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Manuscript_e1c320c3d9c6c31ea3618fbe65c861a1

The Importance of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

for Rural Economies: Livelihood Diversification,
Dependence, and Heterogeneity in Rural Guinea∗
Heather Huntington† Kate Marple-Cantrell‡

June 14, 2022

Abstract

A number of development interventions have sought to improve livelihoods and

benefits in diamond mining communities. Local interventions can include activities
such as formalizing and securing the tenure of mining claims, converting mining sites
to agricultural sites, alternative livelihoods, land use planning, and training miners
in SMARTER mining techniques. However, there are strong assumptions underlying
the program logic and context for many of these interventions. To interrogate these
assumptions, this paper explores livelihood dependence and motivations for ASM, in-
formality and rules, and environmental costs with a focus on differential responses for
indigene miners versus national and transnational miners, as well as for full-time career
miners versus part-time miners. We also analyze the variation in responses across two
diamond mining areas. The findings challenge several key assumptions that inform
development programming around alternative livelihoods and formalization in the the
context of ASM. The results demonstrate that ASM is fully embedded in the local
economy in the study area, although there is significant heterogeneity in livelihood de-
pendence and diversification within and between mining sites. We find that low conflict
results challenge the general association of artisanal miners and violence, in part due to
effective customary systems for land management. The analysis highlight elements of
ASM management that would benefit from programs or policies that seek to facilitate
ASM as a sustainable approach for local economic growth.

Keywords: artisanal mining, Guinea, livelihoods, heterogeneity, rural, customary

∗Research funding came from USAID (Grant AID-OAA-TO-13-00019).

†Huntington (corresponding author): Duke University, Department of Political Science,
heather.huntington@duke.edu
‡Marple-Cantrell : kate.marple-cantrell@cloudburstgroup.com

© 2022 published by Elsevier. This manuscript is made available under the Elsevier user license
https://www.elsevier.com/open-access/userlicense/1.0/
1 Introduction
A large body of work describes both the positive and negative effects of Artisanal and
Small-Scale Mining (ASM) on rural communities. The economic importance of ASM has
been established in a number of studies (Kumah, Hilson, and Quaicoe 2020; Tschakert
2009; Kamlongera 2011). Positive effects center on the income benefits and opportunities
for livelihood diversification - especially to improve resilience in the case of hardships and
shocks (Tschakert 2009; Maconachie and Hilson 2018; Kamlongera 2011). In Sub-Saharan
Africa, ASM provides direct employment for millions of vulnerable people (Kumah, Hilson,
and Quaicoe 2020; Hilson and Maconachie 2020) and serves as an important means of coping
with unemployment (Nyame, Andrew Grant, and Yakovleva 2009).
The linkages and complementarities between ASM and agriculture are well-documented;
many people engage in both ASM and farming as a means to address rural poverty (Ma-
conachie and Binns 2007; Pijpers 2014). Incomes from ASM help to support subsistence
agriculture by enabling farmers to purchase farm inputs and/or supplement agricultural in-
comes during periods of hardship (Maconachie and Hilson 2018). Correspondingly, revenue
and food from agriculture are used to support ASM (Maconachie and Hilson 2011).
While an increase in artisanal diamond mining has been a means of employment and
income-generation for small-scale miners, there are some human development challenges,
related to social conflict, environmental burdens from land degradation, and adverse health
effects (Yelpaala and Ali 2005). Among other issues, environmental degradation, crime, drug
use, prostitution, and conflicts between miners and local communities have received attention
in the literature. Of special importance in rural areas, ASM can have negative effects on
agriculture through three main mechanisms (Ofosu et al. 2020): land degradation (Kitula
2006) and farm invasions; water and mercury pollution (Tschakert 2009; Kamlongera 2011);
and the shift of labor from the agricultural sector to the ASM sector (Hilson and Laing
2017).
A number of development interventions have sought to improve livelihoods in diamond
mining communities. Programs can include a range of activities such as formalizing and
securing the tenure of mining claims, converting mining sites to agricultural sites, alternative
livelihoods, land use planning, training miners in SMARTER mining techniques, etc.. Strong
assumptions underlie the program logic and context for many of these interventions.
One set of assumptions that drives development programming is that artisanal miners
engage in mining because they do not have other livelihood options available to them. Be-
cause of extreme poverty, miners are often incentivized to quickly mine, sell, and move on
to new sites. Mining subsequently creates a poverty cycle, and continued poverty prevents

1
miners from diversifying their livelihoods and - especially in the case of diggers and washers
- it prevents miners from securing the equipment, documentation, etc. that is needed to
operate within the formal chain of custody. Operating within the formal channels would
improve their working conditions and the retail price of the stones that they extract.
Another logic guiding donor-funded interventions is that secure property rights will create
positive incentives for miners to be good stewards of land and resources, thereby improving
environmental outcomes. There is an assumption that stronger property rights for both
mining communities and artisanal miners will yield a number of benefits. For artisanal
miners, formalizing and securing rights to prospect and dig for diamonds is expected to
increase the likelihood that miners will sell diamonds through legal channels, thereby enabling
the government to track the origin of diamonds and prevent them from fueling conflict. For
communities and land owners, clarification and formalization of mining claims is expected to
clarify the rules governing access, use, and transfer of rights. There are a number of strong
assumptions that need to be unpacked in this program logic.
This paper interrogates these assumptions through an exploration of livelihood depen-
dence and motivations for ASM, informality and rules, and environmental costs in Guinea’s
Forécariah and Kindia prefectures. The study conducts a quantitative analysis of the im-
portance and challenges of ASM for rural economies. We rely on a unique and extensive set
of data sources, including a large-N surveys of artisanal miners and masters1, large-N survey
of households in mining areas, and focus group discussions with local community members.
First, the research examines the motivations for engagement in ASM, with a particular
focus on understanding incentives associated with livelihood diversification, poverty, and
“adventure seeking”. Second, the paper describes how the ASM sector largely operates infor-
mally, outside of government oversight and enforcement. We explore how miners gain access
to the land, preferences for licensing sites, and assessments of customary rule prevalence,
oversight, and enforcement at mining sites2. Third, the paper analyzes the environmental
and social costs associated with ASM. We explore differential responses for indigene versus
national and transnational miners, as well as for career miners versus part-time miners. We
also analyze variation across two diamond mining areas within the same region to examine
diversity between proximate sites.
Despite a large and growing body of literature on ASM, there remains a dearth of rigorous
quantitative studies on artisanal diamond mining in a customary context. This paper helps
fill the knowledge gap through the analysis of the most comprehensive miner and household
1. Masters are external operators who fund and control diamond production and trade. They rent the
mining site from Customary Landowners or purchase a parceled site, provide equipment and hire the miners.
2. This section reiterates findings first put forward in Huntington and Marple-Cantrell 2021.

2
level quantitative data collected to-date. The addition of this rich set of data to the scholar-
ship on ASM represents a unique contribution to the literature around livelihoods and ASM
embeddedness in sub-Saharan Africa. It facilitates an understanding of how geographic vari-
ation in local sites and variation in the characteristics of miners shape economic, governance,
and environmental outcomes.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that ASM is fully embedded in the local economy,
and it is key source of livelihoods. A significant portion of miners are local community
members; this provides some support for the argument that alternative livelihood programs
will provide livelihood benefits for indigene miners and that these programs could be sus-
tainable. However, there is a deeply ingrained social practice of migration by young men
in the region to engage in mining before they return to settle in their native community.
Even if livelihood diversification projects are established, there is little reason to believe that
these would motivate transitory miners to establish long-term roots in mining sites. Thus,
as the majority of miners are transient, it is a stretch to assume that alternative livelihood
programs will reduce poverty for the majority of full-time miners. Furthermore, ASM is
seen as a viable, well-understood, and established means of providing individuals with both
primary and supplemental income, and therefore there are reasons to question the uptake
and sustainability of new alternative livelihood options. As there is a dearth of evidence
from independent evaluations of local development interventions in ASM communities, the
literature can only speculate on their potential effectiveness and sustainability.
In our study sites, ASM is effectively managed by informal customary structures. For
communities, land owners, and miners, the rules governing access and use of mining sites are
clear and well-known. Communities and land owners express high levels of perceived land
tenure security for their land; correspondingly, miners express security of rights to prospect
and dig for diamonds in the customary governance regime. Low levels of conflict challenge
the general association of artisanal miners and violence, and are due, in part, to the effective
and sophisticated system for land management. There is limited demand for formalization
or a fundamental changes to the current ASM governance regime among miners, land owners
and local communities. Projects that seek to secure or formalize tenure will not be successful
without significant time and resources spent on local social dialogue and engagement.
The findings also shed light on the importance of mining site heterogeneity with regards
to rule adherence, the level of informality, and dependence on mining for livelihoods. Given
the heterogeneity of sites - even within the same region or district - projects and policies
must consider flexible and adaptive interventions.
Two issues represent primary sources of discontent with ASM. The first issue to refusal
to close the mined-out pits. Perceived security of property and use rights is not a sufficient

3
condition for prompting the restoration of mined out sites. And despite the effectiveness
of the customary system for land management and conflict mitigation, it has not proved
effective at ensuring site restoration. The second challenge is violations of the rule that
some proceeds from found diamonds must revert back to the village. There is a widespread
perception that locals do not benefit from ASM as much as foreigners - in part because
foreigners understand and can navigate the sector better than natives - and that foreigners
leave once they discover a diamond without paying the ’right to shovel’, which is expected
to be used for community infrastructure, including new roads, schools and mosques. These
are elements of ASM management that would benefit from programs or policies that seek to
facilitate ASM as a sustainable approach for local economic growth.
The paper is structured as follows – Section 2 discusses the theory, background and
country context. Section 3 describes the research methods and data sources used in the
study. Section 4 presents the empirical results for household and miner survey data analysis.
Section 5 discusses the overall research findings, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion
of the implications for the research findings.

