Birendra Mishra, Strained Nepal

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 1
2 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

STRAINED NEPAL�INDIA
RELATIONS
Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations
Author : Birendra Prasad Mishra
Publisher : Shyama Mishra

Pipra-3, Mahottari (Nepal)
Copyright ©Birendra Prasad Mishra
Edition : First 2023 A.D. (2080 B.S.)

Copy : 500
Computer : Ranjan Ghimire &

Lilanath Gautam
Price : NC Rs. 800.00/ I.C. Rs. 500
Printed at : Dhimle Offset Press, Kathmandu
ISBN No. : 978-9937-1-5008-8

Dedicated to
The Late Shyamnandan Mishra,
who devoted his life to politics in India

A Few Words
It has now become a
cliché to note that Nepal
and India have ancient
relations that cut across
social, cultural, political,
and geographical realms.
However, a remarkable Ajaya Bhadra Khanal
feature in recent years is Editor-in-Chief and Group
that anti-Indian nationalism Editor, Ukaalo.com
becomes prevalent in Nepal, Director, Ukaalo Abhiyan
which saw India as a threat
to Nepali nationalism, and Nepal attempted to move
closer to China.
This was a curious feature because even now, millions
of Nepali people's livelihood, social security, and kinship
relations are interlinked with India. This is true not only
for people who live along Nepal's southern border but
also for people living in the hills and the mountains.
Nepal-India relation is a condensed symbol of this
paradox. In order to move towards a better future we
need to better understand and address the issues of cross-
border relations and the sources of our ambivalence.
Perhaps this idea is reinforced by Prof Mishra.
The central assumption of his book is that Nepal-India
relations is strained at the moment and there is a need
to reset bilateral ties. In resetting the ties, as much onus
lies on Indian policy-makers as on Nepali leaders.
The Nepal-India border became fixed in 1815, but
the movement of labourers and settlers continued long
after the Sugauli Treaty. Another major milestone was
the 1950 Treaty of Peace and friendship, which was
6i Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

cast in terms of "special" relations. This idea of "special
relations" continues to cast its shadow on Nepal-India
relations to this day and has become a source of much
confusion and consternation.
Nepal's early nationalism sought to push Nepal
away from India's shadow. This was a period when
migration from India was seen as a dangerous mobility—
it continues to fuel angst to this day—and perceived
political interference was another source of resentment.
We must turn to history to understand the present
and to move forward.
In order to move forward, we must improve border
management and security, address issues of economic
development, livelihoods and security, and seek political
solutions to perceived problems.
However, before we can move forward, we must
reshape the discourse around Nepal-India relations. Much
of our notions about Nepal-India relations are based on
perceived grievances as well as lived realities. Therefore,
it is imperative that newer discourses about Nepal-India
relations must take recourse to facts and evidence as well
as the impact of political and strategic realities.
Hundreds of books have been written about Nepal-
India relations, each claiming to offer something new
or interesting. Strangely, even as the Nepal-India
relationship evolves or is shaped by a newer phenomenon,
much remains the same.
So a major question is, what does this book offer?
This book by Prof Dr. Birendra Prasad Mishra is an
attempt to generate fresh understanding as well as reorient
perceptions, especially those held by readers, researchers,
and policy-makers in India by delving deeply into internal
and external complexities related to Nepal.

ii
He takes recourse to history to show how a pro-
British foreign policy emerged, which was then continued
by post-independence India. He analyzes the sources of
Nepal's dependence on India and its efforts to become
independent. This is juxtaposed to the strategic and
foreign policy needs of a newly independent India and
the predilections of its key architect, Jawaharlal Nehru.
He analyzes the sometimes shifting approaches taken
by Indian regimes towards Nepal and their mentality. Prof.
Dr. Mishra provides a succinct but nuanced understanding
of these oscillations and connects them to the difficulties
faced by these foreign policies on several counts. It is this
analysis that is insightful and useful for readers, researchers,
and policy-makers, particularly those in India.
Another major issue is the dynamics generated by
the inter-relations between India, China, and Nepal.
Here again, Prof. Mishra provides his truthful views
about how and why China managed to expand its
footprint in Nepal.
In conclusion, he argues that the way forward is to
adopt a broad-minded democratic approach in bilateral
relations, one that emphasizes the interests and welfare
of the regional population rather than the political
imperatives of self-centered leadership.
The strength of this book is that it distills the
historical understanding of Professor Dr. Mishra and his
insights in a concise way. Professor Mishra is uniquely
placed to comment on Nepal-India relations. In addition
to having a lived experience of cross-border relations
with India—his ancestors held a zamindari in north
Bihar—he has an expert view of Nepali politics and
society as well as a keen interest in history. In recent
years, he was involved in Nepal's peace process as a
mediator and has been, for a long time, commenting and
writing on politics, society and foreign affairs.
iv
Preface
The Nepal-India relations are at the lowest ebb.
After India published its political map in November,
2019 depicting Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura
as the Indian territories, a bog nosedive in Indo-Nepal
relations, came to fore. The crisis was compounded
by the inauguration of the road being built by India
towards Kailas Mansarover by Rajnath Singh, Minister
of Defense, Relations hit the nadir when Nepal not
only published its own map claiming these areas but
also got it passed by both of the Houses of Nepalese
parliament in June 2020. Crises are, however, not new
to Indo-Nepal relations. The Nepal-India relations had
suffered a setback in 2015 when India imposed trade
blockade in the aftermath of the promulgation of current
constitution. Much earlier, Indira Gandhi had threatened
with suspension of trade with Nepal. The threat had
been translated into reality by her son Rajiv Gandhi
after more than a decade later to pressurize Nepal with
limited success.
India and Nepal are predominantly Hindu states.
The goodwill among the people has been in abundance
since ages. Ironically, their formal relations hardly seem
to be cordial, smooth or cooperative barring the early
1950s. There are many political scientists and diplomats
of Nepal and India who have expressed their views on
Nepal-India relations exhaustively. They have dealt
with the issue from their respective national lenses
while I find their analyses cogent to an extent; they have
v
not hit the nail on the head. This book offers a humble
endeavour to look at the issue objectively to ascertain
the causes leading to the present state of affairs.
I was never a student of political science. However,
I have tried to give vent to my views on the subject,
which are based on historical facts. My approach,
which evolved from my education and my denizenery
in Madhes, which is the meeting point of India and
Nepal, has shaped my thoughts. However, we had
small zamindaris in north Bihar (Umgaon in Darbhanga
District and Khangura vishnanpur in Muzaffarpur
District) which were taken away by the Government of
Bihar in 1954/55 by abolishing the zamindari system.
I have been expressing my views on India’s role
in Nepal and on political development in Nepal and
India through my occasional writings in newspapers. I
have tried to put before the reader in brief the Nepal-
India relations to ascertain the role of diplomacy.
My regular interest in Indian and Nepalese political
happenings, and my long stay in India in course of my
studies, helped me develop a taste for writing on Nepal-
India relations. I derive pleasure from writing on these
subjects even after interacting with the people who
tend to grill for what they allege is micro-managing
Nepali politics and in influencing every vital decision
of the government of Nepal.
The insufficient exposition of Nepal-India relaions
in my earlier book ‘Essays on Indian Diplomatic
Dilemma in Nepal’ (2019) necessitated this book. Its
objective is to enlighten the readers, especially from
India with interest in India-Nepal relations, on the one
hand and draw the attention of the policy makers of
both countries to orient their policies to strengthen the
relations. The book is a study of the events that took
10
vi Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra
place basically from 1951 and onwards. To make readers
and researchers understand Nepal’s present internal
and external complexities on the basis some important
historical events of the last two hundred and fifty years
have also been broached briefly.
This book has been divided into ten chapters. The
first deals with overview of Nepal-India relations and
throws light on Nepal and British India relations. The
second chapter is related to the resetting of Nepal and
Independent India relations. The third chapter deals
with the period of growing relations. While the fourth
chapter deals with the period of maintaining relations,
the fifth chapter is related to period of sliding relations.
The sixth chapter is about the period of intervened
relations. The seventh one covers the period of alienated
or tilted relations. The eighth chapter deals with the
efforts carried out by the Indian diplomats in Nepal to
strengthen the relations. The ninth chapter discusses the
psychological barriers affecting the relations and the
last chapter draws brief conclusions about Nepal-India
relations.
I am grateful to Leo E. Rose for I have based my
narratives of the Nepalese history mainly on the basis
of his book, “Nepal Strategy for Survival”, specially
while covering the political and diplomatic activities
from 1768 to 1950, which are needed to enlighten the
reader with the short history of Nepal. The inclusions
of the latest developments that have taken place in the
Nepalese politics may bring to notice of the reader the
twists and turns which have paved the way for a critical
study on this complex issue.
I am equally indebted to Ajaya Bhadra Khanal,
eminent writer and former editor of ‘The Himalayan
Times, for writing ‘a few words’ and also for removing

vii
its eyesores despite his heavy preoccupation with his
challenging job of running his online media news. I
am thankful to Damannath Dhugana, former speaker
of the House of Representatives for encouraging me to
write the book. I also thank Engineer and writer Ganesh
Khania for his suggestions. I thank Yuba Raj Acharya,
former executive director of NTTP Institute, Kathmandu
also for making me available the information I needed
from different websites from time to time for this book.
Ranjan Ghimire deserves my thanks for putting the
references serially in the book and so Lilanath Gautam
for attractive book layout.
There are some mistakes, which could not be
corrected. I humbly look forward to the indulgence of
the reader for the same.
– Birendra Prasad Mishra
92/22, Miteri Marg, Old Baneshwar,
Kathmandu, Nepal.
e-mail-mishra_bp@yahoo.com
December 23, 2022
viii
Contents
Chapter-1: Nepal and British India 3
Chapter-2: Resetting of Nepal and
Independent India Relations 20
Chapter-3: The Period of Developing

Relations (1964-2004) 38
Chapter-4: The Period of Mainitaing Relations 49
Chapter-5 : The Period of Sliding Relations 56
Chapter-6: The Intervened Relations 86
Chapter-7: The Tilted Relations 95
Chapter-8: The Role of Diplomats 111
Chapter-9: Psychological Barriers 122
Chapter-10: Conclusion 149
Bibliography 165
INDEX 167

Chapter 1
Nepal and British India
Background
Nepal, as per National Population and Housing
Census Report 2021, is a country that houses 142 caste/
ethnic groups with 124 mother tongues that adhere to
ten religions. There are three geographic regions:
(1) Tarai constitutes 53.61 percent of the total
population.
(2) Hill constitutes 40.31 percent.
(3) Mountain constitutes 6.08 percent.
Significantly, Nepal has acquired its present
geographic size in the late eighteenth century by the
military activism of the Gorkha ruler (Raja) Prithvi
Narayan Shah to expand the boundaries of his
principality. He conquered other principalities and
finally succeeded in capturing Kathmandu Valley,
known then as the valley of Nepal. King Prithvi Narayan
Shah converted Kathmandu Valley as the capital of
Nepal. The kingdom was ruled, except 104 years by the
Rana Oligarchy (1847-1951), by the Shah dynasty till
it was finally abolished by the duly elected Constituent

Assembly in 2008.The second Constituent Assembly
passed the new constitution on September 20, 2015,
and elected governments have been formed at Central,
Provincial and Local levels in 2017-8.
Multifaceted Relations
The Nepal-India relations are multifaceted because
of its natural, social, cultural, religious, economic,
political, strategic, and individual overtones. Relations
between Nepal and India are unique and delicate. It
suggests that the relations between two countries are the
relations between two peoples, especially of those who
are settled on both sides of the international borders
before the line of demarcation was finalized on the basis
of the Treaty of Sugauli. However, since then there has
been no restriction on the movements of the people
across the international boundaries.
The Nepal-India relations are based on several facts.
First, it is Nature (geographic) that has shaped them. It
was the formation of the lofty snow-covered peaks of
the Himalayas millions of years ago that determined
them. Since then, rivers started flowing towards the
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea through the southern
slopes over which humankind had no say. Human life
evolved, people started settling on the banks of the
rivers, human civilization grew and with the concept of
political boundaries nations were formed. The boundary
between Nepal and British-India was determined after
the Treaty of Sugauli was signed in 1816. Secondly, it is
accepted that people migrated towards the north and east
from the west, as there was a series of invasions from
the western border to the region. Perhaps, it was a time,
when there were no countries like Nepal or India as they
are today. Thus the human bond played a great role in
strengthening social relations. The cultural affinity tied
the knot of relationship stronger. People of one country
have their relations in another based on their castes
and creeds. Their daily market (Hat-Bazar), water for
irrigation and schools for education have brought them
too close to attach importance to any formal relations.
Thirdly, the religious faiths further strengthen their
emotional bonds. There are ten religions in Nepal, to
which the people of Nepal adhere. These religions are
common. The Indian pilgrims visit famous temples like
Pashupiatinath in Kathmandu, Muktinath, Lumbini and
Janakpur etc., in Nepal and the Nepalese pilgrims visit
Kashi, Prayag, Badri-Kedar, Amarnath, Rameshwaram
and Puri in India.
Fourthly, Nepal and India are two sovereign
countries. Their relations are determined in accordance
with the international norms. Lastly, after Tibet became
the autonomous region of China, Nepal became the
buffer state between India and China. It changed the
strategic position of Nepal, which also influences the
relation between the two countries.
A brief political history

The period of Nepal-India relations can be studied
under two heads: (1) under the British rule and (2) under
Independent India. The first covers the Period from
1769-1947, and the second from 1947 onwards. The first
period can be further divided into the period from 1769
to 1846 and the second from 1846 to 1947. The period of
1769 to 1846 was the period of expansion of territorial
domination in both India and Nepal. The British East
India Company was expanding its political control over
the northern plains and the lower Himalayas in India,
whereas Prithvi Narayan Shah was extending his tiny
Gorkha kingdom over the upper Himalayas with an eye

to finally reach the Gangetic plains too. He started his
endeavour to capture Kathmandu Valley, which was
not only very rich financially and culturally but also
the central point of trade between India and Tibet and
Nepal. There were three principalities in the valley.
To pressurize the valley strategically, he obstructed
the route of trade to Nuwakot and Kerung. King Jaya
Prakash Malla of Kantipur sought support from the
East India Company to defeat Shah but its military
help under the leadership of Captain Kinloch in 1767
could not succeed. The Company, however, succeeded
in capturing some part of Morang and received some
favour. Ultimately, Shah conquered Kantipur in 1768
and had control over the entire valley by 1769. Leo E.
Rose writes in this connection, “The failed expedition
of Kinloch had succeeded in seizing some territory,
which was restored to the Gorkha Raja after he agreed
to pay an annual rent of 30 elephants to the Company.
In 1776, the British recognized Gorkha’s authority in
the eastern Terai district of Morang, which had been
conquered two years earlier by the Gorkhalis. In 1783,
a British boundary commissioner decided in favor of
the Nepali government in a dispute between Gorkha
and an Indian zamindar, Mirza Abdulla, over Rautahat
and Pachrauti districts. After 1786, the British stopped
collecting duties on goods imported from Nepal.
Although there were several border disputes that grew
out of the expansion of both powers into the area at the
foot of the hills, the 1792 commercial treaty between
Nepal and the Company was concluded.”1 The treaty
provided for allowing the British Company to depute
its representative to visit Nepal. It also facilitated Indian
interference in Kathmandu by the subsequent visits
of Kadir Khan, Knox, and Kirkpatrick, which added
complexities in the statecraft.
.
1
Rose, Leo E., Nepal Strategy for Survival, pp- 33-4.

Prithvi Narayan Shah’s son Pratap Singh Shah
who succeeded him died after his two-years rule leaving
his two and half years old son Rana Bahadur Shah to
succeed. Though his mother became the Regent, his
uncle Bahadur Shah continued the expansionist policy
capturing dozens of small hilly principalities.
Nepal was always scared of the British and the
British took Nepal as an obstacle in having control
over the entire north of India. However, owing to the
second Nepal-Tibet war of 1791 in which Nepalese
army was pushed back deep into Nepal by the invading
Tibetan army, forced Nepal to have a commercial treaty
in 1792. Regent Bahadur Shah signed the treaty for
Rana Bahadur Shah’s name. In mid-August 1792, the
Regent appealed the Company for, “ten guns together
with ammunition, and ten young Europeans versed
in the management of artillery. Approximately, two
weeks later, another letter was sent to Calcutta, this
time requesting that British troops be sent to Nepal’s
assistance.”2 Significantly, British representative
Abdul Kadir Khan was allowed to visit Kathmandu
to negotiate with the palace. However, before another
representative William J. Kirkpatrick visited Nepal in
1793, the deal with the Chinese was already completed.
Rana Bahadur Shah, who assumed power himself in
1794, dismissed the Regent subsequently. The British
did not take the 1792 treaty of commerce, which was
scrapped and its first casualty being the dismissal,
kindly. Governor-General, John Shore dispatched a
commercial mission under the leadership of Maulvi,
Abdul Kadir Khan with a view to testing the sentiment of
Kathmandu. Rana Bahadur Shah, who was reluctant to
receive the commission, delayed the visit that returned
to India in March 1796 without much success.
2. Ibid. p- 68.

Due to internal conflict, especially with regard to
the decision of Rana Bahadur Shah to choose his infant
son Girvan Juddha (almost one and half years old) by
a Brahmin wife, as his successor in 1798, he finally set
out for Banaras in 1800 with his supporters, as military
leaders were also not in his favour. At Banaras he
became active and started negotiation with the British
for restoring his power on condition of sharing land
revenue with them. Ultimately, his negotiation forced
the establishment of Kathmandu to sign the treaty of
1801 with the Company authorizing the posting of
its representative in Kathmandu. It posted Captain
W. D. Knox, who was looking after Rana Bahadur at
Banaras, as a Resident to negotiate with Nepal in case
of any dispute with the Company. However, the palace
was against the stay of Knox, who returned to India in
1803 and subsequently, Governor-General Wellesley
formally abrogated the treaty in 1804.
In 1804 Rana Bahadur returned to Kathmandu and
assumed power again with the help of his close associate
Bhimsen Thapa. He controlled the situation by killing
and executing dozens of people opposing him. The
factional feud continued, which led to the assassination
of Rana Bahadur in 1806. However, after securing his
position Thapa started expanding the western border up to
Kashmir. The King of Kangra with military support from
Ranjit Singh of Punjab stopped the march of Gorkhali
army in 1809. Interestingly, Ranjit Singh was in favour
of keeping Sutlej as the boundary between Gorkhali
occupied area and Punjab, which was not accepted by
Kathmandu. Nepalese commander Amar Singh Thapa
captured the territories of hill Rajas including those in
plains in 1810, which antagonized the British.
Thapa was instructed by the British not to extend
his conquests to the districts below the hills. Since

Nepal was not ready to confront the British without
preparations, it accepted the British demands. In the
mean time, Kathmandu intensified its diplomatic effort
to get support from China. Its mission in Peking made
yet another strong appeal for Chinese assistance in
1812 but again it was rejected through the usual evasive
reply. Nepal unsuccessfully sought alliance with central
Indian states like Holkers, Gwalior, Bharatpur, Rampur,
Lucknow and Lahore. Ranjit Singh was the main
stumbling block for Nepal.
There was change of guard in India. Moria, who
replaced Minto as Governor-General, wrote a letter
to Kathmandu on March 11, 1814 seeking Nepal’s
recognition of British jurisdiction in Sheoraj and
Butwal within 25 days. Since Nepal did not reply on
due date, British troops moved into both districts on
April 22, 1814 and secured control over there. Due to
oncoming malarial season the British detachments were
withdrawn in May, and the Nepalese forces returned to
reassert Kathmandu’s authority there. Several Company
officials were killed. As a result, in September 1814,
British troops, which were divided into four columns,
invaded Nepal. Troops led by General Morley, General
Wood, General Gillespie and his successor Martindell
suffered serious defeats. The fourth column led by
General Ochterlony achieved success as, after long
fierce fighting, Amar Singh Thapa agreed at Malaun
to the terms under which the Nepali army retired with
their arms and the territory between the Kali and Sutlej
rivers came under the control of the British.
After meeting diplomatic failures at both fronts-
northern (China and Tibet) and at southern (some Indian
states), Nepal tried to convince the British not to resort to
another war and the British too found it difficult to wage
another invasion in the hills. Peace negotiations started

and on November 28, 1815 the Nepalese representative,
Gujraj Misra, signed an agreement with the British
representative, Major Bradshaw, which Kathmandu
refused to ratify, as Misra did not have plenipotentiary
powers. It made the British to invade Nepal again. The
invasion began in February 1816 under Ochterlony. He
was able to outflank the main Nepali defensive position
at Makwanpur, which resulted in Kathmandu quickly
dispatching Chandra Sekhur Upadhyaya to Ochterlony’s
camp with a copy of the Sugauli treaty bearing the seal
of the Maharaj.
Ochterlony finally decided on March 4, 1816 to
accept Nepal’s ratification of the Sugauli treaty. The
most important provisions of the treaty:
(1) authorized the British to establish a Residency
at Kathmandu
(2) surrendered all of Nepal’s hill territories west
of the Kosi River as well as the disputed Tarai
areas below the hills to the Company or its
subordinate Indian states, and
(3) turned over the territories between the Singalila
range and Tista river to the Company, which
then restored to Sikkim.3
Chinese Help Sought

Mukhtiyar Bhimsen Thapa sought help from China
during the war. Even after the end of war, he wrote
a letter to China seeking help against the Company,
which was negatively replied by the General Sai-
chung-a (Shee Chanchoon) the Chinese commander,
who was deputed by the Emperor in May 1816 to
lead an army to Lhasa to assess the situation there.
3. Ibid, p-89.

In response to the letter Nepal sent another letter on
June10, 1816 stressing Chinese assistance to halt the
British expansion in defense of Tibet. Nepal sent a
delegation consisting of Dalbhunjan Pande, Ranbir
Thapa and Bhakta Bir Thapa who reached Shigatse
towards the end of September. The delegation had
a letter from the King that sought blessing from the
Emperor, relief and protection, as well.
Bhimsen Thapa continued to rule as King Girvan
Juddha died in November 1816 just after attaining his
majority, leaving his two years old son, Rajendra Bikram
Shah to succeed. Queen Tripura Sundari was retained as
Regent extending support to Thapa. Even in his death,
Thapa played diplomacy by seeking Chinese support
while intimating the news of the death on December
15, 1816. Failing to get any comment, he instructed the
regular quinquennial mission to make personal appeal to
the Emperor for assistance on October 17, 1818, which
failed again. Thapa was compelled to divert his foreign
policy towards the Company, as he failed to secure
assistance from China. He sent Mathbar Singh, his most
reliable supporter in 1834, as his emissary to Calcutta,
who returned empty-handed. He died on 29 July 1839.
Significantly, King Rajendra too followed the
path of Thapa. He sent Pushkar Shah on quinquennial
mission on July 14, 1837 to Peking. In his letter to
the Emperor, Rajendra described Bhimsen as a “pro-
Feringhi Bhardar” and requested either troops or a
subsidy of Rs. 20 million to oppose the British. The
mission met with stern refusal. During 1837-8 envoys
were sent out to Nagpur, Banaras, Rewa, Hyderabad,
Kuch Bihar, Mathura, Lahore, Kotah, Hardwar,
Gwalior, Scindia, Bhutan, Burma, and Afghanistan.
After getting disillusioned with the establishment,
British Resident Brian Hodgson threatened war if

Durbar did not mend its ways, and Rajendra agreed
to an engagement promising ceasing all intrigues
by messengers and letters.4 After Bhimsen Thapa,
Ranajung Pande was appointed Mukhtiyar on February
8, 1840. He was most critical of the British. Only two
days later, a letter was written to China offering attack
on the British in India through the Amban in Tibet who
did not send the letter to Peking informing Kathmandu
that China was capable of handling the British force.
2. Pro-British Policy (1846 to 1947)

The political events that took place between the
ratification of the treaty of Sugauli in 1816 and the
shifting of real political power from the Shah dynasty
to the Rana oligarchy in 1846 compelled Nepal to adopt
its pro-British foreign policy. The domestic upheavals
in the palace and its failure in obtaining support from
China on the one hand and from some Indian states
on the other, against the British, left Nepal with no
alternative but to toeing the line of the British.
The killing of Gagan Singh, the Queen’s principal
supporter, on September 14, 1846 gave a new turn. The
Queen, in a state of fury, summoned all the important
leaders to the Kot courtyard adjoining the Palace, where
almost all rivals of Jung Bahadur were killed in course of
leveling charges and counter charges. More than thirty
officials lost their lives and many more were expelled
from Nepal. On September 16, 1846, King Rajendra
appointed Jung Bahadur as Mukhtiyar, who gradually
started redefining Nepal’s relations with its neighbours.
First of all, he cancelled the quinquennial mission
to Peking, which was scheduled to depart in 1847.
However, after five years, he decided to renew the
4. Ibid, pp- 98-99.

customary mission to Peking. He sent the mission in
August 1852 under the leadership of Gambir Singh.
It reached Peking on schedule and was received with
normal formalities and friendliness. Gradually he
became ambitious and started eying the throne. To
achieve his goal, he thought out a plan to prove his
strength by waging and winning war with Tibet. He
raised the issues of dispute with Tibet and launched a war
in 1855. However the disputes were settled peacefully
with the ratification of the treaty of Thapathali on July
31, 1856 after repeated negotiations and consultations
with Tibetan officials and the Chinese representatives.
Significantly, Jung Bahadur, after becoming Prime
Minster and Commander-in-Chief with the title of Sri
Sri Sri Maharajah (Sri-3) by King Surendra on June
28, 1857, consolidated his power by playing off the
prince against the king and his queens. He brought his
status equal to the king by becoming King of Kaski
and Lamjung and established marital relations with
the royal family. After securing his position internally,
he diverted his attention to have good relations with
the British anew assuming that China would not
challenge his authority in the near future. Fortunately
he got the opportunity to develop good relations with
the British offering military support in suppressing
the mutiny of the British Indian regiment in Meerut,
which spread over many barracks in India against the
British rule in mid-1857. Initially, Jung Bahadur’s
offer was not accepted by the British as mutiny was
suppressed. However, military aid was needed by the
British to crush Oudh (Abadha), which had become the
centre of rebel activity. On 10 December 1857, Jung
Bahadur led 8,000 Nepali troops. The army performed
creditably in the fighting which culminated in the
capture and looting of Lucknow that put Gurkhas to
their considerable advantage.

Jung Bahadur then met G. G. Canning in Allahabad
and sought his help acquire the throne of Nepal. His
wish as such was not fulfilled but he got back some
parts of the Tarai land, which Nepal had lost in 1814-15
war. He got back four current districts of the western
region of Nepal. Since he was not fully satisfied, he
put restrictions on Gurkha recruitment in British army,
demanded recall of the Resident and gave shelter to Nana
Sahib and Begam Hajarat Mahal of Nabab of Abadha.
With the sudden demise of Jung Bahadur in 1877,
family rivalry between ‘Shamsher’ (Brothers of Jung
Bahadur) and ‘Jung’ (direct descendants or sons of
Jung Bahadur,) erupted and Ranoddip Singh succeeded
Jung Bahadur as Prime Minister. Sensing the situation,
British Resident requested him to help the procurement
of 1,000 ‘Volunteers’ for Gurkha battalions as a token
of his real friendship. The right of the British to recruit
Gorkhas in the British army and the status of Nepal
under the British rule seemed to dominate the British-
Nepal relations. The British were always eager to get the
restriction on recruitment lifted. After the assassination
of Ranoddip Singh on November 22, 1885, Bir
Shamsher became prime minister on November 23. The
British, knowing his weak position politically, gave him
recognition within a week. He could not meet the British
demand for direct recruitment but allowed servicemen
in Gurkha units to visit their homes on leave to solicit
volunteers. However, he permitted the Gurkha to go and
take British service through his official order. He could
collect about 500 volunteers who are mostly physically
disqualified. By 1890, the recruitment problem for the
Gurkha units had been largely solved.
Apprehending the support of Calcutta to the
descendants of Jung Bahadur if a change of regime suited
Calcutta, Bir Shamsher decided to strengthen relations with
China. He wrote in 1885 to the Amban in Lhasa justifying
the assassination of Ranoddip Singh and requested the
Chinese Emperor to bestow upon him with a title and
an official uniform. However, before he was accorded it
in August, 1889, he sought permission for sending the
periodic mission to visit Peking, which was materialized
in September 1886. Again on the periodic dispute with
Tibet, he wrote to the Amban in 1893 seeking permission
to send a deputation to Peking, and the delegation left
for Peking in August 1894 and returned in March 1901.
Interestingly, the language of the letter addressed to
the Emperor, which was sent through the delegation,
was very submissive. It became controversial between
Calcutta and Kathmandu, as Calcutta was interested in
not keeping Kathmandu under the subjugation of China.
However, Bir Shamsher clarified it before he died on 4
March 1901 in a mysterious condition,
Consequently, the British became suspicious about
Nepal’s relations with China after its 1886 mission. It is
evident from the correspondence between the Foreign
Department Secretary, H. M. Durand and the then British
Resident at Kathmandu Major E. L. Durand, in which
the Secretary held the mission ‘undesirable’ and warned
about troubles with China all along the Himalayas,
sooner or later. He, however, concluded, “I am afraid
we cannot help”5 The Resident Durand, who happened
to be the Secretary’s brother, “added to Calcutta’s
apprehension by his report of the reception given to the
Chinese envoy who brought the patent of title for Bir
Shamsher and charged that Chandra Shamsher, Bir’s
brother and second in line for succession, “always asserts
openly that Nepal is subordinate to China, and is in no
way so to the Government of India.” He opined, “The
settled policy of the Darbar is to play off China against
us, and to make use of a pretended subordination to that
power as a safeguard against the spread of any influence
5. Ibid. p. 102.

over this country.” He argued further, “If the Chinese
really attempt to establish their influence in Nepal, we
must object, and revise our relations with that state, not
I think a very difficult matter with all Jung Bahadur’s
descendants under our protection.”6
Dev Shamsher succeeded him but was not allowed
to continue as Chandra Shamsher staged a successful
coup d’etat on June 26, 1901 forcing Dev Shamsher
to resign. The British immediately recognized his
authority. In 1901, the rivalry between Russia and
British over Tibet became serious as a Tibetan
delegation had visited Russia in 1900-01. Russian
interest was challenged through Mongol Buddhist
subjects in establishing contact with Lhasa. The mere
hint of Russia’s interest in Tibet caused worries in
Calcutta. Chandra Shamsher decided to get benefit
from it by deriving certain advantages for himself
and Nepal by playing a leading role to the 1903
Younghusband expedition to Tibet. The coronation
Darbar at Delhi in January 1903 provided him with an
opportunity to impress upon the Viceroy the necessity
for taking prompt action in Tibet. On October 1, 1903,
the Younghusband mission, who had proceeded earlier
to the Sikkim-Tibet border to conduct negotiation with
Tibet, was authorized to cross the border. He finally
occupied Lhasa on August 3, 1904. Calcutta did accept
the loan of several thousand yaks and porters for
transportation. The Nepali Vakil was the single source
of information on the attitudes of Tibetan authenticities.
Chandra tried to play a role of mediator supporting
Calcutta. Before Lhasa was captured, the Dalai Lama
fled to Mongolia and established direct contacts with
Russian officials. It became another headache for
the British. At London’s behest, the expeditionary
force was withdrawn in 1905, and moved to reassure
6. Ibid, p.145.

