AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 - IFU Updated

JADESTONE ENERGY
(LEMANG) PTE. LTD.
AKATARA GAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

PHASE 2
Process Design Philosophy
X Key Non-Key
Revision Reason for Issue Date Author Checked Approved COMPANY Date
0 Issued For Use 17-Nov-2023 LHC AR STS FM ASJ
A Issued For Review 3-Nov-2023 LHC AR STS FM ASJ
PROVISION OF BLANKET
ENGINEERING TO SUPPORT DOCUMENT NO.
AKATARA FIELD DEVELOPMENT
CONTRACT NO. 093-CO-23
AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001
DOCUMENT REVIEW COMMENT SHEET
PROJECT: AKATARA PHASE 2 DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTUAL PROJECT CLIENT: JADESTONE ENERGY (LEMANG) PTE. LTD.
Discipline: PROCESS
Document Title: Process Design Philosophy
Document No.: AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Revision: A
CTR No:
Total Review Duration: 5 Working Days
Responsible / Consolidator: Yulianto Hari Tribroto Reviewers 06 ~ 10 Nov 2023 (4WD)
Responsible 13 November 2023 (+1WD)
Revise and issue as next issuance status with applicable alphabetical revision (B, C, D,
Return Code: REVIEWED WITH MAJOR COMMENTS - etc). Work may not proceed until the document has been resubmitted, reviewed and
returned either code 1 or code 2.
Section/ By
# Rev. No. COMPANY Comments CONTRACTOR Response COMPANY Closed out
Location (Initials)
The comment has been

1 A 1 FZN
incorporated
2 A 5.2 FZN Refer to comment no. 8

3 A 4.5 FZN
incorporated
seem s u n co m p let e sen et en ce, p lease ch eck

p lease m o r e elab o r at e ab o u t Blo w d o w n an d Iso lat io n p h ilo sp o h y w it h r eg ar d s This issue will be addressed in
4 A 6 an d 7 FZN
t o t w o f acilit ies ad jacen t i.e. AGPF an d AGPF2, h o w it w o u l b e. To b e f u r t h er relief and blowdown report
Please d elet e "Th e m in im u m availab ilit y ...........90% . " The comment has been
5 A Ch ap t er 4.1.2 YHT
incorporated
Up d at e t ab le 5-1 t o b eco m e 4-1

incorporated
Up d at e
7 A Ch ap t er 4.3.2 Fo r m in im u m d esig n p r essu r e ........f o r f u ll vacu u m if m eet t h e cr it er ia list ed in YHT
incorporated
sect io n 4.3.1. "
Delet e co n t en t 5.2.1 Pip elin es The comment has been
Th er e is n o f lo w lin e m o d if icat io n incorporated
Up d at e "t h is in clu d es : ............Relief an d b lo 0w d o w n f r o m Fu el Gas Syst em "
Th is is p h ilo so p h y.

incorporated
Typ ical sam e co m m en t as sect io n 7.1.1.

incorporated
Delet e f o llo w in g sen t en ce:

incorporated
Delet e f o llo w in g sen t en ce:"h o w ever t h is is ......f lar e t ip ven d o r ." The comment has been
incorporated
Up d at e t ab le 8-2
Belo w sh all b e ab o ve

incorporated
Page 1 of 2
DOCUMENT REVIEW COMMENT SHEET
PROJECT: AKATARA PHASE 2 DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTUAL PROJECT CLIENT: JADESTONE ENERGY (LEMANG) PTE. LTD.
Discipline: PROCESS
Document Title: Process Design Philosophy
Document No.: AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Revision: A
CTR No:
Total Review Duration: 5 Working Days
Responsible / Consolidator: Yulianto Hari Tribroto Reviewers 06 ~ 10 Nov 2023 (4WD)
Responsible 13 November 2023 (+1WD)
Revise and issue as next issuance status with applicable alphabetical revision (B, C, D,
Return Code: REVIEWED WITH MAJOR COMMENTS - etc). Work may not proceed until the document has been resubmitted, reviewed and
returned either code 1 or code 2.
Section/ By
# Rev. No. COMPANY Comments CONTRACTOR Response COMPANY Closed out
Location (Initials)
Up d at e
Sp ect acle b lin d sh all b e in clo sed p o sit io n
incorporated
Page 2 of 2
REVISION RECORD
Section/
Rev. No. Reason for Revision
Page Ref.
0 1 Introduction has been revised
0 5.2.1 Section 5.2.1 pipeline has been deleted
0 4.5.1.4 The sentence has been revised
0 4.1.2 "The minimum availability ...........90%. " has been deleted
0 4.3.1 Table number has been revised
A sentence has been revised to add “…for full vacuum if meet the criteria
0 4.3.2
listed in section 4.3.1.”
0 7.1.1-7.1.3 Relief & blowdown system lists have been deleted
0 7.2.2 A sentence has been revised
0 8.3.1 Table 8-2 has been revised
0 8.9.1 Spectable blind has been revised to be in a closed position
2 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 6
1.1 Objective ................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Definitions ................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................ 7
2 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATION................................................................................................... 9
3 UNIT OF MEASUREMENT .............................................................................................................................. 9
4 EQUIPMENT PHILOSOPHY .......................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 DESIGN CASE ....................................................................................................................................... 10
4.1.1 Design Margin ................................................................................................................................. 10
4.1.2 Plant Availability .............................................................................................................................. 10
4.1.3 Turndown ........................................................................................................................................ 10
4.2 SPARING PHILOSOPHY ....................................................................................................................... 10
4.2.1 Major Equipment ............................................................................................................................. 10
4.2.2 Instrumentation ............................................................................................................................... 10
4.2.3 Relief Valves ................................................................................................................................... 10
4.2.4 Control Valve .................................................................................................................................. 11
4.3 DESIGN PRESSURE ............................................................................................................................. 11
4.3.1 Maximum Design Pressure ............................................................................................................. 11
4.3.2 Minimum Design Pressure .............................................................................................................. 13
4.4 DESIGN TEMPERATURE ...................................................................................................................... 13
4.4.1 Maximum Design Temperature ...................................................................................................... 13
4.4.2 Minimum Design Temperature ....................................................................................................... 14
4.5 EQUIPMENT SIZING ............................................................................................................................. 15
4.5.1 Separator ........................................................................................................................................ 15
4.5.2 Pumps ............................................................................................................................................. 20
4.5.4 Compressor .................................................................................................................................... 21
4.5.5 Heat Exchanger .............................................................................................................................. 22
4.5.6 Electric Heaters............................................................................................................................... 22
4.5.7 Column ............................................................................................................................................ 22
4.5.8 LPG Storage Vessel ....................................................................................................................... 23
4.5.9 Relief Valves ................................................................................................................................... 23
4.5.10 Control Valve Sizing........................................................................................................................ 24
4.6 LINE SIZING CRITERIA ......................................................................................................................... 24
4.6.1 General ........................................................................................................................................... 24
3 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
4.6.2 Piping Sizes .................................................................................................................................... 24

4.6.3 Liquid Line Sizing ............................................................................................................................ 25
4.6.4 Gas Line Sizing ............................................................................................................................... 27
4.6.5 Gas/Liquid Two or Multi-Phases Line sizing ................................................................................... 28
4.6.6 Relief and Depressuring Lines ........................................................................................................ 28
4.6.7 Insulation and Tracing .................................................................................................................... 29
5 RELIEF VALVE PHILOSOPHY ...................................................................................................................... 30
5.1 General Principles for Overpressure ...................................................................................................... 30
5.2 Relief Design........................................................................................................................................... 30
5.2.1 Gas Processing Facility .................................................................................................................. 30
5.2.2 Relief Load Calculation ................................................................................................................... 30
5.3 Pressure Safety Valve ............................................................................................................................ 36
5.3.1 Relief Valve Set Pressure and Allowable Overpressure ................................................................ 36
5.3.2 Relief Valve Inlet and Discharge Piping Sizing ............................................................................... 37
5.3.3 PSV Selection Type ........................................................................................................................ 38
5.3.4 Relieve Valve Sparing .................................................................................................................... 39
5.3.5 PSV Testing & Inspection ............................................................................................................... 39
5.3.6 Installation of PSV........................................................................................................................... 39
5.4 Rupture Disc Sizing ................................................................................................................................ 40
6 BLOWDOWN PHILOSOPHIES ...................................................................................................................... 41
6.1 General ................................................................................................................................................... 41
6.2 Depressurization Calculation .................................................................................................................. 41
6.2.1 System Volume ............................................................................................................................... 41
6.2.2 Depressurization Scenario .............................................................................................................. 42
6.3 Minimum Temperature at Blowdown ...................................................................................................... 44
6.4 Inlet Piping .............................................................................................................................................. 44
6.5 Discharge Piping ..................................................................................................................................... 44
6.6 Blowdown Station ................................................................................................................................... 44
7 DISPOSAL SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................................. 45
7.1 General ................................................................................................................................................... 45
7.1.1 HP Flare .......................................................................................................................................... 45
7.1.2 LP Flare .......................................................................................................................................... 45
7.1.3 Atmospheric Vents .......................................................................................................................... 45
7.2 Disposal System Sizing .......................................................................................................................... 45
7.2.1 Flare/Vent System .......................................................................................................................... 45
7.2.2 HP KO Drum ................................................................................................................................... 45
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7.2.3 Flare Header and Sub-header ........................................................................................................ 46

7.2.4 Flare Purge ..................................................................................................................................... 46
7.2.5 Flare Radiation and Dispersion ...................................................................................................... 46
7.2.6 Flare Network Hydraulic ................................................................................................................. 49
7.2.7 Noise Philosophy ............................................................................................................................ 49
7.3 Drain System .......................................................................................................................................... 49
7.3.1 Closed Drain System ...................................................................................................................... 49
7.3.2 Hazardous Open Drain ................................................................................................................... 50
7.3.3 Non-Hazardous Open Drain ........................................................................................................... 50
8 ISOLATION PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................................................ 51
8.1 General ................................................................................................................................................... 51
8.2 Design Philosophy .................................................................................................................................. 51
8.3 Isolation Method ..................................................................................................................................... 51
8.3.1 Positive Isolation ............................................................................................................................. 51
8.3.2 Valve Isolation................................................................................................................................. 53
8.4 Maintenance Isolation ............................................................................................................................. 55
8.4.1 Spared Plant and Equipment .......................................................................................................... 55
8.4.2 Train Isolation ................................................................................................................................. 55
8.5 Confined Space Entry ............................................................................................................................. 55
8.6 Equipment ............................................................................................................................................... 56
8.7 Valves ..................................................................................................................................................... 56
8.7.1 Control Valves ................................................................................................................................. 56
8.7.3 Shutdown Valves ............................................................................................................................ 58
8.7.4 Blowdown Valves ............................................................................................................................ 59
8.7.5 Pressure Safety Valves .................................................................................................................. 59
8.8 Packaged Equipment .............................................................................................................................. 60
8.9 Drain and Vents ...................................................................................................................................... 61
8.9.1 Closed Drains ................................................................................................................................. 61
8.9.2 Atmospheric Vents and Drains ....................................................................................................... 61
8.10 Instrumentation ....................................................................................................................................... 62
8.10.1 Level Instrumentation ..................................................................................................................... 62
8.10.2 Pressure Instrumentation ................................................................................................................ 63
9 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................... 64
5 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
1 INTRODUCTION
The Akatara Field is located onshore Jambi Province, Sumatra Island, Indonesia, (Figure 1-1), in the Lemang
Block Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and is operated by Jadestone Energy (Lemang) Pte. Ltd. COMPANY
is currently in the stage of developing the Akatara gas field to produce natural gas and liquids (Liquid Petroleum
Gas / LPG and Condensate), with expected first production in Q2 2024. The gas sales agreement (“GSA”) has
been established with PLN Batam as the gas buyer, whereby the gas to be tied-in to the TGI pipeline in Jambi
area. The GSA is in place for 20.5 Bbtud.
The project execution (EPCI) stage of Akatara Gas Processing Facility and Sales Gas Pipeline (AGPF) including
associated facilities such as pipeline and gas metering station is expected to be completed in Q2 2024. The
sales gas will be piped at approximately 17 km from AGPF for further tie-in to the existing Grissik Singapore
Pipeline (“GSPL”) operated by TGI. Meanwhile, the sales point for the LPG and Condensate is at the plant gate
by tank truck.
Central Sumatera Basin

Lemang PSC
Fields
South Sumatera Basin
Oil
Basin
Gas
Gas & Condensate
Figure 1-1 Akatara Field Location

In addition to the AGPF as outlined above, COMPANY intends to monetize increase production from the Akatara
field by an estimated 7.5 MMscfd of raw gas. The additional gas production is envisaged to be routed to a new
stand-alone gas processing train, located nearby but independent of the current 25 MMscfd of AGPF being built.
The new stand -alone gas processing train will produce sales gas will be tied-in to the same sales gas pipeline
as the current built in AGPF. The tie-in being upstream of the AGPF custody transfer meter, is equipped with an
USM allocation meter installed on this new line prior to tie-in to the existing AGPF custody transfer meter line.
The liquid products produced by new stand-alone gas processing train (i.e., LPG and Condensate) is planned to
be stored in the existing AGPF LPG spheres and condensate tanks respectively.
Since the additional production is considered marginal (for expected 5 years of production life at 7.5 MMscfd
capacity), COMPANY is investigating a low CAPEX option and an OPEX option for the new facilities to develop
this additional gas as part of this conceptual study.
6 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
1.1 Objective
The objectives of this document are:
 To provide the minimum process and mechanical design requirements.
 To provide a consistent set of guidelines for sizing of equipment and process piping.
 To provide guidelines on typical margins to be applied to the sizing of equipment to ensure that
equipment costs are minimized.
 To provide a basis for designing relief system, blowdown system, and hydrocarbon disposal system
include sizing of relief valves, blowdown philosophy, and design criteria for sizing disposal equipment.
 Define safe isolation methods, draining, purging and venting provisions for on-line plant containing
process and utility liquids and gases, so that operation, maintenance and inspection can take place with
minimum plant shutdown.
 Ensure necessary facilities are incorporated in the design.
This philosophy is mandatory to be applied for the new equipment and facilities that will be installed during
project. Specific design criteria for particular items of equipment are described. Turndown and the need for
sparing of equipment are also discussed. The guidance is not intended to substitute for good engineering
practices. Consideration should be given to special circumstances where more or less rigorous criteria should be
applied.
1.2 Definitions
PROJECT Akatara Gas Development Project Phase 2
COMPANY Jadestone Energy (Lemang) PTE. LTD. (JEPL)
CONTRACTOR PT Synergy Engineering
SUB CONTRACTOR Any organization appointed by CONTRACTOR to perform work on the
PROJECT
VENDOR Any organization providing goods to COMPANY, CONTRACTOR, and
SUBCONTRACTOR.
1.3 Abbreviations
Table 1-1 Abbreviations
Abbreviation Definition
AGPF Akatara Gas Processing Facility
AKT Akatara
API American Petroleum Institute
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BDV Blowdown Valve
BOD Basis of Design
CSO Car-sealed Open
DBB Double Block and Bleed
DT Design Temperature
EDP Emergency Shutdown with Depressurization
7 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Abbreviation Definition
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FB Full Bore
FEED Front End Engineering Design
HLL High Liquid Level
HP High Pressure
KO Knock Out
LALL Low Low Level Alarm/Trip
LC Locked Closed
LLL Low Liquid Level
LP Low Pressure
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
MOP Maximum Operating Pressure
NB Nominal Bore
NLL Normal Liquid Level
NPSHa Net Positive Suction Head Available
NPSHR Net Positive Suction Head Required
PAHH Pressure Alarm High High
PFP Passive Fire Protective Insulation
PSHH Pressure Switch High High
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
RO Restriction Orifice
SB Single Block
SDV Shutdown Valve
TALL Temperature Alarm Low-low
8 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
2 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATION

The government regulations, codes and standards and reference documents shall refer to the Basis of Design
[Ref 1] and adhered to in the Akatara Gas Development Project Phase 2.
3 UNIT OF MEASUREMENT
In general SI customary units shall be used in the project. If not included in the following table, the International
System of Units (SI) will be used.
Table 3-1 Units
Parameter Acceptable Units Notes
Area Hectares, square meters