2 Theory and Background

Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is an important, if often-overlooked, means of in-
come generation for individuals living in developing countries that are rich in resources, such
as gold, gemstones, and other minerals (Hilson 2009). The economic role of ASM can range
across contexts from a specialized pursuit for individual actors looking to “strike it rich” to a
widespread secondary or even primary local economic activity that is critical in addressing
rural poverty in conjunction with subsistence agriculture (Fisher 2007; Hilson 2006; Ma-
conachie and Binns 2007). ASM can be an important means of coping with unemployment
and of lessening rural to urban migration pressures (Labonne 2002).
ASM is critical for livelihood diversification and resilience (Maconachie and Hilson 2018).
A large body of work explores the linkages and complementarities between ASM and agri-
culture (Banchirigah and Hilson 2010; Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Maconachie and Binns
2007; Kamlongera 2011). Most of this work confirms that ASM has become an important
supplementary income to farming and extra source of income during hardship. Many families
engage simultaneously in both ASM and agriculture, transferring labor and finance from one
to another (Hilson and Garforth 2012; Maconachie and Binns 2007; Maconachie and Hilson
2018; Pijpers 2014). The revenues from the ASM economy supplement agricultural income
and vice versa, as the earnings from ASM are used to purchase important farm supplies to
support agriculture, and the earnings and food from the agrarian sector are used to support

4
ASM (Hilson and Garforth 2012; Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Persaud et al. 2017; Kam-
longera 2011; Okoh and Hilson 2011; Mkodzongi and Spiegel 2019). The diamond mining and
rice farming economies possess complementarities in a labor allocation cycle, where mining
can be undertaken in the dry season when river levels are low and farming pursued during
the rainy season (Pijpers 2014).The linkages between ASM and subsistence agriculture also
have implications for food security and gender equality (Hilson and Maconachie 2020).
Despite the potential livelihood benefits, the ASM sector presents local and national chal-
lenges for countries with these natural resources. Local challenges include concerns about
environmental degradation, crime, drug use, prostitution, and conflict with the host com-
munity (Aryee, Ntibery, and Atorkui 2003; Maconachie and Binns 2007; Yelpaala and Ali
2005). Depending on the mineral excavated, artisanal mining is associated with a myriad
of negative environmental impacts, such as: noise and dust pollution; erosion and diver-
sion of rivers; deforestation; abandoned open (unfilled) mining pits that are a fall risk for
humans and animals, and when filled with standing water, a breeding ground for malarial
mosquitoes; mercury, cyanide, mineral mine waste, and silt pollution of water sources; and
problems stemming from underground excavation, such as ground and building collapse and
degradation due to the use of explosives (Bakia 2014; Keita 2001; Kitula 2006; Yelpaala and
Ali 2005).
These social and environmental problems are generally attributed to the unregulated
nature of the sector (Aryee, Ntibery, and Atorkui 2003; Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Sinding
2005; Spiegel 2012). ASM largely operates informally within a complex land tenure system
typified by overlapping statutory and customary regimes (Freudenberger 2015; Nyame and
Blocher 2010). A number of studies have highlighted the potential shortcomings of local
and community based ASM regulation approaches, including inequality in the distribution
of benefits and resources, corruption, elite capture, and greater exclusivity of land use and
access rights on the basis of local versus ‘stranger’ distinctions (Berry 2009; Hirons 2011;
Hirons 2014; Muriaas 2009; Putzel et al. 2015).
However, despite minimal government involvement or oversight, small-scale diamond min-
ing is not an unorganized or unregulated activity. Local customary land owners and village
elders most often organize, control, and monitor artisanal diamond mining according to a
set of verbal customary rules and behavioral prescriptions that are well-known by indigenes,
national, and transnational migrants (Muriaas 2009). These dynamics have been identified
through case studies of artisanal gold mining across sub-Saharan Africa in Mali (Keita 2001),
Senegal (Persaud et al. 2017), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Geenen 2012), and Ghana
(Nyame and Blocher 2010).
In Guinea, the customary system has, thus far, generally served to effectively manage

5
land and natural resources in the context of ASM. However, other research has highlighted
mixed empirical findings regarding the success and effectiveness of the customary system to
motivate positive social and environmental outcomes. Research suggests that stronger cus-
tomary institutions and governance systems heighten the potential social gains from mining
while simultaneously mitigating the negative social and environmental impacts of mining.
Correspondingly, these benefits and successes of the customary system support the continued
prominence of customary practices. The customary process continues to guarantee tenure
security for the local community overall and accommodate land pressure and increased mi-
gration from artisanal diamond mining in a manner that provides benefits to many of the
actors involved, including affordable and accessible pit access to miners and community-level
infrastructure gains through the fee system (Huntington and Marple-Cantrell 2021).
However, ASM has placed new and difficult pressures on the customary systems in our
study area. As previous research has shown, despite the strength and legitimacy enjoyed by
customary institutions in mining areas, host communities are not uniformly able to maximize
the social benefits of mining, enact or enforce rules to mitigate environmental degradation, or
control various social disruptions arising from mining-related migration. Communities gen-
erally exhibit a high level of concern about the environmental impacts of mining, and this
concern is highest in areas without traditional rules requiring mine restoration. Correspond-
ingly, communities where there is evidence of weaknesses in the customary systems’ ability
to monitor and enforce rules also struggle to manage the social costs of mining (Huntington
and Marple-Cantrell 2021).

2.1 Context
Guinea is a coastal country in Francophone West Africa with a population of 12.4 million
(Figure 1). In Guinea, it is estimated that 300,000 people work directly in ASM and another
1.5 million people benefit from this economic activity (Hilson and McQuilken 2014). Aside
from the jobs that ASM directly provides to diggers, washers, surveillants, masters and
mine bosses, it is estimated that six support jobs are created for every one job in the ASM
sector, including taxi drivers, cooks, and other support services (Hilson and McQuilken 2014).
Accounting for a notable portion of the country’s exports, artisanal diamond mining is seen
as an important opportunity by bi-lateral donors for Guinea’s future economic growth and
sustainable development (Bermudez-Lugo 2012).
Forécariah and Kindia prefectures are located in the Guiné-Maritime region of Guinea,
where ASM is often a secondary or tertiary economic activity for local inhabitants, as they
are primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture. Diamond mining in these areas occurs in

6
 Figure 1: Location of Guinea in West Africa

the Atlantic-draining Konkouré River basin. Artisanal miners use open pit methods to dig
for diamonds primarily with hand tools and no mechanized tools or equipment, except for
some use of water pumps powered by small generators. There is some migration to these
areas for mining from other parts of Guinea and from Sierra Leone.
Forécariah and Kindia are home to an evolving example of ASM formalization. The
Ministry of Mines and Geology (Ministére des Mines et de la Géologie, MMG) began work
to formalize ASM activities in Forécariah in 2013. These areas were selected for piloting the
formalization effort in 2013 by the MMG in consultation with international donors because
they represent a more tractable place to pilot those efforts, given that it is one of the less
important and less conflict-ridden diamond producing areas of the country (USAID 2014).
In Guinea, the existing statutory tenure system grants formal surface rights to private
landowners or the state, and it grants subsurface rights exclusively to the state to ‘manage on
behalf of citizens’ through the provision of mining licenses and permits (Freudenberger 2015).
Formalization of the ASM sector involves the assessment, registration, licensing, monitoring,

7
evaluation and tracking of mining activity at the pit level, among other activities. This
process is referred to as “parcelization” in the context of Guinea3.
Despite pressure from the international development and donor community to achieve
compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme – in part through formalization
efforts – uptake of the formal system has been very low in absolute terms in Forécariah and
Kindia prefectures. By 2014, the MMG had parceled approximately 130 active and inactive
mines across Forécariah, but very few parcels were purchased, mostly by external actors.
Each parcel is one hectare and requires the user to purchase an artisanal mining permit
(Freudenberger 2015).