China. An agreement was signed on April 27, 1906
by London and Peking committing not to annex any
Tibetan territory and no interference in the internal
administration of Tibet by London and not to permit
any foreign state to interfere with the territory or
internal administration of Tibet.
In view of the Chinese military campaign in eastern
Tibet, Kathmandu sought permission for the periodic
mission to visit China. Since China too was interested
in improving relations with Kathmandu, it agreed
immediately and the mission headed by Bharat Bahadur
left Kathmandu in August 1906. After the Chinese
forward move, Nepal obtained some benefits by way of
getting modern arms from the British. Since China was
looking for Nepalese support in its campaign, Nepal
also expected some gain from the Chinese dominated
Tibet, as the Chinese rule of Tibet did not improve the
conditions of the Nepalese traders on the one hand and
deprive the Nepali Vakil of his extraterritorial rights
enjoyed by him on the other. However, Kathmandu
felt offended on the presumptuous Chinese claim to
suzerainty over Nepal as Nepal used to address the
Chinese Emperor very submissively. Against this
backdrop, Chandra Shamsher wanted to extract some
concessions from the British like, granting the rank
of ambassador, deletion of the reference to Nepal as
a ‘Native State’ and have a new treaty to recognize
Nepal’s independence. However, its status was
confirmed between independent Afghanistan and the
‘feudatory States of India’. The 1911 revolution in China
resulted in the abrupt expulsion of the Chinese from
Tibet. Chandra Shamsher, again, tried to extract some
advantages. He wanted to see Tibet as an independent
state and prepared to help the Tibetan attain it. The
Nepali Vakil significantly mediated the procedure of
withdrawal of the Chinese force from the area. The

regular Nepali mission’s visit to China was postponed
for a year, as the British Resident informed Chandra
Shamsher to take decision only in consultation with the
government of India. The mission was first postponed
and then cancelled after Chandra Shamsher, on British
advice, repudiated the Chinese interpretation of the
significance of the mission and terminated the system.
It resulted almost in the abrogation of diplomatic
relations between Nepal and China.
Chandra Shamsher was shrewd and he developed his
personal relation with the Viceroy. He gave permission
of recruitment to the British and helped the British during
the first World War in which more than 55,000 Gorkha
soldiers were deployed. For this help, he wanted another
treaty to be signed. After the victory in the First World
War, Chandra Shamsher also wanted back the land that
Nepal had lost during 1814 war as a gift to Nepal but
it was not considered and in its place, he was granted
an annual ‘gift’ of Rs. 100,000 for Nepal, which went
into his personal treasury. However, against his demand
for independent status for Nepal, the British changed
the designation of the Resident to British Envoy and the
Residency to Legation in June 1920. His wish for a new
treaty was fulfilled by the Friendship treaty of 1923,
signed on December 21, 1923. Nepal finally obtained an
unequivocal recognition of its independence. The British
Government further recognized Nepal’s independence
in 1934 when it agreed to the establishment of a Nepali
Legation in London.
Bhim Shamsher succeeded Chandra Shamsher,
who had died in November1929. But Bhim Shmasher
was Prime Minister for less than 3 years, and was
succeeded by Juddha Shamsher. He also supported
the British during the Second World War by offering
ten battalions of the Nepal army for use in India. The
British also received permission to recruit 22 more
Gurkha battalions for the British Indian army. In all,
more than 200,000 Nepalis served in British units
during the 2nd World War on the Burmese, Middle
Eastern, and North African fronts.
The Ranas maintained good relations with British
India, as they believed that the British would not leave
India soon. They were having cordial relations with the
Hindu Mahasabha, a Hindu organization, which was
supporting the Ranas as they ran the administration on
Hindu pattern. However, when the interim government
was formed in 1946, the Rana regime started to
adjust itself with the new set-up. And the new Indian
government too was willing to maintain its traditional
relations. The two governments concluded a “standstill
agreement” under which India’s status as the successor
power to the British was recognized and the terms of
relationship between the two retained. In the mean
time, on May 16, 1947, Padma Shamsher announced
to have basic constitutional reforms. He proclaimed
the constitution based on democratic line drafted by
Indian experts led by Sri Prakash Gupta on January
26, 1948. Some Local level elections were also held.
However, the reform was not acceptable to a powerful
faction of the Ranas led by C-in-C Mohun Shamsher
who took over the reign subsequently. Keeping in
view of the Chinese forward policy towards Tibet
and the democratic demands in the country he signed
the Treaty of Friendship with India on July 31, 1950.
However, he could not prolong his family regime after
the Nepali Congress resorted to its armed revolution in
September 1950, which forced him to make room for
democracy in early 1951.

Chapter-2
RESETTING OF NEPAL AND

INDEPENDENT INDIA RELATIONS
Formative Stage of Relations
The end of Second World War, like in India, which
became independent in 1947, let many other countries in
different continents start their democratic movements.
Nepal too could not remain passive being cut from the
air of change blowing in several parts of the globe. The
independence movement in India gave impetus to the
enlightened citizens of Nepal and also the young people
living in the Indo-Nepal border areas. They were either
having their education in India or participated in the
independence movement like “Quit India Movement.”
As politically enlightened, they too felt the necessity
of freedom from the autocratic rule of the Ranas. They
formed political outfits during 1947-1950 on Indian soil,
as political activities were not allowed by the regime in
Nepal. In Kathmandu too the resentment of the local
people was brewing against the oligarchic rule. It was
getting expressed in literary works and dramas. In
Kathmandu, in the year 1940, some people were arrested

and four revolutionaries were executed for raising their
voices against the regime. Significantly, some Ranas
were also seeking democratic rights, as they were
sidelined. The Nepali Congress, which was formed in
India, started its armed revolution to overthrow the rule
in late 1950. Side by side, the monarchy, which was
sidelined by the Rana oligarchy for 104 years, was silently
opposing the Ranas. King Tribhuvana took shelter in
the Indian embassy on November 6, 1950 and finally
shifted to Delhi on November 10 where he remained
in self-exile. All these factors led the establishment
to negotiate the political settlement in Delhi. The
negotiations culminated in a tripartite agreement in the
form of ‘Delhi Compromise’. The compromise restored
the monarchy with a commitment to establish democratic
setup in the country. And to implement the agreement,
the sitting Rana Prime Minster was allowed to continue
with a coalition government of the revolutionary Nepali
Congress. The King returned to Kathmandu and declared
democracy. A new government as per terms of the
compromise was announced in which the Ranas and the
Nepali Congress participated in equal numbers. Thus a
new era began in Nepal in February 1951. However,
the coalition did not continue. The Rana Prime Minster
resigned and the Nepali Congress leader Matrika Prasad
Koirala took over the reign.
The resetting of relations under Jawaharlal

Nehru (1947-64)
After independence India started reshaping its foreign
policy. The independent India faced two realities: the
growing influence of the western countries on Pakistan
on the one hand and Tibet, which was brought under the
direct control of the Chinese communist regime in 1949,
on the other. The British Empire had treated Tibet as the
buffer state between British India and China. Although
China was not as powerful at that time as it is today, yet
it was a power to be reckoned with. Previously, British
India was not at all scared of independent Nepal for
two reasons. First, Nepal, which was an independent
kingdom, had some specific obligations to act for British
India under the Treaty of Sugauli signed in 1815 and
also under the treaty signed in 1923. In other words,
Nepal was an independent kingdom for the world at
large except for British India. Secondly, Tibet was
the buffer state between British India and China. The
regional balance changed drastically with the emergence
of Communist China.
It is no exaggeration to state that its first Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru was the setter of India’s foreign policy.
He was the Foreign Minister himself form 2 September
1946 to 27 May 1964 (when he died). His approach to
Nepal can be divided in two parts: first from 1947 to
1960 (before the royal takeover of BP Koirala’s elected
government) and second, after 1961 and onwards.
The relations between India and Nepal, which he
wanted to set, seemed to oscillate between his personal
idealism and his political realism. The personal idealism
facilitated the smooth landing of a democratic setup
from the oligarchic rule in Nepal when the Rana regime
collapsed due to armed revolution led by the Nepali
Congress (NC) and King Tribhuvan’s dissociation from
the regime by his self-exiling to India. The King took
refuge in the Indian Embassy on November 6 and was
flown to Delhi on November 10, 1950. During his self-
exile he accepted an Indian memorandum proposing
a compromise formula after negotiating with the two
ministers of the Rana Government, Bijaya Shamsher
and Keshar Shamsher, the foreign and defense ministers
respectively who returned to Kathmandu for finalizing
the following three-point formula on December 8, 1950:
a. An elected Constituent Assembly (CA) to draft
a new constitution;
b. An interim government with “popular” (with
Nepali Congress) representation but a Rana
prime minister; and
c. Recognition of King Tribhuvan.
After a long deliberation, an agreement was signed
on February 7, 1951 in Delhi.7 The King executed the
compromise after reaching Kathmandu. A coalition
government of the Ranas and the Nepali Congress
headed by its last PM Mohun Shamsher JBR was formed
to provide continuity of the government. The King
was reestablished as the real sovereign. However, to
constitute a CA was left to the King and the government.
The government went on changing that prolonged the
issue. The ‘Delhi Compromise’ was the effect of his
personal idealism on Indian foreign policy.8
Perhaps, the idea of holding CA was the brainchild
of Nehru, as he was for a democratic Nepal from the
very beginning of the epochal political change in
Nepal in early 1950s. There were four main political
stakeholders in Nepal to initiate the issue of a CA. The
first stakeholder was the king, second was the Rana
Prime Minster, the third was the NC which had waged
an armed struggle against the Rana regime and the last
was the facilitator, the Indian establishment. The king
could not be the originator of the idea of an elected
CA, as he might not have an idea about any CA, since
he was almost captive in his own palace from his very
childhood. Moreover, had it been his project, he could
have done something at least to hold CA election before
his death in Switzerland in February 1955. The Ranas too
could not have proposed a CA as they had already got a
7. Rose, Ibid,p-193.
8. Koirala B.P.Atmavritant, 2055 BS, p, 146.

constitution drafted by some Indian experts a few years
before, which did not have any mention of it. Similarly,
the NC too could not be its initiator, as BP Koirala, in his
‘Atmavritanta’ (autobiography) himself admits that no
NC leaders including Koirala Brothers (MP Koirala and
himself) were allowed to have direct negotiation with
the exiled King at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi to
discuss about the contents of the ‘Delhi Compromise’.
He simply calls it “an imaginary matter.”9 Thus, Nehru
intended to see Nepal to have an elected CA to frame a
constitution to be governed democratically
Ultimately, the dream of Nehru was materialized
on September 20, 2015 after a gap of 64 years.
King Mahendra was not at all interested in CA. The
NC leaders were not serious about having a CA, as
the NC participated in the parliamentary election in
1959 under a new constitution promulgated by the
King. Interestingly, even the people’s movement of
1990 did not entertain the agenda of CA. It accepted
constitutional monarchy through the new constitution
drafted by the representatives of the NC, CPN–UML
and the nominees of the then King. Though, Gajendra
Narayan Singh of Sadbhavana Party raised the issue
of CA, he too did not stick to his demand due to his
limited political sphere and lack of political shrewdness
to fight for this just cause.
Significantly, the Maoists, who raised arms against
the state in the early 1996, took up the issue of CA while
negotiating peace with the government with three main
demands:
a. to hold round table national conference,
b. to form a strong coalition government and
c. to hold the CA election
9. Mishra, Birendra Prasad, art. Bend in the river, Republica,6.10.2012.

However, it remained a matter of curiosity as to why
did the Maoists demand CA being adherent to the political
thought of one party rule and the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Were the Maoist leaders under the influence of
Indian leaders, both the leftist and the democratic, during
their stay in India earlier and during insurgency ? Or did
they think of copying Indian democratic innovations for
themselves? Perhaps, some of the democratic minded
Maoist leaders might have initiated and convinced their
colleagues to go for an elected CA, a more democratic
process to carry the people’s wish ultimately.
Nehru’s relation with Nepal was somewhat
personal. The relations between modern India and post-
Rana Nepal can be better looked through the prism of
the correspondence between PM Jawaharlal Nehru,
King Tribhuwan and PM MP Koirala during the early
1950s. After the revolt of Raksha Dal, Jawaharlal
Nehru wrote a personal letter to the King on January
27, 195210, addressing the King as ‘My dear friend’,
and assured that an Indian small party of Army and Air
Force officers visiting Kathmandu would be of some
assistance to Nepal. He writes, “The whole purpose of
this visit is to render assistance, in the shape of advice,
where required and not to interfere in any other way with
your Government arrangements.” To build harmony
between the King and the Prime Minister, he wrote to
PM Koirala, enclosing a copy of the letter addressed
to the King, on February 28, 195211. With regard to the
internal bickering of the NC and the relation between the
two brothers. He writes “I spoke quite frankly to him (BP
Koirala) about the position in and the needs of Nepal and
the great responsibility which rested on a few leading
personalities in the movement for freedom in Nepal.
These personalities obviously included you and BP. I
10. Appendixed to the book ‘MP Koirala, A role in a revolution’, 2008, pp.203-4.
11. Ibid,pp.208-10.

told him that it was exceedingly injurious to the cause
of Nepal, and of course to that of the Nepali Congress,
for a conflict to take place between you and him. In fact,
everybody should have the sense to pull together in this
crisis; otherwise they will be swept away.”
He writes further, “I told BP that he had some
excellent qualities, push, drive, etc., but he was far too
impulsive and lacked ballast. No doubt with a little
experience he will gain this ballast and be more balanced.
He was young and he would have plenty of chances of
working for big ends. But by over-reaching himself, he
might not only injure his own chances but, what was
more important, injure Nepal’s interests.” Keeping in
view a presidential contest in the party, he suggests, “It
would be improper for a contested election to take place
for the presidentship of the Nepali Congress. Whoever
might win, this would affect the unity of Government
and the cooperation of the government with the NC. It
would leave a trail of conflict and bitterness behind.”
He asserts further, “It was immaterial to me whether
the PM was the President of the NC or not. Much could
be said for either course. But it was essential that the
President of the NC and the PM should pull together…
B.P., I think, was impressed by what I said. I said it
all in a very friendly way, as I would talk to a young
colleague of mine.” In the letter dated April 23, 1952,
he writes to Koirala, “It is not for me to advise you in
regard to domestic matters but, if I may say so, it might
be possible to introduce some simple reforms with
great speed. These reforms may relate to the judicial
system, which, I understand, is very primitive. … May
I also say that it would be desirable if the King as well
as Ministers did not frequently go out of Nepal, more
specially to big cities like Calcutta?”
His emotional approach is evident from his response
expressed on the request made by the then Nepalese
ambassador to India, General Vijaya Shamsher, the
son of Mohun Shamsher, who had resigned from the
Prime Ministership. He wrote to the new PM MP
Koirala on December 5, 1951 showing respect to
Mohun Shamsher who was referred to as His Highness
Maharaja. He suggests that the Maharaja should not
shift his headquarters to India, but to stay in Nepal
and come to India from time to time when he wished.
Realizing his difficulties he writes, “He is an old man
now and has seen many changes which naturally have
shaken up a great deal. He is entitled to every courtesy
and good treatment.”
It proves that he had developed personal relation with
Nepalese leaders. The correspondence between Nehru
and PM MP Koirala and King Tribhuvan cited above,
surprises one to note that Nehru’s addresses to the King
as a friend and to PM MP Koirala as ‘Matrika Prasadji’
and also as ‘Matrika babu’ show his respect and affection
for them. From such overtures, one should not hesitate
to conclude that Nehru’s attitude towards Nepalese
dignitaries was that of equals and there was personal touch
in his treatment of the Nepalese leaders. Significantly,
one can find from the correspondence that serious issues
were discussed and Nehru’s suggestions were sought not
because he was the PM of India but because he was a
senior leader known personally to the Nepalese leaders,
and he was one of the real well wishers of Nepal among
the then Indian establishment and the people.
It seems that the guiding principle of his policy
towards Nepal was his political realism, which is evident
from his implicit and explicit overtures to the matters
relating to Nepal’s foreign affairs. He advises Nepalese
rulers to be cautious about engaging Americans and

Chinese showing his concern over Indian security
and also to have a joint approach to foreign policy.
Interestingly, despite repeated suggestion from Nehru,
Nepal succeeded in contacting the Chinese ambassador
to India through the then Nepalese Ambassador in
August 1954 paving the way for opening the diplomatic
channel with China.
He, while cautioning Nepal against employing
foreigner and especially regarding US aid, writes on
February 25, 1952, “There are all kinds of laws in the
US governing help to foreign countries and wanting
something in exchange for them. We have been dealing
with the US for a long time past and have made it
perfectly clear that while help is welcome, we will not
have any political or other strings attached to it.”
He categorically expresses his commitment not to
interfere in the internal matters of Nepal on June 6, 1952,
by writing, “I have hesitated to write to you because it
is none of my business to interfere in any way in the
internal politics of Nepal.” He attaches importance to two
elements in Nepal: stability and promise of progress. He
shows his disgust for no progress on holding Constituent
Assembly (CA) elections and functioning of the Advisory
Council (AC). He writes further, “These two elements
were: the King and the NC… As I know, no progress has
been made towards the calling of the CA and the AC has
not functioned at all… It is not my concern what kind
of Government the Nepalese people would like to have
themselves. But if something happens in Nepal, which
endangers our own security, then, of course, this is a
matter of great concern to us. … History and geography
have thrown India and Nepal together. We cannot forget
that history, or change geography.”
On July 31, 1952, Nehru advises the PM again to be

broader in outlook, “If I may say so, as PM, you will have
to keep this larger viewpoint before you. The country
is more important than any individual or group, and it
would be a tragedy if, because of group or individual
conflicts, the country suffers.”
During Koirala’s second stint as PM, he was
advised again by Nehru to be careful about American
interference and also become realistic about the takeover
of Tibet by China, while the whole world has accepted
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (May 8, 1954). He was
further advised, perhaps out of the way, not to seek extra-
territorial rights and claiming Rs.10, 000 from Tibet and
to have mutual consultation with both the countries over
foreign affairs (June 29, 1954).
From the above correspondence, one can easily
infer some conclusions regarding PM Nehru’s attitude
towards Nepal. First, he wants to see Nepal to grow as
an independent democratic country. Secondly, he wants
stability in Nepal. Thirdly, he wishes for economic
development of Nepal. Fourthly, he cautions Nepal
against the close relations with China and the United
States. Fifthly, he wants Nepal to be serious about the
Indian security perception. Sixthly, he does not want any
interference in the internal matters of Nepal. And lastly,
he has personal goodwill for Nepal and its leaders.
King Mahendra, decided to go against the all
good wishes of Nehru when on December 15, 1960 he
dissolved the duly elected Parliament, suspended the
constitution and arrested PM BP Koirala and his cabinet
colleagues. On the royal coup, Nehru’s response was
quoted by The Hindu, one of the oldest English daily
published in India. It writes on December 21, 1960, “PM
Nehru, initiating the debate on foreign affairs in the Rajya
Sabha on December 20, was sharply critical of the Nepal

King’s dismissal of the Koirala Ministry, suspension
of the state’s constitution and country-wide arrests and
detention of popular leaders. He said the king’s sanction
came to him not as a surprise but a shock… But the king
stated that the king and the Cabinet have not been working
harmoniously for some months. He described as “vague”
the charges leveled by the king against the Koirala
ministry. The Koirala Government has been functioning
under difficult conditions having regard to the state’s
history after the elimination of the Rana rule. Of course,
nobody could describe the Koirala Government as ideal
and for that matter no Government anywhere could be
regarded as ideal. The Hindu writes again on January
19, 1961 thus, “Prime Minister Nehru on January 18
reiterated his view that the recent development in Nepal
was a serious setback to democratic setup. While it was
for the people of Nepal to decide what they should do,
all that he could say was not ‘a step in advance, but a
step backward and that step backward will have to be
retraced some time or other’. Mr. Nehru was replying to
questions at his press conference.”
Significantly, after a gap of fifty-seven years, the letter
written by Nehru to King Mahendra12 throws ample light
on India’s foreign policy and its diplomacy erasing several
doubts and confusions in Nepal. Nehru wrote the letter
within two months of the royal takeover on December
15, 1960, which reiterates his stand on the royal action. It
was believed in some quarters in Nepal that the king took
over the elected government in consultation with India, as
Nehru was not in favour of the continuity of BP Koirala
as PM. Presumably, they drew their conclusion on the
premise that there were no serious responses by way of
any action from India against the royal move.
12. Its Nepali translation by Pradeep Giri, Nepali Congress MP has been
published in a Nepali daily, ‘Naya Patrika’, 3.11.2018.

Interestingly, Nehru does not initiate any
correspondence with the King as he realizes that what
had happened in Nepal was in opposition to his wishes
and trust. He writes only in response to the letter written
to him by King Mahendra. The very acknowledgement
of the letter speaks more about the fact. He writes
that the King has tried to inform him about the royal
action taken at his pleasure hardly needs his response.
Moreover, he replies his letter after meeting Minister
Dr. Tulsi Giri through whom he could learn about the
situation prevailing in Nepal. He writes that they had
a long discussion for about two hours. Minister Giri
informed him about the king’s views regarding the
present condition and he too shared his personal views
with Giri. He takes it as a freedom to write to the King
about the subject they talked, although he believed that
Giri might have informed the King about the subject
matters of their discussion. He writes that he was writing
to him with full confidence in each other.
He begins his letter by narrating his own past
performances that made him Prime Minister of India with
socialist outlook with a strong antagonism to the thinking
of accumulating excess wealth through personal effort
in trade, commerce and industry that virtually moulded
him into an anti-feudalist. He writes that only history
will judge his success and failure accepting the fact he
has failed in many respects. He writes about the Indian
policy towards Nepal very candidly, which was already
communicated to King Tribhuvan and Prime Minister
MP Koirala long back. He writes frankly that in early
days of independence, the question of what to do about
Nepal came up and we decided for an independent Nepal
knowingly that its independence was virtually curtailed
by the British for all practical purposes with regard to
its foreign relations. British ambassadors used to play

important roles. His respected father (King Tribhuvan)
and the then Rana Prime Minister have told him that a
British Ambassador had to flee to India on account of
some of his activities.
He writes that Indian leaders always wished Nepal
to be an inseparably independent and self-reliant country,
which was natural and pragmatic as well. So, they at once
accepted full independence. Their only concern in Nepal
was its independence, which is also evident from their
present policy. Simultaneously, they felt that their (Nepal
and India) past history, culture and geography have made
them inseparably close to each other and in some subjects,
primarily in foreign affairs and defence, Nepal and India
could build deep relations through negotiations, which
was in the interest of both countries.
He recalls the past and adds that they had their
first old treaty with the Ranas. Knowing well that they
(Indian leaders) disagreed with the then government
regarding the outlines of political and economic
policies, they did not think proper to interfere. Later,
they learnt that his father was liberal that made them
happy. He narrates further about his father’s visit to
Delhi, who was welcomed as an honourable guest.
To negotiate the internal problem on the request
from the Ranas, with their (Indian) felicitation, since
they (Indian leaders) were eager to see a stable and
progressive government in Nepal, a compromise was
reached and the King returned home and formed a
coalition government. To start with, the continuity of
government was accepted as the Rana Prime Minster
continued. Sadly, Prime Minister’s continuity could not
be possible further and thereafter there was continued
change of guard with public assurance to provide a
democratic setup, hold periodic elections and adopt

some form of parliamentary governments. Nepal
faced many challenges including shortages of trained
government servants. Whenever they were requested,
they tried their best to help without any intention of
any kind of intervention.
He writes that after the King ascended to the throne,
they became glad to learn about the King’s decision
to frame a new constitution, hold election and form a
democratic government. They believed that it was the
only proper way-out. The King kept his words to the
people by conducting a general election and forming a
government as per the mandate. It was a matter of two
years back. The voting was fruitful and a strong party
(NC) with the massive majority emerged with its results.
Addressing the King as His Majesty, Nehru reminds
that he told His Majesty so many times that there were
only two stable factors in Nepal. First, King and second,
the Nepali Congress, which was the only established
political party with popular support. For Nepal, being the
least developed country, it was not possible for any one
of the two to succeed on its own strength against odds.
For this reason, he felt it essential that these two factors
should cooperate with each other; otherwise there would
be continuity of regression and instability. He stresses on it
that any tussle between the two would be harmful to Nepal.
At least twice, the King told him about his dissatisfaction
with the method of functioning of the government due to
blooming corruption and unsatisfactory working of the
administration. Though it was painful to him to hear about
it, he reminded the King that for these failures, previous
administration and the backwardness of the country by
all means was also responsible. To solve the problem, the
only way out was to develop the country and fight with
corruption and misadministration.

While praising the NC, he writes that actually, no
great change is possible without people’s vast support
and cooperation. Even from far away, he understands
that the last government amidst all failures had also
brought great reforms in the old administration sector
and apart from these, it has opened the doors of
additional reform and progress.
With regard to the royal takeover on 15 December
1960, he writes that he is greatly distressed by the King’s
proclamation of the dissolution of the government and
both Houses of parliament and taking over the reins
of the country. On account of his life-long training,
thinking and his indispensable inner conviction, he
says that these steps cannot lead the King to his goal,
which he has communicated to the people. Neither his
government nor he has any intention to interfere in
Nepal. He further writes that he answered all queries
on Nepal in a controlled and disciplined manner as per
parliamentary practices. Apart from his displeasure on
series of events taking place, he was anxious about the
unfair and wrong propaganda in the Nepalese media.
Some of the allegations were unjust and disrespectful.
The allegations were amusing and encouraging. All
these showed that these were happening either with the
instructions of the government or its silence.
With regard to the then economic conditions and
King’s thinking for the future, Dr. Giri told him that the
King’s goal was to achieve democracy and he wanted
to have economic development as its first condition. In
response Nehru told Dr. Giri, as he writes, economic
development is a long-time process and a troublesome
issue. It has to be developed through well-established
civil movement, efficient governance, cooperation with
the administration, and special planning with fixed goal.

Pointing out the Nepalese constraints of development like
a dearth of trained human resources and continuity of old
method of administration, apart from lagging behind in
education, he doubts the pace of development. Neither the
world nor any country will remain static. If any country
does not go ahead with speed, it will engulf in social
and political crises, which will be the carrier of repeated
crisis and obstruct the progress. For this reason, he fails
to understand that when Nepal will be in continued crisis,
how will it have remarkable economic development? The
country will be trapped in deadlock and the energy of the
country will be spent on conflict, which will make the
country weak. So, he does not visualize the progressive
setup and stability of the government, if present condition
continues. He anticipates that the situation may worsen
further and the King and his country have to face greater
problems. In such a time of crisis, the King may think of
external help and he may get it, but it will create new risk
and weakness for the country.
While referring to its two neighbours-India and
China, he asserts that Nepal is related to India in respects
of religion, culture, history and geography. These are the
permanent features, which cannot be changed with the
flow of time. So far as India is concerned, they (Indian
leaders) are trained in such a way that they cannot attack
and be aggressive on the border. Their whole structure
and the structure of government and people will oppose
it. We cannot get anything from it. On the contrary, China
has a different system and working style. Presently, its
working method is aggressive. Though they always want
friendly relations with this great country; it has adopted
its aggressive policy, which they cannot tolerate. They,
however, have adopted the goal of maintaining friendly
relations with China.

He cautions Nepal by telling that the condition of
Nepal is different. It is weak and may be incapable of
meeting any risk from its northern border. China may try
to have friendly relations with the King to keep Nepal
distant from India. It is up to the king to think whether
its relations with China with whom it has least common
interests, would be in the interest of Nepal or not. Indian
leaders feel that Nepal’s friendly relations with India
may deter any aggression from China. He is, therefore,
serious about the present activities and feels if such
activities continue, these may invite internal conflict. To
return to the democratic setup at the earliest is the only
way-out from this entanglement. The more it is delayed
the more Nepal has to face unfavourable situations.
There would be no constitutional progress till this path
remains closed. Thereafter people may demonstrate
unconstitutionally and Nepal will be entrapped in the
whirlwind of civil war.
He writes further that he is trying to write to the
King quite earnestly because of their great friendship
and confidence. This friendship is essential also in
the interest of both Nepal and India. As he has said
earlier, they (Indian leaders) have neither any intention
nor any wish to interfere. Their main interest is in the
development of an independent and democratic Nepal.
Naturally, they are also interested in their defense as the
activities in Nepal may also affect them. For this reason,
he seriously requests His Majesty to think not only by
perceiving the present condition but also in view of the
future, which will open up itself. He writes that he may
dare to advise the King that the present crisis should
not be allowed to continue and steps should be taken to
empower citizens to express their views. If the present
parliament cannot be recalled, fresh elections can be
held. If there is corruption, it can be acted upon harshly.

If the administration is bad, it can be made right, but
there is no chance of satisfying the people by ambiguous
and doubtful allegations. He draws the attention of the
King towards foreign media including the British and
writes that Britain is quite favourable to the king, but he
might have read the criticisms published in the media
there. Today’s world opinion cannot tolerate easily the
regression of the democratic process.
After the royal coup, hundreds of leaders and
workers of the banned Nepali Congress took shelter
in India and started their armed protests against the
government. India, being a democratic country could not
control them strictly as the borders between Nepal and
India were open. The official relations got soured. In the
mean time, the tension on the India-China borders, which
was brewing for quite some time, ultimately resulted in
a war between China and India in 1962. Nehru sent a
team under the leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri that
consisted of Dr. Karan Singh, and Bhagwan Sahay to
Kathmandu on an unofficial visit in 1963 to redefine the
relationship between Nepal and India. Shastri played a
crucial role in putting some restrictions on the Nepali
Congress and its workers, who were waging an armed
movement from India against the government as its
leaders including the duly elected PM BP Koirala were
behind bars. The NC ultimately stopped its activities.
And the NC armed cadres were asked to maintain the
distance of 20 KM from the international border.

Chapter-3
THE PERIOD OF DEVELOPING

RELATIONS �1964�2004�
This period can be called the post-Nehruvian period
of relations between Nepal and India. It is a period
when there were many ups and downs in Nepal-India
relations. However, the relations continued to develop
by and large. There were 12 Prime Ministers, one with
two stints and another with three. The period starts
with Lal Bahadur Shashtri. 1. L. B. Shastri (1964-66).
2. Indira Gandhi (1966-77) 3. Morarji Desai (1977-79)
4. Charan Singh (1979-1980). 5. Indira Gandhi (1980-
84). 6. Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). 7. Vishwanath
Pratap Singh (1989-1990). 8. Chandra Shekhar (1990-
1991). 9. P V. Narasimha Rao (1991-96). 10. Atal
Bihari Vajpayee (1996-1996). 11. H. D. Deve Gowda
(1996-1997). 12. I. K. Gujral (1997-1998). 13. Atal
Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004).
Lal Bahadur Shastri’s Reconciliatory Policy

After the demise of Pt. Nehru on May 27, 1964,
L. B, Shastri became the second Prime Minister of
India. Sadly, he was PM hardly for 18 months, as he

died at Tashkent in early January 1966 where he had
gone to negotiate with Pakistan under the mediation of
Russia. During his short period of prime ministership,
he was preoccupied mostly with the tense relations
with Pakistan that ultimately resulted in a war with
Pakistan in 1965 in which India succeeded in capturing
substantial portions of land in Pakistan. The post-
war period too kept him engaged in negotiations with
Pakistan. In spite of his engagement with Pakistan, he
spared time to improve relations with Nepal. He secretly
concluded the Treaty of Arms Assistance Agreement on
30 January 1965 with Nepal regarding supply of arms
and ammunition to the Nepalese army. Interestingly,
Nehru had full confidence in him as a problem shooter.
Nehru involved him in negotiations with Nepal and
Sri Lanka on crucial issues. In response to the Indian
support to the Nepali Congress workers taking up arms
against the government from India and apprehending
growth of Indian domination and influence in Tarai,
King Mahendra got started the construction of Kodari
Raj Marg (Highway) linking China through the
autonomous region of Tibet with Chinese support. The
construction of the East-West Highway (Mahendra Raj
Marg) in Tarai region was also initiated.
In this context, he was also deputed by Nehru in
1963 to negotiate with Nepal to see how India’s interests
of security could be safeguarded. And perhaps, the
negotiation, which he had started, culminated in signing
of the treaty in 1965 during his regime. PM Shastri sent
Srimman Narayan as an ambassador to Nepal. Narayan
with his courteous behaviour, succeeded in getting
King’s balanced treatment against Nepal’s growing
dependence on China through the treaty of 1965.

