
1. Waiver of ACP is valid only when made in a marriage
settlement before the celebration of the marriage.
When the spouses adopt the ACP as their conjugal regime 2. Waiver of its benefits is valid only after the dissolution of
either expressly or by not adopting any other system, they may the partnership.
stipulate the conditions which shall govern it. If the
stipulations of the parties conflict with what is provided in the The present article limits itself to prohibiting the waiver of the
following articles, the stipulations should prevail. The benefits of such community. Nonetheless, every contract
provisions of this code are only suppletory in effect. renouncing the ACP during the marriage is still void and non-
existent under our law. Renunciation of the ACP can be made
The absolute community is an extreme regime, in that all only in marriage settlement before the marriage.
property of the spouses, present and future, become common
property. On the other extreme is the system of absolute
separation of property. The Civil Code adopted the conjugal
partnership of gains as a middle ground or compromise regime
between the two extremes.

93
ART. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the 2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either
absolute community of property between the spouses in all spouse, except for jewelries.
matters not provided for in this Chapter.
Includes clothes, toilet articles, books, eyeglasses,
The rules on co-ownership are to be found in the Civil Code. hearing aids, and the like. This includes articles for the
They are suppletory to the provisions of the FC on the ACP. exercise of a trade or profession, unless they are
luxurious or special. Expensive or luxurious jewelry
(those reserved for special occasions) will form part of
WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMUNITY PROPERTY the community property, while minor or inexpensive
jewelry (for daily wear) are separate properties. In
ART. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
determining what is luxurious and ordinary, the financial
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of
and social position of the spouse should be recognized.
all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
3. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse
The patrimony of either spouse existing at the time of the who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage is automatically converted into common property, marriage, and the fruits and income thereof.
without the necessity of any juridical act transmitting ownership
of the individual objects. The same is true with respect to All property acquired before the marriage by a spouse
property acquired during the marriage by each of the who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage
spouses. The title to the property so converted should then be are also reserved. Under the CC, only presumptive
transferred to the names of both husband and wife by legitimes were reserved. But in the FC, all the present
registration of the marriage settlements. As long as this change property of the spouse with descents are reserved. Thus,
in title has not been made, third persons acting in good faith only his or her acquisitions during the marriage will go
can rely on the title in the name of one spouse and shall be into the ACP. However, it does not follow that such
protected in their acquisition thereof. descendants must necessarily inherit the reserved
property. It is such to his or her full right of disposition
and can be alienated. The price or property acquired
ART. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community from such alienation will continue to be separate.
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title ABRENICA V. ABRENICA (2012)
by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income Petitioner Erlando Abrenica was a partner of the respondent law
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the firm Abrenica, Tungol, and Tibayan. The private respondents
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the filed a case against Atty. Abrenica, alleging that he refused to
community property; return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. parcel of land in Batangas and retainer fees that he received
However, jewelry shall form part of the community from two clients. The RTC ordered the petitioner to pay the fees,
property; and during the pendency of one of the appeals, the sheriff levied
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse some of his properties to pay for the funds. Petitioner alleged
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, that some of the properties levied belonged to his spouse and
and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such children, and that some of the property levied (i.e. house and lot
property. and 2 motorcycles) were owned jointly by the spouses as part
of the community property.
Known as reserved properties, the parties may, by agreement,
include any or all of these in the ACP. They may also reserve Held: The properties are not included in the community
from the community other properties not enumerated in this property. The motor vehicles were purchased in 1992 and
article. In the absence of any agreement they are all reserved. 1997, also the house and lot formed part of their ACP but Art.
92(3) of FC excludes from the community property the property
1. Gratuitous acquisitions during the marriage by either acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
spouse, and the fruits and income thereof, unless the descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits and the
donor/testator/grantor expressly provided that they shall income, if any of that property. In this case, Abrenica and his
form part of the ACP. second spouse Joena were married in 1998. Therefore, they do
not belong to the ACP and to the second marriage.
Properties acquired by donation or inheritance. There
must be an express provision in the deed of donation or
in the will or testament that the property shall form part ART. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
of the ACP. In case of intestate succession by the belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of
spouse, the property inherited will always be his those excluded therefrom.
separate property because it goes to him by operation of
law. Mere alienation of separate property does not • Presumption of absolute community.
convert the price or property into community property.

94
CHARGES UPON THE ACP 3. Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other but to the benefit of the
ART. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: family.
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and 4. Taxes and expenses for the community property.
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the a. Expenses for minor or major repairs of community
support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the property
provisions of this Code on Support; 5. Taxes and expenses for separate properties used by
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage the family.
by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit 6. Expenses for professional or vocational courses or for
of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse self-improvement.
with the consent of the other; 7. Expenses for the professional or vocational courses of
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse legitimate children.
without the consent of the other to the extent that the 8. Ante-nuptial debts that redound to the family’s benefit.
family may have been benefited; 9. Support of illegitimate children and liabilities from
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major crimes or quasi-delicts.
or minor repairs, upon the community property; a. If separate property is insufficient then the
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made community property shall advance it from the
during marriage upon the separate property of either share of the obligated spouse upon liquidation of
spouse used by the family; the community.
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or 10. Expenses for litigation, unless the suit is groundless.
complete a professional or vocational course, or other a. If the suit is groundless, the expenses must be
activity for self-improvement; borne by the plaintiff spouse.
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have b. If the suit succeeds, the expenses must be borne
redounded to the benefit of the family; by the community.
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both c. Defendant must also answer for his own expenses
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for if it is found that he has given cause for the suit.
the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other activity for EXPENSES OF FAMILY:
self-improvement; 1. Support of the spouses, their common children, and
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those legitimate children of either in a previous marriage.
falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of 2. Expenses for a professional or vocational course by
illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities either spouse or their common legitimate children.
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a 3. All taxes on community property and on separate
quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the property used by the community.
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of 4. Expenses for major and minor repairs of the community
which shall be considered as advances to be deducted property, and for minor repairs on separate property of
from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of either spouse used by the community.
the community; and 5. Expenses for litigation, unless groundless.
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the
These DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS are chargeable against
suit is found to be groundless.
the community property:
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing 1. During the marriage for the benefit of the community, or
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses by both spouses, or by one spouse with consent.
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their 2. By either spouse without the consent of the other and
separate properties. ante-nuptial debts as long as they redound to the
family’s benefit.
ART. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game 3. Liabilities from crimes or quasi-delicts.
of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the In all cases of LIABILITY of the community, except those
loser and shall not be charged to the community but any considered as advances for a spouse, if the community
winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. property is insufficient, the separate properties of the spouse
shall be solidarily liable.
The ACP shall be liable for: OBLIGATIONS BORNE BY SEPARATE PROPERTY:
1. Support of the spouses, their common children, and 1. Debts and obligations incurred alone or without the
legitimate children of either spouse. consent of the other without benefit to the family.
2. Debts and obligations during the marriage by the 2. Ante-nuptial obligations which do not benefit the family.
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community; 3. Support of illegitimate children.
both spouses, or one spouse with consent. 4. Liabilities from crime or quasi-delict
a. Under the CC, these were paid from the common
fund, without right to reimbursement.

95
b. Under the FC, must be borne by the separate The CC expressly provided that the ownership, administration,
property of the guilty spouse. possession, and enjoyment of the common property belong to
5. Whatever a spouse loses in gambling or any game of both spouses jointly.
chance, but what he wins will go to the ACP.
a. Punishes the gambler-spouse (he never wins) Article 96 of FC mentions only administration and enjoyment
as belonging to them jointly. Nonetheless, ownership and
SUPPORT DEBTS / OBLIGATIONS TAXES / EXPENSES possession also belong to both spouses jointly based on the
very nature of ACP.
94(2)
94(1) incurred DURING 94(4)
Spouses, common MARRIAGE by including min / maj Neither spouse may alienate or encumber any common
OR legitimate - administrator spouse, repairs upon property without the written consent of the other or
children - both spouses, community property
- one spouse w/ consent
authorization of the court. Absent such, the alienation or
encumbrance shall be void. But as long as they are not
94(6) withdrawn by either or both parties to the alienation or
94(3) 94(5)
commence or encumbrance, they can still be validated.
contracted by either mere preservation of
complete
spouse w/o consent, to separate property
professional or
vocational courses
extent family is benefited used by the family Either spouse may question the validity of alienations made
alone by the other, but the rights of third persons must be
94(8) 94(7) 94(10) protected. Still, the protection in favor of third persons is less
value donated or antenuptial litigation
promised to children debts that have benefited between spouses, because the husband has no right to freely dispose of the
for education the family unless groundless common property.
94(9)
antenuptial debts NOT
The rights of the spouses in the community are united
94(9) benefitting family, permanently. Neither spouse can dispose inter vivos of his
Support for liabilities for crimes or
illegitimate children
share; such disposition is void, even with the consent of the
quasi-delicts,
ONLY in case of other. However, if the disposition of the share of the spouse is
insufficiency of by will, it is valid.
separate property, ONLY in case of
Must be paid back insolvency / insufficiency
of separate property, EXCEPTION: The law allows either spouse to make moderate
must be paid back donations from the community property, without the consent
of the other, for charity or to members of the family during family
celebrations or because of their need. What is moderate
OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF THE ACP depends on their financial and social circumstances.
ART. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of DISSOLUTION
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must ART. 99. The absolute community terminates:
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
implementing such decision. (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
unable to participate in the administration of the common marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
administration. These powers do not include disposition or Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse after the
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written dissolution of the marriage by death or after the dissolution of
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority the ACP shall belong to that spouse exclusively.
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. • Such subsequent acquisitions are not liable for the debts
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing of the community, except in case of insufficiency.
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, • Debts and obligations incurred by either spouse after the
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the dissolution of the community shall be borne by that
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court spouse alone, UNLESS such were incurred in the
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. administration, care, protection and preservation of the
community property.
ART. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest
• Upon dissolution of the community, the property shall be
in the community property. liquidated and distributed.
ART. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property In many cases, even after the death of one of the spouses, the
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, surviving spouse does not liquidate the absolute
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations community. They keep the community properties undivided.
from the community property for charity or on occasions of
• Parties establish a co-ownership for the management,
family rejoicing or family distress.
control, and enjoyment of the common property.

96
• Fruits of the common-property are divided according to ART. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife
the law on co-ownership, or in proportion to the share or shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
interest of each party. (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
• Pending liquidation of the ACP, the alienations or live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
encumbrances must be considered limited to his or her be supported;
undivided interest and cannot involve any particular or (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
specific property or physical part of it. the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
The dissolution of the absolute community must be registered
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the
in the registry of property in order to affect third persons
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
dealing in good faith with the property.
liable for the support of the family. The spouse present
• This doctrine is applicable in cases of registered
shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
property, because persons purchasing registered real
given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
property are supposed to look to the registry alone, in
specific separate property of the other spouse and use
determining whether the vendor has the title and
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
authority to make the sale.
• If the title shows that the property belongs to thus ART. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
husband or to the community and there is no annotation fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
of any pending proceedings, a third person acting in aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
good faith, in ignorance of the dissolution of the judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
community and of pending administration proceedings, administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
will have a better title against the heirs. precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
OÑAS V. JAVILLO (1934) The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
Crispulo Javillo died intestate and his property is now being paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
subject to partition. His first marriage bore 5 children and
produced 11 parcels of land. The second marriage bore 4 A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or
children and produced 20 parcels of land. Petitioner is now she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
questioning the ruling of lower court finding that the properties The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the three months or has failed within the same period to give any
products of the properties of the first marriage. information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
Held: The properties of the second marriage were not dwelling.
acquired with the products of the properties of the first
marriage. Javillo lived for about twenty years after his second Abandonment → departure with intent never to return. Not just
marriage and during that marriage acquired twenty parcels of physical separation, but absolute cessation of marital relations
land. Only eleven parcels were acquired during the first with the intention of perpetual separation.
marriage. It would take a person with a very vivid imagination to
Spouse can seek the remedies in the first paragraph (petition
believe that the product of eleven parcels of land acquired
for receivership, judicial separation of property, or sole
during the first marriage supplied all of the capital used in
administration of community) after three months of absence
acquiring the twenty parcels of the second marriage.
Justifiable separation obligates the husband to pay separate
Community property is terminated when the marriage is
maintenance to the wife.
dissolved or annulled. Whatever is acquired by the surviving
spouse after the death of the other is his separate property; • Maltreatment of spouse
consequently, the other spouse or his heirs can claim no share • Bringing a concubine into the house
of the property. Prior to the liquidation, the interest of the wife, • Forcing spouse to live with persons whose habits,
and in case of her death, of her heirs, is a mere expectancy character, and language are offensive to her dignity
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate and
does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in
the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. In
this case it does not appear that there was a liquidation of the
property of the first marriage. Thus, the project of partition
approved by the lower court is not in conformity to law. As such,
1/2 of all the conjugal property of both marriages corresponds
to the deceased Javillo and must be divided share and share
alike among all the children of both marriages. One-half of the
conjugal property pertaining to the first marriage should be
divided share and share alike among the five children of that
marriage, while one-half of the conjugal property of the second
marriage must be adjudicated to the widow Oñas.

97
LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES Forfeiture → offending spouse forfeits share in net profits
under 43(2) and 63(2) in favor of common children, own children
ART. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, by previous marriage, or innocent spouse.
the following procedure shall apply:
Net profits → pursuant to 102(4) shall be the increase in value
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the between the market value of the community property at the time
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
properties of each spouse. time of its dissolution.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community
shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of • Tolentino: Should be difference between net assets at
said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the time of dissolution minus market value of the capital
unpaid balance with their separate properties in during marriage, in order to take into account the debts
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of the community.
of Article 94.
Presumptive legitimes → legitimes will come from both
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses and are based on the total amount of property to be
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
allotted to each spouse, including his or her separate property
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
and share in the net remainder of the community property.
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a • After the deduction of the presumptive legitimes or the
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the forfeited share in the net profits, if applicable, the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a balance of the share of a spouse in the net remainder or
voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For net assets of the community shall be the amount finally
purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture delivered to him or her.
in accordance with Arts. 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the • All the deductions are not made when the ACP is
said profits shall be the increase in value between the dissolved by death of either spouse.
market value of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at OTHER WAYS OF LIQUIDATION
the time of its dissolution. These methods of liquidation are alternative, not cumulative.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall
be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Art. 51. • Extra-judicial agreement of parties (if all the parties are
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the of age and there are no debts)
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the • Ordinary action for partition (in case no debts and
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the party cannot agree on extra-judicial partition)
spouse with whom the majority of the common children • Testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years spouse (only when one of the spouses dies)
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority,
the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best ART. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
interests of said children. community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
PROCESS OF LIQUIDATION
1) List down the properties in separate inventories, If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
including their market values. spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially
2) Pay the obligations for both community and separate or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the
properties. deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period,
3) The remaining balance of the community shall be the net no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
assets. This shall be divided equally between spouses (or involving the community property of the terminated marriage
on how they divide it in the marriage settlement) shall be void.
4) Separate properties shall be solidarily liable for
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
deficiency of the community.
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
a. Tolentino believes liability of the spouses to their
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
own creditors should be given priority over
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
liabilities to the community
5) If the personal obligations of a spouse exceed his or her Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How?
separate property, the creditors can pursue the 1) judicial settlement in testate or intestate proceedings
deficiency against whatever is his or her share in the net 2) judicial action, or ordinary action for partition
remainder of the community assets. 3) extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no debts)
6) All remaining separate properties will be delivered to
each spouse, and their share of the assets will also be One-year prescription period is not practical. Filipinos have
divided in equal shares to the respective spouses or their a tradition of one year of mourning (babang luksa).
heirs, without prejudice to forfeitures/legitimes.

98
Validity of any disposition or encumbrance can be challenged dissolution, the liquidation of the property of the second
by heirs of deceased. However, these will be valid to the extent marriage can be carried out.
of what is allotted in the property involved to the vendor or
mortgagor in the final partition. When there is NO proof
Property remaining at termination of second marriage shall be
• If the property sold or mortgaged is finally allotted to the divided between the two marriages in proportion to capital (if
vendor or mortgagor as his share, the alienation or known) and duration (if capital not known) of marriage
encumbrance shall be valid.
• Shall also be valid if the surviving spouse is the only heir Applies to division between marriages, not necessarily the final
of the deceased spouse. distribution among parties in case the regimes in the marriages
are different.
If there is no liquidation of the first marriage property and the
surviving spouse remarries, this article imposes a mandatory VDA. DE DELIZO V. DELIZO (1976)
regime of complete separation for subsequent marriages. Nicolas Delizo first married Rosa Villasfer which lasted for 18
years (1891-1909) and they had 3 children. He then married
• Tolentino: no logical reason since why should the regime Dorotea de Ocampo which lasted for 46 yrs (1911-1957) and
continue if the heirs succeed to get a partition of the they had 9 children. After Nicolas died, his property was
properties after the celebration of the second marriage? partitioned. Among these included were homestead lands in
Caanawan. The CA held that these lands were property of the
first marriage because while they were registered during the
ART. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community
second marriage, the property was acquired and given to the
properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same
spouses during the first marriage. Thus, they form part of the
person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out
conjugal property of the first marriage.
simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of
each community shall be determined upon such proof as may Held: The Caanawan property, while in the possession of
be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of Nicolas and Rosa before her death, could not be entirely in
doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. What
the same shall be divided between the different communities in determines ownership of the homestead lands is the fulfillment
proportion to the capital and duration of each. of requirement of registration pursuant to Act 926, which says
that homesteads can be registered after 5 years of cultivation,
From the language of this article, it seems that its provisions and thus can be registered only 5 years after 1905, i.e. 1910
apply only to two or more marriages contracted by the same which is beyond the 1st marriage. However, the first marriage
person before the effectivity of this Code. There is no reason still owns a share to the land since they cultivated it during 1905
for this limitation. The same rules should apply in all cases, but to 1909. At the same time, the other properties also were not
taking into account the kind of regime in each marriage. fully under the second conjugal partnership, since the fruits of
In the event that there is proof of the capital of the spouses, and the Caanawan property were used to acquire the subsequent
the fruits and income from the property or from the industry of lots.
the spouses in each marriage, they can be liquidated Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each
separately, or even simultaneously but separating the spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the
respective assets and liabilities of the marriages. total mass of these properties should be divided between the
In the absence of such proof, the rule in the last sentence of this two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
article can be applied as there is no way by which the properties partnership
of the first marriage can be separated from those of the second. 1) 1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the whole
estate (18 years)
PARTNERSHIPS WITH PROOF 2) 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the whole
The community property of the first marriage should first be estate (46 years)
liquidated, based on the evidence of the property brought to the 3) The share of Nicolas Delizo is the net remainder of
marriage and the property at the time of dissolution of the CPG of both marriages or 32/64, divided into equal
community. The share of each spouse in the net remainder of shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the children)
the properties shall be delivered to them or their heirs.
Thus, the final sharing scheme is:
The property of the second marriage will then be liquidated. The
property or capital of the spouses in the second marriage and 1) Rosa’s share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided
the value at the time of dissolution will be the basis of the among their 3 kids (142/1664 each)
liquidation. 2) Dorotea’s share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share
in Nicolas’ estate (662/1664)
The capital in the second marriage of the spouse who has 3) Nicolas’ share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided
remarried may be his share in the first liquidation, or it may be into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each)
different. On the basis of the capital of the spouses in the
second marriage and the value of the properties at the time of

99
C O N JU GA L P ART N ER SH I P O F GAI N S CPG VS. ORDINARY CONTRACTS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CPG ORDINARY
ART. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage Exists from marriage, Exists according to
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall independent of will of parties agreement of parties
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. Purpose, duration, and
Purpose, duration, and rules
rules are determined by
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal governed by law
parties
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested Profits divided
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or Profits divided equally according to capitals or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. upon their agreement
Under the CC, the system of CPG was the legal regime, and Law grants husband some General rule is all
was presumed if the spouses did not adopt a different system predominance in control, partners have same
in their marriage settlements. But under the FC, this regime is management, and disposition rights to such matters
merely optional and must be provided in the marriage
settlements. Not a juridical person Juridical person
If the spouses adopt this regime, they can provide terms or Not for profit For profit
rules to govern the partnership. Such ruled adopted by the
spouses will prevail over the provisions of the Family Code, Death does not
Dissolved by death
which is only suppletory in effect. Without any stipulation of necessarily dissolve it
rules, the provisions of FC will govern.
Liquidation can happen
Liquidated upon death
Said to be not reflective of Filipino culture since Filipinos anytime
don’t usually compute the source of funds.
THREE SEPARATE PATRIMONIES

ART. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, Each of these has its own assets and liabilities. Spouses
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, cannot modify these patrimonies. Separate property of one
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and spouse cannot by agreement be made conjugal property, or
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts vice versa. The personal debts of one spouse, chargeable
or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the against his property, cannot be charged against the conjugal
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both partnership, nor those partnership against one spouse.
spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless
otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. • Patrimony of husband (capital property)
• Patrimony of wife (paraphernal property)
Under the CPG, the husband and wife place in a common fund • Conjugal partnership of gains
the fruits of their separate properties and of their work or
industry and divide in equal parts, upon dissolution of the Does not mean that there can be no transmission. There
union, the profits and benefits indiscriminately obtained by could be, as long as there is no impairment or prejudice to any
either spouse during the marriage. patrimony. When there is a reduction of one patrimony in favor
of another, there must be a restoration of the equilibrium by
• Each spouse has his or her own property, and his or her means of an indemnity which must be paid by the patrimony
own debts. benefited to the one which was diminished.
• Did not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
Separation in fact does NOT affect the partnership. Implied
debts or properties between the spouses.
by Art 101 and 128.
• The law establishes a complete separation of
capitals—a complete independence of the capital
account from the account of benefits pertaining to the ART. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also
conjugal partnership. apply to conjugal partnership of gains.
• This constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the
presumption of solidarity between the spouses. Art 88 – ACP begins at precise moment of celebration of
marriage
The common fund will contain the
1) proceeds, products, fruits and incomes of separate Art 89 – prohibition on waiver of rights, interest, shares and
properties, and effects of ACP during marriage
2) properties acquired either by efforts or chance

100
ART. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict • If indemnity for patrimonial or moral damage → separate
with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the (e.g. damages for injuries to feelings such as those from
spouses in their marriage settlements. libel or slander)
• If compensatory → conjugal since these injure the
Partnership → Contribute money, property, or industry. If you earning capacity of the spouse and prejudice the
don’t contribute any of these, you are not a partner. conjugal property
IN marriage, there’s a parallelism, but you’re required to give RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

ALL THREE. • Property acquired by redemption belongs to the spouse
exclusively
NATURE OF INTEREST
• If money used in redemption came from others, the
1) There is no co-ownership, instead partnership
owner of the property will have to reimburse the amount
2) Each spouse has mere inchoate rights or expectancy
advanced for him or her
over partnership property during marriage
• Includes also by barter or exchange with property.
• If by RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, then the SOURCE OF
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY FUNDS does not matter. TEST IS by who has the right to
redeem. If right to redeem belongs to one of the spouses
ART. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each exclusively, then that is separate property.
spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; EXCHANGE OF PROPERTIES
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by • Property acquired by exchange always substitutes that
gratuitous title; which is given.
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter
• Where transaction is a purchase, the foregoing principles
or by exchange with property belonging to only one of
would not be applicable
the spouses; and
• Funds derived from the SALE of exclusive property is still
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the
separate
wife or of the husband.
• Law takes into basis the source of the money employed
PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE in the PURCHASE, not the person in whose name it is
• Includes everything owned by a spouse before the made
marriage
o Property acquired prior under a defective title and MONEY THROUGH MORTGAGE
defect is cured during the marriage Money obtained through mortgage or borrowed by wife in
o Alienated prior to marriage but required by him consideration of paraphernal property is still paraphernal
during the marriage due to annulment, rescission, property since it does not constitute fruits of the paraphernal
or resolution of contract OR revocation of property. If the loan is for the benefit of the partnership, the loan
donation may be considered conjugal.
o Property delivered during the marriage where the
cause or consideration came prior to the marriage PROPERTIES IN CO-OWNERSHIP
• IN ACP → everything brought into the marriage and still Manner of acquisition of co-owned property determines
form part of ACP. ownership. If by exercise of right of redemption, owned
exclusively. If purchased, then depends on the source of the
• 109(1) is the main provision differentiating ACP and CPG.
funds.
ACQUISITION BY GRATUITOUS TITLE REDEMPTION → who has the right to redeem

PURCHASE → look at source of funds
• Property acquired by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation.
• A gratuity is considered separate property of spouse INCREASE IN VALUE
entitled to that gratuity (money granted for services If because of investment of conjugal funds, then conjugal. If
already rendered, motivated by pure liberality for ordinarily due to unearned increment or natural course of time,
services which gave rise to no legal obligation) this is separate property.
o A pension (provided when services are still being
rendered, contemplated compensation for POSSESSION HAS NO EFFECT
services) is not a gratuity When the property is separate property of one of the spouses,
the fact that it is in possession of the other does not affect the
• SAME WITH ACP.
right of the former.

101
ART. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, CASTRO V. MIAT (2003)
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Upon the death of his wife Concordia, Moises, the father, gave
a property located in Paco to his sons, Alexander and Romeo.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the Sometime later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo since he
administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by and his wife left the house. Alexander received a partial
means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the payment but never executed a deed of assignment in favor of
registry of property of the place the property is located. Romeo. Romeo later on learned that Moises sold the Paco
property to petitioner Castro for 95,000 pesos. Romeo
The ownership of paraphernal property remains with the questioned the sale and contended the claim of the petitioners
wife, and the mere fact that she transfers the administration that the land is exclusive capital property of Moises. Castro
thereof to the husband does not confer upon him the ownership asserts that the land is exclusive property because while the
of the same. spouses bought it in an installment basis, it was Moises who
paid the balance after his wife’s death.
• The husband cannot alienate, encumber, or dispose of
said property without the knowledge and authorization Held: The Paco property is part of the conjugal partnership.
of the wife The records show that it was acquired by onerous title during
• Such unauthorized acts are without force and effect as the marriage out of the common fund. Property acquired by
against the wife and the paraphernal property. onerous title during marriage is conjugal property pursuant to
• Such property cannot be attached for debts of the Article 153(1) of CC. Article 160 of CC also provides that all
husband property of marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
• He cannot institute any action with regard to such partnership. This presumption applies even when the manner in
property without the wife’s intervention or consent. which the property was acquired does not appear. Since the
• The wife can even eject the husband from the same, if property was bought during the marriage and was obtained
he occupies it without right and without paying rents. through a deed of sale, the land is part of the conjugal property.
• Law vests in the wife the management of the paraphernal
property, which continues unless she transfers it to the
ART. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate
husband by a notarial instrument with intent that he
or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without
administer such property.
the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to
litigate with regard to the same.
PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES V. POIZAT (1925)
Gabriela Andrea de Costen executed in favor of her husband The wife has the right to alienate, encumber, or dispose of a
Juan M. Poizat a general power of attorney, which among other parcel of land appearing to be registered in her name under
things, authorized him “in her name, place and stead, and the Torrens system, without the necessity of the presence or
making use of her rights and actions” to borrow money and to permission of her husband.
execute a mortgage over her properties in question.
Accordingly, Poizat secured a loan for 10,000 Pounds Sterling
from plaintiff Philippine Sugar Estates Company and to secure ART. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse
faithful payment thereof executed a mortgage over the administered by the other automatically terminates the
properties of his wife. However, the mortgage executed by the administration over such property and the proceeds of the
husband, was signed merely in his own name, and not as alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
attorney-in-fact of his wife. For failure to pay the loan, the
plaintiff filed an action for foreclosure, and later the properties No legal obstacle preventing owner-spouse from allowing the
were sold at auction to the plaintiff. When the sale was about to other spouse to continue to administer the proceeds of the
be confirmed, Gabriela objected on the ground that the alienation.
mortgage was null and void, inasmuch as her husband was not
authorized to execute it, and there was no consideration. All of FRUITS
her objections were overruled by the lower court. Hence, the The fact that fruits or income of the paraphernal property belong
current appeal. to the conjugal partnership does not authorize husband to
collect them because they become conjugal property only
Held: The mortgage is not binding upon the wife and as to when they are not necessary to defray the expenses of
her, it is null and void. Poizat may have had the authority to administration and constitute net income.
borrow money and mortgage the real property of his wife, but
the law specifies how and in what manner it must be done, and • While fruits are unliquidated, they continue under
in this case, such power was never exercised. The mortgage management of the paraphernal as long as they answer
was not executed for her and in her name, place, or stead. It for its expenses.
was only signed by Poizat in his own name and by him only, • CPG only after the necessary expenses for
with nothing therein acknowledging that the transfer was administration of separate property have been paid off.
executed on behalf of his wife. The husband should have signed Only the net income forms part of the CPG.
the agreement as his own person and also as attorney in fact
for his wife.

102
LIM V. GARCIA (1907) ART. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly
Lim died intestate, leaving his widow, Isabel Garcia, and 9 and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the
children. The trial court ruled that the properties in the inventory donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the
belong to the conjugal property except for a house and lot, 700 absence of designation, share and share-alike, without
pesos used to buy a lot, and 10,000 pesos brought into the prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
marriage. The petitioners contend that none of the property
should be treated as conjugal property since the defendant, his The designated share of the spouse will he his or her separate
widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership and the property. If no designation, then they will share equally.
petitioner brought more.
Accretion → when one of the donee spouse does not accept
Held: The intestate estate of Lim is part of the conjugal his share, such share shall accrue to the benefit of the other
partnership. The trial court was correct in ruling that the spouse who will get the entire donation, UNLESS donor
petitioners were not able to present sufficient evidence to provides there is no accretion between the donees. (CC 753)
overcome the presumption established in Article 1407 of CC,
which states that all the estate of the married couple will be
considered as conjugal property unless proven that it is the ART. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the
separate property of the husband or the wife charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee
spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal
The three parcels of land are separate properties of Isabel. partnership of gains.
The trial court was correct in its finding that these properties
were not acquired by the defendant from the deceased but as Onerous Donation → one where donor imposed some
a conveyance by third parties; it was an exchange for a property obligation or charge upon the donee.
inherited by her from her father. There was also nothing in the
record to prove that it was acquired as part of her dowry. • Conjugal partnership is entitled to reimbursement for the
Therefore, it was proper for the court to exclude them from the amount used in performance of the obligation.
inventory of the property of Lim which was to be distributed • Entire property remains separate property of the spouse.
among his legitimate heirs.
ART. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities,

PEOPLES BANK & TRUST CO. V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on
MANILA (1934)
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
Domingo Angeles, who was married to Manuel Sandoval but
case.
with whom she lives separately, executed an “Agreement and
Declaration of Trust” to petitioner in which she conveyed part
DISTINCTION
of her paraphernal property so that the lands would be
• If grant is act of pure beneficence, then is separate
subdivided into small lots to be sold for cash. When petitioner
property
registered the agreement, the respondent official denied such
registration because Dominga did not get the consent of her
• If only a return of sums accumulated from salaries
(e.g. retirement benefit), then conjugal UNLESS
husband. The trial court sustained the denial and held that the
accumulated before marriage.
declaration was void since it authorized the petitioner to collect
the fruits of the paraphernal property while the lots remained
unsold, a violation of Articles 1385 and 1401(3) of CC which PRESUMPTION THAT PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL
consider the fruits as part of the conjugal property and under
sole management by the husband pursuant to CC 1412. ART. 116. All property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
Held: While fruits of the paraphernal property do belong to
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
the conjugal partnership, the wife merely transferred
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
administrative authority to the petitioner. The fruits still
belong to the paraphernal property of the wife while they remain All properties of the spouses are presumed to be conjugal
unliquidated and are used for the expenses incurred in the unless the contrary is proved.
administration of the said property. Since Dominga is the legal • Not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
administratrix of the property, she has the right to collect the with funds of the partnership.
fruits and she may delegate such power to other persons. The • When an immovable was acquired by purchase during
husband cannot claim the fruits in question for their conjugal the marriage, it is considered as conjugal property.
partnership until a liquidation hereof has been made by her. • Even when the manner in which the property was
Moreover, the lack of marital consent does not render the acquired does not appear, the presumption applies.
contract null and void but only voidable at the instance of the • The party who invokes this presumption must first prove
husband or his heirs. In view of the foregoing, the Register of that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Deeds of Manila was ordered to register the instrument in o Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
question. condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

103
• Also applies even over the ordinary rules of accession. The following facts, when taken separately may not be sufficient
o Where a building is constructed on the land of one to overcome the presumption as to the conjugal character of
of the spouses, it will be presumed that when the the property acquired by the wife during the marriage, will be
source of the money does not appear, the building sufficient if taken together:
was the expense of the common funds and is thus 1) The title to the property is in the name of the wife alone
conjugal property. 2) The husband gave his marital consent to its being
mortgaged by the wife
This presumption is rebuttable with strong, clear, and 3) The wife was financially able to buy the property.
convincing evidence that the property is exclusively owned by
one of the spouses. When the question involves the source of the money that was
• In case where both husband and wife appear to be employed to purchase property during the marriage, the proof
interested in establishing the separate ownership of the is difficult, even if in fact there existed money belonging
wife, and both spouses are living, as when it is sought to exclusively to one of the spouses.
exclude the property from voluntary insolvency • There is the possibility that property which is separate
proceedings of the husband, the courts are justified in may be held conjugal for want of the necessary evidence
requiring clear, satisfactory and convincing proof in of the exclusive ownership of the funds with which it was
rebuttal of the presumption for the interest of third purchased.
persons would be materially prejudiced by failure to give • If the wife states that the purchase price comes from her
the presumption its full force and effect. exclusive property and is acknowledged by the husband,
• The burden of proving that the property is exclusive or vice versa, it merely proves the existence of an
rests upon the party asserting it. admission or acknowledgment, not the truth thereof.
• Simple manifestations in the deed of acquisition that
the property is exclusive property of one of the spouses When the question is exclusively between husband and wife, or
will not be sufficient to rebut the presumption. between one of them and the heirs of the other, the admission
o To permit this would make the spouses the sole or acknowledgment of one spouse that the money used to
arbiter of the character of the property acquired purchase the property came from the other spouse, is
during the marriage. evidence against the party making the admission or his heirs.
o Mere declaration in the deed of sale to the wife When the interest of creditors of the conjugal partnership are
that the purchase is made with her own separate involved, the proof must be clear and complete to overthrow
funds is not sufficient to overthrow the the presumption.
presumption. • Statement by the wife alone, contained in a notarial
• The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate under Spanish law, that she purchased the
deed of sale or the certificate of title of the registration of property with her own money → not evidence against
the property or the tax declaration has been placed in the creditors that she is the exclusive owner.
name of one of the spouses only, unless the rights of • Receipt signed by the husband and wife → prima facie
innocent third parties are involved. proof against his heirs, but against creditors of the
o Nor is the fact that the permit given by the city conjugal partnership, the proof must be conclusive
authorities for the construction of a building was
• Mere acknowledgment of the spouses in a contract that
in the name of the wife. the property is paraphernal is not full proof of that fact
o But where there is no showing as to when the with respect to third parties.
property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that
the title is in the spouse’s name is an indication of
JOCSON V. CA (1989)
it being exclusive property of the said spouse.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
When a wife claims property purchased during the marriage as Vasquez, who is married to Ernesto Vasquz, are the only
paraphernal, she must establish by proof, other than through surviving children of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
recitals of the act of acquisition, the following: Poblete. Both Emilio and Alejandra died intestate. Moises was
1) The possession of some paraphernal funds under her assailing the validity of three documents executed by Emilio
administration, and available for investment during his lifetime which purportedly conveyed by sale to
2) Sufficiency of such funds for the price of the property Agustina almost all of his properties, including 6 parcels of land,
3) Investment of such funds in the property in question two rice mills and a camarin in Cavite, as well as his 1/3 share
in the estate of his wife. Moises was thus claiming that the
Property acquired by a married woman with money brought by documents were null and void because the properties in Cavite
her to the marriage and with the consent of the husband, are unliquidated conjugal properties of his parents which the
payments having been made with her own check, is father, therefore, cannot validly sell to his sister Agustina. The
paraphernal property. RTC ruled in favor of Moises, declaring the properties as
• Deeds of sale, Torrens titles, and assessment records, conjugal because they were registered in the name of “Emilio
together with the testimony of the wife, are sufficient to Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.” On appeal, the CA
show that the property is her exclusive property. reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal.

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Held: There is insufficient proof to show that the properties during his second marriage, the land would still be his exclusive
are conjugal in nature. Before Moises could invoke the property because it was acquired by him by lucrative title.
presumption under Article 160 of the NCC, he must first prove
that the property in question was acquired during the marriage. As regards the property, petitioner showed building permits for
Therefore, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari
favor of conjugal partnership. In the case at bar, the certificates store issued in her name alone in support of her claim that it
of title presented by Moises, to the extent that the properties was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that the
were registered in the name of Emilio, married to Alejandra, improvements were acquired during the second marriage.
were no proof that the properties were acquired during their The fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not
coverture because acquisition of title and registration thereof determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is
are two different acts. Therefore, it may be that the properties conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents
were acquired by Emilio when he was still a bachelor but were all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures. Further,
registered only after his marriage. Likewise, the certificates of she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the
title also show that the properties were exclusively owned by land of Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of
Emilio because the words “married to” preceding “Alejandra evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at
Poblete” are merely descriptive of his civil status. the expense of their partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption
of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the source of
FRANCISCO V. CA (1998) funding cannot be invoked because there is also lack in proof
Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the legal wife of private that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.
respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage. Teresita Likewise, the certificate of title upon which petitioner
alleges that since their marriage, she and Eusebio have anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is
acquired a sari-sari store, two residential houses and lots, and inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name
an apartment house in Rizal. She also claims that because of of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco,” is no
his health condition, Eusebio was rendered unfit to administer proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’
the properties, which led to him signing a general power of coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing
the said properties. Teresita filed a suit for the annulment of the and the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil
general power of attorney and sought to be declared the status of Eusebio.
administratrix of the properties. The RTC ruled in favor of the
private respondents, holding that Teresita did not show that Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the
said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or properties considering that the assets are exclusively his
that they pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot
belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to
administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. incapacitate him to administer property.
Held: The said properties are capital properties of Eusebio. DEWARA V. ALVERA (2011)
While Article 160 presumes that all properties of the marriage Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Dewara were married
are conjugal in nature, the party who invokes the presumption before the enactment of FC. The spouses were separated in
must first prove that the property in question was acquired fact because Elenita went to work in California, while Eduardo
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is stayed in Bacolod City. Eduardo, while driving a private jeep
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela,
in favor of the conjugal partnership. Nonetheless, this who then filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear, and against him. Eduardo was found guilty and was sentenced with
convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the imprisonment and was ordered to pay actual and moral
spouses. In the case at bar, Teresita failed to show that the damages. The writ of execution on the civil liability was served
properties were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no
As regards the land in Rizal, petitioner failed to rebut property in his name. The City Sheriff levied the land in Bacolod
Eusebio’s testimony that he inherited the same from his registered under the name of Elenita to satisfy the judgment,
parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their and was consequently sold to Ronnie. A new certificate of title
marriage the said land, although in the concept of a possessor was then made in the name of respondent spouses. Elenita then
only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio filed a case for annulment of the sale, claiming that the property
inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is was her paraphernal property and could not be made to answer
inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own for the personal liability of her husband. The RTC ruled in favor
exclusively as an acquisition by lucrative title, which refers to of petitioner, declaring the transfer certificate as null and void
properties acquired gratuitously by either spouse during the and the property paraphernal in nature as it was sold to her by
marriage through inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. her father and her aunt from what they inherited from their father
Hence, even if Eusebio's succession of the land took place for the purpose of expanding her capital at the time so the sale
was essentially a donation gratuitous in character and therefore
could not be charged with Eduardo’s civil liability. On appeal,

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the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that Elenita and PROPERTIES THAT COMPOSE THE CPG
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their
marriage through their common fund and thus it belonged to ART. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
the CPG and can be levied for Eduardo’s civil liabilities. (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the
Held: The subject property is the conjugal property of the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses Dewara. All property of the marriage is presumed to spouses;
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven with (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or
strong, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property profession of either or both of the spouses;
is exclusively owned by one of the spouses. In the case at bar, (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received
there is no dispute that the property was acquired by the during the marriage from the common property, as well
spouses during their marriage, and that their marital relations as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
are governed by CPG since they were married before the spouse;
enactment of the FC and they did not execute any prenuptial (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which
agreement stating otherwise. Aside from her claims that the the law awards to the finder or owner of the property
sale of the property by her father and aunt was in the nature of where the treasure is found;
a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between the (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
actual value of the property and the monetary consideration for hunting;
the sale, Elenita proffered no evidence of the market or (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the
assessed value of the property in 1975. Therefore, Elenita has partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought
not sufficiently proven that the transfers were made as to the marriage by either spouse; and
donations and thus the property is conjugal in nature. (7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings
from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom
However, even if the lot is the conjugal property of the spouses,
shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
it does not necessarily follow that it may be automatically
levied upon to answer for the civil liability of Eduardo. It Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
must be shown first that the debts and obligations were considered conjugal, and their title attaches from the very
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus, if instant such property is acquired.
the spouse who is bound has insufficient or no exclusive
property, the indemnities may be enforced upon the conjugal Acquisition of onerous title
property only after the responsibilities in Article 161 of the CC Whether separate or conjugal is determined by the origin or
have been covered. Therefore, the payment of indemnity in ownership of the money invested or property exchanged.
favor of Ronnie may only be enforced against the partnership • Acquired at the expense of the conjugal partnership or
assets of Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities under the source does not appear → conjugal property
Article 161 of the CC have been complied with. • Subsequently exchanged or acquired by substitution →
conjugal property
ART. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: • Increase of such property by accession or by the
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the industry or work of either or both of the spouses, and
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by their increase in value by nature or time → conjugal
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she
• Purchased with conjugal funds → conjugal property
may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations Life insurance is an onerous contract, and the rules
which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or applicable to onerous acquisitions apply.
of the partnership; • If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the
o Premiums were paid with the conjugal funds →
marriage upon the separate property of either the husband
proceeds are conjugal
or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
o Premiums were paid with separate funds →
partnership;
proceeds are separate
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property; o Premiums were paid partly with conjugal funds
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the and partly with separate funds → proceeds will be
children of both the husband and wife, and of legitimate partly conjugal and partly separate
children of one of the spouses; • If the beneficiary is the other spouse
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
vocational or other course. beneficiary himself and the other spouse →
proceeds belong to the other spouse, even if the
premiums are paid out of conjugal funds but
he/she should also reimburse half to the CPG
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse gets
the proceed with no obligation to reimburse.
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse.

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How do you reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that Ownership of livestock
onerous titles are separate property even if CPG funds were • The excess of the number of livestock of the same kind
used, subject to reimbursement? belonging to a spouse at the time of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership over the original number at the time
Labor, industry, work or profession of the spouses of the marriage constitutes conjugal property.
Includes all income, whether in form of wages, pensions or • If the livestock was acquired as separate property during
retirement pay, honoraria, salaries, commission, bonuses, the marriage, the same rule applies.
backpays, and income from business, even if the capital comes • Does not take into account reduction of the original
from the exclusive properties of one of the spouses. Teacher’s number by the sale of some during the marriage.
gratuity under special law is not conjugal (remuneratory). • Proceeds of the sale must go to the owner-spouse, but
in the liquidation of the partnership, the number sold
Fruits from common and net fruits from separate should be deducted from the original number, and the
Includes all kinds of natural, industrial, or civil fruits coming remainder should be considered as the capital, and
from the capital, and products or benefits produced by the whatever exceeds this capital at the dissolution of the
property may produce. CPG should be considered conjugal property.
• Received → natural and industrial fruits
• Due → civil fruits Acquisitions by chance
• Examples of fruits in the conjugal property: rents of land, • Acquisitions by game of chance are conjugal property,
fruits of paraphernal property, young of animals, but the losses are borne by the gambler-spouse.
damages for the detention of paraphernal property o This seems to be an unfair rule, but the law
• Fruits of the separate property of one spouse accrued presumes that the capital of the spouse comes
after his death → dissolution of the partnership, not from conjugal funds, and so the winnings are
conjugal property made conjugal.
o If he loses, using the conjugal funds, he becomes
ART. 442, CC. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, a debtor to the CPG and must be charged against
and the young and other products of animals. him or her in the liquidation of the partnership.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through o Even if the capital is separate property, the
cultivation or labor. winnings will always be conjugal. Nonetheless,
the capital must be deducted and returned to the
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and gambler-spouse, and only the real “winnings”
other property and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other
must be conjugal as an acquisition by chance.
similar income.
The conjugal partnership does not have to reimburse the ART. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a
spouse for those expenses of cultivation. period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which
• The fruits themselves, however, are bound for the may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
payment of the necessary and indispensable expenses installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of
in their production, administration, and preservation. the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage
• Fruits of paraphernal property cannot be considered as on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
conjugal property, until the liquidation and payment of
such expenses, because it is only the net income of Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent money to another before
separate properties which becomes conjugal. her marriage at interest, payable in installment for 10 years. The
interests falling due during the marriage are conjugal, but the
Intellectual and business property installment payments on the principal loan belong to the wife
Intellectual property is considered as separate property of the exclusively.
spouse who produces, invents, or discovers it. It is not
simply a product of one’s work or industry, but the physical or ZULUETA V. PAN AM (1973)
external manifestation of one’s intellect or genius which cannot Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together with their
be conceived separately from its author. daughter were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left the
• All the benefits or earnings derived from these during the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place where he
marriage belong to the CPG. could relieve himself. He was later offloaded from the plane.
Capt. Zentner asserted that he was offloaded due to drinking
Share of spouses in hidden treasure and his belligerent attitude, but Mr. Zulueta claims that the order
• If treasure is found by chance by a stranger on the land to off-load his family was a result of a prior verbal altercation
of a spouse, the share of the latter as proprietor will be that happened between him and Capt. Zentner. After Mr.
conjugal. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner intended to keep him
stranded in Wake Island for a minimum period of one week at
• If a spouse discovers treasure on the land of a stranger,
the former’s share as finder will be conjugal. the cost of $13.30 per day. In an action for damages against
Pan Am, the Zuluetas were awarded moral and exemplary
• If one spouse discovers treasure on the land of the other
damages, as well as attorney fees. Pending appeal, the
spouse, the whole treasure must be conjugal.
spouses separated and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a

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compromise agreement with Pan Am, settling for P50,000. She lands are conjugal properties of both spouses. Moreover, only
filed for the dismissal of the case, which was denied since a Julia’s testimony was used to rebut the presumption, which is
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the contrary to Araneta’s records as well as to the mortgage
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law. contracts which show that the properties were paid out of the
loan the spouses obtained from RFC.
Held: The award for damages received by Mrs. Zuleta is part
of the conjugal property. The damages arose from a breach Likewise, Ponciano was also not estopped from claiming
of the Zuluetas’ contract of carriage with Pan Am from which that the properties are conjugal in nature. The principle of
they paid their fare with funds presumed to belong to the estoppel rests on the rule that whenever a party has
conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under Art. 153 intentionally led the other to believe a particular thing true to act
CC, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his act,
during the marriage. The damages do not fall under Art. 148 CC declaration or omission, falsify it. It can only be invoked
as exclusive property of each spouse. Further, “that which is between persons making the misrepresentation and person to
acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other whom such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no
property belong to only one of the spouses” and “that which is showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe that the
purchased with exclusive money of the wife or husband” belong land wasn’t conjugal.
exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that
what is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership Lastly, the spouse Mendoza cannot be considered to have
belongs thereto or forms part thereof. acted in good faith because the RFC mortgages were already
registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of lease
MENDOZA V. REYES (1983) was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded Ponciano’s
Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who executed consent when they leased the property but dismissed it upon
a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements in sale. The petitioners, therefore, are unquestionably charged
favor of petitioners, the spouses Mendoza. The land in question with notice of the existence and contents of the said mortgages,
was bought on installment basis from Araneta, but since the their joint execution by the spouses Reyes, and the application
spouses were always late in paying the installments, they had the loans to the payment to Araneta of the purchase price of the
to borrow from the RFC. The money they loaned was used to lots in question.
complete the construction of a one-storey building and pay the
balance of the lot they offered as security. A corresponding VILLANUEVA V. IAC (1990)
deed of absolute sale, in which Julia was named as vendee and Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners
her husband signed under the phrase, “with my marital of a parcel of land. Upon their death, their children, Modesto
consent,” was executed by Araneta. Afterwards, the spouses and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under
secured another loan to pay the balance of the lot and for a deed of extrajudicial partition. The north portion belonged to
additional security and to defray other expenses incurred in the Federico, and the south portion, Lot 13-C, was registered in a
repairs. Later on, the property was leased to the Mendoza Torrens title under the name of Modesto. Modesto’s wife
spouses for ten years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia Victoria died in 1971, and Modesto himself died in 1973, having
as lessor with the marital consent of Ponciano. After failing to no children with Victoria. However, it appeared that Modesto
pay their obligations to RFC, the Reyes spouses asked for was survived by two illegitimate children named Dorothea
extension on their obligation and was granted such. While they Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas, who borrowed P18,000 from
were separated and her husband was in Pampanga, Julia sold respondent Jesus Bernas. In the loan, they mortgaged Lot 13-
the lots to the spouses Mendoza without the knowledge and C to Bernas as security. Raymundo Aranas, a relative, was there
consent of Ponciano. Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of as a witness. After the siblings failed to pay the loan, Bernas
the deed of sale, stating that the properties were conjugal in acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the siblings’ title
nature and that she sold them without his knowledge and and issued another in his name. Later on, Raymundo Aranas
consent. and his spouse Consolacion Villanueva filed a complaint, asking
that they be declared co-owners of the land and that the title of
Held: The deed of sale was null and void. The property is Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled after their discovery of the
conjugal, following the strong presumption found in Art. 160 of alleged wills left by Modesto and Victoria. Modesto’s will
CC, which states that all property of the marriage must be bequeathed to his illegitimate children all his capital property
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is and all interest in his conjugal partnership with his wife Victoria;
categorically proven that it pertains to the exclusive property of while Victoria bequeathed to spouses Aranas and Villanueva,
the spouses. Thus, it is sufficient to prove that the property was and to the illegitimate children of her husband, all of her
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be interests, rights and properties, real and personal, as her net
deemed conjugal property. In this case, there is no question share from the conjugal partnership with Modesto. The trial
that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during court ruled against Aranas and Villanueva in declaring Bernas
the marriage. The records show that the funds used to buy the as the legal owner of the land. They then appealed to the IAC,
lot and build the improvements came from loans obtained by which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
the spouses. Art. 161 states that all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband and wife for the benefit of the Held: The land was not a conjugal property of Victoria and
conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. Thus, the Modesto. It was the latter’s exclusive property which he had
inherited from his parents and registered solely in his name.

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Whether Modesto succeeded to the property prior or This may conflict with Article 109(4), which provides that
subsequent to his marriage to Victoria is inconsequential, and property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife
the property will be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant or husband shall be exclusive property of the spouse whose
to Article 148 of CC which includes in the exclusive property of money was used to acquire the property.
each spouse those properties brought to the marriage as his or
her own, as well as properties acquired during the marriage by Example: if the wife buys a piece of land on installment during
lucrative title. Even if Modesto succeeded to the land during his the marriage and paid all the installments with her own money,
marriage to Victoria, the lot would still be his capital property the title would be transferred during the marriage. Under Article
because it was acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative 118, the property is conjugal since it was vested during the
title. Furthermore, Victoria died two years ahead of her marriage; but under Article 109(4), it is separate property of the
husband, which means that he never inherited any part of the wife whose exclusive money was used to pay for the property.
land and hence, had nothing to bequeath by will to Villanueva. • Equity demands the application of Article 109(4)
because applying Article 118 would be unfair and unjust.
Likewise, the improvements on the lot are not conjugal in • However, the present article is clear.
nature. Under the Civil Code, improvements, whether for utility • Compromise → if the payments had been made by a
or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses spouse, but the ownership is vested in the conjugal
through advancements from the partnership or through the partnership under this article, the spouse should be
industry of either spouse, belong to the conjugal partnership. reimbursed for what he or she has paid. The same rule
Proof of the time of the making or construction of the should apply in a reverse situation.
improvements and the source of the funds used therefor is
needed to determine the character of the improvements. In the
case at bar, however, no such proof was presented by RULES ON IMPROVEMENT
Villanueva. What is certain is that the land on which the
ART. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility
improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto
or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at
and that where property is registered in the name of one spouse
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was
either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership,
acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to the
or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
said spouse. Therefore, it is not possible to declare the
improvements as conjugal in character. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY INSTALLMENT
entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
ART. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or
vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the
owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
The date of vesting or transfer of ownership is the criterion for ART. 158, CC. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment,
determining whether the property acquired on an installment made on the separate property of the spouses through
plan belongs to one or both of the spouses as exclusive advancements from the partnership or through the industry of
property or to the conjugal partnership. either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal
• If a spouse before marriage had purchased a lot on partnership.
installment, and had all but paid the full price when he
got married and the title was transferred after the Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during
celebration of the marriage → conjugal, even if only a the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also
small balance was paid with the conjugal funds. pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
• If the spouse acquired the title with a small down reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
payment before the celebration of the marriage, subject
to a mortgage for the balance payable in installment → This article contemplates a situation in which the property on
separate, even if the entire balance was paid by the which an improvement is made belongs to one of the spouses
partnership during the marriage as separate property, and the improvement is at the expense
of the conjugal partnership in money or personal effects of one
SIMPLIFIED: FC does not look at the source of funds. In cases of the spouses.
where the property is partly paid by either the CPG or exclusive
property, the time of vesting ownership is what matters. Intention → secure unity of ownership over the property and
Though under CC, the basis was “who paid more.” improvement so that both shall belong to only one owner.

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BASIS OF OWNERSHIP: comparative values of the property DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND CPG
and of the improvement at the time the improvement is made.
1. Art 94 (5) and Art 121 (5) → In obligation to taxes and
• Value of improvement + resulting increase in the value of expenses pertaining to preservation of separate
improved separate property > value of principal property property, ACP provides that it should be “used by the
at the time of the improvement = entire improved family” while CPG does not have such qualification.
property becomes conjugal; CPG reimburses spouse at a. The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in
liquidation. the preservation of separate properties since its
• Value of improvement + resulting increase in the value of fruits belong to the conjugal funds. On the other
improved separate property < value of principal property hand, a separate property of the spouses is
at the time of the improvement = entire improved usually beyond the reach of ACP hence, the
property is separate property of the owner-spouse, express requirement.
subject to reimbursement. 2. Art 94 (9) does not have a counterpart in Art 121 →
Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of illegitimate
Ma’am Beth’s take on this: This is unjust (lugi to use her term), children. Spouse can only resort to a financially capable
because you only get the value of the property at the time of ACP in case of absence or insufficiency of exclusive
improvement. Plus, the fact that the reimbursement happens at property. CPG instead has Art 122.
the liquidation of the CPG which is roughly 20-40 years later,
thus because of the delay of payment, the amount has already Maintenance of the family
devaluated. Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in The conjugal partnership is chargeable with the maintenance of
this case because when a person engages in any construction the family. Family refers only to the spouses and their legitimate
or improvement in properties, the cash is usually wiped out. children. The support of other relatives must come from the
private resources of the spouse bound to give it.
CHARGES UPON THE CPG • The amounts advanced by third persons for the
subsistence of the wife and for funeral expenses (e.g.,
ART. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: construction of tombstone or mausoleum) upon her
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and death are chargeable against the conjugal property.
the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the • Expenses of litigation in the interest of the children had
support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the by one of the spouses in a former marriage do NOT
provisions of this Code on Support; constitute a charge upon the CPG.
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit Debts contracted by one spouse
of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses If only one spouse contracts the obligation, it shall bind only the
or by one of them with the consent of the other; property of the debtor-spouse, unless it has benefitted the
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse family, in which case the partnership is bound to pay to the
without the consent of the other to the extent that the extent of such benefit.
family may have benefited; • Debts and obligations contracted by a husband for the
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major benefit of the CPG are chargeable to the conjugal
or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; property. Thus, the unpaid purchase price of a lot bought
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made by the husband on behalf of the conjugal partnership is
during the marriage upon the separate property of either chargeable against the same.
spouse; • If the spouses agree to designate one as manager of the
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or conjugal partnership, such manager can act alone
complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for without the consent of the other, and debts contracted
self-improvement; by him or her will bind the partnership. It is presumed
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have that such manager-spouse is acting for the partnership.
redounded to the benefit of the family; • The husband, as manager of the CPG, has the right to
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both embark the partnership in an ordinary commercial
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for enterprise for gain, and the fact that the wife may not
the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a approve of the venture does not make it a private and
professional or vocational course or other activity for personal obligation of the husband.
self-improvement; and • Useless and notoriously unjust demands of the wife
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the cannot obligate the conjugal property to the payment of
suit is found to groundless. litis expensas.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing Kinds of repairs

liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid All repairs on conjugal property are chargeable against the
balance with their separate properties. partnership, but only minor repairs on separate property are
chargeable against the conjugal property, major repairs being
chargeable against the spouse owning the property.