Calorific Value BTU/scf
Composition mol%
3
Density lb/ft
pipe, flowline, pipeline, tubing, vessels,
Diameter inches
nozzle size
Differential Pressure psi
Distance kilometers, meters, mm pipelines, plot dimensions, etc.
Duty MMBTU/hr
Flow (Hydrocarbon Gas) MMscfd
Flow (Liquid) bopd, bwpd, blpd barrels-per-day (oil, water, liquid)
Flow (LPG) Metric tons/day
Flow (Gas) scfm or MMscfd
Heat / Electrical Energy kWh
Mass lb
Mass Flowrate lb/hr
Particle size µ micron
Pipe Wall Thickness inches
Power hP
Pressure psia, psig
Pump Head Feet of pumped liquid
Sound Intensity dB(A)
Temperature °F
Vapor Pressure psia
Velocity ft/s
Viscosity cP
Voltage V Volts
3
Volume, Gases ft (act or std)
3
Volume, Liquids ft
Water Content lb/MMscf
9 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
4 EQUIPMENT PHILOSOPHY
4.1 DESIGN CASE
4.1.1 Design Margin
The heat and material balance will be prepared without design margin. Design margin will be added and noted
when completing equipment datasheets and performing process calculations.
In general, a design margin of 10% is applied on flow for the design of process facilities, which allows for
uncertainties in the process data and process modelling. However, this margin can be varied on a case-by-case
basis.
For packaged equipment, a guaranteed capacity should be defined, with vendors requested to identify what
design margin has been applied to ensure the guaranteed capacity is achieved.
4.1.2 Plant Availability
The ‘Availability’ of the plant accounts for the times when the plant is producing at reduced capacity or shutdown.
These circumstances can occur due to the following examples:
 Production shutdowns in an emergency.
 Production shutdowns for scheduled equipment maintenance.
 Production shutdowns for equipment failure or unscheduled maintenance.
 Reduced production due to operating restrictions e.g. hydrates, slugging.
 Reduced production due to environmental constraints.
4.1.3 Turndown
The gas conditioning facility shall be designed to operate over the range of 40% to 100% nominal design
capacity. Individual items of equipment will be designed for the range of operating rates likely to occur during the
life of the facilities. For package equipment/Licensor e.g (compressor, LPG Processing system, etc) shall be
verified with Equipment Vendor/packager and some special justification shall be decided case by case.
4.2 SPARING PHILOSOPHY
Sparing should only be provided if it can be justified based on equipment criticality and availability assessment
basis. Sparing will be determined using RAM based assessment - additional sparing will only be provided if
justified by improvements in facility availability using NPV based assessment.
4.2.1 Major Equipment
Generally, no installed spares will be provided except for critical pumps, for which an N+1 philosophy is adopted,
and for equipment, the loss of which, would cause a hazard, prolonged flaring or unacceptable loss of supply to
a downstream facility. For equipment within package Licensor/Vendor, sparing philosophy will be reviewed under
the same criteria
4.2.2 Instrumentation
Generally, spares are provided for fuel gas control valves and fiscal metering components. For transmitter and
control valves in critical service, the sparing will be examined case by case.
4.2.3 Relief Valves
Spare relief valves are to be provided for all relieving cases excluding thermal relief (but including fire relief),
unless the equipment that the relief valve protects is spared.
Installed spare relief valves shall be provided as follows:
 All equipment items which need relief valves and are both in continuous service (without standby
counterpart) and are critical to production shall be equipped with a spare relief valve. If a single valve
10 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
meets the relief requirement (i.e. 1x100%), the spare shall also be 1x100%. Where multiple relief valves
are required for a particular services (e.g. 2x50%), the spare shall be equivalent to the largest size single
relief valve. Preference should be given to install all valves of equal size (e.g. 3x50%). This requirement
includes critical utilities.
 Installed spare relief valves are not required on equipment which is in continuous production but is not
critical to production.
 All relief valves in standby systems shall be unspared. This includes any stand-by compression trains.
 All equipment items which need relief valves and have standby counterpart shall be unspared. Such
equipment includes pumps, filters etc.
 Single fire relief valves shall be provided on PCHEs.
 Single relief valves shall be provided on non-essential systems (e.g. washdown water, possibly potable
water, etc).
 Thermal relief valves (liquid expansion) shall be unspared.
When installed spare relief valves are not provided, then a spare stored relief valve shall be provided.
4.2.4 Control Valve
All unspared control valves for which failure can impact production but where accurate control is not mandatory
should have a bypass installed. The valve shall be a globe valve with a fully open Cv not to exceed the control
valve full open Cv and not less than 50% of the control valve Cv.
All critical control valves where the process requires continuous modulation shall be spared.
Control valves in systems which can be shut down and isolated without impact on production or immediate
impact on the living quarters/control room will be unspared and provided without bypass.
A check valve, if required, shall be located such that it protects the control valve and bypass valve (i.e. outside of
the control valve isolation valves and downstream of the bypass valve tie-in).
4.3 DESIGN PRESSURE
4.3.1 Maximum Design Pressure
For systems protected by a PSV, the criteria in Table 4-1 shall be as a minimum applied.
Table 4-1 Design Pressure Criteria for Pressurized Systems
Maximum operating pressure

Design pressure (psig)
(psig)
0 – 500 Maximum operating pressure + 50 psi
500 – 1000 Maximum operating pressure + 10%

Maximum operating pressure + 8.5%
1000 – 2900
(Minimum 100 psi and maximum 150 psi)
> 2900 Maximum operating pressure + 5%
The limitations given in Table 4-1 are to ensure proper setting of the PSV’s. The MOP (maximum operating
pressure) or PAHH set point is typically 10% above the operating pressure (OP).
Mechanical design codes for piping and equipment have different limitations with regard to maximum allowable
overpressure but such differences should be minimized, consideration may be given to using a reduced design
margin, subject to Company approval, to ensure that the most appropriate design pressure is specified.
11 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
The design pressure of a piping system comprising pipes, fittings, flanges and valves shall in general be
according to ANSI/ASME B31.3. Static head, friction loss and surge pressures shall be taken into consideration.
The design pressure for piping shall be the maximum determined on the basis of the following:
 The maximum continuous operating pressure as defined by the process requirements but not less than
75 psig.
 The vapor pressure of the commodity in the pipe at maximum design temperature, unless protected by a
pressure relieving device.
 The set pressure of a pressure relieving device that protects the pipe.
 The maximum pump shut-off or blocked in discharge pressure, adjusted for short-term variations from
design pressure as allowed in ASME B31.3 and ASME B31.1.
An appropriate margin shall be applied between design pressure and the flange rating of associated piping and
equipment to avoid over-stressing of equipment nozzles. A minimum margin of 5% is recommended or 14.5 psi,
whichever is the greater.
Full vacuum design conditions will be applied to equipment (and associated piping) that fulfills one or more of the
following criteria:
 Is subject to vacuum during start-up, shut-down or regeneration, draining or pump out
 Normally operates full of liquid and can be cooled or blocked in
 Can undergo vacuum through the loss of heat input.
 Equipment subject to steam out
 The vapor pressure of stream in service corresponding to the minimum ambient temperature
The lowest value of maximum design pressure will be 50.75 psig (i.e. 3.5 barg), except for storage tanks
operating at atmospheric pressure.
Atmospheric tanks shall, as a minimum, be designed to be filled “Full of liquid” otherwise the design pressure be
“Full of water” up to the highest possible point and with an overpressure of 1 psig. For cone roofed hydrocarbon
storage tanks, the design pressure will be based on the vapor pressure of the contained fluid at the maximum
temperature that can be reached in the storage and the relief valves (breather valves) will be designed based on
the maximum emergency in-breathing and out-breathing. Reference should be made to API 2000. Vacuum
design condition of tank pressurized by blanket gas shall be determined by the final tank wall thickness. For the
low pressure storage tanks which are blanketed by fuel gas or inert gas are designed for + 0.8 psig / -0.094 psig
For Unfired Pressure Vessel the criteria in Table 4-2 shall be as a minimum applied.
Table 4-2 Design Pressure Criteria for Unfired Pressure Vessel
Maximum operating pressure

Design pressure (psig)
(psig)
0 – 50 75
50 – 250 Operating pressure + 25 psig
250 – 1000 Operating pressure + 10%
> 1000 Operating pressure + 100 psig
Equipment not protected by PSV and located downstream of a pump or a compressor shall be designed for the
shut-in pressure according to the maximum suction pressure based on suction vessel PSV set pressure and NLL
plus pump shut-in head at the maximum rated speed.
12 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Where data from vendor is unavailable, the shut-in head may be estimated as 1.25 times the differential
pressure developed by the pump at maximum rated speed. Maximum rated speed for variable speed drives is to
be specified as 1.10 times the speed for the normal differential pressure at maximum rated flow.
When there is a large difference in delivery and suction pressures, consideration shall be given to whether the
delivery pressure can be imposed on the suction line. If this is the case, the suction line shall be rated for the
same pressure as the discharge line with the specification break taken at the first block valve on the suction line.
The design pressure at the discharge of a reciprocating pump, (e.g. in chemical injection systems) shall be set at
10% above the maximum expected operating pressure, overpressure protection being provided by an
independent pressure relief valve. The pump shall be capable of pumping at the design pressure of the
discharge vessel or system.
The operating pressure of flowlines shall not exceed the MAOP which is generally a minimum of 10% below
hydrotest pressure. The MAWP shall be set by the mechanical engineering/pipeline engineering department
based on material grade and thickness. Generally the MAWP shall be greater than the hydrotest pressure and at
least 100 psig greater than the MAOP. Design pressure for the wellheads and flowlines shall be normally equal
to or lower than the SITHP. In case the design pressure is lower than the SITHP, the flowlines shall be protected
by a pressure relief device.
4.3.2 Minimum Design Pressure
For minimum design pressure, all piping and vessels shall be designed for full vacuum if meet the criteria listed
in section 4.3.1.
4.4 DESIGN TEMPERATURE
4.4.1 Maximum Design Temperature
In general, the maximum design temperature (DT) is calculated by adding 25°F above the operating temperature
(OT). This can be shown as below (as minimum).
o
T OT 2 F
For equipment operating at ambient conditions, the upper design temperature shall be at least equal to a
maximum black bulb temperature of 65°C (149°F), unless it is insulated or other corrective action is taken. Fire
conditions will not be considered in establishing the design temperature of a vessel.
When establishing design temperature, consideration should be given to all abnormal operating conditions, e.g.
start-up, relieving conditions, shut down, depressuring, regeneration, etc.
For thermally insulated equipment, the maximum design temperature shall not be less than 10°C (18°F) greater
than the maximum ambient air temperature.
A high temperature shutdown function may be used to limit the maximum operating temperature of a system. In
such cases, a minimum margin of 5°C (9°F) shall be provided between the TAHH set point and the maximum
design temperature to allow time for the shutdown system to initiate.
In determining the maximum design temperature of systems located downstream of heat exchangers, the
following should be taken into consideration:
a. Potential for the heat exchanger to be bypassed during normal operation.
b. Loss of cooling in the upstream heat exchanger.
If a system operates with wide ranges of operating pressures and temperatures, the system should be designed
for coincident high pressure and high temperature, unless it can clearly be demonstrated that there is no credible
coincident condition.
13 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Compressor System
The discharge design temperature for compressor systems will initially be set at 200°C (392°F, i.e. maximum
seal design temperature) for centrifugal compressor. For reciprocating compressor, the maximum discharge
temperature shall not exceed 140°C (284°F) and for non-lubricated reciprocating compressor shall not exceed
130°C (266°F).
This will be confirmed against the maximum design temperature from the compressor supplier once the
information is available. The compatibility of the supplier data with the rest of the system should be checked to
ensure the appropriate margins are provided. The discharge temperature with the compressor in full recycle
shall be considered.
Power Generation System
For Gas Engine/Turbine Generator, the ISO power is to be de-rated to the service power at the most severe
o
ambient conditions under which the turbine/engine will operate. Ambient condition of 37 C is to be used, (High
O O O
Ambient Temperature of 35 C + Hot air circulation of 1 C + Global Warming of 1 C).
4.4.2 Minimum Design Temperature
In general, the minimum design temperature of equipment and piping shall be selected to avoid the requirement
for significant quantities of alloy steel.
Minimum design temperature for each system shall be determined by the lowest temperature calculated for the
following conditions:
1. Minimum ambient temperature.
2. Minimum operating temperature experienced during normal operation, startup, shutdown, process
upsets, and other off design cases minus 5°C (9°F).
o
3. Normal operating temperature (in case low operating temperature i.e. less than 20 F).
4. Minimum temperature experienced during depressurization (blowdown) to account for simulation
uncertainty.
5. Minimum temperature experienced during a startup operation following a full system depressurization.
6. Minimum temperature caused by draining activity (from system containing fluids at low temperature)
7. Minimum temperature caused by start-up pressurization (in case of start-up, low process fluid can occur
due to Joule-Thompson effect downstream of any restriction).
For all cases, the minimum design temperature shall be assumed to be coincident with the maximum system
design pressure, unless it can clearly be demonstrated that the case is not credible through HAZOP and LOPA.
The impact of minimum temperature at the estimated pressure for this case shall be evaluated.
If the application of these guidelines affects the material selection or system piping class, consideration should
be given to using a reduced design margin, subject to approval by Company, to ensure that the most appropriate
minimum design temperature is specified.
A low temperature shutdown function may be used to limit the minimum operating temperature of a system. In
such cases, a margin of at least 5°C (9°F) shall be provided between the TALL set point and the minimum
design temperature to allow time for the shutdown system to initiate.
Design temperature for piping shall be maximum continuous operating temperature as defined by process
requirements.
For equipment operating at ambient conditions, the upper design temperature shall be at least equal to a
o
maximum black bulb temperature of 150 F unless the equipment is insulated or other mitigating action is taken.
The design temperature for flowlines shall be the maximum of maximum flowing tubing head temperature plus
14 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
o
25 F or the maximum reservoir temperature. For unfired pressure vessel, when operating temperatures above -
o o
20 F, design temperature shall be the maximum operating temperature plus 25 F. For operating temperatures
o
lower than -20 F, the design temperature shall be the lowest operating temperature. Consideration shall be
given to Joule-Thompson cooling during depressurization.
For Heat exchanger or coolers, consideration should be given to designing downstream equipment for the
upstream design condition. Reliance on devices such as temperature trips to protect downstream equipment in
the event of cooling failure may introduce risk, as the instrument response time may not be sufficiently rapid to
offer adequate protection. This shall be reviewed on a case by case basis. For the shell and tube heat
exchanger type, the following criteria shall be considered:
 Cold Fluid On The Shell Side
Design temperature will be equal to the lowest of the maximum operating inlet temperature on the hot
side (excluding process upsets) or the temperature at which the cold fluid has a vapor pressure equal to
the relief valve set pressure.
 Cold Fluid On The Tube Side
Design temperature will be equal to the design temperature of the shell side.
The design temperature of the hot side of the heat exchanger will be equal to the greater of the maximum
temperature of the hot fluid (including upset conditions or the normal inlet operating temperature plus 25 °F.
Generally, for the extreme fluid conditions such as hot vaporized fluid, the hot fluid should be placed in the tube
side. For exchanger in series, the design temperature of the second unit will be established taking into
consideration failure of utility on the first unit i.e. the second unit design temperature will be based on the
maximum inlet temperature of the first unit. Detail design of the heat exchanger and cooler should be verified by
o
vendor. For storage tank, when operating temperatures above -20 F, design temperature shall be the maximum
o o
operating temperature plus 25 F. For operating temperatures lower than -20 F, the design temperature shall be
o
the lowest operating temperature. For Pump, when operating temperatures above -20 F, design temperature
o o
shall be the maximum operating temperature plus 25 F. For operating temperatures lower than -20 F, the
design temperature shall be the lowest operating temperature.
4.5 EQUIPMENT SIZING
4.5.1 Separator
4.5.1.1 Separator Sizing Criteria
Separator sizing (both for horizontal and vertical) should be in accordance with spec API 12 J.
Gas capacities of separators shall be determined by a modification of Stokes’ Law, where the capacity is based
on the principle of the minimum droplet size that will settle out of a moving gas stream at a given velocity.
The first step is to determine the drum size required for liquid entrainment separation. Liquid particles separate:
a) When the residence time of the vapor or gas is equal to or greater than the time required to travel the
available liquid droplet.
b) Vertical height at the dropout velocity of the liquid particles, and when the gas velocity is sufficiently low
to permit the liquid dropout to fall. This vertical height is usually taken as the distance from the maximum
liquid level. The vertical velocity of the vapor or gas should be low enough to prevent large slugs of liquid
from entering the flare.
The dropout velocity, expressed in m/s (ft/s), of a particle in a stream is calculated using Equation:
l v
Vc √( )
v
15 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Where:
Vc = Critical entrainment velocity, ft/s
3
l
= Density of the liquid at operating conditions, lb/ft
3
v
= Density of the vapor at operating conditions, lb/ft
K = Constant depending upon design and operating condition