Indira Gandhi’s Aggressive Policy
After the sudden demise of Prime Minister L. B.
Shastri, Indira Gandhi, who was the Information and
Broadcasting Minister in his cabinet, was elected
P. M. after defeating a senior most leader, Morarji
Desai in Congress Parliamentary party election for
leadership. She was Prime Minister for nearly 12 years.
Significantly, Indira Gandhi had appointed a political
figure Raj Bahadur as an ambassador (tenure 05-01-
1968-22-01-1971) to deal with Nepal politically. During
the period, the relations that got strained during the last
days of Nehru continued almost to remain the same.
She visited Nepal in 1966 to improve India’s relations
with Nepal, which proved to be of no avail. In 1969,
the then Prime Minister Kirtinidhi Bista denounced,
in unequivocal terms, the Arms Assistance Agreement
and held that the Treaty of 1950 had fallen into disuse,
as India did not consult Nepal in 1962 and 1965 wars.
He asserted that the Treaty was no longer binding on
either party and also demanded for withdrawal of Indian
wireless operators from Nepal-China border and the
Indian Military Liaison Group. In response, the Indian
Minister for External Affairs (MEA) Dinesh Singh,
who visited Kathmandu, threatened to close the border
formally. To improve the strained bilateral relations the
Nepalese delegation led by Foreign Secretary, Yadu
Nath Khanal visited Delhi in September 1969. Secretary
Khanal succeeded in getting the joint statement issued
that emphasized the existence of ‘an identity of interests
and of mutual understanding, trust and confidence’
between the governments and the people of Nepal and
India. It was on the basis of this understanding the
Indian Military Liaison Group and the Indian wireless
operators were withdrawn by August 1970.13 It affected
the extension process of the ‘Trade and transit treaty
13. Shaha, Rishikesha, pp-38-39.

of 1960, which was not concluded on due date, though
supplies of goods remained unaffected. After the return
of Indira Gandhi with a thumping majority in parliament
in 1971 election, Nepal had to sign the treaty on less
favourable terms.
After signing of 20-years long Peace and Friendship
treaty with Russia, India helped East Pakistan to declare
itself as an independent state of Bangladesh in 1971
by bifurcating it from Pakistan. Nepal was the second
country to recognize Bangladesh after Bhutan did it. It
is believed that the recognition by Nepal took toll upon
the health of King Mahendra fatally. King Birendra
succeeded him after the demise of King Mahendra.
King Birendra launched his proposal for declaring
Nepal a zone of peace at his coronation in 1974 in order
to neutralize the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship
of 1950. More than hundred countries recognized the
proposal but nothing tangible was achieved by Nepal,
as India did not recognize it. It ultimately fell flat after
the people’s movement of 1990.
Indira Gandhi faced hostilities on two fronts,
first a hostile government and second ex-premier B.
P. Koirala, a friend and supporter of Jaya Prakash
Narayan who had spear-headed the movement against
Indira Gandhi whose election was declared invalid
by Allahabad High Court. She declared the state
of emergency in the country to continue as Prime
Minister. She could not deal with Koirala and the
King simultaneously that jeopardized her diplomacy
in Nepal. King was not kind to her because she had
given shelter to Koirala who was not favourable to
her. He was against the political leadership of Indira
Gandhi and perhaps, also of Nehru who could not save
his elected government and his arrest in 1960.

Morarji Desai’s Easy Policy
Morarji Desai became Prime Minister in 1977 when
Indira Gandhi and the Congress party got defeated in
1977 general election that was conducted after six years.
The Lower House was extended by one year during
the Emergency. The then Janta Party government was
formed under the leadership of Morarji Desai. Sadly,
his government could hardly last for two and half years,
as it collapsed due to his party’s internal bickering.
However, during the short span of regime, he visited
Nepal and declared from a public platform that he was
ready to sign as many agreements with Nepal as it
wanted. And ultimately, by playing an easy diplomacy,
two separate agreements for Trade and Transit, were
signed fulfilling the demand of Nepal.
Second Inning of Indira Gandhi

The Morarji Desai government collapsed due to
internal conflict of the Janta party. There was dissension
in the party opposing the authority of Desai reducing his
majority in the House. A faction led by Charan Singh,
who formed a party named Lok Dal, claimed majority
with support from the Congress Party. Charan Singh took
the oath as Prime Minster in 1979. But his government
could not get the confidence of the House as the Congress
Party withdrew its support. Consequently, Singh resigned
but also recommended the dissolution of Lok Sabha and
called for another general election in January 1980 to elect
a new government with fresh mandate of the people.
In the 1980 general election, the Congress Party
under Indira Gandhi came out victorious and assumed
power again. The result of the election was against the
unstable governments and the internal bickering of the
Janta Party that had come to power against the state of
emergency declared by Indira Gandhi in 1975.
During her second stint as Prime Minster, Indira was
busy with domestic problem like Khalistan movement
and liberation of the golden temple from Bhindranwale
killing him in the temple under Operation Blue Star that
led to her assassination by her Sikh security guards before
completing her term. This paved the way for her son
Rajiv Gandhi to succeed her. Significantly, to deal with
Nepal, Indira had deputed an experienced bureaucrat H.
C. Sarin as ambassador who was governor of Andhara
Pradesh and a state in the North East earlier.
Rajiv Gandhi’s Reactive Policy

Immediately after assuming office, Rajiv Gandhi
called for another general election in which his
party won with more than two-thirds majority. His
performance was constructive, as to bring peace in
Punjab and Assam, he signed agreements with Akali
Dal leader Harchand Singh Longowal and Asom Gana
Parishad leader Prafulla Kumar Mohanta. He acted
assertively by sending humanitarian relief packages to
Tamil rebellions in the war-torn regions of Sri Lanka
by air and deploying naval ships to Maldives to free it
from robbers who had captured some islands. Similarly,
He visited Nepal to attend the SAARC summit and
gave it a reality. However, he became over-assertive
when the issue of two separate agreements for trade and
transit with Nepal surfaced again, as the term of trade
agreement, which had expired, needed extension. As
a result, in the absence of trade agreement, there was
stoppage of supplies from India, a kind of economic
blockade, which continued for several months. People
suffered a lot on account of the economic blockade.
However, the shortages of essential goods created
resentment among the common people that hastened the

people’s movement of 1990 that overthrew the party-
less Panchayat regime after almost three decades.
Vishwanath Pratap Singh’s Supportive Policy

V. P. Singh succeeded Rajiv Gandhi in 1989 when
the Congress party led by Gandhi was defeated in the
general election on the charges of corruption. V. P. Singh,
who was the finance Minister in Rajiv Gandhi’s cabinet,
resigned and spearheaded a campaign against Gandhi
charging him of taking bribe in purchase of Bofors
guns. His party had no clear-cut majority in the Lower
House. He, however, formed the government supported
by the BJP, from outside. His government lasted from 2
December 1989 to 10 November 1990. Coincidentally,
there was people’s movement in Nepal in 1990, which
overthrew the party-less Panchayat system. An interim
government was formed under the leadership of K. P.
Bhattarai. During the visit of Bhattarai to Delhi; the issue
of trade and transit was solved as India agreed to sign
two separate treaties. Nepal too agreed to certain Indian
concerns like equal treatment to Indian teachers working
in Nepal and on customs duty imposed on Indian goods.
Interestingly, I. K. Gujral was the Foreign Minister in
his cabinet pursuing his own foreign policy.
Chandra Shekhar’s No Policy:

Chandra Shehkar succeeded V. P. Singh as Prime
Minister. His government was supported by the Congress
Party, which withdrew its support on the charges of spying
on its leaders by his government. His government lasted
from 10 November 1990 to 21 June 1991. He resigned
and dissolved Lok Sabha for people’s fresh mandate.

P V. Narasimha Rao’s Quiet Policy:
Narasimha Rao succeeded Chandra Shekhar as
Prime Minister. In the general election, which was held
after Chandra Shekhar dissolved the Lower House, the
Congress Party won significant seats in the House. P.
V. Narashimha Rao with support from some fringe
parties became Prime Minister who governed India
for five years. It is believed that the main reason for
winning considerable seats was the sympathy votes for
the Congress as its president and former Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE of Sri
Lanka before the second phase of the polling.
Prime Minister Rao smoothed the Nepal-India
relations. He visited Nepal and signed an agreement on
the Mahakali integrated project and the Pancheshwar
multi-purpose project with Nepal, when there was
minority government in Nepal led by CPN-UML leader
Manmohan Adhikari. The India-Nepal relations were
somewhat soured with the issue of Mahakali project
completed by India unilaterally. Although Prime Minister
G.P. Koirala’s government, which was formed in 1991
after the first people’s movement of 1990, had signed
a Memorandum of Understanding on Mahakali river,
which became controversial in Nepalese political circle,
the Supreme Court of Nepal asked the government to
get it approved by two-thirds majority. It was approved
by the Nepalese parliament later.
H. D. Deve Gowda’s No Policy:

H. D. Deve Gowda succeeded Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
who could not cobble together fringe parties to have a
majority to continue his government. His government
lost the vote of confidence. He was in the office from 1
June 1996 to 21 April 1997.

I. K. Gujral’s Liberal Policy:
I. K. Gujral was the third Prime Minister of the 11th
Lok Sabha (Lower House) succeeding Deve Gowda. He
had the support of the Congress Party. He remained in the
office form 21 April 1997 to 19 March 1998. His tenure
was short as the Congress Party withdrew its support.
In spite of his limited time of performance, he crafted
his own foreign policy especially the neighbourhood
policy, which was termed as ‘Gujral Doctrine’. He
was also a two-time Foreign Minister. It seems that he
developed his policy during his Foreign Ministership
while dealing with the neighbouring countries. It was
always questioned whether the doctrine was really a
doctrine at all or simply an idea, which he harboured
and tried to implement during his short regime.
On 20 January 1997, while speaking on “Aspects
of India’s Foreign policy”, at the Bandaranaike Centre
for International Studies, Colombo, he himself tried to
define his doctrine, “The ‘Gujral Doctrine’, if I may call it
so, states that, first, with its neighbours like Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does
not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates
what it can in good faith and trust. Second, we believe
that no South Asian country should allow its territory
to be used against the interests of another country of
the region. Third, that none should interfere in the
internal affairs of another. Fourth, all South Asian
countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their
disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.” 14
14. Mishra, Birendra, Prasad (Mishra, Birendra P), The Gujral Doctrine, The
Himalayan Times (THT), 30/1/2013.

A. B. Vajpayee’s Developmental Policy
(1996-1996, 1998-2004):
Atal Bihari Vajpayee has a unique identity of
becoming Prime Minster of India thrice during his
total six years in the office. In 1996, he became Prime
Minster for the first time and remained in the office from
16 May 1996 to 1 June 1996. He resigned, as he could
not prove his majority in the House. It was the shortest
government. He became Prime Minister second time in
1998, but he was forced to dissolve the Lower House
(Lok Sabha) in 1999 due to the withdrawal of support
by its major alley the AAIDMK calling for another
general election in which his party, the BJP came out
victorious with a substantial number of seats. He, again,
formed a coalition government of several fringe parties
under ‘National Democratic Alliance’ and took the oath
of Prime Minister for the third time. His government
lasted till 22 May 2004.
He visited Nepal to attend the SAARC summit
in 2002. During his tenure, the Nepal-India relations
appeared smooth. However, some extraordinary events
in Nepal did not permit his policy to be effective. The
Maoist insurgency did not allow the relations to improve,
as it was generally held that the Maoists were backed
by India. Further, King Birendra and his family were
killed in the 2001 royal palace massacre and the ex-king
Gyanendra assumed the state power to rule of the country
directly. He put senior political leaders behind the bars.
All these restricted the scope of Indian diplomacy in
Nepal. Significantly, it is during his period, the Nepalese
Maoists committed to support India through the letter
written to the Indian PMO in 2003.
Interestingly, there was a kind shift in India’s
attitude towards the development of Terai, as
construction projects of schools were taken up by India
in accordance with the agreement signed during Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to India that
authorized the Indian embassy to complete projects
costing up to NRs. 30 million directly in consultation
with the District Development Office of Nepal under
revolving fund provided by India. This was really a
blessing as dozens of schools, which were in dire need
of their old buildings to be reconstructed, were built to
provide education to the youth. Gradually, such projects
were also taken up in hill and high mountain regions.
The scheme is still continuing.

Chapter-4
THE PERIOD OF
MAINTAINING RELATIONS �2004�2014�
It is a period when a non-political leading figure
led India and Nepal suffered extreme instability. Dr.
Manmohan Sinh was chosen as Prime Minster of India
in 2004 by the then Congress President Sonia Gandhi
when her party emerged as the single largest party in
the House of Representatives (Lok Sabha). He led the
government for ten years. He was the Finance Minister
in the P. V. Narashimha Rao government and steered
the economy by his liberal policy with his experience
as the Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission, and
also as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
At the time of Dr. Singh became Prime Minister in
2004, Nepal was going through the Maoist insurgency,
which was a matter of prime concern for India. The
Maoists and the State were fighting to finish each other
by continuously engaging themselves in inflicting
severe military losses to each other by augmenting arm
supplies from different sources. However, the supplies
of arms and ammunitions to the army were on held by
India, the US and the UK since February 1, 2005 after

the King took over the reins of the kingdom by forming
the cabinet under his own chairmanship. Only during the
first week of July 2005, the first shipment of non-lethal
arm supply consisting of 20 military jeeps, bulletproof
jackets, and Mine-Protected Vehicles etc. had reached
from India and the US army had resumed training to
army personnel.15 The clashes between the army and the
Maoists continued unabated forcing innocent people to
bear the brunt of the civil war for the last nine years.
It was commonly held that the prolonged insurgency
in Nepal had become a thorny issue for India too. The
Maoist activities in Nepal adjoining areas like Sitamarhi,
Sheohar and East Champaran and other districts of Bihar
were alarming. It was believed that about one hundred
and seventy five districts of the nine states of India were
affected by the activities of Indian Naxals and PWGs,
who were having links with the Nepalese Maoists. Hence
it seemed imperative for the government of India to take
suitable measures for curbing activities of the Nepalese
Maoists. However, it was reported that Nepalese leaders
used to meet the Maoist leaders at several places such
as Siliguri, Lucknow and Delhi. Even Dr. Baburam
Bhattarai, a one-time supremo of the party, used to
stay and discuss with Indian and Nepalese leaders in
Delhi. It was also held that because of the open border,
the Maoists took advantages of not only taking shelter
in India when pressure was mounted on them by the
security personnel in Nepal but also took replenishment
of arms and ammunitions from there.
The Indian security concern overshadowed the
diplomatic approach, as it was hardly assured of by
Nepal. It resulted in a deviation in Indian approach
of dealing with the then establishment. The Indian
diplomacy suffered further setback when the King sought
Chinese membership of SAARC at Dhaka Summit.
15. Mishra,THT, 6.7. 2005.

These two factors might have prompted India to deal
with the Maoists cautiously that took so much time in
getting them above board by making it a signatory to the
12-Point Understanding with the Seven-Party Alliance
of Nepal in November 2005 in India. Curiously, the
Nepalese parties claimed to have negotiated with the
Maoists themselves without any assistance from India.
Prime Minister Singh was often alleged to be
indifferent to Nepal, as he never visited the country during
his ten-year long tenure, despite the fact that different
Nepalese Prime Ministers visited India from time to time.
During his period, there were changes of guard about a
dozen times in Nepal. There were transitions from the
elected government to the direct rule of the King and from
restoration of democracy to the election to the Constituent
Assembly and from the monarchy to the republic. Also,
perhaps, owing to his bureaucratic temperament, Singh
followed indirect diplomacy. Foreign Ministers were
made to visit Nepal often. Natwar Singh was sent to Nepal
within weeks of his assuming the charge of the Ministry
of External Affairs in 2004. Before the CPM withdrew
support to the United Progressive Alliance government
in 2008, Communist Party of India-Marxist leader,
Sitaram Yechury happened to be the link between the
Nepalese political parties and the Ministry. Thereafter, a
group of three Congress MPs, under the leadership of the
Congress general secretary Digvijya Singh, had visited
Nepal to acquaint themselves with the political situation.
Later, Pranab Mukherjee, having been appointed as the
Foreign Minister, visited Nepal in November 2008.
Second Inning of PM Singh:

During the second inning of Dr. Manmohan Singh
as Prime Minister of India, the Indian External Affairs
Minister S. M. Krishna paid his first visit to Nepal

from January15 to 17, 2010.16 He had meetings with
all high ranking dignitaries, discussing political issues
with his Nepalese counterpart, signed five Memoranda
of Understanding and got released a joint communiqué
accepting terrorism and extremism as a common threat
for both the countries apart from dwelling on ways to
enhance security measures to control smuggling of fake
Indian currency notes, and cross-border crimes etc.
He also met the president of the UCPN-Maoist
Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ who got a chance to
put forward his demands before him, as his demand was
to have direct talk with New Delhi for abrogating treaties
like the 1950 Treaty on the one hand and indirectly
seeking India’s favour for his reinstatement as Prime
Minster on the other, on the basis of the people’s mandate
for the change of leadership after the CA election.
However, his visit could hardly bring any significant
change in the political standoff. After the first Constituent
Assembly election, the Maoist government led by its
leader ‘Prachanda’ resigned as his dismissal order of
the then CoAS, Rukmangad Katwal, was overruled by
President Ram Baran Yadav. The Maoists held India
responsible for obstructing their endeavour to capture
state powers by removing the CoAS strategically. They
took recourse to the old slogans related to nationalism,
cancellation of the 1950 Treaty and declaration of Zone
of Peace raised by the monarchy during the Panchayat
days to sideline the democratic forces and the people
who were clamouring for democracy and equal rights.
They did not hesitate in showing China card as well.
Thus, they tried to exert political pressure on India on
the one hand and sought dialogue with it on the other,
by placing India in a fix as India wanted political leaders
16. Ibid, S. M. Krishna’s visit to Nepal, THT, 25.1.2010.

to act as per expediency. Ironically, the 1950 Treaty
proved its effectiveness, which allowed the Nepalese
people to cross over the border to save their lives along
with young kids during the Maoist insurgency.
Before the second three-day (April 20-22, 2011)
visit of S. M. Krishna, Foreign Secretary Nirupama
Rao had visited Nepal in the last week of January 2011.
During this visit FM Krishna was confined to his meetings
with the political dignitaries alone. There was change of
guard in Nepal. However, he laid the foundation stone
of the integrated customs office at Birgunj. Apparently,
the main purpose of Krishna’s visit was to have dialogue
with the new establishment, as the chemistry of the
government had drastically changed. In place of M. K.
Nepal and his coalition partners, J. N. Khanal, who too
was a CPN-UML leader, was heading the coalition with
the UCPN-Maoist as the sole partner having the largest
number of members in the CA. During his meeting with
P. M. Khanal, while extending invitation for India visit
to the PM, he sought approval of the extradition treaty
and check on the smuggling of fake Indian currency
notes. He also raised the issue of showing black flag to
Indian envoy. Moreover, the three-hour-long meeting
with UCPN-Maoist chairman P. K. Dahal ‘Prachanda’
acquired significance. It was believed that the Indian
diplomacy succeeded only partially. It could not
change the mindset of Prachanda towards India, as the
breakthrough was impossible since Prachanda himself
suffered from the Indian interference twice: first, while
dismissing the former CoAS Katwal and secondly, in
his failure to get himself elected as PM.
Interestingly, Krishna’s visit also invited a
controversy over meeting CoAS Gurung, whom he had
met last time too. The Indian foreign secretary too had

met him during her last visit. He was reported to have
advised all stakeholders to keep the army neutral and
professional. His advice was taken unkindly by some
quarters, as usual by raising questions like, was he right
in meeting the CoAS? Had he gone out of his way in
advising so? As per practice, the CoAS of each country
is the honorary army chief of the other’s.
Finally, the outcome of the visit seemed to be more
than what met the eye. Krishna succeeded in convincing
Prachanda to pave the way for Dr. Baburam Bhattarai
to head the government, as Prachanda was himself
a contender as per agreement between Khanal and
Prachanda to head the government in turn. In reality,
Prime Minister Khanal was proved ineffective as Prime
Minister by the agitation of the Nepali Congress and
the prolonged election to choose his successor due to
the neutrality of his party, the UML, in the voting, in
which Prachanda was himself a candidate against Ram
Chandra Paudel of the Nepali Congress. Ultimately,
Prachanda allowed Bhattarai to contest the election
who became PM by winning election with support
from Madhesi outfits in August 2011. The tenure of
the CA was amended till it was fixed by the Supreme
Court to last till May 29, 2012. Unfortunately, the CA
was dissolved during Bhattarai’s tenure as PM without
delivering any constitution.
India’s new External Affairs Minister Salman
Khurshid visited Nepal on July 9, 2013.17 Though
the visit was hardly for nine hours, it stormed the
almost calm political atmosphere whose dust took
considerable time to settle down. During his visit,
the Minister had hectic engagements. He visited his
counterpart, foreign Minister Madhav Prasad Ghimire
17. Ibid, Salman Khurshid’s visit, THT, 22.7.2013.

and discussed bilateral issues. He also made courtesy
calls on the president and the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers. Two letters were exchanged regarding
India’s logistic support for the security agencies and
the Election Commission. A cheque of Rupees 800
millions covering the cost of 764 vehicles of different
kinds was handed over to the government.
His visit happened when the CA election to be
held on November 19 was looming large due to the
constitutional and political challenges to be met in
a limited time frame and the uncertainty over the
participation of the 33-party forum led by the CPN
(Maoist). Against this backdrop, his meetings with some
former Prime Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers in
a hotel were made the issue of status of protocol. The
issue attracted the attention of print and electronic media
greatly. As per the international convention the status
of a former Prime Minister is equal to that of a sitting
cabinet minister, the media ignorantly took the leaders
to task for not adhering to the protocol.
Curiously, the purpose and effectiveness of the
visit were marginalized as some questions remained
unanswered. Was the visit required at all? Had it anything
to do with the last visit of the Chinese State Counselor
to Nepal? Was not the Indian ambassador enough to
deliver the message of his government to hold the next
CA election on the date announced earlier? The necessity
of holding election to end the lingering transition and
adopt the people’s constitution was needed more for
Nepal than its neighbours.

Chapter-5
THE PERIOD OF SLIDING RELATIONS �2014��

This period covers the apparent changes brought
about the Nepal-India relations by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi who started his inning extraordinarily.
His oath-taking ceremony was unique. The policy he
adopted was different from the past, as he mixed his
spirituality with foreign policy showing a hegemonic
tint. His diplomacy in Nepal can be divided into three
parts. The first part covers the period (2014 to 2015)
starting with his oath taking ceremony to the passing
of the new constitution in Nepal and the economic
blockade. The second part covers the period (2016 to
2018) after the blockade to mid-2020, and the third part
deals with his regional relations.
Part-1
Beginning of his Neighbourhood policy
There has been a general complain of the Indian
hegemonic attitude towards Nepal. Surprisingly, PM
Modi began a unique diplomacy, apparently in the form
of cooperative cum hegemonic, with his swearing in
as the 15th Prime Minister of India on May 26, 2014.
His election as Prime Minister was only a matter of
formality as he was already designated much earlier
as the Prime Ministerial candidate to spearhead the
national election campaign. The oath-taking ceremony
was unusually delayed. It could have been caused
for want of an auspicious moment to take the oath.
Some serious issues like distribution of portfolios
among the coalition allies and within its own party
and also his personal involvement in the selection of
his successor in his home state of Gujarat. Perhaps,
the most important reason was his decision to invite
heads of the state and government of South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at
the ceremony and to give sufficient time to them for
making arrangements for their visits.
The unusual invitation to the SAARC dignitaries
by India requires evaluation. The visits of the SAARC
leaders had definitely some positive and negative
points. Positively, it could be named as mini Delhi
SAARC Summit as all its leaders had assembled there
to interact with the new leader of India. No doubt, it
had provided an opportunity for all leaders to know
each other better. On the part of India, perhaps, PM
Modi wanted to show the SAARC leaders how in a
democracy, pluralism and unity in diversity could
coexist, how Indian leaders could wear different
dresses and speak in different languages on formal
occasions too, as there was no regimentation regarding
dresses and languages. He might have intended to have
person-to-person contact with each leader and also
have interest in acquainting himself with the bilateral
problems, a member country had with India. Since he
did not know the SAARC leaders well so far, as he
was confined to his state alone, he would have availed
himself the opportunity to know them.
Negatively, he failed to distinguish between
domestic and external contexts of the event. The
swearing in ceremony was not really a change of
regime; it was rather only the transfer of power from
one party to another and one coalition government
to another. The same National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) coalition had reoccupied the position, which
it had enjoyed for six years only ten years ago. Of
course, it has come with substantial seats in the House.
It had lost the power unexpectedly in 2004 election
and had failed to recover it even in 2009 election.
Perhaps, this was the reason to celebrate the occasion
with such grandeur.
Secondly, it seemed to overlook the position of
most of the countries, which had constrained bilateral
relations with India. Some countries had to crack a
hard nut before taking a final decision to accept the
invitation. It might have put those countries in a fix
to accept or reject the invitation outright. If it was
accepted, it looked like just following the order;
if rejected, it might have invited bitterness in the
relation. To invite heads of the state or government
at a swearing ceremony and attending the ceremony
are really too impractical to be practiced. Actually
all countries deserved thanks for having shown
magnanimity in participating in the event.
Importantly, the position of the invitee is always
precarious, as any invitation from a superior or a
stronger friend becomes an order or a compulsion.
Apparently, to get invited by India or China is an
honor, but in reality, it is a compulsion. Nepal cannot
afford to refuse. These days, China has been inviting
Nepal to attend its opening or closing ceremonies of
exhibitions and Nepal attends without asking for the
presence of its counterparts from China.18
18. Mishra, Psychology of Invitation, Republica, 26.6.2014.

First Visit to Nepal
PM Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Kathmandu on
the 3rd and 4th of August 2014 had really created a state of
euphoria. It was his first visit as Prime Minister but second
in respect of number as he had visited Kathmandu a few
years ago as well. He was in Kathmandu for about thirty
hours. However, he utilized the opportunity by leaving
lasting impressions of his personality on the common
masses. He was perceived to have won the hearts and
minds of the people as he tried his best to explain Indian
stances on several crucial issues, which they had expected
from him. By implication, he succeeded in erasing some
misconceptions about his views on institutionalizing the
achievements of the People’s movement-2 and some
long-standing controversial issues.
No visit is made without any purpose. His visit
sent some explicit and implicit messages. He delivered
the explicit message himself through his address to
the Constituent Assembly (CA). Accepting the gap
of 17 years in the visits of two Indian heads of the
government, he assured that it would not happen in the
future. With his skill of oration, while touching upon
the so-called controversial issues, he mesmerized all
listeners including members of the CA/parliament.
He dealt with the issue like the revision of the treaty
of Peace and Friendship of 1950, the confirmation of
Lumbini as the birthplace of Buddha, sovereignty of
Nepal, no interference by India, no receiving of power
and water free of costs and offering cooperation in the
development of Nepal. He admired the Maoists for
discarding the politics of bullets and adopting the path of
ballots as a means to social and political transformation.
And politely he advised the members to complete
the task of adopting the new constitution on time. He

cautioned them to adopt a constitution to be accepted by
all with a vision of a sage or saint (Rishiman) to avoid
any confusion and conflict in the future.
The implicit message was that he was not prepared
to address the bilateral issues pending for years. It
seemed that he, immediately after becoming Prime
Minister of India in May 2014, had decided to offer
prayers to Pasupatinath in Kathmandu on any Monday
in the auspicious month of Shravan (between mid-July
and mid-August). To actualize his dream, there were
two alternatives before him: to request the Government
of Nepal to make arrangement for his visit or to get
invitation from it. He chose to invite the Nepalese
PM first to get his invitation in return. Since to invite
him alone at the earliest was not considered proper
diplomatically, he, therefore, invited all the heads of
the government/state of the countries of SAARC region
to attend his swearing-in ceremony. PM Sushil Koirala
availed himself the opportunity of visiting India. In
return, he invited PM Modi to visit Nepal. He accepted
the invitation and landed in Kathmandu on Sunday to
offer his prayers on Monday. Though the prime motive
of his visit was religious, it was treated as political and
a special one, as his meetings with the president, leaders
of all political parties and his address to the Constituent
assembly were included in his itinerary.
Finally, the visit appeared to be a sign of immature
diplomacy.19 It was really an unprepared visit, as India
failed to comprehend the situation prevailing in Nepal.
Perhaps, Prime Minister Modi followed the aggressive
posture by overlooking the draft for power trade
agreement sent by Nepal in 2010 and instead a new
draft of Agreement of Cooperation on power sector was
19. Ibid. Modi’s Visit to Nepal, THT, 12.8.2014.

sent to Nepal, which proved a red rag to the bull for the
Nepalese leaders. They vehemently opposed it. Foreign
Minister Sushama Swaraj’s visit to Nepal formalized
the visit but failed to push ahead the thorny issues. She
returned back with the first hand impressions from the
horse’s mouth by meeting all political leaders except
the CPN-Maoist on the complex issues. As per her
feedback on the sensitive points, Prime Minister Modi
took up with them appropriately in his address to the
CA cum Parliament subsequently.
During the visit, no agreement was signed on power
trade and power development project except modest
agreements on the continuity of supplying iodized salt,
cooperation between Doordarsan and Nepal television.
There was also an exchange of notes between the two
governments to expedite preparation for the execution
of Pancheshwor Multipurpose Project to be started
within a year. (Sadly, the project report could not be
finalized during his two-day meeting on February 27
and 28, 2019 and is still pending.) The thirty-five-point
joint communiqué was made exhaustive to include
setting up a Boundary Working Group to address
border disputes, etc. Since there was no spectacular
achievement of the visit, PM Modi made his visit
memorable and laudable by offering a soft loan of one
billion US dollar to Nepal to be spent on developing
infrastructures and hydropower as per its own priority,
which confirmed his keen interest in the development
of Nepal with an explicit message to the world over.
Second Visit for SAARC Summit

PM Narendra Modi visited Kathmandu for the
second time within four months to attend the 18th
SAARC summit held on November 26 and 27, 2014.