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• Minor repairs → required by the deterioration caused by DBP V. ADIL (1988)
the natural use of the thing and are indispensable for its Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an
preservation agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum of P2,000, as stated
• Major repairs → occasioned by extraordinary events in a promissory note whereby they bound themselves jointly
(floods, storms, earthquakes, and fires) that affect the and severally to pay the account in ten equal yearly
substance of the thing and not merely for its enjoyment amortizations. After failing to pay their obligation, Confesor
executed a second promissory note expressly acknowledging
their loan and promising to pay the same on another date, and
ART. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the upon his failure to do so, he agreed to the foreclosure of his
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be mortgage. After the spouses failed again to pay their obligation,
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar DBP filed a complaint against the spouses for the payment of
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. the loan. The court ordered the spouses to pay the bank jointly
and severally; however, this was reversed by the Iloilo CFI which
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
dismissed the complaint.
upon them be charged to the partnership.
Held: In signing the promissory note alone, Confesor can
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
bind his wife and the conjugal partnership. Under Article 165
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
conjugal partnership are chargeable to the conjugal
preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
partnership. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Confesor
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Hence, the conjugal partnership is liable
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
for this obligation.
paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Personal debts of the spouses, whether contracted before or AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA (1998)
during the marriage, are chargeable against the conjugal PBM obtained a loan of P50 million from AIDC. Alfredo Ching,
partnership insofar as they benefitted the family. the Executive VP of PBM signed as surety to the loan, making
himself liable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBM’s
• All personal debts which do not benefit the family must failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of
be paid from the separate property of the debtor-spouse. money from PBM and Ching. A writ of execution was issued by
• However, under Article 122(3), personal debts before the Deputy Sheriff wherein the properties of Ching were to be
the marriage may be enforced against the partnership levied and scheduled for auction. The 3 properties involved
after the liabilities in Article 121 have been covered, if the were conjugal properties of Ching and his wife; thus, Ching
debtor-spouse has no or insufficient property. asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined
• Despite the silence of the law on debts contracted during because such are part of the CPG and could not be held liable
the marriage, the rule on personal debts before the to answer for a loan that did not redound to the benefit of his
marriage should be applied. family. Nevertheless, the auction still took place and AIDC,
being the only bidder, acquired the properties. As such, Ching
Liabilities for damages instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null and void.
• General rule: pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the The RTC and CA ruled in his favor, rendering the sale null and
husband or wife are not chargeable against the conjugal void and holding that the loan procured was not for the benefit
property. of the conjugal partnership of the respondents.
• Exception: where the wrongful act inured to the benefit
of the partnership, it is unjust to make the partnership Held: The conjugal partnership is not liable for the surety
keep the benefit and impose the indemnity exclusively agreement of the husband. If the money or services are given
upon the spouse who committed the act. to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety, that contract alone cannot be categorized within the
context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
ART. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any partnership. In this case, the execution of the surety agreement
game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind did not redound to the benefit of the family since it was only a
of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be corporate loan extended to and used by PBM. Art 161 of CC
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal and Art 121 of FC are clear in requiring that the loan obtained
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the should redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership in
conjugal partnership property. order for the same to be held liable. The burden of proof that
the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership lies with the creditor-party litigant, and in this case
the AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by the
husband for the benefit of his family. Moreover, actual benefits

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must redound to the conjugal partnership. The petitioners claim of H.L. Carlos Construction. In contrast, the Banker’s Trust
that the loan would benefit the family to the extent that the Check of $25,000 was drawn from the personal account of
employment of Ching would be prolonged and that their share Honorario. This all the more proves that the amount of $25,000
of stocks would appreciate. However, these are not the benefits was not part of such profits because it was issued by the
contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code, as the benefits petitioner from his own account and not from the company’s.
must be one directly resulting from the loan itself. Therefore, the And more so, there was also no showing that he is a
loan procured from AIDC was for the sole benefit of PBM and stockholder, an employee, or an agent of the corporation, and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and thus, the therefore he is not entitled to salaries from the same.
same cannot be held liable.
The loan is a liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant
Also, signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or to Article 121 of FC. While respondent did not and refused to
profession of Ching. No matter how often he acted as a surety sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he there is no doubt that the loan redounded to the benefit of the
had embarked in the business of suretyship. Article 121 of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which
FC is also clear that the payment of personal debts contracted became the conjugal home of the respondent and his family.
by the husband or wife before or during the marriage shall not Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of his consent, he shall
be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that still be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
they redounded to the benefit of the family. In this case, the
conjugal properties are placed in peril of being taken. Thus, CARANDANG V. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006)
signing as a surety is not an exercise of industry or profession Quirino de Guzman and spouses Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. are stockholders and corporate officers of MBS. In two
instances, the capital stock of MBS increased, and in both
CARLOS V. ABELARDO (2002) times the spouses subscribed to it. De Guzman claimed that
Respondent Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa these subscriptions were paid by him, so he demanded the
approached the latter’s father Honorario Carlos and requested spouses to pay for the total amount. The spouses refused,
him to advance $25,000 for the purchase of a house and lot in claiming that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed
Parañaque. Honorario issued a check in the said full amount to between them, whereby de Guzman promised to pay for their
the seller of the property to enable and assist the spouses in stock subscriptions without cost, in consideration of Arcadio’s
starting their married life. When he inquired from the spouses technical expertise and newly purchased equipment. De
about the status of the loan, the spouses acknowledged their Guzman filed a complaint to recover the amount he paid, along
obligation but pleaded that they were not yet ready to settle it. with damages. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of de Guzman
The respondent also expressed violent resistance to and ordered the spouses to jointly and severally pay him.
petitioner’s inquiries by making various death threats against
him. Later on, he made a formal demand for the payment of the Held: For marriages under CPG, an obligation entered into
loan, but the spouses failed again to comply with their by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
obligation. Thus, he filed a complaint for collection of sum of conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is
money and damages before the Valenzuela RTC. The wife primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are
admitted securing a loan together with her husband but claimed sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them,
that loan was payable on a staggered basis. Meanwhile, Manuel they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
claimed that the sum was not a loan but his share of income on the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors.
contracts obtained in reviving the petitioner’s construction Therefore, either of the spouses may be sued for the whole
business. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although the
spouses to pay the $25,000 loan. On appeal, however, the CA amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was ROS V. PNB (2011)
indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife and not Jose Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB and as
his share in the profits of the company. security, he executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel
of land with all the improvements thereon. Upon maturity, the
Held: The $25,000 advanced by the petitioner was in the loan remained outstanding, so PNB instituted extrajudicial
nature of a loan. The evidence presented by Honorario, such foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. The land
as the check he issued to the seller of the property, an was consequently sold to PNB and after one year without
instrument executed by Maria Theresa acknowledging her and redemption, the property was registered in the name of the
her husband’s accountability to his father for the said amount, same bank. Claiming that she has no knowledge of the loan
as well as a formal demand letter sent to and received by the obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
respondent, sufficiently prove by a preponderance of evidence instituted on the conjugal property and that the loan did not
his claim that the amount was really in the nature of a loan. The redound to the benefit of the family, Estrella Aguete filed a
respondent’s claim that the $25,000 was not a loan but his complaint to annul the mortgage, sale, and consolidation of the
share in the profits of the construction company is also property. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners,
untenable. All the checks he presented, which he claimed to be declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage void and ordering
his share in the profits of the company, were all in the account PNB to vacate the subject property. On appeal, the CA reversed

112
the decision of the trial court ruling that the conjugal partnership ART. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal
is still liable because the loan redounded to the benefit of the partnership property without the consent of the other.
family as it was used for the expansion of the family’s business. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other,
make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership
Held: The conjugal partnership is liable for the loan obtained
property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family
by Ros. There is no doubt that the subject property was
distress.
acquired during the marriage of Ros and Aguete and that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it to
FELIPE V. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983)
PNB. Under the CC, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara. The spouses bought
any conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.
several pieces of land, which were divided into three lots in
Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article
Masbate. Gimena sold the conjugal lots to the spouses Felipe
173 of CC allows Aguete to question the encumbrance of the
without the consent of her husband. Later on, the heirs of
property. However, annulment will be declared only upon a
Maximo, including his widow and their two children, filed a
finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the instant
complaint to recover the three parcels of land from the Felipes,
case, the Court upheld the finding of the CA that Aguete gave
alleging that they orally mortgaged the same to the spouses and
her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property when
that their offer to redeem the same were denied. On the other
she signed the mortgage contract of Ros to PNB.
hand, the spouses Felipe asserted that they acquired the lots
The loan also redounded to the benefit of the family. The from the plaintiffs by purchase. The trial court sustained the
application for it shows that the loan would be used exclusively claim of the spouses and dismissed the complaint of the heirs,
for additional working capital of buy and sell of garlic and who then appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the ruling of the
virginia tobacco. Where the husband contracts obligations on trial court, holding that the sale made by Gimena was invalid,
behalf of the family business, the law presumes that such having been executed without the consent of her husband, and
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal thus ordering the spouses Felipe to surrender the lots in
partnership. Therefore, because Ros’ loan from PNB question to the heirs of Maximo.
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, the debt
Held: The sale made by Gimena is a voidable contract.
is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Under the CC, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, but he is unable to alienate or encumber any real
ADMINISTRATION AND DISPOSITION OF THE CPG property of the conjugal partnership without his wife’s consent
except for some cases, and that the wife is unable to bind the
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent. In this
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of case, Gimena sold the lots belonging to the conjugal
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject partnership without the consent of her husband, despite the
to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which sale not being exceptional in character. Therefore, the deed of
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract sale is a voidable contract, because Gimena had no capacity to
implementing such decision. give consent to the contract of sale since the consent of both
spouses is needed. This is further supported by Article 173 of
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
CC, which provides that contracts entered by the husband
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
without his wife’s consent when such is required, are annullable
at her instance during marriage and within 10 years from the
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
questioned transaction.
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority The contract is not rescissible (Art. 1380) for in such a contract all the essential
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. elements are untainted aside from Gimena’s consent. Neither can the contract be
classified as unenforceable, since it does not fit any of those described in Art.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
1403 of CC. Finally, it cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, in Art. 1409 of CC. Thus, it must be a voidable contract.
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court The voidable contract was subject to annulment by her
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. husband only during the marriage because he was the victim
with an interest in the contract. Gimena could not ask for its
Civil Code Family Code annulment. While the marriage was still subsisting, the children
The husband was the Husband and wife are joint could not seek for its annulment since their right to the lands
administrator of the conjugal administrators of the was merely inchoate or expectant. But upon death of Maximo,
partnership conjugal partnership they acquired the right to question the defective contract in so
far as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s
• Sale of conjugal property absent the wife’s consent share in the lands. Maximo’s share is ½ and they are entitled to
is null and void ab initio, there being no showing that she 2/3 of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena.
is incapacitated.
• Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest
in the ACP. No similar provision is made as to the CPG,
but the same rule should apply.

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TINITIGAN V. TINITIGAN, SR. (1980) GUIANG V. CA (1998)
In 1975, Pentel Merchandising Co. and Teofista Payuran Spouses Gilda and Judie Corpuz bought a land in South
entered into a contract of four-year lease of a residential house Cotabato through a conditional deed of sale for a total
in Pasay City for P350,000. In this transaction, the consent of consideration of P14,735.00, payable in installments. The
respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr., husband of Payuran, was not couple sold one-half of their lot to the spouses Guiang, who
secured. Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion seeking judicial have since then occupied the portion and built their house
approval of sale of the two-storey residential house and a lot in thereon. Gilda left for Manila to seek employment in the Middle
Pasay City, which was earlier leased to Pentel. Tinitigan claimed East. However, she fell victim to illegal recruiters and had to
that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000 to Quintin stay in Manila. Sometime later, their daughter Harriet learned
Lim was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that about her father’s plan to sell the remaining half of the lot,
were overdue and to forestall the foreclosure of their mortgaged including their house, to the spouses Guiang. Gilda objected to
conjugal properties. CFI, through respondent Judge Navarro, the sale but Judie still sold the remaining portion to the spouses
issued an order granting Tinitigan authority to sell the house and through a Deed of Transfer of Rights. When she returned, Gilda
lot in Pasay City in favor of Quintin Lim for P300,000. Payuran gathered her children together and stayed at their house. She
and her children moved for reconsideration, alleging that the then discovered that Judie had another wife already. For
sale would result to substantial losses for their family because staying in the house, the spouses Guiang charged Gilda of
the property could still be sold for a higher price. Nonetheless, trespassing, who, along with her children, later agreed to leave
the CA upheld the order of Judge Navarro approving the sale of the house in an amicable settlement. Gilda then filed a
the conjugal property in Pasay City. complaint seeking to declare the deed of sale as null and void
for lack of her consent. The RTC and CA ruled in Gilda’s favor.
Held: Tinitigan can sell the property in Pasay City. The
petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Held: The Deed of Transfer of Rights was void. When Judie
property is void because he had no authority to sell it, it being sold the remaining half of the lot, Gilda’s consent was totally
under the administration of his wife. This has no legal basis. The lacking, contrary to the claim of the spouses Guiang that it was
general rule under Article 165 of CC is that the husband is the only vitiated and hence merely voidable. Under Article 124 of
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Although Article 168 FC, in the absence of the consent of one spouse, the
of the same Code states that the wife may, by express authority disposition or encumbrance made by the other spouse shall be
of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the void. It also becomes clearer upon comparison with Article 166
conjugal partnership property, such provision is not applicable of CC, wherein the alienation or encumbrance made without
in this case. The judicial decree appointing Payuran as consent is merely voidable, and may be annulled by the wife
administratrix of the conjugal partnership cannot be treated as within ten years from the transaction pursuant to Article 173 of
an exception because it was issued only after the trial court CC. Since this provision was not carried over to the FC, it is
granted Tinitigan the authority to sell the Pasay property. clear that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the
Besides, her appointment was not absolute since it was subject conjugal property without the consent of the wife is null and
to certain conditions that were agreed upon. void after the effectivity of FC.
Thus, Severino did not cease being the administrator of their A void contract cannot be ratified. The amicable settlement
conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial approval entered into by Gilda and the spouses Guiang is a direct off-
of the sale was granted. Being the administrator, however, does shoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights, which is a void contract,
not give him the outright authority to alienate or encumber and as such the amicable settlement is also null and void.
assets. This would require the express or implied consent of Neither can it be considered a continuing offer that was
Payuran subject to certain exceptions. Article 166 of CC states accepted and perfected by the parties.
that unless the wife has been declared incapacitated, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any property of the CP RELUCIO V. LOPEZ (2001)
without her consent. But if she refuses unreasonably to give her Respondent Angelina Lopez filed a petition for her appointment
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. This is as sole administratrix of the conjugal properties against her
precisely the reason why Severino sought the judicial approval husband Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Angelina
of sale of the Pasay property. alleged that Alberto abandoned her and their four children,
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control over their
Moreover, as the evidence warrants, the sale was necessary to conjugal properties, and cohabited with Relucio. She further
answer for a big, conjugal liability which might endanger the claimed that in the course of their cohabitation, they have
family’s economic standing. The case at hand actually is one amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-
wherein the wife’s consent is not required and impliedly, no owned or controlled corporations and other properties through
judicial intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the actual contribution of money, property, and industry of
CC, the husband may dispose of the conjugal properties for the Alberto. However, Angelina and her four children did not benefit
purposes specified in Articles 161 and 162. In general, these from the said properties. Instead, Alberto has intentionally
articles deal with the obligations of the conjugal partnership. placed the conjugal properties beyond the reach of Angelina
And in this case, the sale was the surest and most practical and their children, and spent the proceeds thereof for his sole
means resorted to by Tinitigan to save them from a serious benefit, Relucio and their two illegitimate children. Relucio filed
financial setback. a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that Angelina has

114
no cause of action against her, but was denied, holding that she spouses were backing out of the agreement because they
is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because needed “spot cash” for the purchase price. Norma refused to
some of the properties are registered in her name. Her petition sign the contract to sell, despite the contract being already
for certiorari before the CA was also denied, along with her perfected. Thelma then filed a complaint against the spouses to
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. compel Norma to sign the contract to sell. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that it cannot intervene
Held: Angelina has no cause of action against Relucio. The to authorize the transaction in the absence of Norma’s consent.
complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband, and
nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought Held: The contracts to sell between Thelma and the
against petitioner. All the causes of action are against Alberto. spouses Camaisa were not yet perfected. Under Article 124
of FC, the disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property
1. Judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases require
partnership – Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause the written consent of the wife, otherwise the same will be void.
of action, as Article 128 of FC refers only to spouses. The In the case at bar, the properties subject of the contracts to sell
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely were conjugal in nature; hence, for the sale to be effective, the
between the spouses, to the exclusion of all other persons. consent of both husband and wife must concur. There is no
There is no right-duty relation between Angelina and doubt that Norma did not give her written consent to the sale.
Relucio that can possibly support a cause of action. Even if she actively participated in the negotiating for the sale,
2. For accounting of conjugal partnership – This cause of the law requires her written consent for the sale to be valid, for
action is an incident of marriage. Relucio has nothing to do mere awareness of a transaction is not consent.
with the marriage between Angelina and Alberto. Thus, no
cause of action can exist against Relucio on this ground. Court authorization under Article 124 is only resorted to in
3. Forfeiture of Alberto’s share in the co-owned property cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
during his cohabitation with Relucio – This cause of action incapacitated. In this case, Thelma failed to allege and prove
is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto’s share in property co- that Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
owned by him and petitioner, and does not involve the contracts. Absent such showing of incapacity, court
validity of that co-ownership. Angelina’s right to forfeiture authorization cannot be sought.
extends to Alberto’s share alone, and his failure to
surrender such share results in a breach of obligation to VILLANUEVA V. CHIONG (2008)
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause Spouses Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married but
of action, however, pertains only to Alberto, not Relucio. separated in fact. During their marriage, they acquired a lot in
4. Support – Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. Dipolog City. Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the
5. Moral damages – Angelina’s claim is only against Alberto. lot to the petitioner spouses Villanueva for P8,000, payable in
installments, who then built improvements thereon. In the
A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or payment of their last installment, petitioners demanded from
injured by the judgment of the suit. In this case, Relucio would respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor.
not be affected by Angelina’s appointment as the Elisera, however, refused to sign the deed. Afterwards, Elisera
administratrix. As a corollary, she cannot be an indispensable filed with the Dipolog RTC a complaint for quieting of title with
party because Alberto can fulfill the relief sought by Angela even damages. In return, petitioner spouses filed with the same trial
without the participation of Relucio. court a complaint for specific performance with damages.
However, pending the cases, Florentino executed a Deed of
JADER-MANALO V. CAMAISA (2002) Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners without the consent of
Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across an advertisement Elisera. The RTC annulled the sale and ordered the petitioners
by the respondent spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa in to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The trial
the Bulletin Today for the sale of their ten-door apartment in court also dismissed the complaint of petitioners, but ordered
Makati and another property in Taytay. As she was interested Florentino to return to petitioners the P8,000 as consideration
in both properties, Thelma negotiated for their purchase of the sale, with interest. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling
through the spouses’ real estate broker. After a visual of the RTC on the annulment of the sale.
inspection of the lots, petitioner met with the spouses and made
a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Held: Despite their separation in fact, the lot retains its
with the knowledge and conformity of his wife. After conjugal nature. Under Article 178 of CC, the separation in fact
negotiation, Thelma and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not
price of P1.5M for Taytay property and P2.1M for Makati affect the conjugal partnership. Likewise, under Article 160 of
property to be paid on installment basis. The following day, CC, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
petitioner, the real estate broker, and Edilberto met in the presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless
latter’s office for the formal signing of the contracts, wherein it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
Thelma delivered the two checks as downpayments. The wife. Petitioners’ mere insistence about the lot’s exclusive
following day, Thelma, the spouses, and the real estate broker nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption, especially
met to incorporate notations and to revise the contracts to sell. when taken against all the evidence for respondents, such as
However, when they met again for the formal affixing of the real property tax declaration acknowledging her and
Norma’s signature, petitioner was surprised to learn that the Florentino as the owners of the lot, as well as their categorical

115
declaration in a Memorandum of Agreement stating that the lot Nonetheless, both courts misapplied Article 124 of FC,
is a conjugal property. which provides that the powers of administration do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the
The sale is merely voidable. Under the CC, without the wife’s other spouse. Hence, any disposition or encumbrance without
consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of the the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
conjugal property is merely voidable. Article 173 states that the state that the transactions shall be construed as a continuing
wife may seek the annulment of any contract entered into by offer which may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
the husband without her consent during the marriage and within acceptance by the other spouse. In this case, the execution of
ten years from the questioned transaction. Thus, the consent of the special power of attorney can be construed as the
Elisera and Florentino are necessary to make the sale valid. acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing
However, because Elisera’s consent was not present when offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the
Florentino sold the lot and executed the deed, she could annul deed of real estate mortgage a valid contract. Yet again, the
such contract within ten years from the sale. Likewise, the petitioner allowed the decisions of the trial courts to become
petitioners’ argument that the transaction should not be entirely final and executory without asking the same for an alternative
voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot lacks merit. relief, closing his avenue for recovery of the loan.
The alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only
insofar as the share of the wife is concerned. Nonetheless, Flores still has a remedy under the law. He may
file an action for unjust enrichment against Edna,
FLORES V. LINDO (2011) considering she obtained a loan from him without fully paying
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from petitioner Arturo Flores the same. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself
amounting to P400,000. To secure the loan, Edna executed a because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts.
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in the name
of respondents Edna and her husband Enrico. She also signed ALEJO V. SPOUSES CORTEZ (2017)
a promissory note and the deed for herself and for Enrico as his The spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo were in possession
attorney-in-fact. Afterwards, she issued three checks as partial of a parcel of land in Bulacan upon which their house was built.
payments for the loan, which were all dishonored for Jorge’s father, Ricardo, approached his sister, petitioner
insufficiency of funds. This prompted Flores to file a complaint Dolores Alejo, to negotiate the sale of the subject property.
for foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the Accordingly, Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for
respondents. The RTC ruled that the petitioner was not entitled the sale of the property for a purchase price of P500,000. The
to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage, since the deed was Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and Ricardo as witness.
executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement. Upon giving the
and the special power of attorney was executed only after the downpayments, Dolores was allowed to possess the property
deed has been already executed. Nonetheless, the trial court and introduce improvements thereon. However, Jorge wrote a
ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan letter to Dolores denying knowledge and consent to the
from Edna through a personal action against her in the place Kasunduan. He wrote another letter to Dolores demanding that
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides. Hence, Flores filed the latter pay the balance of P200,000 on a date set, otherwise
a complaint for sum of money with damages in another branch the purchase price shall be increased to P700,000. Later on,
of RTC, which denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss. Dolores tendered the balance, but Jorge refused to accept the
Upon appeal, the CA set aside the orders of the RTC for having same and instead filed cases for ejectment and annulment of
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, holding that Flores sale, reconveyance and recovery of possession against her,
may only institute either a personal action for the collection of which were dismissed by the trial court. During the pendency
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. of the cases, the spouses Leonardo sold to respondent
spouses Cortez the subject property for a purchase price of
Held: The CA erred in dismissing the complaint of Flores. P700,000. A new transfer certificate of title was issued in the
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action latter’s names. Consequently, Dolores filed a case for
against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The annulment of deed of sale against the spouses Cortez and
former has the option of either filing a personal action for Leonardo, which declared the original Kasunduan as a
collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to perfected contract and Dolores as the rightful owner of the
foreclose on the mortgage security. These two remedies are property. It ordered the cancellation of titles issued in the names
alternative and each remedy is complete by itself, such that the of the spouses Leonardo and Cortez and the issuance of a new
election of one remedy waives the election of the other. In this title in the name of Dolores. On appeal, the CA granted the
case, however, there are circumstances that the Court took into petition of the spouses Leonardo and Cortez and declared the
consideration. Petitioner originally filed an action for foreclosure Kasunduan as void, absent Jorge’s consent and acceptance.
of mortgage before the RTC, which was dismissed because he
was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the mortgage was Held: The Kasunduan is void. Any alienation or encumbrance
executed by Edna without her husband’s consent. Instead, the of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the FC is
trial court held that Flores could still recover the amount due governed by Article 124, which provides that the disposition of
from Edna through a personal action over which it had no conjugal property of one spouse without the written consent of
jurisdiction, which led the petitioner to file the complaint for the other is void. In this case, it was established that the
collection of sum of money. Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and signed by

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her alone. Nevertheless, it constitutes a continuing offer from ART. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife
Jacinta and Dolores and that Jorge had the option of either shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
accepting or rejecting the offer before it was withdrawn. (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
However, Jorge is deemed to have only qualifiedly
be supported;
accepted the Kasunduan. His first letter was an outright and
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
express repudiation of the Kasunduan. The second letter varied
the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
its terms on material points, such as the date of payment of the
balance and the purchase price. Such counter-offer cannot be
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership
construed as Jorge’s acceptance because of the difference in
property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
the terms and conditions in the first Kasunduan signed by his
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
wife. Neither can the letters be treated as ratification of the
present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be
Kasunduan; nor his alleged participation in the negotiation for
given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
the sale of the property be construed as such because nothing
specific separate property of the other spouse and use
less than a written consent to the sale validates it.
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
DISSOLUTION OF THE CPG ART. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the
ART. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
When the CPG is dissolved, all the provisions of Articles 116 to The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
125 cease to apply. Whatever is acquired by the surviving three months or has failed within the same period to give any
spouse after the dissolution of the partnership by death, or by information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
either spouse after the termination of the partnership for other presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
reasons, forms a part of his or her own capital. dwelling.
• Fruits accruing to separate property of the husband after
his death cannot be considered as conjugal property
and are not responsible for the partnership’s obligations. LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
o It is only after the CPG has been exhausted that
the separate property of the husband and its fruits ART. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
accruing after the dissolution of the partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
can be held liable for partnership debts. (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
• After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
necessary to sell any portion of the community property properties of each spouse.
in order to pay outstanding obligations of the (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and payment of personal debts and obligations of either
with the formalities established by the Rules of Court. spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership
o Any sale, alienation, or disposition of said as an asset thereof.
property effected without said formalities shall be (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or
null and void, except as regards the portion that her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
belongs to the vendors as determined in the the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership
liquidation and partition. of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
o Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be partnership.
considered as limited only to the interest of the (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership
vendor in the particular property shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
o Disposition cannot include the half that may be insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased spouse. solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
• The dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be separate properties, in accordance with the provisions
recorded in the registry of property in order to affect of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
third persons dealing with registered property. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
• Co-ownership for the management and control of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
community property → if there is no liquidation of the (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
conjugal partnership even after the death of the spouse source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
and the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
keep the properties undivided.

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even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said be restored as assets of the conjugal partnership
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. if it has made the advance, or assets of the
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership spouse who made the advance, in the
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be computation.
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a • The amounts to be restored to the CPG include:
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the o Advances for the payment of the separate
marriage settlements or unless there has been a personal debts and obligations and fines
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided and indemnities of either spouses
in this Code. o Advances for the acquisition of conjugal
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children properties
shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with o Indemnification for the loss or deterioration
Article 51. of movables belonging to the spouses
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling used for the benefit of the family
and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise 3) Payment of debts. Conjugal property shall be used to
agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse pay the debts of the conjugal partnership, and separate
with whom the majority of the common children property of each spouse for the payment of his or her
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven respective individual obligations. If the conjugal property
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the is not enough to pay for the partnership debts, the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such separate properties of the spouses remaining after the
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration payment of their own creditors, shall be solidary liable.
the best interests of said children. 4) Division of net remainder of the conjugal property.
The net remainder of the CPG shall be divided equally
The liquidation of the conjugal partnership may take place: between the spouses and/or their respective heirs,
1. By extrajudicial partition between the husband and wife unless a different proportion has been agreed upon in
or their heirs (no debts and all legatees are of legal age) their marriage settlement or the surviving spouse/heirs of
2. By ordinary action for partition (cannot agree + no debt) the deceased renounce their shares.
3. By testate and intestate proceedings 5) Delivery of presumptive legitimes of the common
children. Taken from the total properties or the share in
Steps in liquidation
the conjugal properties and the balance of separate
The process of liquidation of the separate and conjugal
properties pertaining to each spouse.
properties of the spouses may be outline as follows:
6) Whatever remains after all the payments and deductions
1) The formation of the inventory, separately listing the shall be delivered to the spouses and/or their
conjugal properties and the separate properties of the respective heirs.
spouses. An inventory is not necessary:
If a spouse is a creditor and a debtor of the conjugal partnership
a. When one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
at the same time, only compensation should take place, and
renounce the benefits of the partnership, unless
only the balance will be either payable to or by such spouse.
the renunciation is prejudicial to creditors.
b. When separation of property has preceded the
dissolution of the marriage. ART. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
c. When the partnership is dissolved by death of one conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
of the spouses, and the deceased leaves no heir proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
except the surviving spouse.
d. When the dissolution is caused by legal If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
separation, and the share of the guilty spouse is spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property
forfeited to the innocent spouse, there being no either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from
children. the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the
2) Mutual restitutions. During the liquidation, the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
equilibrium in the patrimony of the spouses and the encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
conjugal partnership is to be maintained, so that one terminated marriage shall be void.
should not be enriched at the expense of the other.
• Equity demands that the benefit received by a Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
spouse during the marriage to the detriment of the without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
conjugal partnership be returned in an equal mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
amount to the assets of the latter. govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
• Enrichment of the community at the expense of
The fact that in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
separate properties of either spouse should
spouse the entire conjugal property is under administration is
involve a restitution of the value of such properties
not sufficient to invalidate a mortgage in its entirety.
to their respective owners.
• The heirs as co-owners have each the full ownership of
• Does not involve the actual transfer of properties,
his part and he may alienate, mortgage, or assign it.
but only the crediting or inclusion of the value to

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ART. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal income from their respective shares in the property in
partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted liquidation, such excess is considered an advance upon
by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried their shares not only to the conjugal partnership but also
out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income to their inheritance from the deceased spouse.
of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as
may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case GO V. GO (2011)
of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, Jesus Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio Go Jr. 23
the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in years later, Protacio Jr. executed an affidavit of renunciation
proportion to the capital and duration of each. and waiver affirming under oath that it was actually his father,
Protacio Go Sr., who purchased the land. Before this, Marta,
Liquidation of two partnerships: the wife of Protacio Sr. and mother of the petitioners, died.
1. The conjugal properties of the first marriage shall first be Protacio Sr. and his son Rito, along with his wife Dina, sold a
liquidated so as to determine the share of the first wife, portion of the property to Ester Servacio. Later on, the petitioner
which shall pass to the children of the first marriage, and heirs demanded the return of the property, which was denied
the share corresponding to the deceased husband. by Servacio. They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of
2. The conjugal properties of the second marriage shall be the sale of the property, alleging that following Protacio Jr.’s
liquidates, so as to determine the half corresponding to renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that
the surviving widow and the other half corresponding to the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation
the deceased husband. of the conjugal property was null and void. Servacio and Rito
countered that Protacio Sr. had exclusively owned the property
When there is no evidence showing the conjugal property as he purchased it with his own money. The RTC declared that
belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total the property was conjugal in nature because there were three
mass of the property in all the partnerships shall be divided vendors in the sale to Servacio and the participation of Rito and
among such partnerships on the basis of a double proportion: Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the
1) On the basis of the duration of each partnership late Marta. Nonetheless, it affirmed the validity of the sale of the
2) On the basis of the separate property brought to the property, holding that as long as the portion sold does not
marriage by the respective spouses encroach upon the legitimes of other heirs, it is valid.
The resulting portion pertaining to each partnership shall be
considered as its assets, from which the deduction and Held: Under the FC, any disposition of the conjugal property
payments of its charges and obligations shall be made. after the dissolution of the partnership must be made only after
the liquidation of the same; otherwise, the disposition is void.
However, before applying this rule, the conjugal partnership
ART. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates must first be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the FC.
of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale In this case, the property relation of the spouses Go was one of
of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which conjugal partnership governed by the CC, which was dissolved
are not expressly determined in this Chapter. upon Marta’s death in 1987. An implied ordinary co-ownership
then ensued among Protacio Sr. and the other heirs of Marta
ART. 133. From the common mass of property support shall
with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during
partnership pending its liquidation and distribution. Under
the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what
Article 493 of CC, Protacio Sr., though a co-owner with his
belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted
children of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not
that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or
yet claim any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
rents pertaining to them.
partition of the property first being done. Nonetheless, he still
The Rules of Court limit the right to allowance to the widow had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
and minor or incapacitated children, while Article 133 refers to but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
surviving spouse and children without qualification. Protacio Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of other
• The Code thus gives allowance also to the widower and co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling
to children of age, or married, or even gainfully co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making
employed, without distinction. Servacio a co-owner of Marta’s share.
• The provision of this Code must prevail over that of the Moreover, Article 105 of FC, expressly provides that the
Rules of Court because the right to the allowance applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal
recognized in Article 133 is substantive in nature and partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already
cannot be qualified by the Rules of Court, which refer
acquired in accordance with the CC. This gives another reason
only to procedural matters. not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, rendering the
• Grandchildren are not entitled to this allowance, because sale void would prejudice the right of Servacio, who had already
the law limits it to children. But in the absence of acquired the shares of Protacio Sr. and Rito in the property
legitimate children, parents may be given support during subject of the sale.
the liquidation of the inventoried property.
• If the allowance given to the surviving spouse and the Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the
children exceeds what pertains to them as fruits or efficacy of the sale, and whether it adversely affected the heirs’

119
interests, might not yet be properly decided with finality. The SEPARATION OF PROPERTY AND
appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON PROPERTY BY
action for judicial partition. In the meanwhile, Servacio would be ONE SPOUSE
a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect
of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The regime of separation of property may be:
1. Agreed upon by the spouses in a marriage settlement
DOMINGO V. SPOUSES MOLINA (2016) 2. Judicially ordered upon petition of one spouse
Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in 3. By voluntary agreement of the spouses during the
Tarlac consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an marriage, with judicial approval
18,164-square-meter parcel of land. During his lifetime, 4. Decreed in legal separation
Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses 5. Compulsory, in the case of a subsequent marriage of a
Genaro and Elena Molina. Ten years after Flora’s death, spouse who has not liquidated the conjugal or absolute
Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina community property of his or her preceding marriage
to answer for his debts. Later on, Anastacio died, and the entire dissolved by the death of the former spouse.
parcel of land was transferred to the spouses Molina. Melecio,
one of the children of the spouses Domingo, then filed a This is the only property regime that may not commence at
complaint for annulment of title and recovery of ownership the celebration of the marriage.
against the spouses Molina. He claimed that his father gave the
subject property to the Molinas as collateral for the money he JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY FOR SUFFICIENT
borrowed and thus could not have validly sold the interest over CAUSE
the property without his mother’s consent, as Flora was already
dead at the time of the sale. The RTC dismissed the case ART. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the
because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did marriage settlements, the separation of property between
not sell the property to the spouses Molina and held that spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without his wife’s judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal voluntary or for sufficient cause.
liabilities. The CA also affirmed the RTC ruling in toto, holding
that there is no prohibition against the sale by the widower of Complete separation of property may be had through:
real property formerly belonging to the conjugal partnership. 1. Conventional → in the marriage settlement
2. Judicial decree
Held: The sale of the property is valid. The conjugal a. Voluntary (Article 136)
partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora b. Sufficient cause (Article 135)
died in 1968. Article 130 of FC requires the liquidation of the 3. Compulsory → by operation of law in a subsequent
conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any marriage of a spouse who has not liquidated the absolute
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the or conjugal property regime of his or her preceding
liquidation. It also provides that if no liquidation is made upon marriage dissolved by the death of the former spouse
the lapse of the six-month period, any disposition or (Articles 103 and 130)
encumbrance involving the conjugal property of the terminated
shall be void. However, the foregoing rule does not apply since
the provisions of the FC shall be without prejudice to vested ART. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
rights acquired in accordance with the CC. cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to
Thus, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensured among
a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
her share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation
declared an absentee;
and partition. Anastacio, meanwhile, owns one-half of the
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner
original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is
has been decreed by the court;
an undivided interest. As a co-owner, Anastacio had the right
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject
latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the
property, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
family as provided for in Article 101;
Anastacio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights
the marriage settlements has abused that power; and
or a portion thereof were effectively transferred to the spouses
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
Molina, making them a co-owner of the subject property to the
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation
extent of Anastacio’s interest. The spouses Molina would then
is highly improbable.
be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in
respect of any partition that might belong to the co-heirs after In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
liquidation and partition. As to Melecio, his recourse as a co- presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
owner whose consent was not secured in a sale of the spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of
undivided shares of his father, is an action for partition. judicial separation of property.

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Sufficient causes for judicial separation of property PARTOSA-JO V. CA (1992)
Prima Partosa-Jo filed a case for support and judicial
Presentation of final separation of property against her husband Jose Jo. As Jose
Proof of cause is needed
judgment cohabited with three women and sired 15 children, the trial
court awarded the support, but the decision was silent on the
Art 135(4)
Art 135(1) judicial separation of property. The wife appealed to the CA,
Abandonment or failure to comply
Civil interdiction which dismissed the complaint on the ground that separation
with family and marital obligations
by agreement is not covered by Article 178 of CC. The CA held
Art 135(2) Art 135(5)
that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement
Judicially declared an Abuse of power of administration
absentee granted in the marriage settlement and not because of abandonment, and thus the only remedy
available to the petitioner was legal separation, by virtue of
Art 135(3) Art 135(6) which the conjugal partnership would be terminated.
Loss of parental authority De facto separation for at least one
by court decree (Arts year and reconciliation is highly Held: Prima is entitled to a judicial separation of property.
228, 229) improbable
The agreement between her and Jose was only for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
The mere existence of any of the grounds in this article does pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. Under Article
not by itself bring about a separation of property. A petition for 128 of FC, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation must be filed by the spouse entitled to ask for it, and separation of property upon abandonment by the other spouse
the court should grant the petition. It is the court order granting without just cause or failure of one spouse to comply with his
the petition that will effect the separation of property. or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if he or
she does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies an
GARCIA V. MANZANO (1958) absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with
Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia filed an action for judicial separation of the intention of perpetual separation. As early as 1942, Jose
conjugal partnership against his wife Consolacion Manzano. He had already denied Prima admission to their conjugal home,
alleged that through their slaughterhouse business, they were which shows that he had no intention of resuming their
able to amass real and personal properties but upon their relationship. Prima may also invoke the second ground allowed
separation Consolacion assumed the complete management by Article 128, for the fact that Jose failed to comply with his
and ownership of the conjugal properties to the exclusion and obligations as husband or parent when he cohabited with other
prejudice of Gonzalo. The husband prayed that judgment be women and sired many children by them. Lastly, their
rendered to order Consolacion to render a complete account of separation also falls under Article 135(6) of FC, which includes
the conjugal partnership and its fruits, that their conjugal as a sufficient cause for judicial separation of property the de
partnership be judicially separated, and that the rightful share facto separation of the spouses for at least one year at the time
therein of each of them be adjudicated. Consolacion then filed of the petition with reconciliation being highly improbable.
a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, claiming that his complaint failed to allege any of the DELA CRUZ V. DELA CRUZ (1968)
grounds recognized by Article 191 of the Civil Code. The lower Estrella and Severino De la Cruz were married but separated in
court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint. fact. Estrella filed a complaint against her husband for
mismanaging of their conjugal properties with prayer for
Held: The complaint does not establish a case for separation of property. She alleged that Severino abused the
separation of property. Consistent with its policy of administration of their conjugal partnership by not discussing
discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the with her the partnership’s business activities. On the other
unity of the family and the mutual help obligation of the hand, Severino maintained that the claims of his wife regarding
spouses, the CC requires that separation of property shall not mismanagement of the conjugal partnership were not true
prevail unless expressly stipulated in the marriage settlements because he has steadily expanded the assets of their business
or for limited causes specified in Article 191 of CC. Contrary to enterprises from year to year.
the argument of Gonzalo that in case of maladministration by
the wife, the husband should be entitled to the same relief, the Held: There is no evidence to show that he has squandered
Court held that Article 191 only grants a remedy to the wife the conjugal assets. On the contrary, he proved that through
against the maladministration of the husband because by his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial
express provision of law, it is the husband who administers the had increased to a value of over a million pesos. Mere refusal
conjugal partnership and normally it is only the husband who or failure of the husband as administrator of the family business
can commit such abuse. The wife only administers the conjugal does not constitute an abuse of administration. For abuse to
partnership upon the consent of the husband or a decree of exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interests
court. Thus, the wife cannot mismanage the conjugal of the partnership. Because Severino continued to manage the
partnership unless the husband or the courts tolerate it. conjugal properties with the same industry and zeal, a judicial
Therefore, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property cannot be granted. This is designed to
separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife
wife and resuming the administration of the conjugal property. from want. Besides, a separation of property could also slam
shut the door for possible reconciliation of the spouses.

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VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between the
two partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
ART. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the property belonging to the respective spouses. Therefore, it
the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute is essential that said children by previous marriage be
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the personally notified first of the instant proceedings.
separation of their common properties.
LACSON V. SAN JOSE (1968)
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal
Alfonso and Carmen San-Jose Lacson were married with four
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the
children. The two separated when Carmen left the conjugal
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing
home in Bacolod and resided in Manila, where she filed a
thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
complaint for custody of all their children as well as support for
and other persons with pecuniary interest.
them and herself. However, the spouses reached an amicable
The law does not state the reason which would justify the settlement regarding the custody of their children, wherein the
court in approving a voluntary agreement of the parties for two elder children will go to Alfonso while the younger children
separation of property. will go to Carmen; support; and the voluntary dissolution of their
• Intent → leave the sufficiency of such reasons to the conjugal partnership and separation of property. The
sound discretion of the court compromise agreement was sent to the court for judicial
• Agreement without any reason at all → disapproved approval. The court approved the agreement between the
• Any ground that would lessen friction between the spouses, finding it conformable to law. Later on, Carmen filed a
spouses with respect to the conjugal properties or their complaint praying for the custody of the two elder children
administration, or which would be for the mutual benefit under Alfonso. This was granted by the CA who declared the
of the spouses and the family → sanction of the compromise agreement null and void insofar as the custody
agreement of the court over Enrique and Teresa was concerned.
Held: The compromise agreement and the judgment of the

IN RE: VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid with respect
PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERMAS (1965) to the voluntary separation of property of the spouses.
Jose Bermas Sr. and Pilar Bermas executed a deed for the Articles 190 and 191 of CC allow for the separation of property
voluntary dissolution and separation of their conjugal properties of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
consisting of 12 parcels of land and 2 buildings. The spouses if judicial approval is secured beforehand. In the case at bar, the
believed that the deed will redound to their mutual advantage, spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of
preserve peace and harmony in the family, and prevent friction property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It
and confusion among their respective heirs because Bermas does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced
Sr. has two sets of children from two marriages. The spouses by the said agreement. It is also undisputed that the couple
then filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal have been separated in fact for at least five years—the wife
partnership under the stipulations of the agreement, claiming being in Manila and the husband in Bacolod City—and thus, the
that they have no outstanding debts or obligations and that the lengthy separation between them warrants the severing of their
separation of property would not prejudice any creditor or third financial and proprietary interests.
persons. The court denied the petition on the ground that under
Article 192 of CC, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved MAQULAN V. MAQUILAN (2007)
once legal separation has been ordered, which takes place only Virgilio Maquilan filed a case of adultery against his wife Dita.
upon civil interdiction, declaration of absence, or abandonment. Both Dita and her paramour were convicted and sentenced to
Held: The conjugal partnership may be dissolved upon imprisonment of prision correccional. Thereafter, Dita filed a
agreement of the spouses with judicial approval, although petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of
it must not prejudice third persons. In this case, although the conjugal partnership against her husband, imputing
Bermas Sr. admittedly has children by a previous marriage, their psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the
names have not been given in the deed or in the petition for the pendency of the case, petitioner and respondent entered into a
approval thereof, despite the fact that his children with Pilar compromise agreement partially separating their properties.
have been named in both. Likewise, said children by first The compromise agreement was judicially approved; however,
marriage do not appear to have been notified personally of the Virgilio later filed a motion praying for the repudiation of the
filing of the petition and of the date of the hearing thereof. In agreement alleging that his previous lawyer did not apprise him
fact, no similar notice appears to have been given to his children of its consequential effects. After the motion was denied, he
with Pilar, although the danger of substantial injury to their filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, which
rights would seem to be remote. This is in contrast to the dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction of Dita of
children by first marriage. The dissolution of the conjugal adultery does not disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
partnership between Bermas Sr. and Pilar cannot be effected property and that the compromise agreement is valid and
without first liquidating the conjugal partnership between binding in all respects because it has been voluntarily entered
Bermas Sr. and his first wife, in which the children by first into by the parties.
marriage certainly have an interest. The deed could adversely
affect the rights of the children by the first marriage, for in case

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Held: The compromise agreement on the separation of ART. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where
property is valid. The contention of Virgilio that the separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
compromise agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the decree reviving the property regime that existed between
law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal them before the separation of property in any of the following
properties is misplaced. Under the FC, separation of property instances:
may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to (1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
judicial approval. The compromise agreement which was (2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property (3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted
allowed under the law. This holds true even if the proceedings the power of administration in the marriage settlements
for the declaration of nullity of marriage were still pending. will not again abuse that power, authorizes the
resumption of said administration;
Obiter: There is no need for the presence of the SolGen or
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without
prosecutor because the compromise agreement has no relation
a decree of legal separation resumes common life with
to the nullity of the marriage. The conviction of adultery does
the other;
not carry the penalty of civil interdiction. Negligence of counsel
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the
binds the client, notwithstanding the fact that the compromise
spouse previously deprived thereof;
agreement was plainly written so there is no vitiation of consent.
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least
one year, reconcile and resume common life; or
LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION OF PROPERTY (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership has been
ART. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses,
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains they agree to the revival of the former property regime.
shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be
granted.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by
shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. Article 67.
ART. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the Agreement to revive former regime shall specify (Art. 67)
conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation 1. What to contribute anew to restored property regime
of property shall apply. 2. What to retain as separate property
3. Names of all the creditors
ART. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final
judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registries and registries of property. SOLE ADMINISTRATION OF OTHER SPOUSE’S PROPERTY
ART. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the ART. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive
rights previously acquired by creditors. property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the
other spouse:
Effects of decree of separation
1. Dissolution of the ACP or CPG and its consequent (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
liquidation. (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
2. Each spouse may thereafter own exclusively all his or her (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which
earnings and the fruits of his or her separate property. carries with it civil interdiction; or
3. The obligation of the spouses to support their children (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is
continues, each spouse contributing thereto in in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.
proportion to his or her income or property.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
a. Based not on the value of their respective
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall
property, but on the benefits or income derived
appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
therefrom.
b. If insufficient, the basis will be the market value of Property covered
their respective properties. Civil Code Family Code
c. Support of children – if one spouse pays all the
expenses because the other has no means, the All classes of property in the marriage, All classes of exclusive
former cannot subsequently recover from the whether exclusive or conjugal property of either spouse
latter a proportionate share should his means
improve. Such payment was for his own
obligation imposed by law, which cannot be
In ACP/CPG, administration of common property is given in
reimbursed.
case of incapacity. Exclusive property may be administered
4. Mutual obligation of the spouses to support each other
by the other spouse but court proceeding is required.
also continues.