The acceptable ranges of K factors used for sizing are as follows [Ref 11]:
Table 4-3 Typical K-values for Separator Type
Vessel Type and Internals K (m/s)
Vertical Gravity Settling (no internal) 0.025 – 0.055
Horizontal Gravity Settling 0.06 – 0.075
Vertical with Mist Mat 0.05 – 0.11
Horizontal with Mist Mat 0.12 – 0.15
The K factors should be reduced by the following factors as a function of operating pressure or service;
Table 4-4 De-rating Factor to K-value for Pressure [Ref. 11]
Adjustment of K Factor for Pressure - % of
Value
design value
Atmospheric 100%
150 psi 90%
300 psi 85%
600 psi 80%
1150 psi 75%
% of design value for compressor suction scrubber 70 – 80%
A check will also be made on the minimum droplet size removed in the primary bulk separation section of the
separators to determine whether it is suitable for the vessel service, typically this will be for a 150 micron droplet
without demister installed and 500 micron with demister installed.
For flare/vent knock out drum shall be sized as separator (without mist extractor) which conform to API 521
guidelines. The terminal velocity equation is defined as follows:
√4 g p ( l g
)
Vt
( g
C)
Where:
Vt = Terminal/critical entrainment velocity, m/sec
2
g = Gravitational force, ft/sec
Dp = Droplet diameter, ft
3
ℓ = Liquid density, ft/ft
16 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
3
g = Gas density, lb/ft
C’ = Drag coefficient
This basic equation is widely accepted for all forms of entrainment separation
0. 10 ( )
C( e)2 2
v l v
Where:
= Viscosity of the gas, centipoise;
D = Particle diameter, ft;
l
= Density of the liquid at operating conditions, lb/ft3
v
= Density of the vapor at operating conditions, lb/ft3For air receiver shall be designed to provide 5-10
minutes hold up volume from normal operating pressure of 105-120 psig to low pressure alarm of 60 psig based
on normal demand.
4.5.1.2 Vessel Liquid Levels and Residence Times
2 – Phase Separator
The following liquid level and residence times shall be used for 2 phase separator design:
Table 4-5 Phase Separator Liquid Levels & Residence Time Criteria
Vertical Vessel/ Column Horizontal Vessel

TOV or TTL to HHLL 1.0 x Vessel I (min 12”) At least 20% x Vessel ID (Min 12”)
HHLL to HLL 1 minute (min 6”) 1 minute (min 6”)
HLL to NLL 2 minutes (min 6”) + slug allowance 2 minutes (min 6”) + slug allowance
NLL to LLL 2 minute (minimum 6”) 2 minute (minimum 6”)
LLL to LLLL 1 minute (min 6”) 1 minute (min 6”)
LLLL to BOV or BTL 6” (12” for thick-walled vessels) 12”
Note:
1. NLL to be determined case by case but not more than 80% of diameter vessel for Horizontal Vessel.
2. LLLL to BOV/BTL shall also consider closure time of liquid outlet SDV and potential for blowby.
3. The gas compartment of the vessel above HHLL shall be sufficiently large to allow for proper gas / liquid separation.
3 – Phase Separator
Three phase separators are sized in a similar way to two phase separators but, to allow for separation of the two
liquids, residence times are set for both liquid phases. Preliminary sizing of 3 phase separators will be as follows:
Between BOV and NIL (water volume) 5 minutes (minimum)
Between NIL and NLL (oil volume) 5 minutes (minimum)
If the water volumetric flow rate is small and does not warrant the use of a separate baffled settling
compartment, a water boot may be used instead.
4.5.1.3 Vessel Nozzle Sizing Criteria
Nozzle sizing for both vertical and horizontal separators shall be according to the following criteria:
2
a) lnlet and outlet process nozzles should be sized to meet the momentum v limitations outlined in
b) Table 4-6 .
17 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Table 4-6 The Momentum Criterion for Typical Separator Inlet Device
2 2
Nozzle Devices ρv (kg/m-s )
(Note 1)
No inlet device 1000
(Note 1)
Inlet Half Open Pipe 1500
(Note 1)
Schoepentoeter or equivalent 6000
Gas Outlet All 4500 [Ref. 2]

(Note 3)
Liquid Outlet All 2 m/s
Notes:
1. Criteria are based on v2 when is the fluid density and v is the fluid velocity. The inlet criteria use a mixed gas –
liquid density and superficial velocity.
2. If no upstream straight length is specified, then an inlet Schoepentoeter or equivalent inlet distributor shall be used.
3. Where the liquid outlet supplies a pump or other device requiring low pressure drop, the velocity criteria shall be
reduced to 1m/s.
c) All liquid outlet nozzles shall be fitted with vortex breakers.

d) A minimum size of 2” nominal bore (NB) for flanged connections.
e) The following NB nozzle sizes shall be avoided: 1¼”, 2½”, ½”, ”, 7”, ”, 22” and 26”.
f) The size of man-way is to be 24” NB for standardization reasons, unless there is a specific requirement
for another size.
g) The preferred size of hand-holes is ” NB. The minimum hand-hole size is 6” NB.
The minimum vent and drain nozzle sizes of vessels will be as follows:
Table 4-7 Typical Vent and Drain Connection
Volume or Diameter of Vessels Vent Nozzle Drain Nozzle
and Tanks, Diameter, Diameter,
3
m or m Inch NB Inch NB
V ≤ 7 or ≤ 4.6 2 2
7 < V ≤ 220 or 4.6 < ≤ 6 3 3
21 < V ≤ 420 or >6 4 4
V > 420 6 4
Vessel cleaning nozzles shall be two each of 2” NB connections. Steam-out connections will be 2” NB. For large
vessels (columns) with diameters greater or equal to 4.6 meter, two each 2” NB steam-out connections will be
provided.
Notes:
1. Purge connections, when specifically required, may not necessarily be located on vessels.
2. Utility connections should be distinct and independent from drains.
3. Vessels of 6 meter or longer (tangent to tangent length) will be provided with at least two man-ways or more
depending upon the vessel internal arrangement. On a case by case basis, additional requirements for manways on
vessels will be specified for operations and maintenance requirements.
18 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
4.5.1.4 Vessel Internal Spacing Criteria

The spacing criteria for vertical and horizontal vessel are based on typical dimension as shown in the following
figures and to be updated as per vendor criteria.
Figure 4-1 Phase Horizontal Separator
Figure 4-2 Phase Vertical Separator
19 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Figure 4-3 Phase Horizontal Separator
4.5.2 Pumps
A 10% margin shall be applied in setting the design flow rate (defined as rated flow) for a pump in general
service. No margin shall be added to the differential head.
The procedure for pump calculations shall be:
a) Calculate the rated flow as the design flow rate plus the appropriate margin
b) Determine the size of the pump discharge piping based on pump rated flow rate. The line pressure drop
should be calculated and the 20% design margin added to the pressure drop/100 m to confirm the line
size is acceptable
c) Calculate the pump differential head based on the line size determined above. Calculate pressure drop
excluding the 20% design margin, at the pump rated flow
d) Calculate the NPSHa at rated flow. Design margin of 1 (one) m between NPSHa and NPSHR should be
provided.
Minimum flow provisions shall be made where flow conditions necessitate turndown to less than 30% of the
rated flow. For centrifugal pumps this shall consist of a line from the discharge to the suction source. Minimum
flow requirements shall be based on the pump vendor’s recommendations. However, in the absence of this data
30% of normal flow shall be used for bypass line sizing. Pumps shall be provided with individual minimum flow
recycle lines back to the suction source.
Overplus is a correction factor for difference between calculated or estimated pressure drop and actual site
operating condition. No overplus shall be applied for the following pump systems:
 Control valve system
 Centrifugal pump in booster service

 Positive displacement pump
A 10% overplus shall be applied to other pump system or a minimum of 5 psi and a maximum of 50 psi.
20 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
4.5.4 Compressor
4.5.4.1 Centrifugal Compressor
Rated Capacity
The rated capacity (called as design capacity) shall be 110% of normal flowrate at normal inlet conditions.
Rated Head
The rated head shall be calculated at the rated flow with the minimum normal operating suction pressure and the
maximum normal operating discharge pressure.
Design Pressure
The Maximum Design Pressure on the discharge of a centrifugal compressor is determined from the surge and
also from the setting conditions. The compressor design pressure will normally be determined by vendor and the
design of compressor internals.
The design temperature of the compressor will also be determined by vendor based on the operating condition
and properties of the gas being handled.
4.5.4.2 Reciprocating compressors
Rated Capacity
The rated capacity (called as design capacity) shall be 110% of normal flowrate at normal inlet conditions.
For Air Compressor and Dryer shall be designed with 20% margin above the maximum instrument air and utility
air demand.
Rated Head
The rated head shall be calculated at the rated flow with the minimum normal operating suction pressure and the
maximum normal operating discharge pressure.
Design Pressure
The compressor design pressure will normally be determined by vendor based on the operating conditions and
the design of compressor internals.
A pressure relief valve is required in the discharge of a reciprocating compressor. The MDP of the discharge
side is governed by the relief valve set pressure which will be determined by the following table.
Table 4-8 Minimum Relief Valve Set Pressure Margin
Minimum relief valve set pressure margin

MOP (psig)
above MOP
<= 250 1.7 psi
> 260 to 2465 10%
> 170 to 3480 8%
> 3480 to 5000 6%
Design Temperature
The design temperature of the compressor will also be determined by vendor based on the operating condition
and properties of the gas being handled.
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4.5.5 Heat Exchanger

A 20% margin on area and 10% margin on flow rate will be applied to heat exchangers (air coolers, shell and
tube, plate and frame etc.) and will be shown as a note on the datasheets.
Given this excess area, no design margin would be added to flow. However, exceptions can be made on a case-
by-case basis.
The minimum approach temperatures for the design of heat exchangers shall be:
 Air Cooled Exchanger : 25 °F
 Shell and Tube Exchangers : 20 °F
The LMTD correction factor (FT) for shell and tube heat exchangers shall be greater than 0.75
Air cooled heat exchangers shall be designed for an ambient air temperature of 96 °F. Therefore, the
temperature of all process streams exiting air coolers will be set to 115 °F.
The maximum allowable pressure drops are typically 5 to 10 psi unless economic analysis specifically requests
individual equipment pressure drops.
Fouling factors for various services:
Table 4-9 Typical Fouling Factor for Heat Exchanger
2 o
Service Fouling Factor, h-ft - F/Btu
Sour natural gas 0.001
Sweet natural gas 0.001
Raw feed Condensate 0.002
Stabilized condensate 0.001
Process water 0.002
Nitrogen 0.002
Instrument Air 0.001
Fuel gas 0.001
Diesel 0.002
Air 0.002
Ethylene Glycol 0.002
4.5.6 Electric Heaters

Add 10% on flow to set the heating duty. A minimum of one spare heating element shall be provided to minimize
downtime. Electric heaters are to have as a minimum 25% of rated duty as a single thyristor controlled element,
output variable from 1 – 100% of element duty. The remainder of the duty can be supplied by on/off banks of
elements.
4.5.7 Column
The Column design will normally be determined by vendor based on the operating conditions and the design of
Column internals.
The column internals for the De-Ethaniser and De-Butaniser Columns shall be designed based on the following
parameters:
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Table 4-10 Design Parameters for Columns
Description Value
Down-comer maximum liquid loading 65 USgpm/ft²
System/Foaming factor 0.8
Maximum flooding 80% of jet flood at design point
4.5.8 LPG Storage Vessel

Storage spheres (i.e. LPG Storage Spheres) operating at ambient temperature are to be designed for 1.1 times
the maximum fluid vapor pressure generated at maximum operating temperature. The spheres shall be designed
according to ASME Sec. VIII Div 1 or Div 2. The level setting of the storage spheres shall refer to the Table 4-11.
The minimum sphere capacity is limited due to the wall thickness. The wall thickness is limited by the
manufacturing and the stress relief requirement.
Design Temperature
A design temperature shall be determined based on the assumed highest temperature, with consideration given
to input heat generated by solar radiation. Generally design temperatures are specified per country based on the
ambient air conditions of the district where the plant facilities are to be constructed.
Design Pressure
The equilibrium pressure of a tank internal at the design temperature shall be used as the tank design pressure.
NFPA 58 specifies minimum design pressures.
The typical design for sphere level setting is tabulated in the Table 4-11.
Table 4-11 Level Setting for LPG Storage Spheres
Level Setting Criteria
Vessel Top to HHLL 10% of sphere volume to allow for thermal expansion
HHLL to HLL 2% of sphere volume

3
HLL to LLL 2500 m required working volume
LLL to LLLL 30 minutes at loading rate
LLLL to Vessel Bottom 1 minute at loading rate
Notes:
1. LLLL to Vessel Bottom shall also consider closure time of liquid outlet SDV and potential for blowby or pump damage.
4.5.9 Relief Valves

Relief valves shall be designed in accordance with API RP 520 / 521.
The allowable accumulation for pressure relieving devices shall be:
 For general relief : 10%
 For fire case relief : 21%
 For multiple RVs : 16%
23 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
4.5.10 Control Valve Sizing

Control valves shall be specified with a minimum of two design cases, typically maximum flow with minimum
pressure drop, and minimum flow with maximum pressure drop. No design margin will be applied to the rated
flow rate or pressure drop. For preliminary estimates of control valve size, the following guidelines shall be used.
Instrument Engineers or Vendors are responsible for final control valve sizing and selection.
4.5.10.1 Pressure Drop
Control valve pressure drop in pumped systems shall be calculated in accordance with the following guidelines:
At pump rated flow the control valve pressure drop shall be the greater of:
 0.7 bar.
 15 % of the variable system pressure drop at the rated flow.
At pump normal flow, the control valve pressure drop shall be equal to or greater than:
 1 bar.
 50 % of the variable system pressure drop (excluding the control valve). This is typically 30 % of the total
system pressure drop.
 5 % of the destination pressure.
Control valves in vapor service shall normally be specified for a minimum pressure drop of 0.7 bar at design flow
unless otherwise dictated by specific process conditions.
Control valves in non-pumped liquid service shall be specified with due regard to the system hydraulics under all
operating modes. In flashing services particular attention shall be given to inlet line size with regard to minimizing
flashing at the inlet to the control valve, and to specifying the % liquid flash across the valve.
4.5.10.2 Flow Coefficient
 At maximum flow rate the calculated Cv shall be no greater than 85 % of the valve maximum Cv.
 At the minimum process flow rate the valve Cv should be greater than 10 % of the maximum valve Cv
subject to vendor minimum flow requirements.
4.5.10.3 Compressor Recycle Control Valves
Compressor recycle control valves will be sized by the compressor vendor.
4.6 LINE SIZING CRITERIA
4.6.1 General
Line sizing will generally be based on velocity and/or pressure drop per length. No margin will be applied to flow
rates for the purposes of line sizing.
A 20% margin is added to the calculated pressure drop before comparison with the guideline dP/100 m to
determine that the calculated line size is acceptable. Where the addition of the 20% increases the line size by an
increment, engineering judgement will be applied to determine if the line size increase is in fact warranted based
on system hydraulics and fluid velocities.
Process line sizing criteria shall be accordance to API RP 14E. For firewater distribution piping system, sizing
shall follow applicable NFPA guidelines (NFPA 15, 20).
4.6.2 Piping Sizes
A minimum line size of NB 50mm shall be used for all main process and utility piping, except for instrument
connections where 25mm NB lines are acceptable.
24 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Minimum connection sizes on piping shall be 50 mm for both hazardous and non-hazardous service.
Non-standard pipes sizes shall not be used except where equipment connections and drilling piping systems
require these sizes. Transition to standard commercial pipe sizes shall be made as close to the equipment as
practical.
The minimum nozzle size allowed on vessels and heat exchangers will be 50 mm NB.
4.6.3 Liquid Line Sizing
The liquid line sizing shall refer to API RP 14E.
Single phase liquid lines should be sized primarily based on flow velocity. As a preliminary rule:
 Minimum velocity : 3 ft/s, to minimize deposition of sand and other solids
 Maximum velocity : 15 ft/s, to minimize flashing ahead of control valve.
The limitations for Velocity and Pressure Drop calculation are shown in the Table 4-12.
Table 4-12 Recommended Velocity and Maximum P for Carbon Steel Liquid Lines
Type of Service Maximum P psi/100 ft
HYDROCARBONS
General Recommendation
3
Liquid Density, lb/ft
100 5.0
50 4.0
20 1.3
Pump Suction Centrifugal 0.2 – 1.1
Pump Suction Reciprocating 4.0
Pump Discharge Centrifugal 4.0
Pump Discharge Reciprocating 4.0
Liquid from condenser 0.5
Refrigeration Lines 0.4
Gravity Rundown Lines 0.15
Liquid Feed to Towers 0.3 - 0.5
Liquids to Reboilers 0.1 - 0.25
WATER LINES
General Recommendation 0.3-2.0
Pump Suction 5.0
Pump Discharge 5.0
Cooling Water 2.0
25 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Table 4-13 Allowable Pressure Drops and Velocities in Piping for Centrifugal Pumps
Allowable P psi/100ft
Pipe NB
Pump Suction
inch Pump Discharge
Boiling Liquid Sub-cooled Liquid
<4” 0.05-0.20 0.20-0.60 1.0-1.6
4” 0.05-0.20 0.20-0.60 1.0-1.6
6” 0.05-0.30 0.20-0.60 1.0-1.6
” 0.10-0.30 0.50-1.00 1.6-2.0
> ” 0.10-0.30 0.50-1.00 1.6-2.0
4.6.3.1 Liquids flowing by pressure (Pressure Letdown)