Perhaps, knowing it well the date of SAARC summit,
he had promised to visit Kathmandu breaking the gap of
17 years of previous visit of any Indian Prime Minister.
He, thus, kept his word by coming over to Kathmandu
showing himself different from his predecessors.
Actually there was a gap of 12 years only as then Prime
Minster AB Vajpayee, the first BJP Pri me Minister,
had visited Nepal during the SAARC summit in 2002.
He showed his shrewdness by not accepting the reality
that there had been 23 times change of guard in Nepal
during the last 24 years (1990, the year of people’s
movement-1 to 2014.)
Ironically, both his visits to Nepal had commenced
when Nepal was in a grip of serious political crisis as
the process of framing a new constitution was stalled
due to lack of consensus among the major political
parties. The politics was polarized in the CA on their
well-defined stands. One group, which was led by the
parties in power with nearly two-thirds majority in the
House, wanted to adopt the constitution without taking
any notice of the ethnic identities of the indigenous
communities while carving out provinces in the process
of state restructuring on the one hand and preferred to
divide Madhes Pradesh (province) against the wishes of
the Madhes-based parties, on the other. Another group,
which was led by the UCPN-Maoist, had just an opposite
view, i. e, caste-based identities to be the basis of state
restructuring and Madhes Pradesh to remain undivided.
Ambiguous Speeches
Interestingly, the major part of PM MOdi’s previous
speech in the CA was delivered in Hindi. Apparently,
some leaders failed to follow the contents of his speech
properly or deliberately started distorting it to suit their

stands in the CA. His counseling seemingly produced
different effects on the leaders. Some held that he was
in favor of forming provinces not on the basis of north-
south divide but on the basis of taking together all three
geographic regions in all provinces. Naturally, they were
very enthusiastic that his statement clearly showed a clear
departure from India’s stance of single Madhes issues. On
the contrary, some leaders took it in a different way.20
His first speech in the CA continued to echo in
political circles till he delivered his second speech
while inaugurating the Trauma Centre (built by India in
2008) jointly by Prime Minister Sushil Koirala on 25th
November 2014. While inaugurating the Trauma centre
he advised the leaders in a very simple way to adopt a
constitution, which could address the aspirations of all
people: Madhesis, Paharis (people of Hill origin) and
the Maoists to make them feel their ownership of the
new constitution. Of course, he cautioned the leaders
that if the new constitution did not come on time or
was not adopted on time it might create problems for
the country. Some parties, who were dismayed by
his previous expression, became happy that he had
approved their views. Some leaders went to the extent
of calling it as interference in the internal matter of the
country since drafting a constitution was an internal
matter of the country.
His Concern for Madhes

Significantly, Prime Minister Modi’s suggestion
was based on the demands made by the Madhesi
community, which is the real link between the two
countries through age-old open border dispensation.
The community is having marital relations with the
20. Ibid, Mixed Bag, , Republica, 21.10 2014 s visits to Nepal, THT,2/12/2014.

people of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and has Maithili,
Bhojpuri, Abadhi as their mother tongues and Hindi
as their common language. The ruling elite of
Kathmandu never addressed their political aspirations.
The issue of federation, which was incorporated in the
Interim Constitution, 2007 by the Madhes movement
costing dozens of lives, continued to persist. Despite
the continued agitation and the loss of precious lives
of protesters, the main parties, the Nepali Congress,
the CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist adopted the new
constitution without any detailed deliberation on
September 20, 2015. The suppression of protesters
by the security agencies compelled the protesters to
block the main line of supply of materials from India
to Nepal by staging sit-in protest on the Dashgaja (the
ten-yard no man’s land) between Raxaul and Birgunj
and many other points too at the international border.
However, some of them were withdrawn later. The
responses from the people and the government of
India were helpful.
It was generally believed that the Modi government
might have restricted supplies of goods to Nepal for five
reasons. First, the government did not defer the adoption
of the new constitution to consider the demands of the
disgruntled groups as suggested by India. Secondly, it
helped directly the cause of Madhesi rights. Thirdly, it
shows its displeasure on not declaring Nepal a Hindu
state. Fourthly, it covers its long term planning to hold
control over Nepal’s water resources by forcing the
present government to toe its line. And lastly, it wants
Nepal to address its national interest including the
security concerns in Nepal.
In short, PM Modi’s last visit appeared somewhat
disappointing. First, his visit was marred by the
cancellation of his visits to Janakpur, Lumbini and
Muktinath, which he had committed during his previous
visit. Secondly, it seemed that he could not either
understand the very psyche of the leaders here or take
lessons from his Nepal’s frequent visits with his candid
expressions by confusing politics with diplomacy.21
Part-2
Initiatives for Patching Relations
This part covers his initiatives taken in haste. It started
with the visit of Indian president Pranab Mukherjee22
who gave a new impetus to the Indian diplomacy in
Nepal by opening its jammed doors. India was interested
in restoring its cordial relations with Nepal after the end
of the undeclared economic blockade, which was started
by Madhesi outfits in August 2015, and supported by
India later. The relations deteriorated further when Prime
Minister Oli had to resign in August 2016 paving the way
for the new coalition government led by Sher Bahadur
Deuba of the Nepali Congress. As a result, the visit of
President Bidya Devi Bhandari to India was postponed
abruptly. It was believed that after a long persuasion by
India to restore the relations, the new government invited
the president of India for a state visit.
Indian President’s Visit to Nepal

President Pranab Mukherjee, who was to retire
after completing his five-year tenure, decided to visit
Nepal. He completed his 3-day state visit to Nepal from
November 2 to November 4, 2016 having a very hectic
schedule in Kathmandu covering Janakpur and Pokhara
before flying back to India. During his one and half days
stay in Kathmandu, he met not only his counterpart but
also the PM and senior leaders of Nepali Congress,
21. Ibid, Modi’s Visits to Nepal, THT, 2.12.2014.

22. Ibid. Outcome of the President’s visit, The Statesman, India, 7.11.2016.

the major partner of the coalition government. He was
particular in meeting with the senior leaders of the
CPN-UML who were spearheading the anti-India stand
believing Indian hand behind Oli’s ouster from power.
He also met the prominent leaders of Madhes. He did not
miss the opportunity of shaking hands with intellectuals
and respectable citizens in the Indian embassy premises.
He also participated in the seminar organized by India
Foundation run by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
and other Nepalese organizations indicating India’s
interest in peaceful, stable and prosperous Nepal. Of
course, he expressed India’s intention in harnessing
water resources jointly and called upon Nepal to share
the Indian ‘growth story’. He received the Honorary
D. Litt. Degree conferred upon him at a convocation
ceremony by Kathmandu University where he expressed
the stand of India on peace, stability and prosperity of
Nepal and dwelt upon his own future plan of serving
humanity after his retirement.
President Mukherjee’s visit was to warm up the
Nepal-India relations, which were touching the lowest
level in recent times. Since he had visited Nepal earlier
as the Minister for External Affairs of India, and had
been the trouble-shooter of the Congress party, the
present establishment had chosen the very right person
having acumen, experience and long association with
the Nepalese leaders to untie the Gordian knot of
present diplomatic confusion amidst Chinese aggressive
financial involvement in Nepal limiting the Indian
traditional leverage.
The visit was viewed from different angles. To
some, his visit was ill-timed as it seemed like interfering
in the issue of amendment to the constitution, which was
under consideration when the parties in power and the

main opposition party the CPN-UML, which had been
kicked out of the office, were at daggers drawn position.
The section led by the UML was against the amendment
and did not favor any consideration to the Madhesi
demands, and held India behind these demands fearing
these demands might lead to the division of the country.
On the contrary, the other section appreciated his visit, as
it would facilitate the negotiation in favor of the agitating
parties, since he was well-known to the political leaders,
who might lend their ears to his sound counsel. However,
it was also believed that even if he did not pressurize
the government, his presence in the capital itself was a
message for the present establishment from New Delhi.
Interestingly, after all, why did his government
accept the invitation so promptly and fixed the
schedule for visiting Kathmandu? To put it rightly,
both sides were eager to improve relations at the
earliest, which was marred by the cancellation of the
visit of President Bidya Devi Bhandari to India by the
then Oli-led government.
Significantly, he was the second president to visit
Janakpur after N. Sanjeeva Reddy. It is a religious place
as well as the centre of Madhes politics. Curiously,
no Indian Prime Minster could visit the place except
PM Narendra Modi, who too could not visit Janakpur
during his earlier visit to Nepal, as his programme was
cancelled at the eleventh hour. Perhaps, there seemed to
be a psychology behind restricting the visits of Indian
leaders to Madhes region. In order to facilitate his visit to
Janakpur, his visit to Pokhara might have been included
in his itinerary. In Pokhara, he addressed the ex-Indian
army men at the pension center.

President Bhandari’s India Visit:
After the restoration of supplies from India, Prime
Minister KP Sharma Oli visited India. It was really a
positive step towards normalization of the relations.
President Mukherjee’s visit was planned by India to
revive the old relations. Since the prolonged strained
relations necessitated some positive steps to smoothen
the relations, it began with the diplomacy of continuity of
high-level political visits. President Bidya Devi Bhandari
completed her maiden 5-day state visit to India on April
17, 2017.23 Her earlier visit was cancelled abruptly a
year before by the KP Sharma Oli-led government on
account of alleged Indian involvement in his removal
from prime ministership. President Bhandari was one
of the vice-presidents of the CPN-UML before getting
elected to the highest position in 2015 and was a
close associate of the party chief, Oli. Her visit could
only recover ties affected by the cancellation of her
earlier one. Significantly, after the change of guard in
Kathmandu, Prime Minister PK Dahal ‘Prachanda’
visited New Delhi, which paved the way for President
Pranub Mukherjee’s visit to Nepal. India believes that
the first foreign visit by any Nepalese head of state
and government to India is a diplomatic achievement,
whereas such visits have only cosmetic value.
Hasty Diplomacy
It was evident that PM Modi was in a hurry to
reestablish his communication with the Nepalese
leaders. He congratulated SB Deuba before he assumed
power for the fourth time on June 8, 2017 after a gap of
12 years.24 Interestingly, Modi had also congratulated
23. Ibid, Relevance of Bhandari’s India Visit, The Statesman, 18.4.2017.

24. Ibid, Not much to cheer for Modi in Nepal ties, The Statesman, 5.6.2017.

Deuba’s predecessor Prime Minister PK Dahal
‘Prachanda’ earlier on May 25, 2017 for his success in
holding the first phase of local level elections and hoped
for Nepal’s steadfast move on the path of political
stability and prosperity. Prachanda resigned on May 24,
2017 for paving the way for SB Deuba to succeed him
as per agreement reached between them while forming
coalition. It is normal to congratulate someone on any
victory. However, it seemed unusual to congratulate a
PM who had just completed the first phase of elections
leaving behind more units to be elected.
Curiously, it was difficult to understand whether
PM Modi’s thanks-giving formality to Prachanda was
the execution of his government’s ‘Neighbourhood first’
policy, or was he happy indirectly for Prachanda quitting
the office who took some crucial decisions like awarding
contract for 1200-megawatt Budhigandaki storage
project to China Gezhouba Group Corporation without
any competitive international bidding, sanctioning Tarai
fast track to the Nepal army, which was initially given
to an Indian company and permitting China to study
feasibility of railway track from Kerung (the Tibetan
border point) to Kathmandu and to Lumbini finally.
Again, due to some confusion, Prime Minister
Modi showed his hasty diplomacy by congratulating
early to the ‘would be’ Prime Minister of Nepal.25 It was
the breaking news in Kathmandu, as Radio Nepal, the
government media, announced at 7 pm on January 21
that PM Modi had telephoned CPN-UML chairman K.
P. Sharma Oli at about 4.30 p.m. wishing him a happy
new year 2018 (so late) and congratulated him as the
future Prime Minster. He enquired about the time to
be taken for his formal election to the post of Prime
25. Ibid. Another Pakistan in Nepal, The Statesman, 17.8.2017.

Minister. He also reiterated his standing invitation
to him for visiting India at the earliest. In response,
Chairman Oli too invited PM Modi to visit two religious
places in Nepal: Janakpurdham and Muktinath, which
were his cherished dreams. Coincidently perhaps, on
December 21, 2017, exactly one month back, PM Modi
had congratulated Chairman Oli for the grand success in
parliamentary and provincial elections. He also invited
chairman Oli to visit India and showed his eagerness to
work with him. It was too early to congratulate him, as
the final results by the Election Commission were still
awaited. Of course, he had congratulated PM Deuba for
completing the task of holding elections.
Interestingly, the Indian External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj visited Nepal for two days (February1-
2, 2018). The visit, which was hardly for twenty-four
hours, had really left many questions behind her. The
minister herself told the media persons on her arrival
at the Tribhuvan International airport that she had no
specific agenda for the visit. However, Indian External
Ministry officials claimed her visit as successful. In
Kathmandu, her first engagement was with UML
chairman Oli, which entailed that the main objective of
the visit was to have direct communication with him. Of
course, it was achieved with one-to-one talk and dinner
along with several UML leaders. Some were aghast at
the visit, which was made before the new government
was formed, as her visit could have been made at a more
appropriate time, especially after the new government
would have assumed office so that she could have
congratulated the new PM in person and extend the
invitation to the Prime Minister personally. Was it
meant to communicate the change in India’s stand on
the Nepalese constitution at the earliest without losing
even a day for patching up its difference with Oli?

The left alliance was to form government at the
centre along with six provinces with the massive
mandate it had received leaving one for Madhesis.
However, negotiation between Oli and Prachnada
lingered regarding the choice of leadership and the
merger of these two parties that hanged in balance since
it was announced on October 3, 2017. These two parties
had seats sharing in the elections and were sharing
different positions in the provinces. Perhaps, Prachanda
was doubtful about the verbal commitment of Oli since
he had betrayed Prachanda by not letting him succeed
as PM in turn which was agreed upon by Oli while
contesting election to PM’s post with PM Sushil Koirala
of the Nepali Congress with his support in 2015. He
might have sought guarantee for a befitting post and
reasonable share in the party and government.
Despite the fact that several questions pertaining
to Swaraj’s visit remained unanswered, the final results
of her visit started coming in after a month when PM
Oli government succeeded in getting supports from
both Madhesi outfits, Sanghiya Samajvadi Forum-
Nepal (SSNF) and the Rashtriya Janata Party (RJP)
while seeking the vote of confidence in the House of
Representatives on March 11, 2018. He got 208 votes
against 60 out of 268 vote cast in the House. PM Oli
had 121 votes from his own party, 52 from the Maoist
Centre and the 32 from Madhesi parties and 3 from
independents. PM Oli also negotiated with the SSFN and
the RJP to join his government. Though the SSFN joined
the government, its demand for a kind of guarantee from
the PM on the issue of amending the constitution, the
government accepted their demands in a vague manner.
PM Modi resorted to the diplomacy of pilgrimage by
starting with his pilgrimage to Janakpurdham. His third

two-day state-visit to Nepal (May11-12) commenced
from Janakpur, a ‘Dhama’ by landing there directly from
India. Janakpur, which draws thousands of devotees
every year from India on the birthday of Lord Rama
and on ‘Vivaha Panchami’, the marriage day of Rama
and Sita, was one of the centers of Madhes uprising that
forced Kathmandu to declare Nepal a federal state. It is
now the capital of Madhes Pradesh.
Diplomacy of Religion
PM Modi wanted to visit Janakpur during his visit
to Nepal in 2014, but it was cancelled at the eleventh
hour. His long cherished wish to visit Janakpur, as a
pilgrimage to offer prayers after assuming the office of
Prime Minister of India, was fulfilled after almost four
years by this visit. However, between 2014 and 2018,
Nepal was not the same as it had undergone sea change.
First, structurally Nepal became a duly elected federal
state. Secondly, it faced a devastating earthquake of
April 2015, which killed about 9000 people and injured
thousands and destroyed half a million houses. Thirdly,
it got a new constitution duly adopted by the Constituent
Assembly. Fourthly, seven states came into being.
The first visit of PM Modi was of religious nature as
he had visited in the month of Shravana (July-August),
which is regarded as an auspicious month for offering
prayers to Lord Pashupatinath. However, it was turned
into a political one, as he addressed the then Constituent
Assembly. His second visit was related to the SAARC
Summit in November 2014. His third visit was really
a pilgrimage as he directly reached Janakpurdham and
declared that he had landed there not as a Prime Minister
but as a Prime Pilgrim.
Seemingly, his arrival at Janakpur directly was to
show not only his personal religious sentiment but also
of all Hindus of India towards Janakpur in particular and
Madhes in general. His grant for one billion rupees to
Madhes Pradesh was a friendly gesture towards Madhesis.
It was also a reply to those in Nepal who opposed his
visit in the past by finally visiting Janakpur in support
of Madhes. However, he gave his visit a religious color
also by visiting Muktinath, where the Lord is worshiped
in both Hindu and Buddhist traditions.
Inept Diplomacy
Interestingly, an instance of an inept diplomacy of
India can be observed by the mishandling of a minor issue
of shutting down a camp office of the Indian embassy in
Nepal. The official announcement by the spokesperson
of the Ministry of External Affairs, government of India,
on Monday (May 22, 2018) stating, “Government of
India had already decided to wind up the Camp Office
and re-locate the personnel. This decision was conveyed
by Prime Minister Modi to his Nepalese counterpart
during his visit to Nepal last week” heralded as a victory
of nationalist forces over hegemonic India. The news
of the closing of the field office of the Indian Embassy
established at Biratnagar became the prominent main
headline of all media on May 23 highlighting the
episode. Earlier, Prime Minister Oli announced at the
first Parliamentary Party meeting of the newly formed
the ‘Communist Party of Nepal’ on May 19, 2018 that
the field office of India at Biratnagar would be removed
in the near future, as it had outlived its purposes.
The field office was set up by India after Nepal had
permitted it to open a temporary camp office in Sunsari
District of eastern Nepal in 2008 to issue passes to
Nepalese vehicles to ply on Indian roads in the bordering
regions after devastating Koshi river floods in 2008,

which severely damaged a 17 km stretch of the East-
West highway by changing its course. Previously, it was
established in Sunsari district and was later shifted to a
bigger town Biratnagar in the eastern part of Nepal.
First, there was a long delay on the part of India
in taking decision on closing down the office, as the
repairing work of the damaged part of the Highway was
completed within 3 years. Secondly, the comment of the
Spokesperson that the decision was communicated to the
Nepalese Prime Minster by PM Modi during the latter’s
two-day visit (11-12 May to Janakpur) was too smart.
Perhaps, he was not fully aware of the ramification of
the decision, which was so much important for public
consumption in Nepal. It could have been announced
publicly not to be simply conveyed to the PM of Nepal
and that too without any public announcement by India.
Had this decision been taken before PM Modi visited
Nepal, the External Affairs Ministry of India itself could
have announced it earlier, as Nepal had been repeatedly
drawing India’s attention to this issue. Had this decision
been communicated to PM Oli earlier, he could not
have, perhaps, threatened India, to remove its office at
the earliest to become the national patriot hero.
The closure of the office was taken as a diplomatic
victory of Nepal. It was believed that the temporary
Indian office, which used to issue passes to Nepalese
vehicles for plying on Indian roads outlived its utility
after the damaged portion of the highway was repaired
but was relocated to Biratnagar by the Indian side
unilaterally after realizing the fact the then Nepalese
Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha took up the
issue through diplomatic correspondence with India
to close the office. It was learnt that the Indian side,
not only ignored the repeated drawing of attention by

Nepal on the one hand it lobbied with a section of the
political leadership of Nepal to upgrade the facility into
a consulate, on the other. It began engaging in various
activities including scholarship distributions and even
in gathering intelligence. As the facility was widely
seen as infringing on Nepal’s sovereignty, the then P.
M. Dr. Baburam’s Government in 2011 forwarded two
diplomatic notes to New Delhi seeking removal of the
facility. In early 2018, there was a bomb explosion near
the wall of the building of the office. Some persons were
arrested and the investigation was carried on. However,
it was believed that the elements, which were not happy
with the Indian presence in Biratnagar, had exploded
the bomb as a warning to India to leave Biratnagar
at the earliest. To get popularity, the former foreign
minister and spokesperson of the newly formed party,
the Communist Party of Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha
said that the removal of the office was a historic victory
for the patriotic stand and also congratulated PM Oli
through twitter over the matter. Undoubtedly, it showed
India’s poor diplomacy.
The Row over Land

There is a cartographic standoff between Nepal and
India for about 335sq. km of land on the northwestern
border of Nepal. The issue has again made the then PM
Oli a national hero who spearheaded the issue and got
the map of Nepal modified exerting Nepal’s claim over
the area. Though, the issue was dormant for a long time,
it flared up after India published its map in November
2019 depicting the disputed area as its own territory.
As a result, Nepalese parliament passed unanimously
that the disputed area belonged to Nepal and asked the
government to incorporate the position of the land in its
map in 2020, which was executed promptly.
Significantly, Nepal and India had set up the
Nepal-India Technical level Joint Working Group
in 1981 to resolve boundary issues to demarcate the
international border, and to manage boundary pillars.
By 2007, the group completed the preparation of 182
strip maps signed by the surveyors of the two sides,
covering almost 98% of the boundary, all except the
two disputed areas of Kalapani and Susta. It also
ascertained the positions of 8,533 boundary pillars.
Since the demarcation on Kalapani and Susta areas
have not finalized, the maps are not getting signed by
the designated authorities of both sides keeping the
entire international border uncertain.
Part-3
Regional Relations: SAARC and BIMSTEC
The two major regional fora, SAARC and
BIMSTEC provide opportunity for developing regional
relationship. Curiously, the political conditions, which
were prevalent at the time of formation of SAARC,
have undergone no specific change. There is only one
difference that the cold war does not exist now, which
once used to dominate the world politics. Most of the
nations under SAARC including Nepal were allergic
towards India and were once under American and
Chinese axis. Quoting Gen. Ershad, Jawed Naqvi, a
Delhi-based correspondent of Pakistan’s Dawn daily
rightly summarized the motive behind the formation,
“SAARC began as a childish prank to corner the big
boy in the neighborhood, Gen. Ziaur Rahman who
conceived it and Gen. Hossein Mohammed Ershad
who hosted the first meeting in Dhaka both bore a
baffling grudge against India. We were all allergic to
India in South Asia, so we decided to join hands to deal

with the problem together,” were the words of Ershad,
who said in a TV interview a decade after flagging off
the seven-nation club in 1985. During his interview,
he described Gen. Ziaul Haq, President Junius
Jayawardene, President Maumon Abdul Ghayoom and
King Birendra who joined him at the inaugural session
as the dramatis personae who were as fitted nicely the
description of political allergens and allergies.” He
added further, “Remarkably, India’s detractors had
another thing in common. They were all traditionally
at ease with the United States and China. That is how
the diplomatic cookies crumbled in South Asia during
much of the Cold war.” 26
Genesis of SAARC Formation

Significantly, SAARC was formed only when it was
agreed upon that no bilateral issues would be discussed
in it. India was aware of the intention of its neighbors.
So after a long persuasion, under the leadership of Rajiv
Gandhi, India agreed to participate in the formation
a regional organization. Indira Gandhi was always
reluctant to form such organization, as she knew that
the entire surrounding was under the domination of the
US and China. After Indira Gandhi was assassinated,
Rajiv Gandhi took the reign of the country suddenly
and turned himself from a pilot to a PM. He was young
and almost novice to politics. However, he faced the
challenges of his new assignment and took some bold
steps like calming down the agitations of Punjab and
Assam by signing agreements but also bought super
computer from America to revolutionize the Indian
economy. Spectacularly, on external front, he saved
Maldives from the hands of some hired armed men to
26. The Kathmandu Post (TKP), November 27, 2014.

capture it. Similarly, after signing accord with Sri Lanka
for devolution of power to Tamils, he sent Peace Keeping
Forces there to disarm the Tamil Rebels. Although he
could save himself from the baton charge on his head
from a guard during guard of honor in Colombo, could
not survive the assassination plot of the LTTE.
It was not felt only in the past but is also found that
SAARC is made hostage of India-Pakistan relations. The
19th SAARC summit that was due in Pakistan on October
9-10, 2016 is still on hold. Though Nepal is its sitting
chairman, it has not succeeded in its efforts to convene
the summit. It is difficult to guess whether Pakistan is
also not interested in SAARC summit, as it failed to
get the Chinese status elevated from its observer-ship to
membership of SAARC. Interestingly, the former king
Gyanendra had proposed the membership for China at
Dhaka summit in 2005.
SAARC and PM Modi

PM Modi attended the18th SAARC summit held in
Kathmandu from November 26 to 27, 2014. Its two-day
successful celebrations of the 18th summit had ended with
36-point Kathmandu Declaration on the 27th November
2014. The meet was really concluded gracefully with
the hand shaking by PM Narendra Modi and PM Nawaz
Sharif with special initiative of PM Sushil Koirala who
rightly expressed satisfaction over the success of the
meet, which ended with the seeming reduction of the
bitterness between India and Pakistan. It was expected
that in order to lead SAARC, PM Narendra Modi could
have played his role differently. He could have shown
his saintly mind ‘rishiman’ (which he had suggested in
the Nepalese parliament), especially to Pakistan, at least
in return for his presence at the time of his oath taking

ceremony a few months before. He could have shown
his diplomacy with his Pakistani counterpart, who might
have his own domestic compulsions in cross-border
firing and meeting the Kashmiri separatists
Regionally, India was under pressure to resume
the stalled secretary level regular dialogue, which it
cancelled. The meet was cancelled only four days ahead
of the meet, as Pakistan’s ambassador to India Abdul
Basit met some leaders of Jammu and Kashmir on August
18, 2014. Hence, it was eager to resume the dialogue
with Pakistan. To avoid this embarrassing situation, PM
Modi adopted indirect channel of communication like
expressing telephonically his good wishes to PM Nawaz
Sharif for the cricket team of Pakistan in the coming
Cricket World Cup and informed him of the next visit
by the Foreign Secretary to start dialogue with Pakistan
again. Therefore, Jaishankar’s visit was indirectly
Pakistan-centric and not SAARC- or Nepal-centric.27
SAARC Yatra of Indian Foreign Secretary

To achieve the goal, the then Indian Foreign
Secretary Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited some
countries under his SAARC Yatra (SY), i.e. travel to the
nations of SAARC. He embarked on SY during early
March 2015. He visited Bhutan on March 1, Bangladesh
on March 2, Pakistan on March 3 and Afghanistan on
March 4. Interestingly, his stayed hardly for 24 hours
in these countries, in contrast with his stay in Nepal for
a longer period. Curiously, after visiting four countries,
he winded up his SY only to resume it to cover Nepal
almost after a gap of one month. He resumed his two-
day hectic visit to Kathmandu on April 2 and 3, 2015. He
met all those who were involved in constitution-making
27. Mishra, Long Shadows, Republica, 10.12.2014.

including CA chairman, Subhash Chandra Nembang,
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, PM Shushil Koirala, K. P. Sharma
Oli, and President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav. He also met
Foreign Minister Mahendra Bahadur Panday and his
Nepalese counterpart, Shankar Bairagi and discussed
about the timely implementation of bilateral projects.
He also sought Nepal’s support for India’s candidature
for permanent seat in UN Security Council and also
for non-permanent seat for 2021-22. The calling off of
the proposed nation-wide general strike on April 2 by
the 30-party alliance led by the UCPN-Maoist made
his visit successful as he could convey the message
that India was for early constitution promulgation
with all stakeholders on board to institutionalize the
achievements of the peace process.
The one-month gap in resuming the travel indicated
that either Nepal did not deserve India’s priority in
its foreign policy or it required special attention of
the highest-level diplomat, which was not possible
in continuation of his SY in March itself. It might
have been delayed as the deadlock in writing of the
new constitution was continuing, which he wanted to
avoid. In the context of ongoing inconclusive dialogue
between the leaders, his visit was seen differently.
One section viewed his visit fruitful, while others
considered his advice as interfering in the internal
matter of Nepal, which had been the bone of contention
in Nepal-India relations. The earlier view held India’s
role as significant in getting 12-point Understanding
signed by the Maoists and the seven-party alliance in
November, 2005, which resulted in epochal changes
that had taken place in Nepal. Yet to some, his visit
was SAARC-centric by and large.
Broadly, the very name of his visit as ‘SAARC

Yatra’, though appeared inappropriate and concealing,
yet had significance. It seemed inappropriate because
it hardly suited the foreign secretary level official visits
to SAARC countries. It appeared to be concealing,
as it had been intentionally used to hide the very
diplomatic compulsion for the visit of Indian foreign
secretary to Pakistan by making it a part of his series
of visits to different nations under SY that covered
the visit to Pakistan. It was an unpleasant situation
on the part of India to send its foreign secretary to
Pakistan to resume the dialogue cancelled unilaterally
by it earlier just to show a tough posture on dealings
with separatists in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which
turned out different from the stand taken by the
previous government.
Ineffectiveness of SAARC
If, as per the scheduled 19th SAARC summit was
held in Pakistan on November 9 and 10, 2016, Pakistan
would have chaired SAARC after the end of Nepal’s
term. But the summit was cancelled as India and some
other nations refused to participate in the meet. Though
Nepal, as its chair is negotiating with the member
countries, it is still uncertain when the next submit will
take place. In view of the continued strained India-
Pakistan relations, Kathmandu’s limited economic and
diplomatic resources have handicapped its maneuvering
capacity in steering SAARC.
Ironically, India, despite being the main initiator
and major stakeholder, could not come up as its leader.
Of course, it was skeptic about the role of SAARC from
the very beginning, as most of its members were more
or less hostile to it. Its performance was affected by
intermittent ups and downs in Pakistan-India relations.

Critics hold that SAARC was a non-starter as it was
made the hostage of India-Pakistan relations. Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh were the influence of the cold war
syndrome. Even after the restoration of democracy in
Bangladesh, there were changes of government with
every five years. Nepal too was not happy with India.
Indian Regional Leadership

The second regional forum is BIMSTEC that is an
organization of seven members-Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
Initially, it was called BIST-EC as it was formed by
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand through the
Bangkok declaration on June 6, 1997. It was renamed
as BIMST-EC when Myanmar joined the block on
December 22, 1997 at the ministerial meeting held in
Bangkok. It was rechristened BIMSTEC when Nepal
and Bhutan joined the organization in February 2004 at
the 6th ministerial meeting hosted by Thailand. It seems
that the formation of the regional block was planned to
link the countries situated on the Bay of Bengal with sea
navigation facilities under India’s ‘Look East’ policy
and presently under ‘Act East policy’. The inclusion
of Nepal and Bhutan was in the interest of India
which wanted to form a separate regional subgroup to
positively affect connectivity.
It was started in 1997 with six sectors: trade,
technology, energy, transport, tourism and fisheries as
its objectives to be attained by sharing and accelerating
growth through co-operation in the areas of common
interests using regional resources and geographical
advantages. Now the areas of common interests have
increased to 16 by adding Blue Economy and Mountain
Economy in addition to Agriculture, Climate Change,

Culture, Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crimes,
Energy, Environment and Disaster Management,
Fisheries, People-to-People Contact, Poverty Alleviation,
Public Health, Technology, Trade and Investment,
Transport and Communication and Tourism.
Its 15th ministerial level meeting was held on
August 11, 2017 in Kathmandu with the decision
to conclude Free Trade Agreement and Grid
Interconnection at the earliest.28 The Indian External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and junior foreign
ministers of Thailand, Myanmar attended the meet.
The then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, while
inaugurating the ministerial meet, hoped that the meet
would endorse the regional cooperation framework on
trade, investment and connectivity. He stressed that in
this age of globalization and economic interdependence
regional cooperation was not a choice but compulsion.
He, thus, called upon the member states “BIMSTEC to
give due attention to the different needs of its members
in order to be effective as a regional grouping.”
Indian Leadership
To get rid of the neighborhood hostility, especially
to keep Pakistan out of the conglomeration, and in
accordance with India’s ‘Look East’ policy adopted by the
then PM PV Narsimha Rao, the concept of a sub-regional
cooperation was mooted. However, not to displease
Pakistan, its boundary of south Asia was extended to
the east by including two ASEAN nations, Thailand
and Myanmar making BIMSTEC possible. However,
BIMSTEC with its two decades of history too could not
come up to the expectations of the member states.
28. Ibid. Region needs more from India, The Statesman, 17. 8.2017.