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• Appointment of third persons → If the owner of the Distinctions between conventional and judicial separation
properties falls under one of the causes in this article, but
the other spouse is not qualified to be an administrator Conventional Judicial
• Power of administrator → trustee only When they agree in their By judicial decree under
o Ownership is not transferred; cannot enjoy and marriage settlements Article 135
dispose of the properties to the same extent as
Takes effect upon the Takes effect during the
the owner
celebration of the marriage existence of the marriage
o Cannot perform acts of ownership (alienation,
encumbrance) without court authorization Provisional or temporary,
o Court may impose conditions or limitations upon Permanent or immutable ceases upon the termination
the powers of the administrator of the cause giving rise to it
• Termination → if the cause for the transfer seeks to exist, May except certain No exception; separation
the reason for the administration by another disappears properties from the applies to the whole
o Owner-spouse may petition the court to declare separation; can be partial patrimony of the spouses
the administration terminated and recover full
Stipulations contained the
rights over the properties
marriage settlements shall
o Owner-spouse may also demand an accounting The provision of Articles 135
be the primary rules; only in
from the administrator, and recover to 141 shall apply.
the absence of provision
compensation for such damages as may have therein will this Code apply
been caused by the latter.
ART. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage

REGIME OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
settlements that their property relations during marriage shall
The matrimonial regime under which the interests of the be governed by the regime of separation of property, the
spouses are completely independent of each other, there provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.
being a separation not only of assets, but also of liabilities.
In conventional separation, the will of the parties, expressed
• Each spouse has full ownership, enjoyment, and in their marriage settlements, is superior to the provisions of
administration of his or her own property, whenever the following three articles.
and however acquired, the fruits therefrom, and the • In case of conflict between the marriage settlements and
products of his or her work or industry these articles, the former shall prevail.
• Prevails in Russia, Canada, and several states in US • Provisions of this Code are merely supplementary or
• Partly in Australia, Switzerland, Mexico, and France subsidiary to the marriage settlements.
Advantages Disadvantages ART. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or

future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter
Contrary to the community of life and case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to
Simple; no interest which the marriage is the absolute community.
common supposed to create
properties and Partial separation
May lead to constant friction between
hence no Contemplates the co-existence of both separation of property
the spouses with respect to the
complicated and the absolute community, or if agreed, the conjugal
expenses of the family
liquidation upon partnership of gains.
dissolution Based on trust and not favorable to • Parties may stipulate in their marriage settlement which
the family of their present and future properties shall be under the
regime of separation of property and absolute
Ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who community/conjugal partnership of gains.
Neither spouse is usually unemployed and dependent
• None provided with respect to the income of the spouses
can be accused of on the husband for support
being interested from their work or industry during the marriage → part of
other’s properties Against Filipino custom of trust and the ACP/CPG
sharing in the spouses • Property acquired during the marriage by onerous title →
ACP/CPG (in accordance with the general presumption
in favor of community of property)
When may separation of property exist? • Fruits from property placed under the regime of
1. By agreement in the marriage settlement separation of property → owner of such property by right
2. Decree by court in proper cases of accession
3. Separation of property cannot be converted to any other
property regime during the marriage

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Total separation of property ART. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
No portion of the properties of the marriage will be common. proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or
The fruits of the properties of either spouse, and his or her default thereof, to the current market value of their separate
earnings from any profession, work or industry, will belong to properties.
him or her as exclusive property.
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses
ART. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, shall, however, be solidary.
administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate,
without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse Contribution of the spouses to the family expenses is in
shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or proportion to their respective incomes, or in case of default
industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received or deficiency thereof, to the market value of their property.
during the marriage from his or her separate property. • Neither spouse can be held liable for the debts
contracted by the other.
When separation of property has been agreed upon in a o Exception: when the obligations are for the
marriage settlement, the wife may during the marriage transfer expenses of the family, there is proportionate
to the husband the management of her separate property. liability on the part of both spouses
• Not an amendment of the marriage settlements. • One spouse has income but has no property and the
• If the wife can appoint a third person to manage her other has property but no income → proportion should
properties, there is no legal reason why she cannot be based on the amount of the income and the value of
appoint her husband. the property, respectively
• Only one spouse advances the full amount of the family
Each spouse owns the property he brings to the marriage or expenses → cannot seek reimbursement later because
which he may acquire during the marriage by onerous or the obligation is his, imposed by law.
gratuitous title. Property acquired during the marriage belongs o The same is true if solidary liability is enforced by
to the spouse who appears as the vendee or grantee in the a creditor against one spouse—obligation to the
title conveying the ownership. creditor is not joint and several.
• May be proved by any competent evidence
• In case of doubt, ownership is presumed to belong to:
o Real property → spouse in whose name the PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE
property is registered or was acquired
o Personal property → spouse in possession ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
▪ If jointly possessed with a creditor → either marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
spouse may attach the property possessed and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
in common; presumption that the co- marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
possessor has an interest in the proper. equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
Incumbent upon the other spouse to prove through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
that he is the exclusive owner thereof co-ownership.
▪ If between the spouses → It is better to
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
presume that the personal property
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
belongs to the spouse who owns or leases
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
the real property in which they are found.
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
Each spouse is liable for the obligations contracted by him. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
Hence, creditors of one spouse cannot attach or levy upon party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
the properties of the other spouse. Except when: jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
1. One spouse acts only as agent of the other spouse, with in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
authorization of the latter. household.
2. A spouse has benefited from the obligations incurred by
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of
the other spouse, in which case the former shall also be
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
liable to the extent of his unjust enrichment.
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
Each spouse can recover from the other any credits from, or after the termination of their cohabitation.
advanced made for the latter. The recovery of such credits
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
may be enforced even during the marriage.
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
• If one spouse causes damage to the other by reason of
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
fault, fraud, or negligence, the injured spouse may
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
recover indemnity from the guilty spouse.
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
• Neither spouse may recover compensation from the
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
other for any personal service, advice, or assistance he
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
may render—this is merely a performance of an
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
obligation in marriage

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This article covers the case of a man and a woman, both ACP/CPG, which may include not only the
unmarried, and without impediment for legal marriage products of the work or industry of the parties but
between them, who live together as husband and wife. also the fruits of their properties and even
acquisitions during the union.
• State of concubinage or marital cohabitation → sexual o Article 147 → the share in the co-ownership will
relations, common household, manifestation of marital be forfeited, which includes only the acquisition
ties before third parties, in personal correspondence, as from work or industry (more preferable, since it
well as mutual financial assistance and support, raising involves less deprivation of property)
of children together.
• DOES NOT cover adulterous relations → because of
subsisting ACP/CPG, co-ownership cannot logically ART. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
exist between one spouse and his/her paramour preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
The rules of co-ownership in this article are to govern only
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
property acquired by either or both of the parties through their
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
work or industry or their wages and salaries.
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
• DOES NOT include the fruits of their exclusive property corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
• INCLUDES property acquired through purchase, by the rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
use of the products of their work or industry or of their evidences of credit.
wages and salaries (substitution or exchange of values)
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
• Shares → depend upon the amount of contribution of in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community
each to the common property, subject to proof. or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
o In the absence of proof → presumed that parties party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
have equal shares, as the rule on co-ownership his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
o Contribution in the form of care and maintenance last paragraph of the preceding Article.
of the family and household is included
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
Each party must be personally liable for debts and expenses both parties are in bad faith.
incurred by him or her, except when the expenses are for the
preservation of the common property, in which case the Article 148 covers cases of cohabitation not falling under
parties shall be proportionately liable. Article 147. These include:
1. Parties who have no legal capacity to marry or have
In ordinary co-ownership, a co-owner may validly alienate or
some impediment to marry each other, but without
encumber his undivided share in the common property without
getting married live together as husband and wife:
the consent of the other co-owners. But in the special co-
a. Those below 18 years of age
ownership contemplated under this article, as long as
b. Those incestuous marriages
cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition
c. Those marriages void for violating public policy
inter vivos of such undivided share can be validly made by
2. One or both the parties are validly married to others, but
one party without the consent of the other.
live together in an adulterous relation.
• After the death of one party, the surviving spouse cannot
validly sell the property owned in common without the
COMPARISON OF ARTICLES 147 AND 148
consent of the heirs of the deceased partner, who can
recover their ½ share from the vendee (Maxey v. CA) Similarities:
• Disposition by will or testament, which takes effect upon (1) Parties must be in a state of cohabitation
the death of the testator, will be valid → death terminates (2) No ACP/CPG is formed between the parties
the relationship and their common property is subject to (3) Common property of the parties shall be owned in
partition common and governed by the rules on co-ownership
(4) Property of each that is not in co-ownership, such as
WHEN MARRIAGE IS VOID
when bought by their money before they lived together,
This article applies also to parties living together under a
or acquired from the fruits of their separate properties,
marriage void ab initio, because such marriage does not
will belong to each separately and exclusively.
legally exist. It establishes a special co-ownership between
(5) Bad faith of a party results in forfeiture of his or her share.
them, implying there is no ACP/CPG.
• But under Article 50, in relation to Article 43(2), the Differences:
existence of ACP/CPG is expressly recognized in void
marriages. ARTICLE 147 ARTICLE 148
• As a rule, forfeitures should be strictly construed, so
Parties are capacitated to Parties are not capacitated
as to effect the least deprivation of property.
marry but not married, or to marry, or suffering from
o Article 43(2) → the forfeiture covers the share of
marriage is void ab initio legal impediment to marry
the guilty spouse in the net profits of the

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One or both of the parties Held: Teresita is not entitled to the injunction. Injunction is to
Parties live with each other be granted only if a person has clearly established that he or
may have an existing valid
exclusively she is lawfully in possession of the property in question.
marriage
Although Teresita presented loans that she had contracted
There must be actual joint during the period when the Forbes Park house was being
Wages and salaries of the contribution of money, constructed, evidence was wanting which would correlate such
parties and the property property, or industry in the loans to the construction work. Thus, her assertion that the
acquired by both of them acquisition of property in
Forbes Park house is her exclusive property is unsupported and
through their work or order that this be owned in
may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption
industry are owned in common, and the share of
common in equal shares each party is in proportion that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro during
to his or her contribution the subsistence of his marriage with Josefina, is part of the
estate that should be under the control of Virginia.
Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family Teresita cannot be declared as a co-owner pursuant to
Not recognized because
and household are regarded Article 144 of CC. Under this provision, before a common-law
actual contribution is
as contributions to the spouse can claim co-ownership of his or her spouse’s
required
acquisition of common properties, there must first be a clear showing that the
property common-law spouse had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Thus,
Property acquired during
the periods of cohabitation No such presumption until such right to co-ownership is duly established, Teresita’s
is presumed to be obtained because there must be interests in the property cannot be considered as the “present
by their joint effort, work or actual joint contribution right” that would make available the protection afforded by a
industry writ of injunction.
Acquisition of property is Only the equality of JUANIZA V. JOSE (1979)

presumed to be by joint contributions, not the Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the
efforts and thus owned in acquisition by joint passenger jeepney involved in a collision accident with a PNR
equal shares; proof of actual contribution, is presumed; freight train resulting in the death of 7 and physical injuries to 5
contribution is not proof of actual contribution
of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio was
necessary is necessary
legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with
defendant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years. In the resulting case for
YAPTINCHAY V. TORRES (1969) damages, Eugenio and Rosalia were ordered to jointly and
Isidro Yaptinchay and petitioner Teresita Yaptinchay lived severally pay each of the victims and their heirs. Rosalia moved
continuously and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years until for reconsideration insofar as it condemns her to pay damages
the former’s death. Isidro died intestate and left properties in jointly and severally with Eugenio, but was denied on the
the Philippines and Hong Kong. Teresita was appointed as the ground that she is the co-owner of the jeepney.
special administratrix of his estate. This was opposed by
Josefina, the legitimate wife, saying that Teresita is not a Held: The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of CC
legitimate heir of Isidro and had no right to be the administratrix. requires that the man and the woman living together must
At the same time, Josefina and her children sought the not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
appointment of Virginia, Isidro’s daughter with Josefina, as Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment
special administratrix. The court granted the counter-petition for him to contract marriage with Rosalia. She cannot be a co-
and named Virginia as special administratrix. Consequently, owner of the jeepney; instead, it belongs to the conjugal
Teresita filed an action for liquidation of the partnership partnership of Eugenio and Socorro. Rosalia, who is not the
supposedly formed during her cohabitation with Isidro, as well registered owner of the jeepney cannot be liable for
as a prayer for preliminary injunction. The lower court then damages caused by its operation. Only the registered owner
issued a restraining order to withhold Virginia from disposing of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may
any of the properties, specifically a house in Forbes Park, arise from its operation.
Makati. Virginia and Josefina opposed the restraining order and
claimed that Teresita was not entitled to the injunction because VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V. GSIS (1971)
her right to the properties is still doubtful and in dispute. The Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages: first with
lower court lifted the restraining order and ordered Teresita not respondent Rosario Diaz, out of which were born 2 children;
to divest Virginia of her possession of the Forbes Park property; and second, which was contracted in good faith while the first
however, it also enjoined Virginia from selling, disposing or marriage was subsisting, with petitioner Basilia Berdin, out of
encumbering said property in any matter pending resolution of which were born 7 children. As a member of GSIS, when Jose
the case. Teresita alleged that she is the co-owner of the Forbes died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid to Basilia and
Park property as it was undertaken jointly by her and Isidro and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. He
she even contributed using her own exclusive funds. Josefina was also entitled to retirement benefits, but Jose did not
and Virginia countered this and claimed that the house was built designate any beneficiary for them. Rosario and Basilia claimed
with Isidro’s funds alone and without Teresita’s aid. the retirement insurance benefits. GSIS ruled that both are the

127
legal heirs of Jose, so it awarded ½ (8/16) of the benefits to VALDES V. RTC (1996)
Rosario and ½ to Basilia (1/16 each for Basilia and her 7 Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married and begot
children). The apportionment was later affirmed by the CFI. five children. Antonio sought for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of FC, which the court granted.
Held: The proceeds of the retirement insurance should be However, under the dispositive portion of the decision, the
divided equally between Rosario and Basilia, along with his court directed the petitioner and respondent to start the
children by her, because the second marriage of Jose to proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
Basilia was contracted in good faith despite the subsisting defined by Article 147 of the FC, and to comply with the
marriage of Rosario. Since Rosario’s first marriage has not been provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same within 30 days
dissolved, the conjugal partnership of that marriage has not from notice of the decision. Consuelo sought a clarification of
ceased nor has she relinquished her status as putative heir of the portion directing compliance with Articles 50, 51, and 52,
Jose. With respect to Basilia herself, although her marriage can arguing that FC has no provisions on the procedure for the
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. The
first marriage was still subsisting, there is still a need for judicial trial court clarified that the marriage between petitioner and
declaration of such nullity. Because the conjugal partnership respondent was void ab initio, and hence the property regime
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before a judicial shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership under Article
declaration of its nullity, the only just and equitable solution 147 of the FC and the liquidation and partition of the properties
would be to recognize Basilia’s right to her share of one-half in owned in common by the provisions of co-ownership under CC.
the benefits, and the other half as pertaining to Rosario. Articles 102 and 102 find no application since they refer to the
procedure for the liquidation of conjugal partnership and
MAXEY V. CA (1984) absolute community of property, respectively. Antonio moved
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together for reconsideration, arguing that Articles 50, 51, and 52 should
after they allegedly had a marriage performed in the military apply, but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
fashion. They begot 6 children, including herein petitioners.
Melbourne was a member of the American army who held high Held: In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
positions in the government and public school system. During the property relations of the parties during the period of
their cohabitation, Melbourne acquired some parcels of land. cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Later on, Melbourne and Regina were married in a church 148 of FC, as the case may be. Article 147 applies when a man
wedding. Shortly after, Regina died and Melbourne married and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
another woman named Julia Pamintuan. Using a power of other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
attorney, Julia sold the parcels of land to the respondent void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this
spouses Maycara. The petitioners filed for the annulment of the property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
sale of the property and the recovery of the possession thereof their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
from the spouses Maycara, alleging that the parcels of land co-ownership, and any property acquired during their union is
were common properties of their parents and that the same prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
were sold without their knowledge and consent as heirs. The efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared the sale property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
null and void, holding that Regina should be entitled to the share jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and
of the property. The CA, however, found the parcels of land to maintenance of the family household. On the other hand, when
be exclusive properties of Melbourne and declared the sale the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
valid, since there is no evidence that Regina contributed to the marry, only the property acquired by both of them through their
acquisition of the properties as she was unemployed at the time actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
and thus only Melbourne could have purchased the properties owned in common and in proportion to their respective
by his own efforts and earnings. contributions. Such contributions are prima facie presumed to
be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
Held: The disputed properties were owned in common by accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership if so
Melbourne and Regina. It would be unjust if a woman who is existing under a subsisting valid marriage.
a wife in all aspects of the relationship, except for the
requirement of a valid marriage, must abandon her home and In deciding to take further cognizance on the settlement of the
children, neglect her household duties, and go out to earn a parties' common property, the trial court acted correctly. It did
living just so the rules on coownership would apply. Since the not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
provisions of the CC are premised on the traditional gender respondent own the family home and all their common property
roles of Filipino men and women, the real contribution of a in equal shares, as well as in concluding that in the liquidation
woman to the acquisition of property must include also her proceedings, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
contribution to the family’s material and spiritual needs through Code, not Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the Family Code, should
care and maintenance of the family and the household. apply. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of absolute
Therefore, the properties were owned in common by Melbourne community and conjugal partnership property regimes for valid
and the estate of the late Regina when they were sold. The and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
spouses Maycara should return one-half of said properties to co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. In
the heirs of Regina. this case, Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42 on the
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted

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during the subsistence of a previous marriage could be made Meanwhile, there is only one property acquired after Amanda’s
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not be assumed death which is registered in the names of both Villanueva and
that the law has also meant to have coincident property Gonzales—this would be governed by the rules on co-
relations between spouses in valid and voidable marriages and ownership under Article 144 of CC, which means half of it
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, should pertain to Villanueva and the other half to the heirs of
leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co- Gonzales. The other properties acquired after 1963 and
ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the FC. Nonetheless, registered solely in the name of Villanueva would still be
the provisions of the FC on the family home, as found in Title V, governed by co-ownership, so half should accrue to Gonzales’
Chapter 2 of the FC, remain in force and effect regardless of the heirs and the other half to Villanueva.
property regime of the spouses.
Note: The trial court also did not establish the exact relationship
NICDAO-CARIÑO V. YEE-CARIÑO (2001) between petitioners and Gonzales. Thus, they remanded the
Santiago married two Susans: first with Nicdao and second with case to determine and identify Gonzales’ heirs.
Yee. Upon his death, both spouses claimed death benefits. Yee
tried to get more benefits from Nicdao as legal wife despite SAGUID V. CA (2003)
Santiago’s then subsisting marriage to Nicdao. She alleged that Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married but separated in fact
his first marriage is void ab initio for want of marriage license. from her husband when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid. The
two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in Marinduque.
Held: Nicdao’s marriage is void for lack of marriage license, but Jacinto made a living as the captain of their fishing vessel, while
so is Yee’s because Santiago did not obtain a judicial Gina worked as a fish dealer and entertainer in Japan. Later on,
declaration of nullity before getting married. Because both the couple decided to separate and end their cohabitation.
marriages are void, property regime is co-ownership for live-in Afterwards, Gina filed a complaint for partition and recovery of
partners. Specifically, Nicdao is under Article 147, while Yee is personal property, alleging that through her salary as an
under Article 148. Since Yee did not contribute anything to the entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000 in the
properties, she did not get anything. Meanwhile, Nicdao got ½ completion of their unfinished house as well as in the
of the death benefits, while ½ went to Santiago’s legal heirs. accumulation of personal properties worth P111,375. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of the personal
RIVERA V. HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006) properties and that the amount of P70,000 be reimbursed to
Romualdo Villanueva was legally married to Amanda Musngi, her. In contrast, Jacinto claimed that the expenses of the house
who died in 1963. While Villanueva’s marriage with Amanda was were defrayed solely from his income. The trial court ruled in
still subsisting, he cohabited with Pacita Gonzales and they favor of Gina, declaring the personal properties to be her
lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage from exclusive property and ordering Jacinto to reimburse the
1927 to 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, Villanueva and P70,000. This was affirmed by the CA.
Gonzales acquired several properties. Gonzales died intestate
and afterwards, Villanueva and his daughter Angelina executed Held: Gina failed to prove her actual contributions in
an extrajudicial settlement and sale of Gonzales’ estate. acquiring the properties. It is not disputed that Gina and
Petitioners, who are the half-siblings of Gonzales, filed a case Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because Gina
for partition of Gonzales’ estate and the annulment of titles. The was validly married to another man at the time of her
RTC dismissed the complaint, finding that Gonzales was never cohabitation with Jacinto. Their property regime therefore is
married to Villanueva, and that Angelina was her illegitimate governed by Article 148 of FC, under which only the properties
child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
of petitioners. The CA affirmed this decision. contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Held: Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales Thus, proof of actual contribution is required. In this case, Gina
from was adulterous from 1927 to 1963, their property alleged that she contributed P70,000 for the completion of their
relations were not governed by Article 144 of CC, which house, but nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent
applies only if the couple living together is not incapacitated of her contribution. What she has are receipts in her name for
to marry. Since no co-ownership exists between parties to an the purchase of construction materials in the total amount of
adulterous relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners P11,413. And as to the personal properties, since no sufficient
to prove his or her actual contribution in acquiring the property proof of the exact amount of their respective shares were given,
in order to claim any portion of it. In this case, only four their share shall be presumed to be equal and hence their share
properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales during their is equivalent to one-half or P55,687.50 each.
cohabitation were registered in both their names. However, the
records are devoid of evidence that Gonzales contributed SAN LUIS V. SAGALONGOS (2007)
anything to the acquisition of these properties and thus, none Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages. First was with
of these four parcels of land should accrue to petitioners. There Virginia Sulit, with whom he had six children. Virginia
is only one parcel of land registered solely in Gonzales’ name, predeceased Felicisimo. Second was with Merry Lee Corwin,
which creates a conclusiveness of title in her favor. Since an American citizen, with whom he had a son. However, Merry
Villanueva never challenged the validity of the registration in her Lee later filed a complaint for divorce, which was granted
name, the property should accrue to the heirs of Gonzales. through a decree by a Family Court in Hawaii. And third,

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Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis in California. DINO V. DINO (2011)
Felicisimo and Felicidad had no children but they lived together Petitioner Alain and respondent Ma. Caridad Diño were
for 18 years until his death. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the childhood sweethearts. They started living together until they
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and settlement of decided to separate. Later on, they decided to live together
Felicisimo’s estate, as well as her appointment as administratrix again, until two years after, they were married. Later on, Alain
thereof. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, son of Felicisimo by his filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caridad, citing
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Felicidad psychological incapacity on the part of his wife who failed in her
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only marital obligation to give love and support to him, abandoned
a mistress of Felicismo since at the time of his death, he was her responsibilities, and instead chose to go on shopping
still legally married to Merry Lee. In contrast, Felicidad sprees with her friends that depleted the family assets. Alain
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the court of found out later that Caridad was already granted a divorce in
Hawaii to prove the dissolution of Felicisimo’s previous California and that she already remarried. A psychological
marriage, and thus, he had the legal capacity to marry her. The report was submitted establishing that Caridad was suffering
trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration, from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply
ruling that respondent was without legal capacity to file the ingrained in her system since her early years. The trial court
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with granted the petition, declaring the marriage void ab initio and
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus void ab initio. It also found that stating that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee was not valid in the issued only upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of FC. On
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo as a Filipino citizen. This reconsideration, the trial court held that the decree of nullity of
was later reversed by the CA, which held that Felicismo had marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition, and
legal capacity to marry Felicidad by virtue of Article 26(2) of FC. distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of FC.
As the surviving spouse, Felicidad can institute the judicial
proceedings for the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Held: A decree of absolute nullity of marriage may be issued
even without the liquidation, partition, and distribution of
Held: Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to the parties’ properties. There is no doubt that Article 147 of
marry Felicidad, the latter still has the legal personality to FC applies to the property relations between Alain and Caridad.
file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she The ruling of the trial court that a decree of absolute nullity of
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition, and
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of FC
their cohabitation. Felicidad would qualify as an interested has no legal basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule on
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
virtue of their cohabitation. of Voidable Marriages does not apply to cases governed by
Articles 147 and 148 of FC. The said section applies only to
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s marriage which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove the validity of her judgment under Articles 40 (second or bigamous marriage was
marriage to him, she may be considered as a co-owner under contracted, final judgment declaring a previous marriage void)
Article 144 of the Civil Code, which governs the property and 45 (voidable marriages) of the Family Code and not to void
relations between parties who live together as husband and marriages under Article 36, which should be declared void
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void ab without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
initio. Under this regime, property acquired by either or both of parties. In both Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries either by ACP/CPG unless the parties agree to a complete
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership, wherein it is separation of property in a marriage settlement. As such, there
not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint is a need to liquidate, partition, and distribute the properties
labor, efforts, and industry. Any property acquired during the before a decree of annulment could be issued. Because the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through parties’ marriage was void ab initio under Article 36, their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners property relations shall be governed by co-ownership and the
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. properties should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership.
If Felicidad fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of FC
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of CC by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. Even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the FC took effect, Article 148 governs. In this regime, co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property, or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal.

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TH E FA MI L Y ART. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house
FAMILY HOME and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
ART. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
on which it is situated. extent of the value allowed by law.
Family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. Difference between the Civil Code and Family Code on
• A real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from constitution of family home:
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the • Civil Code → may be constituted judicially (done by
land on which it is situated, which confer upon a filing a petition and with the approval of the proper
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which court) or extrajudicially (done recording of a public
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. instrument in the proper registry).
• As an object → may actually exist even if not constituted • Family Code → actual occupation of the house as a
in the manner provided by the following articles. family residence which creates the family home, without
• Its constitution as provided in the CC created a real right; judicial or extrajudicial proceedings.
hence, the need for registration. o May be too simple → fraud against creditors, who
o Dissolved → not the property itself that is divided; have no means of determining which house is the
it is the real right that is extinguished. family home when a family has several houses
• A sacred symbol of family love and the repository of among which they move or live at certain periods,
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. or the exact date when it was constituted.
o Being a seat and symbol of family affections,
should not be seized for debs, except in certain The family home continues so long as any of the beneficiaries
special cases. actually resides therein.
• Unmarried head can mean live-in partners, eldest • Death of those who constituted the family home does not
sibling/child or widow. necessarily terminate the family home (Article 159)
• Cannot be a family home if you do not own the land it is • May be terminated or dissolved when the property on
situated on. which it is constituted is validly alienated.
Limitations on family home:

(1) Each family can have only one family home. ART. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(2) The family home can be constituted only on the dwelling (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
place and therefore in the locality where the family has the head of a family; and
its domicile (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
(3) The value of the family home must not exceed the limit sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
fixed by law. illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
Use of property
There must be actual and compulsory occupancy with the Requirements to be beneficiary:
intention of dedicating the premises to such purpose. (1) Relationship enumerated in this article
• There must be the element of good faith and a present (2) That they live in the family home
intention to make the premises the dwelling of the (3) They are dependent for legal support upon the head of
claimant and his family. the family
• No valid family home can be constituted upon premises
used primarily for business purposes. Example: If the wife dies, the mother-in-law becomes a
• Where a portion of a building is actually and primarily stranger to the husband and thus would no longer be
used bona fide as a family residence, and not as merely considered as a beneficiary of the family home.
incidental to a business, it may be constituted as a family
home, no matter how large a part thereof may be used
ART. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
for other purposes than for a family residence.
forced sale or attachment except:
Meaning of family head (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
The head of the family would himself be a beneficiary, (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
irrespective of who are his dependents. He may, therefore, home;
establish a family home, even if the members of his household (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
are not legally beneficiaries of such family home. or after such constitution; and
• Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own family home; (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
otherwise they can migrate from one place to another builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
and have lots of family home to the prejudice of service or furnished material for the construction of the
creditors. building.

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This article refers to PREFERRED DEBTORS. • Mortgaged does not cease to be such as long as
beneficiaries live in it. But if the mortgage is later
A judgment for the payment of money may be rendered after foreclosed and the property is sold in the foreclosure it
the constitution of the family home, but the obligation may have will cease as family home.
been contracted before such constitution. Even if it is the • Property passes to the ownership of third persons → no
judgment that is being enforced or executed after its reason to keep it as a family home. The purpose of
constitution, the family home is not exempt because the debt having such is to have a residence exempt from
was incurred before such constitution. attachment and execution.
Tolentino: Par. 4 may also apply to repairs and improvements o If the residence is not owned by the beneficiaries
done to the family home to avoid redundancy of Par. 2 since of a family home, it cannot be attached or taken
construction of the home would always be before the in execution for their debts.
constitution of the family home.
ART. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death
ART. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
family on his or her own property. regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale
on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head
only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who
constituted as a family home. consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as
family home, the property will remain as family home for ten
A family home cannot be created upon property held in co- years or as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it.
ownership by the husband and a third person.
• Family home created partly on conjugal property and • No beneficiaries → dissolved or cease
partly on the paraphernal property → valid. • Beneficiaries → continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor
beneficiary. In such case, the family home continues until
ART. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not that beneficiary becomes of age.
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 • Lapse of period → may be partitioned by the heirs
in urban areas, and P200,000 in rural areas, or such amounts o If heirs do not partition, they retain ownership but
as may hereafter be fixed by law. it ceases to be a family home.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the ART. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under
least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual
others are deemed to be rural areas. value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the
Considering this “price tag” imposed on family homes,
increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article
realistically speaking, there is no family home in the Philippines
157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
anymore. The law must first seek actuarial computation to
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family
update the equivalent value in today’s economy.
home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
ART. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a
assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
with the written consent of the person constituting the same,
applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then
the latter’s spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal
to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The
age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
Effect of alienation or encumbrance
This article refers to JUDGMENT DEBTORS.
• Alienated → ceases to be a family home; proceeds of the
sale or from other source may be used to constitute
another family home.

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Ordinarily, no creditor not included in the enumeration in Article Proceeds from the sale on execution of the property
155 can levy execution upon the property which is a family constituting the family home will be distributed:
home. There are two exceptions: 1. Creditors holding liens or encumbrances on the property
(1) When the actual value of the family home at the time of 2. Beneficiaries, in the maximum amount for constituting a
its constitution exceeded the maximum value new family home
a. The actual value of the property at the time of levy 3. Creditor to satisfy the judgment that is executed
is immaterial → value may have depreciated due 4. If there is any balance, to the owner of the property who
to deterioration of the house to a level below the is the judgment debtor
maximum fixed; will not exempt from execution.
(2) When at the time of the levy on execution the actual
value of the property exceeds the maximum value ART. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family
because of voluntary improvements thereon home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute,
a. Determinative factor for execution → total value of or be the beneficiary of, only one family home.
the property at the time of constitution and the
ART. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern
improvements thereon
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
b. If that total value exceeds the allowable
applicable.
maximum, it can be levied on execution
The court cannot order the sale on execution of a family MODEQUILLO V. BREVA (1990)
home on the mere allegation of a creditor that its value is After a vehicular accident, Jose Modequillo was ordered to
more than P300,000 or P200,000. indemnify the heirs of Audie Salinas who died in the same
• May subject the debtor to unnecessary embarrassment. accident. The judgment being final and executory, the RTC
• There must first be a hearing and appraisal of the issued a writ of execution to satisfy the liabilities on the property
property to determine whether there is reasonable of Modequillo. The sheriff levied a parcel of residential land in
ground to believe that its value exceeds the limit for his name. Modequillo filed a motion to quash and set aside the
family homes. levy, claiming that the same residential land is where his family
home was built since 1969 and prior to the commencement of
If the property can be divided without material injury, the court this case and as such, it is exempt from execution under
should order the appraisers to set aside for the debtor so much Articles 152 and 153 of the FC. He also claimed that the said
of the land and the building thereof as will amount in value of judgment is not one of those listed under Article 155. The trial
the family home exemption, over and above all liens and court denied the motion, holding that the said house and lot
encumbrances, and the execution may be enforced against the became a family home only when the FC became effective.
remainder of the land.
Held: His family home is not exempt from execution of the
A levy of execution upon the family home creates a foundation money judgment. Under the FC, a family home is constituted
for proceedings to ascertain the value of the property covered on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
by the declaration of family home, to procure an order for the residence, in contrast to the CC where there is a need to
division or sale thereof, and to have the excess over the constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially. In this case, the
exempted value applied to the payment of the judgment credit. residential house of petitioner was not constituted as a family
• Creates a lien conditionally to the extent of any excess home under the CC. It was deemed constituted as a family
in value above the family home exemption, which may by home only upon the effectivity of the FC. Article 162 of FC does
proper proceedings be determined to exist. not mean that Articles 152 and 153 apply retroactively—it
• Lien is absolute when such excess is determined. simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
• Any purchaser of the property after such levy takes it the effectivity of the FC are considered family homes and are
subject to the rights of the judgment creditor to have prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
such property sold upon such proceedings. under the FC. Thus, Article 152, or the automatic constitution of
family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be invoked by
The bid must exceed the amount of the family home exemption
the plaintiff. Therefore, the family home is not exempt from
plus the total amount of all liens and encumbrances, because
execution since the liability which was incurred at the time of
creditors holding such liens and encumbrances have a
the vehicular accident and the money judgment arising
preference to the proceeds of the sale, over all others.
therefrom both preceded the effectivity of the FC.
• Their claims can be enforced against the family home,
even if the latter does not exceed the value fixed by law;
PATRICIO V. DARIO III (2006)
the right of family home is subordinate to the lien or
Marcelino Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
encumbrance in their favor; they must first be paid even
petitioner Perla Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc and
before the amount fixed in Art. 157 is set aside.
respondent Marcelino Dario III. Among the properties he left
Ma’am Beth: was a parcel of land with a residential house in Quezon City.
• It’s not a wise move for creditors to go after the family The three extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino Dario,
home because he puts his debtor in a more financially and a new title was issued in their names. Thereafter, Patricio
precarious situation and the creditor is not a priority. and Marcelino Marc advised Dario III of their intention to

133
partition the subject property. When he refused, the two situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
instituted an action for partition before the RTC, which ordered enjoy such properties and must remain with the person
the partition of the subject property. On appeal, the CA constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by Patricio and except in certain special cases. Upon being apprised that the
Marcelino Marc, holding that the family home should continue property subject of execution constitutes Josef’s family home,
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a the trial court should have observed the following procedure:
minor beneficiary thereof. The CA also held that the minor son
1. Determine if Josef’s obligation to Santos falls under the
of Dario III, who is the grandson of the spouses Marcelino and
exceptions under Article 155 of FC
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. 2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of Josef’s claim that the
property was his family home and determine if petitioner
Held: The family home can be partitioned after the death of
actually resided within the premises of the claimed family home.
Marcelino, notwithstanding the presence of a minor 3. If the property is found to be the family home, the court should
beneficiary therein. To be a beneficiary of the family home, determine:
three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the a. If the obligation sued upon was incurred prior to or after
relationships enumerated in Article 154 of FC; (2) they must live the effectivity of the FC
in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support b. If petitioner’s spouse is still alive, and if there are other
upon the head of the family. Article 159 of FC also provides that beneficiaries of the family home
the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both c. If the petitioner has more than one residence for the
purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of
family home
10 years or as long as there is a minor beneficiary. d. Its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying
Articles 157 and 160 of FC
Here, Dario III alleges that his minor son, Ino, can be considered
as a beneficiary under Article 154 of FC. As to the first requisite, However, despite Josef’s allegations, the trial court did not
Ino satisfies the requirement since he is the grandchild of the make an effort to determine the nature of the real and personal
deceased. As to the second requisite, it is established that Ino properties, and whether the items were exempt from execution
has been living in the family home since 1994 within 10 years or not. Therefore, the order of the RTC is deemed void and
from the death of his grandfather; hence, he satisfies the could not have conferred any right to respondent. Any writ of
second requirement. However, as to the third requisite, Ino execution based on it is likewise void.
cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother since
the liability for his legal support falls primarily on Dario III, who SPOUSES DE MESA V. SPOUSES ACERA (2012)
is the head of his immediate family. The law imposes primary Spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa purchased a parcel of
obligation of child support to parents, in default of which the land before their marriage. A house was later constructed on
grandparents take place. Therefore, Ino cannot be considered the subject property, which became their family home after their
as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did marriage. Sometime later, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandma. Acero, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. When Araceli issued a check for payment, it was
Characteristics of legal support: (1) personal; (2) transmissible; (3)
cannot be renounced; (4) cannot be compromised; (5) free from
dishonored and thus the spouses failed to pay Claudio.
attachment or execution; (6) reciprocal; and (7) variable in amount. Consequently, Claudio filed a complaint for violation of BP 22
against the spouses, and an information was later filed against
them. The RTC acquitted the spouses but ordered them to pay
JOSEF V. SANTOS (2008)
Claudio for the total amount of the loan. After failing to pay
Petitioner Albino Josef was found to be liable to respondent
again, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon
Otelio Santos for failing to pay the shoe material which he
the subject property, which was sold to Claudio on a public
bought on credit from the latter. Petitioner appealed to the CA,
auction. Later on, Claudio leased the property to the spouses
which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Thus, Santos moved
De Mesa; however, the spouses again defaulted in the payment
for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted and
of their rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, the spouses
enforced by the Sheriff of the court. This led to certain personal
Acera filed a complaint for ejectment against the spouses De
properties, as well as a real property in Marikina, to be
Mesa. The MTC gave due course to the complaint and ordered
auctioned and consequently sold off to fully satisfy the
the spouses De Mesa to vacate the subject property.
judgment credit. Santos emerged as the winning bidder and a
Afterwards, the spouses filed before the RTC a complaint to
certificate of sale was later issued in his favor. Thereafter, Josef
nullify the title of the spouses Acera over the subject property,
filed an original petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning
asserting that it is their family home and is thus exempt from
the sheriff’s levy and sale of the properties and alleging that the
execution and levy to satisfy the writ of execution issued early
real property in Marikina was his family home and thus exempt
on. The RTC dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed by
from execution. The petition was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.
the CA.
Held: The trial court failed to observe the proper procedures
Held: Although the subject property is the family home of
to determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations about
the spouses De Mesa, it is not exempt from execution. The
the property being his family home. The family home is a real
petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a
right which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment,
family home and its being exempted from execution at the time
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. The Court

134
held that such claim for exemption should be set up and proved TH E FA MI L Y
to the sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
For failing to do, they are now estopped from claiming the In a broad sense, the family is a group of persons united
exemption. The right to exemption is also a personal right together by ties of marriage and blood. Its scope can be
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, must be claimed extended or restricted according to particular legislation.
not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself. Here, the spouses
In a limited sense, it refers to a group of persons, regardless
De Mesa did not assert their claim of exemption within a
of number, who live in the same house, under the authority
reasonable time. They allowed the subject property to be levied
of a head who furnishes the means by which the members of
upon and the public sale to proceed. And even when a new
the group subsist.
Torrens title was made under the name of Claudio, the spouses
remained silent. It was only after a complaint for ejection, or Juridically, it may be defined as the natural and social
about four years after the auction sale, that the petitioners institution, which, founded on the conjugal union, binds
claimed that the subject property is their family home and is together the individuals who compose it for the common
thus exempt from execution. The petitioners’ negligence or accomplishment of the material and spiritual ends of life,
omission to assert their right within a reasonable amount of time under the authority of the original ascendant who heads it.
was presumed as the abandonment or waiver of such privilege.
• Sanchez Roman: an ethical natural institution, founded
FORTALEZA V. LAPITAN (2012) on conjugal relations of the sexes, in which the members
Petitioner spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from creditor are bound together by ties of love, respect, authority and
spouses Lapitan in the amount of P1.2 million. As security, the obedience—it is necessary for the preservation,
spouses Fortaleza executed a deed of real estate mortgage multiplication, and development of mankind.
over their residential house and lot in Laguna. When the
BASES OF THE FAMILY
spouses failed to pay their debts, the spouses Lapitan
1. The matrimonial union
foreclosed the mortgaged property and set a public auction
2. Relationship within the degree determined by law, whether
sale. At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife
legitimate or illegitimate
Rona (respondent spouses) were the highest bidders; hence,
3. Adoption
they were issued a certificate of sale for the property. After the
lapse of the one-year redemption period, the spouses Lapitan The Civil Code Commission considered it wise to lay down
executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and certain general principles which sustain the solidarity of the
registered the property under their names. The spouses family, not only for the guidance of the courts and of
Fortaleza, however, refused to surrender possession of the administrative officials, but also for their wholesome influence
subject property. Thus, the spouses Lapitan filed a petition for upon the members of every family.
the issuance of writ of possession, claiming that they are
entitled to possession of the subject property as the registered
owners. The RTC issued the writ of possession, and the NATURE AND SUPPORT OF FAMILY RELATIONS
spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, alleging that the
subject property is their family home and is exempt from ART. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a
foreclosure sale. The spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law
and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
Held: The family home is not exempt from forced sale. As a
shall be recognized or given effect.
rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale, or
attachment. However, Article 155(3) of FC explicitly allows the IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY
forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages 1. The family is an essential factor in the general, social,
on the premises before or after such constitution.” In this case, and political life.
the spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed a deed of real estate 2. Constant living together of husband and wife, and of
mortgage over the subject property. And even assuming that parents and children → development of a strong sense
the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did of duty, of an aptitude for heroic sacrifices, and of the
not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced love by future generation of the traditions and moral
sale before it was sold at the public auction in favor of spouses conquests of those who preceded them
Lapitan. For failing to do so, they are estopped from later 3. The family is an indispensable element of social
claiming the exemption. Neither can the prayer of the spouses cohesion and equilibrium.
to exercise the right of redemption even after the expiration of 4. Vitality and strength of the State depends upon the
the one-year period be granted. The spouses never filed an solidarity of its nucleus, the family → interest of the State
action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property in the family
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. They allowed the one-year period to lapse from the Family rights are governed by law.
registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the • Acquired, exercised, and extinguished in accordance
mortgage. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the spouses with the provisions of the law.
Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right to redemption.

135
SPHERES OF LAW ON FAMILY ART. 150. Family relations include those:
1. External – the law governs only the external relations (1) Between husband and wife;
between the spouses, and between parents and their (2) Between parents and children;
children. It is only in the external aspect that the law fixes (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
rules regulating family relations because it only here that blood.
third persons and the public interest are concerned.
CLASSES OF FAMILY RELATIONS
2. Internal – essentially natural and moral; it is commonly Family relationship is the relation, union, or connection which
known to be sacred to the family and inaccessible to the exists between various persons, by reason of nature, law, or
law. The spiritual relations, and all those affecting the moral religion. This is classified into natural, civil, and spiritual.
life of the family, are within the realm of conscience and not
embraced by the law. 1) Natural – by consanguinity or by affinity
a. The law cannot and should not regulate such a. Consanguinity → arising by blood, binding
matters as the sexual relations of the spouses, or the persons who come from a common ascendant;
career or profession that parents should choose for may be legitimate or illegitimate
their children, or the practices or customs in the
b. Affinity → between one spouse and the relatives
domestic life of the family.
of the other spouse
b. Although the law provides for equality in legitimes
for the children, the parent may distribute his other 2) Civil – by law, as by adoption, which creates a
properties beyond the legitime among his children relationship between the adopter and the adopted
in the proportion that his conscience may dictate. 3) Religious – by the administration of religious
c. In the internal sphere, the family accomplishes its sacraments, such as baptism and confirmation.
religious, emotional, and physiological purposes—
the law must respect the freedom of action of man The extent of family relations is defined by law. Under our
within this sphere. civil law, religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
i. But the moment such action affects the social given any legal effects. However, family relations are not limited
order, the law must step in (e.g., family to those enumerated in the present article. Civil relationship and
practices against human dignity or morals) relations by consanguinity in the collateral line to the fifth civil
ii. The law intervenes to protect the rights of the degree are also recognized in other parts of the code.
children and the wife from abuses of the father
or husband, to determine the relations of
ART. 151. No suit between members of the same family
members of the family in matters such as
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
support and parental authority, and to regulate
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
the liability and right of the head of the family
compromise have been made, but that the same have
with respect to the wife and the children.
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the
same case must be dismissed.
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY LAW
The law governing the family has two essential characteristics: These rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
1) The increasing intervention of the State in the
consideration and solution of the problems affecting the This has been laid down because it is difficult to imagine a
family. This intervention is justified by the influence which sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
the family has on the social organization. members of the same family.
2) The obligatory character of the laws relating to the • It is necessary that every effort should be made toward
a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
family, because they affect public order or public policy.
in the family.
a. They cannot be set aside or modified by • A lawsuit between relatives generates deep bitterness.
agreement of the parties, except in exceptional • Does not apply where defendants are strangers to the
cases. principal parties in the case.
b. The rights and duties arising therefrom are,
therefore, generally inalienable, untransferable, The impediment arising from this provision is limited to suits
imprescriptible, and not subject to waiver or between members of the family as enumerated in Article 150.
renunciation. • The suit must be for a ground which can be the subject
of a valid compromise.
c. They cannot be performed through agents or • Non-compromisable issues include:
representatives. o Validity of a marriage
o Claims for future support
o Civil status of persons
o Grounds for legal separation
o Future legitimes

136
OMITTED PROVISIONS Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing the action filed
Notwithstanding their omission, the principles they contain are by the petitioners. In this case, the parties are not members of
valid norms in family relations and in cases involving family the same family as provided by Article 217 of CC. The parties
members. They do not provide enforceable substantive rights are merely collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters.
and do not have to be expressly provided by law. The family relations contemplated by Article 217 are only those
between husband and wife, parent and child, among other
ART. 219. Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members
ascendants and their descendants, and among brothers and
of the same family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual
assistance. sisters—therefore, these are the only members of the family
required to reach a settlement before instituting an action.
ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of GUERRERO V. RTC (1994)
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the Petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero filed an action against private
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. respondent Pedro Hernando for the ownership of a lot. The
RTC, through respondent Judge Bello, dismissed the complaint
The rendition of mutual aid among members of a family must
on the ground that the parties, being married to half-sisters and
be within the law, and never for wrongful or unlawful acts.
hence are brothers-in-law, failed to allege that earnest efforts
• Thus, the need for mutual aid cannot be used as a shield
were first made to reach a compromise.
for nepotism in the government service, or as an excuse
for helping a relative in the commission of a crime. Held: Brothers-in-law are not considered as members of the
• However, there are certain provisions of the law which same family. The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as
recognize this obligation as a basis for justifying an act members of the family under Article 217 does not include
otherwise criminal, or mitigating the penalty therefor. brothers and sisters by affinity. Since Article 150 of FC has the
o On defense of relatives (Art. 11, RPC) same enumeration of members of the same family, Gaudencio
o On vindication of offense (Art. 13, RPC) and Pedro are not required to exert earnest efforts towards a
o On accessories (Art. 20, RPC) compromise before filing the present suit.
MENDOZA V. CA (1967) HONTIVEROS V. RTC (1999)

Luisa Mendoza filed a complaint for support against her Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for
husband Cecilio who allegedly abandoned her when she was damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson,
pregnant and without any source of income while he was alleging that they were deprived of income when the land was
gainfully employed as a doctor in the US. Cecilio moved to registered under the respondents. Gregorio and Teodora
dismiss the complaint, and upon denial, he filed an answer with denied that they were married. The RTC dismissed the case
counterclaim, putting in issue the validity of his marriage to because the complaint was not verified as required by Article
Luisa. He then filed another motion to dismiss, this time on the 151 of FC and thus, it did not believe that earnest efforts had
ground of failure to state a cause of action because the been made to arrive at a compromise between Augusto and
complaint contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a Gregorio, who are brothers.
compromise have been made before the filing of the suit,
pursuant to Article 222 of CC. Held: Article 151 of FC does not apply in this case. When a
stranger is party in a case involving family members, the
Held: The complaint should not be dismissed. Article 222 of requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer
CC provides that before a suit between husband and wife is mandatory. In this case, the inclusion of Teodora Ayson and
filed, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise Maria Hontiveros takes the case out of the ambit of Article 151
have been made and such must be properly averred in the since relationships by affinity are not given any legal effect in
complaint. Failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff this jurisdiction; hence, Teodora and Maria are considered
previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
renders it assailable for lack of cause of action. In this case, the
complaint involves a claim for future support that under Article
2035 of CC cannot be a subject of a valid compromise, and SUPPORT
thus is outside the sphere of Article 222. The validity of the
marriage between Luisa and Cecilio is also a non- ART. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
compromisable issue pursuant to Article 2035. Since no valid sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
efforts to compromise them would be superfluous. capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred

MENDEZ V. BIONSON (1977) to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
Petitioners Zoila Mendez and 11 other persons filed an action training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
against the respondent Bionsons for partition of two parcels of the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
land. After the court ruled in favor of the respondents, the going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
petitioners claimed that it erred in dismissing their complaint for
lack of earnest efforts by the respondent Bionsons to settle the
case amicably, them being members of the same family.

137
Natural and civil support The obligation to support the wife rests primarily upon the
Preserved by CC, but erased by FC. husband, and vice versa. The marriage relation imposes upon
• Natural → absolutely indispensable for the subsistence the spouses the mutual obligation to support.
of the recipient • The right of a wife to support depends upon her status
• Civil → what is necessary for the recipient to live and to as such—once the marriage has been annulled, the wife
maintain himself in accordance with his condition and is not entitled to support from the husband, even
circumstance, including those which arise from the civil pending the action filed by her for the liquidation of their
and social position which he may have. conjugal property.
• If the wife is obliged to resort to the court to compel the
Legal, voluntary, and judicial support husband to give support, she is entitled to the
• Legal (family support) → provided by law expenses of the litigation, including attorney’s fees.
• Voluntary (patrimonial) → provided for by the will of man, • These expenses are to be satisfied in the ff. manner:
expressed either in acts inter vivos or acts mortis causa o Absolute community → from the property of the
• Judicial → springs from decisions of tribunals, and may marriage
either be definite or provisional o Absolute separation → from the property of the
defendant husband
Duration of obligation
o Relative community → from the conjugal property
The obligation to support has a permanent or general aspect,
which includes those referring to the physical needs of the • The husband’s liability to pay attorney’s fees is part of
recipient; and an accidental or temporary aspect, which his legal obligation to give support and an incidental
refers to his intellectual development. expense (similar to judicial costs) in the enforcement of
the legal right to be supported.
• Permanent → during the lifetime of the recipient, except
o Attorney’s fees are recoverable, even if the parties
in cases where the obligation to support ceases
settle the case amicably.
• Accidental → only during the period needed to acquire a
o Since this obligation is mutual, the same
profession, trade or vocation
principles apply where the wife is rich and the
o If started by the recipient while still a minor, the
husband is poor, and the latter is obliged to resort
obligor is bound to continue defraying the
to the court to compel his wife to support him.
expenses until the course is completed, even after
• If the wife is forced to leave the conjugal home by
the recipient has attained the age of majority.
justifiable causes, she is entitled to separate
Characteristics of support maintenance from the husband.
1. Personal, based on family ties • In an action by the wife against the husband for
2. Intransmissible maintenance, the marriage having been established, the
3. Cannot be renounced court may grant alimony pendente lite.
4. Cannot be compromised o If the answer of the defendant denies the marriage
5. Free from attachment or execution between him and the plaintiff, thus putting in issue
6. Reciprocal the very status of the plaintiff, alimony pendente
7. Variable in amount lite should not be allowed, until the marriage is
established as a fact.
ART. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, o Should not be allowed where there is a defense
the following are obliged to support each other to the whole that the plaintiff wife has committed adultery.
extent set forth in the preceding article: • The husband cannot allege as a defense to an action for
(1) The spouses; support by the wife that he has other persons to support;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; the support for the wife is a preferred one, second only
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate to that for the children under parental authority.
and illegitimate children of the latter;
Ascendants and descendants
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate
Legitimate ascendants and descendants are mutually bound to
and illegitimate children of the latter; and
support each other.
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-
• But where the mother delivered her child to other
blood
persons when the child was scarcely two years old and
Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance. abandoned her entirely, the mother resigns all parental
claim and is not entitled to be supported by the child.
• It would be a valid defense to show that it is a fruit of
ART. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related,
such adulterous relations for it would not be the child of
whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support
the defendant and thus not entitled to support as such.
each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only
• When the civil status of being a son is denied, and this
when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of
civil status, from which the right to support is derived, is
age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault or
the issue, support pendente lite cannot be made until an
negligence.
authoritative declaration has been made as to existence
of the cause.

138
Illegitimate descendants (d) Descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, from the
Illegitimate descendants, whether from legitimate or illegitimate legitimate parents of their parent (grandparents) →
children, are entitled to support from the grandparents. separate property of the grandparents, under this article.
• Under the CC, illegitimate descendants from legitimate (e) Illegitimate children from parent → separate property of
children were not entitled to support from the the parent
grandparents → unequal and arbitrary (f) Brothers and sisters → property of the obligor
• The FC corrected this lack of uniformity and made the
position of descendants, whether legitimate or
legitimate, and whether they proceed from parents with ART. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for
legitimate or illegitimate filiation, equal. annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported
Support of brothers and sisters from the properties of the absolute community or the
Under the CC, brothers and sisters, whether legitimate or conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the
illegitimate, were entitled only to natural support or the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses
necessaries of life, even if the family’s financial capacity would ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may
justify more. The FC now gives them all civil support, or that order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
which is in accordance with the financial capacity of the family. innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
• Ambiguity in Article 196 → brothers and sisters not
legitimately related are entitled to the full extent of Support pendente lite
support set forth in Article 194, except only when the If there is conjugal property, it is mandatory that the spouses
need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is and the children be supported from such.
due to a cause imputable to claimant’s fault or • If the action is for annulment, the marriage subsists until
negligence. the decree of annulment has been rendered; thus, there
• Does the exception mean that the claimant will not be can be support between the spouses during the
entitled to the full extent of civil support and will be proceedings.
limited to natural support of the bare necessities of life? • If the action is for legal separation, while the plaintiff may
o Under the CC, the brothers and sisters of ask for support pendente lite from the defendant, the
illegitimate relationship were entitled only to latter cannot ask such support from the former because
support only when by a physical or mental defect, the cause for legal separation committed by the
or any other cause not imputable to the recipients defendant would be a ground for the termination of his
they cannot secure their subsistence. or her right to support.
o Tolentino: Although the phraseology of the law
has been changed and some ambiguity has been After final judgment
created, the intention is the same—the right to After final judgment of annulment, the marriage bond ceases to
support will cease. exist, and the right of the spouses to mutual support also
terminates.
• The wife may not ask support from the husband, even
ART. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, during the pendency of an action to liquidate and
whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, partition the conjugal partnership property.
whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate • However, the court may order that a certain sum be
property of the person obliged to give support shall be advanced to her on account of her share in the conjugal
answerable; provided that in case the obligor has no separate property of the annulled marriage.
property, the absolute community or the conjugal
In legal separation, while the obligation of the spouses to
partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the
support each other ceases, the court may order the guilty
support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse
spouse to support the innocent one.
obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of
• This, however, is purely discretionary with the court and
the conjugal partnership.
depends upon the relative means of the spouses.
PROPERTIES ANSWERABLE FOR SUPPORT
(a) Spouses → property of the absolute community or
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
conjugal partnership. In case of absence of common
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
property, the property of each spouse is answerable for
the order herein provided:
the support of the other.
(1) The spouse;
(b) Legitimate children from legitimate parents → property
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
of the absolute community or conjugal partnership. If
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
there is no common property, the separate properties of
(4) The brothers and sisters.
the parents are solidarily liable.
(c) Legitimate parents from legitimate children → property Since the obligation to support certain relatives rests primarily
of the children, under the present article. The parents are upon the requirements of human nature and ties created by
included in the term “ascendants.” family relations, it is only logical that such obligation should be

139
first imposed upon those who are more closely related to the ART. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in
recipient; it is only in default of those nearer in degree of Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources
relationship that those more remote are called upon. or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
The order of liability among ascendants and descendants This refers to civil support, the amount of which is based on
would be: two factors:
1. Legitimate children and descendants 1. The means of the obligor
2. Legitimate parents and ascendants 2. The necessities of the recipient, according to the social
3. Illegitimate children and their descendants position of the family
The action for support may be brought against any of those
obliged to give it, but the plaintiff must show that those who
ART. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding
are called upon to furnish the support before the defendant
article shall be reduced or increased proportionately,
are without means to give such support.
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
• If the defendant can prove that another person who is recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
ahead of him in the order of liability can give the support, furnish the same.
the obligation must fall upon the latter.
A judgment for separate maintenance can never become final
and may always be modified at any time for sufficient reasons.
ART. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two
• May always be modified because of varying conditions
or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
as support, and the ever-changing needs of the recipient
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, himself.
the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
A judgment increasing or decreasing the amount of support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the
does not have retroactive effect, and should not in any matter
other obligors the share due from them.
affect the amount already paid to the recipient.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support • The recipient does not have to return the difference
from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should between what he has already received and the new
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the amount, if reduced; neither is he entitled to demand such
order established in the preceding article shall be followed, difference if the amount was increased.
unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a • Past payments in arrears are not condoned or
child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall extinguished by an order or judgment reducing the
be preferred. amount of future payments.
A judgment in a civil case for support does not lapse like

The obligation of several obligors in the same grade is a joint
ordinary judgments by the mere expiration of five years, but
and not a solidary one.
continues until the minors who are given the allowance are of
• The proportionate share of each will depend upon his
legal age.
means as compared to the others.
• General rule: the recipient should claim his support from It is not necessary to file a separate action for a suspension
all those obliged to give it of current support. The matter of determining whether or not
• Exception: if the obligors are absent and their domiciles petitioner is entitled to support up to the present is subject to
are unknown → any obligor may be compelled to give the presentation of evidence by both the petitioner and the
the full amount of the support, without prejudice to his respondent and is for the lower court to decide.
right to recover the proportionate shares of the others.
When a judgment for alimony has already been rendered, the
Among recipients of support, the law gives preference to wife may enforce it through contempt proceedings, or through
children under patria potestas over all other relatives. attachment and execution, or both.
• Extends to the minor legitimate, legitimated, and
illegitimate children, because they are all under parental
authority. ART. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable
• The adopted child is the child of the adopting parent, and from the time the person who has a right to receive the
there is no restriction placed upon his rights as such— same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
thus, he enjoys all the rights that a legitimate child of the from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.
adopting parent has, including the preference to support
• This preference presupposes that the person obliged to Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the
support gives such from his own separate property as Rules of Court.
a personal obligation.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of each
• But if the support comes from the ACP or CPG, no corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs
preference is to be observed, because this is in payment shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.
of a liability of the community or partnership itself.

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The right to demand support arises from imperative necessity, 2. When the wife is compelled to leave the conjugal
without which it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes dwelling because the husband required her to perform
that such necessity does not exist unless support is demanded. unchaste acts, repulsive to her sense of decency
3. When the husband continually repeated acts of infidelity.
The obligation to give support is demandable from the moment 4. When the husband, addicted to gambling, abused the
the necessity for it arises; but the alimony is payable only from wife in words and in deed.
the time of extrajudicial demand or the filing of the complaint
asking for support.
• Alimony is for the purpose of maintaining the recipient, ART. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well
and if he did not demand it, it is supposed that he did not as any money or property obtained as such support shall not
need it. be levied upon on attachment or execution.
Where a wife has been abandoned, the period of prescription This exempts from execution both the right to support and the
of the action should be counted, not from the date of allowances received under such right. To allow attachment
abandonment, but from the time when she needed support. or execution of the right to support, or of what is used for
• In the absence of other evidence, this would be at the support, would defeat the protection which the law gives to
time when she filed the action for support. Hence, the the recipient against want and misery.
action for support would never prescribe. • Creditors cannot go after the support because it is
“indispensable,” hence essential to survival of recipient.
The heirs of a deceased person entitled to support are not
obliged to return whatever he may have received in advance
for such support. ART. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged
• If the recipient dies on the 20th day of the month, the to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a
obligor is compelled to pay the rest of the pension right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears
corresponding to the unexpired part of the amount, on that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed.
the theory that the amount for the whole month should
have been paid in advance, and there would have been For one to recover under this article, it must be alleged and
no duty to refund in case of death. proved:
1. That support has been furnished by a dependent of one
Ma’am Beth says: If you’re a legitimate child, everything just
bound to give support but who fails to do so.
trickles down to you. You don’t have to ask for support or
2. That the support was furnished by a stranger.
anything because you just go to the dining table and there’s
a. Stranger refers to one who does not have any
food waiting for you.
obligation to support the person given support.
b. The obligation to reimburse him arises from a
ART. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the quasi-contract, and not from an implied contract.
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance 3. That the support was given without the knowledge of the
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling person charged with the duty.
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter 4. That the support must not have been given without the
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal expectation of recovering it.
obstacle thereto.
The option granted to the obligor to support the recipient in ART. 207. When the person obliged to support another
his own home has two requisites: unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently
1. The obligor has his own home or domicile needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support
2. There exists no moral or legal reason which prevents the to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from
recipient from living in the obligor’s home or domicile. the person obliged to give support. This Article shall
particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the
Moral or legal obstacles age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give
May prevent the court from upholding the option of the obligor support to the child when urgently needed.
to support the obligee in his own home. Examples include:
1. Subjecting the wife or their children to prostitution. Under Article 207, the obligor unjustly refuses to support the
2. The wife does not want the husband to keep an person entitled thereto; while in Article 206, there is a mere
illegitimate child with them. failure to give support.
3. Stepbrother and stepsister have an affair. • Not necessary that the obligor does not know that the
support is being given by another—the law creates a
Separate maintenance promise on the part of the person obliged to give support
Separate maintenance outside of the obligor’s home has been to reimburse the one who gave support.
allowed in the following instances:
1. When a wife is separated from her husband by reason of
a decree of legal separation.

141
ART. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, GOTARDO V. BULING (2012)
the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling were sweethearts. They
shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. started having sexual relations, which led to Divina’s
pregnancy. Charles was happy about this and made plans to
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to marry her. However, he backed out of the wedding. ivina filed a
adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to complaint for damages against Charles for breach of promise
changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the to marry, but the two amicably settled the case. She soon gave
contemplation of the parties. birth to their son Gliffze. After Charles failed to show up, she
filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support
The support contemplated by this article arises from the will of pendente lite. Charles denied the imputed paternity, claiming
the obligor, whether expressed in a contract or in a testament. that he first had sexual contact with Divina in August 1994 and
The recipient and the giver may not be mutually obliged to she could not have been pregnant for three months already on
support each other under Article 195. September. During the pendency of the case, the RTC granted
Special rules on conventional support a P2,000 monthly child support. However, the RTC dismissed
1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis causa) the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze's
2. subject to modifications as circumstances may arise filiation. It also ordered the respondent to return the amount of
beyond the contemplation of the parties support pendente lite erroneously awarded. On appeal, the CA
set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
LACSON V. LACSON (2006) recognize his minor son and pay P2,000 monthly child support.
Maowee and Maonaa Lacson are the legitimate daughters of Held: The CA correctly ordered Charles to recognize and
petitioner Edward Lacson and his wife Lea. Edward left the provide support to Gliffze. Divina established a prima facie
conjugal home but Lea did not badger him for support, relying case that Charles is the putative father of Gliffze through
initially on his note saying that he will support their daughters, testimony that she had been sexually involved only with him at
until in 1976 when she went to her mother-in-law’s house to ask the time of her conception. Charles also did not deny having
for support. To provide for her daughters, Lea also borrowed sex with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later
from her brother, Noel Daban, the amount of P400,000 to date than what Divina asserted, such that it was physically
600,000. In 1995, the sisters filed an action for support against impossible for her to have been three months pregnant already
their father, alleging that the latter has abandoned them and when he was first informed of the marriage. And since Gliffze’s
failed to provide for their support since 1976, despite being filiation is beyond question, his support follows as a matter of
gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable land. obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
The RTC ordered Edward to pay his daughters in the amount of legitimate or illegitimate. Such support consists of everything
P2.49 million for 18 years of support in arrears. The CA indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
dismissed his appeal; hence, this petition. attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
Held: His obligation for support should be computed from financial capacity of the family. The Court also pointed out that
1976. Edward claims that he should not be made to pay support if Charles loves his child, he should not condition the grant of
in arrears from 1976 to 1994 since no demand has been made support on the award of Gliffze’s custody to him.
by the respondents, and pursuant to Article 203 of FC, his
obligation to pay should start only from the filing of the action PERLA V. BARING (2012)
in 1995 when an effective demand was made upon him. The Mirasol Baring and her then minor son Randy filed a complaint
trial court found that an extrajudicial demand for support has for support against Antonio Perla. The respondents alleged that
been made as early as 1976 when Lea went to her mother-in- Mirasol and Antonio were common-law spouses for two years,
law’s house to ask for support for her daughters. This is also which resulted in the birth of Randy. However, Antonio
bolstered by his handwritten note to the extent where he abandoned them when he became a seaman. During trial,
committed himself to support his children since 1975. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio engaged in sexual
Therefore, his obligation to pay support in arrears should intercourse from 1981 until 1982, and when Randy was born in
commence from 1976. November 1983, she and Antonio supplied the information in
Randy’s birth and baptismal certificates. Randy also testified
Yes, Noel can rightfully exact reimbursement from Edward. that he first met Antonio in 1994 in the house of his Aunt Lelita,
Pursuant to Article 207 of FC, since Edward failed to give Antonio’s sister, where he called Antonio “Papa” and the latter
support to his daughters, Noel may furnish support to the latter hugged and promised to support him. During his stay, Randy
with right of reimbursement in order to prevent Edward from said that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a member of the family.
unjustly enriching himself. On the other hand, Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse
with Mirasol on multiple occasions in 1981, but denied being
Note: As a matter of law, the amount of support which those the father of Randy and taking part in the filing of the entries in
related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged Randy’s birth certificate. The RTC ordered Antonio to support
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or Randy since Antonio admitted himself having sex with Mirasol
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. and Randy categorically declared him as his father. On appeal,
the CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation with Antonio.