These lines will generally be sized using the guidelines in Table 4-12 . These guidelines may be exceeded
where there is sufficient pressure drop available, subject to the following:
 The maximum allowable velocity is not to be exceeded.
 Lines upstream of pressure letdown valves shall be sized to prevent vapor flash ahead of the valve.
 Lines containing boiling fluids with flow meters shall be sized as for pump suction lines in


 Table 4-13 . The positive head available over the fluid vapor pressure at the meter inlet shall be in
excess of the meter pressure drop.
 Where pressure drop is critical the line should be sized such that the actual pipe frictional pressure drop
does not exceed 50% of the available pressure drop.
4.6.3.2 Gravity Flow
Line flowing by gravity includes tank overflows, drains (closed and open drains), and other lines where the liquid
flows due to gravity forced instead of pressure difference. Generally, for fixed installations, a minimum downward
slope of 1:100 shall be used. However, with mud and/or sand, the slope shall be at least 1:50.
Pipes that are running full, and do not require a minimum downward slope to avoid particle deposition, shall be
sized according to the total available static pressure head, and the maximum allowable velocities for liquid lines.
Near horizontal pipes not running full shall be sized based on the maximum flows as given in the following table.
Table 4-14 Flow Capacity-Near Horizontal Pipes
Liquid Flow Capacity

Diameter Entrance to
(inches) Slope 1:50 Slope 1:100
pipe
(bpd) (bpd)
(bpd)
2” 270 450 380
4” 1,210 3,020 2,260
6” 3,020 9,060 5,280
” 7,550 36,230 25,660
26 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Vertical gravity lines (such as produced water discharge) shall be designed to avoid the formation of siphons,
and to avoid pulsation and vibration. One of the following methods can be adopted dependent on the individual
engineering circumstances:
 Install a siphon breaker at the system high point.
 Size the line for all expected flow rates such that frictional forces offset gravitational forces thus avoiding
sub-atmospheric pressures at the top of the pipe.
 Install a back-pressure control near the base of the line.
 Size the line as self-venting as above.

4.6.3.3 Drains
To avoid deposits of solid particles and sewage, closed and open drains shall be designed for the minimum fluid
velocities given below:
Table 4-15 Minimum Fluid Velocities of Drain Lines
Service Min Velocity (m/s)
Sanitary Drains 0.8

Oily Water Drains (Open
0.9
Drains)
Other Drains 1.1
However, a minimum size of NB 100mm shall be used for headers and NB 75mm for sub-headers. Refer to
Section 4.6.3.2 regarding on the design of gravity flow lines.
4.6.4 Gas Line Sizing
The gas line sizing shall refer to API RP 14E.
Single phase gas lines should be sized primarily based on flow velocity. As a preliminary rule, there may be a
noise problem if the flow velocity exceeds 60 ft/s. Nevertheless, higher velocities are acceptable when the
predicted noise is less than 85 dBA measures 1 m distance from the line. This is also applicable for instrument-
air line sizing.
The design of any piping system where corrosion inhibitor is anticipated should consider increasing the wall
thickness of the piping in the design and/or a reduction in velocity (larger pipe size) to reduce the effect of
stripping inhibitor film from the pipe wall.
Reciprocating and centrifugal compressor piping should be sized to minimize pulsation, vibration and noise.
Table 4-16 Recommended P for Carbon Steel Gas Lines
No. Type of Services ∆P (psi)/100ft
1. General Recommendation
Pressure Level (psig) :
P > 500 2
200 ≤ P ≤ 00 1.5
150 < P < 200 0.6
0 ≤ P ≤ 1 0 0.3
0 < P < 50 0.15
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No. Type of Services ∆P (psi)/100ft
Sub-atmospheric 0.1
2. Compressor Piping Suction 1-1.5
3. Compressor Piping Discharge
Above 100psig 1-1.5
Below 100psig (10% Discharge Pressure)/22
4.6.5 Gas/Liquid Two or Multi-Phases Line sizing

The multi-phase line sizing shall refer to API RP 14E
Two-phase piping lines should be sized primarily on flow velocity which should not exceed the “erosional
velocity”. The erosional velocity can be determined by the following empirical equation:
C
Ve 
m
Where:
Ve : Erosional velocity (ft/s)
C : Constant (empirical)
3
m : Gas/liquid mixture density at flowing pressure and temperature (lbs/ft )
The empirical constants (C values) are shown in the Table 4-17.
Table 4-17 Empirical Constant (C values)
C Value (SI unit) Services
100 solids free fluids continuous service
125 Solids free fluids intermittent service.
solids free fluids where corrosion is controlled by inhibition or by

150-200
employing corrosion resistant alloys in continuous service
solids free fluids where corrosion is controlled by inhibition or by

Up to 250
employing corrosion resistant alloys in intermittent service
The design of any piping where solids are anticipated should consider the installation of sand probes, cushion
flow tees, and a minimum of three feet (3 ft) of straight piping downstream of choke outlets.
The minimum velocity in two-phase lines should be about 10 ft/s to minimize slugging of separation equipment.
4.6.6 Relief and Depressuring Lines
Vapor flow in relief and depressuring lines is treated as adiabatic compressible flow. The size of flare headers,
sub-headers and individual relief valves may be estimated by the method of Lapple (refer API RP521) or by
more rigorous proven computer methods. For preliminary engineering, the guidelines given below should be
followed.
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A detailed network analysis will be undertaken in detailed engineering for all controlling relieving/depressuring
cases in order to ensure that the maximum allowable back pressure at each individual relieving device is not
exceeded.
Calculations will be performed in accordance with API RP520/521 or by use of recognized software e.g.
FLARENET/HYSYS.
4.6.6.1 Relief Valve Inlet Lines
The inlet line pressure drop is to be less than 3% of set pressure calculated at rated flow based on installed relief
valve area and relieving conditions. The inlet line shall not be smaller than the inlet flange of the relief valve.
Block valves must be full bore.
4.6.6.2 Relief Valve Outlet Lines
The discharge line shall not be smaller than the outlet flange of the relief valve. Block valves must be full bore.
The PSV discharge laterals shall be sized based on rated valve capacity and the main relief headers shall be
based on total required capacity.
 Conventional Valves: The discharge line from conventional valves should be sized to limit backpressure
at the relief valve outlet to less than 10% of the set pressure (gauge).
 Balanced Valves: In the case of balanced valves, higher relief valve backpressures are allowed. These
may be used to achieve considerable cost savings. Balanced relief valve outlet lines should be sized to
limit backpressure to 30% of the set pressure (gauge) and to no more than the rating of the internal
bellows. N.B. Always refer to API 526 for maximum allowable bellows rating for a particular valve, prior
to specifying a balanced bellows relief valve.
 Pilot operated valves: Pilot operated relief valve outlet lines should be sized to limit backpressure to 50%
of the set pressure (gauge).
Where there are a number of valves discharging into the same manifold, caution should be exercised to ensure
that the backpressure in the manifold allows all relief valves to discharge properly. The recommended maximum
Mach number range is 0.5 – 0.75 calculated at rated flow rate and at the downstream (end of header) conditions.
4.6.6.3 Flare Headers and Sub-Headers
The maximum Mach number is 0.75, calculated at the downstream (end of header) conditions. For main flare
headers, Mach number shall be based on total required flow. For sub-headers, Mach number shall be based on
rated flow if the sub-header is similar in size to the PSV tailpipe. Required relief flow should be used for sub-
headers, which are larger than the tailpipes and are comparable in size to the main flare header.
4.6.6.4 Blowdown Lines
The maximum velocity in blowdown inlet lines should be limited to 60 m/s. The recommended maximum Mach
number for blowdown outlet lines is 0.75 calculated at downstream junction with relief header.
4.6.7 Insulation and Tracing
Insulation shall be considered for heat conservation (hot and cold). Personnel protection insulation shall be
o
considered if equipment or piping operating-temperature is above 158 F.
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5 RELIEF VALVE PHILOSOPHY

5.1 General Principles for Overpressure
The uncontrolled release of process fluids has potential to harm personnel, the environment and equipment.
Therefore, overpressure protection systems are required to maintain the integrity of the facilities for hydrocarbon
containment. The overpressure protection systems have the following priority of objectives:
 Protection of personnel
 Protection of the environment
 Protection of assets
Generally, the plant will be designed for safe containment of hazardous materials by guarding against
overpressure incidents using an appropriate combination of the following five main protection measures:
 Specification of design pressure higher than the potential source pressure
 Pressure control and alarms
 High pressure trips
 Shut-in and depressure (blowdown)
 Relief of excess pressure (mechanical means)

This document does not address provision of primary protection such as the control, alarms and trips.
Relief devices will be sized for the maximum capacity identified by quantifying all possible relief scenarios. Sizing
will be in accordance with the requirements of API-521 and API RP 520 Part 1.
Relief contingencies are based on the assumption that the primary protection device has failed to act and no
credit will be taken for the action of automatic control systems.
5.2 Relief Design
5.2.1 Gas Processing Facility
At the new Akatara gas processing facility (AGPF-2), two levels of overpressure protection will be provided on
process equipment. Typically, this will involve protection by a high high-pressure trip (PAHH) to shut off inflow
and protection by a mechanical relief device (PSV).
Relief devices will be sized for the maximum capacity identified by quantified contingency analysis according to
API RP 520 and API RP 521.
In accordance with API RP 14C (section 3.4) the shutdown (and blowdown system) is considered to be the
primary level of protection and the relief valves and or rupture discs in the plant are considered to be secondary
level of protection for the plant. This represents the API recommended analysis and design procedure for a
process plant's safety system as per API 14C that the above two levels (PSV/RD) are considered to be the
highest levels of plant protection.
5.2.2 Relief Load Calculation
This section provides information that is additional to the requirements of API RP 521 and shall be used in
conjunction with this document to design the vapour disposal system.
The individual peak-relieving load is the maximum rate that must be relieved from the protected equipment due
to any single source under any failure mode. The possibility of two unrelated independent failures occurring
simultaneously is remote and shall not be considered. API Standard 521 (5th ed Section 4.2.1, page 10) states
that, “The causes of overpressure are considered to be unrelated if no process or mechanical or electrical
linkages exist among them, or if the length of time that elapses between possible successive occurrences of
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these causes is sufficient to make their classification unrelated. The simultaneous occurrence of two or more
unrelated causes of overpressure (also known as double or multiple jeopardy) is not a basis for design”. This
philosophy is used in establishing the relief scenarios. The relief valve shall be sized for the maximum case.
The relevant relief conditions shall be determined for each relief valve and stated in the relief device summary
table. Relief conditions should be documented for all applicable relief scenarios and the calculations referenced.
All possible causes of over-pressure are to be considered. The following scenarios are typical sources of
overpressure for pressure relief:
 Blocked Outlet / Closed Outlet
 Inadvertent Valve Opening / Gas blowby
 Exchanger Tube Rupture

 Utility Failure (heating / cooling medium)
 Instrument Air Failure
 External Fire
 Thermal Expansion
 Power Failure/Voltage Dip
 Abnormal Reboiler Heat Input

 Hydraulic Expansion
 Reflux Failure
 Check Valve Malfunction

For further information on the sources of over pressure for relief rate determination, refer the sections below and
API RP 521. The principles outlined below should not replace a good engineering judgment.
5.2.2.1 Blocked Outlet
For consideration of a blocked outlet scenario, locked open valves or spectacle blinds are not considered subject
to inadvertent closure.
Credit may only be taken for a reduction in relief load under the following circumstances:
 At relieving conditions, the higher pressure imposed on the source may result in a lower flow rate e.g. a
centrifugal pump will move back up its curve and the relieving flow may be lower than the normal
operating flow rate. This would not apply to a positive displacement pump.
 Credit for flow out through the “locked-open” outlets, which have no actuated valves or any other
limitations to flow.
Any credit taken needs to be carefully considered, and shall be approved by the Lead Process (Process Safety)
Engineer.
5.2.2.2 Tube Rupture
A relief device will be provided
 Unless the design pressure of the low pressure side is equal to or greater than two-thirds of that of the
high pressure side.
 Unless it can be clearly shown by calculation that the low pressure system is not subject to overpressure
due to tube rupture.
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The relief capacity shall be based upon API RP 521. The pressures on the high and low pressure side of the
exchanger shall be taken as the maximum operating and the maximum (accumulated) relieving pressure,
respectively.
5.2.2.3 Utility Failure
Partial failures shall be considered as well as total failures.
5.2.2.4 Instrument Air Failure
All pneumatic control valves are assumed to follow their failure mode specification. Should a control valve fail in
its last position, then the position causing the greatest relief load must be assumed (also refer to Section 5.2.2.7
below).
5.2.2.5 Fire Case
Generally, the hydrocarbon processing facilities will be segregated by sufficient distance to prevent escalation. It
is assumed that during a fire there is no feed to or product from an affected system, and all normal heat inputs
have ceased.
In calculating the heat input to the internally wetted surface of vessels, all interconnected equipment and piping
exposed to the fire will be considered, up to a height of 7.5 m above the level at which the fire is located. Wetted
surface will be based on the maximum feasible liquid level in the vessel plus the normal hold-up of internals. No
credit will be taken for the reduction in wetted area due to liquid boil-off.
No credit will be taken for thermal insulation on vessels. An environment factor, F=1.0, will be used for
determining heat input to vessels. Credit will be taken for passive fire protective insulation (PFP) installed on
vessels. An environmental factor, F = 0.3, will be used where passive fire protection is installed.
In some instances, the calculated value of relieving temperature will exceed 1100°F. In this instance this
indicates that there is a high probability that the vessel may fail before the relief valve will open. This is likely to
occur when the operating pressure is significantly lower than the design pressure. In this case, the following
alternatives will be considered:
 Reduce the set pressure of the relief at a value below the design pressure of the vessel. This method
must be used with caution since any reduction may cause the relief valve to be sized in accordance with
different scenario (eg. blocked discharge). Furthermore, possible future lower pressure cases need to
be evaluated.
 Provide a nominal (smallest) size relief valve and set at the design pressure.
The process simulation package HYSYS will be used to determine the required relief rate for the fire scenario.
Fire case relief loads will be calculated for pool fire as well as for jet fire case where applicable.
Fire Type
 Pool Fire
Systems with significant liquid hydrocarbon inventory will be considered for pool fire case. Heat flux and
required relief rate will be estimated using HYSYS. Credit for a 40% reduction in heat flux may be taken
for good drainage and the presence of prompt firefighting efforts as specified in API RP 521.
 Jet Fire
Where potential for jet fire exists, relief load will be calculated for higher heat flux from heat fire. The heat
flux generated by jet fire ranges from 50 kW/m² to 300 kW/m². However, the net heat flux into the fluid
will depend on many factors such as fuel type, vessel temperature, the surface emissivity, the fire
environment, the radiative and convective components of the fire.
rd
Typically, the absorbed flux will be of the order of about 2/3 of the incident flux. A heat flux of 200 kW/m² shall
be used for relief load estimates.
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Liquid Content
Heat transfer rates are highest to the liquid phase in a vessel. For liquid-containing vessels the heat transfer
area is the wetted area in contact with the liquid. Heat Transfer to the vapour is not considered, since the heat
transfer coefficient to the liquid is much higher than that to the gas.
It should be noted that this approach generally applies to all liquid/vapour separators, even if these normally
operate “empty”. When a simulation shows no liquid in such a vessel, and the vessel is being supplied for a
particular purpose e.g., a compressor suction scrubber, then the required level of liquid will be provided by using
the liquid from the appropriate upstream vessel.
For gas filled vessels the heat transfer area is the total vessel internal surface area. For gas filled vessels, the
heat transfer from the vessel wall to the bulk fluid is shown to be very low. Typically a heat flux of only about
1000 BTU/hr.ft² (3 kW/m²) is transferred into the gas. However the heat transfer and required relief rate will be
estimated using HYSYS.
Methodology
There are three methods, depending on the state of the fluid at the relieving pressure:
a) Fluid is sub-critical: P<0.9*Pc
b) Fluid is near its critical pressure: 0.9Pc < P < 1.1*Pc
c) Fluid is super critical (dense phase): P > 1.1*Pc
Where, Pc = critical pressure, P = relieving pressure
For cases b) and c), approval from the Lead Process Engineer must be obtained prior to proceeding with either
method.
Sub-Critical Fluid (Boiling Liquid)
a) Jet fire
 Heat flux = 200 kW/m²
 F (PFP environmental factor) = 0.3
 F (no PFP environmental factor) = 1.0
 Required relieving rate from HYSYS simulation.
 Wetted area = total wetted area in vessel, excluding bottom head in vertical vessels if protected by
skirt.
b) Pool Fire
 Refer to API RP 521 to estimate heat absorption (Q) to the wetted surface.
 Required relieving rate from HYSYS simulation.
Near-Critical Fluid
a) Jet Fire
 Heat flux = 200 kW/m²
 Required relieving rate (kg/s) = 200 x F x (wetted area) / 117
 F (PFP environmental factor) = 0.3
 F (no PFP environmental factor) = 1.0
 Latent heat of evaporation = 50 Btu/lb = 117 kJ/kg
 Wetted area = total wetted area in vessel, excluding bottom head in vertical vessels if protected by
skirt.
b) Pool Fire
 Refer to API RP 521 to estimate heat absorption (Q) to the wetted surface. Latent heat of
evaporation = 50 Btu/lb, as for jet fire above.
 Required relieving rate = Q/(latent heat).
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Supercritical Fluid (Dense Phase Fluid)