Unfortunately, India does not play a pivotal role
in SAARC and BIMSTEC despite being the largest
democracy and the biggest economy in the region.
Perhaps, its internal political compulsions and
personality clashes are responsible for it. Sometimes
it seems that there was no Indian policy, only parties’
policy, as one party was ready to undo what earlier
regime had done. With its rapid economic growth,
India’s policy of ‘look East’ got impetus under
Narshimha Rao. Dr. Manmohan Singh tried his best to
improve India’s relations with Bangladesh, but failed,
as the Teesta water sharing agreement was opposed
by one party, which was led by Mamta Banerjee, the
Chief Minister of West Bengal and the passing of the
Land Boundary agreement obstructed by another major
party, the BJP. Though India’s image was tarnished in
the interest of the BJP, it was made up when it came
to power by getting it through in parliament. Sadly,
PM Modi’s criticism of previous Indian PMs for not
visiting Nepal during the last 17 years, during his
address to the Nepalese parliament was appreciated
locally, as if he were not the part and parcel of the
Indian establishment. Thus the domestic interests
prevail in maintain its bilateral relations.
Indian Leadership in BIMSTEC

PM Modi made his 4th visit to Nepal to participate
in the 4th BIMSTEC summit held in Kathmandu,
on August 30 and 31, 2018. During the summit, he
showed his profound inclination to play a greater role
in strengthening the grouping in the days to come.
He offered dozens of scholarships to researchers,
students and professors at different academic centers
and Universities. He promised to establish a Centre
for Bay of Bengal Studies at Nalanda University. He
invited BIMSTEC members to participate in the India
Mobile Congress to be held in October. He was hosting
International Buddhist Conclave and was ready to host
BIMSTEC Start-up Conclave to engage entrepreneurs of
the region. He was interested in organizing other events
like, BIMSTEC Youth Summit, Youth Water Sports
Event, Band Festival and Second Disaster Management
Exercises. Significantly, he did not forget to invite all
member countries to participate in all these events. It was
felt as if he was more in an election mode distributing
sops to the voters, instead of being interested in making
the organization vibrant despite its slow pace.
Sadly, the event of BIMSTEC joint Military drills
with a strategy, which was to be organized in Poona
(India) from September 10 to 16 September 2018 (for
six days), was made a political issue in Nepal, as it
withdrew its participation in the event. The event was
arranged in consultations with all stakeholders of all
member states and preparation and participation were
smooth. A team of the Nepal army had reached there
to make arrangements of the event. The new CoAS
was ready to leave for Poona as per schedule. But it
suddenly took a political turn and Nepal withdrew
from its participation holding that BIMSTEC was not a
military set-up. Significantly, Thailand joined the event
only as an observer.

Chapter-6
THE INTERVENED RELATIONS

PM Modi’s effort to revive the sliding down of
relations has met with stumbling block in the form of
a Counter-Diplomacy of China and Pakistan playing
significant role in neutralizing Indian diplomacy in Nepal.
Against the India’s hasty overtures to bridge the gap of
understanding between the two governments its diplomacy
was being checkmated by China and Pakistan.
Counter Diplomacy of Election

In Nepal, the successful elections to local levels
units paved the way for simultaneous elections to
Provincial Assemblies and the Federal Parliament
in two phases, one on November 26 and another on
December 7, 2017 under First-Past-the-Post system. In
the first phase, elections for 37 parliamentary seats and
74 assembly seats in 32 districts were conducted and in
the second phase, elections for 128 parliamentary and
256-assembly seats in 45 districts were held.
Uniquely, only two major alliances dominated the
electoral scenario. The first was the communist alliance
constituted by the Communist Parties of Nepal-UML,
the Maoist Centre (MC) and some fringe communist

parties. The MC joined the anti-government coalition
without leaving the coalition government led by the
Nepali Congress (NC). The left alliance fought the
election broadly on the anti-Indian platform and was
against the constitution amendment. The second was
democratic alliance led by the NC, which headed the then
government. The parties under this alliance were two
Rashtriya Prajatantra Parties supporting constitutional
monarchy and were against secularism. It was for
amending the constitution to satisfy those parties who
were not satisfied with the constitution. The plank of
this alliance was anti-communist, as it advocated that the
authoritarian regime of the communists would obstruct
the all-round development of the country.
Strategically, the formation of left alliance was
announced on October 3, 2017 almost after completion
of the third phase of local level elections in September
and also after the announcement of the dates for federal
and provincial assemblies by the government. The Naya
Shakti Party-Nepal (NSPN) led by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai,
ex-PM and one of the founders of the Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist joined the alliance initially, but severed
its relations within ten days of its formation to contest
election on its own symbol. Curiously, the Maoist Centre
continued in the government despite its ministers being
deprived of their portfolios.
With regard to the formation of the left alliance, it
was intriguing as to how Prachanda and Oli came to terms
to form an alliance when they were at daggers drawn
with each other regarding power sharing previously. It
was also presumed that China was steering the whole
exercise. It might have been planning to replace the
coalition government of the NC and the MC led by the
NC, which had dismantled the pro-China UML and MC-
coalition government one year back. Perhaps, China
brought them under one coalition that proved beneficial
as the CPN-UML became the single largest party and
the MC acquired the third position securing almost two-
thirds majority in the House of Representatives.
The crucial role of China was imagined from the
frenzied consultations, which were made to meet some
internal and external designs. During the politburo
meeting and political training of the party on October
7, 2017, Prachanda, accepted to have forged an alliance
with the UML in haste due to ‘extreme pressure and
compulsion’ without any further clarification. To some,
forming a single party after the election was really a distant
goal, but contesting the elections was just half the way
of replacing the Deuba government before the elections.
However, these two parties had their own goalposts. The
MC, which could not fare well in the previous elections,
decided to join the alliance for getting benefit from the
elections and to secure Prachanda’s victory to ensure his
crucial role in the future. Some reasons for the UML’s
initiative to form an alliance were quite obvious. First,
it would head the alliance. Secondly, the ego of its
chairman would be satisfied with Prachanda’s coming
ultimately to work with him. Thirdly, it would receive
MC’s support in local level units. And lastly, it would
help secure majority in the elections.
Purpose of Pakistan PM’s Visit

The visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid
Khaqan Abbasi to Kathmandu (March 5-6, 2018) was
viewed in different contexts including the earlier visit of
Sushama Swaraj, Minister for External Affairs of India,
as its rippling effect continued for a long time.29 Nepal
seemed to have downplayed the visit very tactfully by
announcing the date of the visit only two days ahead
29. Mishra, Thank you for coming, TKP, 16.3.2018.

of the visit to show it a normal visit to congratulate the
newly appointed P. M. KP Sharma Oli, who had taken
the oath of office on February 15, 2018. Of course, it
was not a normal visit, as it had regional dimensions. It
was questioned: Was congratulation needed in person
when it was already done telephonically earlier?
The visit by the Prime Minister of a SAARC member
country was taken in all seriousness by completing all
paraphernalia by the government. Nepal, as the chairman
of this regional block, not only welcomed him but also
listened to him with attention, as it had to act upon.
Pakistan, which was to host the 19th SAARC Summit
and to take the charge of SAARC as the next chairman
in 2016, could not succeed in holding the summit as
India declined to participate in the meet on the ground
of an attack by Pakistan at its army base in the Uri
sector of Jammu and Kashmir. Some other regional
countries including Nepal backed India. Against this
backdrop, it was natural for Pakistan to get the process
restarted as early as possible that remained stalled so
far. Its desire to host the next Summit was confirmed
by Bishnu Rimal, Chief advisor to PM Oli, who said,
“Both the leaders have agreed to sort out issues through
mutual consultations if any dispute arises in the SAARC
process.” It was a challenge for Nepalese diplomacy to
have negotiation with India and Pakistan to find out a
way to restart the process, as a new stable government
was in place in Nepal after ending the period of political
transition. Nepal seemed to be in a position to influence
India to come to the negotiation table, as India had to
listen to Nepal in the new geopolitical context.
Moreover, the visit acquired more significance,
as it followed the Indian Minister for External Affairs
Sushma Swaraj’s two-day visit to Nepal (February 2-

3). Curiously, these two visits contrasted each other, as
Indian Minister Swaraj visited before PM Oli took the
oath of office and PM Abbas came after twenty days
of PM Oli’s swearing in ceremony. It was presumed
that PM Abbasi’s visit had been planned with a view to
neutralizing Swaraj’s influence, if any at all, on the new
Nepalese establishment.
Perhaps, the PM Abbasi visit was hardly an urgent
national need for Pakistan, as it had been facing its
internal political turmoil. It might have been planned
to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand since
it was fed-up with Indian stand on no negotiation with
it, Pakistan was interested in having a substitute by
forming another political and economic block with
China and Nepal to reduce the importance of India in
Nepal, on the other. He might have visited Nepal as per
Chinese advice to gauge the effects of Swaraj’s visit to
Nepal, especially with regard to Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), of which Nepal is also a signatory.
Despite China’s repeated reminders, Nepal had been
allegedly delaying in providing details of the projects
to China, which it wanted to construct under BRI on
priority basis. The visit might have been arranged to
convince Nepal if it had any doubt about the economic
effect of BRI. Notwithstanding the demerits, Pakistan
might have highlighted the benefits of China Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) as well. He might have
suggested similar economic corridor for Nepal too.
Significantly, the Pakistan Embassy in Nepal was
engaged in presenting the benefits, which Pakistan
had been deriving under CPEC, to different groups of
Nepalese intelligentsia.
Interestingly, the Visit of PM Abbasi could also
be looked into in the context of Indian PM Modi’s

congratulations to PM Oli. The Indian PM had
congratulated him twice before his appointment and
once after assuming the office. Indian Minister Swaraj,
during her visit to Nepal, had her first engagement in
Kathmandu with UML chairman Oli to have direct
communication with him. Significantly, the outcomes of
foreign dignitaries’ visits to Nepal were known later on.
PM Oli’s Cosmetic Delhi Visit

The real outcome of the second three-day state visit
to India (April 6-9, 2018) of PM. K. P. Sharma Oli was
finally known by his visit to China in June.30 However,
PM Oli diplomatically claimed his visit successful and
fruitful at the airport while talking to the media persons
by referring to the point 2 of the joint statement issued
in Delhi, “The two prime ministers resolved to work
together to take bilateral relation to a newer height on
the basis of equality, mutual trust, respect and benefit.”
Perhaps, the inclusion of these terms like equality,
mutual trust and respect in the joint communiqué made
him hold his head high as he had assured the parliament
before embarking on India visit in his usual nationalistic
rhetoric, “There will be no agreements that go against
national interests like sovereignty, nationalism and
lowering down our heads disgracing our country.”
Significantly, despite Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar
Gyawali’s assertion that no new agreements would
be signed, and the implementation of the previous
agreements would only be specifically emphasized, the
three new agreements signed during the visit added a
feather in Oli’s cap.
Apparently, the visit itself did not take the Nepal-
India relations to a new height but actually sought
30. Mishra, To newer heights, TKP, 9.4.2018.

commitment of both sides to reach it. Of course, the visit
was, indeed, a step towards removing misunderstanding
and building mutual trust, as both sides avoided to
discuss the points of disagreement and deliberately did
not include several crucial issues in the communiqué.
In contrast to his last so-called successful six-day
(February 18-24, 2016) state-visit to India, which had
ended without any joint statement, the latest visit was
definitely better. The visit succeeded in opening the
door of opportunity. However, Modi’s no proper reply
to the queries raised by him regarding the delays in
implementing earlier agreements and completing the
projects under construction, created doubts that the
agreements signed previously and the projects under
construction had hardly drawn India’s proper attention.
The complexities of Nepal-India relations are
inherent in psychological perception and physical or
geographic situation. The latest visit of PM Oli reflected it
glaringly. It seemed as if there were no misunderstanding
and if there was any real misunderstanding at all, it was
painted as resolved diplomatically.
PM Oli’s China visit

PM Oli's visit to China commenced just within
two months of his assuming office with the backing
of a massive public mandate of two-thirds majority in
parliament and had spectacular victories in local level
and provincial elections, and had a firm commitment
from China for its full financial support under the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) to develop infrastructure,
which Nepal had been craving for.
PM Oli's visit to China showed the final result of
his India visit to all. PM Oli had played his card well
by visiting India first in line with the old practice. This
satisfied the traditional ego of India, which believed
its superiority to another country if the new prime
minister visited India first. Against PM Oli’s several
commitments to China during his last visit when
Nepal’s relations with India were at their lowest point,
it was to be seen as to how he cared for the Chinese
concerns, as strong relations needed taking serious note
of each other’s vital concerns.
It seems that the road to Beijing was through Delhi
for PM Oli’s visit to China. Nepalese Foreign Minister
Pradeep Gyawali had planned to leave for China earlier
before PM Oli visited India, which was really hastened.
Naturally, his visit was delayed, as he had to accompany
his PM during his three-day state visit to India (April 6-
8, 2018). Foreign Minister Gyawali’ s visit to China,
which took place within ten days of the PM Oli’s visit
to India, was his first official visit after assuming the
office of Foreign Minister. He met Chinese vice-
president Wang Qishan and Foreign Minister Wang Yi
on April 18, 2018 and had joint press conference with
his counterpart. PM Oli’s visit was urgently needed by
Nepal for two reasons. First, PM Oli did not want to waste
even a single day in finalizing development projects and
fields of cooperation under BRI that Nepal had already
signed. And secondly, PM Oli had to take China into
confidence as early as possible about its deliberations
and commitments he made to India regarding Nepal-
India mutual relations and also about India’s stance on
Chinese involvement in Nepal.
Moreover, during India’s (Madhesi led) blockade
of 2015, China could supply only a few patrol and
diesel tankers to Kathmandu to meet its urgent
demands due to poor connectivity between Nepal and
China. Hence Nepal was anxious to have some firm

commitment of China with regard to Transport and
communication. And this objective was achieved by
FM Gyawali’s visit, as he concentrated on closing deals
of cooperation in the fields of transport connectivity,
agriculture, industries, technology, human resources,
natural resources, environment, trade and investment.
It indicated that Nepal inclined entirely towards China
for its development.
During his visit, it was agreed that with regard to the
projects to be identified under BRI, some of them would be
decided during PM Oli’s visit, some to be decided during
president Xi Jinping’s visit, which would commence
after Nepalese president Bidya Devi Bhandari's visit to
China in April to participate in the second conference on
International Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing, to be
presided over by Chinese president Xi Jinping. As per
planning, during her visit, the much-awaited Agreement
on Transit and Transportation was formally signed
with some corrections to the text signed in September
2018. Interestingly, the original text was signed almost
three years ago during PM Oli’s first visit to China.
Significantly, the protocol will allow Nepal to use four
sea ports and three land ports of China for third-country
trade in the near future.31 Most probably, China may
take up the job of improving the poor infrastructure in
Nepal, especially, the Rasuwagadhi transit point. The
Minister had revealed his dream to travel from Nepal to
China in a modern train.
31. TKPNews; After ‘minor’ corrections, Nepal and China allset to sign transit
protocol, 2.3.2019.

Chapter-7
THE TILTED RELATION

PM Oli completed his six-day (June 18-23, 2018)
official visit to China, which was keenly awaited with
its much significance. It was his second visit during
his two tenures in two years, as he was there earlier in
March 2016. His meetings with President Xi Jinping
and his counterpart Li Keqiang were very cordial. He
succeeded in deepening ties with the top leadership,
exploring new areas of cooperation and signing new
agreements based on 10 points of agreement reached
during his earlier visit. He looked for Chinese support
in three areas, direct aid, and cooperation and joint
investments. As scheduled, new agreements were
signed for energy, power transmission, railway
connectivity, post-earthquake reconstruction and
border entry points.
The signing of accord to develop a cross-border
railway line connecting the Tibetan town Kerung with
Kathmandu was touted as the most significant initiative in
the history of bilateral cooperation. Interestingly, senior
officials from both sides signed 14 MoUs and letters of
exchange, which were followed up by nine agreements
by Nepalese and Chinese public and private sector
companies. The major agreements included Investment
Board Nepal and Huaxin Cement Company of China

to develop a Rs 15 billion Huaxin Narayani Cement;
Butwal Power Company and Sichuan Investment Group
to work together on Marsyangdi Cascade to produce
1000 megawatt electricity; Nepal Electricity Authority
and China’s State Grid Corporation will construct a 159-
km Kerung-Galchhi transmission line. It is held that a
strong infrastructure of cross-border power connectivity
will link Nepal in the regional power grid that already
encompasses China, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia. Curiously, the MoU on railway project made a
strong commitment towards its timely completion. It was
due to a great degree of technical details involved in such
a huge infrastructure project, which demands massive
engineering works. FM Gyawali told the reporters that the
Detailed Project Report of Kerung-Kathmandu railway
would be completed in another one and a half years
and the project would be completed in additional five
years. Both sides took the railway project as the standout
achievement of the current visit. It was also agreed upon
to encourage Nepalese and Chinese airlines to operate
additional direct flights between the two countries.
However, it was not clear whether the Chinese assisted
projects would fall under BRI or not, the two sides agreed
to intensify implementation of the MoU on Cooperation
under the BRI to enhance the connectivity. Attracting
more Chinese tourists to Nepal was given due importance.
On international diplomacy, they agreed to strengthen
cooperation at the UN and other multilateral fora. They
also agreed to enhance coordination and cooperation
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, \, and
other regional cooperation mechanisms.
The apparent outcome of his visit confirmed that
China was its real well-wisher and a viable partner in
Nepal’s development. It provided impetus for China to
show that Nepal was no longer an India-locked country.

PM Oli succeeded in showing the world in general and
India in particular that China was a country to rely upon.
The second visit of PM Oli prepared grounds for getting
favours from China on several fields in quick succession.
The Budhi Gandaki 1200MW project was taken
to resolve the perennial power crisis in the country.
Initially, the construction work was assigned to an
Indian company but the contract was cancelled due
to delay in construction work. In 2011, the Baburam
Bhattarai government formed the Budhi Gandaki
Hydroelectric Project Development Committee to
execute the project. However in 2017, the Pushpa Kamal
Dahal-led government signed the MoU with China
Gezouba Group Corporation (CGGC) to be constructed
under the engineering, procurement, construction and
financing (EPCF) model.32 The Sher Bahadur Deuba-
led government cancelled the contract and decided to
build it with domestic resources. In September 2018,
the Oli government decided to rope in CGGC again to
get the reservoir project executed under EPCF model
without going through a competitive bidding process,
as was done previously by the Dahal-led government
without undergoing any due formalities.
The successful visit of PM Oli seemed to have
added new impetus to the ongoing bilateral relations. In
the last week of October 2018, Deputy Prime Minister
and Defence Minister Ishwar Pokhrel went on a five-
day visit to Beijing. During his visit, a memorandum of
Understanding was signed by DPM Pokhrel and Chinese
State Councilor and Defence Minister Wei Fenghe to
provide assistance worth (RMB)150 million (Rs 2.53
billion) to the Nepal Army for a period of five years.
Interestingly, the bilateral military cooperation, which
32. TKP, 24.9.2018

started in 1988, had been expanding continuously.
Nepal was considered to be one of the significant
destinations for China’s PLA to conduct forest warfare
and high altitude warfare training.33
Nepal was getting prepared to include the Chinese
language in school curriculum for many years. Giriraj
Mani Pokhrel, Minister for Education, Science and
Technology, was reported to have observed, “It is a
need of time. If we can teach English, why can’t we
teach Chinese?” The Minister asserted that preparations
for curriculum development were underway. The
government took the initiative in this direction after getting
recommendation from some students who returned from
China after learning the Chinese language to include it
in the school education.34 Significantly, the teaching of
Mandarin in Nepal began long back. It was introduced
silently in private schools from the primary level taxing
the growing minds of the country.35 It was reported that
Mandarin had been made mandatory in many schools.
These schools justified the step on the ground that these
schools did not have to bear any cost for introducing
it, as the Chinese volunteers deputed by the Chinese
government were teaching it. Moreover, principals and
owners of such schools were lured by personal favour,
like pleasure cum educational trips to China.36
The Prime Minister’s Office signed a contract with a
subsidiary company of the Chinese Huawei Technologies
Co. Ltd after suspending bidding process to set up the
‘action room’ equipped with video conferencing and
conference call, etc., to enable the Prime Minister and
other senior officers to directly monitor large projects.
33. TKP, 28.10.2018.

34. The Week, 7.12.2019.
35. The Week, 7.12.2018.
36. THT, 15.6. 2019.

The PMO suspended the tender call by the National
Information Technology Centre to award the contract
to the Chinese firm after bilateral negotiation. It would
cost around Rs 54.2 million.37
Nepal decided to adopt a railway-track gauge used
by China, i.e. Standard-gauge or 1.435mm gauge for
its network in place of the broad-gauge or 1.676mm
gauge being used by India in its main railway lines.
India is to lay a broad-gauge rail link for 130-
km, from its border town of Raxaul to Kathmandu.
Significantly, India is using BG for Nepal’s only rail
link from Jayanagar to Bijalpura (Bardibas) being
built by it. The government justified its decision on
the ground that since China is to build rail link from
Tibet to Kathmandu, and it can be extended further to
Pokhara and to Lumbini as well, the standard gauge
would be economical. Moreover, it can also be used
for 1,030 km East-West railway link, which is being
used in many countries.38
Nepal has permitted the China International
Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to
provide development assistance and create capitals
in 15 northern districts of Nepal, which border with
Tibet, to meet their developmental requirements.
The agency was formed in 2018 with a view to
strengthening the strategic planning and overall
coordination of the Chinese aid to Nepal. China has
agreed to provide material support like dozers, solar
lights, blasting equipment construction materials for
schools and libraries, etc. There will be direct contact
between the local bodies and CIDCA through Nepal’s
consular general’s office in Lhasa.39
37. TKP, 31.12.2018.
38. TKP, 6.3.2019.
39. TKP, 30.3.2019.

President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s
Visit to China
To strengthen the growing bilateral relations,
President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s went on a state visit
to China in April 2019. It was the first visit of any head
of state since Nepal was declared a republic more than a
decade ago. Her visit was significant for three reasons.
First, the main purpose of the visit was to extend
formal invitation to Chinese President Xi Jinping for
visiting Nepal, for which the present dispensation
was impatiently waiting for long. Second, she had to
participate in the second conference of the BRI, which
was to be ended on 27 April 2019. The third reason was
the signing of the protocol on implementing agreement
on Transit and Transport and six other agreements,
which were pending since Nepal and China signed the
Transit and Transport agreement in March 2016 during
PM Oli’s first tenure as Prime Minister. It was intended
to diversify trade and pave the way for carrying out
third country trade through China, as there was Indian
border blockade previously.40
In recent years, China has been very generous
in extending scholarships not only to the Nepalese
students but also to the government staff to enhance their
abilities. In 2014, China offered just 20 scholarships
under the Chinese Government Scholarship Program,
with six seats for undergraduates and 14 for
postgraduates but in June 2019 it offered more than
850 training programs to civil servants. Interestingly,
journalists from print and electronic media are also
visiting China in great numbers.41
Interestingly, Nepal banned a Tibetan official from
40. TKP, 30.4.2019).
41. TKP, 25.6.2019.

entering Nepal on advice from China without verifying
the identity of the person. On 22 June 2019, immigration
officers denied Penpa Tsering, an American citizen entry
into Nepal being suspected as an agent of the exiled
Tibet government and deported him to the US after
several hours of interrogations. Nepal did it because
the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu had instructed
the immigration office not to allow those persons to
enter Nepal who were in its blacklist. However, it was
believed that a person with the same name was residing
in Dharmashala in India.42
Chinese State Councilor’s Visit

Significantly, within six months of President
Bhandari’s visit to China, its State Councilor and
Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid a three-day official
visit to Nepal from September 8 to 10, 2019. His first
engagement was his official delegation level meeting
with his Nepalese counterpart Pradeep Kumar Gyawali
for exchanging three letters of exchange, which were
signed during President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s visit to
China in April 2019. Although it was claimed that their
interaction would centre round the detailed discussions
about the project to be taken up by China under the
BRI, and on bilateral economic cooperation and the
execution of the pacts and agreements signed in the past,
the main objective was, perhaps, to assess the overall
preparation and selection of important agreements to
be signed during the forthcoming visit of president Xi
Jinping in October 2019. The President was to visit India
and Nepal both during his forthcoming neighbourhood
tour. FM Wang Yi not only met President Bhandari, PM
Oli and former prime minister PK Dahal, but also the
42. TKP, 27.6.2019.

leader of opposition, which was not only a diplomatic
courtesy but also to gauge the consensus on President
Xi’ visit and its effectiveness.43
Chinese President Xi Jinping’ s State Visit

President Xi Jinping’s two-day state visit (October
12-13, 2019) to Nepal was eagerly awaited, as it was
the first visit by a Chinese president in 23 years, since
Jiang Zemin visited Nepal in 1996. Xi Jinping flew
to Kathmandu from Mamallapuram near Chennai in
India after completing his two-day (October 11-12)
visit there.44
His visit provided a clear twist in the Nepalese
foreign policy. Besides signing of twenty agreements
and MoUs, the14-point joint communiqué was issued
after the conclusion of his visit. Its main feature was
the recognition of BRI as an important opportunity
to deepen mutually-beneficially cooperation in all
fields in a comprehensive manner. It covered the
agreement to enhance connectivity that included vital
components such as ports, roads, railway, aviation and
communications within the overarching framework of
the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity
Network. It not only reiterated to have their relations
based on the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
Charter of the United Nations, and principles of
good neighbourliness, but also significantly added
to elevate Nepal-China Comprehensive Partnership
of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship to
Strategic Partnership of Cooperation to show that
the relation did not remain traditional any more, as it
acquired significant dimension by his visit.
43. TKP, 9.9.2019.
44. Kantipur, a vernacular daily, 29.1. 2020.

Unexpectedly, the much sought after Extradition
Treaty by China was not signed that marred the visit, as
it was agreed during the last visit of PM Oli to negotiate
the Treaty along with the treaty on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters in order to strengthen
cooperation on the administration of border areas
and combat illegal border crossings and transnational
crimes. It was also agreed on that China would train
Nepali law enforcement officials, organize exchange
visits for security personnel and hold joint training
exercises between the two armies. Over the next three
years, China would offer 100 training opportunities to
Nepali law enforcement officers each year.
Interestingly, during his visit, the Ministry of
Education signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Chinese Embassy on Volunteer Chinese
teachers’ Program to gradually expand Mandarin
language classes in public schools. As per the
agreement, 100 volunteer teachers from China would
be assigned to teach it. In addition, on October 13,
2019, Nepal and China agreed to set up Confucius
Institute in Tribhuvan University, though there is one
such institute in Kathmandu University, which was
established in collaboration with the Hebei University
of Economics and Business, China.45
Curiously, just hours before the conclusion of the
Chinese President’s Nepal visit, Nepal and China signed
a Memorandum of Understanding under which China
would help Nepal build two stretches of the road linking
Kathmandu and Rasuwagadhi with two tunnels. The first
stretch of the road would be of 32 kilometers long-from
Tokha in Kathmandu to Chhahare in Nuwakot with a
4.17 km tunnel. The second 19 km stretch would link
Mailung with Syaphrubesi in Rasuwa district.46
45. TKP, 14.10.2019.
46. TKP, 14.10.2019.

Ishwar Pokharel, Deputy Prime Minister and
Defence Minister left for China on 14 October 2019,
within a few hours after President Xi flew back to China,
to sign a fresh agreement for Rs 2.5 billion military
aid to Nepal Army. It was believed that the proposal
was not discussed in the delegation-level talk during
the Chinese President’s visit. Hence, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence ‘quietly’
finalized the deal.47
Nepalese tourism officials and entrepreneurs had
expected that 350,000 Chinese tourists might visit Nepal
during the Visit Nepal 2020, which was unfortunately
watered down by the Coronavirus (Covid-19), which
affected China most. Tourists from China generally
come by air, the air service agreement between China
and Nepal was revised to enable half a dozen Chinese
airlines to have regular flights to Nepal. Currently,
there are six airlines -Air China, China Southern,
China Eastern, Sichuan Airlines, Cathay Dragon and
Tibet Airline, which are operating regularly. Against
these Chinese flights, only one private Nepalese carrier
Himalaya Airlines began its services to Beijing on 27
October 2019. Nepal airlines, which applied to Chinese
authorities to fly the Kathmandu-Guangzhou route in
2016, announced on 15 December 2019 that it would
start its flight to Guangzhou from the second week of
March 2020.48 However, it remained inoperative due to
coronavirus outbreak.
The word ‘Zhumulangma’ has been equated or
bracketed with the Nepalese word ‘Sagarmatha’ used for
Mount Everest in the MoU signed during President Xi
visit on its Protection Cooperation between Nepal and
China. It seems to have been done for the first time.
47. TKP, 18.10. 20190.
48. TKP, 7.11. 2019.

Assertive China in Nepal
It appears that President Xi Jinping has been
exerting his political domination by his assertiveness in
both internal and external policies of Nepal.
Arrest of 122 Chinese Citizens

A joint team of Central Investigation Bureau (CBI),
Metropolitan Police Range and Metropolitan Crime
Division arrested 122 Chinese citizens from different
places in Kathmandu on 23 December 2019, over and
above the five Chinese nationals who were held for
using cloned debit cards to withdraw millions of rupees
from the ATMs of different banks in September 2019.
The arrests were made for their alleged involvement
in suspicious activities with 67 passports,747 mobile
phones, 331 laptops,18 CPUs, 19 monitors, 22 pens
and 327 SIM cards from the arrestees.49 They all had
arrived on tourist visas. Against the Chinese claim on
26 December 2019 of having joint operation by Chinese
and Nepal police, the Nepal police denied it and asserted
that the Nepal police carried it out independently.50
Strangely, the investigating authorities could not
establish the nature of crimes committed by them.
And finally, they were deported by the Department
of Immigration (DoI) on 8 January 2020 in two lots
on two aircrafts sent by China. The Chief District
Officer of Kathmandu set them free on 5 January,
slapping on them a fine of Rs 1,000 as they were
found guilty of “indecent behaviour”. Similarly, the
Dept of Immigration imposed fine of Rs1000 each on
34 of those arrested with valid travel documents for
49. TKP, 6.1. 2020.