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Held: There is no basis for the order to support Randy. The ART. 308, CC. No human remains shall be retained, interred,
complaint for support is based on Randy’s illegitimate filiation disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
to Antonio, which must first be established with sufficient mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
certainty. An order for support must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. In
ART. 309, CC. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead,
the instant case, the decision of the RTC is bereft of any
or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the
discussion regarding Randy’s filiation, and the CA merely
family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
declared that Randy’s birth and baptismal certificates
identifying Antonio as the father as sufficient proof of his filiation
with Randy despite the lack of Antonio’s signature. ART. 310, CC. The construction of a tombstone or
mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral expenses,
The respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership
filiation to Antonio. The birth certificate of Randy bears no property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
probative value to establish his filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. There is also no proof of
Antonio’s participation in the preparation of the baptismal
certificate, aside from the fact that it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the baptism but not the veracity of
entries with respect to Randy’s paternity. Likewise, Randy’s
testimony cannot be considered as his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, since aside
from the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged and
promised to support him, there are no other acts of Antonio
treating Randy as his son. And because there is no proof that
Antonio and Mirasol engaged in sexual relations 9 months prior
to Randy’s birth in November 1983, the illegitimate filiation
between the two cannot be sufficiently established.
FUNERALS
ART. 305, CC. The duty and the right to make arrangements
for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal
shall have a better right.
ART. 306, CC. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social
position of the deceased.
How would you reconcile Article 25 of the CC (i.e. thoughtless

extravagance in expenses for leisure or display during a period
of acute public want or emergency) with Article 306 of the CC?
Ma’am Beth says they are in conflict but didn’t explain any
further.
ART. 307, CC. The funeral shall be in accordance with the

expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall
be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other
members of the family.
This gives priority to the expressed wishes of the deceased

in relation to his funeral. A person’s expressed wish or
direction as to the disposal of his body after death is entitled to
respectful consideration, and should be followed as far as
possible.

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PA TER N I T Y AN D FI LI ATI O N BIOLOGICAL-NATURAL
Paternity and filiation have been defined as the relation of PERIDO V. PERIDO (1975)
parents on one hand and their children on the other. This Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. First, with Benita
relation may arise from nature, that is, when it is derived from Talorong, with whom he begot three children: Felix, Ismael, and
generation; or by fiction of law, in imitation of nature, as in Margarita. After Benita died, Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat,
adoption. with whom he had five children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia,
and Gonzalo. Of the three children of the first marriage, only
Generation may be realized within lawful wedlock, in which Margarita is still living, while her deceased brother Felix is
case the paternity and filiation are legitimate; or it may be survived by 7 children and 2 grandchildren, and Ismael by his 4
realized outside of wedlock, in which case it is illegitimate. children and 1 grandchild (herein petitioners). The heirs of Lucio
from both marriages executed an extrajudicial partition of his
Children may be classified generally into:
estate. However, the heirs of the first marriage had second
1. Legitimate
thoughts and filed a complaint for the annulment of the
2. Legitimated
partition, alleging that all five children of Lucio with Marcelina
3. Illegitimate
were illegitimate and thus had no successional rights to the
4. Adopted
estate of Lucio. They claimed that the children of the second
marriage were born out of wedlock even before the death of
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Benita and that the land certificate indicated that Lucio was still
ART. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by a widower. The trial court annulled the extrajudicial partition but
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. did not order the partition according to the plaintiffs, finding that
the five children of Lucio with Marcelina were all legitimate. This
Kinds of filiation finding was affirmed by the CA.
1. By nature
Held: The five children of Lucio and Marcelina are all
a. Legitimate
legitimate. There was evidence to show that Benita died during
b. Illegitimate
the Spanish regime, and thus Lucio had no legal impediment to
2. By adoption
marry Marcelina before the birth of their first child in 1900.
Likewise, that Lucio stated that he was a widower in the
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of
certificates of title was not conclusive to show that he was not
the parents are legitimate.
actually married to Marcelina. The law presumes that two
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of persons living together as husband and wife have entered into
the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or a lawful marriage, which may be overcome only by cogent proof
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.
wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by LIYAO, JR. V. TANHOTI-LIYAO (2002)
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of Ramon Yulo when she started cohabiting with the late William
the child. Liyao from 1965 to his death in 1975. They lived together along
with Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage,
A legitimate child is one that is born in lawful wedlock or within Enrique and Bernadette, with the knowledge of William’s
a competent time afterwards. The time of birth is the criterion legitimate children from his subsisting marriage with Juanita
of legitimacy. It is sufficient that the child was born after, Tanhoti-Liyao. Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. or Billy,
though begotten before, the celebration of the marriage—this is herein petitioner. Billy, represented by his mother, filed an
made clear by the FC using the phrase “conceived or born action for the respondents to recognize and acknowledge him
during the marriage.” as a compulsory heir of William entitled to his successional
rights. The petitioners claimed that during Billy’s birth, William
Who are legitimate children? visited Corazon and paid all medical and other expenses. He
1. conceived before marriage, born during marriage also asked his secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth
2. conceived during marriage, born during marriage certificate and to open a bank account for him where he will
3. conceived during marriage, born after dissolution of deposit amounts on a weekly basis. William would likewise
marriage bring Billy to his office and introduce him as his son and even
had their pictures taken together. As such, Billy continuously
ART. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid enjoyed and possessed the status of a recognized child through
marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this William’s direct and overt acts. This was supported by
Code. testimonies from their neighbors saying that Billy is indeed the
son of Cora and William, as well as a note stating “To Cora,
The FC has abolished the classification of illegitimate children Love from William,” to the extent that the two had an amorous
into natural children, natural children by legal fiction, and other relationship. In contrast, the respondents painted a different
illegitimate children. Now they all belong to only one class: picture of the story, claiming that Juanita and William are not
illegitimate children.

144
separated; that prior to his death, William was in very poor Held: Only Jeylynn is entitled to monthly pension. Jeylynn’s
health; that Corazon and her legal husband Ramon were not claim is justified by her birth certificate which bears the
separated; and that there is no proof that William provided for signature of Pablo and was certified by the civil registrar. Jeylnn
the needs of Corazon and Billy. The RTC ruled in favor of the was also born during the subsistence of Rosanna and Pablo’s
plaintiffs and declared Billy as the illegitimate son of William for marriage. Article 164 provides that children conceived or born
preponderance of evidence that the latter was cohabiting with during the marriage of the parents are presumed to be
Corazon when Billy was conceived. The CA, however, reversed legitimate in the absence of proof that there is physical
the ruling of the trial court, holding that the law favors legitimacy impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
so long as marital intimacy between the husband and the wife days of the 300 days preceding the birth of the child. Likewise,
is physically possible. It gave credence to the testimonies that impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of
Corazon and Ramon were seen together when she was the husband, and since there is no showing that Pablo
supposed to be cohabiting with William. It also ruled that the challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime, Jeylnn’s
birth and baptismal certificates indicating William as the father status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
are not sufficient to establish paternity in the absence of
evidence that William took part in the preparation of such. There Janet is not entitled to the death benefits of Pablo. Her date
was no signature in the said documents, even in the passbook of birth was not substantially proven, and thus, the presumption
of the bank account he supposedly opened for Billy. of legitimacy does not operate for lack of proof that Janet’s
parents were legally married and that her conception or birth
Held: Billy is the legitimate son of Corazon and Ramon. occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. The Court
Under the NCC, a child born and conceived during a valid cannot also attach the same probative value to her birth
marriage is presumed to be legitimate, grounded in a policy to certificate as it was only a mere photocopy without certification
protect innocent offspring from illegitimacy. The fact that by the civil register. Moreover, all the witnesses also point out
Corazon had been living separately from Ramon at the time Billy that Janet was only adopted by Rosanna and Pablo without any
was conceived and born is immaterial, because impugning the legal proceedings. Under the SSS Law, only legally adopted
legitimacy of the child under Article 255 of CC is a strictly children are considered dependent, and absent any proof that
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs Janet was legally adopted, she cannot be considered a
under Article 262 of CC. Therefore, the present petition filed by dependent child of Pablo, and hence, not a primary beneficiary.
Corazon as guardian ad litem of Billy cannot prosper because
the child himself cannot choose his own filiation and it does not Neither is Rosanna entitled to the pension. For her to qualify
appear that Ramon has impugned the legitimacy of Billy. And as a primary beneficiary, she must first establish that (1) she is
even if Enrique and Bernadette Yulo testified for him, it cannot the legitimate spouse of Pablo and that (2) she is dependent
amount to impugnation of Billy’s legitimacy as Ramon was still upon him for support. In this case, Rosanna was able to prove
alive and thus, the case could not be considered an exceptional that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo through a copy of the
case to allow the heirs to impugn his legitimacy. marriage certificate verified with the civil register by SSS.
However, Rosanna does not qualify on the second ground
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. AGUAS (2006) because she abandoned Pablo six years before his death after
Pablo Aguas, an SSS pensioner, died. His surviving spouse, a commotion due to the paternity of Jeylnn. Since Rosanna was
Rosanna, filed a claim for his death benefits along with her separated in fact from her husband, she cannot be said to be
minor child, Jeylnn. The SSS granted the monthly pension, until dependent upon him for support, and therefore, she cannot be
it received a letter from Leticia, Pablo’s sister. She alleged that considered a primary beneficiary of Pablo’s death benefits.
Rosanna abandoned the family home six years prior and lived
with another man on whom she depends for support. She also BIOLOGICAL-ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that
the latter had several children with Romeo dela Peña. As a Artificial insemination is the impregnation of a female with the
result, SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s semen from male without sexual intercourse.
monthly pension. The SSS also found that Pablo had no legal • The child conceived through artificial insemination with
children with Rosanna and Jeylnn and Jefren were the children the consent of both husband and wife is legitimate.
of Rosanna and Romeo; that Rosanna abandoned Pablo six • The FC does not require, as a condition for the legitimacy
years before his death while she was still pregnant with Jeylnn; of the child, the impotence of the husband.
and that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was • Even without the initial consent, the child can still be
under treatment at that time. SSS refused to resume the legitimated so long as the husband subsequently
pension and ordered Rosanna to refund the amount given to gives his consent before the child is born through AI.
them. She then filed a claim for restoration of pension benefits • Can be homologous/AIH (wife is artificially impregnated
at the SSC and added Janet Aguas to the claimants. On further with the semen of her husband), heterologous/AID (wife
investigation, it upheld the order to suspend Rosanna’s pension is artificially inseminated by the semen of a donor) or
and have her refund the paid benefits as Rosanna married combined (a combination of the two).
Romeo during the subsistence of her marriage with Pablo, and o AID may be consensual (with the consent of the
that Jeylnn was her daughter with Romeo. On appeal, the CA husband) or non-consensual (without his consent)
reversed the SSC decision and declared that Rosanna, Jeylnn • That the child was born of artificial insemination is not
and Janet are entitled to the SSS benefits from Pablo. reflected in the birth certificate.

145
A child can have as much as five parents: adoption is granted. And third, the provision in the surrogacy
FATHER MOTHER contract whereby Mrs. Whitehead irrevocably agreed to
1. Biological (source of surrender custody of her child and to terminate her parental
1. Legal/social rights conflicts with the settled interpretation of New Jersey
sperm)
laws making surrender of custody and consent to adoption
2. Genetic (egg donor)
2. Legal/social revocable in private placement adoptions. As to public policy
3. Gestational (not surrogate) considerations, the surrogacy contract also contradicts the
policy that children should remain with and be brought up by
Legal issues in human egg donation, gestational surrogacy both of their natural parents. That the whole purpose and effect
• Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her womb of the surrogacy contract was to give the father the exclusive
for nine months without giving anything in return? Unless right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother is also
you can find someone whose hobby is to get pregnant in conflict with the law granting equal rights to both parents.
and give birth, it is quite an impossibility to have free Worst of all, however, is the contract's total disregard of the
surrogacy. This is vulnerable to abuse of women in lower best interests of the child. No inquiry has been made to
social economic classes. determine the fitness of the Sterns or Mrs. Whitehead as the
• Ma’am Beth tells about the travails of pregnancy and parents of Baby M.
even asked a pregnant student in the class to share her
prenatal experiences. The termination of Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights is void.
• What would be the relationship if a woman carries the There is no evidence that Mrs. Whitehead was an unfit mother
embryo formed by her daughter and her daughter’s to justify such termination; rather, the trial court affirmatively
husband? This was an actual case in an African country stated that she had been a good mother to her other children.
wherein the grandmother bore the child of her daughter. Moreover, her initial surrender of Baby M was pursuant to an
invalid and unenforceable contract, which does not terminate
IN RE: BABY M. (1988) her rights over the child.
William and Elizabeth Stern were married when they decided to
The constitutional right of procreation does not extend to
defer starting a family. Later on, Mrs. Stern learned that she has
the Sterns. The right to procreate is the right to have natural
multiple sclerosis, which poses a serious health risk during
children, whether through sexual intercourse or natural
pregnancy. Instead, the spouses entered into a surrogacy
insemination—in this case, Mr. Stern has not been deprived of
contract with Mary Beth Whitehead, wherein Mrs. Whitehead
that right because Baby M is his child. The custody, care,
would become pregnant through artificial insemination using
companionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of
Mr. Stern’s sperm, bear it, and deliver it, and do everything
the right to procreation. Neither was Mrs. Stern denied equal
necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern
protection of the laws when the law grants parental rights to an
could adopt the child, all in exchange for a fee of $10,000. After
infertile husband and not to an infertile wife. A sperm donor
a successful artificial insemination, Mrs. Whitehead became
cannot simply be equated with a surrogate mother based on
pregnant and eventually she gave birth to Baby M. At that
the time it takes to provide sperm for artificial insemination and
moment, Mrs. Whitehead realized that she could not part with
the time invested in a nine-month pregnancy.
the child; however, she still turned the child over to the Sterns.
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Whitehead became deeply distraught Baby M’s best interests call for custody in the Sterns. The
over surrendering Baby M to the Sterns, so she went to the stability of the Whitehead family was doubtful at the time of
latter and told them of her suffering. Not wanting to cause harm trial—their finances were in serious trouble; Mr. Whitehead,
upon her, the Sterns agreed to temporarily turn over Baby M to although gainfully employed, has alcoholism; and Mrs.
Mrs. Whitehead with the condition that she will return the child Whitehead seems to be too controlling to allow for the
to the spouses later on. However, after four months of struggle wholesome and independent psychological growth of Baby M.
over Baby M with the spouses Whitehead fleeing to different In contrast, the Sterns lack experience but all indications are
places to evade apprehension, the Sterns filed a complaint for that their household and personalities promise a much more
possession and ultimate custody of the child. After trial, the likely foundation for Baby M to grow and thrive. Their household
lower court ruled that the surrogacy contract was valid, granted is stable, finances are more than adequate, their circle of friends
the Sterns custody, ordered the termination of Mrs. supportive, and their marriage is happy. They demonstrated the
Whitehead’s maternal rights, and allowed Mrs. Stern to adopt wish and ability to nurture and protect Melissa but at the same
Baby M. Mrs. Whitehead was also given visitation rights during time encourage her independence. All in all, the child’s future
the pendency of the appeal. appears better with the Sterns.
Held: The surrogacy contract is invalid. The contract directly The issue of visitation rights of Mrs. Whitehead was
conflicts with existing statutes and the public policies of New remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The
Jersey. First, the surrogacy contract conflicts with laws Court took cognizance of the opinion of Baby M’s guardian ad
prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions, litem that Mrs. Whitehead’s visitation should be suspended until
which is tantamount to baby-selling without regard to the best Melissa reaches the age of majority.
interest of the child and the mother. Second, it also contravenes
laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment
before the termination of parental rights is ordered or an

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JOHNSON V. CALVERT (1993) child to its genetic parents. She cannot also raise the issue of
Mark and Crispina Calvert are a married couple who desired to equal protection because a woman who voluntarily agrees to
have a child but could not because of a prior hysterectomy by gestate and deliver for a married couple a child of their genetic
Crispina. The spouses entered into a surrogacy contract with stock is different from the wife who provides the egg and
Anna Johnson wherein an embryo created by the sperm of intends to be the mother of the child. Lastly, Anna’s choice does
Mark and the egg of Crispina would be implanted in Anna and not equate to one’s private right to procreative choices as she
the child would be taken by the spouses as their child. Anna is merely agreeing to provide a necessary service without any
agreed that she would relinquish all parental rights to the child expectation that she will raise the child as her own.
in favor of the spouses in exchange for $10,000 in a series of
installments and $200,000 life insurance policy. After Anna IN RE: ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973)
became pregnant, the relations between the parties turned Husband A and wife B had a baby born of consensual artificial
sour. Mark learned that Anna had not disclosed about her insemination through a donor. Husband A and wife B were
miscarriages, while Anna felt abandoned by the Calverts. Anna registered parents in the birth certificate. Later on, the couple
demanded that the spouses pay the balance of the contract or separated, followed by a divorce. Both the separation
she would refuse to give up the child, so the Calverts filed a agreement and divorce decree declared the child to be the
lawsuit seeking declaration that they were the legal parents of daughter of the couple. The wife was granted support and the
the unborn child. When the child was born, a blood test was husband visitation rights. He faithfully visited and performed all
taken which excluded Anna as the genetic mother. The parties the support conditions of the decree. Afterwards, wife B
agreed that the child would remain in the meantime with the remarried and her new husband, C, petitioned to adopt the
Calverts with temporary visits by Anna. After trial, the court child. Husband A refused to give his consent.
ruled that Mark and Crispina were the child’s genetic parents,
that Anna had no parental rights to the child, and that the Held: Husband A’s consent is required before the child
surrogacy contract was legal and enforceable. The court also could be adopted. New York’s Domestic Relations Law
terminated the order allowing visitation rights to Anna. The CA requires the consent of both parents of a child born in wedlock,
affirmed this decision. which may only be dispensed with in cases of abandonment,
insanity, and divorce for adultery, among others, which are not
Held: Mark and Crispina are the natural parents of the child. present in the case at bar. The term “father” is not limited to a
Since both Crispina (genetic mother) and Anna (gestational biological or natural father—the determinative factor is whether
mother) presented acceptable proof of maternity, the case will the legal relationship exists between a father and his child, and
be decided based on the intention of the parties. The Calverts hence, a child born of consensual AID is the lawful son of the
are a couple who desired to have a child of their own genetic father. New York also has a strong policy in favor of legitimacy,
stock and affirmatively intended to do so by effecting in vitro and thus the child cannot be considered illegitimate since it was
fertilization. Anna agreed to facilitate the child into the world, born during the marriage and not in circumstances of infidelity
not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zygote to her. Hence, at or adultery as she was conceived out of a consensual
the outset, Crispina intended to be the child’s mother, and it medically-assisted procedure. Therefore, the consent of
can be assumed that Anna would not have been given the husband A is required for the adoption of his child.
opportunity to gestate and deliver the child if she originally
intended to be the child’s mother. Thus, when genetic
consanguinity and giving birth do not coincide in one woman, IMPUGNED LEGITIMACY
she who intended to procreate the child and raise him as her
ART. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
own is the natural mother under California law. The intended
following grounds:
parents are the first cause, or the prime movers, of the
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to
procreative relationship.
have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
The surrogacy contract is not barred by public policy. 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
Gestational surrogacy is different from adoption and so is not the birth of the child because of:
subject to adoption statutes. Anna was not vulnerable to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
financial inducements to part with her own expected offspring sexual intercourse with his wife;
as she was not the genetic mother of the child, and her (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living
payments were meant to compensate for her gestational and separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
labor services. Neither can it be considered involuntary not possible; or
servitude, as there is no evidence of coercion or duress and (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
under the contract, she retains the right to abort the fetus she prevented sexual intercourse;
is carrying. Finally, the other issues she raises, such as its (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific
tendency to dehumanize women and view children as reasons, the child could not have been that of the
commodities, can only be addressed by the legislature. husband, except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or
The determination that Crispina is the natural mother does (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
not violate her right to due process, equal protection, and insemination, the written authorization or ratification
privacy. There is no issue of procedural due process as she of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
cites no deficiency in the notice for her relinquishment of the violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

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The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption place through corrupt violation of prison regulations, or
that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the conjugal visits are allowed.
period of conception. Thus, proof of the physical impossibility • Spouses living separately by reason of a decree of legal
of such sexual union prevents the application of presumption. separation → if they should, even for a short time,
reconcile and have access to each other, the
PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCESS presumption of legitimacy will apply to a child born later
To overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown within the prescribed period.
beyond all reasonable doubt that there was no access as
could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. SERIOUS ILLNESS OF HUSBAND
• The first 120 days refer to the first trimester when it The illness must be of such a nature as to exclude the
cannot be known if a woman is pregnant. She may not possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife.
even be aware that she is pregnant. During the second • When he is placed in a plaster cast, and it was
trimester, the tummy begins to bulge and so pregnancy inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the
becomes evident. most severe pain
• Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal • When the illness produced temporary or permanent
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is impotence, making copulation impossible.
rebutted by evidence to the contrary; and where sexual
intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be BIOLOGICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REASON
taken to be the father of the child. Pertain to blood typing and DNA testing. The FC has taken into
• There must be physical impossibility of access by the account the progress of science in providing this reason to
husband to the wife during the period of conception. overthrow the presumption of legitimacy. The CC failed to take
o Moral impossibility of access, such as when the into account the advance of science.
wife is in open adultery, or there is bitter hatred
between the spouses, cannot defeat the Blood typing is conclusive only in non-paternity, wherein a
presumption of legitimacy. child’s blood type is not a possible product of the blood types
• The period of physical impossibility of access must be of the mother and the alleged father. As to paternal ties, it can
during the marriage, and not before. only go as far as saying that a man is a possible father.
o If a child is born 185 days after the celebration of
the marriage, the husband needs to prove the Mother’s blood type
BLOOD TYPE
physical impossibility of access only during the O A B AB
first 5 days of the marriage.
o The conception takes place at any time before the O O O, A O, B A, B
180 days preceding the birth of the child (the 120 O, A, B,
days of conception make up the full 300 days Father’s A O, A O, A A, B, AB
AB
blood
period of gestation). O, A, B,
type B O, B O, B A, B, AB
o The law cannot presume access prior to marriage; AB
hence, the want of access needs to be shown only
AB A, B A, B, AB A, B, AB A, B, AB
during the marriage.
IMPOTENCE OF HUSBAND VITIATED CONSENT TO INSEMINATION

Impotence is the inability of the male organ of copulation to The mistakes, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
perform its proper function. It does not include sterility, which should be such as to render the consent void, that without these
refers to the inability to procreate. circumstances, the husband would not have given his consent
• There can be no absolute sterility, except in the absence to the insemination.
of testicles or complete absence of spermatozoa in the
semen due to atrophy or disease of the testicles or Why is it all about “paternity” and not “maternity”?
blockade of the vas deferens. Because mothers are with their babies since birth. Fathers are
• Therefore, once there is sexual intercourse, there will essentially unattached to their child, so there is a lot of room for
always be the possibility—although perhaps not always doubt. There is no maternity because who will know better than
the probability—of pregnancy. the woman if a child is not hers.
SPOUSES LIVING SEPARATELY ART. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
sexual access impossible. have been sentenced as an adulteress.
• This may take place when they reside in different
countries or provinces, and they have never been This rule is a guaranty in favor of the children.
together during the period of conception. • The status of children is protected from the passions of
• The husband may be in prison during the period of their parents.
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took

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• As long as there is access between husband and wife, ART. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother
the mere fact that the wife has committed adultery will contracted another marriage within three hundred days after
not overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of the child. such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall
• The law is not willing that a child is declared illegitimate govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
to suit the whims or purposes of either parent, nor merely (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
occurred between husband and wife at or about the time considered to have been conceived during the former
the wife became pregnant. marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage;
EFFECT OF ADULTERY (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following
Adultery on the part of the wife in itself cannot destroy the the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still considered to have been conceived during such
possible that the child is that of the husband. But once the marriage, even though it be born within the three
adultery during the period of conception is proved, the hundred days after the termination of the former
presumption ceases to be conclusive, and other proof may marriage.
be presented that the husband is not the father of the child.
• By means of blood tests, it may also be shown that the This article applies to a subsequent marriage of a woman
husband and the child of an adulteress belong to whose remarriage is within 300 days following the death of
different blood groups and, therefore, are not related by the first husband or the separation of the spouses in case of
consanguinity. Blood test exclusions have been held to annulment of the first marriage, and a child is born to her within
effectively overthrow the presumption of legitimacy. such 300 days.
• If for ethnic reasons it appears highly improbably that the • Annulment → the actual separation of the spouses,
child is that of the husband, the law itself establishes the and not the final judgment, should be the starting point
ground for contesting legitimacy. for counting the 300 days
• Cut-off point for determining to which marriage the child
CHILD OF RAPED WOMAN belongs → 180th day following the celebration of the
Even if the rape occurred in the first 120 days of the 300 days marriage
preceding the birth of the child, and could probably have been o A child born within the 180 days shall be
the product of the rap, the child should still be considered presumed to be that of the first marriage.
legitimate, if the husband was cohabiting with the wife o A child born after the 180 days shall be presumed
during the same period. to be that of the second marriage.
• The term “adultery” is the act of a stranger having sexual • The legitimacy established here is a presumed
union with the wife and not the legal name of the act, legitimacy, and may be overthrown on the grounds given
which should constitute adultery under this article. in Article 166 or proof of the contrary.
• The reason for the law being present in rape equally as
Who may rebut presumption?
in adultery, the same rule should apply equally to both.
Can be overthrown only by the husband who is presumed to be
• The FC has abolished the presumption of illegitimacy—
the father, or his heirs in proper cases.
the child will still be presumed legitimate in spite of the
• The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
rape or adultery.
o If the husband presumed to be the father does not
o But a remedy is given in Article 166(2) to the
impugn the presumption, then the status of the
husband to impugn the legitimacy of the child.
child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
o The burden of proof shifts from the party asserting
the child of the other husband.
legitimacy to the husband who claims illegitimacy.
• If a wife contracts a second, bigamous marriage during
the existence of the first, a child born therein after 300
CHILD CONCEIVED BEFORE MARRIAGE
days following her separation from the first husband and
The presumption of legitimacy holds even when a child was
180 days after the second marriage would be considered
clearly conceived before the celebration of the marriage of the
legitimate in the second marriage.
spouses. The wife was pregnant when the marriage was
o If it is born within 300 days after such separation
celebrated and the child was born three or four months later.
from the first husband, the child may be presumed
The law still presumes it legitimacy, which can be overthrown
to be the legitimate child of the first husband.
only under the provisions of Article 166.
o The husband can overthrow that presumption by
• Under Article 258 of CC, the presumption of legitimacy
proving physical impossibility of access during
became conclusive if the husband before marriage knew
the period of conception of the child.
of the pregnancy of the wife, or he consented to the
o Once the presumption is overthrown, the child
putting of his surname on the record of birth of the child,
must be presumed as a legitimate child of the
or he expressly or tacitly recognized the child as his own.
second husband, if born after the first 180 days of
• This CC article has been omitted from the FC and is not
the second marriage.
in force; hence, Article 166 of FC would be applicable.
• If a woman, after the death of her husband, has amorous
relations with another man, and a child is born to her

149
within 300 days following the death of the husband, and Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn legitimacy of
its status is acknowledged by the mother and her lover the child? Because it is in the best interest of the child to avoid
who subsequently marry each other, the child is still a putting his/her status in a state of uncertainty for a long time.
legitimate child of the first husband.
o At its birth, it already has that status of legitimacy; What does it mean to be “unknown”?
the subsequent acknowledgment has no effect • The child is registered as the child of other persons
because only children of parents who could have • The child is registered in other municipalities
contracted marriage at the time of conception can • The child is given other names
be legitimated.
ART. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation
ART. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article
three hundred days following the termination of the only in the following cases:
marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy (1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
or illegitimacy. period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without
If nobody asserts the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born having desisted therefrom; or
after 300 days following the termination of the marriage, the (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
child should be considered the illegitimate child of the
mother, unless she or the child proves legitimacy. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born
• Anomaly → Legitimacy cannot be presumed because to his wife. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
the birth was beyond the period of gestation of a child allowed to contest such legitimacy. If the husband clearly did
conceived during the marriage; the presumption of not make use of such right or has desisted from such intention,
illegitimacy, on the other hand, runs counter to the the heirs cannot bring the action. This is to prevent the heirs
policy of the law to lean in favor of legitimacy. from subordinating the sentiments of the husband to their own
• State of limbo, wherein the child is statusless. patrimonial interest.
- Heirs → general; all kinds of heirs, whether testamentary
or legal, compulsory or voluntary.
ART. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth JAO V. CA (1987)
or its recording in the civil register, of the husband or, in a Petitioner Janice Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support against
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. respondent Perico Jao. Perico denied paternity so the parties
agreed to a blood grouping test under the NBI, which indicated
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at that Janice could not have been the possible child of Perico and
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it Arlene. After a trial on merits, the trial court declared Janice as
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should the child of Perico, thus entitling her to monthly support. On
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that
birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the result of the blood grouping tests is a conclusive and
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the indisputable evidence of Perico’s non-paternity and noting the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the discrepancies as to when he and Arlene started cohabiting and
fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. having sexual intercourse. The CA also found that Perico
repudiated Janice as his own daughter by filing a petition to
Action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be within:
delete his name as her father in her birth certificate.
1) If there is no concealment
Held: The result of the blood grouping tests is admissible
From knowledge of birth or recording in the civil and conclusive on the non-paternity of Perico to Janice.
1 year register, if husband, or any of his heirs reside in Although the use of blood typing is inconclusive to paternity, it
the same place where the birth took place is conclusive as to non-paternity—if the blood type of the child
2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and
3 years Abroad that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child
cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. In this case, no
evidence has been presented to show any defect in the testing
2) Concealed or unknown to husband or heirs → period for
methods for the conduct of the tests, and thus, its result should
filing of action shall be counted from discovery or
be accepted as accurate. The cohabitation of Perico and Arlene
knowledge of the birth of the child or the fact of registration
cannot also be a ground for compulsory recognition since such
of said birth, whichever is earlier
cohabitation could not have led to the conception of Janice.
Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct action, not
collaterally.

150
ANDAL V. MACARAIG (1951) between them. This presumption of legitimacy is based on the
Emiliano became sick of tuberculosis, and his brother, Felix, assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly
lived with him to help him work his farm. In September 1942, during the period of conception; and where sexual intercourse
his condition worsened that he could hardly move and get up is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken to be the
from his bed. At that time, Maria eloped with Felix and they lived father of the child. Rolando was also born on October 1967,
at the house of Maria’s father until 1943. Since 1942, Felix and only seven months after March 1967, the alleged date of the
Maria also started having sexual intercourse and treating each first illicit intercourse between Elizabeth and Antonio, and only
other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died seven months from the alleged separation between Elizabeth
without the presence of his wife. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave and Crispin. The fact that Rolando was born mere seven
birth to Mariano. Mariano, a minor, filed an action for the months after the affair is another proof that he is not from the
recovery of the ownership of a parcel of land through her petitioner since, by all indications, he came out as a normal, full-
mother, alleging that he is the surviving son of Emiliano, who term baby.
was the owner of the land in question after acquiring it from his
mother, respondent Eduvigis Macaraig, by virtue of a donation Even though Antonio was declared as the father in
propter nuptias. The lower court declared Mariano as the Rolando’s baptismal certificate, it does not prove the
legitimate son of Emiliano and as the owner of the said land. veracity of the claim that he is indeed his illegitimate father.
While baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered
Held: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. Pursuant to public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
Article 108 of CC, since he was born on June 17, 1943 and administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified,
Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, he is presumed to be the but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein
legitimate son of Emiliano, having been born within three with respect to his family. Thus, for such declarations and
hundred days following the dissolution of his marriage to Maria statements to be admitted as true, they must be indispensably
after his death. There is also no evidence that it was physically shown by proof recognized by law.
impossible for Emiliano to have had access to his wife during
the first 120 days of the 300 preceding the birth of Mariano. On To allow the bastardization of Rolando would give rise to
the contrary, the spouses then were still living together under serious consequences. Article 256 of CC, which provides that
the same roof—even if Maria and Felix were having illicit the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have
relations at the same time, it does not preclude cohabitation declared its illegitimacy or may have been sentenced with
between Emiliano and Maria. Although Emiliano was suffering adultery, has been adopted to protect the children from the
from tuberculosis, this also does not prevent him from having passions of their parents and because it is difficult to ascertain
sexual intercourse with his wife. Therefore, since there is no as to whom the child was begotten when a woman cohabits
evidence showing that Emiliano was absent during the initial with two men at the same time. Elizabeth has paraded herself
period of conception, that he was suffering continuous and as a woman of highly questionable character. Although her
incurable impotency, and that he was imprisoned at the time, husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an illicit
the presumption is that Mariano is his legitimate son. relationship with another man she had never known before. She
had also shown total lack of or genuine concern for Rolando
MACADANGDANG V. CA (1980) after she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. The
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. In Court will not tolerate scheming married women who indulge in
March 1967, she allegedly had sexual intercourse with illicit affairs with other men and then exploit the children born of
petitioner Antonio Macadangdang. She claimed that due to the such immoral relations by using them to collect money.
affair, she and her husband separated. In October 1967, around
7 months following the illicit affair, she gave birth to Rolando TAN V. TROCIO (1990)
Macadangdang. Elizabeth then filed a complaint for the Felicidad Tan filed a complaint for the disbarment of Atty.
recognition of Rolando and support against Antonio, who Galileo Trocio for immorality. She alleged that Trocio raped her
opposed her claims. The trial court dismissed the complaint, one night from which she begot a son named Jewel. She
which was later reversed by the CA, declaring Rolando as the averred that Trocio initially supported Jewel but lost interest
illegitimate son of Antonio. The CA denied Antonio’s motions soon thereafter and neglected the expenses for Jewel’s well-
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. being. She also claimed that it took her eight years after the
incident to file the complaint because Trocio threatened to
Held: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of deport her husband if she reported the incident to the
Elizabeth and Crispin. Applying the presumption under Article authorities. Trocio, in his answer, admitted that he acted as the
255 of CC, during the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded lawyer for Tan and her family in various cases, but denied
the birth of Rolando, no concrete or substantial proof was having sexually assaulted her. He alleged that Tan only wanted
presented to establish the physical impossibility of access to get back at him after she was humiliated when Trocio
between Elizabeth and Crispin. She often visited her mother’s declined her request to report an erroneous amount of
house where her husband and their children are residing, and attorney’s fees to the family so that she could pocket the
thus there was always the possibility of access to each other. difference. Upon investigation, the Fiscal found prima facie
Likewise, the birth of Rolando came more than 180 days evidence to hold Trocio administratively liable. The OSG
following the celebration of the marriage between Elizabeth and recommended his disbarment for gross immoral conduct.
Crispin and before 300 days following the alleged separation

151
Held: There is insufficient basis to disbar Trocio. Jewel was LUMAIN DE APARICIO V. PARAGUYA (1987)
born during the wedlock of Tan and her husband, and hence Trinidad Montilde had an affair with Reverend Father Felipe
the presumption should be in favor of Jewel’s legitimacy Lumain, which led to the pregnancy of Trinidad. When she was
especially it has not been overcome by convincing proof that almost 4 months pregnant, she married Anastacio Mamburao
physical access was impossible between the spouses, and in order to conceal her disgrace, but the two never lived
Jewel was also registered as the legitimate child of the two. The together as husband and wife. 192 days after the marriage,
alleged incident took place in April 1971, yet no criminal charge Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain, whose parents in
was filed until eight years later when the present administrative the birth certificate were Trinidad and Anastacio. When Father
complaint was filed. There is no basis for her fearing the Lumain died, he left a last will and testament acknowledging
deportation of her husband since she herself admitted that she Consolacion as his daughter and making her the sole and
lost contact with him when he learned of the incident the same universal heir of all his properties. After reaching the age of
evening. Tan also continued having dealings with Trocio after majority, Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito Paraguya
the incident, which is far from being the normal reaction of a for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have
woman who has been wronged. That Trocio supported the child inherited from Fr. Lumain. The lower court entitled possession
for several years, which was the reason she desisted from of certain parcels of land to Consolacion but granted ownership
charging him criminally, was also unsubstantiated and it of the others to Paraguya. Dissatisfied, Paraguya appealed to
appears more of a condonation of his conduct. The unusual the CA, alleging that the lower court erred in granting certain
closeness between Jewel and Trocio was also inconclusive to parts of the land to Consolacion and in considering her as the
prove the former’s paternity. natural child of the late Fr. Lumain.
PEOPLE V. TUMIMPAD (1994) Held: Consolacion is the natural child of Fr. Lumain. At the
Sandra Salcedo was a 15-year old mentally-challenged child time Consolacion was conceived, Trinidad was still single.
and the daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto and Pastora Salcedo. She While the child can be presumed to be the legitimate daughter
had the mind of a five-year old who still needed to be fed and of the spouses Trinidad and Anastacio, this can be disputed or
dressed up and whose vocabulary was limited so most of the overcome. Nonetheless, the paternity of Consolacion is
time she expressed herself by motions. The Salcedo family was immaterial in this case, because in the last will and testament
living inside the police camp and they were assigned four of Fr. Lumain, she was not only acknowledged as his natural
security men, including the co-accused Moreno Tumimpad and daughter but she was also designated as his only heir. Since Fr.
Ruel Prieto. In 1989, Sandra complained of constipation and Lumain died without any compulsory heir, Consolacion is
was brought to the hospital, where she was found to be therefore his lawful heir as duly stated in his will.
pregnant for 17 weeks already. In January 1990, Sandra gave
birth to a baby boy named Jacob Salcedo. Consequently, Mrs. CHUA KENG GIAP V. IAC (1988)
Salcedo filed a complaint against Tumimpad and Prieto for the Chua Keng Giap filed a petition for the settlement of the estate
crime of rape against Sandra. During the investigation, Sandra of the late Sy Kao, which was dismissed by the trial court after
positively identified her assailants as Tumimpad and Prieto finding that he is not the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in
three times—first when she picked up their pictures out of 30 a prior case for the settlement of the estate of the former. In this
people, second when she personally pointed to the two in a petition for review, petitioner insists that he is the son and the
police line-up of ten people in the investigation room, and third legitimate heir of the deceased Sy Kao.
when she identified them in open court. A blood grouping and Held: Chua Keng Giap is not the son of Sy Kao. The issue of
phenotyping test was also conducted on Sandra, Jacob, and his filiation has long been settled, and with finality, in the case
the two co-accused. Afterward, the trial court convicted of Sy Kao v. CA where Sy Kao categorically declared that she
Moreno of rape but acquitted Prieto since he has a different was not the petitioner’s mother and that the latter has no right
type of blood with Jacob and thus could not be his father. to settle the estate of Chua Bing Guan. To allow him to pursue
Held: Tumimpad was rightfully convicted for the rape of a trial on the merits would violate the doctrine of res judicata.
Sandra. It was proven that they were not always with Col. There is no better person other than Sy Kao herself to know that
Salcedo and there were instances that they would even play the petitioner was not begotten of her womb.
with Sandra. Hence, it is not physically impossible for the
accused to have access to Sandra. Moreover, Tumimpad’s
culpability was established mainly by the testimonial evidence
given by Sandra and her relatives, notwithstanding the fact that
she positively identified her assailants three times through the
course of the investigation and the trial. Since group blood
testing is inconclusive when it comes to paternity, the blood test
was adduced as evidence only to show that he has the same
blood type as Jacob and may possibly be the father of the child.

152
PROOF OF FILIATION ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT
A parent may admit legitimate filiation in a document duly
HOW TO PROVE FILIATION acknowledged before a notary public, with the proper
formalities, so as to become public and be admissible in suits,
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
or also in a private handwritten document signed by the
any of the following (primary evidence for voluntary recognition)
parent concerned.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
- A typewritten document containing an admission of the
judgment; or
legitimate filiation is not admissible, as the signature therein
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
may be super-imposed and may not be the true signature
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
of the parent.
parent concerned.
- Also, for handwritten documents, the intent to recognize
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
the child must be sufficiently apparent.
filiation shall be proved by (secondary evidence for involuntary
- Baptismal certificate → not proof of filiation; proves only
recognition)
the baptism on the day specified.
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
o It is not proof of the veracity of the statements made
legitimate child; or
therein regarding the relatives or parents of the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
person baptized.
special laws.
o It is presumptive evidence only, and may be
Proof of filiation is necessary: overcome by contrary evidence.
1. Where the child is born after 300 days following the
termination of the marriage → child has no status, and OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS
whoever alleges legitimacy must prove it. The concurrence of facts which indicate the relation of
2. If the legitimacy of a child conceived or born in wedlock filiation between an individual and the family to which he
is impugned and the plaintiff has presented evidence to claims to belong.
prove any of the grounds provided in Article 166 → proof - Examples: bearing the father’s surname, treatment by the
of filiation may be used as a defense. parents and of the family of the child as legitimate, constant
attendance to the child’s support and education and giving
Article 172 provides for two classes of proof: the child the reputation of being the child of his parents.
1) The primary evidence - BASIS → the admission of the parents themselves and the
a) Record of birth concurrence therein of the family and of the society
b) Authentic admission in writing - Continuous → uninterrupted and consistent
2) Secondary evidence, only in the absence of primary o Tolentino: idea of possessory status of some
evidence duration
a) Continuous open possession of the status of a o Sempio-Diy: no required particular length of time
legitimate child o Pangalangan: distinguished from continually which
b) Any other evidence admissible under the Rules allows for interruption as long as it is in a regular
of Court or the law basis; continuously may be translated to “walang
humpay”
RECORD OF BIRTH
The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at OTHER PROOF ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND
the birth, or in default thereof, the declaration of either parent SPECIAL LAWS
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of 1. Baptismal certificate: is a presumptive evidence only,
a birth in the civil register. especially when people often have different names in
- The books making up the civil register and all the their birth certificate and baptismal
documents relating thereto shall be considered public 2. Judicial admission
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the truth 3. Family bible where child’s name is entered: As explained
of the facts therein. by Ma’am Beth, this is given importance because a Bible
- If the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the is presumed to have been there for generations and is
birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or handed down to children. As the family grows, the
doctor or registrar is void. The father’s signature is names of the children are added in the list. This is biased
necessary. to Catholics though.
o Ma’am Beth says that the rule requiring father’s 4. Common reputation respecting pedigree.
signature on the birth certificate to prove 5. Admission by silence
participation is ridiculous since there is no blank or 6. Testimonies of witnesses
provided space for the father to sign. The only 7. Other kinds of proofs admissible under Rule 130 of RRC
chance a father can sign on the birth certificate is if
he is the informant.

153
RULE 130, RULES OF COURT point for the conception of the child, is inconsistent with her
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration response that she could not remember the date of their last
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of sexual intercourse in November 1974, since she only said that
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in she had sexual relations with Ivan in September, October, and
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship November 1974. Her assertion that Ivan is her only boyfriend is
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
also belied by her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
she revealed that her attraction to Ivan was because of his traits
these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also not present in his boyfriend and confided that she left her work
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. after being the subject of gossips following a quarrel with her
boyfriend. Because an order for recognition and support may
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy,
convincing evidence, the absence of such in this case means
in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
that the complaint must be dismissed.
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
Obiter: Amelita is not entitled to damages. Damages could
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree.
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is involuntary and not
mutually desired. In this case, however, Amelita’s attraction to
Section 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood.
to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more Despite learning of his married status, she continued having
than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be sexual intercourse with him in the months of September,
given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
October, and November 1974, which indicates that it was
received as evidence of common reputation.
passion, and not the alleged promise of marriage, that made
Admissible evidence: Amelita submit herself to Ivan.
• Declaration against interest
• Act or declaration about pedigree MENDOZA V. MELLA (1966)
• Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree Paciano Pareja owned a lot in Sorsogon, which he donated to
• Common reputation his son Gavino. In 1943, Gavino disappeared and has not been
• Entries in official records heard of since. At the time of his disappearance, he was living
• Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding with his common-law wife Catalina Mendoza and their son
• Opinion of expert witness Rodolfo, herein petitioners. In 1948, Paciano sold the lot to
Temistocles Mella, who notified the petitioners to vacate the
• Opinion of ordinary witnesses
same. With the notice unheeded, Mella commenced an action
ART. 220, NC. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of on the basis of the deed of sale by Paciano in his favor. The
the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the petitioners, meanwhile, claimed ownership of the land for
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the Rodolfo, on the grounds of succession from his father and by
legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the adverse possession for more than 10 years. The trial and
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for appellate courts ruled in favor of Mella.
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
Held: Rodolfo cannot be considered an acknowledged
CONSTANTINO V. MENDEZ (1992) natural child of Gavino. While his birth certificate contains the
Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment of her names of Gavino and Catalina as his parents, there is no
son Michael, support, and damages against respondent Ivan showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its
Mendez. In her complaint, she alleged that she met Ivan at a contents as required in the Civil Registry Law. Hence, it is
restaurant where she worked as a waitress, and a day after they possible that it was not the two who furnished the data to be
met, they engaged in sexual intercourse after Ivan promised to entered in the civil register. Even if Rodolfo’s birth certificate
marry her. Later on, Ivan revealed that he is actually married, partakes the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
but the two continued having illicit relations in September and recognition of a natural child may be made, Article 131 of the
November 1974, which resulted to the pregnancy of Amelita. old CC requires a clear statement in the document that the
She also averred that she had no sexual relations with any other parent recognizes the child as his or her own. In this case, there
man except Ivan. After the birth of Michael, Amelita amended is no such statement, and therefore the claim of voluntary
her complaint to implead the child. Despite the denial of Ivan recognition has no basis.
that Michael is his illegitimate son, the trial court ruled in favor
of the petitioners and ordered Ivan to recognize Michael as his Obiter: The issue of whether Gavino is to be presumed dead in
own illegitimate child who shall be entitled to all rights as such, 1943 or 1953 was raised for the first time in the SC. Although
and to give him monthly support. On appeal, the CA set aside Article 390 of CC provides that Gavino can only be presumed
the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. dead in 1953 after a lapse of 10 years since his disappearance
for the purpose of succession, it cannot be properly considered.
Held: Amelita has not proven by clear and convincing
evidence that Michael is the illegitimate son of Ivan.
Amelita’s testimony on cross-examination that she had sex with
Ivan in the first or second week of November 1974, the crucial

154
LIM V. CA (1975) HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAÑAS V. HEIRS OF BIBIANO
Felisa Lim filed a suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy BAÑAS (1985)
to nullify the affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to The late Raymundo Bañas was a natural child born out of
himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim, a lot with the wedlock of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. Upon his
house thereon in Manila and to cancel the certificate of title death, his heirs filed a complaint for the partition and recovery
issued in his name and to issue a new one in Felicita’s favor. of their share in the estate of the late Bibiano Bañas, alleging
Both Felisa and Uy claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of that Raymundo was the acknowledged natural son of Bibiano.
each other, the property from Susana. The defendants, heirs of Bibiano, denied that Raymundo was
the natural son of Bibiano. They alleged that Raymundo’s use
To support her claim, Felisa: of the surname Bañas was because of his filiation with Pedro
(1) Presented her certificate of baptism and marriage contract, both
Bañas, Bibiano’s brother. The trial court dismissed the
indicating Susana as her mother
complaint of the petitioners, holding that the evidence they
(2) Alleged continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
presented was insufficient to prove that Raymundo was the
Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana, presenting his: acknowledged natural child of Bibiano, and that it is more likely
(1) application for alien registration which stated that his mother that Raymundo is the son of Pedro and Bibiano supported him
was Susana only out of paternal solicitude.
(2) the order of the Bureau of Immigration describing Uy as a
Filipino citizen by derivation from his mother Susana Held: There was no voluntary recognition in this case. Article
(3) his identification certificate from the same Bureau which 278 of the NCC provides that recognition shall be made in the
describes him as the son of Susana.
record of birth, a will, a statement before the court, or in any
authentic writing.
The lower court declared Felisa as the daughter and only heir
of Susana. Uy appealed to the CA, which then reversed the
Plaintiffs Ruling of the Court
judgment of the lower court and ruled that neither Felisa nor Uy
is entitled to the inheritance because neither of them had been This does not constitute a sufficient
recognized by Susana as her child and neither of them had proof of a valid voluntary recognition.
been declared in a judicial proceeding as her child. Hence, The recognition of natural children must
these petitions filed by Felisa and Guadalupe Enriquez Uy, wife be precise, express, and solemn. “Su
Handwritten note
of Uy, to review the decision of the CA. padre” is not an indubitable
allegedly written
acknowledgment of paternity but a
Held: Felisa is not entitled to the inheritance. Section 131 of by Bibiano to
mere indication of paternal solicitude of
Raymundo with
CC requires that the recognition of a natural child be made in Bibiano for his nephew. Therefore, the
a complimentary
the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document. intent to recognize is not apparent.
ending of “su
Public documents are defined by Article 1216 of CC as those padre”
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with Incidental acknowledgment does not
formalities required by law. Thus, there are two classes of public apply. This rule applies only to a public
documents—those executed by private individuals which must document, where a father would likely
be more careful about what he says.
be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The marriage contract
These do not confirm Bibiano’s
presented by Felisa does not satisfy the requirements of
intention to recognize Raymundo.
solemnity prescribed by Article 131 of the old CC because it is
School records are prepared by the
not a written act executed before and certified by a notary. The School records, school authorities. To prove filiation,
marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting report cards, and the authentic writing must be written by
parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage school receipts the putative father himself. The records
and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as for matriculation are bereft of evidence that Bibiano
husband and wife, signed by the contracting parties and the all signed and furnished the statements therein and
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the paid by Bibiano that he participated in securing the
marriage. It does not possess the requisite of precise, express, enrollment of Raymundo. The signature
and solemn recognition required in a public document. of Bibiano in Raymundo’s report cards
could merely indicate his guardianship.
Uy is also not entitled to inherit from Susana. The title is in
the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome That such documents were
Typewritten
the fact that the sale was made to Susana Lim and title issued discovered only after Raymundo’s
letters to Atty.
in her favor. Guadalupe claims that an implied trust exists in death defies belief. These could not
Faustino alleging
favor of her husband, which arises where a person purchases have been written without the
his personal
land with his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the knowledge of Trinidad since it is only
circumstance, as
natural for a husband to share his
name of another. Guadalupe raised the theory of implied trust well as
sentiments with his wife. The conflicting
in favor of her husband for the first time in her motion for typewritten
testimonies of Trinidad indicates that
reconsideration filed with the appellate court and the evidence autobiography
she already knew of such documents
regarding the purchase by her husband is altogether asserting that his
long before Raymundo’s death, which
unconvincing. father is Bibiano
casts doubts as to their authenticity.

155
Defendants Ruling of the Court RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
A public instrument explicitly ART. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
A sworn affidavit duly
stating Pedro is the father of (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in
notarized and executed
Raymundo is strong evidence conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
by Bibiano declaring
that Bibiano does not Surnames;
that Raymundo is his
acknowledge or intend to
brother’s son (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants,
recognize Raymundo as his son.
and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
If Raymundo really believed that conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support;
A sworn JOINT affidavit (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional
he is the son of Bibiano he
duly notarized and rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
could not have consented to
executed by Raymundo
executing such declaration;
and Pedro correcting 3S → support, surname, succession
Trinidad’s claim about the
an error made on the
document was groundless since • The right to use the surnames of the parents never
marriage certificate of
they were not given a lot after prescribed by non-use.
the former
executing the document. o It is not an exclusive right and does not create a
monopoly in favor of the persons entitled to it.
o The child’s use of his/her father’ surname
Raymundo should and could have filed an action for indicates the family to which he/she belongs.
compulsory recognition during Bibiano’s lifetime, alleging Hence, it is mandatory for the child to do so.
continuous possession of the status of a natural child by direct o Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to
acts of Bibiano or his family. His failure to do so militates against adopt the surname of a person who is not their
his heirs’ complaint. Under Article 285 of the NCC, after the father.
death of Bibiano, Raymundo was precluded from filing an • The rights of legitimate children cannot be renounced.
action for compulsory recognition against the heirs of Bibiano. o The right to support cannot be renounced in
His heirs cannot invoke the same right because it is not advance, as it would be against public policy to
transmissible to the natural child’s heirs—the right to file an allow a person to commit suicide.
action for compulsory recognition is purely a personal one to o Article 905 of CC nullifies every renunciation or
the natural child. Thus, the evidence presented by the heirs of compromise as regards future legitime.
Raymundo does not constitute a sufficient act of voluntary o Article 1347 of CC prohibits contracts with
recognition, but may be a ground for compulsory recognition. respect to future inheritance.
However, since such the right to compel acknowledgment
solely belongs to the natural child and cannot be transferred REPUBLIC V. CA AND VICENCIO (1998)
and exercised by his heirs, the plaintiffs have no personality to Cynthia Vicencio was born to the spouses Pablo Vicencio and
file such action, and therefore their complaint is totally baseless. Fe Leabres. After a fight, Pablo left the conjugal home and has
since never reappeared nor sent support to his family. During
that time, it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe and
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY Cynthia. Fe was allowed to dissolve their conjugal partnership
and to remove the surname of her husband from her name, an
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
after Pablo was declared an absentee, she married Ernesto.
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
Since her childhood, Cynthia had known Ernesto to be her
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
father; but despite this, she continued using the surname
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
“Vicencio” in her school and other activities therein. Because of
years within which to institute the action.
this, confusion arose as to her parentage, which subjected her
The legitimacy of a child which is controversial, or being denied, to inquiries from people, causing her extreme embarrassment.
can only be resolved in a direct action brought by the proper Nonetheless, when she entered two beauty pageants before,
she used the surname “Yu,” and when Cynthia petitioned for a
parties and within the period limited by law.
change in surname, Ernesto openly declared his consent. The
• In such action, the proofs provided in Article 172 may be
trial court ruled in favor of Cynthia, holding that there is no valid
used to establish the legitimacy.
cause for denying her petition and that Ernesto’s failure to
• The action of a child to claim legitimacy does not
adopt her does not disallow Cynthia from legally changing her
prescribe as long as he lives. Neither can it be
name. This was affirmed by the CA, which held that it is for the
renounced.
best interest of Cynthia that her surname be changed since she
• While the action is imprescriptible for the child, the heirs
is suffering from embarrassment and inferiority complex due to
may only institute an action within five years upon
the confusion in her surname. The OSG opposed, saying that
transmission of the right if:
there was no valid, proper, and reasonable cause to grant her
1. The child dies during minority
request. Instead, it would generate problems especially with
2. The child dies in a state of insanity
regards to inheritance since her status will be affected. They
• The effect of legitimacy claim extends the successional
assert that Ernesto’s failure to adopt her means that he has no
rights.
intention of making Cynthia as an heir.