Use the approach outlined in API RP521. Specific heat (Cp) of critical fluid from HYSYS simulation, then:
 Cv = Cp – R / MW
 MW = Molecular weight
 k = Cp/Cv
 T1 = fluid temp at relieving pressure, from HYSYS Depressuring utility. The Depressuring utility
performs constant volume heating calculations for the trapped fluid.
 Tw is 200°C above the normal operating temp of the fluid or equal to 230°C, whichever is higher.
 Environmental factor, F’ must not be less than 0.01.
5.2.2.6 Thermal Expansion
Thermal expansion relief valves (TERVs) are required in liquid-full systems if the system can be blocked in and
subjected to heat input from the environment or process. In practice, the theoretical pressure rise is not attained
because systems are rarely totally liquid full and usually have slight leakage through valve seats or gaskets.
Therefore, calculations determining the relieving rate are of little use in determining the size of thermal relief
valves. ¾“ x 1” TE Vs are typically used.
The following factors should be considered before deciding not to fit TERVs:
 Is the piping or equipment continuously in operation and thus unlikely to be isolated without being
depressurised and drained? Most process equipment and piping is in this category.
 Is the liquid non-toxic and non-corrosive and does it have an initial boiling point higher than the
maximum ambient temperature?
 Is there a weak point in the system such as a flange where expansion could relieve pressure without
unacceptable consequences?
 Is it unlikely that the system will be totally liquid-full?
 Has the release a safety or environmental impact?
As a general guide, TERVs are not needed for:
 Process plant piping
 Lines in which there is normally two-phase flow
 Systems which are not totally liquid filled.
TERVs are normally fitted to:
 The cold side of heat exchangers which can be blocked in
 Sections of piping containing more than 500 litres of LPG or toxic liquids which could be blocked in.
 Piping in storage areas or transport lines which will be regularly blocked in during normal operation, to
protect against pressure rise due to solar heating or heat tracing.
In all cases, operating procedures should be developed such that overpressure due to thermal expansion cannot
occur, even when a relief valve is fitted. This can be done by prescribing drainage of a small quantity after a
pipe section has been blocked in.
5.2.2.7 Failure of Automatic Controls
Inlet Control Devices
This situation arises from the failure or inadvertent opening of a control or block valve segregating a high
pressure system to a low pressure system. Typical examples of this is the fuel gas pressure letdown systems.
Refer to Section 0 below.
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Outlet Control Devices

The guidelines under Section 5.2.2.1, above, shall be followed.
Control Valve Failure
Fully open failure of inlet and outlet control valves and fully closed failure of outlet control valves will be
considered. Control valve failure will be evaluated regardless of the air failure spring return position of the valve.
Gas blow-by sizing will be based on the upstream maximum operating pressure and the downstream maximum
relieving pressure. Maximum Cv of the selected trim size of the control valve will be used to determine the
maximum flow through the failed open control valve.
A note will be provided on P&I “The downstream pressure relief valve sizing is based on the selected trim of
this control valve.” A note will also be provided on the control valve data sheet - “A tag will be displayed in the
field on the control valve to state “Control Valve and bypass size affects downstream PSV”.
For control valves with a manual bypass valve, opening of the bypass valve will be considered in determining the
maximum relief load estimates. Where a manual bypass is installed, the calculation will be based on the larger
capacity of the fully open control valve or the fully open bypass.
The relief rate is equal to the difference between the maximum inlet flow and the outlet flow, at relief conditions,
through the valves that remain open. No credit for outlet valves response will be taken i.e. they will be assumed
to remain in their current position. No credit will be taken for opening normally closed control valves (such as
operational flare valves) in a gas blowby situation.
Where two control valves are provided in parallel, the relief load will be based on the combined flow through both
of the failed open control valves, only if both valves fail open on loss of air supply.
The following assumptions are to be applied:
 The control valve fails 100% open. If parallel control valves are installed, both will be assumed to fail open
unless they are controlled and activated by independent control elements / instruments.
 The upstream pressure is at high pressure shutdown level (this can be assumed to be at 90% of design
pressure when high pressure shut-down data is unavailable).
 The downstream pressure is 110% of the set point of the relief valve on the downstream vessel.
 The possibility that the bypass valve around the control valve is open will be considered in determining the
relief rate. Caution should be applied if taking credit for a “locked closed” bypass as the risk of blowby still
exists (and may be higher) when the bypass is unlocked and in use.
Note: The relief load will be the sum of the control valve and its by-pass unless credit can be taken where the
piping helps to limit flow.
For temperature control failing in heat exchange equipment, additional heat input will be calculated on the basis
of clean, rather than fouled conditions.
5.2.2.8 Power Failure / Voltage Dip
Loss of electrical power can cause a wide range of problems that lead to overpressure situations. Power loss
can be simply local to a piece of equipment, localised to groups of equipment or a total power failure. Failure of
the power supply to groups of motors (either by the motor control centres or by a single busbar) can cause
multiple failure conditions and this should be considered.
5.2.2.9 Abnormal Heat Input
This applies to the reboilers in particular whereby overpressure can occur should the vapour generated exceed
the ability of the condensing system. The following factors should be considered:
 Reboilers are clean and conservatively sized
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 The temperature control fails

The relief valve should be able to handle the full vapour capacity based on the abnormal heat input minus the
cooling capacity of the system.
5.2.2.10 Check Valve Malfunction
A check valve may not be effective for preventing overpressure by reverse flow from a high pressure source.
Experience shows that substantial leakage can occur through check valves. The following guidelines should be
used to establish minimum requirements for protection of the low pressure side (more stringent guidelines may
be applied on a case by case basis in consultation with the client).
A single check valve is considered adequate if reverse flow from a high pressure source will not result in
overpressure of the low pressure side by more than the following limits:
 10% or 16% overpressure (as applicable), where a relief valve exists on the low pressure equipment for
some other contingency, assuming a leakage rate of 10% of forward flow per check valve, and;
 The limits imposed by the “1. times esign Pressure ule” assuming TOTAL failure of the check valve.
If the resulting overpressure exceeds the above limits, the low design pressure side needs to be protected by a
relief valve sized for reverse flow through the check valve. Reverse flow should be estimated as follows:
 If one check valve is present, as a design contingency (i.e. relief valve sizing case), assume backflow
equals 10% of forward flow. Where the normal forward flow is liquid (e.g. pump systems) but backflow
may result in liquid followed by vapour, the vapour rate may be estimated by assuming the failed (open)
portion of the check valve is equivalent to an orifice with a diameter of one-third the valve diameter (i.e.
approx. 10% of a valve area). As a remote contingency (see below) assume check valve fails fully open.
 If two dissimilar check valves are present in series, then as a DESIGN CONTINGENCY, assume one
check valve leaks (as calculated above), and the second check valve leaks 10% of the first check valve
rate. As a remote contingency assume the first check valve has failed completely and the second leaks
a rate based on 10% backflow.
For remote contingency, the “1. times esign Pressure ule” may be applied. This allows the pressure of the
low pressure system to rise 1.5 times its design pressure due to the estimated rate of reverse flow i.e. use 50%
overpressure when calculating required relief area.
5.3 Pressure Safety Valve
5.3.1 Relief Valve Set Pressure and Allowable Overpressure
A single relief valve in service will normally protect each pressure vessel, with the spare relief valve being
isolated. The relief valve set pressure shall therefore not exceed the design pressure of the vessel. The
upstream relieving pressure is defined as the relief valve set pressure plus the allowable accumulated
overpressure.
5.3.1.1 Non-Fire Case Relief for Single Relief Devices
The following limits apply to the set pressure and overpressure for a single relief device:
 Safety relief valves on pressure vessels shall be set at 100% of the design pressure as per ASME
Section VIII Division 1 and Division 2. For safety valves on pressure vessels where fire case is the only
criteria, refer to section 5.3.1.3, below.
 Safety relief valves on low pressure tanks shall conform to the requirements of API Standard 2000 and
API Standard 620.
 Safety relief valves on pipelines, launchers and receivers shall conform to ANSI B31.8 - Gas
Transmission & Distribution Piping which references ASME Section VIII Division 1.
 The maximum overpressure for the above criteria is 10% of the system design pressure.
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5.3.1.2 Non-Fire Case Relief for Multiple Relief Devices

When the required capacity is provided by more than one relief device and the relief device conforms to Section
5.3.1.1, above, only one relief device shall be set at the system design pressure and the additional relief devices
shall be set at 105% of the system design pressure. The maximum overpressure for this situation is 16% above
the system design pressure.
5.3.1.3 Fire Case Only Relief for Single Relief Devices
Fire case relief devices shall be set at 100% of the system design pressure. Fire Case relief valves shall have a
maximum overpressure of 21% of the system design pressure.
5.3.1.4 Fire Case Only Relief for Multiple Relief Devices
When the required capacity is provided by more than one relief device, the following table applies:
Table 5-1 Relief Valves Setting
Maximum relieving pressure

Set Pressure (percent)
(percent)
First Valve 100 121
Additional Valves 105 121
It should be noted that British pressure vessel code PD (BS) 5500 specifies a maximum allowable overpressure
of 10% even for fire case. All local design codes should be checked.
5.3.1.5 Thermal Relief Valves
Thermal relief valves are to be set to 100% of the system design pressure for vessels or heat transfer
equipment, but shall not exceed 110% for piping runs (see Section 5.2.2.6 for equipment and piping thermal
relief requirements).
5.3.2 Relief Valve Inlet and Discharge Piping Sizing
5.3.2.1 Inlet Piping
The inlet piping is defined as that between the entrance to the vessel nozzle and the face of the inlet flange of
the pressure relief valve. The pressure drop in the inlet piping should be minimized and the line should not be
pocketed. The pressure drop between the protected equipment and the inlet to a relief valve shall not exceed 3%
of the set pressure of the device, to minimize chattering of the valve. The 3% specification may be relaxed for
remote pilot operated relief valves however the PSV capacity may be reduced significantly [Ref 5].
Pilot operated PSV’s with remote sensing may be used where there is excessive inlet pressure loss that could
not be avoided in the design, or where the margin between operating and design pressure is small (e.g. LPG
sphere PSVs). Pilot operated PSV’s shall only be used for processes with clean service
The effect of any component along the inlet piping should be considered in terms of potential reduction of relief
capacity. The inlet piping and any fittings should have a bore area at least equal to the PSV inlet flange. All
block valves must be full bore. The PSV should be situated as close to the source of pressure as possible.
The inlet system should be self-draining to source. The inlet piping should be sized using the rated relief rate,
where;
( )
Piping for a regulating type PSV shall be sized using required relief rate.
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If the inlet line losses are excessive and a pilot PSV has been selected, then the capacity of the relief valves
needs to be checked at the reduced inlet pressure. An example is a vessel with a design pressure of 15 barg but
with inlet lines losses of 1 bar (7%). Consequently, to prevent more than 10% accumulation the PSV must be
sized based on a relieving pressure of 15 – 1 = 14 barg.
Note that both inlet piping pressure loss and valve back-pressure is to be calculated using the valve rated flow.
An exception to this will be back-pressure calculations for multiple relief valve lifting scenarios such as fire or
utility failure.
This factor can be neglected for inlet line losses less than 3%.
5.3.2.2 Discharge Piping
The main design criteria for the discharge piping and the relief manifolds is that the back pressure must not
reduce the relieving capacity of the PSV below the amount required to protect the corresponding equipment from
overpressure. In addition, the back pressure during relief should be calculated to ensure that it remains below
piping design pressure.
The discharge line must not be smaller than the outlet flange of the relief valve and sized according to the type of
relief valve in service. All block valves must be full bore.
The piping should be designed with as few restrictions as possible, should not be pocketed and should be
sloped to drain to the flare KO drum.
The rated flow rate in the discharge piping should not exceed 0.75 Mach. Each tailpipe should be sized using the
rated relief flow whereas the headers are sized based on the required relief flow. A back pressure of 3 bara shall
be assumed for preliminary estimates.
5.3.3 PSV Selection Type
The selection of relief valves is based on backpressure, inlet pressure drop, dirty/clean service considerations,
space/size, weight considerations, and seat tightness.
5.3.3.1 Backpressure
Maximum allowable back pressures for different relief valve types are [Ref 5]:
 Conventional valve ≤ 10% of set pressure

 Balanced bellows ≤ 0% of set pressure (maximum limit to be cross checked with allowable
pressure for bellow metallurgy)
 Pilot operated ≤ 0% of set pressure
5.3.3.2 Dirty/Clean Service For PSV
Pilot operated relief valves will not be used in dirty service where there is a possibility of wax, hydrate, ice,
corrosion products or solids which can block the small-bore pilot sensing lines. Generally, the following
classifications will be considered:
Table 5-2 Dirty/Clean Service Considerations for PSV
Fluid Type Typical Equipment
Two phase production stream Dirty Well head to Production Separator
Second stage separator, flash gas

Water-wet / Water saturated Gas Dirty
compressor, de-ethanizer
Glycol rich gas PCHE’s Dirty Glycol contactor to cold process
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Fluid Type Typical Equipment
Dry gas
Clean Downstream of cold process
PCHE’s, e-buthanizer, LPG splitter
Hot oil Dirty
Valve reseating problems may occur in dirty service.