50. TKP, 27.12. 2019.

engaging in activities restricted by Nepal’s immigration
laws. Those who did not posses any travel document
were, of course, fined Rs 2000 each.51 It proves the
helplessness of Nepal before China.
Curiously, the protocol of Mutual Legal Assistance,
which was signed in October 2019, could not be tabled
in parliament for several months. However, such a vital
protocol was suddenly announced by the spokesperson
of the government, the Minister for Information and
communication technology, announced on 16 January,
2020 in his regular press briefing that the protocol
of Mutual Legal Assistance with China pertaining
to criminal cases had been formally accepted by the
government. Interestingly, such news of international
importance was hardly covered by any major English
and vernacular dailies. However, ‘Kantipur’ a major
vernacular daily gave only one-line coverage. It
seems that the news of the cabinet decision was not
so significant for them to cover or they deliberately
abstained from highlighting it to catch the eyes of
international community under any internal or external
pressure. Remarkably, it was the first bold step taken
by Nepal to please China, the first country to have such
protocol. It was believed that since Nepal was under
tremendous pressure from China for signing the treaty
of extradition, Nepal appeased China by agreeing to
this protocol.
The assertiveness of China was displayed by its
response to an article published in English daily in
Kathmandu. The Kathmandu Post, on its 18 February,
2020 edition carried the article, ‘China’s secrecy has
made coronavirus crisis much worse’ written by Ivo
Daalder, a former US ambassador to NATO published
51. THT, 9.1. 2020.

earlier by The Korean Herald, a part of the Asia News
Network. The Chinese ambassador to Nepal Hou
Yanqi made her strong protest through a statement on
the article stating, “The piece, along with an adjoining
picture, “deliberately smeared” Chinese fight against
the novel coronavirus and “viciously” attacked the
political system of China”. She also made a threat of
‘further action’ to Editor-in-Chief by name. However,
her threat invited severe criticisms not only from print
and electronic media but also from diplomatic circles.
On 19 February, 17 editors of Nepal’s dailies and online
portals condemned the Chinese embassy’s statement and
reminded the embassy of full press freedom in Nepal
guaranteed by its constitution. Freedom Forum, a civil
liberty group and the Federation Nepali Journalists,
an umbrella of more than 13,000 journalists showed
their displeasure by issuing statements condemning the
threatening of a journalist by a diplomat.52 But sadly, the
editor had to quit his post.
The issue of Covid-19 exposed the China’s assertive
posture in Nepal. Despite the frantic continuous call for
rescue of the Nepalese nationals who were stranded in
Wuhan, the epicentre of novel coronavirus outbreak, to
the government, they were the last lot to be evacuated
only in the second week of February. It was not done
immediately, as the government could not dare go
against the Chinese request to countries not to hasten the
evacuation of their citizens since it could have proved
China’s incompetence in dealing with the deadly virus.
Nepal might have delayed the airlifting also due to lack
of preparedness of the government to deal with them
after they arrived in Nepal. Similarly, Nepal could not
stop regular Chinese flights to Katmandu, though most of
52. TKP, 20.2. 2020.

the countries cancelled them. Nepal’s helplessness was
exposed when, instead of canceling Chinese flights, Nepal
decided temporarily to stop issuing on-arrival tourist
visas to all countries till 14 March 2020 and suspended all
international flights operations at Tribhuvan International
airport from March 22 to March 31.53
Nepal shares 1414 km borders with China. The line
of demarcation was settled in early 1960s. Recently,
pillar no. 10, 11 and 12 were found missing, but recently
pillar no. 11 has been traced intact. There is dispute
over the area falling between pillar no. 11 and 12. In
September/October, 2020, it was reported in the media
that China has occupied some area of Lapcha of Limi of
Humla district. It has built eleven structures for security
purpose. Except one, all are empty. Interestingly, the
Chinese ambassador however claimed the area well
within the Chinese territory and also offered negotiation
if there was any dispute. But the then Foreign Minister
Gyawali who was also the spokesperson of the
government, denied the report immediately, as the area
fell within the Chinese territory before the government
received the factual report from the committee that had
visited the place to verify the fact. However, the Nepali
Congress, the main opposition Party in parliament,
disputed the Minister’s denial by issuing a statement
on October 14, 2020 citing the findings of the fact
finding team of the Nepali Congress led by its Member
of Parliament. The team finds the Chinese occupation
in Hilsa as well. Significantly, the issue has found due
place in the print media. There is another dispute on
pillar no.57 in Lamabagar area in Dolkha district since
1979, which has not been resolved yet.54
53. Naya Patrika, a Nepali daily,15.3.020, and THT, 21.3.2020.

54. Annapurna Post, a vernacular daily, 16.10.2020 ( 30.5.2077 BS)
Shyamaprasad Mainali, Uttari simama atikraman kin ?.

Political Stasis
Sadly, before the execution of hurriedly signed
agreements would gather momentum, the abrupt
breakout of Corona pandemic in November/December
2020 in China led not only to the economic stagnation
but also to political stasis in Nepal, China and all over the
world. The attention of the governments was diverted
to Covid-19 and all other activities got paralysed.
The brewing of internal discontentment in the newly
formed CPN (a mixture of UML and MC) ended in the
division of the party with the verdict of the Supreme
Court and the CPN-Maoist Centre stood bifurcated
from CPN-UML leading to the fall of Oli Government
and a new government was in place in July 2021 headed
by Sher Bahadur Deuba in accordance with the Apex
Court verdict after the House of Representatives was
dissolved twice by PM Oli.
With the subsiding of Corona pandemic and with
the approval of the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) a grant of US$500 million Dollars by the HoR
in February 2022 again activated China. Moreover, the
border issue was raised and a study panel was formed,
which found some issues. Chinese Foreign Minister
and State Chancellor Wang Yi landed in Kathmandu on
25 March 2022 after completing his visits to Pakistan,
Afghanistan and India. Though nine agreements were
signed but none was under BRI. It is believed that Nepal
wanted projects to be completed under grant or soft loan
with a long period of payment of loans. Interestingly, he
did not raise the issue of MCC with government but he
took up the issue seriously with the communist parties.
In June the Chief of the foreign relation committee of
the Communist Party of China had virtual dialogue
with the top leaders to renew the relation. In August

2022 during the meeting between Nepalese Foreign
Minister N. Khadka and his Chinese counterpart it was
decided that China would grant 800 million Yuan to
Nepal shortly. In September, Li Zhanshu, the chairman
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress of China paid a three-day visit (Spetmber
12-14) at the invitation of the Nepalese Speaker, A.
P. Sapkota. It was believed that he advised the major
communist parties to unite and also shown interest in
the execution of the MCC.
PM SB Deuba’s India Visit

Significantly, after a gap of four years, PM SB
Deuba paid a three-day official visit to India (April 1-
3, 2022). Apart from flagging off jointly the railway
service 35-km line built by India from Jayanagar to
Janakpurdham, inauguration of the 90-km long 132
KV Solu Corridor transmission line built with Indian
line of credit at cost of INRs 22 crore and launching of
RuPay Card in Nepal some documents like International
Solar Framework Agreement, Agreement on supply
of petroleum products, MoU on enhancing Technical
Cooperation in the Railway Sectors and Agreement for
sharing Technical Expertise between IOC and NOC55
were exchanged. Curiously, the crucial issue of border
row raised by Deuba was not taken seriously. The
relations which were ebbing low could not be floored
as the major issues affecting the relations remained
unattended. Since official meetings have begun, the
issues cannot be left unattended for long.
In continuation of the visits, Indian PM Modi paid
one day official visit to Lumbini on May 15, 2022 to
lay jointly with PM Deuba the foundation of the Indian
55. THT, 3.4.2022.

International Centre for Buddhist Culture and Heritage
in the Lumbini Monastic zone. This visit provided an
opportunity for both the PMs to hold wide-ranging
bilateral talks on connectivity, supply of fertilizers, air
entry routes, seamless power trade etc. There were some
exchanges of memoranda of understanding related to
cooperation and collaboration in the academic field
and power sector.56 Then PK Dahal ‘Prachanda’, chief
of the MC, the second largest partner of the coalition
Government, visited India on the invitation of JP
Nadda, chief of the BJP in July 2022. Since the BJP is
in power, his visit seemed relevant. It was claimed that
he raised the issues of prime concerns of Nepal with
him but he could not meet the Indian PM.57
56. TKP, 17.5 2022.

57. THT,17.7.2022.

Chapter-8
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATS

The overall relations between two sovereign
countries are formally known as diplomatic relations.
Diplomacy is the joint product of the decisions taken by
the government of (foreign ministry) and their efficient
execution by its representative, the ambassador of the
country. Moreover, the government needs the effective
role of its ambassador in getting the factual information
about the country for framing its policy.
Nepal and India are geographically and culturally
intertwined by Nature, which has tied them together
for millions of years. Politically, Nepal and India stood
almost on a similar footing as India got freedom from the
British rule in 1947 and Nepal from the oligarchic rule
of the Ranas in 1951. During these last seven decades,
India established itself as a democracy, whereas Nepal
could not. Even after the adoption of the new constitution
in 2015, democracy remains elusive and stability is a far
cry. However, the goal of these countries is the same to
raise the standard of living of the respective peoples.
It requires mature diplomacy. The exemplary relation
between the top Indian leaders and the senior Nepalese
political leaders and even the late kings helped Nepal
and India sign two big river projects improving the lot
of the millions of the people.

Significantly, Indian foreign policy towards
Nepal always remained under direct control of the
Foreign Minister, as PM Nehru always headed the
ministry himself. Perhaps, Nepal occupied the top
most priority of India for four reasons. First, Nepal, a
northern neighbour suddenly became the buffer state
between India and China after China’s takeover of
Tibet that shook the Indian traditional perception of
insurmountability of its northern frontier. Secondly,
it took the Nepalese leaders including those who
were well known to Indian leaders, some of them had
participated in the Indian independence movement,
for granted that they would keep in mind the Indian
concern about its security. Thirdly, it accepted Nepal’s
full independence seeking its total allegiance to them.
And lastly, it facilitated Nepal to usher in a democratic
era by acquiring the real power from the Rana oligarchy
and by restoring the legitimacy to the monarchy keeping
democracy at bay. Though the then king had assured to
hold election to the constituent assembly and to frame
a democratic constitution to guarantee democracy
for the people, India’s insistence on it proved to be
a political misjudgment or counter-productive later,
as the issue of democratization constantly displeased
almost all-political power centers, which viewed India
as an obstacle to using the state power unhindered for
personal interest.
Limited role of Indian ambassadors in Nepal

The first Indian ambassador to Nepal was Surjeet
Singh Majithia. His role in making spadework for drafting
of the constitution of 1950 by Indian constitutional
experts was significant. The Indian diplomacy was
at the very beginning stage during his tenure. C.P.N
Singh is remembered as the ambassador who played the
crucial role in overthrowing the Rana regime by helping
King Tribhuvan to take shelter in the Indian embassy.
However, Ram Hari Joshi, a Nepali Congress leader and
a former minister, mentions in his autobiography that in
1951 when there was first coalition government in Nepal
and Ganeshman Singh of the NC was a minister, the
Indian envoy had requested him to get some fish from
a pond at Balaju to serve in the dinner of some Indian
guests in the embassy as he could not receive fish from
Patna. Singh was hesitant as he used to feed the fish
himself every morning.58 B. K. Gokhale, who succeeded
Singh, facilitated the signing the Treaty of Extradition
between India and Nepal on 2 October, 1953. He signed
it for the Government of India and PM Matrika Prasad
Koirala signed for the Government of Nepal.
Rasgotra who joined the Indian Embassy as
second secretary in April 1954 narrates the condition
of diplomacy in Nepal. In his words, “Ambassador
Gokhale said that the embassy had no information at
all about what is happening in the country beyond the
valley of Kathmandu, and because of acute shortage
of personnel, we knew little even about going-on
in the valley’s political circles, whose numbers and
activities had multiplied manifold after the end of Rana
rule. Access to those circles would be no problem but
it required a degree of finesse and sophistication in
enhancing routine contacts into friendship for India.”59
About Nepal-India relations, he explains, “Managing
that change in the nature and scope of India-Nepal
relations was not going to be easy. For a while Nepal was
in dire need of reviving and reorganizing its military,
economy and administration, which were destroyed
58. Joshi, Ram Hari, Atmakatha Tatha Nepali Congress-sanga Gansiaka

Samjnanaharu, p-139
59. Rasagotra, p, 96.

by the widespread armed insurrection triggered by
King Tribhuvan’s voluntary exile. India ran the risk of
getting too deeply in the process and attracting criticism
and accusations of interfering in Nepal,”60 During his
tenure a library-cum cultural centre was established
in Kathmandu. Cultural shows by way of arranging
musical concerts on regular basis on two occasions -
- Independence day and Republic day of India. During
Harishwar Dayal’s tenure, the elected government of
Nepali Congress led by BP Koirala was dismissed,
parliament was dissolved, all political activities were
banned and the constitution was suspended.
Sriman Narayan was the sixth ambassador
to Nepal. During his tenure the Arms Assistance
Agreement was reached on 30 January 1965 very
secretly. The people knew it after a long time when
Rishikesh Shaha found a copy of the agreement in a
British library. The agreement was confirmed vide the
letter written by Yadu Nath Khanal, Royal Nepalese
Ambassador to Y. D. Gundevia, Foreign Secretary to
the Government of India, New Delhi. Raj Bahadur,
a former minister of Indira Gandhi Ministry, was
appointed Indian ambassador to Nepal to play his
political role. He negotiated successfully with the king
to make him allow having a senior military officer in
the embassy and have exchange of information about
the developments harmful to both countries. It is
believed that his role in getting B. P. Koirala and other
leaders released from jail was significant.
M K Rasgotra came to Kathmandu again after a gap
of seventeen years as ambassador to Nepal. After the
presentation of his credentials, he had to face officially
inspired anti-Indianism when the then P M Nagendra
60. Ibid, pp-94-5

Prasad Rijal and Foreign Minister Gyanenda Bahadur
Karki complained him about the slow progress of the
India-aided development projects in contrast with the
Chinese projects. After making personal inspection
to the project, he found everything normal and gave
all relevant facts and figures not only to the Foreign
Ministry and other offices but also to the media but
they ignored them as they were influenced by the
Chinese embassy. Rasgotra writes that he spoke to the
Prime Minister, “Mr. Prime Minister, … If you are not
satisfied with our aid, I shall immediately stop work on
the projects and send the Indian personnel back to India.
You can hand the projects over to China. Derogatory
treatment of India inspired by Nepalese officials or
by a foreign embassy in Nepal is not acceptable.”61
Rasgotra reveals that as per practice, royal family
used to visit Indian embassy. He took advantage of his
early personal relations with the king and the queen,
invited them to a private dinner in the premises of the
embassy, which was utilized to convince the king to
give proper treatment of ex-PM BP Koirala to bring
him back to Nepal. He also narrates how he convinced
Koirala’s sister to persuade him to come to Nepal.62
He cites an example of state sponsored protest over
Sikkim’s integration into India in April and writes
that during the course of protest, Indian embassy was
almost under seize and effigies of Nehru and Mahatma
Gandhi were burnt. After he lodged a four-point strong
protest with the Foreign Minister and informing the
King about the government of India’s decision to recall
its ambassador in protest for the time being, had its
effect on the Nepalese government. He writes, “Action
by the Nepal government to meet our demands was
61. Ibid, P-300.

62. Ibid. pp-301,and 308-9

swift. A public apology was voiced on three occasions
by Prime Minister Rijal; he also paid a day’s visit to
Delhi as a conciliatory gesture.”63
N. B. Menon was appointed ambassador during the
state of emergency declared by Indira Gandhi and he
continued till the Janata Party government signed two
agreements with Nepal. N. P. Jain succeeded Menon and
remained in office till Indira Gandhi regained power. H.
C. Sarin was appointed during Indira Gandhi’s second
inning. He was sent to deal with Nepal carefully, as
he was a very seasoned bureaucrat having Gandhi’s
confidence. During A. R. Deo’s period, there was
economic blockade by India on the issue of Nepalese
demand for separate trade and transit treaties.
During 1990-91, Lf Gen. (retd.) S K Sinha was the
ambassador. Ambassador Sinha’a role was not of much
diplomatic significance; however, India helped the
Election Commission to complete its job by providing
some logistic support like providing ballot boxes and
indelible ink etc. Prof. Bimal Prasad played a somewhat
more political role than that of usual diplomacy. He spent
most of his time in keeping the ruling Nepali Congress
intact as it was a house divided against itself. He used
to shuttle between PM GP Koirala and his opponent
Ganeshman Singh and former PM KP Bhattarai. It seems
that since there was some indirect role of India in the
people’s movement I, he might have thought his duty
to help smooth functioning of the elected government,
which was formed after three decades.
The Indian diplomacy was so apparent that the
behaviour of the ambassadors very often was disgusting.
Even the signing of 12-point Understanding in India was
not digestible to some in Nepal.
63. Ibid.pp-302-307

Critical Period of Diplomacy:
K.V. Rajan stayed here for the longest period of more
than five years. This was the period when governments
changed very often. The mid-term poll delivered a
hung parliament and the first left government occupied
the office in December 1994 but it could hardly last for
nine months. There was series of unstable governments
during his tenure. Dev Mukharji witnessed the most
tumultuous condition of Nepal as King Birendra and
his families were assassinated on June 1, 2001, and
Gyanendra ascended to the throne. There was hardly
any role to be played by him. Dr. I P Singh came to
Nepal at a critical juncture. The state of emergency was
imposed to deploy the royal army against the Maoist
insurgency. S. B Deuba dissolved the Lower House as
his party was against the imposition of the emergency.
The Congress party was divided, which affected the
democratic setup greatly. Any significant diplomatic
role played by him remained unnoticed.
The role of Shyam Saran was a bit different. Perhaps,
the perception of India had undergone a drastic change in
looking at Kathmandu as Nepal. In accordance with the
agreement reached between the two governments, the
government of India in consultation with the government
of Nepal started investing money on developmental
work in Tarai, especially on constructing buildings
for schools. In the words of Saran, “As ambassador, I
tried to make a start by connecting with the Madhesis
through small community-level development projects
and by regularly visiting the Terai to directly meet their
local leaders. This was done without reducing in any
way the number of community projects we had in the
hill areas. It was obvious that the development projects
promoted by the Nepalese government and even by

many of the international and western aid agencies were
almost entirely focused on these areas. The Terai plains
were completely neglected until the Indian embassy
began some community projects there.”64 It was the
time when CPN-Maoist leaders were in contact with the
Indian establishment, the office of PM AB Vajapayee.
Significantly, Saran, as the Foreign Secretary of India,
had accompanied Dr. Karan Singh, who visited Nepal
during the second people’s movement of 2006. It was
believed that Dr. Singh was in Kathmandu to persuade
the then King Gyanendra to surrender the state power
to the people. Saran claims that he persuaded the then
CoAS Pyar Jung Thapa to not go for suppressing the
public uprising making easy for the peaceful transition
of power.65 Perhaps, it was not the Indian advice to the
army and the King alone but also the advices of all area
commanders of the army to the King that forbade the
King not to suppress the agitation, as the issue was to be
negotiated with political stakeholders.
His successor, Shiva Shankar Mukherjee was the
second long residing Indian ambassador who was in
Kathmandu for four years. It was the period when
the second people’s movement with support from the
Maoists threw the autocratic rule of the King and got the
dissolved parliament restored. During his period, the
twelve-point Understanding between the Seven-Party-
Alliance under the leadership of GP Koirala and the
Maoist president PK Dahal ‘Prachanda’ was signed in
Delhi on November 22, 2005 laying the foundation of
the People’s movement of 2006. Significantly, Shyam
Saran was the Foreign Secretary of India then. Rakesh
Sood succeeded him as the twentieth ambassador.
During his tenure, the first Constituent Assembly
64. Saran, How India Sees The World, pp-170-1, 2017.
65. Saran, Ibid.

(CA) election was held and PK Dahal ‘Prachanda’ led
CPN-Maoist government. The episode of dismissal of
the then CoAS Katwal was significant, as his dismissal
order was overruled by president Dr. Rambarna
Yadav that led to the resignation of Prachanda. It was
believed that he played a crucial role in the overruling
of the dismissal order. Jayant Prasad who succeeded
him played a significant role in making the sitting
Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi as the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers to hold the second CA election
as a neutral government.
Ranjit Rae was the 22nd ambassador to Nepal.
The new constitution was to be adopted during his
period. He had to face many challenges, as all major
parties were adamant to adopt the constitution without
addressing the demands of Madhes-based parties on
the one hand, and Madhesi outfits were agitating in the
streets facing bullets of the security agencies on the
other. Ultimately, Madhes-based parties and Rashtriya
Prajatantra Party voted against the adoption of the
constitution that was passed with a big margin. The
Madhesi agitation was being suppressed very high-
handedly thorough bullets that resulted in the ‘sit-in’
protests on several Indian border checkpoints, which
blocked the supplies from India with assistance from
the Indian people and the government.
Manjeev Singh Puri succeeded Ray in 2017, who
retired in 2019. M. S. Puri completed his term silently.
However, he seems to follow the footsteps of the External
Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister by pleasing PM
Oli through his first visit to meet him to start with. He
was succeeded by Vinay Mohan Kwatra in 2020 who
became the foreign secretary of India. Naveen Srivastava
succeeded him in June 2022. The period covered by Puri

and Kwatra was a period when Indian diplomats had
hardly any role to play. Their role remained unnoticed,
as Nepal-China relations dominated the scene.
Media/Publicity for Diplomacy:

Interestingly, during the last seven decades, India
and Indian diplomacy could not get support from media
in Kathmandu. In the beginning, there was only one
Nepali language newspaper ‘Gorkhapatra’ which was
owned by the state, which was naturally the mouthpiece
of the government. The English daily ‘The Rising
Nepal’ owned by the government was started some time
later. Radio Nepal was established in 1951, which too
was state-owned. These media were just reporting the
news provided by the government. With the change of
the regime, from autocratic rule to democratic system,
a few dailies and weeklies were started but they did not
have mass circulation. Strikingly, after the people’s
movement of 1990, some dailies and weeklies came
up with mass circulation, as these were critical of
the government. The number of dailies has markedly
increased in recent years.
Publicity never seemed to capture the attention of
the embassy. Of course, it started printing a magazine of
its own, named “Bharat Samachar” which continued for
some years and was stopped long ago. The reason for the
Indian embassy not taking interest in local publicity was
that almost all major Indian English and Hindi dailies and
weeklies were available in Kathmandu, which quenched
the intellectual thirst of the people. Moreover, India and
the Indian embassy, perhaps, did not take interest in local
publicity also because they always felt their dominance
(in both political and economical spheres).

Scholarships
India has been providing educational facilities
in its universities for higher studies to Nepalese
students to strengthen its ties with Nepal. Sometimes
Ambassadors’ or staff members’ subjective decisions
on awarding scholarships prove ineffective. In contrast
to the influence on those who went to Russia to study
returned home after completing their studies becoming
Russia friendly. Students, who went in hundreds
to India for education, came back to Nepal after
becoming anti-India and hardly India-friendly. It was
in the past and continues to be so even today. Perhaps,
the government of India or the bureaucracy takes it
as an act of charity with no expectation in reward, to
the countries it has been providing facilities for higher
studies under self-finance and scholarships. At least
India deserves thanks if not gratitude from those who
go there for their higher studies.

Chapter-9
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS
The age-old multifaceted Nepal-India relations, at
times, blur the normal visions of different stakeholders
to perceive and act suitably. Divergent sections
of Nepalese and Indian societies hold different
perceptions. Interestingly, politicians view it in one
way when in power and reverse it when they are out.
Similarly, diplomats, the ruling elite, and the common
people too perceive it differently. The perception
of Kathmandu elite differs from the perception of
Madhesis, who reside on the Nepalese border. Their
common suffering and happiness, economic, religious,
social mingling, day-to-day interaction at local hat
(Bazaar), social feasting and the marital relation etc.,
can hardly be realized by Kathmandu.
The twists and turns of the India-Nepal relations
have been caused by psychological barriers, which
obstruct the normal perception of the people. We
perceive or conceive things objectively, yet at times we
are forced to look at things in a different way under
the influence of some psychological and external
conditions, such as, background or context and meaning,
our past experience, socio-cultural inheritance, official
positions, interests, habits, ideologies, identities.
Personal barriers include weakness, complexes, lack of

skill, low intelligence, internal tension, irritability etc.
With regard to the Nepal-India relations L.E. Rose,
refers to the unpublished manuscript of Bhuwan Lal
Joshi, “The Psychological Basis of Nepali Attitudes
to China and India”. Rose quotes him, “Nepali had
to reckon with the Indians so long and so often that
they are more prone to infer the latter’s intents quickly
than to observe their overt behavior. Due to the high
degree of intimacy between the two countries through
the ages, whatever the Indians do in actual practice
is not considered as important as what the Nepalis
think the Indians mean. With the Chinese, however,
it is a different story.” He finally concludes, “Indeed,
a whole new historical myths, recently formulated in
Nepal, aims at providing that cultural and intellectual
influences from China and India have been equally
important in shaping Nepali social values and culture.
Factually, this is nonsense, but psychologically it makes
very good sense.” 66
It is not easy to perceive the relations existing
between two neighbouring countries like perceiving
an object directly. Our relations with India or China
are perceived differently. When we talk about our two
immediate neighbours geographically, we call China as
northern neighbour and India as southern neighbour,
even though we are surrounded by India on east and
west, as well. Perhaps, the mighty size of China affects
our thinking. Nepal sees it is surrounded by India on
three sides, whereas India sees Nepal as a crucial frontier
that exists between it and China.67
Some psychological barriers, which vitiate the
relations, are as follows:
66. Rose, L.E., Nepal Strategy for Survival, 1971, pp.16-17.

67. Mishra, The Psycological barrier………The Rising Nepal, 26.1.2011.

1. Perception of Nepal
Objectively, Nepal, in the present geographic
size is the creation of Prithvi Narayan Shah and his
successors in late 18th century. Hitherto, Kathmandu
valley was Nepal. It is evident from the narration by
Colonel William J. Kirkpatrick, who visited Nepal in
1793, called the valley as ‘the valley of Nepaul’68 He
was deputed by Marquis Cornwallis, G-G of the British
India to mediate in the dispute between China and
Nepal. He described Kathmandu valley the ‘Valley of
Nepaul’ because it was called so. Secondly, he found no
trace of Nepalese government in the rest of the areas he
visited, and lastly he found that the whole eastern Tarai
was being ruled by Jorawar Singh, governor of western
Tarai who used to pay two lakh rupees annually to the
Kathmandu establishment.
Similarly, in 1905 Slyvian Levy, in his first volume
of his book written in French language “Le Nepal”
defines Nepal Valley under the heading ‘Nepal Valley’
in these words, “Nepal Valley (Nepal) is situated on the
midway from the plains of India to the high peaks of the
Himalayas.”69 Earlier, Nepal was limited to the present
Kathmandu valley itself. Curiously, even during the last
150 years, Kathmandu remained the capital of Nepal
and was always called Nepal by virtue of its dominance
in every aspect of life. This very contradiction in
perception and reality influenced the relations between
Nepal and India to a great extent.
68. Kirkpatrick , ‘An Account Of The Kingdom of Nepaul’

pp.147, 153,280, etc.
69. Slyvian Levy 1905, in his first volume of his book written in French
language “Le Nepal” P-31, first volume,Nepali translation).

2. Open Border Dispensation
The present border between Nepal and India is the
outcome of the Treaty of Sugauli signed in 1816. The
four western districts of Nepal (Banke, Bardia, Kailali
and Kanchanpur) were returned to Nepal by the British
in 1860 as a reward for assisting them to subdue the
first Indian revolt against the British government for
independence, which had broken out in India in 1857.
It was PM Jung Bahadur Rana who captured Lucknow
in February 1858 after crushing the rebels on this
way to Lucknow, which was the centre of rebellion.
Interestingly, there are two British maps, one of 1827
and another of 1879, which show the boundary of Nepal.
Significantly, there was some border dispute, which was
settled by PM Jung Bahadur in October 1874 when he
visited Calcutta in October.
The total length of Nepal-India boundary is 1880 km
of which 1240 km is land boundary and 640 km is river
and rivulet boundary (fluid boundary). Perhaps, it was not
possible to close the land boundary, so concrete pillars
were built, which were known as ‘Junge pillar’. It was
kept open for some obvious reasons. The arrangement of
ten-yard no-man’s land was the demarcation between the
two countries. There were villages, which were divided
between Nepal and India, which can be traced even today.
The residents on the border were allowed to move freely
for social and individual needs. Hat bazaars were common,
lands were cultivated jointly. Even the ownership of the
land was possessed by the citizens of each side. They
did not require any citizenship certificates to purchase
and sell their lands. Interestingly, Nepal required Indian
Currency (IC) to circulate in the country for its trade and
commence with India. IC was made the legal tender, which
continued till 1959 throughout Nepal except Kathmandu.

Workers were needed. Workers, especially farm workers
from each country were planting and harvesting of crops
on each side. With urbanization and industrialization in
India, migrant workers from Nepal started earning their
bread and butter there in thousands. Of course, they are
seeking jobs in other countries too.
The traditional free movement of people of each
side became finally a major psychological barrier that
irritates the power centers, which hold all Madhesis as
emigrants from India and their continued influx causes
demographic shift in the country. Sadly, despite the data
of the census reports of the last fifty years, which clearly
establish the fact that the increased population in Tarai
is due to migration of the people from the hills in great
number, the mindset persists.
The issue of open border dispensation was raised
intermittently by Nepal. For the first time it was raised
in Panchayat era, especially by Dr. Harka Gurung, a
renowned geographer who came out vehemently against
the so called large scale migration from India, perhaps,
finding the similarity between the faces of Madhesis
and Indians, on the one hand, and unfair data collected
by him, on the other. He raised the issue of controlling/
sealing the border on account of the high growth of
population in Tarai region, due to migration of the
people from India to this region. In this connection
Rishikesh Shaha writes significantly, “But if we look at
Nepal’s Census figures, it does not appear that there has
been an alarming growth of immigrants from India into
the Tarai. According to the 1981 Census figures, there
has been a considerable shift of population from the
Nepali hills. In 1971, 62.39 percent of the population
lived in the hills and only 37.61 percent in the Tarai,
while in 1981, only 56.33 percent of the population

was found living in the hills and 43.67 percent in the
Tarai. There has been thus an increase in the Tarai
population by 6 percent as a result of internal migration
itself. According to the 1991 Census, 53 percent of the
population is living in the hills and 47 percent in the
Tarai. Again if we look at the 1981 Census figures for
those who speak the more important Tarai languages of
Indian origin, we do not find a normal increase in their
ratio to the total population. In some cases, there has
been a decline in the numbers” 70
It is worth mentioning here that during the Rana
regime professors, teachers, medical doctors, engineers
and other technicians were recruited from India and
absorbed in government jobs of Nepal. Some of them
came to Nepal themselves and got settled here. In the
early 1950s, Indian workers were invited to come to
Tarai to clear the dense forest to eradicate malaria from
this region to make it worth living and to supply wooden
slippers for the Indian railways. Moreover, the process
of migration from hill to plains was accelerated with the
construction of the East-West Highway together with
the policies of the government to settle as much people
as possible from the hills to the plains to influence
the domination of the local people politically and
economically. The process of resettlement of landless
people from hills to plains in the forest areas still
continues. Of course, with the urbanization of Nepal
a sizable number of people from Tarai and bordering
Indian states came to Kathmandu and other towns to
work as carpenters, masons, plumbers, sanitary and
pipe-fitters and electricians, as new concrete houses
were being constructed. Some of them work in
factories. With them some vegetable vendors, hawkers
70. Shaha, Rishikesha, Nepal’s Foreign Policy: Focus on Nepal-India
Relations), 1992,p-47.

for purchasing empty bottles and waste papers too
landed in Kathmandu and other places. Rag-pickers
also followed them.
Significantly, during the high pitch of insurgency,
the issue was raised more frequently that the insurgents
were taking shelters in India and got arms and training
regularly due to the open border. However, there were
reports that the young people working at Mahendranagar
(Kanchanpur) in daytime, used to take shelters at
Banbasa (India) fearing from the insurgents who might
recruit them forcefully.
Ironically, during the Rana regime, people from Tarai
and hills had to obtain visas for entering Kathmandu, as
if Kathmandu alone were Nepal and the rest parts of the
country were foreign lands.
3. The Treaty Of 1950

Another major psychological barrier, which distorts
the perception of the Nepal-India relations, is the Treaty
of Peace and Friendship signed on 31 July 1950 by
Chandreshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to Nepal and
Mohun Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Maharaja, Prime
Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal.
The Treaty of 1950 seems to be the modified version
of the Treaty of Friendship signed by W. F. O’Connor,
Lieutinent-Colonel, British Envoy at the Court of Nepal
and Chandra Shumsher, Prime Minister and Marshal of
Nepal on 21 December 1923. It has seven Articles. It
seeks perpetual peace and friendship and acknowledges
respect for each other’s independence. It confirms all
Treaties, Agreements and Engagements including the
Treaty of Segowlie. It commits preservation of peace
and friendly relations with the neighbouring states
whose territories adjoin their common frontiers to
the mutual interests. It allows all measures to prevent
its territories being used for purposes inimical to the
security of the other. Nepal will be free to import from
or through British India into Nepal whatever arms,
ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may
be required or desired for the security of Nepal. No
custom duty shall be levied at British Indian Ports on
goods imported on behalf of the Nepal government for
immediate transport without breaking bulk en route of a
rebate of the full duty paid. Rebate may be claimed on
the basis of a certificate signed by an authority.
In contrast to the Treaty of Friendship of 1923, the
1950 Treaty is named ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’.
It has ten Articles with a vast canvas. It contains
matters related to political, diplomatic, security,
and trade-commerce. It provides for continuity to
the centuries-old free movement of citizens in each
other’s territory, right to participate in each other’s
development projects, privileges in the matter of
residence, and ownership of property. It acknowledges
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence
of each country. The two Governments have to inform
each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding
with neighbouring state likely to cause any breach
in the friendly relations subsisting between the two
governments. Perhaps, the term ‘state’ used here and
‘states’ used in Article 3 of the 1923 Treaty are meant
to denote ‘states’ of India and not independent states.
It binds both countries to maintain normal diplomatic
relations. It authorizes Nepal to import arms and
ammunition from and through India. It cancels all
previous treaties, and provides for termination of the
treaty by any country by giving one year’s notice.