156
Held: Cynthia cannot change her surname to Yu. There is no ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION
proper and reasonable cause to allow the change in her
surname. Cynthia is the legitimate child of Fe and Pablo KINDS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Vicencio, and thus, she shall principally use the surname of her In general, all children born of parents who are not united by a
father. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, valid marriage are illegitimate. Under the CC, they were
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must classified into three main groups.
consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and 1) Natural children → those born of parents, who, at the time
to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. While of their conception, could have validly married; only the
uncertainty might arise as to Cynthia’s parentage due to her use marriage of their parents is wanting to make them
of the surname Vicencio, more confusion with grave legal legitimate
consequences could result if she is allowed to bear her
2) Natural children by legal fiction → those who are not
stepfather’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.
natural children but are considered as acknowledged
For example, it could impinge on the legitimes and successional
natural children by express provision of the law; they were
rights of Ernesto’s legitimate children with Fe.
generally those born of void marriages
DE ASIS V. CA (1999) 3) Other illegitimate children → spurious children
Vircel Andres, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor a. Adulterous – those born of a married person with one
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance who is not the spouse
and support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the latter is b. Incestuous – those born of unmarried persons who
the father of Glen and that he refused or failed to provide for the cannot marry each other because of relations by blood
maintenance of their child, despite her repeated demands. c. Sacrilegious – those born of persons who by reason of
Manuel denied his paternity of Glen and argued that he cannot religious profession are disqualified to marry
be required to provide support for him. After Vircel agreed to i. No disqualification to marry on the ground of
compromise if Manuel withdraws his counterclaim, the case religious profession → no sacrilegious children.
was dismissed. Six years later, Vircel filed another complaint for
d. Manceres – those born of prostitutes
maintenance and support against Manuel. Manuel moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging i. No law which classifies them as illegitimate by the
that the action is barred by the prior dismissal of the case. The mere fact of having mothers who are prostitutes.
trial court denied his motion to dismiss, ruling that res judicata
The FC has abolished all distinction between illegitimate
is inapplicable in an action for support since waiver of future
children. All children conceived and born outside a valid
support is prohibited by law. The CA affirmed this decision.
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
Held: The action for support may still prosper. Article 301 of legitimate status. But an informal difference still exists between
CC provides that the right to receive support can neither be two groups:
renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Likewise, future (1) Those conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents
support cannot be the subject of a compromise, pursuant to who at the time of conception of the children were not
Article 2035 of CC. The reason behind this prohibition is disqualified by any impediment to marry each other →
because the right to support is founded upon the need of the can be legitimated
recipient to maintain his existence, and thus the renunciation of (2) All other illegitimate children → cannot be legitimated
such will be tantamount to allowing the suicide of the person or
his conversion to a public burden, which is contrary to public
PROOF OF FILIATION
policy. Moreover, paternity and filiation is a relationship that
must be judicially established and cannot be left to the will of ART. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid
the parties. Hence, although Vircel seemingly admitted the non- marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
paternity of Manuel when she dismissed her complaint, such an Code.
admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively
establish the lack of filiation. Since the agreement entered into The FC has abolished the classification of illegitimate children
by Manuel and Vircel for the dismissal of the complaint for into natural children, natural children by legal fiction, and other
maintenance and support is in the nature of a compromise, it illegitimate children. Now they all belong to only one class:
cannot be countenanced and therefore it cannot bar the second illegitimate children.
action for support.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children (Art. 172).
The action must be brought within the same period specified

in Article 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be extinguished by
death of either parties), except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

157
The same kind of evidence provided in Article 172 for Respondent: Felicitas should be allowed by:
establishing legitimate filiation may be used to prove the
filiation of illegitimate children, and the action for this purpose Art 283(4), CC: The father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
must be brought within the same period and by the same
defendant is his father
parties as provided in Article 173.
• If the evidence to prove the filiation is secondary, the Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A witness can testify
action must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which
parent. are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
o The supposed parent is given the chance to these rules.
dispute personally the evidence of the paternity
Held: Felicitas’ testimony may be admitted. The prohibition
attributed to him.
in Article 280 of CC against the identification of the father or
o An illegitimate child should be allowed that status
mother of a child applied only in voluntary and not in
if the evidence presented satisfies the court.
compulsory recognition. The action filed by Clarito was brought
Why must the action be brought during the lifetime of the under Article 283 of CC, which added new grounds for filing an
putative parent in Par. 2? Since there might still be a question action for recognition, such as when the child has in his favor
as to whether the child is really the illegitimate child of the any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. It is also
alleged parent or not, the latter must be given an opportunity to worth noting that the prohibition in Article 280 of CC has not
contest the action, and this he or she can only do if the action been replicated in the FC, which indicates the intent of the
is filed during his or her lifetime. Congress to liberalize the investigation of the paternity of
illegitimate children. Finally, the FC, under Article 175, now
Ma’am Beth asks: “How would illegitimate children know they allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way
are illegitimate if they have always been living with the family? and on the same evidence as illegitimate children, including the
The only time they’d learn they do are not entitled to their rule that filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that
parent’s estate is when they die. Only Sempio-Diy knows that the defendant is his father.
rule, mortals don’t!”
ARUEGO, JR. V. CA (1996)
COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
Minors Antonia and Evelyn Aruego, represented by their mother
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions in
Luz Fabian, filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and
the prescription for recognition of natural children, FC removed
enforcement of successional rights against Jose Aruego Jr. and
this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v. CA)
the five minor children of the deceased Gloria Torres,
1. If the father or the mother died during the minority of the
represented by their father Justo Torres Jr. The complaint avers
child → the latter may file the action before the expiration
that the late Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with
of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Luz, which resulted in the birth of Antonia and Evelyn. The
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a
plaintiffs prayed for their compulsory recognition as the
document should appear of which nothing had been
illegitimate children of Aruego Sr. and their acknowledgement
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
as his compulsory heirs, and for their shares in his estate to be
child → the action must be commenced within 4 years
delivered to them. The main basis of their action is their alleged
from the finding of the document.
open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate
How to bring action to claim filiation children due to the overt acts of Aruego Sr., including:
1. File a separate action
(a) Regular support and educational expenses
2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of his/her alleged
(b) Allowance to use his surname
parent (c) Payment of maternal bills
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein
RODRIGUEZ V. CA (1995) (e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores
Clarito Agbulos filed an action for compulsory recognition and (f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs
support against his putative father, Bienvenido Rodriguez. (g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then
During the trial, Clarito presented his mother, Felicitas, as first (h) Introducing them as his children to family friends
witness, who was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of
The trial court ruled that only Antonia is the illegitimate daughter
Clarito’s father. This was seasonably objected by the counsel
of Aruego Sr., and ordered petitioners to recognize her as such
of Rodriguez. On petition to the CA, the court allowed Felicitas
and deliver her share in the estate. Petitioners moved for
to testify regarding Clarito’s putative father.
reconsideration, alleging loss of jurisdiction by the trial court
Petitioner: Felicitas should not be allowed to reveal the name after the passage of the Family Code. Upon denial, they
of the father as stated in Art. 280 of CC: appealed to the CA, but were also dismissed. In the present
petition, petitioners claim that the trial court lost jurisdiction
When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or over the complaint of Antonia on the ground of prescription,
she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had considering that under Article 175(2) of FC, an action for
the child; neither shall she state any circumstance whereby the other compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation based on the
party may be identified.
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

158
Held: Monina was able to establish through evidence that
she is the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. She enjoyed
Held: The provisions of CC apply in this case. The action open and continuous possession of the status of a child of
brought by Antonia for compulsory recognition and Francisco through overwhelming evidence.
enforcement of successional right was filed prior to the
effectivity of the FC, and thus, it must be governed by Article Evidence Ruling of Court
285 of CC and not by Article 175(2) of FC. This was broad enough to cover the
Francisco fourth quarter of 1945, which means that
The application of FC will prejudice the vested right of
had sex with Monina’s birth in August 1946 could still be
Antonia to have her case decided under Article 285 of CC. Esperanza attributed to sexual relations between
This right was vested to her when she filed her action under the “by the end Francisco and Esperanza. Sexual contact
regime of the Civil Code. “Vested rights” was not defined by the of 1945” is not impossible because she was still
FC, leaving it to the courts to determine what it means on a employed under him at that time.
case-to-case basis.
The testimonial evidence of Monina
The action was not yet barred. Even if it was brought when coupled with the testimonies of her
Aruego Sr. was already deceased, since Antonia was then still witnesses clearly establish that Francisco
a minor when it was filed it would be an exception the general Testimonial is Monina’s father and she was conceived
rule under Article 285 of CC. Therefore, the trial court never lost evidence at the time when her mother was in his
employ; that Francisco recognized
jurisdiction over the complaint despite the passage of the FC.
Monina as his child through his overt acts
and conducts, openly and continuously.
JISON V. CA (1998)
Monina Jison filed a complaint for recognition as an illegitimate These are not competent evidence of his
child against her putative father, Francisco Jison. Monina paternity absent proof of Francisco’s
alleged that Francisco impregnated Esperanza Amolar, which participation in their preparation. Since
resulted to the birth of Monina in August 1946. She claimed that Francisco did not sign the said documents,
since childhood, she enjoyed the continuous, implied Monina’s they cannot prove voluntary
recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and certificate of acknowledgment on his part. The Civil
that of his family. Francisco denied his paternity and argued that live birth, Registrar is also devoid of authority to
baptismal record the paternity of an illegitimate child
he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza during
certificate, upon the information of a third person.
that period because she had ceased to be in his employ as early
and school
as 1944. He also asserted that he never recognized Monina, Neither may these documents be taken
records
expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. as circumstantial evidence to prove
Monina’s filiation. Since they are per se
The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was also
inadmissible in evidence as proof of such
possible for Esperanza to copulate with the other domestic filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly.
helpers. The birth and baptismal certificates of Monina cannot
be attached with probative value, considering the misspellings
The contents of these documents are
therein. Likewise, Monina’s testimonial evidence to prove her Various notes inadmissible on two grounds:
open and continuous possession of status of Francisco’s child and letters (1) There is no showing that their authors
fall under the categories of hearsay, incredulous, and self- written by were dead or unable to testify
serving evidence. Lastly, Monina was barred by estoppel by Francisco’s (2) These are private documents, not
deed because of the affidavit she signed stating that she is not relatives family possessions (openly exhibited
the daughter of Francisco. On appeal, the CA reversed, finding and well known to the family)
that Monina established her illegitimate filiation not only by
preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record that she Monina at first did not agree to sign the
continuously enjoyed the status of illegitimate child of Francisco affidavit which contained false statements,
by the direct acts of her father and his relatives. but signed it only because Francisco
explained to her that it was to keep the
Monina’s 197
Evidence of Monina’s filiation according to CA: peace of his wife. If Monina were not his
affidavit,
(1) Francisco sent Monina to school by paying for her tuition fees, illegitimate daughter, it would be
where she
school uniforms, books, board, and lodging unnecessary for Francisco to secure
attests that
(2) Defraying Monina’s hospitalization expenses Monina’s statement at the cost of P15,000.
Francisco is
(3) Providing for her monthly allowance of P15.00 Besides, Monina had resigned from Miller
not her father
(4) Paying for the funeral expenses of Esperanza, Monina’s mother & Cruz 5 months before the affidavit was
(5) Acknowledging her by calling her “Hija” executed, which negates Francisco’s
(6) Recommending her employment at Miller & Cruz Co. theory of the need to quash the rumors
(7) Allowing Monina to use his house in Bacolod circulating in the office about her father.
(8) Allowing Monina to use his surname in her scholastic records
(9) Francisco’s relatives acknowledged and treated Monina as their
relative and Francisco’s daughter
(10) Monina’s birth and baptismal certificates serve as
circumstantial evidence to reinforce her claim

159
ALBERTO V. CA (1994) The CA reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that
Petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to the petitioner was not able to prove her continuous possession
Aurora Revina with Juan Alberto as her alleged father. After of the status of a natural child of Juan. It noted Ma. Theresa’s
Juan died intestate, his widow, Yolanda, was appointed as the letter to Jose Tablizo where she wrote of how proud she is of
administratrix of the estate. Upon approval of the settlement of her dad and how she only knew him as a big man. She said that
the estate, the court ordered the proceedings to be terminated. she envied his friends like Tablizo who knew him well. CA claims
However, petitioner Ma. Theresa filed a motion to re-open the that the letter gave the impression that Juan distanced himself
proceedings, alleging that she is the natural child of Juan and from her Ma. Theresa.
as such she is entitled to share in the estate of her father. The
lower court was convinced that Ma. Theresa had been in Held: Ma. Theresa is the natural daughter of Juan.
continuous possession of the status of a natural child and
Evidence Ruling of the Court
ordered Juan’s heirs to recognize her as a natural daughter and
to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. These do not prove that Juan refused
Aurora’s to recognize Ma. Theresa. All that the
Proof of her filiation according to the probate court: letters to Juan letters stated was that Aurora was having
(1) Juan and Aurora were sweethearts prior to his marriage to and Fr. Arcilla; a difficult time raising Ma. Theresa on her
Yolanda → Aurora conceived and gave birth to Ma. Theresa Zenaida own, so she sought the assistance of
(2) Ma. Theresa used ‘Alberto’ as her surname in all her school Reniva’s letter Juan. The letter indicated that Juan gave
records and Juan was known to be her father
to Juan her 300 pesos for support; hence he was
(3) Money was given to Aurora through Fr. Arcilla, 1st cousin of Juan
not completely indifferent towards her.
(4) When Ma. Theresa was about 9 years old, Aurita Solidum, the
youngest sister of Juan, arranged their first meeting where they Ma. Theresa’s Juan never stopped her from using his
talked and Juan gave her P500 and two telephone numbers
surname surname, “Alberto.”
(5) Juan would have visited her in her school, International School,
during her birthday, if not for his untimely death
(6) When Ma. Theresa and her mother went to the PGH after Juan’s
This testimony of Tablizo established
death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to Showing of Juan’s recognition of Ma. Theresa as
make way for her as she was a daughter of Juan report card to his daughter. It falls within the
(7) After the wake for Juan, his stepmother, Saturnina, introduced Tablizo exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sec.
Ma. Theresa as Joy Alberto’s sister 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
(8) The siblings of Juan regarded Ma. Theresa as their niece and
introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter of Juan Ma. Theresa is recognized by Juan’s
(9) The children of Juan’s siblings regard her as their cousin family, including Fr. Arcilla, Jose Alberto,
(10) Ma. Theresa was known by Juan’s friends as his daughter Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto,
(11) Aurora testified that: Recognition by
among others, as his natural daughter.
a) Ma. Theresa was born out of an indiscretion with Juan the relatives of
Yolanda could have presented any of
b) Mrs. Solidum arranged the meeting between Ma. Theresa Juan
these relatives to negate Ma. Theresa’s
and Juan claims but she failed to do so, because
c) Juan had been sending her money from time to time doing so would be contrary to her cause.
(12) Ma. Theresa testified that:
a) Her father gave her P500 and two telephone numbers
Ma. Theresa’s
where he could be conducted during their first meeting Her letter merely expresses her desire to
letter to Jose
b) Her father gave her money whenever she met him establish parental links with her father.
Tablizo
c) Juan visited her two times at her school whose rules on
visitors were strict; the secretary of the principal also told
her that her father was waiting for her, which means that Thus, there is evidence to conclude that Juan did not try to
he identified himself to the personnel as her father conceal his paternity. Since Ma. Theresa is a very talented
d) He promised to see her in school during her birthday and child, it was expected for him to proudly step forward and claim
to bring her to Catanduanes but was not able to do so
his paternity. Moreover, despite the traditional norms at the time
because of his death
and his social and political position, Juan openly visited Ma.
e) Her uncles and aunts regarded her as their niece and
introduced her to others as Juan’s eldest daughter Theresa in school, met with her and gave her money, and
(13) Jose Tablizo testified that: introduced her proudly to his friends. Taken altogether, the
a) There was a strong physical resemblance between Juan evidence shows that her filiation would be hard to disprove.
and Ma. Theresa
b) Juan and Ma. Theresa wrote similarly Her action was also not yet barred by prescription. Under
c) It was known among Juan’s friends, the Breeze Gang, that Article 285 of CC, an action for the recognition of natural
she is his daughter children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
d) Juan showed him the report card of Ma. Theresa and presumed parents, unless the father or mother died during the
boasted of her high grades minority of the child, in which case it may be brought within four
(14) Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of Immigration
years from the attainment of majority of the child. Ma. Theresa’s
Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for Juan, made an appointment with
him for a conference where Reyes said that Juan was not
case falls under this exception, as she was only fourteen when
denying his paternity to Ma. Theresa, and that he was quietly Juan died. Therefore, she had until Sept. 18, 1978, her 25th
supporting his daughter because of his public position. birthday, to file the action, which she seasonably did on Sept.
15, 1978—three days before the expiration of the 4-year period.

160
GUY V. CA (2006) LUCAS V. LUCAS (2011)
Minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their Petitioner Jesse Lucas filed a petition to establish illegitimate
mother Remedios, filed a petition for letters of administration, filiation, with a motion for the submission of parties to DNA
alleging that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate testing, against his putative father, respondent Jesus Lucas. He
children of the late Sima Wei. The deceased died intestate, narrated that his mother, Elsie Uy, used to work in a nightspot
leaving an estate valued at P10-million consisting of real and in Manila where she met the respondent. Eventually, the two
personal properties to his known heirs, his surviving spouse became intimate, which led to the pregnancy of Elsie and the
Shirley Guy and their five children. Private respondents prayed birth of Jesse. The name of Jesse’s father was not stated in his
for the appointment of a regular administrator of Sima Wei’s birth certificate, but Elsie later told him that his father is Jesus.
estate, and in the meantime, for petitioner Michael Guy, his son, Jesse alleged that Jesus extended financial support to him and
to be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Michael his mother for about two years, which stopped when the
moved for the dismissal of the petition, claiming that his father relationship between Elsie and respondent ended and she
left no debts so his estate can be settled without the letters of decided to raise Jesse on her own. Nonetheless, while Jesse
administration, and that the private respondents should have was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce him
established their status as illegitimate children during the to Jesus, but all attempts were in vain.
lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of FC. In a
supplemental motion to dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs Attached to Jesse’s petition were the following:
(1) His birth and baptismal certificates
alleged that the claim of the respondents to the estate was
(2) His college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
waived by Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, stating that
Louis University in Baguio with a degree in Psychology, along
in exchange for financial and educational assistance from with his Certificate of Graduation from the same school
Michael, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate (3) His Certificate of Recognition from the UP College of Music
of Sima Wei from all liabilities. The RTC denied both motions, (4) Clippings of several articles from different newspapers about
ruling that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed Jesse as a musical prodigy
by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the
guardian of her minor daughters and thus no renunciation of After the RTC ordered for the hearing of the case, respondent
right occurred. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. filed a motion for reconsideration, averring that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him
Held: The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar them as Jesse’s father.
from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective,
a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which The RTC dismissed the case, holding that, based on the case
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to renounce the of Herrera, there are four procedural aspects of a traditional
right which legally pertains to him. In this case, there was no action for paternity which the parties have to face: (1) a prima
waiver of rights because the document did not specifically facie case, (2) affirmative defenses, (3) presumption of
mention the respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima legitimacy, and (4) physical resemblance between the putative
Wei. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary father and the child. Jesse must first establish these four
rights of Karen and Kamille, such waiver will not bar their claim procedural aspects before he can present evidence on paternity
because under Article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may and filiation, including DNA test results. Upon motion for
not repudiate the inheritance of their children or words without reconsideration, the RTC set aside its previous order and set
judicial approval, because such repudiation amounts to an the hearing for the case. It dismissed the respondent’s
alienation of property which could endanger the children’s arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test,
interests. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and noting that the new Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct
Waiver of Claim is void. And finally, waiver is the intentional of DNA testing.
relinquishment of a known right—in this case, since the minors
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
were yet to prove their status, they do not have successional
dismissed the complaint, holding that the petitioner failed to
rights yet, and thus there would still be nothing to waive.
follow the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
A ruling on the issue of prescription would be premature, paternity action, and thus, a DNA testing should not be allowed
considering that private respondents have yet to present for failure to establish a prima facie case. It held that the Rule
evidence. The resolution of the issue of prescription depends on DNA Evidence was not intended to trample on the
on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents substantive rights of the parties and to promote harassment.
in proving their filiation, and since no evidence has been
Held: The CA misapplied the Herrera ruling in this case.
received yet, this matter may only be resolved by the RTC after
These procedural aspects are matters of evidence that cannot
a full-blown trial.
be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only
Note: While the original action filed by private respondents was the petition to establish filiation has been filed. A prima facie
a petition for letters of administration, the RTC is not precluded case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegation in
from receiving evidence on their filiation because it is a matter the initiatory pleading. Thus, it is premature to discuss whether
collateral to the exercise of its powers in settling the estate. a DNA testing is warranted, considering that no evidence has
been presented yet by the petitioner. There is a need to
supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in

161
resolving motions for DNA testing order, especially in paternity their open and continuous possession of the status of
and filiation cases. illegitimate children, the problem of Graciano is that his action
is now barred. Under Article 175(2), actions based on Article
The petitioner must present prima facie proof of paternity 173(2) may be brought only during the lifetime of the alleged
before a DNA test can be ordered. In some states, to warrant parent. Hence, despite having established prima facie proof of
a DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing his alleged filiation, since Apolinario is already dead and can no
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to longer be heard in court, Graciano cannot introduce evidence
establish a prima facie case of paternity or good cause for the to prove his illegitimate filiation. Indeed, Graciano’s complaint
holding of the test. As the SC of Louisiana explained, although is a circumvention of Article 172, since the issues of filiation are
a paternity action is civil, the constitutional prohibition against only collateral to the action for partition.
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of justification or reasonable possibility of Sempio-Diy: Unlike legitimate children, illegitimate children are
paternity must be made before a court may order a compulsory usually begotten and raised in secrecy. Who then can be sure
blood test. The same condition should be applied in our of their filiation but the parents themselves? The putative parent
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment should be allowed to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, which is
suits. Nonetheless, the issuance of a DNA testing order is impossible if the parent is already dead.
ultimately a discretion of the court.
ACEBEDO V. ARQUERO (2003)
UYGUANGCO V. CA (1989) Edwin Acebedo filed a complaint against Eddie Arquero,
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate, leaving considerable Process Server of the MTC, for immorality. He alleged that his
properties. His wife Dorotea and their four legitimate children, wife, Dedje, and Eddie scandalously cohabited as husband and
herein petitioners, divided among themselves the estate. wife, which resulted to the birth of Desiree May Arquero.
Graciano, claiming to be an illegitimate son of Apolinario and Attached to the complaint were (1) Desiree’s baptismal
having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, certificate reflecting the names of Dedje and Edwin as her
filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners. He alleged parents, and (2) a copy of the marriage certificate of Edwin and
that he was born to Apolinario and Anastacia Bacjao and that Dedje. Eddie denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is
at the age of 15 he moved to his father’s hometown at the merely harassment and a product of Edwin’s extreme jealousy
urging of Apolinario and Dorotea. There, he received support of his wife. He averred that a prior criminal complaint for
from his father while he was studying and was also assigned by adultery was also instituted by Edwin, which was dismissed
his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as after preliminary investigation. Finally, he also alleged that
storekeeper at the Uyguangco store. The petitioners moved for Edwin himself had been cohabiting with another woman. Upon
the dismissal of the case when Graciano admitted that he had investigation, the RTC Judge recommended that the complaint
none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 of CC to prove be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show
his illegitimate filiation to Apolinario. They also averred that he the guilt of Eddie. On referral, the OCA disagreed with the
could not resort to Article 285 because he was already an adult recommendation of the investigating judge and proffered that
when Apolinario died, thus his claim does not fall under the Eddie be held guilty of immorality and be suspended from office
exceptions. To the petitioners, the action for partition is a way for one year without pay. The OCA found that Eddie and Dedje
to circumvent the provisions of Article 285. Meanwhile, engaged in sexual relations for eight to nine months, which the
Graciano asserted that he has a right to show that he is in former justified based on the Kasunduan entered into by Edwin
continuous possession of the status of a child of Apolinario by and his wife consenting to and giving freedom to either of them
the direct acts of the latter or his family. The trial court ruled that to seek any partner and live with him or her.
he could, which was sustained by the CA.
Held: Edwin is guilty of immorality. By his own admission,
Evidence presented by Graciano: Eddie admitted having illicit relations with Dedje for 8 to 9
(1) Lived with his father from 1967 to 1973, receiving support from months, which he justified on the basis of the prior settlement
him during that time of the spouses of their marriage in their Kasunduan. As an
(2) He has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to know that the
from his father and the petitioners, as shown in: Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of
(a) His high school diploma the marriage between Edwin and Dedje because under Article
(b) A special power of attorney executed in his favor by 1 of FC, marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
Dorotea, and another by Sulpicio Uyguangco
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
(3) He has shared in the profits of the copra business of the
subject to stipulation. Therefore, respondent’s adulterous acts
Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business
with Dedje is a disgraceful and immoral conduct under the
(4) He was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and
Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation Administrative Code of 1987. Since the present charge of
(5) In the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement by the immorality is his first offense, Eddie was ordered to be
petitioners, he was given a share in Apolinario’s estate suspended for 6 months and 1 day without pay.
Held: Graciano can no longer be allowed to introduce

evidence to prove his illegitimate filiation. While illegitimate
children may now establish their claimed filiation by proving

162
ARA AND GARCIA V. PIZARRO (2017) putative parent must only do so via a record of birth appearing
Petitioners Romeo Ara and William Garcia, and respondents in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
Dra. Fely Pizarro and Henry Rossi, all claimed to be the children legitimate filiation. In this case, none of the evidence presented
of the late Josefa Ara. Petitioners assert that Fely was born to by the petitioners constitute evidence under Article 172(1) to
Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during prove their illegitimate filiation to Josefa. While William was able
WW2. Towards the end of the war, Josefa lived with an to present a Certificate of Live Birth in 2003 through late
American soldier named Darwin Gray, which resulted to the registration, a delayed registration of birth, made after the death
birth of Romeo Ara. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia, of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation. As to
and the two begot Ramon and William Garcia. After Alfredo illegitimate children, the law provides that their birth certificate
passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named Frank shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi. Fely claims that she or only by the mother, if the father refuses, to ensure that
is the only child of Josefa, while William is recorded as the son individuals are not falsely named as parents. Hence, the Local
of Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a birth Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the filiation of
certificate; and Romeo is recorded as the son of Jose Ara and an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person, and
Maria Flores, as evidenced by his certificate of live birth. the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only
by the mother, for instance, is incompetent evidence of
Petitioners submitted the following to establish their filiation: paternity of the said child.
(1) William’s Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as his mother
(2) William’s Certificate of Marriage listing Josefa as his mother Nonetheless, even without a record of birth or a final judgment,
(3) A picture of William’s wedding, with Josefa and other relatives filiation may still be established after the death of the putative
(4) Certificate of Marriage showing that Alfredo and Josefa were
parent through an admission of filiation in a public document or
married in 1952
(5) William’s Certificate of Live Birth issued in 2003, which is a late
a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
registration of his birth, showing he was born in 1951 to Alfredo concerned. However, petitioners did not present such. Instead,
and Josefa the evidence they presented, such as group pictures with
(6) A group picture of all the parties in the present case Josefa and testimonies, do not show that Josefa is their mother.
(7) Rossi’s comment that William and Romeo are half-brothers of They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions
Henry, their mother being Josefa, who did not register them as attributable directly to Josefa and her filiation to the petitioners,
her children for fear of losing her pension from the US Veterans absent any showing that Josefa participated in making any of
Office
them. Therefore, none of the evidence presented constitute an
(8) Romeo testified that he was the son of Josefa and Gray, and
that his record of birth was registered at Camp Murphy, QC
admission of filiation under Article 172 of FC.
(9) Nelly Alipio, first degree cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was
By virtue of their birth certificates, the petitioners are also
a son of Josefa and Gray
properly determined by the CA not to be Josefa’s children.
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Henry The certificates of live birth submitted by Fely belonging to
(collectively, plaintiffs a quo), verbally sought the partition of the petitioners William and Romeo name Carmen Bugarin and
properties left by Josefa, which were in the possession of Fely, Maria Flores as their respective mothers, and thus, Josefa could
including (1) a lot and other improvements thereon in Bukidnon, not be their mother. And despite the difference in the actual
(2) a Tamaraw FX, and (3) an RCBC Passbook in the amount of birth date of William and the one indicated in the birth
P108,000 bank deposit. After the parties were unable to reach certificate, to the effect that the petitioners claim that the birth
an amicable settlement at the barangay, the plaintiffs a quo filed certificate is of a different person, this is a matter of
a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties. At the appreciation of evidence which cannot be subject of inquiry in
pretrial, Romeo, William, and Ramon claimed a property of a petition for review to the Court.
Henry in Baguio as part of the estate of Josefa, which was not
alleged nor claimed in the original complaint. This compelled
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Henry to have a separate counsel. After the trial, the RTC
awarded the Baguio property to Henry; the Bukidnon property, ART. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
the Tamaraw FX, and the RCBC Passbook to Fely; and other shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
properties not covered by the foregoing to the plaintiffs and Fely shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
as co-owners with equal shares. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
On appeal, the CA held that only Fely and Henry, as well as
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
Ramon, were the children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares
or when an admission in a public document or private
in her estate. Fely and Ramon are each entitled to one share,
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
while Henry, as the illegitimate child of Josefa, is entitled to ½
father has the right to institute an action before the regular
of the share of a legitimate child. The CA found that the RTC
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
erred in allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
sons of Josefa after her death under Article 172(2) of FC.
legitime of a legitimate child (as amended by RA No. 9255 in
Held: The petitioners can no longer prove their filiation to 2004).
Josefa. Pursuant to Articles 172 and 173 of FC, a person who
seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a

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Comparison of CC, FC, and RA 9255 child since at the time of his conception, his father was married
• In CC → recognition of the father was required before to another woman. As such, under Article 176 of FC, the child
illegitimate child can use his surname. is under the parental authority of his mother, Daisie, who is
• In FC → regardless of recognition, illegitimate child shall entitled to have custody of him. Since she has been deprived of
use mother’s surname. her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to the
• RA 9255 → reverts to the CC rule which allows illegitimate issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Besides, since
children to use father’s surname subject to the father’s Christopher J. is only 6 years old when he was separated from
recognition. his mother, his custody should be given to Daisie pursuant to
o RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla Sr. Article 213 of FC, not to mention the fact that Christopher J. has
who is known for having at least 85 children of legal also categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
age. (the number does not include minor children.)
o The problem with this law is that it takes out of the Moreover, the fact that Villar is well-off should neither be a
picture the role of women. reason to deprive Daisie of the custody of her children. She
is earning a decent living as a market vendor and a secretary at
The law recognizes the rights of illegitimate children as it does a company and is able to support her children according to her
those of legitimate children to the surname of the parent, means. That she receives help from her parents and sister for
support, and inheritance. the support of her children is not a point against her. It is only
• The only difference is in degree → the law considers that characteristic of a Filipino family to offer cooperation,
the transgressions of social conventions committed by compassion, love, and concern for every one of its members.
the parents should not be visited upon the children.
o They are born with a special handicap and the law Christopher J. should also be granted support. The grant of
helps them to surmount such disadvantages. such in this case is justified by the fact that Villar has expressed
willingness to support the child. The order of payment of
• In case there are valid reasons for not placing the
illegitimate child under the parental authority of the allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
mother, a guardian may be appointed by the court for it. custody of Chistopher J., since under Article 204 of FC, Villar
o When the child is born to a married woman who may fulfill his obligation to support by paying the allowance
has committed adultery, and the husband lives fixed by the court. If Villar loves his Christopher J., he should
with the erring wife but treats the child badly, the not condition the grand of support for him on the award of his
custody to him.
child may be taken away from the mother.
o When the mother of a minor illegitimate child
married a man other than its father, a guardian PEOPLE V. NAMAYAN (1995)
may be appointed by the court. Margie Pagaygay, then 21 years old, was allegedly raped by
Tortillano Namayan in March 1991. Margie is moderately
DAVID V. CA (1995) retarded with a mental age of 3 to 7, which is congenital in
Daisie David was the secretary of private respondent Ramon nature, and an IQ of 25 to 50. In July 1991, Margie’s mother
Villar, a married man. Their relationship became intimate, which noticed her bulging stomach and enlarging breasts, and upon
led to the birth of Christopher J., followed by two more examination, she was found to be 4 to 5 months pregnant.
Margie blamed Namayan for her condition, alleging that he had
daughters, Christine and Cathy Mae. Eventually, the children of
raped her on three separate occasions by force and
Daisie were introduced to and accepted by the legal family of
intimidation. Namayan denied his presence at the place, time,
Villar. One summer, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J.,
then 6 years old, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed; and date charged in the information, claiming that he was under
but after the trip, Villar refused to give him back, saying that he detention at the municipal jail due to a pending case of illegal
had enrolled Christopher J. at a school for the next school year. discharge of firearms and was only released in April 1991. He
Daisie then filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of relied on the testimony of Ruben Gadayan in that as the jailer,
Christopher J. The trial court granted custody of the child to he checks the inmates twice a day. The trial court found
Namayan guilty of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
Daisie, and ordered Villar to pay temporary support of P3,000 a
of reclusion perpetua, to compulsorily acknowledge the child
month for the three children. On appeal, the CA reversed,
when born as a result of his act, to support the same child until
holding that the question of custody and support cannot be
brought up in a habeas corpus case because such only applies it reaches the age of majority, and to indemnify the victim.
to cases involving marital relationships, not to adulterous ones, Held: The child being conceived by Margie is the illegitimate
as in the case at bar. The CA ruled that the trial court never child of Namayan. When Margie was found to be pregnant on
acquired custody over Christopher J., and it would also be for July 30, 1991, she was then in that condition for 4 to 5 months
his best interest if he would be temporarily placed under the already. Thus, the sexual intercourse which caused the
custody of Villar until the issue on custody and support shall pregnancy might have happened between March to April 1991,
have been determined in a proper action for such. a time when Namayan had physical access to Margie as
Held: A habeas corpus case is proper. The writ of habeas established by one of the witnesses who saw him during the
corpus does not distinguish between a mother of a legitimate town fiesta at that time. Compulsory acknowledgment and
and a mother of an illegitimate child who is deprived rightful support of the child are also proper as there is no legal
custody of her child. In this case, Christopher J. is an illegitimate impediment in doing so, since both Margie and Namayan are
single. The crime of rape carries with it the obligations to

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acknowledge the child if the character of its origin does not Held: The trial court did not err in finding probable cause for
prevent it, and to support the same. neglect of his child. Roberto acknowledged Robby as his son
and has admitted never contributing for his education except in
Ma’am Beth: Compulsory acknowledgment should not depend 1992 and 1993. This is despite the prima facie showing from the
on the absence of legal impediment on the part of Namayan. If evidence that Roberto is in fact financially capable of
he were married, he would not be compelled to acknowledge supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD
and support his child. Development Corporation indicates that Roberto owns
P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company. His further
GAN V. REYES (2002) assertion that this is not evidence of his capability was rejected
Bernadette Pondevida wrote to petitioner Augustus Caezar Gan by the Court. The Court likewise rejected the argument that
demanding support for the schooling of their three-year old criminal liability for neglect of child under PD 603 attaches only
daughter Francheska Joy. Gan denied paternity of the child, so if both parents are guilty. Liability for the crime does not depend
Bernadette instituted a complaint against him for support with on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The
prayer for support pendente lite. Gan moved to dismiss, irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of action consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s
since the birth certificate of the child indicated her father as faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties because
unknown and thus there was no legal basis for the claim of to allow such defeats the prescription that in all questions
support. The trial court ordered Gan to recognize Francheska regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
Joy as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000 every child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
month. Bernadette moved for execution of the judgment of
support, which was granted by the trial court on the ground of However, while Roberto can be indicted for violation of
Francheska's immediate need for schooling. Gan appealed to Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be
the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610. The law
CA dismissed the petition, ruling that judgments for support are expressly penalizes any person who commits other conditions
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by appeal. prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered
by PD 603 but not covered by the RPC. The “neglect of child”
Held: The courts did not commit grave abuse of discretion punished under PD 603 is also a crime (known as indifference
in issuing the writ of execution. The Court admonished Gan of parents) which is penalized under Article 277 (2) of the RPC.
for continuously delaying the execution of the writ and said that Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
substantial justice would be better served if petitioner be
precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate REPUBLIC V. CAPOTE (2007)
execution of the support judgment. There may be instances Respondent Trinidad Capote, as guardian ad litem, filed a
where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty petition for change of name of her minor ward from Giovanni N.
of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial Gallamoso to Giovanni Nadores. Giovanni is the illegitimate
court attains finality while time continues to slip away. natural child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamoso,
who was born prior to the effectivity of the FC, hence his use of
DE GUZMAN V. PEREZ (2006) the surname of his father despite the absence of marriage
Roberto De Guzman was Shirley Aberde’s boyfriend while between Corazon and Diosdado. The father, from the time
studying law at UST. Their studies were interrupted when Giovanni was born, failed to fulfill his obligations to his son;
Shirley became pregnant. Shirley gave birth to De Guzman’s Giovanni’s attempts to reach out to him were futile, which made
child, Robby, but the two never got married, and instead, him aware of how he stands with his father and now he wants
Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two to change his surname to that of his mother’s. Trinidad claimed
children. Roberto allegedly sent money for Robby’s schooling that the change of name will be for the benefit of Giovanni, since
only twice. He also gave Shirley P7,000 to help defray the cost his mother might eventually petition him to join her in the US,
of the child’s hospitalization. In order to make ends meet, and his continued use of the surname of his father may
Shirley accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan. However, complicate his status as her natural child. The trial court gave
her salary was still insufficient to provide for her and Robby’s due course to the petition and ordered its publication in a
needs. Meanwhile, Roberto managed his family’s corporations newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern
and led a luxurious lifestyle. Shirley filed a criminal complaint for Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks. The local civil
abandonment and neglect of child under PD 603 (The Child registrar was also notified, and the OSG was sent a copy of the
Youth Welfare Code). In his answer, Roberto claimed financial petition and the order. Since there was no opposition to the
incapacity and insisted that the acts attributed to him did not petition, Trinidad was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
constitute abandonment or neglect, explaining that it was his Afterwards, the trial court ordered the change of name sought.
father who shouldered all the expenses of his family. The City This decision was appealed by the OSG, claiming that the trial
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for abandonment but court erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
found probable cause to charge Roberto with neglect of child Nonetheless, the CA affirmed.
punishable under Art 59 (4) of PD 603, in relation to Sec. 10 (a)
of RA 7610. An information was then filed before the RTC for Held: The trial and appellate courts did not err in allowing
the crime of neglecting a minor. The Secretary of Justice Giovanni to change his name. Since he was born in 1982,
affirmed the prosecution. Hence the petition. Article 366 of CC governs his use or surname, which provides

165
that if a child is recognized by only one of the parents, they shall claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
employ the surname of the recognizing parent. Thus, Giovanni entitled to such support until Dolina proves his relation to him.
should have carried his mother’s surname from birth. The Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of rights, but their filiation must be duly proved; and in this case,
Giovanni’s putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, it would be through a judicial action for compulsory recognition
the same rule applies in Article 176 of FC, which states that or a direct action for support where the issue of compulsory
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. recognition may be integrated and resolved.
Giovanni likewise availed of the proper remedy and While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in
complied with all the procedural requirements thereof. His cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
Court is proper. There was also a hearing which sufficiently privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
established that Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in
was never recognized by his father, and thus, a change of name the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue
will be for his best interest as it will facilitate his reunification has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
with his mother. More importantly, all the requirements to make
a proceeding adversarial were satisfied. A proceeding is REPUBLIC V. LABRADOR (1999)
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal Respondent Gladys Labrador filed a petition for the correction
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity of entries in the birth certificate of her niece, Sarah Zita Erasmo.
to contest it. Trinidad gave notice of the petition by posting in a In the petition, which impleaded the Local Civil Registrar,
newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the Gladys alleged that she is the sister of Maria Rosario Cañon
petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. who is presently residing in the US. In 1986, Maria Rosario had
And despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the a common-law relationship with Degoberto Erasmo which
petition, and such fact did not deprive the trial court of its resulted to the birth of two children, one of which is Sarah Zita
jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding C. Erasmo, as registered in her birth certificate. During the
less adversarial in nature. registration of the birth of Sarah Zita, Maria Rosario told the
Local Civil Registrar that she was not legally married to the
DOLINA V. VALLACERA (2010) father of the child; however, the civil registrar erroneously
Petitioner Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with prayer for issuance entered the name of the child in her birth record as Sarah Zita
of a TPO against respondent Glenn Vallecera for alleged woman C. Erasmo, instead of Sarah Zita Cañon. Likewise, the name of
and child abuse under RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC Law). Dolina also the mother was also erroneously written as Rosemarie Cañon,
prayed for financial support from Vallecera for their supposed instead of Maria Rosario Cañon. Thus, in order to correct the
child on the basis of the latter’s birth certificate which named record of birth of the child pursuant to Article 176 of FC, her
him as the child’s father. She also asked the RTC to order name must be changed to Sarah Zita Cañon. The trial court then
Vallecera’s employer to withhold from his pay such amount of set the case for hearing and directed the publication of the
support as the court may deem appropriate. Vallecera opposed notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu
the petition, claiming that it was essentially for financial support City once a week for three consecutive weeks. During the
rather than for protection against abuse. He averred that he was hearing, Gladys presented as evidence Maria Rosario’s birth
not the child’s father; that the signature on the birth certificate certificate and a certification from the Office of Civil Registrar
is not his; that he has never lived with Dolina, which makes the that it had no record of marriage between Maria Rosario and
issuance of a TPO unnecessary; and that the petition is a Degoberto. The trial court granted the petition for the correction
harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child of the erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita.
as his and give it financial support. The RTC dismissed the Disagreeing with this decision, the OSG brought this petition
petition after finding that no prior judgment exists establishing directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support.
She moved for reconsideration, but was denied; instead, she Held: Rule 108 is inapplicable in the case at bar. Summary
was admonished to first file a petition for compulsory proceedings under Rule 108 of RC and Article 412 of CC may
recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. be used only to correct clerical or innocuous errors, not to alter
or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the
Held: The RTC correctly dismissed her action for temporary legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. Where the effect of a
protection and support. Dolina filed the wrong action to obtain correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of a child
support for her child—although the issuance of TPO against from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted
Vallecera under RA 9262 may include the grant of legal support except only in an adversarial proceeding. In this case, because
for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to the correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita
a protection order and to legal support. In this case, the will change her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” it
evidence shows that neither she nor her child ever lived with cannot be granted in a summary proceeding but only in an
Vallecera, and the true object of her action was to get financial adversarial proceeding to fully thresh out the allegations in the
support from him. However, to be entitled to legal support, petition of Gladys.
Dolina must, in a proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child. Since her demand for support for her son is based on her Moreover, a petition for substantial change in the civil registry
should implead not only the civil registrar, but also all other

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persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be Moreover, under the CRL, in case of an illegitimate child, the
affected thereby. Therefore, Sarah Zita and her purported birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents should have impleaded to the proceeding, as it would parents or only the mother if the father refuses. Thus, it is
affect her legitimacy, along with her successional and other mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
rights. The change may also embarrass Sarah Zita because of certificate of her child in all cases, regardless of whether the
the social stigma illegitimacy may bring. There was also no father recognizes the child as his or not, since she is the only
sufficient explanation as to why Gladys, an aunt who had no legally known parent of an illegitimate child and has parental
appointment as guardian of the minor, was the party-petitioner. authority and custody over the same. In the case at bar, the
birth certificates not only are incorrect but also incomplete as
Even granting that the hearings before the trial court were they lacked the signature of Barcelote. Therefore, the birth
“adversarial,” the evidence presented by Gladys was not certificates are void and must be cancelled for being registered
enough to fully substantiate her claim that Sarah Zita was against the mandatory provisions of the FC requiring the use of
illegitimate. As such, Gladys was not able to prove the the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and the CRL
allegations in her petition. for requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s birth
certificate.
BARCELOTE V. REPUBLIC AND TINITIGAN (2017)
Jonna Barcelote had a child out of wedlock with Ricky Tinitigan, Note: The Revised IRR of RA 9255, which apply to all illegitimate
a married man. She was not able to register the birth of their children born during the effectivity of RA 9255, state:
child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she
did not give birth in a hospital. Later on, she had another child RULE 8. Effects of Recognition
with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. 8.1 As a rule, an illegitimate child not acknowledged by the father shall
Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation and use the surname of the mother.
possible criminal charges. When her first child needed a birth
certificate for school admission, Barcelote finally decided to 8.2 Illegitimate child acknowledged by the father shall use the surname
of the mother if no [Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father] (AUSF)
register both of her children. The Local Civil Registrar approved
is executed.
the late registration of the births of the two children, but upon
submission of the late registration to the NSO, she was told that 8.3 An illegitimate child aged 0-6 years old acknowledged by the father
there were already two birth certificates with the same name of shall use the surname of the father, if the mother or the guardian, in the
the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office. absence of the mother, executes the AUSF.
The first child was registered as Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote
8.4 An illegitimate child aged 7 to 17 years old acknowledged by the
Tinitigan, and the second as Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan, father shall use the surname of the father if the child executes an AUSF
with Tinitigan as the informant for both. Thus, Barcelote filed a fully aware of its consequence as attested by the mother or guardian.
petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates registered without her knowledge and participation 8.5 Upon reaching the age of majority, an illegitimate child
and for containing wrong entries. The RTC ordered the acknowledged by the father shall use the surname of his father provided
that he executes an AUSF without need of any attestation.
cancellation, ruling that they are legally infirm because they
were registered without the knowledge and signature of
Barcelote in violation of the Civil Registry Law (CRL). They also
contained void entries because the children use the surname of
Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of FC.
However, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the

RTC. It ruled that the registrations were valid and did not require
the consent of Barcelote. It further ruled that children can legally
use the surname of Tinitigan, since RA 9255, amending Article
176 of FC, allows illegitimate children to use the surname of
their father if the latter had expressly recognized them through
their record of birth, such as in this case.
Held: The CA erred in not cancelling the birth certificates.

The use of the word “may” in Article 176 of FC, as amended by
RA 9255, shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is not
compelled to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, and
the discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the
surname of his father is conditional upon proof of compliance
with the IRR of RA 9255, including the execution of an Affidavit
to Use the Surname of the Father. In this case, since both
children are illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote, they
shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote.

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LEGITIMATED CHILDREN if the father becomes a widower and actually marries the
mother. And yet, if instead of an adulterous relation, they had
ART. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock contracted a bigamous void marriage, the child would be
of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were considered legitimate. Therefore, there is some inconsistency
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or in the policy of the law. It places in a better position children
were so disqualified only because either or both of them were born of marriages prohibited by law than those born of the same
below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated (as parents who had not violated the prohibition.
amended by RA No. 9858, 2009)
LEGITIMATION is a remedy by which those who were not ART. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
born in lawful wedlock and considered illegitimate children marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable
are by fiction considered legitimated, it being supposed that marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
they were born when their parents were validly married.
Under the CC, the child must be acknowledged by both
• An act by which the quality of legitimate child is parents to be legitimated. Under the FC, this is no longer
conferred upon an illegitimate child. needed—the marriage of the parents is enough.
• A product of nature and law • Filiation of the child must still be established.
o Adoption → the law merely creates by fiction a o If the parties who contract marriage do not accept
relation which did not in fact exist a child as theirs, it will be necessary for such child
o Legitimation → the law merely makes legal what to prove his filiation by any of the means provided
exists by nature in Articles 172, 173, and 175.
• Takes place without prior judicial approval. • Effect of nullity or annulment of marriage
• Only those who were classified before as natural o If the subsequent marriage of the natural parents
children may be legitimated. is void → no marriage, child is not legitimated
o If the subsequent marriage is voidable and is later
REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
annulled → child is still legitimated
1. Child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
2. The parents were not disqualified by any impediment to Civil Code Family Code
marry each other at the time of conception
Article 178 → Legitimation
Article 270 → Legitimation
takes place through subsequent
CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED takes place through subsequent
marriage, as long as the
1. Adulterous marriage, provided that the
requisites of Art. 177 are met.
2. Incestuous parents have acknowledged the
The length of time between
child before or after the
3. Of marriages against public policy child’s birth and the parents’
marriage
4. Of bigamous marriages → but can be adopted to elevate marriage does not matter.
their status
WHY CAN’T CHILDREN OF ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS ART. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
BE LEGITIMATED? legitimate children.
1. Rational of legitimation would be destroyed
2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of successional
ART. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time
rights
of the child’s birth.
3. Problem of public scandal
4. Will destroy the sanctity of marriage The FC makes it effective from the birth of the child in order
5. Very scandalous, especially if the parents marry years to protect the child, because the parents may not marry until
after the birth of the child a very long time has passed.
6. It is tantamount to tolerating what would have been a
wrong act, it would seem to be more beneficial to the
ART. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the
erring spouse
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
OBSERVATIONS BY TOLENTINO
Legitimation also protects the child’s descendants because it
Persons already married and those enumerated in Articles 37
can happen that at the time of the marriage of the child’s
and 38 cannot be validly married due to some impediment.
parents, the child had already married and died. If he is survived
Notwithstanding such, if they have children, they cannot be
by children, they should benefit from the legitimation of their
legitimated. They must remain illegitimate and cannot be raised
deceased parent and inherit by representation of the same.
to the status of legitimate children. And yet, if the disqualified
parents had contracted marriage, which would be void, the
children would be considered legitimate under Article 54. ART. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who
are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time
Even if after the birth of the child the parents become qualified their cause of action accrues.
to marry, the child cannot be legitimated. A child born from a
married father and a single mother cannot be legitimated even

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Legitimation may be contested not only when the child does Leona as his daughter. While the original document itself was
not have the condition of a natural child but also when the child not produced in evidence, it was shown that diligent search was
is not that of the persons who recognized it. made to discover its whereabout, without avail. This was
sufficient to justify the introduction of secondary evidence
Who may bring the action? concerning its contents, including the testimony from Fr.
• Sanchez Roman and Buron → only those who suffer Ferrero. The recognition of Leona falls under Law 11 of Toro.
economic or material injury; or the testamentary or Under this law, tacit recognition was sufficient. Meanwhile,
intestate heirs. under Art. 131 of CC, the acknowledgment of a natural child
• Castan → must be understood broadly; includes those must be made in the record of birth, by will, or in other public
who have a moral interest as entitled to contest the instrument. The recognition of Leona is sufficiently shown in
legitimation either of these provisions.
• Tolentino → supports the view of Sanchez Roman and
Buron; “rights” must be regarded as rights recognized by The divorce decree obtained by Frederick is invalid. The
and enforceable under the law French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the
dissolution of a marriage contracted in the Philippines by
RAMIREZ V. GMUR (1918) persons domiciled in the country, such marriage being
Samuel Bischoff, a Swiss, was married to Doña Ana Ramirez indissoluble under Philippine laws. In this case, neither
without children. Upon his death in 1913, he left a valuable Frederick nor Leona were domiciled nor intended to be
estate which was disposed through a will, naming Doña Ana as domiciled in France. Hence, the court of a country in which
the executrix. Since they had no children, everything was given neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of
to the widow, except for a real property in Switzerland which them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce
was given to Samuel’s brothers and sisters. However, his has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status, and a
declaration that he was devoid of forced heirs ignored the divorce granted by such court is not entitled to recognition
possible claims of two sets of children born to his natural elsewhere. To confer jurisdiction to one court, the person must
daughter, Leona Castro. Based on an original baptismal entry, be a bona fide resident of that country.
Leona was born to one Felisa Castro and to an unknown father.
However, an additional Spanish document called escritor Likewise, during the time they obtained the divorce decree, the
(public document) was annotated to this record, which states Philippine law (Act No. 2710) provided that a valid marriage can
only be dissolved by death of one of the parties. Under this law,
that Leona was recognized by Samuel. The annotation and the
absolute divorce was also allowed where the wife has been
baptismal entry were authenticated by Fr. Ferrero. As the years
found guilty of adultery, or the husband of concubinage.
passed, Leona was taken and brought up by Samuel and his
Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant to the
family, and it appears that Samuel tacitly recognized Leona as
moral sensibilities of the Filipinos and it is contrary to law.
his daughter and treated her as such.
Leontina is the illegitimate daughter of Mory and Leona.
In 1985, Leona married Frederick von Kauffman, a British
When she was born, the marriage between Frederick and Leona
subject, with whom she begot three children, namely: Elena,
was still subsisting, which means that she was an offspring of
Federico, and Ernesto. When she became sick, Leona was
brought by Frederick to a sanatorium in Switzerland. Eventually, adulterous relations and as such, she cannot be legitimated,
the two decided to separate, so in 1904, Frederick went to Paris pursuant to Article 119 of CC.
to obtain a divorce decree under French laws. A divorce was Only the von Kauffman children may participate in the
decreed in the next year. The estrangement between the estate of Samuel, since they are the legitimate children of
spouses was due to the fact that Leona had become attracted Leona and Frederick. The Mory claimants, however, are born
to Dr. Ernest Mory, the physician-in-charge of the sanatorium out of an invalid marriage, and thus they cannot participate in
where Leona was staying. After the divorce decree was entered, the estate of Samuel. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
Dr. Mory and Leona went to London with plans of marriage. But legitimated, and acknowledged natural children, excluding
prior to the celebration of their marriage, a daughter, Leontina children of adulterous relations. “Descendants” under Art. 941
Elizabeth, had been born to the couple. She was followed by of CC cannot include illegitimate children born of adulterous
two more daughters, Carmen Maria and Esther. relations.
In the proceedings, Otto Gmur appeared as the guardian of the
three Mory claimants, while Frederick appeared as the guardian IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN
of his own three children, the von Kauffman claimants. Both CARULASAN WANG (2005)
claimant parties claim tht Leona was the recognized natural Minor petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, through his mother,
daughter of Samuel, and thus, they should be considered as filed a petition for change of name and/or correction or
forced heirs to his estate. In contrast, Doña Ana asserted that cancellation of entry in his Civil Registry. He sought to drop his
Leona had never been recognized by Samuel. middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Julian was born to Anna
Held: Leona is a recognized natural child of Samuel. She had Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married,
continuously enjoyed the de facto status of a natural child and but when the two subsequently married they executed a deed
was treated as such by Samuel and his kindred. Samuel had of legitimation of Julian so his name was changed to Julian Lin
also executed an escritor, a notarized document recognizing Carulasan Wang. His parents were migrating to Singapore and

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will let him study there, along with his sister Wang Mei Jasmine. AD O PTI O N
Because middle names are not carried in a person’s name in
Singapore, his mother feared Julian’s usage of his middle name ADOPTION has existed since ancient times and is by no means
will cause him discrimination and embarrassment, as Carulasan a contemporary concept.
sounds funny in Mandarin which pronounces R as L. Confusion • However, public perception of adoption to this day
might also arise between Julian and his sister because of their remains ambivalent.
different surnames.
It is a creation of statute law.
The RTC denied the petition, finding that the reason given for • It is not a mere contract between consenting adults—the
the change of name sought does not fall within the grounds biological parents and the adopters—but one of status.
recognized by law. It also ruled that as a legitimated child, he • It creates a legal relationship of parent and child between
shall bear the surnames of his mother and father. It also denied the adopter and adoptee → adoptee is raised as the
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, stating that the adopted parents’ own.
Singaporean practice of carrying a middle name does not justify
the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate child, and that
ANCIENT ORIGINS OF ADOPTION
Philippine law is still controlling as to the use of surname. In its
Comment, the OSG said that the trial court correctly denied the BIBLICAL STORIES
petition for change of name. Under Art. 174 of CC, legitimate There are several Biblical stories on adoption, including:
children have the right to bear the surnames of their mother and
father. There is also no proof that the change is in the best • Moses and the Pharaoh’s daughter, the orphan Esther
interest of Julian, since mere convenience is not sufficient to who was adopted and became queen of Persia
support a petition for change of name, and the confusion and • Jacob’s adoption of Ephraim and Manesseh
difficulty alleged is more imaginary than real. There will also be
no confusion as to their parentage because they both use their References to adoption can also be found in ancient codes,
father’s surname, Wang. Finally, it noted that Singaporean law laws, and writings of Babylonians, Chinese, Egyptians,
does not prohibit the use of middle name. Hebrews, and Hindus.
• To provide male heirs to childless couples, to maintain
Held: Julian should not be allowed to drop his middle name. family lines and estates, or to fulfill religious practices
A change of name is a privilege, and not a right, so there must such as ancestor worship.
be a proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason to
justify such change. Middle names serve to identify the ROMAN LAW
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further Roman law provides the source of adoption, but what has
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name changed are the reasons for adoptions and the legal
and surname as he has. Article 174 of FC provides that procedure by which this takes effect.
legitimate and legitimated children have the right to bear the • Adopter-centric → designed to benefit the adopter, and
surnames of their father and the mother, while illegitimate any benefits to the adoptee was secondary; adoptees
children shall use the surname of their mother (Art. 176). were all male and usually adults, not children
However, when an illegitimate child is subsequently legitimated
by reason of marriage, he shall be allowed to use his mother’s Under Roman law, the purposes of adoption were:
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his • Create artificially the parental power for the benefit of a
surname. Thus, as a legitimated child, Julian shall use the head of a family over a person not subject thereto.
surnames of both his mother and father. • Avoid the extinction of the family.
• Perpetuate the rites of family religious worship
Moreover, in contrast to the cases cited by the petition, the
petitioners thereon were able to prove their unique Two forms:
circumstances which warranted a change of name. In this case, 1. Adrogatio or arrogatio → subject was someone who
the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his middle was sui juris
name is convenience. However, how such change of name a. Initially, only sons who were above the age of
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier was puberty could be arrogated but was later
not clearly established. In addition, Julian is only a minor, and expanded to include daughters.
thus it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to b. Done only in Rome since it required a vote of the
his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of people in the assembly called comitia curiata.
majority. c. Later on (after 3rd century AD), by imperial edict.
2. Adoption → legal act to enable a person to fall under the
paternal power of a new head of a family
a. Originally done by the biological father fictitiously
selling his son three times, and his daughter or
granddaughter once
b. By authority of a magistrate

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c. Institutes of Justinian – adoption had the effect of Adoption laws of US and Spain differ radically:
making the adoptee the child of the adopter by • US → complete change in the domestic relations of the
legal fiction child, making him to all intents and purposes the child of
the legal heir of the adopting parent
Adoption was subject to certain conditions: • Spain → only a change in the person who is to exercise
1. Adoption must imitate nature → Eunuchs could not the parental authority, preserving all the other relations
adopt since they are incapable of engaging in sex and of the adopted with his natural family
cannot have children
2. Adopter be a full generation older, or 18 years older than Adoption under Spanish law has been characterized as
the adoptee → it would not be imitating nature to have a resembling a relationship between a guardian and a ward,
son older than his father more than a parent and a child.
3. Only men were allowed to adopt until 291 AD when
• The adopter does not have usufruct in the property of the
women were thereafter permitted a limited form of
child and without a right to administer the same.
adoption to comfort them for the loss of children taken
from them.
MODERN DAY LAWS AND POLICIES ON ADOPTION
BABYLONIA
Dating back to 2286 BC, the Code of Hammurabi had enduring TIMELINE OF LAWS
themes such as the permanence of the parent-child relationship
created in adoption and the indispensability of the biological • PD 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code (December 10,
parents’ consent to the adoption. 1974) → repealed all the provisions on adoption in the
Civil Code
GREECE • EO 91 (December 17, 1986) → amended provisions
Adoption was celebrated with formalities and was done during regarding non-resident aliens
the festival of Thargelia. • Family Code (August 3, 1988) → significant provisions
on adoption
ATHENS
• RA 8043, Inter-Country Adoption Act (June 7, 1995)
Adoption was accomplished either during the lifetime of the
• RA 8552, Domestic Adoption Act (February 25, 1998)
adopter or by his will. Only independent citizens of responsible
character without any male heirs could be an adopter. Has adoption been accepted by Philippine society as a
legitimate act of creating a family?
MIDDLE AGES
• There is still stigma and labeling on adopted children →
Legal adoption was abandoned in many provinces of the
adoption as the ‘second best route to parenthood’ and
Roman Empire. But in some parts of Medieval Europe, such
the ‘second best way of entering a family’
as the Byzantine Empire, Roman law was applied with some
• Uncertainty towards adoption is reflected in our
changes, including the right of childless of women to adopt.
language → referring to adoptees as ampon or one who
• It was during this time when the view that adoptions are is more of a ward than one’s own child
inferior to natural filiation and when adopted children o A study of 20 non-relative adopted children from
began to be stigmatized. ages 15-19 and reared in two-parent families
observed that adoptive parents are reluctant to
disclose the adoptive status of their children due
SPANISH AND AMERICAN ANTECEDENTS to the narrow and condescending attitudes
towards adoptees.
Philippine adoption laws can be traced from two sources—
▪ They are not considered as “real children,”
Spain and the United States of America—both influenced by
and neither are their parents considered
Roman law.
“real”
In 1889, Spain promulgated its Civil Code, which contained ▪ By real parents = biological parents.
provisions on adoption found in Articles 173-180. • This casts adoptive parents as
• Extended to the Philippines by royal decree. unreal and adoption as unnatural.
• After the Treaty of Paris in 1898 → sovereignty from the • Media and films depicting adoptees
Spaniards to the Americans as misfits perpetuate stereotypes.
• When legislative authority was transferred from the • Another study involving 44 adoption petitions granted
Governor-General to the Philippine Commission → revealed that out of the total 66 respondents, 38
enacted the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) expressed that there were no problems while 28
• The Code of Civil Procedure repealed the Spanish CC’s articulated problems such as attitude of relatives toward
provisions on adoption, which were later revived in the adopted children, marital conflicts, jealousy between or
Philippine CC. among children, and children’s behavior.
Nevertheless, statistics from DSWD show that from 1995 until

the third quarter of 2001, the number of documented local
adoption placement totaled to over 12,000.