5.3.3.3 Space/Size, Weight Consideration For PSV
For clean, high pressure, high-capacity service, pilot operated relief valves will have cost, space and weight
advantage over the conventional and balanced type valves. For small sizes, (≤ 2” x ”, 00#) conventional or
balance type will be used. For thermal relief and other small size relief valves in utility services, the conventional
or balance type would be more economical. In general, high pressure, high-capacity relief valves will exhibit
higher pipe stress and acoustic induced vibration (AIV) potential. Maintenance difficulties may arise during the
removal and transportation of these heavy relief valves. Selection of valve type for large size valves will need to
be addressed on a case-by-case basis during detail design in order to decide the most cost-effective solution.
Notes: Acoustic vibration calculations for the PSV and BDV tailpipes shall be performed during detailed
engineering.
5.3.4 Relieve Valve Sparing
A balance between increasing plant availability (by providing critical equipment with spare relief valves) on one
hand and minimizing space, weight and cost of relief valves (by avoiding spare relief valves) on the other will be
achieved by taking the following approach:
 Provide installed spare relief valve

 Provide space and piping connections for a future spare relief valve
 Do not provide any spare relief valve
The detailed description of relief valve sparing philosophy shall refer to section 4.2.3.
5.3.5 PSV Testing & Inspection
Periodic testing of the relief valves is necessary to check the set pressure. The relief valves will be removed from
equipment for testing. This is a key criterion in PSV sparing.
The relief valve testing and inspection philosophy is premised on establishing inspection intervals based on the
service conditions of each particular valve and the likelihood and/or expected progress of deterioration. It is
possible that this approach will require baseline condition information from an inspection at the conclusion of
year one of operation. This inspection will require physical removal of valves, pre-strip testing, strip down, rebuild
and re-test. For 100% spared services this may be accommodated by staggered testing during operation. Where
no spare is installed, the valves will only be accessible during shutdowns.
5.3.6 Installation of PSV
All relief valves will be located as close as is practical to the protected equipment to ensure a steady flow
through the device and minimize pressure drop in the inlet piping. The relief valve connections shall be
sufficiently downstream of reducing stations, orifice plates and flow nozzles, other valves and fittings to avoid
turbulence. If the protected vessel contains a demister pack or any other internal/outlet device which may be
susceptible to blockage, then the relief nozzle shall be located on the vessel, “upstream” of the internal device.
The valve shall be installed in a vertical upright position at an elevation such that the inlet line will free drain back
to the vessel and the discharge line will free drain to the flare header.
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The inlet line must not be smaller than the PSV inlet flange, the discharge line must not be smaller than the PSV
outlet flange and inlet/outlet block valves must be full bore, preferably ball valves.
Upstream Isolation
A single upstream block valve will be provided for spared relief valves up to 300# pipe rating. For 600# pipe
rating and above, double block valves shall be used. Maintenance will be performed with single isolation if the
single isolation is proven to seal by the local bleed.
Upstream / Downstream Bleed Connection
A bleed connection will be provided on the upstream side of the relief valves if an isolation valve is provided.
This bleed connection will be used to check the integrity of the upstream isolation valve during maintenance on
the relief valve.
A bleed connection will not be provided on the downstream side of the relief valves. However, a downstream
bleed shall be provided on the flare connections/header to positively confirmed isolation.
Downstream Isolation for Future PSV Installation
An isolation valve with blind flange will be installed on the discharge side for a future PSV installation. This is to
avoid a platform shutdown during installation of the future relief valve. Suitable flanges and piping space for
future installation will be provided.
5.4 Rupture Disc Sizing
The maximum operating pressure should be significantly lower than the design pressure of the vessel and the
rupture disc burst pressure, to prevent premature failure of the rupture disc due to fatigue or creep. A rupture
disc is a pressure differential device, the pressure on both sides of the device should be considered during
design. The disc is also sensitive to temperatures and the normal operating and relief temperature coincident
with the relief pressure must be specified to the manufacturer in the design.
Table 5-3 MAOP for Bursting Disc
Conventional Operating conditions 70% less than burst pressure
Scored Tension Loaded Operating conditions 85% less than burst pressure
Composite Operating conditions 80% less than burst pressure
Reverse Acting Operating conditions 90% less than burst pressure
Graphite Operating conditions 70% less than burst pressure
The sizing of a rupture device used alone is based on the equations applicable for pressure relief valves for the
particular fluid type. For all liquids an effective coefficient of discharge Kd = 0.62 is used as described in ASME
VIII Divisions 1 and Division 2. For two phase flow use the method described in API 520, to calculate the
required area. The rupture device selected should be the nominal pipe size whose area is equal to or greater
than the required discharge area calculated by the appropriate equation.
For two rupture discs in series a pressure indicator between them will indicate leakage of either disc. The
pressure indicator will detect an increase in back pressure, which would lead to an increase in rupture pressure.
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6 BLOWDOWN PHILOSOPHIES
6.1 General
Blowdown is only required as a safety response, primarily to a fire. The purpose of blowdown is to reduce the
pressure of high pressure process equipment/system by reducing/removing the hydrocarbon inventory in the
equipment/system.
In the event of fire, it will rapidly reduce the pressure by removing the blocked-in pressurized hydrocarbon
inventory. This protects pressure vessels and flowlines from rupture under external fire conditions and to reduce
hydrocarbon inventory and the potential for escalation in a fire.
The Blowdown system is initiated manually with EDP push button by operator intervention, to release the
hydrocarbon gas containment during fire or emergency condition. In the event of a confirmed fire that may
impinge on pressurized hydrocarbon systems the facility will immediately be shutdown but NOT automatically
depressurized. If the simultaneous blowdown rate of the entire facilities proves to be excessive, sequential
blowdown may be considered, in conjunction with QRA studies.
Emergency depressurization facilities will be designed to achieve following pressure levels from initial conditions
to a level equivalent to 50 % of the vessel's design pressure within approximately 15 minutes at carbon steel
vessel with a wall thickness of approximately 1 inch to reduction of the vessel stress during pool fire exposure.
For vessels other than 1 inch carbon steel, the following depressurization criteria shall be applied:
 Vessels with wall thickness more than 60 mm to be depressurized to 50% of design pressure.
 Vessels with Passive Fire Protection to be depressurized to 50% of design pressure.
 Other vessels to be depressurized to 6.9 barg (100 psig)
Depressurization for some process system, such as for the compressor system, shall consider the requirement
of the package design whichever the more stringent. Decision shall be evaluated case by case.
It should be noted that depressurization will not stop after 15 minutes and that the pressure will continue to
decline. This approach will ensure protection against rupture while reducing the initial peak blowdown load to a
manageable level. Vendor equipment, e.g. compressors, will be depressurized at a rate no greater than that
permitted by the equipment supplier. This will be examined in detail with the selected vendor when more precise
details and procedures are known It should be noted that blowdown does not stop after 15 minutes. The
pressure will be allowed to continue to decline to minimize the probability and consequences of rupture.
6.2 Depressurization Calculation
The total blowdown load on the flare system shall be based on a credible combination of individual blowdown
rates. Typically, this would assume only one area exposed to fire as the plant layout will be designed to minimize
escalation between areas. The extent of individual fire areas will be agreed with the safety discipline.
6.2.1 System Volume
Vessel and piping volumes for both the liquid and gases for each sectionalized area based upon the appropriate
liquid level as below:
 Storage vessels are assumed to contain their maximum working volume.
 Process vessels are assumed to contain their normal working volume.
 Columns (packed and tray) are assumed to contain a liquid volume corresponding to the height from the
bottom to the highest level controller connection and the liquid on the trays which can be calculated on
the basis of normal pressure drop over the columns.
Based upon this information the engineer will calculate the required blowdown orifice size and rate. For each
system the following information is required;
 The actual volume of hydrocarbon vapour within the isolatable section
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 The actual volume of hydrocarbon liquid within the isolatable section

 The actual volume of aqueous liquid within the isolatable section
 The liquid level as defined above
 The overall surface area of the isolatable section
 The liquid wetted surface area of the isolatable section
6.2.2 Depressurization Scenario
Blowdown calculations should consider the following three scenarios;
 Fire Case
 Adiabatic Case
 Low Temperature Case (Isothermal)
For blowdown no credit is taken for operator intervention. Credit will not be taken for insulation unless it is
designed to maintain integrity for the duration of the fire.
The HYSYS dynamic depressuring will be used for all depressurizing calculations.
The HYSYS blowdown model allows specification of the isentropic efficiency, vessel mass, vessel specific heat,
initial liquid volume, the wetted area, the valve constants, and the number of data points. The basis for all fluid
properties and compositions shall be from simulations applicable to the design heat and material cases (to be
defined).
Blowdown simulations will be performed for two reasons:
1. To determine the required blowdown rate under a fire, adiabatic, and isothermal scenario
2. To determine the minimum equipment design temperature
To establish these, three different simulation approaches are required. The different approaches are defined in
Table 6-1 below, this includes the required input data to the HYSYS depressurizing module.
Table 6-1 Parameter Input for Depressurizing Condition
Parameter Fire Case Adiabatic Case Isothermal Case
Initial pressure/ Operating pressure and Ambient temperature @ Ambient temperature @

(note 1) (note 1)
temperature temperature. isochoric pressure or isochoric pressure or
compressor settle-out compressor settle-out
(note 7) (note 7)
conditions or conditions or operating
operating temperature at temperature at PSHH,
PSHH, whichever gives the whichever gives the lowest
lowest temperature at temperature at 0 psig
0 psig.
Final Pressure 100 psig or 50% design 0 psig 0 psig

pressure
Blowdown time Dependent on vessel wall Based on the blowdown Based on the blowdown
(Notes 5, 6)
or 15 minutes. orifice area from the fire orifice area from the fire case
case and estimated by and estimated by manual
manual iteration. iteration.
Vessel Volume Total volume of vessel plus Total volume of vessel plus Total volume of vessel plus
the sum of detail piping the sum of detail piping the sum of detail piping
volume estimation or the volume estimation or the volume estimation or the
assumed of 20% design assumed of 20% design assumed of 20% design
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Parameter Fire Case Adiabatic Case Isothermal Case
margin when the piping margin when the piping margin when the piping
calculation is not available to calculation is not available calculation is not available to
account for isolated piping to account for isolated account for isolated piping
volume between S V’s piping volume between volume between S V’s
S V’s
(Note
Liquid volume  Based on NLL set-point or Based on LALL set-point Based on LALL set-point
(Note 2,4) 2,4)
HLL if LCVs are on-off type. . .
Wetted Area Based on NLL set-point. Entire vessel surface area Wetted area below LALL set
(for adiabatic case where point with normally no margin
gas filled only) or Wetted to account for piping. Wetted
area below LALL set point piping may be included on a
with normally no margin to case-by-case basis
account for piping (for
adiabatic case where
gas/liquid filled)
(Note 3) (Note 3)
Isentropic efficiency - 100 % 100 %
Vessel Heat Transfer C1: 21,000 Btu/hr-ft2 Heat transfer constant: Heat transfer constant:
Coefficient depressuring module depressuring module
C2: 0.82
calculated calculated
C3: bare vessel F=1
Fire Blanket F=0.3
(Environment factor)
Blowdown Orifice size Estimation by HYSYS to Orifice area calculated by Orifice area calculated by the
achieve the final pressure in the fire case fire case
required time
Lower vessel design - Minimum calculated metal Final liquid temperature at 0

temperature temperature at 0 psig psig with no margin.
minus a 20°F margin or
gas temperature at 0 psig
with no margin.
Notes:
1. Isochoric pressure is constant volume cooling.

2. LALL is used for the Low Temperature determination since it produces the lowest fluid temperatures (but higher wall temperature).
Since fluid temperature and not wall temperature is used to determine the minimum metal design temperature for gas/liquid
containing vessels this represents the most conservative approach.
3. 100% isentropic efficiency refers to a completely isentropic process and will generate the coldest temperatures. 0% isentropic
efficiency represents a completely isenthalpic process. A value of 100% shall be used for gas filled systems as this has been
shown to agree with experimental data. In situations where this value creates metallurgy problems the effect of lowering the
efficiency will be evaluated
4. Vessel heat transfer area will be determined based on the Process Data sheet.
5. Refer to API 521 (2020) Section 4.6.6 [Ref. 7], depressuring to a gauge pressure of 690 kPa (100 psi) in 15 min is commonly
considered when the depressuring system is designed to reduce the consequences from a vessel leak or failure. This criterion is
based on the vessel wall temperature versus stress to rupture and applies generally to carbon steel vessels with a wall thickness
of approximately 25.4 mm (1 in.) or more. It is also stated in section 4.4.13.2.3 of API 521 that recommended maximum vessel wall
temperature for steel plate materials of 590°C (1100°F ).
6. Blowdown time shall be set based on a comparison of failure times and escape times. Failure time shall be used if the vessel fails
within the escape time. Escape time is the time to reach the assembly point from the processing facility.
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Settle out conditions vary. Worst case settle out conditions shall be considered when determining vessel design
pressures. However coincident worst case settle-out conditions and a jet fire shall not be considered if they are unrelated
events, e.g. worst case settle-out requires the failure of a suction control valve.Minimum Temperature at
Blowdown
The minimum temperature for the blowdown scenario needs to be determined to specify the metallurgy of the
system. The minimum design temperature is determined by the lowest of the following criteria:
 20°F below the minimum operating temperature.
 Minimum ambient temperature.
 The minimum temperature resulting from depressurization after vessel shell and remaining liquid
contents have reached thermal equilibrium.
 The minimum temperature resulting from adiabatic or isothermal depressurization in applying the fire
case orifice size to achieve the normal ambient pressure within reasonable depressurization duration.
The minimum temperature resulting from depressurization is determined from the following criteria:
 For vessels which are blown down from a vapour filled starting condition the minimum temperature of
the vessel will be taken as the temperature predicted by HYSYS for the vessel wall with a 20°F margin
applied or the temperature of the gas without a margin, whichever is lower.
 For vessels, which contain liquid, which boils throughout the blowdown and is present at the end of the
blowdown, the vessel minimum wall temperature is to be set to the minimum fluid temperature without a
margin being applied.
Depressurizing lines are to be assumed to reach the fluid temperature as predicted by HYSYS, due to the
relatively high heat transfer co-efficient obtained compared to inside the vessel itself. Where this requires exotic
material to be employed a more detailed heat transfer analysis may be warranted to determine the acceptability
of carbon steel.
For hydrocarbon containing vessels where the predicted temperature is lower than the specified design
temperature, then preference is to reduce the design temperature. However, if this has a significant impact, eg
leads to exotic materials, then lower temperatures may be acceptable if they occur at pressures significantly less
than design pressure. This shall be approved by the COMPANY and should be checked by Mechanical on a
case-by-case basis. If this approach is adopted, then the P&ID and operating procedures shall clearly note that
the vessel or system shall not be re-pressurised whilst cold.
6.3 Inlet Piping
The inlet piping should not be pocketed and the velocity should not exceed 60 m/s at the rated blowdown
capacity. Refer to section 4.6.6.4 for additional line sizing criteria.
6.4 Discharge Piping
The recommended maximum Mach no is 0.75 calculated for the rated blowdown capacity at the downstream
junction with the flare header. Refer to section 4.6.6.4 for additional line sizing criteria.
6.5 Blowdown Station
The process systems are segregated by ESD valves on shutdown. Any other isolation will be considered as the
lowest priority of isolation, to be determined as special case and the application is subject to Company approval.
Each section will be provided with at least one depressurization valve station. Blowdown releases will be
directed to the appropriate flare system header.
A depressurization station will comprise a full bore actuated ball valve with a downstream restriction orifice. The
blowdown valve will be specified as fail open.
The blowdown valve should be located at the high point in the piping with the inlet line falling back to the source
vessel with no pockets and the outlet line falling to the flare header with no pockets. This feature is to eliminate
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the potential for a condensate/water slug to accumulate upstream or downstream of the blowdown valve (e.g. as
a result of condensation) and thereby avoid resultant excessive pipe stresses when the blowdown valve opens.
7 DISPOSAL SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY

7.1 General
Three disposal systems commonly used for the safe release of relief and blowdown vapour as follows:
 HP flare/vent – for high pressure sources, (> 10 psig source pressures)
 LP flare/vent – for low pressure sources, (from 1 to 10 psig)
 Atmospheric vents – for very low pressure, usually intermittent, say up to 1 psig.
For LP and HP disposal flares are normally preferred to vents as the combustion process will remove entrained
liquid droplets, minimizing liquid fallout during a release. In addition, the CO2 released from flaring has a lower
greenhouse gas warming potential than methane.
7.1.1 HP Flare
HP Flare systems will handle pressure relief valve releases, emergency blowdown releases and excess
pressure flaring. There will be no continuous venting to the HP Flare.
The HP flare will be continuously purged with fuel gas to prevent Oxygen ingress.
HP flaring will be infrequent, but when required, will be at a relatively high rate. As such a sonic flare tip is
recommended to minimise radiation and reduce the size of the flare system piping.
7.1.2 LP Flare
The LP Flare system will accommodate venting from sources that are not tolerant of potential backpressure from
the HP vent system.
Although the LP flare receives vapour from a number of sources, these sources can be intermittent in nature. As
such it is recommended that the LP vent be continuously purged with fuel gas.
7.1.3 Atmospheric Vents
All vent lines will be routed to safe locations. For application where bird screen is required, venting line will be
sized to consider the pressure drop along the line such that it will not hinder the relieving rate.
7.2 Disposal System Sizing
7.2.1 Flare/Vent System
Process system flare loads will be established for various contingencies such as:
 Pressure relief loads.
 Emergency depressurization loads.
 Operational flaring loads.