Politicians, diplomats, and Kathmandu elite have
been criticizing it as a treaty between two unequal
countries. Since the Treaty binds these two countries
formally, Nepal cannot close the border arbitrarily.
Hence it has no option but to oppose the Treaty that
restricts its sovereignty. Though the Treaty can be
terminated with one-year notice, Nepal does not seem
to be ready to end the Treaty unilaterally, as it is scared
of losing other benefits guaranteed by the Treaty.
Gradually, the facilities accorded to the Indian
citizens were getting curtailed, as several Articles,
including Arts. 6 and 7 have been rendered ineffective.
Nepal got the Indian wireless operators ousted from the
posted at the Nepal-Tibet border in 1970. Armed vehicles
and arms and ammunitions were imported from China
and other countries. It nullified the letters exchanged
between the government of India and the ambassador
of Nepal on 30 January 1965. Furthermore, no Indians
are allowed to keep land and have industries without
acquiring Nepalese citizenship. No bank account can
be opened without citizenship certificate. No Indians
are allowed to work permanently. No Indian companies
are getting priorities over other countries in matters
of contracts. Significantly, only the privilege of free
movement of the people of one country to another for
pilgrimage remains effective. King Birendra brought
the proposal for declaring Nepal a zone of peace was
just to neutralize the treaty. It was proved useless when
India did not accept it; though more than hundred
countries had accepted it.
Interestingly, the Treaty is beneficial for thousands
of hill origin people living in India for their livelihood
and second, the people living across the border (the
Madhesi) having blood relation (through marital

relations) for centuries and the people who have religious
faith, both Hindus and Buddhists, have pilgrimage
without any hassle for centuries. However, Maoists at
the time of insurgency and some armed groups utilized
this dispensation for their own purpose. Earlier the
Nepali Congress started armed struggles twice against
the government from the Indian soil.
The continuous opposition to the Treaty and the
constant demand for its review by some groups and
political parties, an eminent persons group (EPG) to
review the treaty and recommend their change or reject the
Treaty altogether was formed. The initiative of forming
the EPG had taken place during the Prime ministership
of Dr. Manmohan Singh, when the then Nepalese PM
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai visited India. During their meet,
it was agreed upon to have a committee, but no such
formation could take place. It was PM Modi who took
up the thread during his first visit to Nepal and it was
decided to form a group of four persons from each side
to constitute the EPG.
Significantly, the decision remained unexecuted.
PM Sushil Koirala's tenure ended without the formation
of EPG. It was not known whether he didn't take the
initiative in this regard or he failed in his endeavour to
select four eminent persons. PM Oli succeeded. Did
other parties including the Madhesi outfits not accept
Koirala’s nominees? PM KP Sharma Oli formed the
group during his earlier stint before visiting India.
Interestingly, PM Manmohan Adhikari had raised the
issue for the first time during his visit to India in 1995,
which was responded by his counterpart seeking his
proposal and the issue lingered henceforth.
The government of Nepal formed the EPG on 27
January 2016 that consisted of Dr. Bhesh Bahadur Thapa

(former ambassador to India and foreign minister was
the leader of the team), Neelamber Acharya (ambassador
to India), Surya Nath Upadhaya (Former bureaucrat)
and Rajan Bhattarai (leader of the ruling CPN-UML).
India, too, promptly constituted its EPG consisting of
Bhagat Singh Koshiyari, BC Uprety, Jayanta Prasad,
and Mahendra P. Lama. The first meeting of the group
was held in Kathmandu on July 4, 2016 with a provision
for a two-year non-extendable term.
However, the selection of four persons from
Nepal drew criticism from some quarters, as the group
represented only one community and represented the
Kathmandu elite, whose recommendations might not be
acceptable to the Madhesis, the original inhabitants on the
Nepalese side of the border. The process of formation of
the group looked partisan and arbitrary. Curiously, some
members were known for their public stands on the open
border dispensation. Significantly, PM Oli was learnt
to have directed the EPG on Feb. 2, 2016 not to repeat
mistakes that had been committed by Nepal in the past and
move ahead without compromising on national interests,
as if Nepal had committed the mistake by signing treaties
including the treaty of 1950 under review. 71
The formation raised some eyebrows, as its
recommendations might be used as a means to
be played in the hands of a few politicians. If the
recommendations are unrealistic, it will be difficult to
implement them on the one hand, and it might land the
country in another conflict apart from the existing one
on the other, as Madhesis may not accept them. Some
skeptics hold that the vastness of the ToR of the EPG
may lead to nowhere and it may prove to be a futile
effort as eight persons can hardly review objectively
71. Mishra, Group of Eminent Persons, THT, 9.3. 2016.

the complex issues of cultural relations existing for
centuries that too within two years. It will be hard
to adjust the existing relations in the 21st century,
when borders are being made irrelevant day by day
throughout the world and natural resources are being
harnessed for serving the humanity.
However, the Group, which completed its task of
preparing its report, is yet to submit it to the Indian PM
Modi first and then to the Nepalese PM Oli. Koshiyari,
leader of the Indian team, is the governor of Maharashtra
state of India and Uprety is no more. Interestingly, the
inability of the EPGs of India and Nepal to submit their
joint report to the Indian PM Modi concerns all.
4. Water resources
The fourth barrier is related to the utilization of
some common rivers and water resources. After India
became independent, the top priority for the state and
central governments was to give immediate relief to the
people of Eastern India who used to suffer hugely every
year, without fail, due to floods. Hence, there were
negotiations with the Government of Nepal to tame the
big rivers, which flow through Nepal and cause serious
flood effects in Bihar. Consequently, in the 1950s,
Koshi and Gandak projects were signed by India and
Nepal and executed accordingly.
These projects were largely criticized in Nepal for
favoring India, which was allowed to harness water
resources more ignoring the interest of Nepal. Though
the Gandak project, which was signed later, could address
some of the grievances raised by the Nepalese side, it
is commonly accepted that Nepal has been deceived
by India in Koshi and Gandak river projects, as Nepal
has been denied its rightful share of the anticipated
benefits. In fact, these were flood-controlling projects.
It is a truism that had there been no Koshi project, the
economic transformation of the people of the eastern
districts of Nepal would not have been uplifted so soon.
No doubt, by taming Koshi, the people of Bihar got rid
of their enormous sufferings as Koshi was regarded as
the “sorrow river”. Of course, only limited Nepalese
areas are saved from floods.
Perhaps, these projects were signed with a view
to harnessing cooperation aiming at human welfare
ignoring the borders as to which side was benefited
more. Perhaps, it was for three reasons. First, the then
top political leaders were equally concerned about the
welfare of India and Nepal since they had their education
in India and had also participated in Indian independent
movement. Secondly, the rivers’ flow is longer in India
than Nepal. And thirdly, Nepal was not in a position
to meet the expenses as it had been just free from the
oligarchic rule of the Ranas hardly a few years before
and that it did not have sufficient financial resources to
meet the costs of projects
In view of the past experience, Nepal is scared
of sharing of the water resources with India, as its
limited financial and technical capacity may not
safeguard its interest in the negotiations. Hence,
even the economical development was pushed back
to the back burner. It not only became over-cautious
on sharing the use of its water resources but at times
it became anti-India. It preferred to keep its people
in darkness and poverty than letting India utilize the
water resources fully. It seems that it chose to become
one-eyed for making India blind. The burning example
is the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, which was
conceived under the Mahakali Treaty between Nepal

and India in 1996, is yet to takeoff. Even in February
27-28, 2019 the meeting of the experts of India and
Nepal failed to prepare the Detailed Project Report
(DPR) for want of consensus. The project, apart from
generating electricity, will provide irrigation facility
to 0.13 million hectares of land in Nepal and 0.24
million hectares of land in India. Perhaps, since India
is bargaining hard, the DPR is getting delayed.72
Sadly, the fertile land in Tarai is getting turned
gradually into desert telling upon the production of
food grains considerably on the one hand, and causing
tension and clashes between the people living on both
sides of the border on the other, as rivers change their
courses frequently. Rivers in Tarai require taming
urgently. The deforestation and unbalanced utilization
of Siwalik (Chure) Range Mountains and rivers have
brought the beds of rivers up to cause floods in the areas
even with meagre rainfall. Floods create enormous loss
of property and life in both Nepal and India.
5. Matter of sphere of influence or

Interference in domestic matters
The fifth barrier is concerned with the matter of sphere
of influence. It is believed that India is very often directly
or indirectly involved in the Nepalese politics, which is
tantamount to Indian interference in Nepal. To some, the
restoration of power to the Shah dynasty in the name of
democracy by snatching power from the Ranas in 1951
was the first diplomatic interference by India in Nepal.
However, it is viewed differently by different sectors of
Nepal. Some hold that it was not an Indian interference
in Nepal, as the Nepalese citizens led it with support from
independent India in the interest of the people of Nepal at
72. Himalayan News Service, (THT) I.3. 2019.

large, who were deprived of their political rights.
The genesis of Indian interference in Nepal is traced
back to the 1950 treaty and “Delhi Compromise” which
allowed India to have a say in several matters pertaining
to Nepal. It was believed that ministers were appointed
on the advice of Delhi until King Tribhuvan survived. His
successor King Mahendra did not toe the Indian line and
sought Chinese support to neutralize India in which he
succeeded considerably. After his demise, his successor
King Birendra tried his best to insulate himself from
Indian influence and declared Nepal a zone of peace,
which was recognized by more than hundred twenty-
five nations except India; the result was obvious. The
very motive behind the proposal was to restrict India’s
influence on facilitating Nepalese leaders to organize
their anti-monarchy or pro-democratic movement from
the Indian soil. It is generally held that the absolute rights
of the king were curtailed by the People’s movement
of1990, which was indirectly supported by India. It is
also believed in some quarters that India was behind
the Maoist insurgency. Significantly, the 12-point
agreement was reached between the Maoists and the
Seven-PartyAlliance in Delhi in November 2005, which
paved the way to kick start the people’s movement-2 to
overthrow the monarchy successfully.
Perhaps, India has a policy to invite the new
Nepalese head of government to visit India. Almost all
Prime Ministers have visited India in a few months after
assuming the office, except a few, like Jhala Nath Khanal.
Actually, these visits just satisfy India’s ego. These visits
might be meant for seeking India’s economic support for
the development and also for establishing or renewing
personal contact with the Indian establishment.
It is questioned whether India has any political,
economic and other leverages over Nepal to force it

to follow the latter’s advice. Is Nepal psychologically
dependent on India or materially? The answers are
simple. Despite the treaty of 1950, Nepal is not
dependent on India entirely for its military hardware. Its
dependence on India for petroleum products and huge
gap in the balance of payment in trade and commerce
do not force Nepal to toe its line, as Nepal is making
payments in foreign currency, which India needs. Nepal
seems to be psychologically dependent on India, as it is
caused by its past mental impressions.
It was customary to invoke India in different ways
in all, big or small and serious or trivial political events.
Some have obsession with India as they find India’s
presence implicitly or explicitly in every vital decision
and hold India responsible. To some yet, India is used as
an alibi for its ills. It is no wonder that India and China
also now take interest in the appointments of Prime
Ministers and other high officials. Since Nepal-India
border is open, India attaches greatest importance to
its security concern. The conception that India engages
itself in Nepal’s political affairs at the highest level does
not hold water, as India’s influence has been neutralized
gradually by another powerful neighbour China and to
a lesser extent by the Western Power Block that are
increasingly active in Nepal. Some hold that India has
started influencing Nepal at the lower level, as it cannot
be effective at the top level.
6. Security
The sixth barrier is related to security perception.
Significantly, the national security dimension acquires
prime concern for modern India since its very inception,
as it had to deal with Pakistan. On its realization that high
mountains and deep seas cannot safeguard any nation in
the twentieth century, it was alert on its northern border

too sensing possibility of aggression/ encroachment by
the newly born communist China and it did face another
challenge in 1962 when there was border conflict with
China and, later on, with Pakistan in 1965 in full-fledged
war in its western and eastern sectors.
India has serious concerns for its internal and
regional security. In the past, there was a time when
India did really face secessionist and separatists’
agitations. In his book ‘India and Nepal’ S. D. Muni
writes, “The cases of Assam, Bodo, and Jharkhand
movements, Naga, Mizo and Tripura insurgencies, and
Punjab and Gurkha troubles may be mentioned here.”73
He states further, “India’s security concerns towards
China and the fallout of internal turmoil in Assam
and Darjeeling may be recalled here. The possibility
of Sikh terrorists and Bihar and West Bengal based
left-extremists (Naxalites) seeking shelter in Nepal
has occupied attention of India’s security managers.”
74
Even today, India is facing the Maoist insurgency
in its several states, which threatens its internal peace
gravely. With regard to regional security, Muni holds
the changing global and regional strategic environment
as the second important variable since India constitutes
the main focus of Super Power policies in South Asia,
as he writes, “The widening of Sino-Soviet schism and
the consolidation of Sino-US rapprochement during the
sixties and seventies further strengthened the need for
India and the Soviet Union to co-ordinate their regional
strategic perceptions. Needless to say that this impact
of global great power rivalry got perfectly linked to
the regional South Asian conflicts, between India and
China and India and Pakistan.” 75
73. Muni, S.D. 1992, p-10.

74. Muni, Ibid, pp-10-11
75. Muni, Ibid, p-46

India was skeptic about the role of Nepal in the
cold war era, as it was having good relations with
Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Bangladesh and even with China,
which were not friendly to it. Interestingly, in quest
of Nepal for reorganization and modernization of the
Nepal Army in August 1963 India not only agreed but
offered all possible assistance, which was accepted by
the then Royal Nepal Embassy, New Delhi on January
30, 1965. However, in 1969, the PM Kirtinidhi Bista
denounced the Understanding about the import of arms
and ammunition and asked India to withdraw Indian
technicians and observers (wireless operators) posted on
Nepal’s northern check-posts along the Chinese borders
and Military Liaison Officers Group from its Embassy.
Finally, India withdrew these personnel from Nepal
in 1970 as per the agreement between the government
of India and the Nepalese delegation led by the then
Foreign Secretary Yadunath Khanal. Interestingly, King
Mahendra declared, in a press interview in October 1970
that Nepal has agreed to:
(a) “exchange” military information with India on
developments harmful to each other; and
(b) permit the posting of a senior Indian military
officer in the embassy in Kathmandu for an
“agreed period and job” 76
Perhaps, India succeeded in getting some relief
on keeping its officer in the embassy. But this was the
greatest setback in the Nepal-India relations. It seemed
to happen partly because of the Chinese influence on
Nepal and also due to drastic change in the Nepalese
perception on Indian concept of its security and also
because of Indian establishment’s support to anti-
royal forces like the Nepali Congress. Unfortunately,
76. Rose, Ibid, pp-279-80).

the deficit of mutual trust still persists as a stumbling
block in getting India’s concern over security addressed
by Nepal, despite frequent highest-level Nepalese
dignitaries visiting India. India perceives that Nepal
is not keen on Indian security, supply of fake Indian
currency notes through Nepal and entry of terrorists into
India via Nepal. India has been asking for an extradition
treaty to control the menace but has not yet succeeded.
Hence India appears to have assigned its security
agencies to handle its strategic relations with Nepal.
7. Construction of Roads
China has been constructing roads in Nepal very
strategically since it defined its strategy in Nepal.
Coincidently, King Mahendra had decided to link Nepal
with China by road to lessen its dependence on India both
economically and militarily, when he faced opposition
from the Nepali Congress from the Indian soil after his
coup in December 1960, and India was reluctant to accept
his regressive step. Against India’s warning against the
communist regime of China, the king’s famous reply
was: “Communism does not travel in cabs.”
China’s first move was to link Kathmandu with
Lhasa by Kodari Highway. Then it linked Kathmandu
with Pokhara. It was assigned to construct east-west
Highway in eastern Terai but it was cancelled at the
request of India which took up the job. Kathmandu has
been connected with Kerung-Rasuwa road and other
roads are under construction to link Nepal and China in
such a way that India can be approached directly and
shortly from China. Kor La road will be the western link.
Kerung and Kodari are in the middle and a road in the
east is also being constructed in Taplejung. And some
roads have been proposed to be constructed under BRI.

There seems to be two reasons for the Chinese interests
in roads. First, China may become the first economy of
the world superseding the United States within a few
years. Therefore, it needs a big market. Nepal cannot be
so, as out of its thirty million people, about five to seven
million are out of the country. Hence it can be India alone,
which is the second largest economy in Asia. And it can
be easily and shortly approachable through Nepal.
Secondly, there are border disputes between India
and China and there was a war between them in 1962.
There were conflicts again even in 2020. Though these
two countries have a mechanism to negotiate and settle
the disputes, there is no progress on this score so far.
Psychologically, India is always skeptic about China’s
intention in the region and perceives road constructions
by China in Nepal as a threat to its security, because
getting more access to India may be strategically harmful.
Interestingly, the plains of Terai/Madhes, the adjoining
Indian areas have been divided into five fragments in
terms of provinces deliberately to link China with India
through all these provinces.
India is a fast growing economy, which requires
market. Nepal, though small in size, has been an
Indian market so far. Nepal’s commerce with India is
about 60 percent of its total foreign trade. India must
be aware of its challenges. Nepal will have to evaluate
the worth of these roads, as it must not want to be a
mere transit point of trade between India and China. It
may not help Nepal grow its economy, especially the
manufacturing industries.
8. Recruitment of Gurkhas in the Indian Army

The British establishment in India was interested
in the recruitment of Gorkhalis in its army, especially
after the First World War in which Gorkhalis fought

courageously. Their bravery, honesty and their dedication
to sacrifice their lives as soldiers impressed the British
during their wars with Nepal. The recruit of Gurkhas to
the British army used to be an issue the British wanted
to settle forever during the Shah’s direct rule. However,
some Rana prime ministers allowed recruitment and
some rejected it too. In the Second World War, Gorkhalis
sacrificed their lives but with no satisfactory rewards.
Some of them were sent back home empty-handed,
which antagonized them against the Ranas.
After India became independent in August 1947,
the continuity of Gorkhalis in the Indian army was a
problem to be addressed by both India and the British.
Hence, with regard to the recruitment of Gorkhalis, a
tripartite agreement was reached on the Memorandum
dated 7th November 1947 between Nepal, the United
Kingdom, and the Government of the Dominion of India,
which was signed at Kathmandu on 9th day of November
1947 by Padma Shamsher Jung B. R., A.C.B. Symon
and Bedi. The agreement provides for the transfer of all
volunteers from Regular battalions of each of the second,
sixth, seventh, and tenth Gurkha Rifles leaving the rest
with Indian army. There were twenty battalions.
After independence, India too took interest in their
continuity, which has been intermittently opposed by
the political parties to suit their cause. Even today,
the recruitment continues to remain an issue between
Nepal and India.
9. Madhesi and Madhes Movement

The ninth barrier is the apparent India’s concern
over Madhesis, the people who constitute more than
twenty percent of the total population and are traditional
settlers. They have been marginalized for centuries.
They have been craving for their normal and natural
identity in the country, which no other communities
like indigenous communities (Janajatis) and Dalits face.
Their nationality is always questioned.
Ironically, they are sandwiched between Indian
and Nepalese perceptions. Some foreign scholars and
researchers for various reasons have overlooked the
issue. Either they did not have any interest in getting
more information about them as it might not come under
their scheme of research or deliberately did not go deep
into the problem. It is evident from the observation of
Leo E. Rose, who finds the presence of Madhesi “the
large proportion of the Nepali population (20 to 25
percent) which is of recent Indian origin” a problem with
both ideological and cultural terms for Nepal’s national
identity.77 Surprisingly, he does not take trouble in tracing
back the history of old settlement of Madhesi community,
who were there much before Prithvi Narayan Shah
captured these areas from different principalities. There
was Simrawn Gadh civilization in Bara district much
earlier. It is on records that the rulers of the Makawanpur
state, which was captured by Prithvi Narayan Shah before
he captured Kathmandu, made land grants to the abbots
of different temples. Abbot Ram Das of Janaki Monastry
had received land grants from Manik Sen in 1727, Abbot
Sital Giri of Kuwan Monastry received land grant from
Sujagat Sen in 1740, and Abbot Sital Giri received
grant from Hem Karna Sen in 1753.78 There was Sakya
dynasty to which Gautam Buddha belonged at Lumbini
more than two millennia ago.
Geographically, Tarai/Madhes is a strip of plain
cultivable land averaging ten miles (16kms) in width.
During the Rana regime deforestation was a serious
crime. After the 1950s the deforestation of the dense
77. Burghart Richard, The History of Janakpurdham, 2016, p-109, footnote)
78. Regmi, Mahes Chandra, Imperial Gurkha, 1999, pp-3-5.

jungle of 12 to 16 km width (Charkose Jhari) between
Siwalik hills (the foothills of the Himalayas), the widths
of Tarai/Madhes have been doubled. Madhes is a thickly
populated region now. It is the most productive region
and majority of industries are in this region. It feeds not
only its own inhabitants but also the majority of total
population of Nepal. Its main crop is paddy. Previously, it
used to export rice and jute to India. Despite the doubled
area of Madhes, Nepal is importing rice and other food
grains in large quantities from India these days.
During the last 250 years and specifically in the last
sixty years, barring the last two decades, the status of
Madhesis have not undergone any spectacular change.
On the scale of political power and position, during the
last fifty years, Madhesi leaders could not rise above the
post of deputy prime Minister. They are hardly given a
few seats in constitutional bodies and in the diplomatic
service. However, their number is increasing gradually.
Ironically, no one was engaged in the erstwhile palace
service. Incidentally, the first Constituent Assembly
elected Madhesi president and vice president in 2008, due
to their strategic election on the basis of number game.
Even after the 1990s when democracy was restored,
the plight of the youths of Madhes has hardly improved.
Those who have studied in India faced discrimination.
It was difficult for them to get jobs. Their frustration led
them to the Madhesi Uprising of 2007 to get Madhes
Pradesh to have a justified share in the administration. It
forced the government to raise the number of seats to be
elected for Constituent Assembly proportionally at the
cost of more than four dozen innocent lives that were
shot dead by the security agencies. The Uprising forced
the government to fix quotas on seats for Madhesis in
the government services.

Significantly, Madhes agitation took a serious
turn after the publication of the first draft of the
constitution ignoring their claims. The Madhesi
outfits facing the bullets of the armed forces opposed
it vehemently. Although the constitution was adopted
in September 2015, the agitation continued even
after the killing of protesters. It ultimately led to
the blockade of the India-Nepal borders, which was
supported by the Indian government and the people
settled on the Indian side. Of course, a province was
carved covering only 8 districts out of twenty where
they are settled in large number. This province has
been named as ‘Madhes Pradesh’.
10. Ownership of Buddha

The tenth barrier, which is emotional in nature, is
the Nepalese citizenship of Buddha. It is an undisputed
truth that Buddha was born in Lumbini, which falls
under the present political boundary of Nepal. He was
born about 2550 years ago. At that time, there was no
country like India and definitely Nepal border was not
extended to that area. It is a fact that Buddha attained
Buddhatva (enlightenment) at Bodh Gaya, now in
Bihar state of India. Buddha addressed his disciples
describing the Dharma Parivartana Chakra at Sarnath
in Uttar Pradesh, India. Buddha breathed his last at
Kushinagar, which too falls in Uttar Pradesh. Before
it was confirmed that Lumbini was the birthplace of
Buddha, it was said that India was the birthplace of
Buddha. Though it has been confirmed and accepted
world over that Nepal is his birthplace, Nepal still has a
bad feeling about India which used to claim that Buddha
was born in India. Sometimes even today some Indian
leaders claim so when they visit abroad.

11. The Psychology of Duality of Mind
The eleventh barrier is the mindset of the ruling
class. It was a reality that once Nepal had conquered
several principalities in both east and west of present
day Nepal, as has been discussed earlier. It extended
upto Tista in the east in 1777 when Prithvi Narayan
Shah died. Nepal captured the state of Kumayun in
1791 and Gadhwal in 1804-09. These were taken over
by the British in 1815-16 under Sugauli Treaty.79 The
province of Kumaun was under Nepal for 24 years,
Garhwal was under it for a decade and the areas in
the east were under it for nearly four decades (43
years). Nepal, which occupied these areas for limited
periods, still holds that these areas belonged to Nepal,
as these were conquered once forgetting the reality
that these areas were independent for centuries. The
very psychology also plays some role in defining
Nepal-India relations. Interestingly, Nepal lost its vast
portions of its land under the Treaty of Sugauli signed
in 1816. Of course some portions of the lost areas were
restored to Nepal in 1860 after it helped the British
capture Lucknow in 1857.
Perhaps, the ruling class of Nepal suffers from
superiority complex. As a matter of fact, a superiority
complex is a coping mechanism to deal with an inferiority
complex, as someone with a superiority complex asserts
one’s own feelings of inferiority, which sometimes
prove self-delusional. These complexes, which are
related to individual human mind, seem effective on
social and national psyche too. Nepal feels inferiority
complex with India in regard to its vastness of area,
population, developmental stage, social engineering,
education and scientific achievements, agricultural
79. Sylvian Levi, Ibid. p-18, First Volume, Nepali translation.

self-reliance and providing livelihood to thousands of
Nepalese citizens. It has a huge deficit in trade with
India and it depends on India for supply of essential
commodities. Nepal does not want to forget the losses
it suffered due to the treaty of Sugauli. Side by side, the
Indian leaders and officials often show their superiority
in their treatment of Nepal. The gap between the two
sometimes eludes solution of the problems.
12. Politics of Language

The twelfth barrier is the supremacy of one
language. After capturing Kathmandu valley, the first
job of Prithvi Narayan Shah and his successors was to
impose Nepali language in administration replacing
local Newari Language, which is now called ‘Nepal
Bhasha’. Sylvain Levi, accepting the predominance of
Hindi in Terai, writes, “In spite of the predominance
of Hindi in Terai, the Gorkha language, a mixture of
Indian and hilly elements, continued to spread over
far off regions of Nepal by dint of the administration
and the army.” 80
In Tarai, Hindi was spoken as a common language,
as it was difficult for a Madhesi from the east to
communicate himself with another Madhesi from the
west. In Tarai Hindi was the medium of teaching.
Being the lingua franca, it has unique strength of
uniting almost all 20 districts of Tarai/Madhes to form
a block. It was the medium through which government
officials and educated persons used to communicate
with an ordinary person and it still continues because
it is difficult for them to communicate themselves
either in Maithili or Bhojapuri or in Avadhi. The
80. Jayant Prasad, Lower the temperature, defuse the issue, The Hindu, India,
23.5. 2020.

all pervasiveness of Hindi made not only the ruling
elite of Kathmandu including the government and the
entire Nepali speaking community scared of Hindi’s
binding force, but accept it as an obstacle coming in
the way of unifying Nepal through Nepali language
in the form of a monolingual country. They also
apprehend that in the future, Hindi may be a dividing
factor of Nepal on the lines of language. Thus,
through government policy, Hindi was removed as
the medium of teaching in schools and colleges.
But it failed in separating and dislocating the blood
relations existing between the people of both sides.
Hence, the politics of language also functions like a
barrier. Curiously, the government of India is hardly
doing anything substantial to develop Hindi which
unites the peoples of Nepal and India.
13. Border Dispute

Nepal and India are facing a cartographic battle over
335sq.km of land on the northwestern borders of Nepal
after India published its political map depicting the area
as its own. As a result, in early June 2020, Nepal hurriedly
amended its constitution to incorporate the area on its
map to legitimize its claim over it, which was shown on
the Indian map released in November 2019.
Curiously, the area under dispute is uninhabitable
half of a year. It was one of the crucial routes for trade
with Tibet during the British rule for one and a half
centuries. It is the shortest route to Kailash Mansarobar.
It became a strategic point for independent India in 1962
after it had border conflict with China. The possession
of the land has now become a national issue for Nepal
and it wants to get it back from the Indian military
possession at the earliest.

Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, a former Director General
of Survey department of Nepal, claims that the British
map of 1827 shows Limpiyadhura as the originating
point of Kali river, whereas the British map of 1879
depicts Kuti, Navi, and Gunji (under dispute) in Indian
Territory. Interestingly, the map of 1879 published by
British India suggests that no physical possession of
the land was given to Nepal earlier. Does it mean the
British drew the map of 1879 on the basis of the actual
possession of the land?
Nepal has been raising the issue with India
from time to time. It had dialogues with India earlier
unsuccessfully too, as Nepal’s stand was based on the
Treaty of Sugauli, whereas India seems to claim it on
the basis of 1879 map and actual possession of land.
Nepal has been collecting land revenue from that area
and had conducted census in 1963 (2018 B.S.).

Chapter-10
CONCLUSION
Historically, after the treaty of Sugauli was signed
in 1816, Nepal was forced to have pro-British foreign
policy, as it failed to get support from China and the then
Indian states. It was strengthened further by the Rana
rulers, who developed good relations with the British
by rendering armed support to the British to quash the
rebels in 1857 and provided massive supports during
the World Wars. The Ranas were optimistic about the
continuity of the British rule even after the Second
World War. However, political conditions changed
drastically and India became independent. Though
Nepal tried to maintain its traditional good relations
with India, the democratic India stirred the peaceful
relations by supporting the democratic ambitions of the
Nepalese people against the Rana regime and succeeded
in overthrowing it.
Significantly, Nepal ended the 104 years old
oligarchic rule of the Ranas in early 1951 through an
armed revolution led by the Nepali Congress, whereas
India achieved freedom from the British rule after a
peaceful struggle for almost a century. Thus, Nepal and
India differed with regard to the nature of their struggles,
though some top ranking Nepalese leaders participated
in the Indian independence movement. The freedom

struggles of both countries have become all past history.
The leaders of today have not gone through the ordeal
of freedom movements. It is a time for peaceful politics
when parties are for gaining or sharing state powers
through electoral process. Hence both the countries
have only peacetime leaders with different mindsets.
Hardly any leader is seen to strive for the betterment of
the people of these countries.
Interestingly, the absolute monarchy was reinstated
under ‘Delhi Formula’ to pave the way for the democratic
living of the people, which ultimately proved to be
erroneous, as it never allowed political leadership to grow
and bloom. As a result, Nepal did not have a democratic
rule except for eighteen months when an elected
government led by BP Koirala was formed in1959. A
King may be a good ruler but not a good leader. The
Kings, one after another, tried to show their democratic
posture, which stunted the growth of political leadership
by depriving the country of a dynamic leader. To a great
extent, bilateral relations are dependent not only on
social, cultural, economic, and geographic conditions of
the countries but also on psychology of the leader, who
finally dictates the course of relations.
Nepal’s dependency on India

Fortunately, India inherited a well-developed
bureaucracy from the British. Hence it did not face any
administrative problems. On the contrary, Nepal lacked
it. One of the reasons of Nepal’s dependence on India
is its own failure in utilizing its natural and human
resources. It is one of the least developed counties of the
world not because of its dearth of resources but because
of its inability to exploit its natural potentialities to
achieve a high rate of growth. The economic growth

has never been the prime objective of the rulers of
Nepal. They were more concerned with their interest
in power and its continuity ignoring the interests of the
state. Despite their primary political goal, there were
some shortcomings, which obstructed its economic
march from the days of its new political formation.
First, the lack of bureaucracy, at the early stage, was the
main reason that made it rely on India for its support.
Previously, there was no permanent administrative setup
in the country till 1950, as it was governed by the whims
of the highest authority. The immediate job of the new
government, which took over in 1951, was to create a
permanent service mechanism to deliver services to the
people in the changed democratic dispensation. There
was hardly any permanent staff, as every year there used
to be ‘Pajani’, (a summary dismissal of staff) in which
some administrative staff had to be dismissed. Hence, it
needed administrative and logistic support from India,
which was the only neighbour to come to help in no
time to meet its requirements.
Secondly, it depended on India for political
support as well because it was not stable politically.
Thirdly, even for its economic development, it had
to lean on India primarily. India has been supporting
it in its development and is its biggest donor, though
China too has come forward with its great support. At
the early stage, India, which was itself in its formative
stage, was experiencing difficulties in meeting its own
developmental challenges with its limited resources.
In fact, it was not in a position to meet all requirements
of Nepal and naturally Nepal had to look beyond
India. It enlarged its horizon to look beyond India
politically and it got exposures to the external world.
It interacted with them and established relations with
the countries all over the world.

With regard to Nepal-India relations, Dr. S.D.
Muni, writes, “India’s Nepal policy has always been a
matter of debate in the inner policy circles as also at the
level of political competition. For instance, during the
anti-Rana revolution of 1950-51, Nehru was confronted
by two conflicting pressures: one, from the right of
the centre, which wanted not to disturb the Ranas and
have pragmatic alliance with them to protect India’s
perceived security interests. The second pressure
came from the Congress Socialists, i.e. those taking
left of the centre, who asked for all out support for the
democratic forces and carry the momentum of change
generated in Nepal at that time to the extent of turning
the kingdom into a Republic. These polarities in the
Indian political culture have continued to reflect that
Nepal-bias for all these years, wherever need for taking
position has arisen. These polarities existed even in the
Janta government (with its socialist members pushing
the government towards greater identification with B.P.
Koirala and his Nepali Congress and the traditionalist
elements, like the B.J.P. and even Prime Minister
Morarji Desai favouring a harmonious relationship with
the king, which was otherwise committed to be soft and
accommodating towards all the neighbours, including
Nepal. This was to underline the Janta government’s
contrast with Mrs. Gandhi’s approach and style in
dealing with India’s neighbours.”81
As stated above, there was a kind of continuity
in Indian approach towards Nepal till 1977. After the
electoral defeat of Indira Gandhi, for the first time a
non-Congress government led by Morarji Desai came to
power. Though PM Morarji Desai and some ministers
were former Congressmen, A B Vajpayee and Nanabhai
Desmukh were from a different political background.
81. Muni, S.D. India and Nepal, 1992, pp,9-11.

Interestingly, the political instability that started with
Morarji Desai government (1977-79) could not patch up
the deficit of trust and cordiality with Nepal. However,
Desai fulfilled the demand of Nepal for two separate
treaties for trade and transit. It was P. V. N. Rao
government, which completed its full term and signed
the Mahakali Pancheshwar multi-purpose project. PM
Rao tried to improve India-Nepal relations. The relations
remained smooth during the six-year rule of Vajpayee.
However, the Dr. Singh’s government maintained the
bilateral relations by supporting the People’s movement-
2 (2006), which finally led to the abolition of monarchy.
The Modi’s government endeavoured with a new vigour
to reach new heights but slipped down even from the
height, which exited earlier.
India’s diplomatic difficulties

The India-Nepal relation was challenging in the
past, and continues to be so with a greater degree.
Contrary to a guardian or well-wisher’s role played by
Nehru by advising the Kings and the Prime Ministers at
times, India’s reluctance on the exchange of old Indian
currency notes with new ones (a few million Indian
currency notes lying with the Nepal Rashtra Bank, the
central bank of Nepal, due to demonetization by India in
2016) indicates clearly the level of relations India wants
to have with Nepal.
Significantly, India’s foreign policy has been facing
constant difficulties in Nepal on several fronts. First,
it confronts with its internal contradictions. The post-
independent India decided to have a foreign policy that
recognized and respected the sovereignty, integrity and
independence of Nepal, on the one hand and wanted
to have common foreign and defence policies towards

China on the other. British India faced Tibet directly
and China remotely. The British succeeded in having
greater control over Nepal only after 1816 when Sugauli
Treaty was ratified by Nepal. Its relations with Tibet
were somewhat defined in course of time but its relation
with China was neither defined properly nor was it
needed then. There was no clear-cut line of demarcation
of border between India and China on the map, which
the British got drawn as McMahon line by Lieutenant-
Colonel Sir Henry McMahon. But there was no line
of demarcation on the ground that later created border
disputes between India and China.
The second difficulty related to its special relation
with Nepal is its open border with Nepal. If its international
borders with Nepal are restricted, it cannot boast about
having special relations with Nepal. So it wants borders to
remain open. However it entails that it needs continuous
vigilance at the borders to check that no criminal and
terrorist enters its territories to create havoc there.
Simultaneously, the Kathmandu elite is adamant
to have the open border restricted, if not sealed for it
holds open border dispensation responsible for the
imaginary flux of Indian immigrants to Nepal to upset
the demography of Nepal.
The third is related to India’s genuine concern of
security on its northern borders. To have its northern
border secure, it always considered seriously holding
Nepal under its security umbrella. After 1950, the
Nepal-India relations through the treaty of 1950,
continued to maintain the formal traditional relations.
However, in course of time, the Nepalese stand
underwent drastic change, which is evident from the
analysis made earlier. Hence, India has to accept it as
a pseudo concern or has to live with it like a migraine

for the days to come. This contradiction may continue
implicitly and explicitly.
The fourth is the flawed perception of the Indian
establishment, which always equated Kathmandu and
its elite with Nepal. It always tried to please them
at any cost neglecting others who really constitute
Nepal. If it continues for those who are in power, it is
well and good for them; and if it deviates, Kathmandu
elite will oppose it as has been experienced recently
while promulgating the new constitution. Hence,
any change in perception will meet with all sorts of
opposition and resistance from Kathmandu and will
face it in the future too.
The fifth one is only a corollary of the fourth. It
concerns with the inhabitants of Terai/Madhes region
who aspire for equality with the hill-origin people.
With the people’s movements in Nepal, Madhesis and
other marginalized communities like Janajatis and
Dalits started aspiring for equality with the ruling elite
and proportional representations in all fields. They
are struggling for it against the establishment’s stiff
resistance. It is obvious from the adoption of the new
constitution by the constituent assembly half-heartedly
leaving room for another struggle. India, if it remains
neutral, will be welcomed by the elite and if it shows its
sympathy to the Madhesis, it will invite opposition from
Kathmandu and its ruling elite.
Sixthly, India faced different political factors in
maintaining and developing its relations with Nepal.
Previously, in the Nepalese politics, there were three
decisive factors: first, it was the Monarchy, which is
now abolished. The monarch used to be the sovereign
and had effective control over the Kathmandu elite
and kept its people oppressed and voiceless. Second,

the political parties, which were secondary, have now
become primary after the dawn of democracy in 1990.
Since these parties are engaged in their own power game
the country suffers from political instability. Third, it is
the people whose interests count most in any democratic
dispensation. Nepal is a country with more than 120
castes and communities with their mother tongues. It
is multicultural, multi-religious, multi-racial and multi-
lingual. Since Nepal is not a monolithic nation, India
has also to deal with the people who are marginalized.
Interestingly, almost all parties except Madhesi parties
are led by a political class, which are in power, will
not tolerate their minimized dominance. Hence, it is a
Herculean task before India to have balanced relations
with Nepal. Any hasty and immature decision and action
will prove to be problematic for India.
The role of China

From the early days of Modern Nepal, Shah
Kings and Regents sought China’s help to counter
British India unsuccessfully, as they could not play
the China card. In between China and Nepal Tibet
was there. The emergence of communist China in
1949, which captured Tibet in 1959 and declared it
its autonomous region, changed the very dynamics of
regional politics. Monarchy and communist regimes
are similar in respect of governance that both prefer
centralized, regimented and authoritarian rule. China
always stood by the Monarchy, whereas India, at least,
pretends to stand for its people and democracy. This is
the basic difference between the two. China therefore
remains an important factor, which used to play its role
silently and strategically in the past. Now it has openly
expanded its sphere of influence. In this connection,
Lok Raj Baral writes, “China’s clout in Nepal seemed
to have increased in recent years, while India’s role
is somewhat declined despite its overarching relations
with Nepal”82 This has actually pushed India to the
corner. India seems to have failed in asserting itself.
India is now on the horns of a dilemma, as it
is difficult for it to accept the reality as it is, and it
is more difficult for it to get it changed to suit it. It
warrants India’s introspection, revision and decision
to choose its course of action to deal with it suitably.
The present condition has emerged partly because of
some actions taken by India and partly due to Nepal’s
internal necessity and partly on account of China. It
has been supporting Pakistan against India in several
ways and now it wishes to play Nepal against India, as
it has found another friend in Nepal, which is hardly
happy with India.
India requires introspection over its own policies
and performances in Nepal, on the one hand on and
the Nepalese leaders with whom it may be difficult to
deal with on the other. There are leaders who cannot
be changed at any cost. It should not favour one and
disfavour another, as has been believed. It cannot afford
to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
The deficiency of India’s past performance in
executing its earlier agreements is another challenge
that affects its relations indirectly. It is perceived that
India did not execute the provisions of the agreements
on the two major river projects, which were signed and
executed earlier. The confusion should be cleared as early
as possible and the Nepalese claims should be addressed
immediately. Perhaps, the problem is that the agreements
were signed by the central government of India, whereas
82 Baral, Lok Raj, 2018, Preface to Politics of Geo-Politics: Continity and

Change in India-Nepal Relations, p.viii.

the execution part was the subject of Indian states that
marred the fulfillment of the agreements.
For the present state of affairs, there are four
reasons. First, it is leadership of Nepal; the second is the
Nepalese political condition; the third is assertive China
and finally, it is India’s own policy. The relationship
deteriorated when KP Sharma Oli, who was once in
India’s good book, gradually distanced himself from
India. He appears to have shifted his stand completely
in favour of China because he got annoyed with India
during his first stint as PM when he was forced to resign.
He claimed that at the behest of India, his competitor
PK Dahal Prachanda, another Chairperson of his Party,
brought the motion of no confidence against him in
parliament with support from the Nepali Congress
leader SB Deuba. However, Prachanda claimed that he
went against him because Oli did not keep his words of
sharing the post in turn.
Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai took up
arms against the state with a demand of forty-points
submitted to the government before waging the war in
1996. Interestingly, most of the demands were against
India. Dr. Bhattarai, a former student of JNU Delhi,
was believed to have a soft corner for India, persuaded
Prachanda to give up his anti-India agenda, which
facilitated the Nepalese peace process. After the new
constitution was passed by the Constituent assembly-2
in September 2015, the baton was to be transferred to Oli
by PM Sushil Koirala as per agreement between them
before Koirala assumed Prime Ministership. However,
Koirala forced Oli to contest election against him and
got defeated by Oli with support from Prachanda with
a tacit agreement to share the post of Prime Minster in
turn. After getting betrayed by Oli, Prachanda sought

support from Deuba and became Prime Minster with
an agreement to share the post in turn again. He kept
his words and allowed SB Deuba to succeed him. He
again turned the table against Deuba and contested both
federal and provincial elections in cooperation with the
CPN-UML forming a left alliance. Significantly, though
the UML, which did not get majority in the House of
Representatives of its own, formed his left alliance
government with an absolute majority in the House,
Prachanda’a party, the Maoist Centre Party secured
substantial seats in the election. Oli became Prime
Minster again with a tacit agreement with Prachnda to
share the post in turn. Later, the two were merged to
form a single party the Communist Party of Nepal. It
is believed that it was under the Chinese pressure that
the merger took place. The formation was carried out so
hurriedly that even after a lapse of more than two years,
these two parties fought for proper sharing of power that
ultimately led to their bifurcation in 2021.
India seems to be responsible for this mess because
it did not proceed cautiously. The present establishment
failed to understand the complexities of India-Nepal
relations from the very beginning. It pressurized Nepal
to withhold the passing of the new constitution to make
it broad to include the genuine demands of the Madhesis
who were fighting in the streets and facing bullets of the
security agencies. All major parties had already made
up their minds to give only a fragmented portion of
the land for Madhes Pradesh. It was immature to send
the Foreign Secretary to negotiate at the eleventh hour
when most of the formalities were completed and even
the Madhesi stand of blocking the border could have
been tactfully dealt with without affecting the bilateral
relations. Later, the initiatives to restore the warmth
of relations appeared almost hollow. The present

establishment of India showed its narrow-mindedness
in not exchanging a few million Indian rupees lying in
the Rashtra Bank of Nepal when India demonetized its
500 rupee notes in 2016.
Interestingly, the border dispute of Kalapani was
lingering for several years, got life after India published
its map covering the disputed areas as its own. Nepal
too acted against it and got these areas incorporated
on its map in 2020. The distance between PM Oli and
PM Modi increased and Nepal rushed towards China.
Despite many high levels visits and agreements signed
in 2020, no substantial progress was made due to
Covid-19 pandemic and the political instability that was
created by the internal bickering in the CPN for prime
ministership between Oli and Prachanda took serious
tern and the party was divided again. Even a group of
MPs of the UML led by former PM MK Nepal deserted
the party and formed a party of their own. With support
of Prachanda and MK Nepal a new government under
the leadership SB Deuba was formed in July 2021. Of
course, there is no pro-China decisions taken despite
senior Chinese leaders’ visits to Nepal. Though PM
Deuba has visited India and PM Modi visited Nepal, the
drifting of the course in favour of India looks difficult,
as India does not show its positive stance on solving
the problem.
To get the natural course of relations, a well
thought out plan is needed. The recent controversy
over the demarcation of the international borders in
northwestern area of Kalapani should be discussed
to resolve it peacefully through negotiations. It is the
prime duty of the leaders of these two countries to
sit together and evolve a common interest strategy to
avoid further gap between the two. Bilateral relations

will improve if both the sides decide and act positively.
The reason is obvious. The relations between the two
countries are just like a two-way traffic. No one can
clap with one hand. Either India should wait patiently
till Nepal realizes the relative importance of its relations
with India, or India may make Nepal feel the relative
importance of its relations.
Need of Rational and Magnanimous

Leadership
Generally, leaders are of two types: democratic and
authoritarian. A democratic leader believes in politics
of consensus and follows a set of rules and regulations,
whereas an authoritarian leader behaves arrogantly and
sidelines his opponents. However, a democratic leader
is a rational leader as he acts reasonably. Hence, Nepal
and India require such leaders who can understand the
genuine grievances and needs of each country and can
act to meet them sincerely. Such leaders can bridge the
gap between the two countries considerably and may
pave the way for a better future for both countries.
A leader should not only be reasonable but also
broad-minded. He should keep in mind the welfare of
the whole region if he wants to emerge as a regional or
global leader. India wants to be a regional and global
leader; it must keep its regional responsibility in its mind
while taking any decision, political or commercial. A
regionally isolated leader cannot be a global leader. It
has been rightly said: Udaracharitanam tu vasudhaiva
kutumbakam (for persons of magnanimous character,
the world is a family.

Bibliography
 Baral, Lok Raj, 2018, Politics of Geo-Politics: Continuity
and Change in India-Nepal Relations, p. viii, pub. by
Adarsh Books, New Delhi.
 Burghart, Richard, 2016, The History of Janakpurdham,
1st edition, Social Science Baha and Himal Books, Himal
Kitab Pvt. Ltd. 521 Narayan Gopal Sadak, Lazimpart,
Kathmandu-2
 Joshi, Ram Hari, Atmakatha Tatha Nepali Congress-
sanga Gansiaka Samjnanaharu, The Rising Sun Printers,
Teku, Kathmandu, 1st edition, 2067(BS)
 Koirala, B.P. Atmavritamta, 2055 BS, Jagadamba
Prakashana, 1st edition, Lalitpur , Nepal.
 Koirala M.P. 2008, A Role in a Revolution, pub. by
Jagadamba Prakashan, Patan Dhoka, Lalitpur, Nepal.
 Krikpatrick, William J., 2007, Rupa. Co, 7/16, Ansari
Road, Daryagunj, New Delhi, 110002
 Khanal, Yadu Nath, 1988, Essays in Nepal’s Foreign
Affairs, pub. By Murari Prasad Upadhyay, Gha 1-29,
Kathmandu-2, Nepal.
 Levi Sylvain, 1905, Le Nepal: Etude Historique
dun Royaume Hindu, Nepali Translation,5th edition,
2013,Himal Kitab Pvt. Ltd, Narayan Gopal Sadak,
Kathmanu-2.
 Muni S.D., 1992, India and Nepal, Konark Publishers
Pvt Ltd, A-149, Main Vikas Marg, Delhi 110092.
 Rasgotra, Maharajakrishna, A life in Diplomacy, 2016,
First pub. in Viking by Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd,
7th Floor, Infinity Tower C,DLF Cyber City, Gurgoan
122002, Haryana, India.

 Regmi, Mahesh C.1999, Imperial Gurkha, first edition,
Pub. by Adroit Publishers, C-8/2,Yamuna Vihar,
Delhi,110053.
 Rose, Leo E. 1971, Nepal: Strategy for Survival,
South Asia Edition, published by Mandala Book Point,
Kantipath, Reprinted in Nepal, 2010.
 Saran, Shyam, 2017, How India Sees The World, Kautilya
to the 21st Century, Juggernot Books, K S House, 118
Shahpur Jat, New Delhi 110049.India
 Shaha, Rishikesh, 1992, Nepal’s Foreign Policy: Focus
on Nepal-India Relations, Pub. under Nepal’s India
Policy, by CNAS, ed. By Dhruba Kumar, Centre for
Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur,
Kathmandu Nepal.
News Papers
 Annapurna Post, Vernaculary daily, Kathmandu.
 Naya Patrika, Vernacular daily, Kathmandu.
 Republica, English daily, Kathmandu.
 The Himalayan Times (THT), English daily,
Kathmandu.
 The Hindu, English daily, India
 The Kathmandu Post, English daily, Kathmandu.
 The Rising Nepal, English daily, Kathmandu.
 The Statesman, English daily, published from Delhi and
Kolkata (India)
 The Open Market (Khula Bazar) Vol. 5, August/
September, 2010, A Collection of Articles on Nepal-
India Cooperation, Kathmandu.

INDEX
Abadhi, 63, BIMSTEC, 76, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85
Abbasi, Shahid Khan, 88, 91
Bharatpur, 9
Abdul Kadir Khan, 7
Bhattarai, K.P.
Acharya, Neelamber, 131
Bhattarai, Dr. Baburam, 50, 54,
Afghanistan, 11, 17, 79, 109 74, 87, 131, 185
Amarnath, 5 Bhattarai, Rajan. 130
Assam, 43, 77, 137. 139 Bhojapuri, 146
Badri-Kedar, 5 Birgunj, 53, 64
Banbasa, 127 Bodo, 137
Banke, 124 Bodh Gaya, 145
Baral, Lok Raj, 156, 164, 166 Buddha, 143, 145
Bardia, 124 Burma, 11
Basit, Abdul, 78 Bhutan, 11, 41, 46, 79, 81, 82
British, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, BRI, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 102,
16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30, 32, 37, 124, 109, 140, 168
125, 128, 140, 144, 146, 148, 149,
150, 153, 154, 156 Budhi Gandaki 97
Banaras, 8, 11 Butwal 9, 96
Bedi, 142 Calcutta, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 125,
Bhandari, Bidya Devi, 65, 67, 69, CBI, 104

94, 99, 101
Cambodia, 96
Bihar, 11, 63, 133, 138, 144
Canning, G.G. 13
Bijalpura (Bardibas), 99
Chandra Shekhar, 38, 44, 45
Birendra, King, 41, 47, 46, 117,
130, 135 Chennai, 102

China, 21, 22, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 44, 45, 77
39, 40, 53, 58, 69, 76, 77, 78, 87,
88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, Gandhi, Sonia, 149
98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 119, 123, Ghayoom, Maummon Abdul, 76
124, 130, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141,
Gillespie, Genral, 9
148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157,
158, 160, Ghimire, Madhav Prasad, 54
Constituent Assembly, 3, 22, 28, Giri, Sital, 143
51, 52, 59, 72, 118, 144,
Giri Tulsi, Dr., 31
Connor, W. F. O’, 128
Girvan Juddha, 7, 11
Cornwallis, Marquis, 125
Gokhale, B.K., 113
Corona, 104, 108, 109
Gorkha, 3, 5, 6, 18, 147
Covid-19, 104, 107, 108, 160
Gorkhalis, 6, 141, 142
Darjeeling, 138
Gundevia, Y, D, 114
Desai Morarji, 38, 40, 42, 152,
153, Gunji, 148
Deuba, Sher Bahadur ( Deuba, Gupta, Sri Prakash, 19
S,B.) 48, 64, 82, 96, 108
Gurkha, 14, 19, 142, 176
Dhaka, 50, 76, 78
Gurung, Dr. Haraka, 126
Dharmashala, 101
Gujral, I.K., 38, 44, 46,
Durand, E.L., 15
Gwalior, 9, 11
Durand, H.M., 15
Gyawali, Pradeep Kumar, 91, 101
Ershad, Hussan Mohammed, 76
Haq, Ziaul, 76
Gadhwal, 144
Hindi, 63, 120, 147
Galchhi, 96
Hodgson. Brian, 11
Gandak, 97, 133
Holkers, 9
Gandhi Indira, 38, 40, 41, 42, 77,
114, 115, 116 Hou Yanqi, 106
Gandhi, Mahatma, 115 Huaxin, 95, 96
Gandhi Rajiv, 38, 43, Hyderabad, 11, 24

Huawei, 98 Khanal, Jhala Nath (JN). 136
India, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, Khanal, Jadu Nath, ,
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57,
58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69 ... Khurshid , Salman, 54, 162
Jain, N.P., 116 Kinloch, 6
Jaishakar, Dr, Subrahmanyam, 79 Kirkpatrick, William .j. 6, 7, 124,

164
Janakpur, 5, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71,
72, 73 Kodari, 39, 140
Jharkhand, 137 Koirala Ministry, 29
Jayawardene, Junius, 76 Koirala, B.P., 26, 152, 162, 166
Jinping, Xi, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, Koirala, G.P., 45

104
Koirala, M.P., 166
Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, 123
Koirala, Sushil, 60, 63, 70, 78,
Kadir Khan, 6, 7 131, 158
Kailali, 124 Kor La, 140
Kailash Mansarobar, 148 Koshiyari, Bhagat Singh, 131
Kalapani, 75, 159, 160, Korean Herald, 106
Kanchanpur, 124, 125 Kosi, 10
Karki, Gyanendra Bahadur, 114 Kotah, 11
Katwal, Rukmangad, 52 Krishna, S.M., 52, 53, 54, 162,

166
Knox, W.D., 8
Kushinagar, 145
Kangra, 8
Kumaun, 145
Kashmir, 78, 80
Kwatra, Vinay Mohan, 119
Kaski, 13
Kuwan Monastry, 143
Kathmanu, 166
Kuti, 148
Kathmanu Post, 106, 163
Lama, Mahendra P., 131
Keqiang. Li, 95
Lamjung, 13
Kerung, 6, 69, 140, 95, 96

Laos, 96 Modi, Narendra, 56, 58, 61, 67,
78
Limpiyadhura, 148
Mohanta, Prafulla Kumar, 43
Lipulekh, vi
Morang, 6
Lumbini, 5, 59, 64, 69, 99, 110,
143, 145, Mukharjee, Pranab, 51, 65
Lucknow, 9, 12, 50, 125, 146, Mukharjee, Shiva Shankar, 118
Lahore, 9, 11, Mukhtiyar, 10, 12
London, 16, 17, 18 Muktinath, 5, 64, 69, 72
Levy, Slyvian, 124, 164 Muni, S.D., 152, 164, 166
Longowal, Hardhand Singh, 43 Myanmar, 81, 82, 83, 96
Madhes, 10, 54, 62, 63, 64, 65, Naga, 137

66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 93, 117, 119,
122, 126, 130, 132, 141, 142, 143, Nagpur, 11
144, 147, 155, 159
Naqvi, Jawed, 76
Mahendranagar, 127
Narayan, Jayaprakash, 41
Mahendra King, 24, 29, 30, 31,
39, 41, 135, 139 Narayana Sriman, 114
Makawanpur, 143 NATO, 106
Mamallapuram, 102 Navi, 148
Mandarin, 98, 103 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 20, 22, 25,
Martindell, 9 Nepal, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44,

45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.........
Mathura, 11
Nepal, M.K. 53, 160
MCC, 109
Nuwakot, 6, 103,
Menon, N.B., 115
Nepali Congress, 19, 20, 21, 22,
Minto, 9 23, 25, 26, 33, 37, 39, 54, 64, 65,
71, 87, 108, 113, 114, 115, 130,
Misra. Gijraj, 9 139, 140, 149, 152, 158, 162, 163,
166
Mirza Abadlla, 6
Nepali Vakil, 16, 17
Mizo, 137

Oli, K.P. Sharma, 67, 68, 69, 70, Rae, Ranjit, 8, 9, 119
71, 89, 91, 131, 158
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party, 119
Ochterlony, General, 9, 10,
Rasuwagadhi, 94, 103
Pachrauti, 6
Raxaul, 64, 99
Pakistan, 21, 38, 39, 41, 76, 77,
78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, Regmi, Khil Raj, 118
109, 137, 138, 157, 163
Rose, L.E., 123, 164
Pancheshwar, 45, 134, 153
SAARC, 43, 47, 50, 57, 60, 61,
Panday Ranajung, 12 62, 2, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 89,
96
Pasupatinath, 60
Sai-chung-a, 10
Peking, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16
Saran Shyam, 117, 118
Pokhara, 65, 67, 99, 140
Sarin, H.C., 43, 116,
Pokharel, Giriraj Mani, 98
Sen, Hem Karan, 142
Pokharel, Ishwar, 97, 103
Shaha Rishikesh, 114, 126, 162,
Prachanda, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, 164, 167
52, 79, 97
Shah Bahadur, 6, 7
Prasad, Bimal, 116
Shah Pratap Singh, 6
Prasad, Jayant, 118, 131, 164
Shah Prithvi Narayan, 3, 5, 6,
Prayag, 5 123, 143, 145, 146
Puri Manjeev, 119 Shah Pushkar 11
Rahman, Gen.Ziaur, 76 Shah Rajendra Vikram, 11, 12
Rajan, K.V., 116 Shah Ran Bahadur,
Rana, Mohun Shamsher Jung hamsher Bhim, 18

Bahadur, 128
Shamsher Bir, 14, 15
Rao, P.V. Narshimha, 45, 49, 83
Shamsher Chandra, 15, 16, 17, 18
Rameshwaram, 5
Shasher Dev, 16
Rampur, 9
Shamsher Juddha, 18
Rasgotra, M.K., 114
Shamsher Padma, 19, 142

Shamsher Mohun, 19, 23, 27, Thapa, Amar Singh, 8, 9
128,
Thapa Bhimsen, 8, 10, 11, 12
Shamsher Vijaya, 172
Thapa Bhakta Bir, 11
Sharif Nawaz, 78
Thapa, Dr. Bhesh Bahadur, 131
Shastri Lal Bahadur, 37, 38
Thapa, Pyar Jung, 118
Sheoraj, 8
Thapa Ranbir, 11
Sikkim, 10, 16, 114
Treaty of 1950, 129
Simrawn Gadh, 143
Treaty of Sugauli, 4, 12, 22, 124,
Singh Charan, 39, 42 146, 148, 149
Singh C.P.N, 112 Tripura Sundari, 11
Singh, Dr. Manmohan,49, 51, 83, Tsering Penpa, 100

131
UN, 79, 96
Singh, Dr. I.P.,
Shekhar, 10
Singh, Dr. Karan, 36, 118
Upadhyaya, Surya Nath, 131
Singh, Ganeshman, 113, 116
Upreti, BC, 131
Singh Natwar, 51
US, 28, 49, 50, 61, 77, 100, 106,
Singh Ranjit, 8, 9 138,
Singh Ranoddip, 14, 15 Uttar Pradesh, 63, 145
Singh Visvanath pratap, Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 38, 45, 47
Sri Lanka, 39, 43, 45, 46, 77, 81, Wang Yi, 93, 101, 109
83, 139
Wei Fenghe, 97
Srivastava, Naveen, 119
Wellesley, Eood General, 8
Sugauli, 4, 10, 12, 22, 124, 143,
146, 148, 149, 154 West Bengal, 84, 138
Surendra, King,13 Yadav, Ram Baran, 53, 79
Swaraj, Sushma, 70, 82, 89 Yechuri, Sitaram, 51
Symon, 143 Younghusband, 17
Taplejung, 140

about the writer
Birendra Prasad Mishra is a retired professor
of Philosophy. He participated in the
Nepalese peace process as a coordinator
for the National Monitoring Committee
for Ceasefire Code of Conduct in 2006.
He was an Election Commissioner from
1994 to 2000.He contributes frequently to
newspapers and magazines on electoral and
contemporary issues.
Prof. Mishra enlists and elaborates the intricacies

of Nepal-India relations. He draws the attention
of the policy-makers of these two countries
to remove the barriers that affect their cordial
relations and usher in a new era of relations for
the betterment of their peoples.
- Daman Nath Dhungana, Former Speaker,
The House of Representative
This book by Dr. Birendra Prasad Mishra

presenting the historical background as well as
the latest developments in Nepal-India relations
contains a candid and refreshing analysis of the
subject. It is highly detailed and very useful not
only for the academics but also the practitioners
of diplomacy of both India and Nepal. As a
Nepali who has a very close roti-beti relationship
across the border, the author is uniquely qualified to provide a
comprehensive perspective on this topic. It is a must-read book
for anyone who is seriously interested in the complexity of the
relationship between these two countries.
- Prof. Jaya Raj Acharya, Former Ambassador the UN
ISBN : 9789937-1-500-88

Birendra Mishra, Strained Nepal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Birendra Mishra, Strained Nepal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 1

2 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 3

Publisher : Shyama Mishra

Copyright ©Birendra Prasad Mishra

Edition : First 2023 A.D. (2080 B.S.)

Computer : Ranjan Ghimire &

Price : NC Rs. 800.00/ I.C. Rs. 500

Printed at : Dhimle Offset Press, Kathmandu

ISBN No. : 978-9937-1-5008-8

4 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 5

6i Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 7

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 11

Chapter-3: The Period of Developing

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 1

Nepal and British India

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 3

A brief political history

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 5

6 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 7

8 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 9

Chinese Help Sought

10 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 11

2. Pro-British Policy (1846 to 1947)

4. Ibid, pp- 98-99.

12 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 13

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 15

16 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 17

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 19

RESETTING OF NEPAL AND

20 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

The resetting of relations under Jawaharlal

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 23

9. Mishra, Birendra Prasad, art. Bend in the river, Republica,6.10.2012.

24 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 25

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 27

28 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 29

30 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 31

32 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 33

34 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 35

36 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 37

THE PERIOD OF DEVELOPING

Lal Bahadur Shastri’s Reconciliatory Policy

38 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 39

40 Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 41

Second Inning of Indira Gandhi

Rajiv Gandhi’s Reactive Policy

Strained Nepal-India Relations / Birendra Prasad Mishra 43

Vishwanath Pratap Singh’s Supportive Policy