2.2 Sample Characteristics

The study area for this paper consists of 108 communities surveyed across Kindia and Foré-
cariah (Figure 2). Villages are rural and remote; they are located approximately 13 km from
tarmac roads, 3 km from a primary school, and 6.5 km from a health clinic, on average.
Community size is variable, although most villages are small, consisting of 15 households
or less (56%, 50). In Forécariah, rice cultivation is the main agricultural activity, whereas
Kindia is defined by the subsistence farming of vegetables, rice, cassava, and fruits. Further-
more, plantation agriculture is more prevalent in Kindia than in Forécariah, as evidenced
by the planting of fruit trees at a much higher rate in Kindia. The descriptive statistics for
sample characteristics are displayed in Table 1 below.
3. To mine legally , artisanal miners must obtain an artisanal operation license on a maximum area of 1
ha in reserved zones from the ASM Division of Guinea’s National Directorate of Mines. Guinean nationals
are eligible to apply for a maximum of three of these licenses annually, though they can be renewed. In these
cases, the National Mining Authority is tasked with the environmental evaluation that mining companies
are usually required to undertake and submit with an application for a large-scale mining permit. Formal
artisanal miners are required to sell their diamonds to authorized collection agents (Agent collecteur), who
then sell these diamonds to licensed agents of trading houses. After mining activities have ceased, the holder
of an artisanal operation license must restore the site of operations covered by the mining title. Collection
of a deposit from the title holder for the rehabilitation of the operation site is meant to ensure compliance
with this stipulation (Guinea 2013). At the time this study was conducted, the ASM Division had granted
129 ASM Licenses in Guinea; other artisanal mining production was taking place outside the formal system
(Freudenberger 2015).

8
 Figure 2: Location of Study Villages in Kindia and Forécariah

Household characteristics

Among our study sample, household heads in Forécariah and Kindia largely identify as
Soussou (83%, 1,797); the second largest ethnic group is Peuhl (7%). Eighty-three percent
of household heads were born in the village where they currently live (1,797). Of those not
from their village of residence, 95% (328) are from another town in Guinea and 5% (16) are
from another country. Most non-Guinean household heads are from Sierra Leone (12). The
average age of household heads is 47 years, and households are comprised of six individuals,
on average.
Our sample is defined by a low literacy rate and high degree of poverty. In 51% of
households (1,104), adults have no formal schooling, and only 9% (195) of households have
a member who has graduated high school. Forty-one percent (888) of households can afford
to send all of their children to school, although this is significantly lower among households
in Forécariah (29%), which points to a higher poverty rate.
As noted above, farming of rice, fruit and vegetables is the dominant activity in the study
area. 98% of households farm at least one plot of farmland, and 79% of household members
older than 13 years spend the majority of their time working in rice cultivation or smallholder
cultivation of subsistence crops. As rice is the staple crop in Guinea, approximately three
quarters of households have one or more plots used for rice cultivation (77%).
Plantation agriculture of palm oil or tree fruit is another important livelihood in the
study area. Forty-five percent of households (974) have at least one plot with trees; the most
common type of tree is mango trees, followed by palm oil trees, cola trees, and orange trees.
Roughly 20% (433) of households in the study area report involvement in ASM by at least

9
one household member. Unsurprisingly, participation rates are lower among female-headed
households (5%) but higher among youth-headed households (25%). Among those who are
or were involved with mining, most worked as diggers or washers (59%, 222), and often both.
On average, household survey respondents with mining experience have worked in the sector
for 8 years, though there is tremendous variation.

Artisanal miners

Kindia and Forécariah are defined by the presence of ASM without large mining concessions
and the absence of large-scale conflicts over mining rights. Our study sample consists of
diggers or washers, pit masters, and owners of the mining site or surveillants. In the miner
survey, 84% (769) of miners work or have worked as diggers or washers, and 16% (147) are
or have been masters. An additional 5% (46) are or have been owners and 5% (46) are or
have been overseers4.
Almost all artisanal miners are male (98%, 898) and report working on an average of
2 mining sites over the past year. The average age of miners in the sample is 37 years,
and they have, on average, 9.16 years of experience. During the mining season, miners
report working roughly six or seven hours per day in the mines. For this work, on average
they earn approximately 6,000 GNF per day (0.82 USD). The daily pay includes food and
lodging for 69% of miners (632). Although other studies have highlighted the high number
of women engaged in mining activities (e.g. Dessertine 2016; Arthur-Holmes 2021), there are
a relatively few number of female respondents in our survey sites5. Female respondents in
the ASM survey have not only worked as support staff at the mines (4), but also as masters
(9), washers (4), a surveillant (1), and a digger (1).
Approximately 66% (604) of miners are Soussou. Similar to household heads, education
levels for miners are low. Less than half of respondents (48%, 440) have completed any
level of formal education, whereas 12% (110) of miners have finished some level of primary
school (grades 1–5). The majority of mining respondents are married (monogamous or
polygamous)(73%, 669).
4. We included all levels of mine workers in the study sample to better understand the role of each position
on the site.
5. This might be due to our survey’s focus on direct laborers and supervisors, versus indirect workers who
provide support as food vendors, for example. Other studies have also struggled to find women engaged in
digging and other more intensive extraction tasks (Arthur-Holmes 2021).

10
 Overall Local Not local Forecariah Kindia Full-time Miner Part-time Miner
Kindia (%) 42 (381) 75 (282) 25 (94) NA NA 18 (68) 82 (311)
Geography
Forecariah (%) 58 (535) 33 (144) 73 (390) NA NA 68 (358) 32 (171)
37 37 37 35 39 35 38
Age (yrs)
(sd=12.74) (sd=13.53) (sd=12.03) (sd=11.94) (sd=13.54) (sd=11.99) (sd=13.15)
Soussou (%) 66 (601) 88 (375) 46 (220) 56 (299) 80 (302) 54 (230) 77 (366)
Education (%) 48 (438) 46 (196) 50 (241) 47 (252) 49 (186) 44 (187) 52 (249)
Demographics
Marital status (%) 75 (671) 82 (344) 68 (322) 70 (367) 82 (304) 67 (279) 82 (386)
Diggers and Washers (%) 84 (766) 87 (420) 80 (340) 83 (442) 85 (324) 89 (378) 79 (382)
Local miners (%) 47 (426) NA NA NA NA 26 (109) 66 (314)
9.16 7.61 10.45 9.91 8.11 10.03 8.34
Mining experience (yrs)
(sd=8.22) (sd=6.74) (sd=9.09) (sd=8.21) (sd=8.16) (sd=8.25) (sd=8.15)

Table 1: Sample characteristics, Artisanal Miners

Customary Land Owners

Customary Land Owners (CLOs) are descendants of the village founding families who are
responsible for land allocation. One hundred and eight CLOs were surveyed for the study.
CLOs are male (105), older than the household respondents on average (68), and 89% (96)
belong to the Soussou ethnic group. Most have iron roofing sheets (89%, 96) as opposed to
grass thatched roofs (11%, 12). Ninety percent (97) report having no formal education.

3 Methods and Data Sources

Our paper relies on two primary methods. First, we conduct a descriptive analysis of survey
data from households, artisanal miners and customary land owners in Guinea’s Forécariah
and Kindia prefectures. We complement this analysis with findings from qualitative focus
group discussions that took place across the study area.
Second, the study uses regression analysis to complement the descriptive analysis and
provide a more in-depth understanding of differential effects for indigene and full-time miners
for indicators about livelihoods, informality, rules, and environmental outcomes. We also use
the regression models to explore variation across geographic sites.
Both the descriptive analysis and regression methods draw on baseline data from two
large–N quantitative surveys of households (N=2,165) and of individuals involved in the
ASM sector (N=916), including miners and overseers. Data was collected from October to
December 2014 for an impact evaluation of the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond
Development II (PRADD II)6 project in the Forécariah and Kindia prefectures of Guinea.
Household survey data was collected from 100 villages, including 59 villages in Forécariah
prefecture and and 41 villages in Kindia. Twenty households were selected for sampling
6. The PRADD II program was a USAID-funded intervention that was designed to support country
compliance with the KPCS and increase the percentage of diamonds entering the legal chain of custody,
improving the livelihoods of artisanal diamond mining communities.