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• Despite the social bias, the numbers suggest that adopts the child legally without going through the matching
adoption is prevalent in the Philippines. and supervise trial custody.
• Does not account for those who did not go through the
processes of DSWD → no systematic documentation of (3) Independent adoption
the number of children reared formally by those who Biological parents directly place their child with a person
circumvent the law by registering someone else’s child they know or through an intermediary/go-between.
as their own (simulated birth) • An intermediary is used when an individual knows of
parents who want to adopt and arranges such
Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the placement.
child’s interest is the primary consideration. Meanwhile, in the • These intermediaries are usually motivated by the
CYWC and the Domestic Adoption Act, the child’s welfare is noble desire to unite childless couples with children
the paramount consideration. waiting for a home.
• CRC → child’s welfare as the first consideration in
making decisions involving the child In relative and independent adoptions, the prospective
• Philippine laws → not only the first but also the chief adopters file a petition to adopt directly with the Family
factor in making these decisions Court and the DSWD becomes involved only when ordered by
the Court to conduct case and home reports.
Nonetheless, the CRC has a higher standard clause which • Biological parents should not choose for themselves the
provides that nothing in the Convention affects provisions in adopting parents of their child since their fitness to be
domestic laws that afford children more rights or protection. parents may not have been sufficiently ascertained.
• Therefore, Philippine adoption laws prevail given that
they put vulnerable children in the center of the adoption Biological parents retain the legal right to retrieve their child
process to enable them to be placed with their from his or her actual custodians, who are legally strangers for
permanent family without delay. as long as no adoption decree has been issued by the courts.
PEOPLE V. MARQUEZ (2011)

TYPES AND NATURE OF ADOPTION Aida Marquez was charged with kidnapping for failing to return
a 3-month old baby girl, Justine, to her mother Carolina Merano
Adoption is a socio-legal process of providing a permanent who had earlier entrusted Aida with custody of the child.
family to a child whose parents have voluntarily or Carolina alleged that she let Aida borrow Justine for a few hours
involuntarily relinquished parental authority over the child. to buy her clothes and food. Later on, she received a call from
• Adoption is meant for the benefit of the child. Aida who promised to return Justine the next day and
• It is a juridical act that creates a relationship similar to demanded payment of P50,000 which she incurred for Justine’s
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. needs. Aida failed to return Justine the next day, which
prompted Carolina to seek help from authorities. Here, she
THREE TYPES OF DOMESTIC ADOPTION received reports that Aida sold Justine to the spouses Castillo
(1) Agency adoption for P60,000. Carolina went to the home of the spouses, who
A DSWD licensed agency finds adoptive families for begged her not to take Justine as they had grown to love her.
children who are voluntarily or involuntarily committed. The To legalize her adoption, the couple turned over the custody of
adoptive families go through the process. Through this Justine to the DSWD. Aida claimed that Carolina offered Justine
type of adoption, the legal rights of the three principal to her for adoption. As she was not interested, she
actors in adoption are equally protected. recommended her friend Modesto Castillo. During the trial, a
police officer testified that Carolina executed a Kasunduan
How their rights are protected:
which gave up her right to Justine to the spouses Castillo. The
• Biological parents → counseling
RTC found Aida guilty, which was affirmed by the CA.
• Child → counseling; determining preferences
• Adopting parents → valid adoption confers rights Held: Yes, Aida is guilty of kidnapping Justine. The act
to them imputed to Aida was not the illegal detention of a person, but
her deliberate failure to restore Justine to Carolina after being
Steps in adoption:
entrusted with the child’s custody. Under Article 270, this crime
• Inquiry about adoption
has two essential elements: (1) the offender is entrusted with
• Application
said baby’s custody; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to
• Interviews for the case study report
restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. Hence, in this
• Matching
crime what is being punished is not the kidnapping but the
• Supervised trial custody
deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his
• Finalization of the child’s adoption
parents or guardians. In this case, the first element is present
because Aida was the one entrusted with the custody of
(2) Relative adoption
Justine. The second element is also present because the
Biological parents relinquish their child to a relative or a
custody of Justine was one entrusted to Aida, and whether this
member of their extended family. The family member
lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains

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that Aida had physical and actual custody of Justine, and she LAZATIN V. CAMPOS (1979)
refused to return her when demanded to do so by Carolina. Petitioner Renato Lazatin moved to intervene in the probate
proceedings of the estate of Dr. Mariano Lazatin as an admitted
Aida’s insistence on Carolina’s alleged intention to have illegitimate child. He also filed a motion for intervention in the
Justine adopted has no bearing on her deliberate failure to estate of Margarita de Asis, Dr. Lazatin’s wife, as an adopted
return the child to Carolina. It was also shown that Carolina child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin,
desperately searched for a way to communicate with Aida. And brother of the deceased, that petitioner was adopted by the
even if it were true that Carolina subsequently agreed to have spouses Lazatin. Renato presented no decree of adoption in his
the spouses Castillo adopt Justine, it would still not affect favor but instead attempted to prove it through secondary
Aida’s liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return evidence:
the minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate
failure to return Justine to Carolina.
(1) He had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents
(2) He had been supported by them until their death
It took Carolina almost a year to legally recover her baby.
(3) He used to carry the surname Lazatin but was compelled to
Justine was only 3 months old when the whole issue began, change his surname to Sta. Clara when the deceased spouses
and she was already 9 months old when Carolina saw her again. refuse to give consent to his marriage
She even spent her birthday at the DSWD. Thus, Carolina’s right (4) He and his spouse reside in a house owned by the spouses
as a parent which was violated must be vindicated and (5) Photographs showing Renato with the Lazatins.
recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages.
The trial court barred the introduction of Renato’s evidence.
Later on, he filed a motion to declare as established the fact of
PROCEEDING IN REM adoption in view of respondent Nora de Leon’s refusal to
comply with the orders of court to deposit the items she had
Adoption always requires a judicial proceeding and can be
removed from the safety box of Margarita. Renato claimed that
proven only by a judicial decree issued by a court of
the court order for the production of the items in the safety
competent jurisdiction.
deposit box is warranted, however, the trial court ruled that he
• Mere registration of the birth certificate that the adopted
has failed to establish his status as an adopted child.
is the child of the supposed adopter, also known as
simulation of birth, is a crime and punishable by law. Held: Renato is not an adopted child. He was not able to
• Unlike in proof of biological filiation, a child claiming to provide evidence to show judicial adoption. Adoption is a
have been adopted cannot prove the act of adoption by juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between two
means of open and continuous possession of the status persons a relationship similar to that which results from
of an adopted child. legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court is valid in this jurisdiction. Since adoption
Adoption is a proceeding in rem since it establishes the status
wholly and entirely artificial, and thus, to establish the relation,
of the adoptee as the legitimate child of the adopters.
the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out—
• The law requires publication in a newspaper of general otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.
circulation of the adoption order.
• Actual notice to the birth parents o the adoption Moreover, the absence of proof of judicial order of adoption
proceedings is not required if they have abandoned their cannot be substituted by secondary evidence, to the effect that
child, or where their residence is unknown. a child has lived with a person who is not his parent and has
• However, to adequately notify DSWD, actual notice is been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Although
required and constructive notice will not suffice. pedigree testimony is admissible because it is the best that the
• Constructive notice made through publication is nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise
sufficient to comply with due process requirements. from the rejection of such proof, there are still better proof
o Constructive notice is a fiction that the persons available and it should be produced. Besides, secondary
who are interested in the case are legally evidence is admissible where the records of adoption
presumed to have acquired knowledge of it on proceedings were actually lost or destroyed, but before such
grounds of public policy. evidence may be introduced, the petitioner must first establish
the former existence of the document. Therefore, the attempts
IN REM VS. IN PERSONAM of Renato to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the
• In rem → directed against the thing itself or its status; deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the
applies to “all the world” judicial decree of adoption.
o Constructive notice to notify persons through a legal
As a consequence, Renato cannot properly intervene in the
fiction.
settlement of the estate of Margarita as an adopted child for
• In personam → lodged against a person based on
lack of proof thereof.
personal liability; case is against a specific person

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REPUBLIC V. CA AND CARANTO (1996) QUALIFICATIONS FOR FILIPINO CITIZENS
In the adoption proceeding of Michael Mazon, the petition (1) Any Filipino citizen
erroneously stated that his name is “Midael” instead of (2) Legal Age
“Michael.” The petition was subsequently granted for the (3) Full civil capacity and legal rights
adoption of the child, Midael. Later on, the adoptive parents (4) Good moral character (RA 8552)
sought to have the child’s name corrected but was opposed by (5) Not been convicted of crime of moral turpitude (RA 8552)
the Solicitor General. (6) Emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children (RA 8552)
Held: The RTC has jurisdiction over the adoption petition.
(7) 16 years older than the adoptee
While the petition did not state the true name of the minor child,
(8) Position to support and care for his / her children in
the notice of publication is still valid. It involves an obvious
keeping with means of family
clerical error in the name of the child and the correction involves
(9) Undergone pre-adoption services are required under the
merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter “d,” so
IRR (RA 8552)
that what appears as “Midael” would read “Michael.” Changing
the name of the child cannot possibly cause any confusion Why legal age?
because both names can be read and pronounced with the Because they have capacity to act.
same rhyme and tone. The publication requirement is to give
notice so that those who object to the adoption can make their Emotional or psychological capacity
opposition known. This purpose had been served by • Requires that adopters be emotionally and
publication of notice. Therefore, the RTC and CA correctly psychologically capable of caring for children
granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon. • Looks at overall fitness of prospective adopters to take
Note: Adoption is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which is on the responsibilities and rights of being a parent
wholly and entirely artificial so that to establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, Non-conviction of crime of moral turpitude
the adoption is an absolute nullity. • Moral Turpitude → done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals
o Act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
DOMESTIC ADOPTION: ELIGIBILITY AND CONSENT private duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
REQUIREMENTS or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man
QUALIFICATIONS OF FILIPINO ADOPTERS and woman
• Examples: rape, theft, murder, robbery, estafa, bribery,
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
bigamy, concubinage
a. Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has
Age disparity
not been convicted of any crime involving moral
• No MAXIMUM age to adopt
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
o However, older applicants should NOT be
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
matched with newborns
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care
o Why? Huge age gap has a bearing on the ability
for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
of parents to function with little sleep and
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
demands of younger children, as well as their
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
ability to engage in physical activities. Parents
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
might fall ill or pass away before adoptee finishes
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
education
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward after the • If living with prospective adopters, risks of old age
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her should be weighed versus trauma of being separated
financial accountabilities. • DSWD should inquire re: state of health, but age per se
should NOT disqualify adopters.
ART. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a 16 Year Age Gap
position to support and care for his children, legitimate or • Why? Adoption intended to mirror nature. Parent will be
illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family. more mature than the child and will be able to give care
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the and sound advice.
adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title. o Lessen confusion between third parties and the
adopter and adoptee themselves
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older
• Exceptions:
than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the
o Adopter is biological parent of adoptee
parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the
o Spouse of the adoptee’s parent
legitimate parent of the person to be adopted.
o Sibling of the adoptee (IRR, Sec 7)

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Pre-Adoption Services (pursuant to IRR of RA 8552) Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
• Getting counselling from DSWD interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
• Attending adoption fora and seminars for assessing consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental
motivation, readiness, and capacity to adopt care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
• There will be a certificate issued which is a requisite of and give them the protection of society and family in the person
the home study of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to
experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child
Other regulations in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
• No law prohibiting relatives from adopting other family natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
members. sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
• No law barring unmarried individuals from adopting, but objectives of the law.
married couples will be given priority.
o Couple in a non-marital relationship will NOT be IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM (2009)
allowed to adopt jointly. Petitioners Monina and Primo Lim were childless. When two
minor children were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
IN RE: ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA (1967) Ayuban, they registered the children to make it appear that they
Edwin Villa was born to his natural parents, Francisco Villa and were their own children. The spouses reared and cared for the
Florencia Mendoza. He was a sickly child, and his parents children as if they were their own and named them Michelle Lim
entrusted him to his sister, Edipola, who reared him for the and Michael Lim. When Primo died, Monina married Angel
years thereafter. When Edwin was 4 years old and Edipola and Olario, an American citizen. She decided to adopt the children
her husband were 32, they instituted a petition for adoption in by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552. She then filed
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The natural parents for separate petitions for adoption for Michelle and Michael.
voluntarily submitted their written consent and conformity to the Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
adoption. However, the court dismissed the petition saying that evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his
such adoption will result in an incongruous situation where consent to his adoption. Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Edipola’s brother will also be her son. Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The trial
court dismissed the petitions and held that since petitioner was
Held: Edipola may adopt her younger brother. There is no remarried, they should have filed a joint adoption.
provision in the law prohibiting relatives by blood or by affinity,
from adopting one another. To say that adoption should not be Held: Monina, who has remarried, cannot singly adopt. RA
allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each 8552 makes it mandatory that husband and wife shall jointly
other, except in those cases enumerated in Article 338 of CC, adopt. Exceptions to the law were provided, but the case of the
is to preclude adoption among relatives, no matter how far petitioner does not fall into any of those exceptions. Moreover,
removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, mere consent of her foreigner husband was not enough to
which is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of satisfy the requirement of joint adoption, and he still had to
the child should be the paramount consideration. The fact that satisfy the requirements laid down by RA 8552. However, these
a dual relationship will be created between the parties should were not presented and proven in court. As to the contention of
not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by the Monina that joint parental authority is no longer necessary
fiction of law. The relationship established between them does since the children have been emancipated, parental authority is
not extend to other relatives. merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Therefore, even
if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
REPUBLIC V. MILLER (1999) still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
Claude, a member of the US Air Force, and his wife Jumrus rights of a legitimate child.
Miller, both American nationals, petitioned to adopt the minor
Michael Madayag, and for his surname to be changed to Miller. Spouses shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
Michael’s natural parents consented to the adoption because (1) Spouse adopts the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
of their poverty. The RTC granted the petition; however, the (2) Spouse adopts his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
OSG appealed, arguing that Art. 184 of FC prohibits aliens from Provided, however, that the other spouse has signified
adopting. his/her consent thereto; or
(3) Spouses are legally separated from each other.
Held: The FC does not apply since the petition was filed
days before its enactment. Before the FC, the CYWC allowed Adoption by Guardians
aliens to adopt. Its enactment of five days after the petition was • Guardians can adopt their ward only after the termination
filed will not impair the right of the respondents who are aliens of the guardianship.
to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested • Prevents the guardian from adopting the ward in order to
at the time of filing of the petition shall be governed by the law avoid accounting for ward’s money and properties of the
then in force. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient under his or her guardianship.
in form and substance in accordance with the law in • Termination will happen only after the financial
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires responsibilities are met
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

175
ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN ADOPTERS Why FC Rule?
• Children suffer culture and psychological shock and
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt: can’t adjust
b. Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above • Alien pedophiles adopt for sexual pleasure and abandon
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her the children after
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the • Children adopted for organ transplants and donors
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines • By limiting adoption, there would be a measure of
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of assurance that adopted children would receive love,
the application for adoption and maintains such care, and protection from adopters related to them by
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that consanguinity
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or • Repealed through liberalization of adoption by aliens
consular office or any appropriate government agency under RA 8552 → introduced rigid resident and
that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her certification requirements instead
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted Residence requirement
son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements • 3 years minimum prior to filing of application, in order to
on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification assure familiarity with PH culture, tradition, and practices
to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the • Residence → person’s actual and legal stay in the
following: Philippines
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a • Continuous → alien’s temporary absence from the PH
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of was for professional, business, or emergency reasons
consanguinity or affinity; or and NOT exceeding sixty (60) days out of EVERY YEAR
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter • Must continue residing until the adoption decree is
of his/her Filipino spouse; or finalized
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the Certification requirements
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
• DSWD clearances
Filipino spouse;
• Certification that alien has legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country
ART. 184. The following persons may not adopt: • Certificate of residence in the PH issued by Bureau of
(3) An alien, except: Immigration or DFA
(i) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity; Home Study Report must be accompanied by police
(ii) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his clearances from ALL places of residence in the past two years
or her Filipino spouse; or immediately prior to residence in the PH
(iii) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to • Confirm that frequent transfers were not because the
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by applicant was a fugitive on the run
consanguinity of the latter. • In lieu of this, embassy gives a certificate. Courts have
prerogative to accept it or not.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
Certificate Allowing Adoptee to Enter and Reside
adoptions as may be provided by law.
• PH law cannot require that the adopted child should
automatically acquire the citizenship of his or her
An ALIEN is any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and
adopted parents
remains in the Philippines an in possession of a valid passport
o Why? Citizenship is a political matter and outside
or travel documents and visa (RA 855 IRR, Sec 3, par. y).
the ambit of civil law
• Protects child’s interest without encroaching into State
REQUIREMENTS FOR ALIENS prerogative and authority
• Same qualifications as Filipino adopter • Problem for those with a federal system of government,
• Country has diplomatic relations with PH since validity of adoption decree is a matter of State law
• Living in PH for at least 3 continuous years prior to filing o Solved by issuing formal documents stating that
the application approved application with the citizenship and
• Maintains residence until adoption decree is entered immigration service office is prima facie evidence
• Certification of legal capacity to adopt in his or her for issuance of a visa for the child. This is also
country by diplomatic / consular office accepted as proof of capacity to adopt.
• Government allows adoptee to enter as his or her o Consul offices also issue certificates attesting to
adopted son/daughter State’s policy to allow adopted child to enter and
citizen to sponsor the adopted child for
permanent residence

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Changes from Family Code child will be elevated to the level of a legitimate child, so it will
• Circumstances stipulated in Family Code become be natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. This will also
grounds for leniency in the residency and certification insure harmony between the spouses. RA 8552 allows for
requirements former Filipinos with alien spouses to adopt as long as they
• What would remain is need for same qualifications as PH comply with its requirements, which are not present in this case.
adopter, diplomatic relations, and allowance of
government for adoptee to enter as adopted child. REPUBLIC V. MILLER (1999)
Held: The FC does not apply since the petition was filed
JOINT ADOPTION BY SPOUSES days before its enactment. The enactment of FC five days
after the petition was filed will not impair the right of the aliens
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt: to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following at the time of filing of the petition shall be governed by PD 603.
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/ IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM (2009)
daughter of the other; or Held: Monina cannot singly adopt. RA 8552 makes it
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate mandatory that husband and wife shall adopt jointly.
son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other Exceptions to the law were provided, but the petitioner does
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or not fall into any of these. Mere consent of her foreigner husband
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. was not enough to satisfy the requirement of joint adoption, and
he still had to satisfy the requirements laid down by RA 8552.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts
However, these were not presented and proven in court. As to
the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
the contention of the Monina that joint parental authority is no
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
longer necessary since the children have been emancipated,
Why? parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
• Level of child is elevated to a legitimate child. adoption. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
• Ensures harmony between spouses. authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child.
PD 603 → allowed spouses to file a petition for adoption
separately
ADOPTION BY FOSTER FAMILY
REPUBLIC V. CA & BOBILES (1992) Foster family is where a child is place for a planned period of
Zenaide Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Conda, then 6 time to a licensed foster family and has its goal the return or
years old. The court granted the petition and was affirmed by reunification of the child with his or her biological family.
CA. OSG contends that when Bobiles filed the petition, the law • Best substitute for children in need of temporary care.
was PD 603 which allowed either or both of the spouses to file • Temporary and conditional, since the child is with them
a petition for adoption. However, while the case was pending for transition to another family
on appeal in CA, the FC took effect which makes joint adoption
by husband and wife mandatory. Hence, the petition should be Adoption by Foster Family gives rise to a dilemma
dismissed as Zenaida filed it without her husband. • Can make the relationship permanent
Held: Filing a petition for adoption is a vested right and • Allows a couple whose real intention is to adopt a way to
cannot be affected by retroactive application of the FC. customize their choice of a child
Court acquires jurisdiction if the petition is pursuant to laws at • Circumvention of practice of allowing adopters only to
the time it was filed. The Court allowed the petition since specify age and sex
husband executed an affidavit of consent, showing that the
The reality is that some foster parents do fall in love with their
husband had actually joined his wife in adopting the child.
foster child and it would be cruel to wrest the child away from
them and give him to a total stranger, just because his foster
REPUBLIC V. TOLEDANO (1994) parents circumvented the legal system.
Spouses Clouse filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon
• Cognizant that the continuation of a nurturing
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn Clouse. Her
relationship with an adult is needed for a child’s total
husband, Alvin, is a natural-born citizen of US, who married her, development, the DSWD issued guidelines to apply to
a Filipino. Afterwards, Evelyn became a naturalized American cases where a foster family may opt to adopt the child.
citizen. Solomon was and has been under the care and custody
• Government gives primacy to child’s best interest by
of the spouses. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption,
preserving the bond existing between the child and his
along with his mother, who consented due to poverty and
foster parents.
inability to support her son. The court granted the petition.
Held: Evelyn and her foreign spouse were barred from

adopting a Filipino child. The alien spouse is not qualified to
adopt while the wife cannot adopt without her husband. The

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DSWD GUIDELINES TO APPLY ON FOSTER ADOPTION 8(f): Dead biological or adoptive parents
a. The foster child is legally free for adoption and not yet matched • Period intended to give child time to grieve over the
for adoption either domestic or inter-country. death and undergo counseling before adoption is once
b. The foster family is qualified to adopt. again contemplated.
c. Bonding between the child and foster family exists and the
separation would be traumatic for the child;
d. A harmonious and happy relationship exists between the foster 8(a): Minor child
child and his/her foster family; • Came from Roman Law where adoption must imitate
e. The children of the foster family, if any accepts the foster child nature; mirror nature since son is always younger than
as their sibling; his father.
f. The foster child is accepted by the members of the foster • In order to provide permanent loving home to children,
family's extended family/relatives; and since they are vulnerable and need it more.
g. The child has integrated well with the family and the community.
h. A case conference shall be conducted focusing on the
8(a): Administrative or judicially declared available
psychological and social functioning of the child and to ensure
that adoption by the foster parents is the best option. • IRR of RA 9523: “A child in whose favor a certification
was issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally available
The Foster Care Act of 2012 signifies that the question of for adoption after the fact of abandonment, neglect, or
whether or not adoption of a foster child should be permitted dependence has been proven through the submission of
has been resolved in favor of the child’s best interest. pertinent documents, or one who was voluntarily
committed by his or her parent/s or legal guardian/s.”
SEC. 17. Conditions. – A foster parent may adopt his foster child o Voluntary → parents sign a deed of voluntary
subject to the following conditions: commitment
• The foster parent must have all the qualifications as provided for
o Involuntary → administrative or judicial certificate
by RA 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998 or RA 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-Country DSWD will issue certificate without any judicial case and court
Adoption Act of 1995, as the case may be;
order. Transformed to administrative matter.
• The trial custody, as required in adoption, may be waived:
Provided, That a harmonious relationship exists between the • EXCEPTIONS:
child and his foster parent and family members; and o Adoption of illegitimate child by either biological
• The procedures for adoption, for purposes of this Act, shall be parents
governed by Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 or Inter-Country o Adoption of a child by his or her stepparent
Adoption Act of 1995, as the case may be. o Adoption of a child by a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity
ELIGIBILITY OF THE ADOPTEE KINDS OF CHILDREN (RA 9523 and SC Rule on Adoption)
Art 183 Only minors can be adopted Abandoned Child → No proper parental care or guardianship,
parents have deserted them for at least 3 continuous months
Art 187 Permits adoption of “a child by nature of the adopter
or his or her spouse, or, if prior to the adoption, said Foundling → person whose facts of birth is/are unknown
person has been consistently considered and treated
by the adopter as his or her own child during minority. Neglected Child → basic needs have been deliberately
unattended or inadequately attended within a period of three (3)
Although RA 8552 does not disturb the general rule, Section 8 continuous months
requires the adoptee to be below 18 years of age and adds that
he or she must have been administratively or judicially declared - Physical - malnourished, ill clad, and without proper
available for adoption. shelter. Unattended, or left by himself without proper
provision and/or supervision.
SEC. 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted: - Emotional - maltreated, sexually abused, raped,
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has seduced, exploited, overworked, or made to beg in the
been administratively or judicially declared available for streets or left in moral danger
adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other Dependent Child → without parent, guardian, or custodian;
spouse; one whose parents, guardian, or custodian, for good cause,
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to desires to be relieved of care and custody; and is dependent on
improve his/her status to that of legitimacy; public for support.
(d) A person of legal age, prior to the adoption, said person
has been consistently considered and treated by the 8(b) and 8(c): Legitimate/illegitimate “son or daughter”
adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; • Adoption possible even when the son or daughter are
(e) A child whose adoption has been previous rescinded; or NOT of minor age
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died:
Provided that no proceedings shall be initiated within six
(6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

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8(d): Person of legal age consistently considered as own IN RE ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973)
child Held: Child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a
• Ascertain that the relationship is that of parent and child legitimate child entitled to rights and privileges of naturally
ongoing despite the absence of a formal recognition or conceived child. The father is the parent whose consent is
judicial imprimatur; adoption is an affirmation of familial required to the adoption of such child by another.
bond
• Everything except for a legal cover was there. There • If legitimacy is impugned on the grounds of vitiated
must be a parental-child relationship already existing. consent, then the husband’s consent is not needed.
o Changes child to an illegitimate one over which he
IN RE: ROBERT PAUL P (1984) does not exercise parental authority
Held: Where the petitioners are living together in a homosexual
relationship without incidents of a parent-child relationship, Status of the child as legitimate or illegitimate
adoption cannot be granted. Adoption is not a means of • If presumed father signs an affidavit denying paternity,
obtaining a legal status for a non-marital sexual relationship, the mother’s consent alone will suffice.
cannot legalize an emotional attachment wholly devoid of the • If father does not do this → the child is presumed
filial relationship that is fundamental to the concept of adoption. LEGITIMATE, mother’s consent alone will not suffice.
o Child will be considered as an abandoned child in
Note: Philippine courts will most likely rule the same way, there which case a petition for availability for adoption
is need for a parent-child relationship. shall be filed in the regional office of the DSWD
where the child was abandoned or found.
CONSENT NECESSARY FOR ADOPTION BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

SEC. 9, RA 8552. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. The general rule is that only the mother exercises parental
– After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right authority (Art. 136, FC), so only the mother’s consent is
to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written required.
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; What if mother is a minor? Can her parents override her?
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the • NO, Art. 176 of FC does not make parental right
legal guardian, or proper government instrumentality dependent on age
which has legal custody of the child; • Art. 216 of FC grants substitute parental authority to
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/ daughters, ten (10) grandparents only in default of parents, i.e. death,
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if absence, or unsuitability
any; • Minority does NOT result in default of mother to care and
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age cannot be subsumed under unsuitability
or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the
latter's spouse, if any; and Role of Illegitimate Fathers
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be • RA 8552 IRR → biological parent is mother alone if the
adopted. child is an unacknowledged illegitimate child
• If child is acknowledged, IRR requires that father’s
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN consent must be obtained
o Contradicts Art. 176 of FC → Art. 176 must prevail
This is to protect unwarranted interference by interlopers
since it is a law that gives parental authority solely
and insure opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
to the mother
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
• Ma’am: mere act of acknowledging should not
• Natural right of parents requires consent before
automatically extend father’s rights over the child unless
termination of parental rights and duties.
he had a substantial relationship with their child
• Under FC, both parents will have to give consent if the
child is legitimate because they exercise joint parental
New York Domestic Relations Law
authority.
• Confers different rights to unmarried fathers based on
Children born of Artificial Insemination substantial relationship shown by a commitment to raise
• Legitimate if conceived with written consent of both the child.
spouses signed before birth of child • Substantial relationship → established depending on
• Problem as to who exercises parental authority in case factors such as child’s age, father’s relationship with
of participation of a third-party donor mother, willingness to acknowledge child, payment of
• Ma’am: Court will probably rule that the legal father’s expenses and support, regular and sustained
consent is needed communication with the child.
o Fathers who fall under this have full substantive
rights.

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• Due process rights → allows to present evidence to CANG V. CLAVANO (1998)
court relevant to the best interest of the child in order to Herbert Can and Anna Marie Clavano were married with three
block termination of parental rights. children. When Anna learned of her husband’s alleged
• If there is no effort at all to establish relationship, father extramarital affair, she filed a petition for legal separation, which
has NO RIGHT over consent of adoption was granted. Herbert then left for US where he obtained a
divorce decree, while custody was granted solely to Anna.
LEHR V. ROBINSON (1983) While in the US, he sent a portion of his earnings to the
Held: Father who has never established a substantial Philippines for his children’s expenses, while another portion
relationship with the child is not entitled to notice of an was deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
adoption. The mere existence of a biological link does not merit Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed a petition
equivalent constitutional protection. to adopt the three minor Cang children. Anna gave her consent
alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to
Ratterman’s Gray Areas: Possible non-establishment of support his children and so had long forfeited his parental rights
relationship may be due to: over his children. The trial court issued an adoption decree,
• Being barred by courts because of conviction of which was affirmed by CA.
domestic violence, drug addiction, or incarceration
• Never informed of child’s existence in the first place Held: The written consent of the natural parent is
• Interference by child’s mother or other relatives indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. In
this case, Herbert’s conduct did not manifest abandonment or
WHEN PARENTAL CONSENT IS NOT REQUIRED a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children. Physical estrangement alone,
Abandonment by the parents of their biological child is one without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
ground for dispensing with their consent. abandonment. While he was physically absent, he was not
• Abandonment → any conduct of parent which evinces a remiss in his obligations to his children. Therefore, the adoption
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and is void for want of Herbert’s consent.
relinquish all parent claims to the child
o Neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC (2006)
obligations of care and support which parents Diwata Landingin filed a petition to adopt three minor children
owe their children who are the biological children of Manuel, Diwata’s brother, and
• Physical estrangement alone is NOT abandonment Amelia Ramos. When Manuel died, the children were left with
o There must be complete relinquishment of ALL their paternal grandmother while Amelia went to Italy and
parental duties and claims remarried. Throughout the years, Diwata and Amelia supported
the minors. Diwata claimed that she is qualified to adopt the
SANTOS V. ARANZANSO (1966) children as she already acquired the written consent of the
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed a petition for adoption minors and her children to the adoption. The DSWD
of the minors Paulina and Aurora Santos. The petition alleged recommended the adoption of the minors to Diwata; during the
that the minors were abandoned by their parents and had no trial, however, she failed to present the social worker who
known nearest of kin. Since infancy, they had been in the care conducted the case study. She also failed to offer in evidence
and custody of the petitioners. The guardian ad litem of the Amelia’s consent to the adoption. Nevertheless, the trial court
minors gave his written consent. Paulina, being 14, likewise granted the petition. The CA reversed, holding that Diwata failed
gave her consent. The court granted the adoption. Eight years to show the voluntary consent of Amelia.
later, Juliana died intestate. When Simplicio filed a petition for
the settlement of her estate, Juliana’s cousins appeared Held: Amelia’s consent to the adoption is still needed
alleging that the adoption was void for want of the written because she has not abandoned her children. When she left
consent of the natural parents, who were then living and had for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, but
not abandoned them. The trial court upheld the validity of the chose to work there due to financial constraints. While abroad,
adoption, but the CA reversed, finding that the adoption was she did not relinquish her motherly obligations of rearing the
null and void ab initio for want of consent by the natural parents. children since her children still talk to her for their concerns and
she still sends them financial support. It would be against the
Held: Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their paramount consideration in adoption. More proof has to be
children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned her children.
suffices. In this case, although the trial court did not use the
word “abandoned,” its findings sufficient contain a set of facts DUNCAN V. CFI (1976)
and circumstance which truly constitutes a finding of Atty. Corazon Velasquez received an infant from the latter’s
abandonment. Actual notice on the natural parents is also unwed mother who told her to look for a suitable couple who
unnecessary since in adoption, which is a proceeding in rem, would adopt the child, and to never reveal her identity. Atty.
constructive notice is enough, and it is not needed at all in Velasquez gave the three-day old baby to the petitioner-
regard to the abandoning parent. spouses for adoption. Later, the child was baptized, and the
names of the spouses appeared in the baptismal records as the

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child’s parents. In the petition for adoption, Atty. Velasquez, as shall provide alternative protection and assistance through
the child’s de facto guardian or loco parentis gave the written foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected,
consent required by law. The trial court dismissed the petition orphaned, or abandoned.
on the ground that the consent given is improper and falls short (c) It shall also be a State policy to
of the express requirement of Art. 340 of CC that the consent (i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried
must be given by the parents, guardian or person in charge of decisions to relinquish his/her parental authority over his/
her child
the child to be adopted.
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from
Held: Parent who abandoned the child does not need to give biological parents
her consent for adoption. The de facto guardian, absent any (iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her
legal compulsion to accept the child and a guardian ad litem, is parental authority & custody over his/her adopted child
the person whose consent is required for adoption. There could (iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to
not have been anyone other than Atty. Velasquez who could be promote a positive environment for adoption
called the guardian of the infant. It was she who had actual (v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government
physical custody of the infant and who extended the mantle of and private sector agencies to handle adoption inquiries,
process domestic adoption applications, and offer
protection over the same who otherwise could have suffered a
adoption related services including, but not limited to,
traffic fate. parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling; and
Under RA 8552, a de facto guardian cannot suffice.
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's
There must be consent of the DSWD or the legal
identity and culture in his/her native land, and only when
guardian, and absent such, a petition must be filed
this is not available shall inter- country adoption be
before the DSWD for certification of availability for considered as a last resort.
adoption. Facts of abandonment or neglect must be
proven through pertinent documents Policies safeguard all the three actors in adoption
• Biological parent
CONSENT BY CHILDREN AND THIRD PARTIES • Adoptee (child given up for adoption)
• Adopters
Other Individuals
• Adoptee who is at least ten years of age (after Only when extended family cannot take over rights and
undergoing counseling) responsibilities may adoption by non-relatives be pursued
• Legitimate children who are at least ten years old
• Illegitimate children living with the adopter also 10 years
PRE-ADOPTION PROCEDURES
old adopter and adoptee’s spouses
• Adoptee’s spouse’s consent is required as additional The psychosocial services provided by professional trained
guarantee that motives are not contrary to public policy social workers of DSWD, social services units of local
or good morals government, private and government health facilities, Family
• Serve as notice for order of inheritance Courts, licensed and accredited child-caring and child- placing
• Consent must be authenticated according to the Rules agency, and other individuals and entities involved in adoption
of Court as may be authorized by the DSWD.
• Prepare actors by guarding against hurried decisions
and unnecessary separation of a child from biological
PROCEDURE FOR AGENCY ADOPTION
parents
RA 8552 clarifies the State policy towards adoption. • Counseling → ensures no hasty decisions caused by
anxiety or stress are made
SEC. 2. State Policies.
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody COUNSELING OF BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious Purpose
development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts • Guarantee that decision to give up child for adoption is
prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption not a hurried decision borne of emotional and financial
within the child's extended family is available shall adoption by
pressures on the parents
an unrelated person be considered.
• Pre-adoption services before and after birth of child
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a
• Focus on what it means to adopt.
child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in
accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social
and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Inter-country Adoption. Toward this end, the State

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SEC. 4, RA 8552. IRR. Adoption Forum
(1) Biological parent shall be counseled regarding their options: • Mandated by law; prepares them for effective parenting
a) to keep the child and avail of services and assistance; • Must be organized by DSWD or Kaisahang Buhay
b) avail of temporary child care arrangements such as foster Foundation
care; or
• Assesses motivation, capacity, and readiness to adopt
c) relinquish the child for adoption
(2) Counseling shall provide in a language and manner
understandable to the biological parents(s)/legal guardian on Goal of Counseling
the implications of relinquishing his/her parental authority over • Explain the nature and effects of adoption
the child focusing on: o Child not temporarily filling a void while waiting for
a) the loss of parental rights over the child and as a rule, not a biological child
having further contact with the child; o Parents should understand, process, and grieve
b) the importance of providing relevant information on the
about feelings over infertility before becoming
child, their own medical history and family background;
adopted parents
c) the possibility that the child may be placed for adoption
within the Philippines or in a foreign country; • Feelings about infertility should be assessed in Home
d) the possibility that in the future, there may be Study Report in the section about motivations to adopt
communication with the child at their or the child's
initiative; Processes Involved
e) the right to reconsider his/her decision to relinquish his/her • Explain nature and effects of adoption
child within six (6) months from signing the Deed of
• Familiarization with the adoption process
Voluntary Commitment (DVC) subject to assessment by
• Address and resolve adoption issues
the Department.
(3) Continuing services shall be provided after relinquishment to o How and when to tell children they are adopted,
cope with feeling of loss and other services for his/her answer questions about biological parents
reintegration to the community. • Providing a support group
(4) The biological parent(s) who decides to keep the child be
provided with adequate services and assistance to fulfill COUNSELING FOR PROSPECTIVE ADOPTEE
parental responsibilities.
Processes Involved
Other Rules • Help older children understand that adopters will provide
• No binding commitment to an adoption place shall them with a loving home
permitted before the birth of the child. • Process and legal effects explained in a level they can
o Shall be considered attempt to commit trafficking understand
pursuant to The Anti-Child Abuse Act • Articulate uncertainties and hopes
• Biological parents will be given option to leave contact • Ensure consent of older children is voluntary and their
info, write a letter, or give pictures or personal items that wishes and opinions are considered
will serve as a link to the child.
• Extended services post-relinquishment for coping with LOCATION OF UNKNOWN PARENTS
loss and guilt.
RA 8552, Sec. 5 → duty of DSWD or child- placing or child-
COUNSELING FOR THE PROSPECTIVE ADOPTERS caring agency to exert all efforts to locate unknown biological
parents
SEC. 4, RA 8552 IRR.
(1) Prospective adoptive parent(s) shall attend adoption fora and
seminar to help them assess their motivation, capacity and Sufficient Proof
readiness to adopt. The department shall conduct fora, • Certification from radio and/or TV stations that case was
seminars and counseling session to achieve the following aired on three different occasions
additional objectives: • Publication in newspapers of general circulation or local
a) to disseminate basic information about adoption including circulation whichever is more appropriate
the adoption process and procedures and the effects of
adoption
IF LOCATED → assessed to determine willingness to keep as
b) to inform them of the general background of children in
need of adoptive homes including children with special well as parenting capability
needs;
c) to develop among prospective adoptive parents a respect
• Reunification is desired → take effect after counseling of
for the child's biological origin and an awareness of the both parents and child
importance of telling the child that he/she is adopted. • Not desired → parents sign a deed of voluntary
d) to provide a support group for adoptive parents which shall commitment where they freely and unequivocally give up
give them a venue for sharing their adoption experiences. rights over the child
(2) A certificate shall be issued by the Department to the
prospective adoptive parents attesting that they have IF NOT LOCATED → register as founding; within 3 months
undergone pre-adoption services. The certificate shall be made from date of being found, subject of legal proceedings where
a prerequisite of the home study. he or she shall be declared abandoned

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AD O PTI O N P RO C ED U RE Sec. 11, RA 8552. Case Study. No petition for adoption shall be set for
hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department, the social
Starts upon the completion of the counselling and support service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing or child-
services caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, as well as the
• Parallel simultaneous processes intended to protect the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the
rights of all the parties to the adoption matter to the court hearing such petition.
• One for the child (biological parents + child) At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned
social worker shall confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and
registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not
CASE STUDY REPORT registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally
Sec. 10, RA 8552 → court shall require proof that biological available for adoption and that the documents to support this fact are
parents have been properly counseled valid and authentic.
• Need for a submission to the court of a comprehensive
study report prepared by a licensed social worker ADOPTERS
• Proof of support services for the following:
o All measures to strengthen family ties and keep Process
the child were exhausted • After counselling and fora, adopters are visited at home
o Decision to relinquish the child for adoption is not and interviewed
caused by stress, anxiety, or pressure • Content will include information on family background,
o Decision does not result in improper financial gain marital relationship, financial capacity, health situation,
motivation to adopt and adoption plans, etc.
Documents Needed
• Deed of Voluntary Commitment (RA 8552 IRR) Home Study Report
• Affidavit of Consent (SC Rule on Adoption) Study made by the court social worker of the motivation and
o Says that they relinquish parental authority and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to provide a home
commit him/her to DSWD that meets the needs of a child.
o Consent must be given FREELY after proper • Ascertains genuine intentions of adopters.
counseling
o Social worker must attest that required DSWD V. BELEN (1997)
counseling and information have been given Judge Belen granted the petition for adoption of a minor to
spouses Soriano, both naturalized American citizens. He
Revocation asserted that the DSWD local office prepared an “Adoptive
• Any decision may be revoked by biological parents Home Study Report” and “Child Study Report.” However, it
within three months (per RA 9523) turned out that DSWD did not have any record of the adoption
o Previously 6 months under 8552 and there was no order from the judge for the DSWD to conduct
o Child will be legally available for adoption at a the said reports. As the adoption never passed through the
younger age DSWD, it filed an administrative case against the Judge for
• Irrevocable after three months of signing DVC asking undisclosed amount of money from adopting parents.
o DSWD will issue certificate of availability for The OCA conducted an inquiry and afterwards recommended
adoption that Judge Belen be punished for violating SC Circular No. 12
and Article 33 of PD 603.
CHILD TO BE ADOPTED
Held: DSWD should have been notified about
Child Study Report commencement of adoption proceedings so that the case
• Study made by the court social worker of the child’s legal study could have been conducted. Judge should not assume
status, placement history, psychological, social, that it was routinary for the court’s social welfare officer to
spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural background and that of communicate with DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings.
his biological family needed in determining the most It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such
appropriate placement for him. coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings,
• Temporary placement → Child is placed in a child-caring together with all the other requirements of the law.
or child-placing agency, or under a foster family
• Child-caring → 24 residential care services for
abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children
• Child-placing → receives and processes applicants to
become foster or adoptive parents and facilitate
placement of children eligible for foster care or adoption

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MATCHING PROCESS o Public morality expressed in the law is secular.
Distinction between public and secular morality
Matching refers to the judicious selection from the regional and on one hand, and religious in the other, should be
interregional levels of a family for a child based on the child’s kept in mind. Law refers to the former.
needs and in their best interest as well as the capability and o Adoption matching committee should look only
commitment of the adoptive parents to provide such needs and into civil laws to determine criteria, e.g. marriage
promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship. of spouses
Child Welfare Specialist Group (CWSG) SCOTT V. FAMILY MINISTRIES (1976)

• In charge of matching of children with qualified adopters Held: Allowing adoption agencies to restrict the religion of an
• Consists of adoptive family beyond that which the law mandates, which is
o DSWD social worker only in the case of the religion of natural parents, the adoptee,
o Lawyer specializing in child and youth welfare or upon express preference of adopters, is a violation of the
cases Non-Establishment Clause.
o Physician
o Psychologist
o Representative of NGO of adoptive parents or PLACEMENT AND SUPERVISED TRIAL CUSTODY
child welfare agencies
• Also look at the background of the adopters PRE-PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD
• Upbringing • Preparation of adoptive family and child, physically and
• Financial capacity → if no ITR, certification from psychologically, before actual placement
employer • Done before the physical transfer to the prospective
o Show they are capable, but dangerous to show adoptive parents
they are too capable (they become targets)
• Moral fitness → paying his income tax PRE-ADOPTION PLACEMENT AUTHORITY
• Health/physical capacity • A certificate that marks the commencement of the
• National CWSG → matching for the entire country supervised trial custody
o Old rule → matching is first made within the • Authorizes parents to be responsible for care and
region; if no match is found within 30 days, child’s custody of the child
records forwarded for interregional matching
▪ Causes delay SUPERVISED TRIAL CUSTODY
Preferences of Adopters SEC. 12, RA 8552. No petition for adoption shall be finally
• Sex and Age granted until the adopter(s) has been given by the court a
• Whether with developmental delay or physical disability supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months
o Ascertain financial ability, emotional preparedness within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically
o Same reason for testing of children with high risk of and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding
HIV/AIDS; for establishment of health status relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority
• Should NOT be partial to a “perfect child” (e.g. white, shall be vested in the adopter(s). The court may motu proprio
happy, intelligent, etc) or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds
o Burdens child to be perfect the same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the
o Distorts purpose of adoption reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien
adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial
Religious Considerations custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
Omnibus Guidelines on the Domestic If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with
• Adoption Process the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement
o Religious Affiliation → considered only if child has authority issued by the Department, the prospective
reached an age and level of understanding of adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological
religious practices parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with
o Age said to occur is 6 years old and above the prospective adopter(s).
o If infant or toddlers, religion is not a factor that
• Period of time during which a social worker oversees the
should deter their being matched with adopters
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopters
who belong to another faith
and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship
o Consider children left to agencies run by religious
• Social worker shall conduct monthly home visits to
groups to be matched with adopters who profess
monitor adjustment and submit progress reports to the
a different religion
Department and CCA (IRR)
• W/N religion should be given weight in requirement of
• Upon termination, the Consent to Adopt is given.
“good moral character”

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SEC. 26, RA 8552 IRR. Consent to Adoption. If the adjustment of the FILING A PETITION FOR ADOPTION
child/adopter(s) is satisfactory, the social worker shall forward to the
Department the final supervisory report which shall include the Petition should be filed in the Family Court where the adoptive
recommendation for the issuance of the written consent to adoption parents reside. Both the petitioner and adoptee must
executed by the Department. personally appear before the judge, even if adoptee is infant,
so the court can appreciate the child’s general condition. This
Sec. 27, RA 8552 IRR. Filing of Petition for Adoption. The prospective
adoptive parent shall initiate judicial proceeding by filing the petition
is the only stage of adoption process where the services of a
to adopt not later than thirty (30) days from date of receipt of the lawyer are required.
Department's written consent to adopt.
SUPREME COURT RULE ON ADOPTION
SC Rule on Adoption, Sec 15 SECTION 7. Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be
• Trial custody shall be monitored by the social worker verified and specifically state at the heading of the initiatory
of the court pleading whether the petition contains an application for
• Presupposes that petition is already filed before the change of name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or
trial custody period involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as
abandoned, dependent or neglected. If the petition prays for a
Reconciliation change of name, it shall also state the cause or reason for the
• IRR governs regular adoptions coursed through the change of name.
DSWD
• SC Rule applicable to relative adoptions and indirect SECTION 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. In case the
placements which start with filing a petition in court petition also seeks rectification of a simulated of birth, it shall
allege that:
Reduction of Trial Custody Period (a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth;
• For independent placements or relative adoptions (b) The simulation of birth was made prior to the date of
• Also applicable to aliens who are adopting children effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552 and the application
related to them or to their spouses for rectification of the birth registration and the petition
for adoption were filed within five years from said date;
Waiver (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best
• Biological parents adopt their illegitimate child for interests of the adoptee; and
purposes of elevating the status of the child from (d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and
illegitimate to legitimate treated by petitioner as his own child.
• For foster parents adopting the foster child pursuant to SECTION 9. Adoption of a foundling, an abandoned,
RA 10165
dependent or neglected child. In case the adoptee is a
• Requires a harmonious relationship to exist between foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child, the
child and parent and family members petition shall allege:
(a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling,
Unsuccessful Trial Custody Period abandoned, dependent or neglected;
• Child will be placed in the care of a foster family (b) The names of the parents, if known, and their residence.
If the child has no known or living parents, then the name
SEC. 24, RA 8552 IRR. Disruption of Pre-Adoptive Placement. If the
and residence of the guardian, if any;
placement/relationship is found unsatisfactory by the child or the
(c) The name of the duly licensed child- placement agency
adopter(s), or both, or if the social worker finds that the continued
placement of the child is not in the child's best interest, said or individual under whose care the child is in custody;
relationship/placement shall be suspended by the Department which and
shall recommend to the Adoption Resource and Referral Office to (d) That the Department, child- placement or child- caring
consider another possible placement. Should there be no available agency is authorized to give its consent.
prospective adoptive family, the Department shall arrange for the
child's temporary care. No termination of placement shall be made SECTION 10. Change of name. In case the petition also prays
unless it is shown that the social worker has exhausted all efforts to for change of name, the title or caption must contain:
remove the cause of the unsatisfactory relationship/placement (a) The registered name of the child;
within a reasonable period of time. (b) Aliases or other names by which the child has been
SEC. 25, RA 8552 IRR. New Placement. In the event of the disruption known; and
of the pre-adoptive placement, the Department shall arrange without (c) The full name by which the child is to be known.
delay a new placement of the child or of inappropriate, other
alternative long-term care. The consent of the child to the measures
to be take under this section shall be obtained having regard to his/her
age and level of maturity in particular.