7.2.2 The flare system will be designed to meet the governing loads arising from any coincident cases or
combination of these cases which may occur.HP KO Drum
The HP KO drum removes liquid droplets from the HP flare releases. The KO drum will be sized according to
API RP 521 for a liquid droplet size of 600 µm for the maximum vapour load with the KO drum at high-high liquid
level. This droplet size can generally be accommodated by the sonic type flare tips [Ref 7].
The following criteria should be considered in designing flare KO drum:
 Maximum vapour release – for the largest relief case identified
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 Maximum amount of liquid – the LAHH set point in the drum shall ensure that total facility blowdown can
be accommodated. The volume occupied by the liquid should be based on a release that lasts 20 to 30
minutes in accordance with API Standard 521.
 Allow liquid droplets of 600 mm minimum to separate.
 Be the most economical design (vertical or horizontal vessel), dependent on vapour/liquid relief rates.
7.2.3 Flare Header and Sub-header
Flare headers are sized so that the backpressure which may exist or is developed at any point in the system
from each single contingency, will not reduce the relieving capacity of any related pressure relief devices to
below that required to protect the corresponding vessels, piping and equipment from overpressure.
The HP flare header is sized for the largest of:
 Any single pressure relief valve release
 Platform total blowdown load
The LP flare header is sized to the largest relief flow connected to the LP Flare system.
Vapour flow through the discharge header will be treated as compressible flow.
7.2.4 Flare Purge
Flammable gas or non-condensable inert gas added to the flare header to mitigate air ingress and burnback.
For safety purposes, a pre-commissioning purge and subsequent continuous purge with a non-condensable
oxygen free gas is required through the flare system. The pre-purge displaces any existing air from the stack and
the continuous purge ensures that atmospheric air does not enter the stack through the flare tip during low-flow
conditions.
Once the required quantity of purge gas has been established, the injection rate should be controlled by a fixed
orifice, rotameter or other device that ensures the supply remains constant and is not subject to instrument
malfunction or maladjustment. Consult the vendor to determine purge rates to prevent burning inside the flare
tip.
7.2.5 Flare Radiation and Dispersion
The methodology used for Radiation and Dispersion is shown below.
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Figure 7-1 Study Methodology
The criteria used to assess the flare thermal radiation and gas dispersion are elaborated in sections below.
7.2.5.1 Dispersion Criteria
During ignition system failure (flame off), un-ignited gas release from the facilities will form gas clouds that are
dispersed by the initial momentum of release, turbulence around obstruction and wind. The hydrocarbon gas
cloud envelopes are defined by the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) and Upper Flammability Limit (UFL). The
Gaussian plume model will be used for dispersion modeling. The model assumes (on the basis of empirical data)
that Gaussian distribution can adequately describe the concentration profiles in both horizontal and vertical
directions. The Gaussian distribution can also be derived as a solution to the equations describing the diffusion
of a tracer under some (restricted) conditions.
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Figure 7-2 Study Methodology

LFL concentrations which have been used in this study are UFL, 100%, 50%, and 20% LFL. The concentrations
criteria above are considered for flammable materials. Those concentrations have been used to generate the
gas dispersion contours to determine the extent of dispersion within the plant. The cloud concentration between
UFL and 100% LFL indicates that the flare gas will be ignited.
7.2.5.2 Radiation Criteria
Many investigations have been undertaken to determine the effect of thermal radiation on human. Since the
allowable radiation heat level is a function of length of exposure, factors involving reaction time and human
mobility should be considered. It should be noted that these criterions only applied when the vent is ignited
during relief and the flame arrestor was fail to prevent the ignition. In emergency releases, a reaction time of 3s
to 5s may be assumed. However, in evaluating the emergency procedures, consideration may also be given to
an exposed individual becoming anticipated during attempt to the exit area. The recommended design thermal
radiation for personnel is extracted from API 521 that is shown in the following table.
Table 7-1 Recommended Design Thermal Radiation for Personnel
Permissible Design
2 2 Conditions
Level kW/m (Btu/h.ft )
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where urgent emergency action by personnel
is required. When personnel enter or work in an area with the potential for radiant heat
2 2
intensity greater than 6.31 kW/m (2000 Btu/h.ft ), radiation shielding and/or special
9.46 (3000) protection apparel (e.g. fire approach suit) should be considered.
Safety Precaution – It is important to recognize that personnel with appropriate
(Note 1) 2 2
clothing cannot tolerate thermal radiation at 9.46 kW/m (3000 Btu/h.ft ) for more
than a few seconds.
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 30 s can be
6.31 (2000) (Note 1)
required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting 2 min to 3 min can
4.73 (1500) (Note 1)
be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where personnel with appropriate clothing
1.58 (500) (Note 1)
can be continuously exposed.
Note:
1. Appropriate clothing consists of hard hat, long-sleeved shirts with cuffs buttoned, work gloves, long-legged pants and work shoes.
Appropriate clothing minimizes direct skin exposure to thermal radiation
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2 2
In this study, thermal radiation of 4.73 kW/m (1500 BTU/hr.ft ) is utilized as threshold limit (emergency action as
per API 521) for human exposure during emergency.
7.2.6 Flare Network Hydraulic
Flare and relief piping will not have pockets downstream of the relief blowdown devices. When the discharge
header is sized, the relief contingency that gives the greatest back pressure will be identified. Vapor flow in the
discharge header will be treated as compressible flow. Calculations will begin at the system outlet, (i.e. the flare
tip) where the pressure is known, and work back step wise through the system, checking that the backpressure
is acceptable at each PSV outlet.
A detailed network analysis, carried out on recognized software such as FLARENET, will be undertaken for all
controlling relieving/depressuring cases in order to ensure that the maximum allowable back pressure at each
individual relieving device is not exceeded, with the actual pipe network configuration.
The guidelines given of previous section shall be applied.
7.2.7 Noise Philosophy
Noise generated by the flare should not be at a level such that personnel in normal working areas are exposed
to continuous levels of 85 dB(A). In areas where hearing protection must be worn, and for short duration of
flaring (30 seconds), the maximum noise level should not exceed 115 dB (A). The dispersion shall also cover the
noise dispersion results.
7.3 Drain System
The drainage system normally comprises the above fluids of the following streams:
 Instrument drains during normal operation.
 Drain contents from process vessels prior to maintenance.

 Drainage of overflow, wash-down, rain or deluge water.
 Drainage of fluids under accidental loss of containment.
The drainage system consists of the following sub-systems:
 Non-hazardous open drain system
 Hazardous open drain system
 Closed drain system

7.3.1 Closed Drain System
The closed drains system collects liquids from the following sources:
 Operational drains
 Maintenance drains after the equipment has been depressurized and the liquid has been pumped out to
level alarm low-low (LALL).
As part of the plant isolation and maintenance philosophy, each closed drain tail pipe emanating from equipment
maintenance drains could have an assembly consisting of double valve (ball and globe) on drain line and a bleed
valve in between.
All connections will be hard-piped from the equipment item to the relevant drain headers keeping the hazardous
fluids out of contact with the atmosphere. The drains system will be positively isolated from individual items of
equipment during normal operation.
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The Closed Drain Vessel removes liquid droplets from the LP flare releases and will be sized according to API
21 for a liquid droplet size of 00 m for the maximum vapor load with the vessel at high-high liquid level. This
droplet size is consistent with the liquid handling capability of a pipe flare [Ref 7].
7.3.2 Hazardous Open Drain
The following objectives are to be achieved by the system:
 Removal of liquids that could fuel a fire
 Control the spread of flammable liquids from one fire zone to another
 Maintain possibility of escape routes

 Limit rundown of flammable liquid onto other equipment or structures
 Minimize environmental damage
All drains from the process areas and atmospheric drainage points subject to process fluids contamination will
be routed to the open hazardous drain.
Each drain from the skid equipment will be equipped with a swan neck / seal pot (or equivalent) to prevent gas
return from the drains system. The open drain system would also be designed to handle peak rainfall or wash-
down rate.
The hazardous open drains headers would not contain any pockets. In general, Hazardous Open Drains will
have no connections to safe (non-hazardous) areas and it will be routed to the relevant slop tank.
7.3.3 Non-Hazardous Open Drain
The Non-Hazardous Open Drains system collects residual non-hazardous process fluids, wash down from
equipment, rain/fire water from areas designated as non-hazardous.
Any area classified as non-hazardous will be directed to a segregated non-hazardous drain system and the
relevant fluids can be disposed to environment (e.g. river, etc). It is essential that flammable vapour leakage
through oily water drains to non-hazardous areas be prevented therefore the non-hazardous header will be
physically segregated from the hazardous header.
Drainage from areas where no hydrocarbon spillage can occur would be routed directly to environment rather
than to the open drain system.
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8 ISOLATION PHILOSOPHY
8.1 General
Isolation within the new AGPF will require the identification of:
 Trains
 Shutdown and Blowdown Sections
 Maintenance Sections
Trains, shutdown and blowdown sections and maintenance sections can overlap and/or coincide across the
facility, which may allow isolation of items on a broader rather than individual basis. Equipment within a train can
generally be isolated at the train boundary, and should this overlap with a shutdown section, may also take
advantage of the section SDV.
Design will also consider isolation requirements for specific items of plant and equipment, related to the service
of the item, its purpose and also its location within the facility. Items that require frequent maintenance may be
spared in order to minimize impact on facility production. These items may be located within a train and require
sufficient isolation for maintenance whilst the train continues to operate.
8.2 Design Philosophy

The isolation of sections of plant will typically be an engineering judgment based on:
 The purpose for the isolation; either maintenance/operation or shutdown.
 The design conditions of the section, particularly pressure.

 The nature of the fluid in the section, e.g. flammability, toxicity etc.
Isolation of a section for shutdown purposes will always consist of single, actuated shutdown valves on the
perimeter, which will respond to a shutdown signal(s) from emergency shutdown systems. Single shutdown
valves are normally sufficient for the event initiating the shutdown and the associated risk. These valves also
require maintenance, and so may be part of a maintenance section in which a manual valve(s) is provided
outside shutdown section in order to isolate the SDV.
When isolation is provided for maintenance or other operational purposes, single valves may not be adequate.
This is generally because the facility personnel are required to physically handle plant and equipment and need
to be sufficiently protected. The level of isolation required generally increases for higher pressure, and
hydrocarbon containing systems.
8.3 Isolation Method
Isolation of sections of plant or equipment will be generally divided into two types:
8.3.1 Positive Isolation
Positive Isolation, is define as a method of guaranteeing 100% physical segregation of a hazard or
contamination source from personnel and/or product inventory. In general, positive isolation must be employed
in the following conditions;
 All confined space entries.
 To prevent cross-contamination of utilities with process.
 To isolate a train from other hazardous process/utilities for purpose of overhaul/inspection.

 Where hot work is to be undertaken
 Where equipment is to be mothballed
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 For process fluids above auto ignition temperature.

 Long duration isolation (more than one week)
Positive isolation must be achieved in one of the following ways:
 Spectacle blind
This is combined spacer and spade blind system use for size/pressure combinations where weight less
than 50 kg.
 Spacer and Spade Blind
Installing a spacer with the same thickness as the fully rated spade blind. The spacer facilitates the
installation of the spade blind when required.
 Drop Out Spools (Removable Spool)
The removal of a spool piece with blanking of open ends.
Blanks blinds, spades, bolting and gasket shall conform to the piping specification for the line. Spectacle blinds
are normally preferred, but they become increasingly impractical as line size and pressure rating increase. In
these cases positive isolation will be provided by spacer and spade blinds or removable spool, depending on the
specific nature of the requirement and the configuration. If spacer is applied as positive isolation as indicated on
PID, matching spade blind for the spacer shall be provided.
Table 8-1 Guideline for Positive Isolation Selection
Line Size ASME / API FLANGE RATING

(inch NB) 150# 300# 600# 900# 1500# 2500#
1
2
3 SPECTACLE BLIND
4
6
8
10
12
14
OVER SPADE AND SPACER / REMOVABLE SPOOL
Typical examples are as follows:

Table 8-2 Positive Isolation Selection
Flange Rating Spectacle Blind Spade and Spacer Removable Spool
150# 12” and below - 14” and above
300# 10” and below 12” – 16” 1 ” and above
600# ” and below 10” – 1 ” 20” and above
900# 6” and below ”–1 ” 20” and above
52 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Note that positive isolation may be provided on a train rather than an individual item basis, and for certain items
more specific requirements may apply, e.g. PSVs.
Typical examples are as follows:

Table 8-3 Positive Isolation
Application Method
Confined Space (Vessel) Entry

 Appropriate upstream isolation is required to enable Positive
spectacle blind/spade rotation Isolation
Isolated
 Blinds/spade shall be located as close to the vessel
Section Valve
nozzle as practically possible to avoid dead legs Isolation
Maintenance
 All hydrocarbon/hazardous chemical handling
equipment
 Appropriate isolation is required to enable spectacle

blind/spade rotation
8.3.2 Valve Isolation

Valve Isolation, where the isolation of the section is performed by one or more valves, but the guarantee of
segregation is not required. Non return valves and flow control valves are not acceptable for valve isolation.
Shutdown Valve (SDV)
Shutdown valves will typically be actuated ball valves located on the perimeter of the isolated section. As
implied, these valves are intended to operate when sections of plant need to be shutdown and isolated from the
rest of the plant. In line with this function, they are normally required to be of high integrity.
Shutdowns are generally performed in response to deviations from normal operating conditions detected by the
process control or emergency shutdown systems. As a consequence, shutdown valves have a distinctly different
purpose to single block (SB) valves, but can also be used as single block valves by plant personnel for
maintenance or inspection purposes.
Single Block (SB) and Single Block and Bleed (SBB)
General isolation can be achieved by either Single Block (SB) valve or Single Block and Bleed (SBB)
is used when level segregation is required for non-hazardous services or for low pressure hazardous
SBB is a single block valve with a bleed on the side of the equipment to be taken off-line. The bleed
the Operator to test the Single Block Valve for leakage before flanges inside the isolated section are
Non-return valves, control valves and other valves which do not provide tight shut-off, must not be used
purpose of block valve.
Table 8-4 shows the SBB & SB configuration with Globe Valve.
53 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Table 8-4 SBB and SB Configuration
Single Block and Bleed Single Block
Double Block and Bleed (DBB)
DBB isolation is valve isolation that consists of two valves in series with an interposing bleed facility. The vent
allows personnel to monitor the performance of the first valve for leaks and prevent a build-up of pressure on the
second.
DBB isolation can be provided by one of the following methods:

Table 8-5 Type of Double Block and Bleed
Application Method
Two separate valves with a vent valve on the interconnecting

pipework.
Integral double block and bleed valve assemblies, typically

use of instrumentation (e.g. pressure gauges)
Multiple connections from the same pressure source
Pressure
Source
The use of a SDV as the second valve in a DBB configuration is acceptable provided that the SDV actuator is
deactivated; i.e. the control and power connections must be designed to be isolated/ disconnected to prevent
actuation.
54 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Valve isolation of maintenance sections will be as follows:

Table 8-6 Isolation Valve Selection
Low Pressure High Pressure
Service Note 1
<600# rating ≥ 600# rating
Process Fluids Single valve DBB

Non-hazardous Utilities Single valve DBB
Note:
1. A vent/bleed valve should be provided when the system requires positive isolation.
Double block and bleed will be used for services requiring isolation against operating pressures greater than the
design pressure of the flare system as well as to enable positive isolation to be affected by swinging a blind. For
sour system a double block and bleed isolation will be required even at operating pressures less than the flare
design pressure.
8.4 Maintenance Isolation

8.4.1 Spared Plant and Equipment
Some items of plant and equipment may require more frequent maintenance or inspection than the others, e.g.
filters and control valves. These items will generally be considered in a duty and standby arrangement, with
sufficient isolation provided around each to allow for removal or inspection of the offline item whilst the other is in
service.
8.4.2 Train Isolation
Where the vessel forms part of a process train and the train inventory is small (V<0.8m³) then it is acceptable to
provide positive isolation at the train boundary limits. However, where the train inventory is larger, single isolation
valves shall be provided adjacent to the vessels in order to eliminate the requirement for full train purging prior to
vessel maintenance. The requirement for single valve at vessels within trains shall be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Where a process train includes several parallel equipment items such as filters and pumps (e.g. 3 x
50%) positive isolation shall be provided at the items to facilitate their maintenance whilst production continues in
the remainder of the train.
8.5 Confined Space Entry
 Valve isolation as per Section 8.3.2.