11
in each of the 100 villages in the study area using random number tables, and additional
households were sampled from large villages to compensate for villages with less than 20
households.
A total of 23 active diamond mining sites were identified in the study area. The research
conducted a census of ASM miners who were present in the study area during the time of
data collection. A total of 916 miners were surveyed from the mining sites. As our sample of
ASM miners is drawn from a convenience sample, the outcomes and interpretation presented
below is focused on the findings from Forécariah and Kindia prefectures. The ASM dataset
does not provide a representative sample of miners that can be used to generalize to broader
trends in Guinea or beyond.
Data from the household and survey of miners is supplemented by a smaller survey of cus-
tomary leaders in each community (108) and qualitative data from focus group discussions.
A series of 35 focus group discussions were held in 18 different randomly-selected communi-
ties; ten of these 18 communities were located in Forécariah and eight were located in Kindia.
Focus group data was collected from 11 women-only focus groups, 10 youth groups, and 14
general groups of adults. This qualitative data details the process for accessing mining sites,
as well as perceptions about the disadvantages and advantages of ASM.
Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous outcome variables, which represent
our outcome indicators of interest. As per equation 1 below, ρ is the outcome measure of
interest. β0 is the intercept and β1 to βk are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and
ϵij denotes robust standard errors clustered at the mine site level for the miner analysis, using
Huber-White sandwiched standard errors (Lin 2013). The final logit models were tested for
specification error, multicollinearity, goodness of fit (using the Hosmer and Lemeshow test),
and influential observations7(Hosmer Jr 2013).

( )
ρ
logit(ρ) = log = β + β X + β X + ...β X + ϵ (1)
0 1 1 2 2 k k ij
(ρ − 1)

The regression analysis explores three categories of indicators – Livelihood and Motiva-
tion, Informality and Rules, and Environmental Outcomes.

• For Livelihood and Motivation, we explore nine outcomes, including four indicators
related to livelihoods and five models related to motivations for engaging in ASM.

– The first livelihood outcome - socio-economic status - is a binary indicator for

whether respondents are in the bottom quartile for poverty based on an asset
7. An influential observation is one whose removal from a dataset would noticeably change the predictions
of a regression model.

12
 index. The second outcome measures the percent of annual income that is from
mining (either daily earnings or from diamond discovery). The third outcome
explores factors that predict status as a full-time versus part-time miner. The
final outcome examines whether the respondent conducts agricultural work for
hire.
– The first motivation indicator relates to an expressed motivation driven by a
search for adventure. The second indicator focuses on well-being and livelihood
support as the primary motivator. The third indicator explores factors that pre-
dict positive responses that ‘mining is the best wage’. The fourth indicator asks
respondents if they would continue to mine even if they had not found a diamond.
The final indicator asks how many seasons respondents would continue to mine
without finding a diamond.

• For Informality and Rules, we examine five indicators related to preferences for
formalization and rules. This includes questions about awareness of ASM rule existence
(formal or informal), rule adherence, and rule enforcement.

• For Environmental Outcomes, we evaluate two indicators related to environmental

indicators associated with ASM, including reported restoration of mining pits and an
overall assessment of the importance of environmental restoration.

Control variables include age, marital status, socio-economic status, education, migration,
the position or level of the respondent in the ASM hierarchy (digger or a washer versus a
higher position such as pit master, owner of the mining site, or surveillant), mining site, years
of experience in ASM, status as a career miner, and indigene versus national/transnational
miners. As noted above, to explore site and miner heterogeneity, this paper is especially
interested in differential results for career miner versus part-time miners, indigene versus
national/transnational miners, and Forécariah versus Kindia.

4 Descriptive Findings
4.1 Livelihoods and Motivations for ASM
Livelihoods

As noted above, 20% (433) of households in the study area are engaged in ASM. However,
ASM is the primary income-generating pursuit of only a very small proportion of the members
of households surveyed (1%, 22). A full 83% (1,797) of household respondents feel that they

13
could earn more in a different (non-mining) job, and a slight majority of respondents to the
household survey do not feel that one can support a family through diamond mining (57%,
1,234). Nevertheless, this means that a non-trivial 43% of respondents agree that mining
can serve as a primary livelihood option.
Highlighting the livelihood benefits that have accrued from ASM, FGD respondents in
Kourouyah Center report that

There was not even a bicycle in the village but thanks to the diamond, each
household has at least one bike. Today, straw houses have almost disappeared in
favor of those from hard materials. The straw houses that exist serve as kitchens.

Women have also experienced positive effects. A group of female FGD respondents in
Samou note

the development of small businesses created substantial income to Samou’s women.

I was selling fish and rice. With this trade, I have gained a lot. Also, I helped
my husband to build a building. I can say that we have benefited from the
exploitation of Samou diamond.

ASM is generally not seen as a standalone profession. However, our data shows that forty-
seven percent (426) of miners in our sample are fully dependent on mining for their income.
We refer to this group as full-time miners throughout the paper. Youth and diggers/washers
are more likely to engage in mining as a full-time livelihood option. For those who are not
full-time miners, we find that mining income still constitutes more than half of their reported
annual income (63%). Although there is significant variation in the spread of this indicator
(std. deviation = 0.37), these findings highlight that mining is a key source of well-being.
ASM is a secondary or tertiary economic activity for a little over half of miners (53%,
482) who engage in additional livelihood activities, including hiring themselves out for rice
cultivation and plantation work during the agricultural season8.
There is a relatively even split in our sample of miners between indigene miners (47%, 426)
(those born in the villages near the mining sites where they work) and national/transnational
miners who migrant in to work on the sites (53%, 484). Indigene miners are less dependent
on mining revenue and more likely to be engaged in a diverse set of livelihoods beyond mining
(74% (314) compared to 34% (164)). Importantly, mining income represents 56% of revenue
for indigene miners versus 76% of revenue for national/transnational miners9. Interestingly,
8. Twenty four percent of miners (106) hired their services out for agricultural labor in the last mining
season, for an average of 117 days.
9. Sixty-nine percent (622) of miners live close enough to their family to easily visit them, although ap-
proximately 42% (214) of miners have spent 6 months or more away from their families. Only 9% (25)

14
although national/transnational miners are more likely to engage in mining, holding all else
equal, our regression models show that indigene miners are only 4% less likely to engage in
mining as a full time livelihood activity. This result highlights the significant embeddedness
of mining in local rural economies.
Our analysis sought to explore the factors that are associated with higher levels of poverty
among miners. Interestingly, the only significant predictor of poverty in our regression model
is years of mining experience - those with a longer tenure in mining are less likely to be
characterized as poor. A one standard deviation increase in mining tenure (about 8 years)
corresponds with a 3.5% lower likelihood that the miner is poor. This provides evidence
that - at least in our study context - mining is not necessarily a poverty trap. Instead, we
find that engagement in agricultural wage labor is associated with lower education, greater
poverty, and engaging in mining as a means to improve well-being versus as a means to find
“adventure”.
Despite a close proximity and many contextual similarities, we find important variation
in ASM between Forécariah and Kindia in our regression analysis and descriptive statistics.
Mining constitutes a larger proportion of overall income for respondents in Forécariah, and
correspondingly, miners in Forécariah are more likely to engage in mining as a full-time liveli-
hood option10. In contrast, engagement in agricultural hires is associated with the Kindia
site, as miners in Kindia are 50 percentage points more likely to engage in supplemental
livelihood activities (82% 311, versus 32% 171). Miners in Kindia complete agricultural
labor for 106 more days than those in Forécariah, on average (135 days versus 29 days).
This may be linked to the growing economy around plantation agriculture in Kindia previ-
ously discussed. Despite the fact that both prefectures are located in the Kindia region of
Guinea, their differing histories and contexts is important for understanding this variation.
Kindia prefecture is more populous, more connected via road and rail networks than Foré-
cariah, and has a stronger historical connection with agriculture (e.g. The National School
of Agriculture, the government Institute of Fruit Research) than Forécariah.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2, and regression models of Livelihood Out-
comes are displayed in Table 3 below.
never or hardly ever speak to their families. Although education and poverty levels do not differ signifi-
cantly between indigene and non-indigene miners, indigene miners are significantly more likely to be Soussou
compared to national/transnational miners (88% 375, versus 46% 220) and married (82% 344, versus 68%
322).
10. Miners in Forécariah are more likely to work in mines that are not in the village where they were born
(73%, 390 versus 25%, 94), and are more likely to be born outside of Guinea entirely (13%, 50 versus 7%,
7).