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SECTION 14. Hearing. Upon satisfactory proof that the order (3) the Civil Registrar of the place where the adoptee was
of hearing has been published and jurisdictional requirements registered:
have been complied with, the court shall proceed to hear the a. to annotate on the adoptee's original certificate of
petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must personally appear birth the decree of adoption
and the former must testify before the presiding judge of the b. to issue a certificate of birth which shall not bear any
court on the date set for hearing. annotation that it is a new or amended certificate
c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil
The court shall verify from the social worker and determine registry record which can be open only upon order
whether the biological parent has been properly counseled of the court which issued the decree of adoption;
against making hasty decisions caused by strain or anxiety to d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of adoption
give up the child; ensure that all measures to strengthen the proof of compliance with all the foregoing.
family have been exhausted; and ascertain if any prolonged
stay of the child in his own home will be inimical to his welfare If the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the Civil
and interest Registrar where the foundling was registered, to annotate the
decree of adoption on the foundling certificate and a new birth
certificate shall be ordered prepared by the Civil Registrar in
DECREE OF ADOPTION accordance with the decree.
RA 8552 spells out the provisions on the adoption decree. Important Features
• Decree becomes effective as of date of filing of petition
SECTION 13, RA 8552 IRR. Decree of Adoption. - If, after the o If adopter passes away while case is being heard,
publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and still considered to be the adoptive parent of the
no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after child
consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the
• Civil Registrar shall annotate the original birth certificate,
adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the and issue a new one which shall not bear any mark or
court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt,
annotation that it is new or annotated
and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the
o End practice of merely stamping “amended” on
adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be
the original birth certificate and adding notes
effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This
about adoption (i.e. date, original name w/
provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before adopter’s surname, name of adopters)
the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of
the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the Foundling → deserted or abandoned infant or child found, with
child is to be known. parent, guardian or relatives being unknown, or a child
committed in an orphanage or charitable or similar institution
SECTION 14, RA 8552 IRR. Civil Registry Record. - An
with unknown fact of birth and parentage
amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry,
• Foundling gets a Foundling Certificate containing place
as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the
and date of finding, founder, and approximate age at
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with
time of finding
his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be
• SC Rule mandates issuing of new birth certificate after
stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an
the cancelling of the foundling certificate
amended birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the
civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to
REYES V. SOTERO (2006)
the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an
Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
amended issue.
administration and the settlement of estate of the late Elena
Section 16 of the SC Rule specifies that the adoption decree Lising. She claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising
shall contain the name of the child is to be known, which who died intestate and left real and personal properties
refers to the child’s first name, middle name, and surname. It allegedly in the possession of Ana Joyce Reyes, a grandniece
also provides that the decree shall order the following: of the deceased. The other relatives of Lising were named as
co-heirs of Chichioco. Reyes opposed the petition, claiming
Section 16, SC Rule. that she was an adopted child of Lising. She asserted that the
(1) The Clerk of Court to issue to the adopter a certificate of petition should be dismissed as she was the only heir of Lising.
finality upon expiration of the 15-day period within which Reyes presented as evidence a certification stating that she
to appeal; was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She
(2) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree also submitted a Decree of Final Distribution issued by the
of adoption and the certificate of finality to the Civil PVAO showing that, upon the death of Delos Santos, death
Registrar where the child was originally registered within benefits were paid to Lising and Reyes. Chichioco claimed that
30 days from receipt of the certificate of finality. In case no such adoption proceeding took place, and the OSG had no
of change of name, the decree shall be submitted to the records of the adoption case. Reyes’ mother allegedly made it
Civil Registrar where the court issuing the same is appear that the spouses adopted her. The RTC granted
situated; Chichioco’s motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court. The CA

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nullified the resolutions, holding that the appointment of the information upon written request to the child/adopted
branch clerk of court as special administrator engender a person with appropriate guidance and counseling
suspicion that he and the judge are milking the decedent’s • By analogy, the adoptee in a domestic adoption must
estate. It also held that it was incumbent upon Reyes to prove have this same right especially in light of the absence of
that she was indeed adopted by the spouses since there were any law proscribing it.
imputations of irregularities on her adoption decree.
Search Movement
Held: The certifications issued by the local civil registrar and • Group pushing for the openness of adoption records in
the clerk of court regarding details of Reyes’ adoption recognition of the problems “inherent in the sealed
which are entered in the records kept under their official record system and on the importance they attribute to
custody are prima facie evidence of the facts contained the search that enables both parents and adoptees to
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of connect with each other
petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until o Says adoptees suffer from “genealogical
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere bewilderment” and should be reunited with birth
imputations of irregularities will not cast doubt on the adoption parents
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed • Counter: threatening sense of difference for adoptees
valid until proof to the contrary is offered. The contrary proof since they have two set of parents
can only be presented in a separate action brought principally o Counter to counter: two set of parents not unusual
for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree—it cannot be in today’s society given annulment/divorce
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of • Right of child to information must be balanced with
Lising’s estate. desire for secrecy and privacy of biological parents.
IN RE ROGER B
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PERMANENCY OF SEALED
Adoptee has no fundamental right to view adoption records
RECORDS
since status of being an adoptee is derived from a legal
Confidentiality proceeding. Sealing adoption records is rationally related to
• “All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and protecting the integrity of the adoption process and is thus
shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and constitutional
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the Philippines does not impose confidentiality of proceedings
court, the Department, or any other agency or institution
against the adoptee himself but only against the public or
participation in the adoption proceedings shall be kept third persons.
strictly confidential.” (RA 8552)
• Why? No reason. Need to know about heritage and find
• If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to closure or resolve issues about their identity.
a third person is necessary for purposes connected with
o This hardly imperils the family relationship that
or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best
has been developed during the formative years
interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the
necessary information to be released, restricting the Post-Adoption Support Services
purposes for which it may be used (SC Rules and RA Includes that adoptee, adoptive parents, and the birth parents
8552) shall be consulted and their consent secured prior to the giving
o Law does not define of what is “necessity” and of information and/or search and reunion
how to assess “adoptee’s best interest”
• Reality is that adoption hearings remain open to public Intent to Search
in real life since they are scheduled together with other • Allowed only upon written request by adoptee who is of
special proceedings legal age, by adopters on their own behalf or
representing the minor adoptee, or by the birth parents
Nature of the Rules
• There must be written consent from the party as well as
• Does Birth → pertain only to “third person”, thus those
counseling
who were not party to the adoption
• If ADULT ADOPTEE petitions for the opening of OWN
Why the law?
records, Court should allow him
• Protect adopters against the disruption of their parental
o Law enacts a system of sealed records only with
authority and custody over the child
regard to outsiders
o ENDS upon the EMANCIPATION of the minor (i.e.
• Legislative Intent is to protect the privacy rights of the
becomes legal age)
adopter and adoptee and enable the adoptee to access
• Having an open records system would allow parents to
information about their own life
establish connection with birth child but at the expense
Does an adoptee have the right to his unsealed records of security and stability of the new adoptive family
WITHOUT a court order? YES • Adoptee is enabled to assert his/her right to own
• Under Sec 53 of Inter-Country Adoption Rules and adoption records under the language of the Domestic
Regulations, allow DSWD to reveal birth and adoption Adoption Act

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EFFECTS OF ADOPTION AND RESCISSION If the adopting parent dies before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the
SECTION 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the parents or ascendants of the adopter.
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties • The adopted child is not related to the deceased
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be because filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
between the adopter and the adopted.
SECTION 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the • Under Philippine law, the child and descendants of the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and adopted child cannot represent him.
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations o Arts. 971 and 973 of CC preclude representation
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them because there is no legal relation between the
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is adopter and the children of the adopted; the legal
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means tie of adoption is personal and exclusively
of the family. between the adopter and the adopted.
SECTION 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of COMMENTARIES OF ERNESTO PINEDA
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
Adoption, once decreed by the court, has the following effects:
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. (1) The adopted, for civil purposes, shall be deemed the
legitimate child of the adopter or adopters.
ART. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: - FC, civil purposes → excludes political purposes;
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a cannot inherit citizenship
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire - RA 8552, all intents and purposes → ell-
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
encompassing and all-embracing; adoptees can
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
inherit from their adopting parents and can now
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
represent them in the estate or ascendants of the
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the
adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters,
adopters
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
(2) The adopters and the child acquire reciprocal rights
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted
and obligations arising from the relationship.
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents - Right to use the surname of the adopter
and other blood relatives. - A child adopted by a married woman, without the
concurrence of her husband, follows the maiden
ART. 365, CC. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the name of the mother to avoid confusion.
adopter. - But it does not confer on the adopted the nationality
of the adopter.
TOLENTINO (3) The parental authority of the natural parents over the
The general effect of the adoption decree is to transfer to the adopted is terminated and the same is vested on the
adopting parents the parental authority of the parents by adopters.
nature, as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock.
• The duty of obedience, right to custody of the child, - Exception: if the adopter is the stepparent of the
duties of support and education, and the rights of adoptee (or the child of the other spouse) in which
correction and punishment are transferred from the case, the parental authority of the biological parent
natural parents to the adopters. remains but is exercisable jointly with the adopter
The relationship established by adoption is limited to the (4) The adopted remains an intestate heir of his/her natural
adopting parent and does not extend to his other relatives, parents and other blood relatives because the adoption
except as expressly provided by law. did not dissolve his/her relationship with them.
• The adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of - However, under RA 8552, all legal ties between the
the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, biological parents and adoptee had been severed.
nor of the legitimate children which they may have before - With the amendment of the law under Article 17 of
or after adoption. RA 8552, the adopted is now given the right of
• Neither are the children of the adopted considered as representation which is endowed on legitimate
descendants of the adopter. children.
o In effect, what the legitimate children enjoy,
The adopted child is entitled to inherit from two sources: the adopted must also enjoy without
1) The adopting parents discrimination.
2) The biological parents and relatives by blood o It is only just and fair that adopted children
who are deemed legitimate children be
granted the same right.

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- The adoptee has been accorded the right to (1) Adopters surviving with the biological parents,
represent the adopter in the estate of the latter’s whether legitimate or illegitimate, or biological
parents. ascendants of the adopted.
- The adoptee may now inherit from legitimate (a) Adopters → whole estate
children of the adopter(s). (b) Biological parents or ascendants → none
Reason: Under Sec. 16 of RA 8552, all legal ties

ART. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the previously existing between the biological parents and
adopted shall be governed by the following rules: the adopted are severed, except only if the biological
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants parent is the spouse of the adopter.
and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit
from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules (2) Adopters concurring with surviving spouse OR
of legal or intestate succession; illegitimate children.
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the (a) Adopters → ½ of the estate
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the (b) Surviving spouse or illegitimate children → ½ of
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be the estate
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters (repealed by RA 8552); (3) Adopters concurring with surviving spouse AND the
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of illegitimate children.
the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide (a) Adopters → ½ of the estate
the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited (b) Surviving spouse → ¼ of the estate
by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted (c) Illegitimate children → ¼ of the estate
and the other half, by the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children (4) Adopters surviving alone: They get all. If both adopting
and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide parents are alive, each parent will get ½ of the estate.
the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited
by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving (5) Collateral relatives
spouse, and one-third by the adopters (repealed by RA (a) Surviving alone → whole estate
8552); (b) Concurring with adopters → ½ for adopters and
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the ½ for collateral relatives
entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted
survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate PARENTAL RIGHTS
succession shall apply. PARENTAL AUTHORITY OF ADOPTERS
By virtue of the adoption decree, the parental authority of the
• The adopter and adoptee are reciprocal heirs to one biological parents is terminated and vested in the adopter.
another.
• This article applies only if the adoptee dies intestate or • Art. 189, FC → parental authority shall terminate and be
without a will or with a will but not effective, and without vested in the adopter
any legitimate children. • Sec. 16, RA 8552 → broader terms; all legal ties between
o If he died with a valid will, the law on testamentary the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
succession will govern. and be vested on the adopter(s)
• The adopters do not inherit from the adopted if the latter
The adoption decree transfers from the natural parents to the
is survived by legitimate children or descendants.
adoptive parents the custody of the child’s person, the duty
o Surviving heirs are the spouse, legitimate and
of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal
illegitimate children or descendants → inherit
consequences and incidents of the natural relation as if the
pursuant to the ordinary rules of intestate
child is a legitimate child in the first place.
succession under Art. 999 of CC
o Surviving spouse of the adopted survives with In Section 7 of RA 8552, the husband and wife must adopt
legitimate parents → Art. 997 of CC jointly and exercise joint parental authority over the child. There
o No legitimate children or other heirs and only the is a typographical error in the last paragraph of this article:
adopters survive → adopters will inherit the entire
estate of the adopted (Art. 190, par. 5) In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse
o Only surviving heirs are collateral relatives → adopts the illegitimate child of the other, joint parental
inherit pursuant to Art. 1003 of CC authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
If the adopted had no legitimate children or descendants, the According to this provision, when a person adopts the
adopters can concur in the inheritance with the certain heirs. illegitimate child of the other, both the adopter and the
biological parent of the child exercise parental authority.

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• Anomaly → relationship of the adopter and the adopted If the case were decided today, the applicable rule would be RA
is that of a legitimate parent and child while the biological 8552, which provides that during the supervised trial custody,
parent who did not adopt the child remains an temporary parental authority shall be vested in the
illegitimate parent adopters. A decree of adoption shall also be effective as of
• The adoption of an illegitimate child does not fall under the date the original petition was filed.
the exceptions in Section 7 unless the illegitimate child • General rule → if the child commits a tort during the trial
is being adopted by his or her own parent for the purpose custody period, the prospective adopters who are
of elevating the child’s status to that of a legitimate child. already exercising parental authority, albeit temporarily,
• When a spouse wants to adopt the illegitimate child of should be held liable.
the other spouse, the general rule applies, which requires • How to avoid liability → clear evidence that at the time
both the illegitimate parent and his or her spouse to of the tort, legal custody over the child had been
adopt the child who then becomes their legitimate child. returned, no matter how briefly, to the biological parents.
TAMARGO V. CA (1992) VISITATION RIGHTS BY THE BIOLOGICAL PARENT(S)

Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt In relative and independent adoptions, the exercise of parental
Adelberto Bundoc, then ten years old. Before the petition was authority by the adopters does not automatically void
granted, Adelberto shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, which visitation rights of the birth parents agreed to before the legal
caused her death. A complaint for damages was then filed by separation.
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer’s adopting parent, and spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, her biological parents, against GROVES V. CLARK (1996)
Birth mother agreed to the adoption of her child by a couple of her
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s biological
choice on the condition that she would have continued visitation rights.
parents with whom he was living with at the time of the incident.
After the decree was issued, the adopters refused the birth mother’s
A criminal Information was also filed but Adelberto was request to visit her child. This prompted her to petition for specific
acquitted for acting without discernment. The spouses Bundoc performance of the visitation agreement.
claimed that because the child was adopted, the spouses
Rapisura were the indispensable parties to the action as Held: Birth parents and prospective adoptive parents may freely
contract for post-adoption visitation. The courts must give effect to
parental authority had shifted to them when they filed the
this arrangement unless it is clear that it will not be in the best of the
petition for adoption. The trial court ruled that the spouses
child to be visited by his/her biological mother.
Bundoc indeed were not the indispensable parties to the action.
Due to failure to appeal on time, the CA dismissed the petition. WEINSCHEL V. STROPLE (1983)
There is nothing in the legislative purpose or in the substantive provision
Held: The liability belongs to the spouses Bundoc. Under Art.
of the statute that precludes the adoptive and biological parents
2180 of CC, civil liability is imposed upon the father, and in case from entering into a visitation agreement given that it is not
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that repugnant to public policy. The law is a shield, not a sword.
may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. This
principle of parental liability is called as vicarious liability, where This may be the same for us since under Section 16 of RA
a person is also responsible for torts committed by others with 8552, all legal ties between the biological parents and the
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested
responsible. Parental liability is thus a natural consequence of on the adopters.
parental authority. In this case, the shooting of Jennifer • The law does not prohibit the biological parent(s) from
occurred when parental authority over Adelberto was still entering an agreement with the adopters on post
lodged in the spouses Bundoc as his natural parents. Thus, it adoption visitation.
follows that the natural parents who had the actual custody of • Neither do our laws compel the adopters to grant
Adelberto are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. visitation rights if such is not beneficial to the child.
• The absence of an express provisions prohibiting
The adoption decree may not be applied retroactively so as continued contact between the biological parents and
to impose liability upon the spouses Rapisura. At the time of the child with the approval of the adopters simply means
the incident, they had no actual or physical custody over that for those who this as a positive arrangement, a court
Adelberto. To give them liability for a tortious act that they could may not arbitrarily refuse to enforce it.
not have foreseen and prevented—since they were in US at the
time—would be unfair. Moreover, under Art. 35 of CYWC,
parental authority is vested provisionally in the adopting parents LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD
during the period of trial custody. In this case, the trial custody
had not yet begun or had already been completed. Either way, The adopted child is considered the legitimate child of the
actual custody of Adelberto was with the spouses Bundoc. adopters. Under Art. 189 of FC, this effect is limited only for civil
purposes. However, under Sec. 17 of RA 8552, the adoptee is
In Tamargo, what is controlling is the fact that the child’s considered the legitimate child of the adopters for all intents
biological parents had actual physical custody of him at the and purposes. It also emphasizes the equal rights of a
time of the incident. Also, parental authority was still lodged legitimate child and an adopted child.
with the natural parents since no decree had been granted yet.

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The adoptee also enjoys all the rights of a legitimate biological REPUBLIC V. CA & WONG (1992)
child in terms of use of surname, support, and succession, as Spouses Hoong and Concepcion Wong adopted Maximo
well as the non-material aspects of love, attention, Wong when he was 2 ½ years old. Upon reaching the age of 22,
encouragement, and guidance. he filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala Jr., his
former name before the adoption. He averred that his use of the
SURNAME OF ADOPTED CHILD surname Wong embarrassed him from his relatives and friends,
For civil purposes, the adopted child is the legitimate child of as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in fact he is a
the adopter and has the right to use the adopter’s surname. Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wanted
to erase any implication of alien nationality. He also claimed that
JOHNSTON V. REPUBLIC (1963) he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, which is
A married woman who adopted a child singly without the hampering his business and social life. His surviving adoptive
concurrence of her husband sought to have the adoptee’s mother, Concepcion, gave her consent to the filing of the
surname changed to her surname, Johnston. petition. The trial court and appellate courts granted his petition.
Hence, this appeal by the Republic.
Held: The law entitled the adoptee to use the adopter’s own
surname—her maiden name—and not the surname she Held: He should be allowed to use his former surname. A
acquired by virtue of marriage. The adoption had created a change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103
personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted of RC is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
only and since the husband was not a co-petitioner in the personality and to provide his best interest. In this case, the CA
adoption, the child was not entitled to the use of the husband’s had exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the
surname. To allow the minor to use his surname would mislead petition. Maximo was prompted to change his name because
the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the of the embarrassment and ridicule his surname “Wong” brings
husband. And later, when questions of successional rights in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim
arise, the husband’s consent to the adoption might be Filipino in a Muslim community. In the absence of prejudice to
presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of a former alien nationality is a proper and
One of the exceptions to the rule that spouses must
reasonable cause for change of name. Nothing in this case
adopt jointly is when they are legally separated.
shows that such prejudice or injury would be caused to the
Where the female adopter is legally separated from her
state or other persons by the change of petitioner’s surname.
spouse, the surname that the adopted child will use
shall be the legal name of the adopter and not her Moreover, while an effect of adoption is that the adoptee shall
husband’s surname. bear the surname of the adopter, the change of surname of
the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object
ART. 372, CC. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall of adoption proceedings. The purpose of adoption is to effect
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal a new status of relationship between the child and his or her
separation.
adoptive parents, and the change of name is more of an
incident only than the object of the proceeding.
LAPERAL V. REPUBLIC (1962)
The wife, even after the decree of legal separation, shall FIRST NAME OF ADOPTED CHILD
continue using her name and surname employed before the Under the FC, if a change in the child’s first name is desired,
legal separation because her married status is unaffected by the the adopters must comply with the substantive and procedural
separation. The wife should continue to use the name indicative requirements for a special proceeding for a change of name. RA
of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned. 8552, under Section 13, does away with this and provides that
Taking Johnston and Laperal together, a woman who is legally the decree of adoption shall state the name by which the
separated from her husband must continue using the name child is to be known.
indicative of her married status. Hence, is she has been using The SC Rule also requires that if the supervised trial custody is
her husband’s surname during her marriage, that continues to satisfactory and the court is convinced that the adoption will
be her name even during the legal separation. If so, this too redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of
should be the name she gives her adopted child. However, this adoption shall be issued stating the name by which the
contradicts the Johnston ruling and gives rise to an absurd child is to be known and registered. Moreover, Section 10 of
and confusing situation where the legally separated woman is the SC Rule mandates that if the petition for adoption also prays
compelled to continue using her married name but must give for a change of name, the title or caption must contain:
her adopted child her maiden surname. (a) The registered name of the child;
In such case, the adopter herself should not be barred (b) Aliases or other names by which the child has been
from using her maiden surname. After all, Art. 370 of known; and
CC is not mandatory and states that a married woman (c) The full name by which the child is to be known.
may use her husband’s surname. What is important is
her legal surname should be the same surname her
adopted child must use.

191
REPUBLIC V. HERNANDEZ (1996) surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. One of the
Spouses Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to adopt the effects of adoption is that the adoptee is deemed to be a
minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, with a prayer to change his legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes, and
first name to Aaron Joseph as it is his baptized name and by such, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
which he has been called by his adoptive family ever since. The provided by law to a legitimate child, including the right to bear
Republic opposed the joinder of the petitions for adoption and the surname of her father and her mother. Additionally, her
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will
petitions should be pursued as two separate proceedings. maintain her maternal lineage. Because the adoptee remains an
However, the trial court ruled in favor of the spouses. intestate heir of her biological parent, Stephanie can still claim
her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Also,
Held: A change of name is beyond the purview of a decree Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father.
of adoption. There is no question that the change of name will Hence, to allow her to use her mother’s surname as her middle
not prejudice anyone, as the name sought to be changed name will eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
belongs to an infant barely over a year old and thus has not
exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual
obligation. Article 189 of FC allows the adoptee, as a matter of NATIONALITY
right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter upon
issuance of the adoption decree. However, the first name of the Adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopter to
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil the adopted.
register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not OPINION NO. 141, S. 1994, DOJ
confer upon the adoptee a license to change the adoptee’s first The Justice Secretary stated that Filipino children adopted by
name. The change of first name is not a mere incident to an foreigners retain their Philippine citizenship since under existing
adoption proceeding, and thus a prayer therefor inserted in a laws, acquisition by a minor of the foreign citizenship of his
petition for adoption cannot properly be granted. adopted parents is not one of the ways by which Philippine
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register citizenship may be lost, and the acquisition by minors of
should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest foreign citizenship through adoption cannot have the effect of
the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and naturalization or renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
shall continue to be used until the court orders otherwise. It is a fundamental principle of international law that it is for the
Changing the first name of a person is a substantial change law of each State to determine who are its nationals. Hence,
which cannot be authorized without a judicial order. Hence, a since the minors are Filipinos at birth, their status must be
change of name can only be done by strictly complying with the governed by Philippine laws. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
procedural and substantive requirements for a special the adoption of the Filipino minors by Danish citizens is not
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of RC. among the grounds for losing Philippine citizenship. Therefore,
If the SC had to decide the same issue now, RA 8552 it cannot be said that the minors lost their citizenship by reason
will apply, giving the adopters the right to change of their adoption.
their child’s first name. Choosing the first name of a The only possible mode of losing Philippine citizenship for the
child is part of the joyful experience of being parents, minors is renunciation. However, even renunciation cannot be
and consistent with the law that deems the adoptee as possible for the minors in this case since the law requires an
a legitimate child for all intents and purposes. express renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate
language. Moreover, being minors, they are without legal
MIDDLE NAME capacity to renounce their status.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA (2005)
Section 1, CA No. 63. Grounds for losing Filipino citizenship:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate (1) Naturalization in a foreign country
child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that (2) Express renunciation of citizenship
Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s (3) Subscribing to an oath of allegiance of a foreign country
surname, and that her surname be changed to Catindig, his (4) Joining the armed forces of a foreign country
surname. The RTC granted the adoption and allowed the (5) Cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
change of the child’s name to Stephanie Nathy Catindig. (6) Declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the
Philippine army in times of war, unless pardoned
Honorato then moved to reconsider, praying that Stephanie
(7) In the case of a woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by the laws
should be allowed to use Garcia as her middle name. The RTC
in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality
denied his motion as there was no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother
TOLENTINO
as her middle name. The OSG agreed with Honorato.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the laws on naturalization
Held: Stephanie may use the surname of her mother as her which makes adoption of an alien a means of acquiring
middle name. While the law is silent as to what middle name Philippine citizenship. The right to confer citizenship belongs
an adoptee may use, the members of the committees that exclusively to the State. Although an adopted child has the
drafted the FC recognized the Filipino custom of adding the same rights and duties as a legitimate child of the adopter, this
is only limited to civil rights and duties, not political rights.

192
A Filipino adopted by an alien cannot be considered as long Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. However, the CA
his Filipino citizenship. The loss of such an important right modified the decision, stating that Delia and Edmundo are
cannot be left to implication, and must only be upon the disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased.
grounds enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63, wherein
adoption by a foreigner is not one of the causes. Held: The three are entitled to inherit from their parents.
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Philippine adoption law cannot prescribe the Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are
automatic acquisition by the adopted child of the the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
adopter’s nationality since our country cannot couple, in line with Art. 979 of CC. The philosophy underlying
determine for another who its citizens are. Thus, if the this article is that a person’s love descends first to his children
adopter’s country extends citizenship to the and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and spreads
adoptee, such will not, by itself, divest the child of among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of
his Filipino citizenship. In the case above, since the purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually
Danish law confers Danish citizenship to the adopted to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision
Filipino child, he or she now enjoys dual citizenship. for their continued care even after his death.
However, only Doribel has the right to represent her

SUCCESSION deceased father in the intestate estate of her grandparents.
As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and the granddaughter
Article 189 of FC categorically states that the adoptee shall of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has the right to represent her
remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood father. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father
relatives, while Article 190 provides for a detailed enumeration would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
as to legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted. equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.
Meanwhile, to Delia and Edmundo, Eleno and Rafaela were
Section 18, RA 8552. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, total strangers. While an adopted child has the same rights as
the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of a legitimate child, these rights do not include the right of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern. between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extent to the blood relatives of either party.
Under Section 18 of RA 8552, the adopter and adoptee have
ART. 970, CC. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
reciprocal rights of succession → an adoptee inherits as a
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree
compulsory heir of his/her adoptive parents the full share of a
of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
legitimate child, and vice versa. would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
BETWEEN ADOPTEE AND ADOPTER ART. 971, CC. The representative is called to the succession by the law
RA 8552 provides that the adopter and adoptee have and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
represented would have succeeded.
legitimate children in legal and intestate succession.
ART. 981, CC. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
BETWEEN ADOPTEE AND ADOPTER’S RELATIVES other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
The relationship created by adoption is exclusively between the right, and the latter by right of representation.
adopter and the adopted. Hence, the adopted child has no
right to inherit from the relatives of his adopted parents.
BETWEEN ADOPTEE AND BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
SAYSON V. CA (1992)
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children: Mauricio, ART. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
Rosario, Basilia, Remedios, and Teodoro. Teodoro married (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his
Isabel, and when they died, their properties were left in the parents and other blood relatives.
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel Sayson, who claim
Two views of Prof. Balane on the successional relationship
to be the children of the spouses. Later on, the siblings of
between the adoptee and biological parents:
Teodoro filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson to the exclusion of the 1. Adopted has no right of compulsory and intestate
alleged children. The children then filed their own complaint for succession to his biological parents and relatives
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Under Article 189(3) of FC, the adopted shall remain an
Rafaela Sayson against the couple’s four surviving children.
intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
They claimed that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted
However, the new law is silent and neither gives nor denies
children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
an adopted child the right to a legitime from his biological
and Isabel, and as such they were entitled to inherit Teodoro’s
parents. RA 8552 could have easily reproduced Article
share in his parents’ estate by right of representation. The trial
189(3), but it did not.
court declared the three children as entitled to inherit from

193
2. Adopted child retains his right to succeed his biological and how this will be assisted by the adopter’s
parents and relatives enjoyment of maternity leave benefits.
In the absence of express repeal of Article 189(3) of FC, the
adopted child retains his right to succeed his biological Section 11 of the CSC Memorandum Circular that discusses
parents and relatives. Doubts should be resolved in favor the conditions for the grant of maternity leave was applied
of the adoptee. suppletorily.
Since many biological parents relinquish their child for adoption SEC. 11. Conditions for the grant of maternity leave. – Married
by reason of poverty or emotional unpreparedness, their women in the government service who have rendered an
biological child should not be prevented from inheriting if aggregate of two (2) years of service, shall, in addition to the
they were able to improve their lot. vacation and sick leave granted them, be entitled to maternity
• However, the clear intent of the law is to severe all legal leave of sixty (60) calendar days with full pay.
ties between the biological parents and the adoptee.
Maternity leave of those who have rendered one (1) year or
• There is nothing that precludes the biological parents in
more but less than two (2) years of service shall be computed
this situation to give their biological child his or her
in proportion to their length of service, provided, that those
rightful share in their last will and testament.
who have served for less than one (1) year shall be entitled to
One reason behind the law severing all legal ties is to quell the sixty (60) days maternity leave with half-pay.
fears of prospective adopters that whatever they might
leave to their adoptee could merely end up with the This CSC resolution is binding on all those in government
biological parents, who failed to fulfill their parental duties in service, but not to those in the private sector.
the first place. • Adoptive mothers and fathers have to rely on the grant
of maternity and paternity benefits from the generosity of
• Those who pursued relative and independent adoptions
their employers.
know the identity and whereabouts of the adopters.
• Even in the absence of a resolution or guideline, the
• Knowledge that the adopters have passed away and left
provision of RA 8552 is clear and should be sufficient to
a sizable estate to the adoptee could induce an
provide the legal basis for claiming maternity, paternity,
unprincipled person to take the life of his or her biological
child to inherit from the latter. and all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled.
BENEFITS TO WHICH ADOPTERS ARE ENTITLED BARTOLOME V. SSS (2014)

John Colcol was employed as an electrician on a shipping
The IRR of RA 8552 emphasizes that adoptive parents also vessel and was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
enjoy all benefits to which biological parents are entitled to. Compensation Program. Unfortunately, an accident occurred
which led to his death. At that time, John was childless and
SECTION 34. Benefits. – The adoptive parents shall, with
unmarried. Thus, Bernardina Bartolome, John’s biological
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
mother and allegedly sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
biological parents are entitled. Maternity and paternity
for death benefit with the SSS. The SSS, however, denied her
benefits and other benefits given to biological parents upon
claim, stating that she is no longer considered as the parent of
the birth of a child shall be enjoyed if the adoptee is below
John as he was legally adopted before by Cornelio Colcol.
seven (7) years of age as of the date the child is placed with
Bernardina appealed to the Employees’ Compensation
the adoptive parents thru the Pre-Adoptive Placement
Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of SSS, holding
Authority issued by the Department.
that John was adopted by his great-grandfather Cornelio and
the decree of adoption had already attained finality. Hence, it is
Thus, adoptive parents may avail of maternity and paternity
Cornelio who qualifies as his primary beneficiary. It also ruled
benefits provided the adoptee is below seven years old as of
that Bernardina could neither be considered a secondary
the date of issuance of the Pre-Adoptive Placement Authority.
beneficiary, since such beneficiaries could only be the
dependent legitimate parents of the covered member.
RESOLUTION NO. 00765, CSC
The issue is whether or not Mrs. Tan, a documentation officer Held: Yes, Bernardina is entitled to receive the benefits from
of CSC who had previously been granted with her husband a the death of his natural son, John. First, it was error for the
Pre-Adoption Placement Authority for adoption of a baby girl, ECC to rule that it was not duly proven that Cornelio has already
could avail of maternity leave benefits consistent with Sec. 34. passed away—based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears
The problem arose since CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41 did that he died in October 1987, or only less than three years since
not explicitly give such benefit to adoptive parents. the decree of adoption attained finality.
Held: The grant of maternity benefits to a female adoptive Second, the ECC also indulged in unauthorized administrative
parent may be allowed even without categorical mention of legislation when it enacted its Rule on Employees’
the same in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41. Compensation interpreting the phrase dependent parents as
limited to legitimate parents only. The use of the term parents
The CSC took cognizance of the adopter and
under the Labor Code is ought to be taken in its general sense.
adoptee’s need to adjust to their new relationship

194
Plainly, dependent parents are parents, whether legitimate or • FC → the adopter could file a suit to abrogate the
illegitimate, biological or adoptive, who are in need of support adoption proceedings under specific circumstances.
and assistance. Moreover, the Rule also contravenes the equal o If the adopted has committed any act constituting
protection clause since it prevents the parents of an illegitimate a ground for disinheriting a descendant
child from claiming benefits with such interpretation. o When the adopted has abandoned the home of
the adopters during minority for at least one year,
Finally, Bernardina qualified as John’s secondary beneficiary. OR by some other acts, has definitely repudiated
When his adoptive father died less than 3 years after the the adoption.
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about 4 years old. • RA 8552 → right to rescind solely in the hands of the
Hence, under Sec. 20 of RA 8552, parental authority over him adoptee.
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of Bernardina. And o The adoption decree may be vacated of the
under Art. 190 of FC, it is apparent that biological parents retain adoptee proves the existence of any of the
their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was following grounds:
the subject of adoption. On top of this restoration of parental (a) Repeated physical, verbal maltreatment by
authority, Bernardina’s dependence on John can also be the adopter(s) despite having undergone
established by evidence—both of them have the same address counseling;
as their residence, and John named her as one of his (b) Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
beneficiaries for his SSS benefits. (c) Sexual assault or violence; or
(d) Abandonment and failure to comply with
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION parental obligations.
o Adopters have no right to a judgment setting
SECTION 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition aside an adoption decree.
of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or
if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as There is no relief for rescission of the adoption of
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the stepchildren by an adoptive father on the ground of fraud in
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): the marriage between him and the children’s biological mother.
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
JOSLYN V. REYNOLDS (2001)
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
Reynolds, then married with three children, was hired to care for Joslyn,
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
a quadriplegic. Reynolds, who also managed Joslyn’s finances, soon
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
divorced her husband and initiated a sexual relationship with Joslyn.
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental They married and her children moved in with them. Later on, Joslyn
obligations. adopted them and paid for their support. However, Reynolds became
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be unfaithful and he found that she married him only for his money. After
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) the divorce, Joslyn tried to vacate the adoption of his step-children.
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the
Civil Code. Held: A marriage based on fraud does not give rise to a claim for setting
aside an adoption arising out of that marriage. The fraud goes to the
SECTION 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the basis for the marriage rather than the basis for the adoption.
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if RA 8552 underscores that adoption is permanent, just like
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights biological filiation. A parent-child relationship created by law
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other should also be for better or for worse, safeguarded with the
shall be extinguished. same tenacity and commitment.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended COONRACH V. SAILORS
certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth Where one voluntarily assumes the relationship of parent to a child by
certificate. formal adoption, it cannot be lightly set aside. In the absence of such
statute the courts will not assume jurisdiction to annul a decree of
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but adoption at the instance of the adopting parent and the child to
only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights again become a public charge.
acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without LAHOM V. SIBULO (2003)
prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if Spouses Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom adopted the latter’s
the criminal acts are properly proven. two-year-old nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo. After the adoption
was decreed, the child’s name was changed to Jose Melvin
Lahom. More than twenty years later, Mrs. Lahom commenced
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, alleging that:
A fundamental difference between the FC and Domestic (1) Despite their pleadings, Jose refused to change his surname
Adoption Act is on who has the right to rescind the adoption. from Sibulo to Lahom, as evidenced by his records with the PRC
and in all his dealings and activities in his profession;
(2) Mrs. Lahom being a widow, and living alone with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and

195
concern of Jose, but the latter remained indifferent and would Disinheritance can be done only through a will in which the
only visit her once a year; ground must be specified. The subsequent reconciliation of
(3) Because of Jose’s indifference, Mrs. Lahom has suffered the parties revokes the right to disinherit and any disinheritance
wounded feelings, knowing that his only motive to his adoption
already made becomes ineffectual.
is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of the
spouses, as shown by his filing of a complaint for partition According to the SC Rule on Adoption, only the adoptee, by
against Mrs. Lahom.
way of a verified petition, may ask for the rescission of the
Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 went into effect, adoption decree.
removing the right of adopters to rescind an adoption. However,
• Minor → assisted by the DSWD
Mrs. Lahom asserts that the proscription in RA 8552 should not
• Legal age but incapacitated → with the guardian
retroactively apply to cases where the ground for rescission
o Petition for rescission must be filed within 5 years
vested under the regime of Art. 348 of CC and Art. 192 of FC.
after he reaches the age of majority.
The trial court held that the action for rescission had already
o If incompetent at the time of adoption → within 5
prescribed, since it has been more than five years when she
years after recovery from such incompetency.
discovered the legal ground for the petition.
• The petition for rescission shall be filed with the Family
Held: Mrs. Lahom may no longer rescind the adoption Court of the city or province where the adoptee resides.
decree. It was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that she
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption of Jose. By
EFFECTS OF RESCISSION
then, the new law had already repealed the right of an adopter
under the CC and FC to rescind a decree of adoption. Effects of rescission under the IRR of RA 8552:
Moreover, even before the passage of the law, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 1) Restoration of parental authority of the adoptee’s
100 of RC and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke biological parent(s) or the legal custody of the
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. Thus, Mrs. Department if the adoptee is a minor or incapacitated.
Lahom is also barred by prescription from filing an action for 2) Extinguishing of the reciprocal rights and obligations
rescission. Adoption is a privilege that is governed by the of the adopters and adoptee.
state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best
3) Cancellation of the new birth certificate of the
interest and welfare of the child, and as a corollary, a right of
adoptee as ordered by the court and restoration of the
action given by statute may be taken away any time before it
adoptee’s original birth certificate.
has been exercised.
4) Reverting successional rights to its status prior to
Nonetheless, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal adoption but not only as of the date of judgment of
ties of adoption, can always, for valid reasons, cause the judicial rescission.
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an 5) Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall
undeserving child. For instance, an adopter may deny to an be respected.
adopted child his legitime, and by will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of According to Senator Tolentino, the rescission or revocation of
the estate. the adoption terminates all its effects in the future.
• The effects produced before the rescission must be
recognized.
In extremely serious cases, the remedy of the adopters is to • The child, if still a minor, does not revert automatically to
disinherit the adoptee for causes under Art. 919 of CC. The the parental authority of the parents by nature—the court
same remedy is available to biologically-related parents and must order the revival of such parental authority.
children. Grounds sufficient to disinherit an adopted child are: • The adopter and adoptee cannot recover what has been
given by one to the other by way of support before the
(1) Attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
rescission of the adoption.
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) Groundless accusation to the testator of a crime • Only the future effects of adoption cease.
punishable by six or more years; Revocation of the adoption must be instituted by the adoptee
(3) Conviction of adultery or concubinage with the spouse and granted by the court to protect him or her from abuse,
of the testator; exploitation, or neglect in the hands of the adopter. A rescinded
(4) By using fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence adoption decree aims to put the child in a better position than
causes the testator to make a will or to change one if he remains adopted.
already made;
(5) Refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or
ascendant who disinherits;
(6) Maltreatment by deed or word of the testator;
(7) Living a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carried with it the penalty of
civil interdiction.

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VIOLATIONS & PENALTIES: SIMULATED BIRTH RA 8552 refers to physicians or nurse, while the RPC
specifically identifies physicians and surgeons.
SECTION 21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of • Due to the common occurrence where some women,
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to mostly poor, leave their newborns in the hospital in order
twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand to avoid having to pay their hospital bills.
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred • Hospital staff, including physicians, have been known to
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court locate couples that long for a child and enable them to
shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the register the child as their own.
following acts: • This also guarantees that the hospital bills are paid.
• To prevent this, the IRR of RA 8552 mandates that all
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of
physicians and midwives in attendance at the birth of a
the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is
child shall register such birth not later than 30 days from
not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of
the date of said birth.
simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision
mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00). PROCEDURE FOR RECTIFICATION
Section 21 of RA 8552 penalizes any person who shall causes Under RA 8552, persons who simulated the birth of a child were
the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the given an opportunity to correct their mistake without fear of
name(s) of a person who is not his or her biological parents for prosecution:
simulation of birth.
SECTION 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. – A person who has,
Section 3(j) of RA 8552 defines simulation of birth as the prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall
tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been
his or her biological mother, causing such child to lose his or consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of
her true identity and status.
the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five
It is also a crime punishable under Article 347 of the RPC. (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter:
Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as
ART. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. — The simulation of by the Department.
births and the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by
prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos. From the time RA 8552 took effect in March 1998 until five
years later, in 2003, those who sought to rectify simulated births
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall could file a single petition for correction of entries in or
conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to cause such child cancellation of the birth certificate, a declaration of
to lose its civil status.
abandonment to make the child available for adoption, and a
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties petition for adoption.
of his profession or office, shall cooperate in the execution of any of the
crimes mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the Section 8 of the Rule on Adoption requires that the petition
penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special that seeks to rectify a simulated birth allege that:
disqualification. (a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth;
(b) The simulation of birth was made prior to the date of
One way by which simulation of birth takes place is when a effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552 and the application
pregnant woman has herself admitted to a hospital under an for rectification of the birth registration and the petition
assumed name, with the intention of having her infant registered for adoption were filed within five years from said date;
as the child of another. (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best
• Since hospital expenses are out of pocket, a pregnant interests of the adoptee; and
woman could easily get away with this. (d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and
• She then provides the hospital with data pertaining to the treated by petitioner as his own child.
woman and her husband who will later on pass
themselves off as the child’s parents. Meanwhile, the IRR of RA 8552 provides that the Department
• These fraudulent information will be the same entries shall conduct its child and home study reports through a
appearing in the child’s birth certificate. licensed and duly credited social worker to determine if said
• Given birth certificate establishes legitimate filiation, the conditions exist.
child’s birth certificate is the best proof that he is the • DSWD shall also secure a deed of voluntary commitment
legitimate child of the individuals. executed by the child’s biological parent(s) or a
• This can be impugned only under stringed grounds in declaration of abandonment transferring legal custody of
Art. 166 of FC. the child to the Department.
• Any publication to determine the whereabouts of the
child’s parents shall be limited to the circumstances at

197
the time the child was found without revealing the RA 11222 OR SIMULATED BIRTH RECTIFICATION ACT
present identity of the child and his/her custodian. SECTION 4. Rectification of Simulated Birth Record. - Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, a person or persons who, prior to
Whether it was the filing of a single petition or the amnesty for the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child, and those who
simulation of birth that expired in 2003 cooperated in the execution of such simulation, shall not be criminally,
civilly, or administratively liable for such act: Provided, That the
(1) If the petition for adoption does not comply with the SC simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that
Rule, then no petition correcting a simulated birth can the child has been consistently considered and treated by such person
be filed. or persons as her, his, or their own daughter or son: Provided, further,
That such person or persons has or have filed a petition for adoption
The act being regulated by RA 8552 is that of punishing a with an application for the rectification of the simulated birth record
person who simulated the birth of a child before the law within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally,
came into effect and filed the petition for adoption within That all the benefits of this Act shall also apply to adult adoptees.
the five-year period of the law. It does nor prohibit the filing
of a petition for adoption beyond the five-year period—only
the amnesty was lifted. PENALTIES
Hence, those who simulated the birth of a child prior to RA 8552 imposes penalties ranging from a fine of P50,000 to
1998 but filed after 2003 may still rectify the same but P200,000 to imprisonment from six years and one day to
should be apprised of the possibility that they could be twelve years for violations of the Act. These violations include:
apprehended and punished. • Obtaining consent for adoption through coercion, undue
The same single petition should be allowed if petitioners influence or fraud
agree to file the same despite the risks involved. • Non-compliance with procedures and safeguards
provided by law
(2) Beyond the five-year period, three separate petitions • Subjecting the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
have to be filed exploitation
If this is upheld, then some “adopters” might file a petition Simulation of birth is punishable by prision mayor in its
to correct the birth certificate as the first step to the legal
medium period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years) and a fine not
adoption of the child. Since there is no guarantee that the
exceeding P50,000.
persons will proceed to have the child declared legally
available for adoption then file for a petition of adoption, Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a
rectification of simulated birth by way of three separate and syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
distinct legal procedures can be used to circumvent the law conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of
preventing adopters from rescinding the adoption. It will the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein
also be more costly and time-consuming. provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be
imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws, ordinances,
One way to address this confusion was to seek an extension of executive orders, and proclamations.
the prescriptive period. As a result, several bills were filed in the
Any violation is presumed to be committed by a syndicate if
Congress, such as SB No. 1245 (filed in 2007) which sought to
three or more persons conspiring to do any unlawful act carry it
extend the prescriptive period to 10 years.
out. It also states that the penalties provided by the Domestic
• The bill explained that the DSWD has estimated that
Adoption Act shall be in addition to other penalties imposed
there are several hundred thousand Filipinos who have
for the same act by other laws.
been informally adopted in this manner.
• Low number of applicants applying for amnesty → The IRR of RA 8552 also makes it a duty of every person, child-
unreadiness of the parents to legalize the adoption and caring or placing agency who has knowledge of any violation to
their ambivalence to tell the child of his/her status report such to the nearest police station, local government
o Parents also complained about the tedious unit, or the DSWD, which in turn is compelled to act on the
process in the rectification of the simulated birth. report within 24 hours. Delay or negligence in acting on the
o The public has misconception towards the report will give rise to criminal and administrative liability.
amnesty provided by law.
Finally, the failure of the adopters to start the legalization of the
Although RA 8552 became effective on March 22, 1998, the SC adoption of children in their care within 6 months from the
Rule on Adoption was issued only on August 22, 2002. Thus, completion of the 6-month trial custody period is considered an
the procedural steps for adoption and rectification of simulated act not in the best interest of the child. Since at this point the
birth were spelled out only then and ended within six months. child has been with the prospective adopters for more than a
year already, this delay is unconscionable and leaves the child
without legal protection should they die before filing the petition
for adoption.

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PA REN TS AN D C H I LD REN ART. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
GENERAL PROVISIONS parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail,
ART. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the Children shall always observe respect and reverence
caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and the children are under parental authority.
physical character and well-being.
The authority of the father and the mother over their children is
Parental authority (patria potestas) is the mass of rights and exercised jointly—however, the mother’s authority is
obligations which parents have in relation to the person and subordinated, although not subsidiary, to that of the father.
property of their children, until their emancipation and even • In private matters pertaining to the internal aspect of
after certain circumstances. the family, such as the education and moral guidance of
the children, the mother and father share equally in the
• Roman and Germanic law → conferred on the father; exercise of parental authority.
lasted during his lifetime; primarily for his benefit o But in case of conflict, the decisions of the father
• Modern view → authority is an institution for the benefit prevail over his wife, unless there is a contrary
of the children; granted to the parents as a consequence order of the court.
of the heavy responsibilities imposed by law, which • In matters pertaining to the external or juridical aspect
seeks to prevent abuses of parental authority without of the family, the preferential authority of the father is
impairing filial respect expressly recognized by law.
o Art. 225, FC → the father is preferred over the
Purposes of guardianship:
mother in the administration of the property of
1) Physical preservation and development
their children
2) Cultivation of their intellect
o Art. 14, FC → right to give or deny consent to the
3) Education of their heart and senses
marriage of the child is primarily in the father
o Art. 2180, CC → responsibility for the quasi-
ART. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be delicts of the child is still vested in the father, and
renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by only in case of his death or incapacity does it
law. devolve upon the mother
• Adopted children → if adopted by only one parent, then
Parental authority is inalienable, and every abdication of this he is under the parental authority of such adopter; but if
authority is void. The right attached to parental authority is a they adopt jointly, they jointly exercise the parental
purely personal one and it is extinguished upon the death of authority over such child
the parent exercising it. It cannot be passed to the • Illegitimate children → parental authority of the mother;
administrator of the estate of the deceased parent. guardian may be appointed if mother marries a man
other than the natural father
Although the rights may be expressly or tacitly waived, under • The preferential right of fathers is for cases that require
no consideration can there be a waiver of their duty without immediate decision and are essentially temporary until
violating the provisions of the law. decided by the court.
Waiver of parental authority is allowed: Authority is limited to parents. As long as they are living and
1) Adoption have not lost their parental authority, patria potestas is limited
2) Guardianship to them, to the exclusion of other ascendants.
3) Surrender to children’s home or an orphan asylum • But when both parents are dead or have lost their
parental authority, other relatives may exercise
Minority does not divest a parent of parental authority. In fact,
substitute parental authority as provided by law.
there are two kinds of parental authority:
• The exercise of parental authority follows parents, even
1) parental authority over the person of the child
if the parent resides abroad with his children.
2) parental authority over the property of the child
DUTIES OF CHILDREN
When does a parent have parental authority over the person
There are two important duties imposed upon the children:
but not the property?
1) when the parent is a minor (1) To obey their parents → temporary, as long as children
2) when the parent is disinherited by an ascendant are unemancipated
(Grandparent → Parent → Child) (2) To respect and honor them at all times → permanent,
lifetime of parent and child
Any minor guilty of disrespect and disobedience to his parents

incurs criminal liability upon complaint of the parents. Art. 223
of FC also provides for a remedy to enforce parental authority.

199
ART. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the ART. 213(2). No child under seven years of age shall be
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of reasons to order otherwise.
the children.
GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Alice Beth Devine, an educational specialist of the US Army,
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant was married to Christopher Devine, a university professor. The
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven couple had two minor children, Matthew Patrick and Timothy
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Clark. After their divorce, the court awarded custody of the
children to Mrs. Devine according to the tender years
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
presumption. Mr. Devine is now claiming that the presumption,
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
as applied in child custody proceedings, violates the 14th
otherwise.
Amendment on Equal Protection.
Effect of separation
Held: Yes, the tender years presumption is violative of the
In case of legal separation, the custody of the minor children
14th Amendment. It represents an unconstitutional gender-
shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise
based classification which discriminates between fathers and
directed by the court under Article 63.
mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex.
But in case of de facto separation, the court shall award the It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent
care, custody, and control of children as will be for their best without any consideration of the actual capabilities of the
interest, permitting the child to choose if over seven years old. parties. It imposes unnecessary legal burden upon individuals
according to their sex—by requiring fathers to affirmatively
If both parents are improper persons to take charge of the prove the unfitness of the mother, the presumption may deprive
children, the court may either designate some reputable some loving fathers of the custody of their child, while enabling
person to take charge of the child OR commit it to any suitable alienated mothers to arbitrarily obtain temporary custody.
asylum, children’s home, or benevolent society.
Moreover, even if mothers as a class were closer than fathers
to younger children, this presumption becomes less
ART. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the acceptable as basis for judicial distinctions as the age of
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the child increases. That courts have relied on this
the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one presumption as a substitute for a factual analysis of the relative
designated by the court, taking into account the same parental capabilities of the parents cannot be justified.
consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise Therefore, the judgment of the appellate court affirming the
the authority. award of custody to Mrs. Devine and upholding the
constitutionality of the tender years presumption is reversed.
ART. 58, PD 603. Torts. Parents and guardians are responsible The case is remanded to the trial court to take into account all
for the damage caused by the child under their parental relevant considerations for the custody of the children.
authority in accordance with the Civil Code. Note: Relevant cases cited by the ruling
ART, 2180, CC. The father and, in case of his death or The preference to the father over the mother for appointment as
administrator of a child’s estate is an arbitrary legislative choice
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
Reed forbidden by the 14th Amendment—no attempt was made to
caused by the minor children who live in their company. determine the relative capabilities of the parents to administer the
estate.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
The presumption of dependence in case of spouses of male
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in members of the Army but not to spouses of female members
their company. relegates the entire class of females to inferior legal status
Frontiero
without regard to their actual capabilities. For administrative
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and convenience, it presumes that only men are the breadwinner of
the family and women are generally dependent on them.
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their The Alabama statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands
but not wives reinforces stereotypes about women and their
custody. Orr
need for special protection. The State cannot be permitted to
classify on the basis of sex.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the The distinction under New York law between the adoption rights
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. of unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers violated the Equal
Caban
Protection clause of the 14th Amendment—maternal and paternal
roles are not invariably different in importance.