 Positive isolation for all process connections as per Section 8.3.1.
 Drain isolation as per Section 8.9.

 PSV isolation as per Section 8.7.5.
 If entry is required to a vessel, or a pump or compressor is dismantled, while the facility is live, then
isolation valves should be provided to enable the blinds to be installed or spool pieces removed.
 Un-spared vessels essential to facility operation and thus not intended to be entered while the facility is
live, require specific isolation for turning of spectacle blinds, installing blinds or spacers and the removal
of spool pieces.
 A vessel or piece of equipment in severe service that is spared (i.e. parallel train) or can be bypassed
and can thus be entered while the facility is live requires provision for isolation valving to enable the
55 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
installation of positive isolation while the remainder of the facility is live. Provision of vent or bleed shall
be provided to check the integrity of the isolation valving before intervention for installed positive
isolation.
8.6 Equipment
 Equipment that is not within a train but which is spared, and sufficiently critical to operations that
servicing of that equipment while the facility is live may be required, shall have provision for positive
isolation (including DBB if required by the service).
 Equipment, including spared equipment, which is within a properly isolatable train, will only be provided
with single isolation valves (i.e. spared pumps, filters, etc). If upon isolation the single block valve
arrangement is found to be leaking, then the train can be shutdown and isolated for servicing to
continue.
 Where spared equipment arrangements are installed that are not within a train and recurring failures are
not expected, single block valves may be used to isolate the failed, plugged, or dirty unit and allow the
plant to run on the spare until an appropriate shutdown can be initiated to properly isolate and repair the
unit. Where such an approach is employed in the initial design, the piping configuration shall allow for a
second block valve to be subsequently installed by shortening of removable spools.
 Equipment not intended to be disconnected or taken out of service while the facility is live does not
require isolation. However, isolation may still be provided to facilitate operation and maintenance, and to
minimize purging volumes and duration and reduce maintenance intervals.
8.7 Valves
8.7.1 Control Valves
The requirements for isolation of control valves will be generally as follows:
Table 8-7 Control Valve Isolation
Application Diagram
DIRECTION OF FLOW
Critical Service with Spare Provided
__x__ __x__
 For modulating valves for critical service, DBB

isolation valves should be provided for system with Bleed not required for
FO Control Valve
600# and above.
__x__ __x__
 Should the control valve fails, the spare valve can

Bleed not required for
be put into service (automatic/manual) FO Control Valve
Critical Service with Unspared Valve

 All unspared control valves, not within a train and DIRECTION OF FLOW
__x__ __x__
critical to production but where accurate control is
not mandatory should have a bypass installed.
Bleed not required for
FO Control Valve
 The valve shall be a globe valve with a fully open
Cv not to exceed the control valve full open Cv and
not less than 50% of the control valve Cv DBB
(as required)
 DBB isolation valves should be provided around the

control valve for system with 600# and above.
56 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Application Diagram
Non-critical Service DIRECTION OF FLOW
 Disruption to system does not impact production

 Upstream vent / drain as per diagram
General requirements for control valve isolation:

 Reducers, if required, shall be located inside the block valves to connect to a reduced size control valve.
 A check valve, if required, shall be located such that it protects the control valve and bypass valve (i.e.
outside of the control valve isolation valves and downstream of the bypass valve tie-in).
 Drains / vents:
- Fail open control valve; a single drain valve shall be located on the upstream side of the control
valve for draining/venting post isolation.
- Fail closed control valve; a drain valve shall be located on the both side of the control valves
draining/venting post isolation.
57 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
8.7.3 Shutdown Valves

The provision of shutdown valves will be generally as follows:
Table 8-8 Shutdown Valve Isolation
Application Diagram
SDV with Automatic Bypass – SBB Configuration DIRECTION OF FLOW
 Actuated bypass valve of equal integrity and SDV Shutdown

shutdown action with the main line SDV Section
RO
SDV
600min
PDT
SDV with Manual Bypass – SBB Configuration DIRECTION OF FLOW
 Manual bypass valves locked closed when not in SDV
service
 Manual valves should be capable of throttling with

large pressure differentials. To maintain integrity of LC
system and prevent leakage past a throttling valve,
a ball valve should be installed in series with the
throttling valve
PDT
SDV with Automatic Bypass – DBB Configuration DIRECTION OF FLOW
 Actuated bypass valve of high integrity SDV Shutdown

Section
 Shutdown action consistent with main line SDV

RO
SDV
600min
PDT
SDV with Manual Bypass (Downstream Shutdown

Section) - DBB Configuration
 Manual valve positioned “outboard” of S V DIRECTION OF FLOW
provided to achieve DBB valve isolation; locked or
CSO when in service. SDV Shutdown
Section
 Manual bypass valves locked closed when not in

service
 Manual valves should be capable of throttling with

large pressure differentials. PDT
 To maintain integrity of system and prevent leakage

downstream of throttling valve, a ball valve should
be installed upstream of the throttling valve.
58 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Application Diagram
SDV with Manual Bypass (Upstream Shutdown Section) - DIRECTION OF FLOW

DBB Configuration Shutdown SDV
Section
 Manual valve positioned “outboard” of S V
provided to achieve DBB valve isolation; locked or
CSO when in service.
PDT
The need for pressurization bypasses will be determined by the start-up philosophy and start-up procedure. The
size of the bypass is determined by the volume of the system to be pressurized and the pressure differential
across the valve. If a large pressure differential may exist, shutdown valves with start-up bypass shall have a
differential pressure (ΔP> bar) permissive to prevent the shutdown valve from opening under high differential
pressure. All transmitter tapping points used for differential pressure permissive shall be local to the valve.
Manual valves acting with shutdown valves to provide DBB isolation of a train or pipeline shall always be
positioned “outboard” of the shutdown valves.
Shutdown valves on vessel liquid outlets should be located as close to the vessel outlet flange as possible.
8.7.4 Blowdown Valves
The general configuration for isolation of blowdown valves will be as follows:
Table 8-9 Blowdown Valve Isolation
Application Diagram
Blowdown Valve
 Downstream isolation valve is required to be locked DIRECTION OF FLOW
open and full bore (equal to the outlet flare
connection line) provided the inlet line size and BD RO
upstream block valve are equal to the BDV size. 600 mm
MIN
LO
 A restriction orifice (RO) will be provided on the
FB
downstream side of the BDV. This RO will be sized System to
such that in high pressure systems the pressure Blowdown
drop (and the required flow to flare system) occurs
across the orifice rather than the BDV.
8.7.5 Pressure Safety Valves

The general configuration for isolation of PSV will be as follows:
Table 8-10 Pressure Safety Valve Isolation
Application Diagram
PSV with Spare Provided

 The active PSV shall have inlet and outlet isolations
valve specified in Locked Open (LO).
 The spare PSV shall have the inlet isolation valve

specified Locked Closed (LC), and outlet isolation
valve in Locked Open (LO) position.
 Valve isolation on spare PSVs allows positive
isolation to be installed at both open pipe ends when
59 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
Application Diagram
the PSV is removed.
 Pilot lines for pilot operated relief valves also require

isolation
 Double block and bleed upstream of the PSV should

be considered for high pressure (600# and above)
and cold services where solids blockage is a
potential.
PSV with no Spare

 PSV with no spare is applicable for the equipment is
N+1 spare provided. For PSV with no spare on a
single equipment without spare equipment but it is
critical equipment (continuous operation), a spare
PSV shall be provided at warehouse and a suitable
line for the spare PSV shall be installed on the
equipment with adequate isolation method e.g. block
valve and blind flange.
 Where no inlet isolation valve is utilized, the

protected system should be isolated from all input
sources in line with this philosophy, depressurized
and purged before it is made ready for PSV
replacement or maintenance
General requirements for PSV isolation:

 Isolation valves upstream and downstream of the PSV shall be full bore, and not be less than the PSV
inlet and outlet flange sizes.
 Downstream isolation valves should be locked open and equal to the outlet flange connection line size.
 Downstream isolation can be excluded where the system discharges to atmosphere.
8.8 Packaged Equipment

Package equipment connected to the process and utility systems will be provided with flanges, isolation valves
and if necessary, blinding facilities at the skid limits.
60 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
8.9 Drain and Vents

8.9.1 Closed Drains
The general configuration for isolation of drain lines will be as follows.
Table 8-11 Drain Isolation
Application Diagram
Single Drain Connection

 Ball valve and drain installed upstream of spectacle
blind with throttling valve downstream of spectacle
blind
Vessel
DRAIN
DRAIN
Multiple Drains Connections

 Where auto refrigeration is possible distance Vessel
between block valves shall be minimum 600 mm.
DRAIN
8.9.2 Atmospheric Vents and Drains

All vents and drains to atmosphere from systems under severe service shall be provided with a blind flange or
plug at the outlet.
Operational (those envisaged to be frequently used during maintenance isolations) vents and drains to
atmosphere that could result in low temperatures shall utilize a double valve arrangement with intermediate
bleed. No integral DBB is acceptable in this case. The use of a double valve arrangement where there is a
possibility of auto-refrigeration and consequent low temperatures is warranted due to the potential for hydrate
blockage and for valve seizure resulting from freezing of atmospheric water vapor on the valve stem. The double
61 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
valve arrangement should consist of a ball or gate on the upstream side and a globe or other suitable throttling
valve downstream. Where auto-refrigeration is possible the valves should be at least 600 mm apart.
8.10 Instrumentation
8.10.1 Level Instrumentation
Vessels shall have isolation for level instrumentation as shown:
(NOTES 1,2) (NOTE 7A)
Vessel LG LT
(NOTES 4,5) (NOTES 1,3)
(NOTE 7B)
(NOTES 1,2)
Figure 8-1 Vessel Level Instrumentation Assembly
NC
VENT
NC NC
(NOTE 8)
NC NC
CONNECTION FROM
CSO
(SAME AREA ONLY)
(NOTE 6)
INSTRUMENTS
OTHER LEVEL
LT
Vessel
CSO
(NOTES 1,2) NC NC
(NOTE 8)
NC NC
NC
DRAIN
Figure 8-2 Level Instrumentation Valve and Drain Assembly
Note:
1. For 3-phase applications, an additional nozzle is required for lighter liquid (middle) phase.
2. Valve isolation (Table 4.2) should be consulted to determine whether double block valve assembly is required.
3. Where two level devices are used for control and trip functions, the elevation of nozzle tappings shall be identical to facilitate
discrepancy checking as much as possible.
4. One bridge cannot be used for both control and safety instruments.
5. Level bridle connections are always ”, however vessel nozzle connections could be 4”.
6. Isolation valve connection to instruments where connected to ESD and fire protection systems shall be car-sealed open (CSO).
62 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
7. A. Connections cannot be higher than nozzle of bridle

B. Connections cannot be lower than nozzle of bridle
8. There shall be 2 sets of valves for each vent and drain as is follows: one valve shall be located on instrument / bridle side and the
other valve shall be located on drain / vent pipe side.
8.10.2 Pressure Instrumentation

Isolation of pressure instrumentation will be as follows:
Table 8-12 Pressure Instrumentation Isolation
Application Diagram
For pressure instrumentation connections requiring double
block and bleed valve. Minimum size of valve is ¾”.
PT PI
SCOPE OF
INSTRUMENTATION
SCOPE OF PIPING
For pressure instrumentation connections requiring single PT

block isolation, a block valve will be provided (by piping) and
a bleed valve (by inst).
SCOPE OF
INSTRUMENTATION
SCOPE OF PIPING
PI
SCOPE OF
INSTRUMENTATION
SCOPE OF PIPING
Vessel
63 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0
9 REFERENCES
1. AKATARA Project Development, AKATARA Gas Plant & Sales Gas Pipeline, Basis of Design for FEED,
Doc No. AKT-GEN-BOD-70-000-001, Rev 0.
2. AKATARA Project Development, Akatara Project Development, Basis of Design for New Gas Plant, Doc
No. AKT-PG-BOD-200-0001
3. API Specification 12 J, “API Specification for Oil and Gas Separators”, Seventh Edition, October 1, 1 .
4. API, “API ecommended Practice 14E – Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore
Production Platform Piping Systems, Fifth Edition, October 1991, Reaffirmed March 2007.
5. API, “API ecommended Practice 20 - Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving

evices”, Part I – Sizing and Selection, Ninth Edition, July 2014.
6. API, “API ecommended Practice 20 - Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices
in efineries”, Part II – Installation, Fifth Edition, August 2003.
7. API, “API Standard 521 - Pressure- elieving and epressurising Systems”, Seventh Edition, June 2020.
8. ASME, ASME B31.4-2002 - Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbon.
9. ASME, ASME Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels – Section VIII Div 1, 2001 Edition, Dated July
1, 2001.
10. Crane, Flow of fluids through Valves, fittings & pipes, Technical Publication
th
11. GPSA Handbook, SI Version, 13 Edition, 2012.
64 of 64 AKT-PR-PHI-200-0001 Rev 0

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JADESTONE ENERGY

(LEMANG) PTE. LTD.

AKATARA GAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Process Design Philosophy

0 Issued For Use 17-Nov-2023 LHC AR STS FM ASJ

A Issued For Review 3-Nov-2023 LHC AR STS FM ASJ

The comment has been

2 A 5.2 FZN Refer to comment no. 8

The comment has been

seem s u n co m p let e sen et en ce, p lease ch eck

Up d at e t ab le 5-1 t o b eco m e 4-1

The comment has been

Typ ical sam e co m m en t as sect io n 7.1.1.

Delet e f o llo w in g sen t en ce:

The comment has been

4.6.2 Piping Sizes .................................................................................................................................... 24

7.2.3 Flare Header and Sub-header ........................................................................................................ 46

Central Sumatera Basin

Figure 1-1 Akatara Field Location

2 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATION

Area Hectares, square meters

Maximum operating pressure

0 – 500 Maximum operating pressure + 50 psi

500 – 1000 Maximum operating pressure + 10%

Maximum operating pressure

50 – 250 Operating pressure + 25 psig

250 – 1000 Operating pressure + 10%

> 1000 Operating pressure + 100 psig

K = Constant depending upon design and operating condition

Vessel Type and Internals K (m/s)

Vertical Gravity Settling (no internal) 0.025 – 0.055

Horizontal Gravity Settling 0.06 – 0.075

Vertical with Mist Mat 0.05 – 0.11

Horizontal with Mist Mat 0.12 – 0.15

150 psi 90%

300 psi 85%

600 psi 80%

1150 psi 75%

% of design value for compressor suction scrubber 70 – 80%

Vertical Vessel/ Column Horizontal Vessel

HHLL to HLL 1 minute (min 6”) 1 minute (min 6”)

NLL to LLL 2 minute (minimum 6”) 2 minute (minimum 6”)

LLL to LLLL 1 minute (min 6”) 1 minute (min 6”)

LLLL to BOV or BTL 6” (12” for thick-walled vessels) 12”

Gas Outlet All 4500 [Ref. 2]

c) All liquid outlet nozzles shall be fitted with vortex breakers.

7 < V ≤ 220 or 4.6 < ≤ 6 3 3

21 < V ≤ 420 or >6 4 4

4.5.1.4 Vessel Internal Spacing Criteria

Figure 4-1 Phase Horizontal Separator

Figure 4-2 Phase Vertical Separator

Figure 4-3 Phase Horizontal Separator

 Centrifugal pump in booster service

Minimum relief valve set pressure margin

<= 250 1.7 psi

> 260 to 2465 10%

> 170 to 3480 8%