15
 Overall Local Not local Forecariah Kindia Full-time Miner Part-time Miner
SES (poor) (%) NA 49 (208) 51 (249) 54 (289) 45 (171) 53 (225) 48 (231)
80 67 92 94 60 0.63
Livelihoods Mine income (%) 1
(sd=32) (36) (sd=23) (sd=18) (sd=37) (sd=0.37)
Not career miner (%) 53 (482) 74 (314) 34 (164) 32 (171) 82 (311) NA NA
Agriculture hire (%) 24 (106) 29 (84) 15 (21) 9 (13) 32 (93) NA NA

Table 2: Livelihoods, Artisanal Miners

16
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
SES (poor) Mine income Not career miner Agriculture hire

Site 0.198 0.180*** -1.157*** -0.882***

(0.187) (0.0386) (0.177) (0.210)
Age 0.00302 -0.00174** 0.00667** -0.00574
(0.00304) (0.000828) (0.00297) (0.00697)
Local miner 0.0712 -0.0368* 0.497*** 0.0600
(0.165) (0.0215) (0.163) (0.146)
Soussou 0.0397 0.000321 0.183* 0.249
(0.109) (0.0177) (0.0970) (0.216)
Education -0.0441 0.0129 0.388*** -0.277**
(0.0956) (0.0148) (0.124) (0.124)
Marital status -0.0184 -0.0228 0.317*** 0.102
(0.0607) (0.0167) (0.0926) (0.204)
Digger.Washer -0.0826 -0.00905 -0.385** -0.221
(0.152) (0.0357) (0.162) (0.188)
Not career miner -0.0997 -0.247***
(0.115) (0.0466)
Mining experience (yrs) -0.0108* 0.000179 -0.0101 -0.00478
(0.00560) (0.00121) (0.00981) (0.0107)
SES (poor) 0.0142 -0.0926 -0.342***
(0.0172) (0.108) (0.125)
Well being (motivation) 0.0254 0.0338 -0.0895 0.337**
(0.100) (0.0235) (0.152) (0.150)
-

Constant -0.0353 0.903*** 0.237 -0.284

(0.244) (0.0639) (0.276) (0.475)

Observations 795 776 795 356

R-squared 0.421
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Regression Results - Livelihoods

17
Motivations for mining

Several studies have elucidated the push and pull factors that drive engagement into ASM.
Miners are pulled into labor due to the revenue opportunities for productive purposes or “hot
money” (Walsh 2003), alongside the “push” of labour out of the agrarian economy as a result
of agricultural poverty (Hilson and Garforth 2012). What motivates individuals to pursue
mining in Guinea’s Forécariah and Kindia prefectures? Descriptive statistics and regression
models of Motivation Outcomes are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 below, respectively.
Fifty-four percent (491) of our ASM sample reports that they are motivated to engage in
mining for adventure. For interviewees who spoke French, references were made to l’aventure,
which is a period of adventure in many young people’s lives when they leave their villages,
seeking money and the basis for starting life as adults in their home communities(Dessertine
2013). The regression results indicate that “fame and adventure”11 are greater motivators
for those who mine part-time and for those with more years of mining experience. Indigene
miners report ‘fame and adventure’ as their motivator for mining less often than national
or transnational miners (49% 210, versus 58% 290), though this covariate is not significant
predictor in the regression results. These results are in line with other key studies that
emphasize the importance of seasonal migration and young men’s search for adventure as
part of local social organization in Guinea (Dessertine 2013; Bredeloup 2014).
Other studies in Guinea have highlighted a shift in the role of gold mining to a main
long-term subsistence activity (Bolay 2016). We find evidence of this as well. Forty-six
percent (417) of respondents report that they pursue mining as a means to achieve well-
being. For the regression model about the factors that predict well-being and livelihood
support, the only statistically significant predictor is mining experience - those with more
years of mining experience are more likely to state that improved well-being is the primary
motivator of engagement in ASM, though the magnitude of the effect is quite small (less than
a 1% change in likelihood associated with a 1 SD increase in years of experience). Career
miners confirm that they pursue the activity to secure their well-being; indigene miners are
slightly less likely than full-time miners to be driven by well-being as a means for engaging
in mining.
Despite an average pay rate that is less than 1 USD per day, 18% of respondents report
that mining represents the best wage among livelihood options. Indeed, the persistence of
mining is illustrated by respondents’ claim that they would continue to engage in mining for
about five seasons, even if no diamond was found. In the regression models, we find that in-
digene miners will stop mining approximately 2.5 seasons sooner than national/transnational
11. Here fame refers to being known or talked about by many people, especially on account of discovering
a large diamond.

18
miners, if a diamond is not found. This is perhaps a smaller substantive difference than one
might expect. Not surprisingly, significantly more career miners are likely to report a greater
persistence of mining in the case that a diamond cannot be discovered12.
Finally, we find evidence in the qualitative interviews of a “lottery mentality” among
farmers who mine as a secondary pursuit. Rather than investing in the future by attempting
to grow a surplus, some farmers plant only the bare minimum amount of rice to feed their
families for the year. When they would otherwise be farming, they mine instead and hope
that their discovery of a large diamond will bring more security to their family(McGovern
2014).
As such, our study of diamond mining echoes the trends seen in other key studies about
the role of ASM on local economies; we find evidence of ASM in our sites as a seasonal com-
plement to agriculture (Hilson and Garforth 2012), perceived source of adventure (Dessertine
2013), as perceived “lottery” (Bolay 2016; Dessertine 2013 where success is based on luck
and all can hope to gain, and as a viable livelihood (Bolay 2016).

Overall Local Not local Forecariah Kindia Full-time Miner Part-time Miner
Mine fame (%) 54 (491) 49 (210) 58 (280) 61 (324) 44 (167) 57 (243) 51 (247)
Mine well-being (%) 46 (417) 40 (171) 50 (243) 47 (251) 44 (166) 47 (200) 44 (213)
Motivations Mine best wage (%) 18 (163) 22 (92) 14 (70) 17 (89) 19 (74) 23 (96) 14 (66)
Mine w/o diamond (%) 81 (713) 88 (357) 75 (351) 74 (386) 91 (327) 76 (318) 58 (389)
4.86 3.44 6.26 5.61 4.05 6.16 3.79
Seasons w/o diamond
(sd=12.4) (sd=8.07) (sd=15.43) (sd=13.03) (sd=11.71) (sd=15.84) (sd=8.54)

Table 4: Motivations, Artisanal Miners

12. There are also prefecture level differences as miners in Forécariah are 17 percentage points less likely
than those in Kindia to report that they would continue to mine even if a diamond was not found.

19
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
Mine fame Mine well-being Mine best wage Mine w/o diamond Seasons w/o diamond

Site 0.730*** 0.0330 -0.189 -0.652*** -0.132

(0.222) (0.146) (0.275) (0.205) (2.578)
Age 0.00518 -0.00140 -0.00282 0.000186 0.0507
(0.00544) (0.00324) (0.00423) (0.00746) (0.0419)
Local miner 0.243 -0.131 0.442** 0.210 -2.415***
(0.150) (0.147) (0.181) (0.147) (0.844)
Soussou 0.0272 -0.0944 -0.107 0.196 0.0642
(0.128) (0.0926) (0.158) (0.182) (1.659)
Education 0.162 0.0744 -0.103 -0.168* -0.708
(0.130) (0.0992) (0.121) (0.0974) (1.822)
Marital status -0.0284 0.0108 0.110 -0.0686 -1.427
(0.147) (0.114) (0.139) (0.119) (1.502)
Digger.Washer 0.167 -0.0909 -0.111 -0.0956 0.0429
(0.174) (0.131) (0.233) (0.141) (1.397)
Not career miner 0.374** -0.0758 -0.590*** -0.0147 -1.783
20

(0.167) (0.159) (0.220) (0.183) (1.105)

Mining experience (yrs) 0.0186** 0.0149** 0.000148 0.00316 -0.0680
(0.00938) (0.00652) (0.00811) (0.0106) (0.0807)
SES (poor) 0.130 0.0239 -0.0825 -0.117 0.825
(0.101) (0.0999) (0.147) (0.127) (0.813)
Well being (motivation) -0.0727 -1.732
(0.197) (1.156)

Constant -0.477 0.223 -0.478 1.430*** 7.713

(0.510) (0.282) (0.438) (0.446) (5.144)

Observations 795 795 795 765 557

R-squared 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Regression Results - Motivation Outcomes

4.2 Informality
Descriptive statistics and regression models exploring informality and rules are displayed in
Tables 6 and 7 below, respectively. Government formalization of mining activities in the
study area is not yet well established. Similar to many other contexts (Lanzano and Balme
2017; Muriaas 2009), ASM in Forécariah and Kindia largely operates informally within a
customary regime with minimal government involvement or oversight. It is organized and
regulated by customary land owners (CLOs) according to a set of verbal customary rules
and behavioral prescriptions that are well-known by indigenes, national, and transnational
migrants (Huntington and Marple-Cantrell 2021). CLOs report that only ten of the mines
on customary land have been formally mapped, and of those that have been mapped, five
have formal license or permit. The CLO is the holder of the license in two of these cases.
Nearly 90% (794) of miners agree that they can easily access a site for mining through the
CLO, which is largely an informal process that does not involve licensing of the mining site
or even documentation of ownership by the CLO. Only 11% of miners (100) were required
to acquire some type of documentation, but only 1% (11) were required to attain a formal
mining license. Similar to the process that outsiders wishing to acquire land for farming must
follow, outsiders wishing to acquire land for mining must approach village elders and land
owners with the traditional cola nuts offering. The regression results confirm that indigene
miners and diggers/washers are more likely to access sites through the customary landowner.
While indigene miners can access and mine sites for free, national/transnational miners
must pay CLOs or government officials for the ability to mine on various sites. Payments
to CLOs are most common, and average 91,456 GNF (180,697), approximately 10.97 USD.
Government payments average 25,399 GNF (220,041), or 3.05 USD. Additionally, in exchange
for their land, customary land owners are often granted the “right to shovel”, meaning that
as land owners they are entitled to part of the profits from any diamonds found, although
cases of non-compliance with such agreements are commonly mentioned in the qualitative
data.
Miners were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about
mining licenses and the permitting process. Although the informal system dominates, almost
half of miners report that having a formal mining license would benefit them (44%, 387).
In general, those miners who expressed a belief that licenses will be beneficial, indicated
that the licenses would protect them from conflicts and help them garner a high price for
their diamonds. Interestingly, this perception of the value of a formal mining license is
similar across indigene and national/transnational miners. The regression results indicate
that indigene status is not a significant predictor of the perception that a mining license will
be beneficial. Instead, those with more years of mining experience, career miners, and those

21
dependent on mining as a source of well-being are more likely to report that a mining license
will be beneficial.
Most miners report that the process to acquire a license is prohibitive. A majority of
miners report that lack of awareness, expense, a slow and complicated process, and corruption
are all serious obstacles to acquiring a license. Most miners agree with the statement “I do
not know how to get a license” (89%, 724). Three-quarters of miners (75%, 599) agree it is
very difficult to gather all of the documents, and the same percentage (73%, 585) agree that
the process of gaining a license is very slow. Another 64% (509) agree that the price for the
license is too high. Corruption is also a concern, with 61% (481) of miners reporting that
bribery is involved in obtaining the license.
Registration of production is also rare. Only 4% (34) of miners have ever registered
their production. Sixteen percent of reported found diamonds were sold to licensed brokers
(342), whereas almost half of reported found diamonds (49%, 1,036) were sold to banabanas
– non-licensed diamond buyers who travel to the ASM sites to purchase diamonds.
As per the other outcome findings, we find significant descriptive differences between
sites. Those mining in Forécariah are more likely to access mining sites through the CLO.
Correspondingly, elements of formalization are more common in Kindia. In Kindia, the
master and District Head/District Council (Chef de district) play a slightly more active
role in authorizing new mining sites13, and mapping is more common in Kindia, as 15% of
sites in Kindia (100) have been mapped, compared to just 6% of sites in Forécariah (52)Of
these mapped sites, 38% (45) had a formal license or mining permit for operation; again,
this percentage is higher for Kindia (50% 39) compared to Forécariah (15% 6).. Nearly all
of these miners that were required to attain a formal mining license work in Kindia (11).
Finally, miners in Kindia are more likely to have registered production and are slightly more
likely to sell diamonds to licensed brokers (22% (139) versus 14% (203) in Forécariah. In
contrast, banabanas are much more common in Forécariah (59%, 877) compared to Kindia
(25%, 159).

Overall Local Not local Forecariah Kindia Full-time Miner Part-time Miner
License benefits (%) 44 (387) 42 (170) 45 (214) 43 (227) 45 (160) 41 (173) 46 (211)
CLO access (%) 90 (792) 85 (345) 94 (443) 98 (518) 77 (274) 97 (408) 83 (376)
Informality Rules (%) 25 (224) 38 (156) 14 (67) 10 (55) 46 (169) 13 (54) 36% (167)
Rule adherence (%) 18 (160) 26 (107) 11 (52) 8 (44) 32 (116) 9 (38) 26 (119)
Rules enforced (%) 25% (219) 37 (152) 14 (66) 10 (53) 45 (166) 13 (54) 35 (162)

Table 6: Informality, Artisanal Miners

13. When they occur, payments to CLOs are higher in Kindia (156,168 GNF) compared to Forécariah
(54,846 GNF), and payments to government officials are higher in Forécariah (30,519 GNF) compared to
Kindia (15,386 GNF).

22
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
License benefits CLO access Rules Rule adherence Rules enforced

Site 0.0408 1.075*** -1.084*** -0.944*** -1.108***

(0.233) (0.182) (0.233) (0.237) (0.232)
Age 0.00152 0.00668 -0.00337 -0.0115*** -0.00293
(0.00327) (0.00730) (0.00469) (0.00432) (0.00468)
Local miner 0.0894 0.391* 0.441*** 0.281** 0.427***
(0.132) (0.200) (0.140) (0.142) (0.138)
Soussou -0.144 0.0487 0.124 0.0374 0.116
(0.104) (0.198) (0.121) (0.147) (0.122)
Education 0.207* 0.248** 0.347*** 0.321** 0.371***
(0.116) (0.104) (0.120) (0.128) (0.120)
Marital status -0.438*** -0.321 0.362*** 0.350** 0.352***
(0.118) (0.201) (0.134) (0.147) (0.135)
Digger.Washer 0.0982 0.444** -0.197* -0.270* -0.214*
(0.124) (0.176) (0.118) (0.157) (0.116)
Not career miner 0.299* 0.173 0.127 0.104 0.0994
23

(0.170) (0.211) (0.143) (0.135) (0.140)

Mining experience (yrs) 0.0251*** -0.00477 0.0278*** 0.0216** 0.0270***
(0.00793) (0.01000) (0.00719) (0.0106) (0.00713)
SES (poor) 0.113 0.0769 -0.206 -0.187* -0.219*
(0.100) (0.0937) (0.130) (0.112) (0.132)
Well being (motivation) 0.555*** 0.114 0.216 0.136 0.218
(0.203) (0.168) (0.149) (0.166) (0.150)

Constant -0.792* -0.0274 -1.075*** -0.757** -1.039***

(0.464) (0.515) (0.286) (0.357) (0.283)

Observations 779 707 779 777 776

R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Regression Results - Informality

4.3 Social and environmental costs of ASM
When asked about the economic effects of ASM in their communities, households and CLOs
recognize that this sector provides jobs and supplemental income, rents to landowners, and
increased trade. Yet, they note that these benefits must be weighed against several draw-
backs, including higher food prices, in-migration, increased violence, and drug-use.
Households are divided about the impact of ASM on their community, although youth-
headed households are more likely to say that ASM has a positive influence on their commu-
nity. Thirty-seven percent of household respondents note a positive impact, 35% view the
impact as neutral, and 28% believe that mining has a negative impact on their community.
Similarly, CLOs with an active mining site on their community’s land are almost equally
split in their perception of ASM. The most common positive benefits reported include better
jobs (9), rents to land owners (8), increases in trade (8), and better roads (6). Among
negative impacts, CLOs indicate that ASM has caused food prices to increase (15) and that
ASM increases migration (13). Although engagement with ASM can provide families with
supplemental income to purchase agricultural inputs or food during periods of shortages,
qualitative data frequently highlights the higher food costs during influxes of miners. Less
prevalent negative effects include increased conflict (7), increased drug use (7), and increased
crime (5).
The qualitative findings highlight concerns with inflation, violence, loss of land for farm-
ing, and pollution. Even in villages where mining activities were not present, FGD partic-
ipants reported similar negative effects to those reported in areas with active mining sites.
The following excerpt from a FGD with women in Forécariah represents this point well.

I ignore the advantages that the artisanal mining sector could bring to our com-
munity. I know with this sector the abduction of women increases. This sector
destroys cultivable lands. When diggers arrive in a locality they make holes that
they never close back. That prevents farmers to work. Another inconvenience
that I can quote is the rise of foods price and other necessary goods. That
is what provokes hunger in the village because the majority of the inhabitants
are not involved in the extraction of diamond...As another inconvenience, you
must quote the destruction of the low grounds, the decreases of the farming man
power...The artisanal mining sector provokes the pollution of rivers through the
deposit of gravels on their bed, without mentioning that woods are cut in [an]
abusive way. Cultivable lands as far as low grounds are destroyed. Mining ex-
ploitation starves the village. It destroys soils and provokes prices increase, theft
of fruits and plants and crime. With this sector, pity disappear[s] in the village

24
 and increase[s] the suffering of the population(FGD, women, Forécariah).

Another clear theme from the qualitative interviews was respondents perception that
mining does not benefit the native inhabitants of a village, only the outsiders that come to
mine and then leave thereafter. This is illustrated by an FGD respondent from Bassia:

Foreign and indigenous are not managed my same way. If the foreigner earns a
lot of money, he goes home. This is the opposite of the native. Therefore, to the
latter, we do not sell the plots. Aboriginal, we can give 2-3 holes free. But when
it’s 10 plots and more, they are asked to buy like the others. Now, the stranger
pays money regardless of the number of pits.

Thus, although seasonal migration (especially by young men) is commonplace and deeply
embedded in social and economic organization, this in-migration is perceived as negative by
community members - especially due to the belief that migration does not provide permanent
and/or sufficient benefits for the communities. This is in line with other scholarship that
highlights the culture of young male seasonal migrants as “conspicuous consumers” that
waste money versus investing in the local communities (Walsh 2003). A FGD respondent
with men in Forécariah noted the following:

I know the artisanal mining sector has more negative effects than positive. In
addition to the abuse of alcohol and marijuana, conflicts do not end. Added to
this is the lack of benefit derived by the district. Then farmland was destroyed.
The holes are not closed. The population does not receive the profit from diamond
mining. In our mosques, the miners are the first to benefit from the blessings of
the Imams at the expense of our own children. Also when the diamond is found,
they return home.

Environmental degradation

Despite the abundance of land in our study area, community concern with environmental
degradation is a clear theme in both the quantitative and qualitative data sources. Descrip-
tive statistics and regression models of Environmental Outcomes are displayed in Tables 8
and 9 below.
The overwhelming majority of household respondents (90% 1945), miners (92% 794),
and CLOs with an active mining site report that it is important to restore mined-out sites14.
Among CLOs and households, the most important reasons for restoring mined sites is to
14. Although this may reflect a social desirability bias in the responses.

25
facilitate future agricultural cultivation of the land. Respondents expressed feelings that
at unrestored mining sites, “soil will be unusable,” and as a consequence, “cultivation will
always be impossible.” Other respondents noted that restoration can prevent accidents on
the site, such as children falling into unused pits. Women in FGDs stressed that open pits
are dangerous to children and livestock, particularly when they are filled with rainwater. In
more than one village, children had drowned after falling into unrestored sites. One group
of women explained,

We know nothing of the advantage that pulls the diamond but on its way there
are large holes where it was dug, that makes our children and animals in danger.
Also all our [swampland for agriculture] [is] now useless because [there] are holes
everywhere...From diamond we only know the damage it causes. These are the
holes where our children may fall at any time.

Finally, a handful of responses cited concern for water quality in the area if the site is not
restored15.
While miners are aware of the environmental impacts of mining and recognize the im-
portance of these impacts, a minority have adopted mining practices that minimize damage
to the environment, such as restoring mined-out pits or streams. Thirty percent of miners
report that they have engaged in mining site restoration. Approximately 70% (633) of miners
report never refilling a mining pit in the past year. Nineteen percent (169) of miners report
they “always” or “frequently” refill mining pits.
Our regression models sought to explore the factors associated with higher levels of site
restoration. We find status as a career miner is not a significant predictor for engaging
in site restoration, and - interestingly - neither is status as an indigene miner versus na-
tional/transnational miner. Locals are equally likely not to restore sites. Those who pursue
mining for greater well-being are more likely to report having restored a mining site. This
may indicate the link between agricultural livelihoods and engaging in mining as a supple-
mental livelihood - namely, those who engage for well-being are more likely to engage as
hired agricultural labor and have been required to refill a pit as part of their agricultural
labor work.
Not surprisingly, the data emphasizes the high labor and equipment costs that would be
required to close the pits. Approximately 33% (203) of miners report that refilling pits is
too time consuming, and FGDs with youth in Kindia explain:
15. Not surprisingly since chemicals are not used in diamond mining in the study sites, access to quality
drinking water is not perceived to be a widespread problem, since 69% of households describe their drinking
water as ‘very clean and pure’ and only 3% of households list their drinking water as ‘very dirty or polluted’.
Getting sick from drinking water is a rare event, as 3% of respondent households report that someone in the
family has ever fallen ill due to drinking polluted water

26
 Money that we receive after the selling of our diamond cannot allow us to restore
the holes, we cannot do it with the hand, you must fuel a bulldozer to do it. As
such, we do not have this means to restore more than 100 pits. It is also difficult
to engage, for example, 5 people to close back these holes. There are bosses,
when they find [a] diamond, [they] disappear without leaving the trace. They go
either to... or on another mining site. And workers who he maintained benefit
only of crumbs to feed their family.

Another primary reason cited for not refilling mining pits is the absence of a rule that
requires pits to be refilled (33%, 203). Indeed, despite respondents acknowledging the impor-
tance of restoring mined-out sites, communities lack rules to enforce behaviors that would
improve mining site conditions. Other research in these study sites has highlighted that
one of the areas where the customary system appears to be under additional pressure is
the monitoring and enforcement of rules related to site restoration (Huntington and Marple-
Cantrell 2021). In the household survey, rules requiring restoration are reported by less than
a quarter of respondents (20%, 427). Similarly, in the miner survey, only a quarter (25%,
224) of miners report that their village has rules that require restoring mined-out sites. Not
surprisingly, the regression analysis indicates that local miners and those with more years of
mining experience are more likely to report the existence of rules about restoring mined out
sites, as well as to report greater adherence to rules.
Where rules exist, they are not followed consistently. A significant majority of household
respondents report that no miners obey rules about restoring mined-out sites (65%, 762),
and just 20% of household respondents believe all or most miners obey the rules (238).
Miners express a significantly more positive report of rule adherence - only 27% report that
no miners follow rules (61), and 44% think that people always or mostly follow these rules
(97).
Punishment is also enforced unevenly. Overall, 69% (806) of household respondents
claim no people are ever punished for breaking rules about mining site restoration, and
only a quarter of respondents believe that rule breakers are always punished (25%, 295).
Miners have varying interpretations of how rules are enforced. Forty-two percent (91) of
miners report that rule-breakers are never punished, while 39% (85) of miners report that
rule-breakers are always punished.

Overall Local Not local Forecariah Kindia Full-time Miner Part-time Miner
Environmental Site restore (%) 30 (269) 32 (133) 28 (135) 25 (134) 37 (135) 25% (105) 34 (161)
Outcomes Restore importance (%) 92 (794) 96 (383) 88 (406) 88 (449) 96 (345) 88 (359) 94 (428)

Table 8: Environmental Outcomes, Artisanal Miners

27
 4.1 4.2
Site restore Restore importance

Site -0.371* -0.413

(0.203) (0.258)
Age -0.00459 -0.00502
(0.00409) (0.00811)
Local miner 0.0711 0.475**
(0.111) (0.213)
Soussou -0.150 0.0929
(0.122) (0.203)
Education 0.179* 0.0961
(0.0965) (0.106)
Marital status -0.124 0.311**
(0.109) (0.130)
Digger.Washer -0.155 -0.471*
(0.118) (0.263)
Not career miner 0.154 -0.00397
(0.105) (0.188)
Mining experience (yrs) 0.0133*** 0.0200
(0.00476) (0.0129)
SES (poor) -0.0185 -0.00633
(0.0979) (0.158)
Well being (motivation) 0.472*** -0.100
(0.175) (0.129)

Constant -0.453* 1.711***

(0.245) (0.440)

Observations 787 753

R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Regression Results - Environmental Outcomes

28
Disputes

Focus group respondents express the belief that mining activities commonly lead to increased
disputes and violence. Groups of women in particular express concern over violence regarding
mining conflicts, as one group of women said,
When there is fighting in the mining camp, this scares because they use even
shovels, pickaxes during the fight. They are often recorded in cases of serious
injury or sprains which may lead them to the hospital.
Despite the stated concerns, the incidence of conflicts at mining sites is not especially
widespread or frequent; conflicts are resolved relatively quickly and without violence or
destruction of property in most cases. Twenty-seven percent 27% (240) of miners included
in the mining survey and 28% (106) of the mining households reported knowledge of at least
one conflict. Of the miners who experienced a conflict, half (49%, 118) experienced one
conflict, while the other half experienced two or more conflicts during this time.
Most conflicts at mining sites are disputes about boundaries (61%, 264), followed in a
distant second and third by the theft of stones (or allegations thereof) (12%, 51), and mining
rights (6%, 28). Diggers and washers are the most common actors involved in a conflict (56%,
272).
Some conflicts in this context did escalate, as 16% of disputes (69) on mining sites
involved violence or destruction of property by one or more parties16 Nevertheless, nearly
all conflicts are reported as resolved. Masters and CLOs play the largest role in conflict
resolution. The master or mine boss is the most common actor to help resolve conflicts at
the mine (36%, 174), and CLOs were involved in the resolution of 15% (75) of conflicts. Most
miners are satisfied with conflict resolution mechanism; respondents believe that conflict
resolution was fair in more than 90% of conflicts.
According to household survey respondents who participate in ASM and heard about at
least one mining conflict in the last year, the majority of disputes involve actors that are not
from the same village or commune as the respondent. This calls for further investigation,
since this could mean that either respondents do not want to implicate their neighbors in
disputes or conflict may be much more prevalent among migrants17.
Furthermore, conflicts between miners and households on community land that is not
being used for mining is incredibly rare, and occurred on only 43 plots (1%) over the last
16. In the household survey, there appears to be a marked difference in the probability that a conflict turns
violent across Forécariah and Kindia. This calls for further investigation. It may be the respondents in
Kindia were just far less likely to report lower-level conflicts, in which violence was not used or threatened.
This would explain why respondents in Kindia report fewer conflicts, but also more violent conflicts.
17. Unsurprisingly, respondents report more recent disputes: the vast majority of recorded conflicts oc-
curred within the last two years. Most likely, this is attributable to recency bias.

29
two years. The majority of these conflicts are boundary-related (28) and involve members
of the community (23): either family (12), the CLO (9), or neighbors (8). There are only 4
instances where mining masters were involved in conflicts and 2 instances with miners.
Reports have suggested that conflicts between locals and miners are less common than
they could be because villagers have enacted strict rules about miner’s behavior, such as
barring them from sleeping in villages. These rules are a means of dealing with anxiety
about the threat posed by an influx of strangers, alcohol, drugs, or money into the commu-
nity(McGovern 2014).
In addition to well-structured customary land management and dispute resolution sys-
tems, the abundance of land in our study area may help to mitigate conflict pressures.
Almost all CLOs (95%, 102) report that households in their village could obtain additional
land for crop production. Labor and inputs are generally perceived to be the largest limiting
factor increasing agricultural yield.
Despite the close proximity of diamond mining and agricultural activities, it is also an
area with a lower prevalence of diamond occurrences compared to other regions of Guinea.
The land suitable for farming is plentiful and accessible, and the key limiting factor for
households who would like to increase their amount of cultivated land is instead a lack of
inputs and labor. The abundance of land, lower prevalence of diamonds, and effectiveness of
the current land governance regime have helped to reduce the potential for conflict between
farming areas/community land and miners (Huntington and Marple-Cantrell 2021).

5 Discussion
Overall, the data highlights the embedded nature of ASM in the local economy. A significant
portion of miners are not transient - but are instead local community members. While we
find that many migrants work far from home and are transient, we also find that about half
of miners are indigene - and almost 70% of the annual revenue of indigene miners is from
mining revenue. One-quarter of miners also engage in agricultural labor during the mining
off-season.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of ASM as a livelihood source. Despite a
relatively small mining sector in our study sites, we still find that ASM is a key livelihood
option for a significant number of stakeholders. Approximately 20% of households are in-
volved in both ASM and agriculture. A little over half of miners engage in mining as part
of a diverse livelihood portfolio. While the overwhelming majority of miners report that
they are motivated by fame and adventure, a substantial proportion report that mining is a
source of high wages and well-being. Correspondingly, miners would still continue to mine

30
for an average of 5 years - even if they had not found a diamond.
Given the deeply embedded nature of ASM in local economies, there are reasons to ques-
tion the uptake and sustainability of new alternative livelihood options. Additional research
and evaluation is needed to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of local development
interventions that seek to establish alternative livelihoods in ASM communities.
Although many youth are involved, our data does not show this as an overwhelmingly
youth driven enterprise. Our data also does not show that ASM engagement is predominantly
driven by ASM as a poverty trap - rather, ASM is an opportunity for (significant) supple-
mental income. Indeed, in areas with additional agricultural opportunities from plantation
agriculture, mining is less prevalent.
Our two study sites are in an area where land is plentiful, and ASM is deeply embedded
in informal customary structures. The customary tenure system remains the predominant
means for gaining authorization to mine a site in these areas; this is largely an informal
process that does not require miners to obtain a formal license to use the mining site.
Projects that aim to formalize tenure will face a number of challenges. CLOs organize,
control, and monitor artisanal diamond mining, and less than half of miners report that
there would be benefits from securing a formal mining license. Levels of perceived tenure
security are high, and this system works well at keeping conflicts down and social problems
at a manageable level.
However, there is room for improvement in the governance of mining activities, especially
given the importance of ASM as a key livelihood supplement for so many people and the
inability of the informal system to provide a means for managing the aftermath of min-
ing, including the restoration of mined out pits. Also, there are widespread reports that
foreigners shirk on the ‘right to shovel’ payment. This reduces or eliminates the expected
community benefits from mining, such as new roads, schools and mosques. Correspondingly,
our evidence indicates that while preferences for documentation are relatively similar be-
tween career miners, who are mostly national/transnational, and part-time miners, career
miners are less likely to report the existence of rules, adherence to rules, or that rule breakers
are punished. Career miners are are also less likely to have restored mined out sites and to
report that restoring mined out sites is important.
Our analysis indicates significant heterogeneity within and between mining sites. Differ-
ent prefectures - even within the same region - display important differences across liveli-
hoods, dependence on mining, motivations, informality, rules and environmental outcomes.
In Kindia, respondents are better off, less dependent on mining revenue, and are more in-
tegrated with the agricultural economy as compered to Forćariah. Miners are less likely to
access sites through customary land owners but report a much higher prevalence of rules,

31
adherence and enforcement. Perhaps related to the greater integration with agriculture, we
find that Kindia is more likely to have site restoration, and respondents note the importance
of restoration.
The within site analysis shows a similar level of differential effects for indigene versus
national/transnational miners, and full-time versus part-time miners. Within sites, mining
varies across individuals seeking wealth through a career in mining versus engagement in
mining as a secondary local economic activity. Career miners are more likely to report well-
being and wage as key motivators for participating in mining and to express a persistent
commitment to mining despite failure to find a diamond. Not surprisingly, local miners are
less dependent on mining income and more likely to report awareness of rules, enforcement
of rules, and punishment for rule-breakers. They are more likely to engage in agriculture and
much more likely to engage in mining as a temporary activity. Interestingly, motivations for
mining are relatively similar between indigene and national/transnational miners, as well as
preferences for formal documentation and engagement in site restoration.

6 Conclusion
This research draws on primary data collected across a large sample of households and arti-
sanal miners – the first and largest study of its kind. Our findings help clarify the importance
and integration of ASM in rural livelihoods. The paper also sheds light on the heterogeneity
of ASM, including site heterogeneity and the differential motivations, perceptions, and be-
haviors among various actors. Our results also point to several challenges to formalization
and programs that support alternative livelihoods.
Facilitating the growth of ASM in Forécariah and Kindia through a more structured
system might support economic development while protecting environmental conditions.
Greater oversight of the mining sector has the potential to provide important benefits, as
we find a low level of site restoration, along with challenges to enforcing key rules about
community compensation. However, a formalized ASM sector requires a significant political
and financial commitment from national governments to support the sector. A number of
studies have highlighted the challenges to formalization. Moreover, successful and sustainable
formalization interventions will require a creative and perhaps hybrid design that engages
or integrates with the current customary system. In a context like Guinea, with strong and
effective customary institutions, along with low state capacity and limited enforcement, a
hybrid approach to mining management has been shown to maintain peace in gold mining
areas (Dessertine and Noûs 2021 and should be considered as a means to improving conditions
in this study area (Huntington and Marple-Cantrell 2021). Furthermore, program design will

32
need to pay careful attention to designing interventions that provide viable incentives for
being good environmental stewards. The high levels of perceived tenure security coupled
with lack of efforts to fill-in used mining pits indicate that stronger property rights are likely
not the binding constraint to site restoration.
In line with other studies on the viability of programs to foster sustainable livelihoods
(Aryee, Ntibery, and Atorkui 2003; Tschakert 2009), our research suggests some uncertainty
about the viability of projects that support alternative livelihoods. In our context, mining
provides a significant supplementary income even though it is not a primary livelihood for
most actors – and it benefits a large number of people. Similar to Tschakert 2009 we find
that as long as miners have some expectation that they will find a diamond - even if the
chance is small - they are unlikely to commit to alternative livelihood options introduced
by external donors. Thus, one-off alternative livelihood programs would have a hard time
providing the same level of revenue to as many individuals as currently benefit from ASM18.
The ASM system is established and perceived to be sustainable, and although there are some
low level tensions, ASM and local community relations are relatively good.
Finally, our study highlights the important of baseline data to inform understanding of
context, demands, and needs prior to program design. This is especially important given
the heterogeneity of sites - even sites located within the same region. Baseline data can
provide decision-makers and development partners with a deeper knowledge and awareness
to challenge assumptions and make informed decisions in data poor areas. It highlights the
importance of due diligence and analysis of context, constraints, and opportunities prior to
development program planning and implementation.

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