200
TEST PROXY by the Bill of Rights. The courts are also prohibited from taking
Moe v. Dinkins Maturity Age any punitive measures to restrict individuals from reading any
Devine Parental fitness Sex/gender matter in the privacy of his or her own home.
Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No, because GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO (2005)
even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is not Crisanto Gualberto filed a petition to nullify his marriage to
sufficient because as the child matures, the difference between Joycelyn Gualberto, with a prayer for custody pendente lite of
the parental skills of the father and the mother decreases. their three-year-old son Rafaello whom Joycelyn allegedly took
away with her when she abandoned the conjugal home. The
SY V. CA (2007) RTC granted the prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite of
Mercedes Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against Wilson the child, finding that Joycelyn was having lesbian relations and
Sy to get custody of her minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah was not attentive to the needs of Rafaello. Later on, the RTC
as their mother. Wilson opposed, claiming that Mercedes was reversed its previous order and awarded custody of Rafaello to
unfit to take custody of the minors as she abandoned their Joycelyn, citing Article 213 of FC. Crisanto filed a petition for
family, is mentally unstable, and cannot provide proper care to certiorari before the CA, which reversed the ruling of the RTC.
the children. The RTC and CA granted custody of the children
Held: Custody should remain with Joycelyn. The use of the
to Mercedes and ordered Wilson to pay support.
word “shall” means that a mother is to be preferred in awarding
Held: Mercedes should have custody over her children. The custody of children under the age of seven. The tender age
law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have presumption may be overcome only by compelling evidence of
custody of her children so that they may have the benefit of a the mother’s unfitness under certain instances, such as neglect,
mother’s love and devotion for which there is no substitute. abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
Likewise, no children below the age of seven shall be separated drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
from their mother, unless there are compelling reasons to the or affliction with a communicable disease. Sexual preference
contrary. In this case, Wilson’s allegation of the unfitness of alone does not prove parental neglect. Instead, the husband
Mercedes were refuted by the latter. She left the conjugal home must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
to work in Taiwan and earn money to reclaim her children. Her adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the
act of praying in the rain is a mere expression of her faith offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. In this
different from that of Wilson’s family, which is also the reason case, Crisanto failed to prove that his son was exposed to the
for their separation. She is also financially able to provide her mother's alleged sexual activity or that his proper moral and
children with the necessities of life. psychological development suffered as a result.
PARENTAL UNFITNESS
ROLE OF THE CHILD’S PREFERENCE
FELDMAN V. FELDMAN (1974)
LAXAMANA V. LAXAMANA (2002)
Philip and Mady Feldman were married with two minor children,
Petitioner Reymond Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes
Joyce and Scott. Mady then obtained a divorce on the ground
were married with three children. Initially, the family was well-
of cruel and inhuman treatment from Philip and was awarded
off, until Reymond became drug dependent. Despite several
custody of their two children. Later on, Philip filed a petition for
attempts for treatment and rehabilitation, Reymond’s condition
habeas corpus for the custody of the two children. Because the
worsened and he became violent, which led Lourdes and her
trial court found that Mady was having a sexually-liberated
children to abandon him. When he was declared drug-free,
lifestyle, it transferred the custody of the two children to Philip,
Reymond filed a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of
despite them living with their mother since birth.
the three children. The parties then underwent psychiatric and
Held: Having unusual sexual practices do not ipso facto psychological evaluation, which revealed that the children were
constitute unfitness for custody. The evidence established psychologically affected by the father’s drug-related behavior,
that Mady’s private sex life in no way affected the children. They and that Reymond is still not completely cured of his addiction.
are well-provided for, both emotionally and physically—in fact, However, the psychiatrist did not find that paternal visits would
both children were elected as class officers in school. The be harmful to the children. Hence, the court granted custody to
atmosphere of the mother’s home is also happy and cheerful, Lourdes and visitation rights to Reymond.
and the premises well-kept and comfortable. Mady is likewise
Held: The issue of custody was not properly resolved. The
sincerely concerned and devoted to her children and she
fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the
always shows them love and care. Hence, for the best interests
welfare of the children shall not be disregarded by mere
of the children, a change of custody should not be made as it
technicality. The trial court should have conducted a trial
will only cause the psychological dislocation of the children.
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case
Because neither Mady nor Philip are unfit to have custody, the
for resolution on the basis of the psychiatric report. Although
tender years presumption shall apply in favor of the mother,
Reymond is not completely cured of his drug dependence,
who shall have custody over the children.
there is no evidence showing that he is unfit to give the children
Moreover, the right of a divorced woman to engage in private adequate support, education, and moral and intellectual
sexual activities is within the penumbra of privacy mandated training and development. Moreover, the children in this case

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were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the that Gwendolyn is the primary caretaker parent and there is
decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which no evidence that she is an unfit parent. In fact, she was able
parent they want to live with. That they were afraid of their father to mobilize all of the resources at her command in the interest
and wanted to be sure that he is no longer a drug dependent of her child and she went to great lengths to provide for
does not categorically express their choice. Therefore, the trial Jonathan. And that she permitted him to be adopted by her
court was remiss in its duties when it resolved the case on the grandparents does not mean that she abandoned her child—
sole basis of a sketchy finding of facts. she only did it to make him eligible for social security benefits
which will significant enhance his opportunities in life.
Ma’am Beth does not like this decision. Why would you risk the Therefore, the decision of lower court is reversed.
children staying with someone who has propensity for drug
addiction? It’s only saving grace is that the lower court has to
receive evidence to determine the fitness of the parents. FLIP OF THE COIN
• The use of an indeterminate standard for private dispute

PRESUMPTION FOR PRIMARY CARETAKER resolution raises a number of questions related to fairness.
o However, if we do away with no presumptions, there
This rule is not followed in the Philippines. It is just included is the disadvantage of moving into the facts, and what
here so that we know that we have other alternatives to: should be the hierarchy of the facts? All cases will be
(1) tender years presumption litigated, spending money and destroying families
(2) best interest of the child when we could have done it by being civil.
(3) child’s preference o How much weight should be given to the child’s
choice?
GARSKA V. MCCOY (1981) o When and where should we ask the child? Any place
Gwendolyn McCoy met Michael Garska in North Carolina. After where there are neither parents nor lawyers.
she became pregnant, Gwendolyn returned to her grandparents o When do you ask? Not during the trial of course, when
in West Virginia. During her pregnancy, she received no support the child would be fearful of hurting the parents
from Michael; but after she gave birth, Michael sent a package • The best-interests test also encourages judicial delay and
of baby food and diapers. The child, Jonathan, later on became lack of finality that plague custody law.
ill and required hospitalization. To pay for the bills, Gwendolyn • Meanwhile, while sex-based rules (e.g. maternal
consented to his adoption by her grandfather so that he can use preference) are capable of more predictable application,
his insurance. Upon learning of the adoption plan, Michael they unjustifiably tilt the process in favor of the mother,
visited the baby and sent money weekly. Gwendolyn’s reinforcing stereotypes that our society is rejecting.
grandfather then filed a petition for adoption. Consequently, • Random selection through the flip of a coin can be an
Michael filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to secure alternative to relying on indeterminate standards:
custody of his son. The court denied the petition for adoption, o Acknowledges our ignorance and the presumed
since the baby had not resided with them for the requisite six equality of the natural parents.
months. The court awarded custody to Michael, finding that he o Cheaper and quicker
is Jonathan’s natural father, is better educated, more intelligent, o Avoids the pain of an adversarial proceeding
and more able to provide financial support than Gwendolyn. o Encourages private compromise if both wanted the
Held: Custody of the child should be awarded to child and were very risk-averse
Gwendolyn. In child custody proceedings, there is a • Why coin-flip is viewed as unacceptable:
presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent, if he or o Represents an abiding faith in the decision of the
she meets the minimum objective standard for being a fit judge, despite the absence of empirical basis for it
parent, regardless of sex. In establishing which natural or o Abdication of the search for wisdom → in the absence
adoptive parent is the primary caretaker, the trial court shall of feedback, judges and decision-makers will not learn
determine which parent has taken primary responsibility for: from their decisions
o Abdication of the government’s responsibility for the
(1) preparing and planning of meals child and symbolically denies the importance of
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing human differences and distinctiveness
(3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes o Deprives the parents of a process and a forum to
(4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians express their anger and aspirations
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school • Repulsion for coin-flip as an alternative reflects the
(6) arranging alternative care appreciation of the importance of the educational,
(7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the participatory, and symbolic values of adjudication as a
middle of the night, waking child in the morning mode of dispute settlement.
(8) disciplining o May result to random results, but affirms parental
(9) educating equality and expresses social concern for the child.
(10) teaching elementary skills • Therefore, while the indeterminate best-interests standard
may not be good, there is no available alternative that is
Once the primary caretaker is identified, the court must
less detrimental to the child and to the parents.
determine only whether the same is fit. In this case, it is obvious

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OTHER RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN EXERCISE OF PARENTAL Rights of parents
AUTHORITY The rights of parents with respect to their children may be
summarized as follows:
ART. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority 1. To have them in their custody.
shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on 2. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests.
wards the following rights and duties: 3. To demand from them respect and obedience and
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate impose necessary discipline on them.
and instruct them by right precept and good example, 4. To administer their property and to use the fruits and
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their income for the support of the children and collective daily
means; needs of the family.
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, 5. To give or withhold consent to their marriage, marriage
companionship and understanding; settlements, donations by reason of marriage, adoption,
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, and employment.
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self- 6. To disinherit them for just cause.
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the Duties of parents
duties of citizenship; The duties of the parents in relation to their children are:
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome 1. To support them, providing for their upbringing in
educational materials, supervise their activities, accordance with their means.
recreation and association with others, protect them 2. To educate, instruct, and provide them with moral and
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring spiritual guidance and love and understanding.
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; 3. To defend them against unlawful aggression.
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their 4. To answer for damages caused by their fault or
interests; negligence and for the civil liability for crimes committed
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience; by them.
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under 5. To give their lawful inheritance.
the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law DUTY TO SUPPORT
upon parents and guardians. The obligation of parents to support their unemancipated
children arises from the relationship of parent and child; hence,
it continues under the provisions of Art. 195 of FC even after the
RIGHTS OF PARENTS DUTIES OF PARENTS
emancipation of the children.
1) To keep them in their • Failure to comply with this obligation is punishable by
company All others; in effect, parents Articles 276 and 277 of the RPC.
2) To demand from them have more duties than rights o Failure to give the unemancipated child the
respect and obedience
education justified by the financial condition of the
parents is also penalized.
• Not subject to the general rules on mutual support →
ART. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
regardless of the necessities of the child and is
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
determined only by the means of the parent
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
o Obligation cannot be extinguished by the fact that
children living in their company and under their parental
the necessities of the child arise from his bad
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
conduct or lack of application to work.
SCOPE OF POWERS AND DUTIES CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

Under the CC, there were only two paragraphs of this article: The father and mother are the natural guardians of the
unemancipated children, and as such they are duty-bound and
(1) On the duty to support the children, to have them in the
entitled to keep them in their company.
parents’ company, educate and instruct them, and to
• No showing by a third person that he could furnish the
represent them; and
child a better home or education would remove the child
(2) On the power to correct and punish them.
from the custody of his or her parents, if the home they
Although Article 221 contains a long enumeration, many are just provide is decent and respectable.
elaborations and details of the two paragraphs of CC, mixed up • The natural affection of parents outweighs possible
in such a manner that there is no clear division between the advantages of wealth or culture.
duties and the rights of the parents. • The parents need not necessarily have the children in
their company, but they must have the same residence.
• Parents may open and examine the correspondence of
their unemancipated children → they can intercept and
confiscate, if necessary, the letters written by or to them

203
o Secrecy and inviolability of correspondence does • They may accept pure donations and inheritance for the
not exist for children under parental authority. children and enter into contracts which are beneficial to
o Parents may also prohibit their children from them.
having any dealings or relations with strangers or • This includes appearance in litigations for the children.
collateral relatives when such relations are o Parents may legally represent their children in
dangerous or unwholesome. court, as also provided in RC.
o But a child cannot be prohibited from seeing or
dealing with his or her ascendants → elementary CORRECTION AND PUNISHMENT
principle of natural law and necessary for the The power to correct and punish the children in moderation
solidarity of the family is inherent in parental authority.
• Parents may require their children to render to them the • Only to keep the prestige of parental authority and to
services appropriate to their age without any right to properly direct the education and conduct of children.
claim compensation. • Should never exceed the limits of prudence, moderation,
• A child below eighteen cannot enter into a contract for and human sentiments.
services or labor without the intervention of his parents. o Moderateness and reasonableness → custom
o However, parents cannot enter into employment o Means and manner → discretion of the parents
contracts for their children against the will of the • Modern educational system bans the use of corporal or
latter → tantamount to compulsory labor, unless physical punishment.
the object of the contract is to teach them a trade, • When the parents abuse this power, they may be held
occupation, or other beneficial purpose. criminally liable and their parental authority may be
• Parents cannot force their children to follow corrupting suspended.
orders or examples, nor compel them to do acts
repugnant to their conscience or dignity. LIABILITY FOR QUASI-DELICTS
o They cannot force their children to marry against Under Art. 2180 of CC, the father, and in case of his death or
their will (even if they can refuse to give consent incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
to those below 21) caused by the fault or negligence of the minor children who live
o Art. 57, CYWC → child shall have prerogative to in their company.
choose future spouse • Based on the presumption that the parents have failed in
o Art. 56, CYWC → child shall freely choose his own their duty of vigilance and guidance over their children.
career, parents may advise but not impose o May be overthrown and escape liability by proving
• The child should be emancipated in everything that that they observed all the diligence of a good
refers to the discharge of the functions of his office or father of a family to prevent damage.
employment → responsibility is towards the government,
and it has supervision over him; also applies to private CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PARENTS
employment Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, it is provided:
• A parent who has allowed an unemancipated child to live
separately in order to study or engage in profession or Art. 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
(1) Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his
employment cannot arbitrarily require such child to civil status.
return and live with him. (2) Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive him of the
love, care and protection he needs.
(3) Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration.
EDUCATION AND INSTRUCTION
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's
It is the duty of the parents to educate and instruct the children station in life and financial conditions permit.
in keeping with their means. (5) Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required
• Instruction → limited to the development of the by Article 72.
(6) Causes, abates, or permits the truancy of the child from the school where
intelligence and capabilities for human endeavor in the he is enrolled. "Truancy" as here used means absence without cause for
sciences, literature, industry, etc. more than twenty schooldays, not necessarily consecutive. It shall be the
• Education → moral and spiritual upbringing of the child, duty of the teacher in charge to report to the parents the absences of the
child the moment these exceed five schooldays.
such as the guidance of his conscience, formation of his (7) Improperly exploits the child by using him, directly or indirectly, such as
character and religious beliefs, and the improvement of for purposes of begging and other acts which are inimical to his interest
his aesthetic and artistic sense. and welfare.
• The parents also choose the kind of instruction to be (8) Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately
subjects him to indignitions and other excessive chastisement that
given to the children, the school in which they shall be embarrass or humiliate him.
enrolled, and the course that they are to take. (9) Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life.
• Duty of the parents to give a college education to their (10) Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon,
regardless of its ownership.
children if the latter are specially fitted for such, and the (11) Allows or requires the child to drive without a license or with a license
former can afford to give it. which the parent knows to have been illegally procured. If the motor
vehicle driven by the child belongs to the parent, it shall be presumed
that he permitted or ordered the child to drive.
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN
It is the duty of the parents to represent the children in all
actions that may affect their interests.

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OTHER OBLIGATIONS ART. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
Other obligations of parents are provided in the CYWC: guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
• Allow the children to participate in the discussion of common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
family affairs (Art. 47) In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail,
• Win the child’s confidence and encourage him to consult unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
with them on his activities and problems (Art. 48)
• Discover the child’s talents and develop them (Art. 49) Where the market value of the property or the annual income of
• Encourage the child to associate with other children of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
his own age and prevent him from falling into bad required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
company (Art. 52) determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
• Prevent the child from having vices (Art. 55) of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance
of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
ART. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child’s A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the
child so requires. child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the
place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
This provides for substitute representation when the interests
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
of the child so require.
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
• In case of conflict of interest between the parent and the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second
child, the child should be represented by a guardian in
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
court.
• If the father does not properly administer the property of Ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory
the child, the court may appoint a guardian for such. except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or
• Child’s welfare is paramount. the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which
case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
ART. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the
individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
may petition the proper court of the place where the child purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over reduction the substance of the patrimony of the child, exceeds
the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of the limits of guardianship.
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a • Parents cannot validly dispose of the property of their
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner children without express judicial authorization.
and the child shall be heard. • But they can keep the money of their children.
• Parents are also not authorized to enter into compromise
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner
agreements with respect to the rights of their children,
at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the
for the right to administer property does not include the
circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the
authority to compromise.
deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as it may deem just and proper. The legal guardianship of the property of minor children by their
parents cannot be renounced by the same.
ART. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may • It is a natural and logical consequence of parental
include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty authority and of the presumption that no one can take
days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in care of such property with more zeal and affection than
children’s homes duly accredited by the proper government the parents.
agency. • Also, a consequence of the duty of assistance and
protection which parents owe to their children.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere • A matter of public interest.
with the care of the child whenever committed but shall
provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own The power of administration cannot be delegated to the child
instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child himself or to a third person.
whenever just and proper. • Father designated by the court → transfer to the mother
must be approved by the Court, otherwise void.
If a parent finds that the discipline imposed upon the child fails • No judicial designation → mother may exercise such
to correct him, this article provides for a civil remedy. legal guardianship alone.
• Civil action will review the conduct of the child and the • The court may legally remove the guardianship of the
treatment of him by the parent. child’s property from the father for sufficient cause.
In some instances, the law itself denies the parent the power
of administration over some properties of the child.

205
(1) When the parent is disinherited by an ascendant, he • Administration and usufruct are two distinct things.
cannot administer the legitimate which is inherited by the o Administration without usufruct → property is
child through representation (Art. 923) given by donation or will, and the grantor provides
(2) When the parent is incapacitated by unworthiness to that the child shall also have the usufruct
succeed an ascendant, he is deprived of the o Usufruct without administration → property is
administration over the legitime transmitted to the child worth more than P50,000 and the parent does not
(Art. 1035) furnish a bond and another person is appointed
as guardian of the property
If the natural parent is a minor, his incapacity to administer his
own property extends to his child’s property, for which a SALIENTES V. ABANILLA (2006)
guardian should be appointed by the court. Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Abanilla. Initially, they lived with the parents of Marie,
ART. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or but due to issues with his in-law, Loran suggested to his wife
acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous that they transfer to their own house. When Marie refused,
title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be Loran left and was prevented from seeing his son. Later on,
devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and education, Loran filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody. The RTC
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. directed the petitioners Salientes to bring Lorenzo to the court
and show cause why he should not be discharged from them.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child’s
On appeal by certiorari, the CA denied the petition of the
property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and
Salientes and affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
the court did not award the custody of Lorenzo to anyone but
The child owns all property acquired as earning with his work was simply the standard order issued for the production of
or industry, or by onerous or lucrative title, although they may restrained persons. The CA held that the RTC was still about to
be under the legal guardianship of the parents. conduct a full inquiry on the cause of the minor’s detention and
• The parents have a limited usufruct → for the benefit of the matter of his custody.
the child and the family Held: The petition for the writ of habeas corpus is proper.
o Usufruct → right to enjoy the property of another, Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
with the obligation of preserving its form and custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article
substance, unless the title containing it or the law 211 of FC, Marie and Loran have joint parental authority and
provides otherwise custody over their son. Although the couple is separated de
o Basis: parental authority facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
o Justified by the indivisibility of the family court. In this case, Loran’s cause of action is the deprivation of
appropriation for the support of every member his right to see his child. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus
o Compensation to help bear the work, expenses, is available to him.
and other burdens inherent in parental authority
• CC → if the child, with consent of his parents, lives To reiterate, the order did not grant custody to any of the parties
independently from them, he shall have ownership, but merely directed the Salientes to produce Lorenzo in court
usufruct, and administration over his property and explain why Loran is prevented from seeing him. Article 213
• FC → same principle; because the child can take care of of FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves
himself, the parents would not be actually supporting as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. It is
him and thus the reason for the parent’s receiving the not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.
fruits or income from the child’s property would cease Therefore, nothing in the provision disallows Loran from seeing
• Salary received by a child does not constitute fruits, but or visiting his child under seven years of age.
property in usufruct → belongs to the child and cannot
be attached to satisfy the obligation of the parent PEOPLE V. SILVANO (1999)
• The donor or testator may expressly provide that the Sheryl Silvano is the legitimate daughter of David Silvano and
usufruct shall pertain to the child and not to the father, Shirley Pedrosa. One night, while Sheryl was sleeping in her
as consistent with the power of the donor or testator to room, she was awakened by her father, who started scolding
impose conditions. her for coming home late. Silvano, who was drunk at the time,
• Legal usufruct, an attribute of parental authority, is started undressing Sheryl, which she said she has been
inalienable and cannot be renounced. experiencing as “punishment” from her father since she was 13.
• The usufruct of the parent over the property of the child Silvano then continued touching Sheryl, and when she told him
may be extinguished: to stop, he told her, “you did something wrong and I told you I
(1) Emancipation of the child would do that as a punishment to you.” Afterwards, he
(2) Death of the child proceeded to rape his daughter. Sheryl then went to the house
(3) Loss of parental authority by judicial decree of her grandmother, and when she was asked to go back,
(4) Consent of the parent to the child living Sheryl confided about the rape. The trial court convicted
independently Silvano of rape and sentenced him with death penalty.
(5) Disinheritance and incapacity to succeed

206
Held: Silvano does not have the right nor the duty to rape Moreover, the spouses’ allegation that they are purchases
his daughter. Although he claims that he gives her financial, in good faith is untenable. They knew from the start that their
material, and educational support, it does not give him the vendor, Dolores, without court approval, could not validly
license to rape her. It is his right and duty to give support to convey to them the property of her minor children. As such, they
Sheryl as provided in Article 220 of FC. Moreover, punishing her acted in bad faith when they bought the land from her anyway.
for coming home late at night is plainly wrong—it is the product
of a sick mind of an equally sick parent who does not deserve SHIELDS V. GROSS (1983)
to be such. Although the FC recognizes the rights and duties of Brooke Shields is a well-known actress. For many years, she
parents to impose discipline on their unemancipated child, to had been a child model, and when she was 10, she got several
supervise their activities and association with others, and to modeling jobs with defendant Gary Gross. One of the jobs
prevent them from acquiring bad habits, it does not authorize required Brooke to pose nude in a bathtub, which was intended
them to force their children into having sex with them under the to be used in a publication entitled “Sugar and Spice.” Before
mask of discipline. Silvano’s way of punishment comes not in the pictures were taken, Brooke and her mother and legal
the form of correction but of an insane sexual gratification. Sex guardian, Teri Shields, executed two consents in favor of Gross.
with one’s own child is evil in itself and can never be justified as Afterwards, the photos were used for other purposes, such as
a form of parental punishment. in an advertisement in New York, in her autobiographical book,
and in other publications. Later on, Brooke found that several
Thus, instead of instructing and teaching his own daughter with of the photographs had appeared in a French magazine called
“the right precept and good example,” Silvano provided her “Photo,” and disturbed by that publication, she attempted to
with perversed and distorted “moral and spiritual guidance” to buy the negatives. Brooke also commenced an action in tort
the extent of brainwashing her that sex with one’s father is and contract seeking compensation and an injunction
nothing but a disciplinary sanction and a normal part of her sex permanently enjoining Gross from any further use of the
education. While it is his duty under the FC to give her love and pictures. After the trial, the court ruled that the consents given
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and by Brooke and her mother were unrestricted as to time and use,
understanding, what Sheryl got was humiliation and trauma. thus it dismissed her complaint but granted her limited relief for
the injunction, enjoining Gross from using the photos in
LINDAIN V. CA (1992) pornographic publications. The appellate court modified the
The plaintiff siblings Lindain were the registered owners of a judgment and granted Brooke a permanent injunction enjoining
parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. When they were still minors, their Gross from using the pictures for advertising or trade.
mother, Dolores, then already a widow and acting as guardian
of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Held: Brooke is now barred from filing an action. Historically,
Absolute Sale to the defendant spouses Apolonia Valiente and New York common law did not recognize a cause of action for
Federico Ila. The siblings then filed a complaint for the invasion of privacy but later on, the legislature enacted Secs.
annulment of the sale, claiming that the sale of the lot by their 50 & 51 of Civil Rights Law, which provide that a person, whose
mother to the spouses was null and void because it was made photo was used by an entity without the former’s consent, has
without court approval. On the other hand, the spouses a cause of action against the latter, unless a consent was
contend that the sale was valid because the value of the executed before use of the photograph. Brooke was a minor
property was less than P2,000 and thus judicial approval is not when the contract took effect, so her mother gave the
required. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and declared defendant her unrestricted consent om behalf of the plaintiff.
the deed of sale to be null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed Thus, there being a written consent, civil action is now barred
the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint,
holding that when the value of the child’s property is less than The consent executed by her mother was valid and may not
P2,000, the parent acting as legal administrator may alienate or be disaffirmed. Because the consent complied with statutory
dispose the same even without the permission of the court. requirements, it is valid and may not be disaffirmed. The
contract does not need judicial approval as such was only
Held: Judicial approval was necessary before the mother required of child performers, which by statutory definition
could sell her children’s properties. Under Article 320 of CC, exclude child models. The trial court also found that the photos
a parent acting merely as the legal administrator of the property were not pornographic, and thus there is no need to discuss
of his/her minor children does not have the power to dispose of unenforceability of contracts violating public policy.
or alienate the property of the children without judicial approval.
The powers and duties of Dolores as the legal administrator of
her minor children’s property are only powers of possession
and management—her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or
dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from
the court. Because compromising the property of the children
has always been deemed equivalent to alienation, the court’s
approval is indispensable, regardless of the amount involved.
Therefore, Dolores should have first secured court approval
before selling the property to the defendant spouses.

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SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY ART. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
ART. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
parental authority over the child in the order indicated: persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; shall be subsidiarily liable.
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified; and The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
age, unless unfit or disqualified. proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
preference shall be observed. delicts.
The inclusion of grandparents and the oldest brother or sister

ART. 2180, CC. The father and, in case of his death or
among those standing in loco parentis is in conformity with
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
Philippine customs.
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL SPECIAL PARENTAL Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
AUTHORITY AUTHORITY incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
Grandparents, oldest their company.
School, administrators and
sibling or court appointed
teachers Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
guardian
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
Exercised in case of death, Exercised concurrently with students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
absence or unsuitability of the exercise of parental custody.
parents authority
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
Subsidiarily liable for Principally and solidarily persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
damages caused by act or liable for damages caused diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
omission under the by act or omission of minor
supervision of people with under their custody, PALISOC V. BRILLANTES (1971)
special parental authority supervision or instruction
Dominador Palisoc and Virgilio Daffon were classmates in
Manila Technical Institute. One afternoon, while classes were in
Law is silent about
Cannot inflict corporal recess, the two were in the laboratory room of the school.
prohibition of corporal
punishment on the minor Dominador and Virgilio suddenly had a fight, and when
punishment
Dominador was retreating, he stumbled on an engine block
which caused his death afterwards. Spouses Moises and
ART. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or Brigida Palisoc, the parents of Dominador, then filed an action
abused children and other children similarly situated, parental for damages for the death of their son against (1) Virgilio; (2)
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings Antonio Brillantes, a member of the Board of Directors of MTI;
to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and similar (3) Teodosio Valenton, the president of MTI; and (4) Santiago
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. Quibulue, the instructor of the class to which Dominador
belonged. The trial court found Virgilio liable, but absolved the
Abandoned child is one who has no parental care or three other defendants of MTI, holding that Art. 2180 does not
guardianship or whose parents or guardian have deserted him apply since there is no evidence that Virgilio actually lived and
for at least six months. boarded with them, and thus they could not have exercised
authority over Virgilio.
ART. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the Held: The defendants head and teacher of the MTI are liable.
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have Defendants Valenton and Quibulue, as president and teacher-
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor in-charge of the school, must be held jointly and severally liable
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. for the quasi-delict committed by Daffon since the death of
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized Dominador could have been avoided if they were able to
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the comply with their duty of providing adequate supervision over
school, entity or institution. the activities of the students in the school premises to protect
their students from harm. They were also not able to prove that
Teachers do not have the power to inflict corporal punishment they observed all the diligence to prevent damage, which
on their pupils, which is vested exclusively in the parents. means that they are not exempted from liability.

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The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for Note: Ma’am Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly decided
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand in loco parentis PALISOC AMADORA
as to their pupils and students and are called upon to exercise during school hours; school not during class hours; what
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. The liable if impleaded mattered was the purpose
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents and it becomes
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS (2002)
their obligation to provide proper supervision of the students’
St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive, which
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in
involved visiting schools to get prospective enrollees. Sherwin
the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
Carpitanos was part of the campaign group, and he was riding
that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student
in a jeep driven by James Daniel II, then 15 years old, on the
who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.
way to one school. Allegedly, James drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result, it turned turtle, killing Sherwin. The
AMADORA V. CA (1988)
parents, spouses Carpitanos, then filed a case for damages
Alfredo Amadora, then 17 years old, was in the auditorium of
against James Daniel and his parents, the vehicle owner, and
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos to finish his physics experiment
St. Mary’s Academy. The trial court declared the school to be
as a prerequisite for his graduation. There, he was shot to death
primarily liable for the damages and James’ parents as
by his classmate, Pablito Daffon. Daffon was convicted of
subsidiarily liable. James and the owner of the jeep were
homicide thru reckless imprudence, and herein petitioners, as
absolved. On appeal, the CA reduced the actual damages but
the parents of Alfredo, filed a civil action for damages against
upheld the liability of SMA. Hence, this appeal by the school.
the school, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher. The trial court held the Held: SMA is not liable. Under Article 218 of FC, the school, its
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984; administrators and teachers shall have special parental
however, on appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed and authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
all the defendants were completely absolved. instruction or custody. And in Article 219, those exercising
parental authority over a minor are principally and solidarily
Held: Article 2180 can also make academic institutions
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the same,
liable for damages. It shall apply to all schools, whether
provided that the act or omission considered as negligent was
academic or not. Where the school is academic in nature,
the proximate cause of the injury. In this case, however, the
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
spouses Carpitanos failed to show that the negligence of the
to the teacher in charge of such student. There is no substantial
school was the proximate cause of the death of their son. The
difference between schools of arts & trades and academic ones
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of the
in terms of proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils.
school or the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical
Thus, it as long as the student is under the control and influence
defect in the jeep when its steering wheel guide was detached.
of the school and within its premises at the time of the injury,
There was also no evidence that the school allowed James to
and he or she is there for a legitimate student objective and for
drive the jeep—it was the owner’s grandson who had
the enjoyment of a legitimate student right and privilege, the
possession and control of the jeep and who allowed James to
teacher-in-charge of such student must answer for his
drive it at the time of the accident. Therefore, liability for the
student’s torts.
accident must be pinned on James’ parents primarily as they
The rector, the high school principal, and the dean of boys had actual custody over the minor at the time, along with
cannot be the held liable because none of them was the Vivencio Villanueva as the registered owner of the vehicle.
teacher-in-charge. They are exercising only a general authority
over the student body and are not immediately involved in the VANCIL V. BELMES (2001)
discipline of the students. The physics teacher cannot also Petitioner Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a US
be held liable because there is no evidence that he was the Navy serviceman. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children,
teacher-in-charge at that time. And even assuming that he was Valerie and Vincent, with his common-law wife, Helen Belmes.
the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that he was Bonifacia commenced a guardianship proceeding over the
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon—his absence at persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent, then only
the incident was due to the fact that he was not required to 6 and 2 years old, respectively. Bonifacia was appointed as the
report to school on that day. Neither can the dean be held legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of the
liable because there is no proof that the gun used to shoot minor children. Shortly thereafter, Helen opposed the
Alfredo was the same gun he initially confiscated and returned guardianship proceedings, claiming that she is the natural
to Alfredo’s classmate. Finally, the school itself cannot be mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority
held directly liable because only the teacher of an academic over the minors and that Bonifacia is actually a US resident. The
institution is made responsible for the damage caused by its trial court rejected Helen’s opposition, but on appeal, the CA
students. reversed the order of the RTC, holding that Helen, as the
biological mother, should not be deprived of her legal rights as
natural guardian of her minor children. During the pendency of
the case, Valerie became of legal age, hence, this petition
applies only as to Vincent.

209
Held: Helen, being the biological mother of Vincent, has the for them; also applies to the mother of an
preferential right over Bonifacia to be the child’s guardian. illegitimate child who marries a man other than the
Under Article 211 of FC, the father and the mother shall jointly father of such child.
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common • Legal separation → custody is generally awarded to the
children. In this case, being the natural mother of Vincent, Helen innocent spouse, but a guardian may also be appointed
has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
ART. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of
Moreover, the parent present shall also continue exercising the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which
parental authority, and only in case of his or her death, carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental authority automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or
be exercised by the surviving grandparents. Because Helen upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.
is very much alive and has continuously exercised parental
authority over Vincent, the burden of proving that she is
ART. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
unsuitable falls under Bonifacia; but in this case, she failed to
related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent
prove that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
or the person exercising the same:
But even assuming that Helen is unfit as a guardian, Bonifacia (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
can still not qualify as a substitute guardian because she is an (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
American citizen and a resident of Colorado. She will not be (3) Compels the child to beg; or
able to perform all the responsibilities and obligations required (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts
of a guardian. She is also of old age already and her conviction of lasciviousness.
of libel will give her second thoughts about staying here.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases
Besides, Vincent only has 2 years before emancipation.
which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or
the person exercising parental authority.
SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the
AUTHORITY
child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be
ART. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
proper under the circumstances.
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in
the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor
ART. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, has ceased and will not be repeated.
parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child; ART. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the
in a case filed for the purpose; court of such authority.
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the
party concerned of parental authority; or Causes enumerated by the FC for termination or suspension of
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of parental authority are not exclusive—as long as the court finds
the person exercising parental authority. justifiable cause for depriving a person of parental authority, it
may decree such termination or suspension.
Except in the cases of emancipation by law and the death of • Child is maltreated by a stepmother → the court could
the child, there is no absolute termination of parental appoint a guardian for such child
authority under Article 229. • Absence of any kinship is not a bar to giving custody of
• Death of the parents, while the child is still a minor → the child to a stranger.
grandparents, brothers and sisters, or a guardian may
exercise substitute parental authority over the child Sexual abuse
o He cannot transmit his parental authority to the Under Art. 232, sexual abuse of the child is a ground for
administrator of his estate. permanently depriving a parent of parental authority.
• Adoption of the child → adopting parent will exercise the Meanwhile, under Art. 231, acts of lasciviousness give rise to
parental authority suspension of such authority.
• Abandonment, absence or incapacity, or judgment • Sexual abuse must be more serious in nature and more
divesting parent of parental authority → guardian offensive to morality and the personal dignity of the child,
• Remarriage of parent involving sex.
o CC → widow loses her parental authority over the • Court must exercise its sound judgment in this matter →
child, unless provided by the husband in his will even acts of lasciviousness, if serious in degree, can
o FC → will not extinguish parental authority, but for justify deprivation of parental authority
sufficient cause the court may appoint a guardian

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ART. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority with contracts and obligations contracted in favor of third
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as persons or others from whom he does not derive such right, can
the parents. be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan to represent
his children as father or guardian of the same is an exclusively
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual personal right, and this right which is attached to his parental
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority authority or guardianship was extinguished when he died.
inflict corporal punishment upon the child. Therefore, he has not transferred, nor could he transfer to
Sebastian such right.
• TERMINATION – permanent
• SUSPENSION – temporary Note: What Sebastian should have done is to file a complaint
a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion as an heir of Vicenta, not as the administrator of his father’s
temporal, perpetua or death); terminated by: estate. As an heir, he is entitled to inherit from her.
i. service of penalty
ii. amnesty or pardon
b. judicial decree RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CHILDREN
Rights of the child Rights of the parent

RA 7610. ANTI-CHILD ABUSE ACT.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. – Duties of the child Duties of the parent
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not,
of the child which includes any of the following: ART. 356, CC. Every child:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual (1) Is entitled to parental care;
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents
human being; or guardian;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his
such as food and shelter; or physical, moral and intellectual development.
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and → Rights of the child
development or in his permanent incapacity or death. → Compare with Art 3 of PD 603
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, ART. 3, PD 603. Rights of the Child. All children shall be entitled to the
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy,
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors.
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. (1) Every child is endowed with the dignity and worth of a human
being from the moment of his conception, as generally
SECTION 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading accepted in medical parlance, and has, therefore, the right to be
and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying born well.
and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, (2) Every child has the right to a wholesome family life that will
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The provide him with love, care and understanding, guidance and
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is counseling, and moral and material security.
under twelve (12) years of age. The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the
nearest substitute for a home.
ABIERA V. ORIN (1907) (3) Every child has the right to a well-rounded development of his
Vicenta, Mariano and Petra, all surnamed Cacao, were siblings. personality to the end that he may become a happy, useful and
Vicenta was married to Miguel Orin, and Petra to Juan Abiera. active member of society.
The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement
When Vicenta died, Miguel, Mariano and Juan entered into an
to develop his special talents.
agreement covering the disposition of the properties left by The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted child shall be
Vicenta; Mariano and Juan were representing their children, treated with sympathy and understanding, and shall be entitled
who are the heirs of Vicenta. Later on, Sebastian Abiera, the son to treatment and competent care.
of Petra and Juan, filed a complaint as special administrator of The physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the
his deceased father to compel the performance of the said treatment, education and care required by his particular
agreement, alleging that Miguel has not complied with such. condition.
(4) Every child has the right to a balanced diet, adequate clothing,
Held: Sebastian does not have the right to compel the sufficient shelter, proper medical attention, and all the basic
performance of the obligation. The true interested parties in physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life.
the obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children of (5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening
Juan Abiera and not the latter, because the obligation was
of his character.
executed in their favor and not in favor of Juan. Sebastian, as (6) Every child has the right to an education commensurate with his
administrator of the estate of Juan, has no right to ask for the abilities and to the development of his skills for the improvement
compliance with the said obligation. As an administrator, he of his capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen.
only has the right to institute such actions pertaining to the
estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing

211
(7) Every child has the right to full opportunities for safe and (6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the promotion of the
wholesome recreation and activities, individual as well as social, general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the youth who
for the wholesome use of his leisure hours. will eventually be called upon to discharge the responsibility of
(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, leadership in shaping the nation's future; and
improper influences, hazards, and other conditions or (7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the
circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of
social and moral development. cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common
(9) Every child has the right to live in a community and a society aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of
that can offer him an environment free from pernicious world peace.
influences and conducive to the promotion of his health and the
cultivation of his desirable traits and attributes.
(10) Every child has the right to the care, assistance, and protection ART. 358, CC. Every parent and every person holding
of the State, particularly when his parents or guardians fail or
substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the
are unable to provide him with his fundamental needs for
child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall
growth, development, and improvement.
(11) Every child has the right to an efficient and honest government particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with high-
that will deepen his faith in democracy and inspire him with the mindedness, love of country, veneration for the national
morality of the constituted authorities both in their public and heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment
private lives. to the ideal of permanent world peace.
(12) Every child has the right to grow up as a free individual, in an
atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal Democracy as Way of Life
brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share • Democracy affects the very foundations of human life
in the building of a better world. and happiness, so it should become a dynamic faith in
the daily lives of the citizens.
• Parents and persons holding substitute parental
ART. 357, CC. Every child shall:
authority must imbue democracy to children by precept
(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
and example.
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons
holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training; ART. 359, CC. The government promotes the full growth of
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government
good of the same. will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where
→ Duties of the child
optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the
→ Compare with Art 4 of PD 603
curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
Effects of Misconduct (2) Puericulture and similar centers;
Parent may use reasonable measures to discipline the child. (3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
This is a DUTY of the parent. (4) Juvenile courts.
• No prohibition made on parents for use of corporal
Reflects the modern need for State intervention
punishment.
• Decisive interest in seeing to it that the future citizens be
• Corporal punishment should be moderate (not be harsh,
useful men and women which cannot be guaranteed by
cruel, excessive, or amount to maltreatment). Anything
leaving them exclusively to the actuation of the family.
beyond may cause suspension of parental authority.
• State has obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
ART. 4, PD 603. Responsibilities of the Child. Every child, regardless of who are unable to care of themselves fully
the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political
antecedents and other factors shall: ART. 360, CC. The Council for the Protection of Children
(1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in accordance with the
shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall,
tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders and mentors, among other functions:
and the biddings of a clean conscience; (1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate with them in (2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
the strengthening of the family; (3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children,
(3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and and orphans;
helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the family (4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
harmonious and united;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service,
particularly by undergoing a formal education suited to his
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
abilities, in order that he may become an asset to himself and (7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to
to society; the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.
(5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions
of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted
ART. 361, CC. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as
authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and
practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
institutions of democracy;

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ART. 362, CC. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any 2) Name is consequence of a change of status
court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be (acknowledged or legitimated)
judicially admonished. 3) Change is necessary to avoid confusion
4) Adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien
nationality which unduly hamper social and business life
ART. 363, CC. In all questions on the care, custody, education
and property of children the latter's welfare shall be Not Sufficient Cause
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under 1) Imposition in a will or donation of condition to change the
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons name of the beneficiary
for such measure. 2) Mere fact that person has been using different name and
has been known by it
Welfare of the Child
3) Change would cause injuries to the feelings and
• Welfare of the child as the paramount consideration →
sensibilities of the wide and children of the person
not measured by money or physical comfort only, but
applying for a change
also moral and religious welfare and ties of affection
4) Marriage to a second husband
• Sole and foremost consideration in all custody
5) Will sow confusion on paternity and successional rights
controversies is the physical, educational, social, and
moral welfare of the child. Effect of Change on Children
Children will not be affected by change of name of father.
Children below 7 years old • Children of age can only have their name changed upon
• Apply the tender years presumption their own petition
o Avoid tragedy of mother who sees her baby torn • Names of minor children may be changed on petition of
away from her. the father if there is justification
o Maternal affection and care are generally needed
by the child more than paternal care. Consequences → will NOT affect
o Compelling reasons → even adultery is not a 1) Family relations
sufficient ground since it will not have an effect 2) Creation of family rights and duties where none existed
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand before
the situation 3) Legal capacity
4) Civil status
Father will still have parental authority over the child
5) Citizenship
• Has right to supervise the care of such child
• Ask for measures conductive to its welfare when mother Only consequence is changing of the label or appellation by
does not comply with her duty which a person is known and distinguished from others
• Manage property of the child
Nature of Proceedings
ART. 364, CC. Legitimate and legitimated children shall • A proceeding in rem which requires strict compliance
with publication requirements
principally use the surname of the father.
• Any defect as to the spelling of the name, in both petition
• Legitimate children have right to bear both the and publication, is substantial since the party is not
surnames of the father and mother, but father shall be correctly identified
principally used. o True or official name of a person is that which is
• Law does NOT prohibit the use of additional surnames recorded in the civil register
of ascendants.
ART. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership

ART. 375, CC. In case of identity of names and surnames
regime, the following procedure shall apply:
between ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children
be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male
shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
descendants shall either:
Article 51.
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2) Add the Roman Numerals II, III, and so on.
ART. 211(2). Children shall always observe respect and
reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them
ART. 376, CC. No person can change his name or surname
as long as the children are under parental authority.
without judicial authority.
DUTIES OF CHILDREN
Sufficient cause is needed since a change of name is a
There are two important duties imposed upon the children:
privilege and not a right. Must be based on a licit and
(1) To obey their parents → temporary, as long as children
compelling cause such as:
are unemancipated
1) Name is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor or extremely
(2) To respect and honor them at all times → permanent,
difficult to write or pronounce
lifetime of parent and child

213
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental jeopardize his health. The Department of Mental Health also
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the recommended that Jerry be permitted to undergo the surgery,
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant noting how important Tommy has been to the improvement of
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven Jerry’s health. All members of the immediate family have agreed
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. to the transplant; however, Jerry’s guardian ad litem questioned
the authority of the state to authorize the operation.
Separation in this article applies both to de facto and legal
separation. Held: The court may permit the kidney transplant from Jerry
• Legal separation → custody shall be awarded to to Tommy. Under the rules of equity and the doctrine of
innocent spouse subject to Article 63 of FC substituted judgment, when a person is incapable of protecting
• De facto separation → care, custody, and control himself, the court will protect him and its jurisdiction will be
decided based on child’s best interest plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary
o If over 7 years old, choice of child to protect his interests and preserve his estates. Such rule has
o If under 7 years old, mother based on tender years been extended to cover not only matters of property but also of
presumption personal affairs of the incompetent. Thus, the court does have
sufficient power to authorize the operation of Jerry.
ART. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or The operation will also be for the best interests of Jerry. As
acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or established by the Department of Mental Health, Jerry greatly
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall identifies with his brother Tommy, as he is his model and his tie
be devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and education, with his family. Tommy’s life is also vital to the continuity of
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. Jerry’s improvement at the state institution. Moreover, since
Tommy is his only living sibling, if both of their parents, who are
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child’s
now in their 50s, die, Jerry will have no other person to look
property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and
forward to. Besides, renal transplant also offers minimal risk to
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
both the donor and the donee.
PARENTS VS. CHILDREN: WHEN RIGHTS CLASH CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N. (1985)

Valerie, then 29 years old, was born with Downs Syndrome,
SEC. 14, RA 10354. Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive which resulted to her being mentally challenged (she has an IQ
Health Education. – The State shall provide age- and development- of about 30). She lives with her mother Mildred and stepfather
appropriate reproductive health education to adolescents which Eugene, herein petitioners. Valerie has received therapy and
shall be taught by adequately trained teachers in formal and nonformal training for behavior modification, which was not successful in
educational system and integrated in relevant subjects such as, but not
eliminating her aggressive sexual behavior towards men. The
limited to, values formation; knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and petitioners filed a petition to be named as Valerie’s
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; conservators, with an additional prayer to authorize tubal
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women’s rights ligation that will permanently sterilize Valerie. According to her
and children’s rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and mother, Valerie would often approach men on the street and
development; and responsible parenthood: Provided, That flexibility in hug and kiss them, and would also sit on their laps. Although
the formulation and adoption of appropriate course content, scope and she is not sexually active, she masturbates excessively. Her
methodology in each educational level or group shall be allowed only mother fears the day when she will no longer be able to look
after consultations with parents-teachers-community associations,
after Valerie and wanted to make sure that she would not
school officials and other interest groups. The Department of
Education shall formulate a curriculum which shall be used by public become pregnant. She also claimed that they tried alternative
schools and may be adopted by private schools. birth control methods, such as contraceptive pills and intra-
uterine devices, but all were futile as Valerie would refuse to
STRUNK V. STRUNK (1969) take them. The trial court granted the petition as to the
The spouses Arthur and Ava Strunk are the parents of Tommy conservatorship but denied the request for additional powers,
and Jerry. Jerry is 27 years old and an incompetent who is holding that the probate court lacks jurisdiction to authorize the
committed to a state institution for the feeble-minded. He has sterilization of Valerie since Sec. 2356(d) of the Guardianship-
an IQ of 35 and a mental age of six, and is afflicted with a Conservatorship Law states that “No ward or conservatee may
speech defect. Meanwhile, his older brother Tommy is suffering be sterilized under the provisions of this division.”
from a fatal kidney disease and is being kept alive by frequent Held: Yes, the law violates certain constitutional rights of
treatment on an artificial kidney. In order for Tommy to survive, persons under conservatorship. Absolutely precluding
the doctors said that a kidney transplant is necessary, and Jerry sterilization as a means of contraception deprives incompetent
was tested and found to be highly acceptable. The mother, as persons like Valerie of the rights of privacy and liberty provided
Jerry’s committee, petitioned the court for authority to proceed by the 14th Amendment. The said provision is constitutionally
with the transplant. The court granted the petition, finding that overbroad—it may not be invoked to deny the probate court
the operation was necessary and would also be beneficial to authority to grant a conservator the power to consent to
Jerry because his emotional and psychological well-being is sterilization when no less intrusive method of contraception is
greatly dependent upon Tommy, and his death would severely available to a severely challenged conservatee.

214
On privacy the motion of the defendants for summary judgment. According
The right to privacy includes the right of a woman to choose not to the judge, the plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold
to bear children, and to implement such choice by use of requirement for their claims because they were unable to
contraceptive devices or medication. Sec. 2356(d) deprives demonstrate that the program placed a coercive burden on
Valerie of her right to procreative choice as to the contraceptive their rights. Now, the plaintiffs argue that they were not required
to be used, or whether to use such in the first place. The to show coercion in order to sustain the motion for summary
interests of the incompetent which mandate recognition of judgment, and that even if coercion is indeed required, the
procreative choice do not differ from the interests of women program met the standard. Thus, they claim that the state has
able to give voluntary consent to this procedure. to prove the existence of a compelling state interest in
maintaining the FSC condom program.
On liberty
Liberty includes the right of a person to be free in the enjoyment Held: The grant of summary judgment was proper. The judge
of all his faculties. An incompetent woman has the same interest found no infringement of the plaintiffs' rights and, thus, he did
in a satisfying or fulfilling life free from the burdens of an not reach the stage of constitutional analysis which would have
unwanted pregnancy as her competent sister. Hence, if the required him to examine the extent of the State's interest. The
state withholds from her the only safe and reliable method of issues before the judge were issues of law, such as whether the
contraception suitable to her condition, it limits her freedom to condom-availability program infringes on the rights of the
pursue a fulfilling life. plaintiffs to familial privacy, parental liberty, and free exercise of
religion.
On equal protection
While the prohibition of sterilization may be a reasonable means The FSC condom program does not violate the rights of the
by which to protect some conservatees’ right to procreative parents. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how their interests
choice, here it sweeps too broadly for it extends to individuals are burdened by the program to the extent that it is an
who cannot make that choice and will not be able to do so in unconstitutional interference by the State. One threshold
the future. Sterilization should not be denied to incompetent requirement in determining violation of parental liberty is the
women when it is necessary for their habilitation. presence of a coercive effect on claimant’s rights. Coercion
exists where the governmental action is mandatory and
Mildred and Eugene cannot authorize the sterilization of provides no outlet for parents to refuse to participate in a
Valerie. Although there was an assumption that Valerie may program where it results in a sanction or expulsion. In this case,
become pregnant, there is no evidence on record that she is there is no coercive burden because students are free to not
capable of conceiving. And even assuming that she can participate in the program without any penalty for their refusal.
conceive, there is also no evidence on record that there was no It does not supplant the parents’ role as advisers in the moral
other less intrusive means of contraception available to Valerie. and religious development of their children.
Therefore, the judgment denying the request for additional
powers is affirmed inasmuch as there was neither evidence of The plaintiffs’ argument that the program is coercive because
necessity for contraception nor was there sufficient evidence it has been implemented in the compulsory setting of the
that less intrusive means of contraception were not available to public schools is untenable. The mere fact that parents are
Valerie. required to send their children to school does not vest the
condom program with the aura of compulsion necessary to
CURTIS V. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF FALMOUTH (1995) deprive a constitutional right. Likewise, that the students are in
The Superintendent of Falmouth Schools issued a close proximity to contraceptive devices does not change the
memorandum to the teaching staff of grades 7 through 12 fundamentally voluntary nature of the program.
regarding the condom availability program.
No, it does not violate their right to freely exercise their
(1) At Lawrence Junior High School, students could request religion. The plaintiffs argue that the program burdens their
free condoms from the school nurse. Prior to receiving right by creating a conflict between their religious teachings as
them, students would be counseled. Pamphlets would to premarital sex and the view that sexual activity before
also be given by the nurse on AIDS/HIV and other marriage is not only permissible but can also be made safe.
sexually transmitted diseases. However, the free exercise clause cannot be understood to
(2) At Falmouth High School, students could also purchase require the government to conduct its affairs in ways that
condoms for $.75 from the vending machines located in comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens—it is
the restrooms. written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
The plaintiffs, students of the Falmouth public school system government. The program does not penalize students for their
along with their parents, filed an action against the School religious beliefs or condition the receipt of benefits on a certain
Committee of Falmouth about the implementation of the said belief. Thus, although it may offend some religious sensibilities,
program. They prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief, mere exposure at public schools to the “offensive” program
alleging violations of their federal constitutional rights since the does not amount to a violation of free exercise of religion.
FSC condom program does not provide for an ‘opt out’ for Parents have no right to tailor public school programs to meet
students’ parents nor is there a parental notification provision their individual religious or moral preferences.
in it. Nonetheless, the court denied the relief sought and granted

215
ROE V. DOE SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Petitioner is the court-appointed guardian for Mary Roe, a 20-
year-old student of the University of Louisville who had been ART. 249. Petitions under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this
fully supported by her father, a prominent New York attorney, Code involving parental authority shall be verified.
until April 1970. After living in the college dormitory for a time,
ART. 250. Such petitions shall be filed in the proper court of
the daughter lived with a female classmate in an off-campus
the place where the child resides.
apartment, contrary to the father's prior instructions and
without his knowledge. Upon learning of this, the father cut off ART. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify
all support and instructed her to return to New York. Ignoring the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals,
her father's demands, the daughter sold her automobile—an entities, or institutions exercising parental authority over the
earlier gift from her father—for some $1,000 and chose to finish child.
the school year, living off the proceeds of the sale. She further
enrolled in summer classes, and upon returning to New York, ART. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern
lived with the parents of a female classmate on Long Island. summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are
She also has a history of similar derelictions, rooting from the applicable.
instability of her family: she was only three years old when her
mom died, while her father has remarried several times since; RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
she fared poorly in her academics and was placed on probation SECTION 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be
during her freshman year; she also experimented with drugs but established a Family Court in every province and city in the country. In
without addiction. case where the city is the capital of the province, the Family Court shall
be established in the municipality which has the highest population.
For the academic year 1970-1971, her tuition payments
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall
amounting to $1000 per semester were long overdue. Hence,
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
petitioner commenced a support proceeding, alleging that the cases:
respondent father has refused and neglected to provide fair and (a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
reasonable support. The Family Court entered two separate eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age
orders: first, a temporary order of support requiring the father but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of
to remit a tuition payment for the then pending semester and to the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
provide for reasonable medical, dental, eye and psychiatric offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court
care; and second, a final order of support requiring that the shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which
the accused may have incurred.
father pay $250 per month in support until his daughter reaches
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of
21. The father failed to comply with the temporary order of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
support and was committed to jail for 30 days; however, the known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code";
order of commitment was stayed pending appeal. The (b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
Appellate Division reversed the final order of support, while corpus in relation to the latter;
modifying the temporary order which is now limited to those (c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
university and health bills actually rendered. (d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of
marriage and those relating to marital status and property
Held: The daughter is not entitled to support from her father. relations of husband and wife or those living together under
While the duty to support is a continuing one, the child's right different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
to support and the parent's right to custody and services are
(e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
reciprocal: the father, in return for his maintenance and support,
(f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of
may establish and impose reasonable regulations for his child. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code
Hence, where by no fault of the parent, a child who voluntarily of the Philippines";
abandons the parent's home, for the purpose of seeking its (g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned,
fortune in the world or to avoid parental discipline and restraint, dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or
forfeits his or her claim to support. involuntary commitment of children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases
Also, before a support order could be issued, there should be cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order
some showing that the moral, mental and physical conditions No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
are so bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of the (h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
(i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs
child. And considering the child’s past derelictions, we can only
Act, as amended;
conclude that her father’s requests were reasonable and in
(j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the
her best interest. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
is affirmed. Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic
Act No. 7658; and,
(k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender-based violence that
results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms
of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion

216
which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and Acting on the motion, Ernesto was again requested to appear
freedom movement; and in court, but failed to do so. He was declared in contempt of
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of court and a bench warrant for his arrest was issued. Thus, he
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and
filed a petition for certiorari to enjoin the RTC from issuing the
discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
bench warrant and implementing the order which awarded
custody of Carlos over to Joan. The CA nullified the orders of
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be Judge Gonzales-Asdala, hence this petition.
subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
Held: RA 8369 did not divest the RTC, CA, and SC of their
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody
incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be
of minors. Despite the passage of RA 8369, which confers
determined in that court.
upon family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus
SECTION 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use cases, the RTC, CA, and the SC have concurrent jurisdiction
of ten per cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and other court over habeas corpus cases. If the CA were to lose its jurisdiction,
fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court for research and other it would result in an iniquitous situation by leaving people
operating expenses including capital outlay: Provided, That this benefit without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their child, since
shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice.
writs from family courts are only enforceable in their respective
The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, a petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
SECTION 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of be left without legal remedy, which is surely not the intention of
such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the the legislature when they passed the law. Because Joan filed
branches of the Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each
the habeas corpus petition before the RTC, it has acquired
of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig,
Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan, jurisdiction over the petition. Jurisdiction, once acquired by a
Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, court, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, until the case is terminated. Therefore, Joan’s motion for the
Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, production of Carlos Iñigo should be resolved by the RTC, along
General Santos, Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, with the issue of the alleged violation of Article 213 of FC.
Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court may deem
necessary.
MADRIÑAN V. MADRIÑAN (2007)
Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned Petitioner Felipe Madriñan and respondent Francisca Madriñan
to the Family Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such were married with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, Phillip,
additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter quarrel, Felipe left
heard. the conjugal home and took their three sons with him to Albay
and then to Laguna. Francisca sought the help of her parents,
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec.
5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court. parents-in-law, and even the Lupong Tagapamayapa to patch
things up with her husband, but to no avail. Thus, Francisca
Approved October 28, 1997. filed a petition for habeas corpus of her three sons in the CA,
alleging that Felipe disrupted the education of their children and
REYES-TABUJARA V. CA (2006) deprived them of their mother’s care. Initially, Felipe agreed to
Joan Reyes-Tabujara and Ernesto Tabujara III were married. return the custody of their three sons to Francisca, but he
Their union begot a son, Carlos Iñigo. However, shortly after changed his mind and filed a memorandum instead, alleging
their marriage, the relationship turned sour and eventually the that his wife was unfit to take custody of their children because
couple separated, with Ernesto taking Carlos Iñigo with him. she was habitually drunk, spent most of her time at a beer
Joan was also prohibited by Ernesto from returning to their house, and neglected her duties as a mother. He also
conjugal home. Left with no recourse and wanting to see her questioned the jurisdiction of CA, claiming that under RA 8369,
son, Joan filed a petition for habeas corpus to compel Ernesto family courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
to produce their son before the RTC. Ernesto appeared during petitions for habeas corpus. In contrast, Francisca averred that
the schedule hearing, but without Carlos Iñigo. Joan then asked it was her husband who was unfit as he was an alcoholic,
to consolidate the case with another pending case for violation gambler, and a drug addict, which caused him to lose his
of the Anti-VAWC Act of 2004, which was granted. The court faculties and abuse her and their children.
granted the petition for habeas corpus; however, it ruled that
during the pendency of the case, the child shall remain with The CA asserted its authority to take cognizance of the petition
Ernesto until the issue of his custody is resolved. Afterwards, and ruled that, under Article 213 of FC, Francisca was entitled
she filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to compel Ernesto to to the custody of Philip and Francis Angelo, who were aged 6
comply with the writ, as well as an Urgent Motion for Partial and 4 at that time, respectively. The court also granted Felipe
Reconsideration, alleging that the award of temporary custody visitation rights. As to Ronnick, who was then 8 years old, the
to Ernesto violated Article 213 of the FC. CA held that his custody should be determined by the proper
family court in a special proceeding.
The motion was referred to Judge Gonzales-Asdala, Pairing
Judge, because the former Judge was to go on official leave. Held: The CA has jurisdiction over the petition of Francisca
for habeas corpus. The CA should take cognizance of the case

217
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
Thus, family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and
the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue. In any case, whatever uncertainty there was
has been settled with the adoption of the SC Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors, which provides that a petition for habeas corpus may
be filed with the SC and CA, and if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. If the CA were to be
divested of its jurisdiction, it would result in an iniquitous
situation by leaving people without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their child, since writs from family courts are only
enforceable in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, a
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy, which is surely not the intention of the legislature when
they passed the law.
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5 (b) of RA 8369 reveals

that family courts are vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases.
Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by
family courts under Section 5 (b) of RA 8369 pertain to the
ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a
petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court. The rule therefore is when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all
other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is denied.

218

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PERSONS AND

Marc Cedric N. Dela Cruz

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

• The constitutional duty to support marriage must be read LEGAL CAPACITY

Held: Same-sex marriage does not violate any constitutionally

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

OBERGEFELL V. HODGES (2015) REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN (2008)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

WASSMER V. VELEZ (1964) FORMAL REQUISITES

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board

Art 18 Impediments noted in the application for marriage

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

REPUBLIC V. DAGDAG (2001)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

TING V. VELEZ-TING (2009) CASTILLO V. REPUBLIC (2017)

TSOI V. CA (1997) PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE DEFENSE

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

NIÑAL V. BAYADOG (2000) PEOPLE V. MENDOZA (1954)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

Held: Respondent was naturally plump and could have

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

JIMENEZ V. CAÑIZARES (1960)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

Prescriptive periods limit the time in which the action for

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

Custody of the child

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER

Art 52 Registration in the appropriate civil registry

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER