d.

Power of Appointment
Article VII, Section 16.
1. The President shall (1) Nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
2. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
3. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
4. The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. 164978, October 13, 2005
Trigger Words: appointment, acting secretaries, without consent
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed to declare the
appointments of the respondents - as acting secretaries in their
respective departments - issued by PGMA thru Exec. Sec. Ermita was
unconstitutional.
Summary of Facts:
● While the Congress was in session, Pres. Arroyo appointed
the respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments, who immediately took their oaths and assumed
office without the consent of CoA.
● Senator Pimentel Jr, Angara, Enrile and along with other
senators, filed a petition, questioning the constitutionality
of the said appointments.
● Days after the adjournment of Congress, Pres. Arroyo issued
ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of
the departments to which they were previously appointed in
acting capacity.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
W/N the appointment by Arroyo of the respondents as acting
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional - YES
Summary of Ruling: Petition was [DISMISSED]
PA: Under Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of EO. 292, “in case of a
vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who
can be designated as Acting Secretary”, therefore PGMA should not
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries. They further
argued that while the Congress is in session, no appointments can be
made without first obtaining the consent or confirmation of COA,
because the law does not give the President such power.
RA: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the COA even while
Congress is in session. Moreso, in EO 292 (Sec. 16 & 17), there is a
devoted chapter about the President's power of appointment. Moreso,
they insist that the President can issue such appointments because no
law prohibits such appointments.
SC: The court held that the president may make appointments “in
acting capacity” without seeking confirmation from the CoA even
when congress is in session because under S17, Ch5, T1, B3 of EO
292, the president may temporarily designate an officer already in
government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint a person who is not yet in government service, as acting
capacity, as long as the President deems that person competent.
● Appointment in an acting capacity is only temporary, in order
to fill an office until a permanent occupant is appointed.
● This is only applicable in case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President (e.g. office of a department
secretary), where the president can appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office, even while the Congress is in
session.
○ However, Congress cannot impose on the President
the obligation to automatically appoint the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego, since it
holds a position of great trust and confidence.
● In addition, Congress is not the only source of LAW - which
refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress,
municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to
law, and judicial decisions.
● Acting appointment is susceptible to abuse and may be
used as a way to circumvent confirmation by the CoA, thus
the law mandates that they cannot exceed 1 year in office
as provided in S17(3), Ch5, T1, B3 of EO 292.

● Ad Interim Appointment vs. Appointment in Acting Capacity
○ Ad interim appointment - Made if congress is not in
session; requires confirmation of CoA; permanent in
nature; appointee enjoys security of tenure
○ Appointment in acting capacity - Made anytime there
is vacancy (w/n congress is in session or not); does not
require confirmation of CoA; temporary in nature; does
not enjoy security of tenure.
Doctrine (if applicable):
Presidents can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the commission as stated in Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The appointment in acting
capacity is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office until a
permanent appointee of the President’s choice may occur.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
“On the Mootness of the Petition”
● OSG argues that it is moot because President Arroyo had
extended to respondents ad interim appointments immediately
after the recess of Congress.
● The court held that the mootness of the petition does not bar
its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
President's appointment of department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such
appointment. Thus, since it is capable of repetition, then falls
under the exception to the rule of mootness, where the court can
exercise its power for judicial review.
“On the Nature of the Power to Appoint”
● Even if the Congress composes the COA, its exercise of powers
is executive and not legislative; it does not legislate when it
exercises its powers to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
● It is the executive who essentially has the power to appoint
and the legislative may not interfere except in those instances
when the constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
○ The power of the legislature’s interference is only limited
to the power to prescribe qualifications to an appointive
office.
■ It cannot appoint a person to an office in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to that
office, nor impose on the President the duty to
appoint any particular person to an office.
“On Petitioner’s Legal Standing”
● Considering the independence of the Commission on
Appointments from Congress, it is an error for petitioners to
claim standing as members of Congress. President Arroyo's
issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session
impairs no power of Congress. Thus, only Senators Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Ejercito- Estrada, and Osmeña have standing, as
they are members of the COA.
“On the issue about the abuse of discretion”
● The court found no abuse, which is apparent from President
Arroyo's issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of
one year.
General v. Urra, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011
Trigger Words: [Acting (Temporary) Appointee files a Quo Warranto
against Permanent Appointee – Know thy place, temp!]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto and Certiorari
and/or Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction
Summary of Facts:
● Roces was appointed by PGMA as acting NAPOLCOM
commissioner in 2004 and was reappointed in 2006.
● When Roces died in 2007, General was appointed as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces, and Escueta
as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as
NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
● Later, PGMA appointed the following people as permanent
NAPOLCOM Commissioner
○ Urra in place of the petitioner General (AP or
appointment papers dated March 5, 2010)
○ De Guzman in place of Leones (AP dated March 8,
2010)
○ Escueta (AP dated March 8, 2010)
● [March 9, 2010] Escueta took his oath of office before
Makati RTC - Judge Umali
● [March 19, 2010] DILG Head Executive
Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate
congratulatory letters to the respondents, wherein attached
are the appointment papers signed by PGMA.
● [March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010] Urro and de Guzman
took their oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners
before DILG Secretary Puno and Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Hernandez.
● [July 30, 2010] President Noynoy Aquino issued E.O. No. 2
which revoked appointments issued by the previous
administration in violation of the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments made on or after March 10, 2010.
● Hence, petitioner General:
○ questioned the constitutionality of the appointment
of Urro, Guzman and Escueta as Commissioners of
NAPOLCOM
○ seeks to prohibit the Exec Sec and DILG Sec from
enforcing the respondents' oath of office.
○ asks that Urro be ousted and for him to resume
office.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the respondent’s appointments were valid and
constitutional?
Summary of Ruling: Petition was [DISMISSED]
● The court held that the appointments of the respondents
were valid and the petitioner was only appointed in acting
capacity which is temporary in nature.
a. Also, a staggered term of office is not a prohibition
(under RA 6975) for the issuance of a temporary
appointment.
● A prohibition against an acting appointment must be
specific or there must be a repugnancy in the nature of an
acting appointment and the office itself (acting appointments
cannot be done to the CoA, COMELEC, and CSC).
a. Prexy can also appoint permanent appointees even
while there are acting ones. General is also estopped
from filing this case due to implied acceptance.
● Mooreso, since the petitioner merely holds an acting
appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not
have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.

Doctrine (if applicable):
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUES & HELD
1. What is the nature of the petitioner's appointment as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner? - [ACTING (TEMPORARY)]
PA: He contends that he is a “regular” employee and should not be
removed from office without cause or reason. He also claims that he
indeed does not have a permanent appointment, but he has a regular one,
because RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) does not allow appointment of
NAPOLCOM commissioners in acting capacity.
SC: The court explained that there are 2 ways to categorize appointments:
1. Nature
a. permanent - only be removed from office for cause
b. temporary - removed even without hearing or cause and
does not enjoy security of tenure
2. Manner in which it is made:
a. regular - made while Congress is in session
b. ad interim appointment - issued during the recess of
Congress. (NOTE: presidential appointments that require
no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments
cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or an
ad interim appointment)
● The court believes that what the petitioner is claiming is regarding
the first category (nature).
● Under Sec. 17, Chap. 5 of EO 292, the president’s power of
appointment allows the Prexy to make temporary
appointments in the executive branch in order to prevent
hiatus in the discharge of official functions
○ separation from the service of an acting officer does not
import removal but merely the expiration of his term
○ no violation of security of tenure because it does not
involve removal
● Under R.A. No. 6975, there is a staggered term of office to
minimize the appointing authority's opportunity to appoint a
majority of the members of a collegial body, and to ensure the
continuity of the body and its policies
○ HOWEVER, a staggered term does not prohibit the
appointment of acting appointees, as long as it does
not go beyond the term of office of original appointee
● Given the wide latitude of the President's appointing authority, the
prohibition on the President from issuing an acting
appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear
repugnancy between the nature of the office and the
temporary appointment, however, the SC found nothing like
that in the text of RA 6975.
○ Thus, there is nothing repugnant between the
petitioner's acting appointment, and the nature of the
functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the
NAPOLCOM as an institution.
● Hence, the petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was
permanently appointed due to his implied acceptance for a
considerable time without protest or reservations, since from
the time until he was apprised of the appointment of respondent
Urro, he continued to work without any complaints as to the
contents of his appointment paper.
2. W/N the petitioner has the clear right to be reinstated to his
former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM
Commissioner? - [NO]
SC: The court held that the acting appointee has no cause of action for
quo warranto against the new appointee
● Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public
office allegedly usurped by another suing private individual must
show a clear right to the contested office
● Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and
an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of
action to maintain the present petition.
● Therefore, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to
the disputed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of
the unconstitutionality of the respondents' appointments.
○ The petitioner's failure in this regard renders a ruling on
the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary
3. W/N constitutionality of the respondent’s appointment is the lis
mota of the case [NO]
SC: If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo
warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of
the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary.
● The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does
not alter the essential character of the petitioner's action since he
does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial
interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other
respondents are concerned.
OTHER NOTES
● E.O. No. 2 Provisions:
SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. — The following
appointments made by the former President and other appointing
authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments:
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all
appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010
where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or
assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except
temporary appointments in the executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety as may be determined by the
appointing authority.
(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect
after said date or appointments to office that would be
vacant only after March 11, 2010.
(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of
45 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in violation of
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight
Appointments. — Midnight appointments, as defined under
Section 1, are hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The
positions covered or otherwise affected are hereby declared
vacant.
De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Trigger Words: midnight appointments
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
● A series of consolidated petitions were filed addressing whether
the sitting President of the Philippines has the authority to
appoint the successor of CJ Puno following his retirement. The
central question revolves around whether the President can
make this appointment during the period of the ban on midnight
appointments, as the appointment was made shortly before the
May 10, 2010 presidential elections.
De Castro’s Petition G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149]
● Special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus compelling the JBC to submit a list of
nominees for the next Chief Justice.
● Contended JBC deferred nominee submission, overstepping its constitutional role.
● Accused JBC of abrogating judicial functions and causing tension in the legal community.
Summary of Facts:
● Prior to the retirement of CJ Puno, the JBC adopted a
resolution to initiate the application process for the Chief
Justice position - that would be left vacant 7 days after the
presidential elections - which was published in the newspapers.
○ JBC considered numerous nominations, wherein
some accepted, while others declined. However, the list
of nominees has not yet been submitted due to the
controversy that has yet to be resolved (vacancy of
CJ’s position).
● Subsequently, multiple petitions were submitted to the Court,
presenting conflicting perspectives on the matter, with petitioners
arguing that the sitting President is barred from making
appointments within the two months leading up to the
imminent presidential elections and until the conclusion of
her term on June 30, 2010.
○ Petitioners seek to restrain the JBC from submitting a
list of nominees for the position of CJ Puno upon
his compulsory retirement because S15, A7 of the
Consti prohibits midnight appointments. However,
S4(1), A8 of the Consti requires appointments be
made within 90 days from the occurrence of a
vacancy.
● On the other hand, an opposing stance contended that the
prohibition solely pertains to appointments in executive
positions.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the incumbent President can appoint Chief Justice during
the election ban period? - YES
Summary of Ruling: Petition was [DISMISSED]
● The court held that the prohibition under Section 15, Article
7 does not extend to appointments for Supreme Court
vacancies or other judicial appointments, because it only
applies to the executive department. Considering that the
nomination and screening process of the JBC would prevent
midnight appointments, and depoliticize judicial appointments.
○ If the framers intended to extend the prohibition to
the appointments of members in the SC, they would
have explicitly said so.
○ Therefore, the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President's or Acting President's term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
● The Court also emphasized the deliberate organization of the
Constitution as well as rules on statutory construction, with
Article VII designated for the Executive Department and
Article VIII for the Judicial Department, and the framers'
omission of Supreme Court appointments from the Section
15, Art. 7 prohibition.
● Whereas, Article 8 is dedicated to the Judicial Department
and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the
Supreme Court, among others.
○ Section 9 - appointment of Supreme Court Justices
can only be made by the President upon the
 submission of a list of at least three nominees by 5. The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is
the JBC; suspended during the ban on midnight appointments
○ Section 4 (1) - mandates the President to fill the 6. The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice
vacancy.
■ This is actually a special provision to establish a
ISSUES & HELD
definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by
1. W/N the prohibition under Sec 15, Art VII applies to
mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or other
effect that Section 15, Article VIl prevailed
appointments in the Judiciary – NO
because it was "couched in stronger negative
language."
SC: The court held that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
■ Such interpretation even turned out to be
does not extend to appointments for Supreme Court vacancies or
conjectural, in light of the records of the
other judicial appointments.
Constitutional Commission's deliberations on
● The framers, as evident from the Constitutional Commission
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
deliberations, deliberately organized the Constitution, designating
● The President was left with an imperative duty under the
Article VII for the Executive Department and Article VIII for the
Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such
Judicial Department.
inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence.
○ If they intended to include Supreme Court appointments in
Her official duty she must comply with.
the Section 15 prohibition, they could have expressly done
○ Otherwise, failure to do so will be a clear disobedience
so, but their omission reveals otherwise.
to the Constitution.
○ Section 15 does not apply to all judicial appointments due
to the JBC's establishment and the thorough nomination
Summary of Opinions:
and screening process for judicial candidates.
Carpio-Morales (dissenting): I vote to hold, for the guidance of the
○ Therefore, Prohibition under Section 15, Article VIl does
JBC, that the incumbent President is constitutionally prescribed from
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
appointing the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ended at 12:00 noon of June
● Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict, as
30, 2010.
○ Sec 15, Art VII - Two months immediately before the next
1. Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
at a constitutional construction
President or Acting President shall not make
2. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils
appointments, except temporary appointments to
of midnight appointments in the judiciary
executive positions
3. The clear intent of the framers is thus for the ban on midnight
○ Sec 4, Art VIII - Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
appointments to apply to the judiciary.
days from the occurrence thereof
4. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation
● SC agrees with the consolidated petitions (except Soriano,
arrived at by the ponencia
Tolentino, and Inting) that the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
 retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition
against presidential appointments does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
○ The appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be
made by the President upon the submission of a list of at
least three nominees by the JBC (Art VIII, Sec 9)
○ It also mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy (Section 4(1), Art
VIII)
1. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
a. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VIl as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court
b. Confirmation made to the JBC by a former member of the
Constitutional Commission about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments should prevail
c. The case of Valenzuela (which they reversed) was
invoked but Court held that it did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of Constitutional Commission
d. Records disclosed the express intent of the framers to
enshrine in the Constitution, a command to the President
to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
occurrence; a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy
2. Section 15, Article Vil does not apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary.
a. Underlying reason was to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive
b. The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department
c. Framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because JBC and their
subjecting/screening of candidates for judicial positions
ensured that there would no longer be appointments to
the Judiciary
3. The non-applicability of Section 15, Article VIl to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior
Associate Justice Regalado a member of the Constitutional
Commission) to the JBC itself, on the basis of the records of
the Constitutional Commission (which was accepted by the
JBC)
a. The election ban had no application to appointments to
the Court of Appeals
b. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation
to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
4. The Constitution provides for the power of the succeeding
President to revoke appointments made by an Acting
President and evidently refers only to appointments in the
Executive Department.
a. No application to appointments in the Judiciary because
temporary/ acting appointments can only undermine the
independence of the Judiciary due to their being
revocable at will
b. Also, no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of
appointments in the Judiciary Justices may only be
removed for cause and members of SC by impeachment
5. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15
extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the
intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the
Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Departments
a. It will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election
6. It Ignores the need to apply Section 4 (1) to every situation of
a vacancy in the Supreme Court since they only focused on
the vacancy of Chief Justice Puno's retirement
a. Argument: No need for the incumbent President to appoint
during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within 90 days, because anyway there will
still be about 45 days of the 90 days remaining
7. In an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a
JBC list is necessary at all for the President — any President
 — to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from
the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
2. W/N Judiciary Act of 1948 be applied? [NO]
Context: Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the
next President appoint the successor.
● In case of vacancy or the event wherein Chief Justice is unable to
perform duties, and it shall devolve upon an, Acting Chief Justice
or the Associate Justice who is first in precedence until a new
Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed
SC: With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the
President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting
capacity. Express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the
framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of
the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the
Constitution.
● Framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent,
not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity
● The Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in
which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the
incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and
powers of the office.
3. W/N the JBC may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to
submit the list to the President? - [NO]
SC: Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to
submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary
● For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be
an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President
The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus,
the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
● Mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the SC to enable the President to
appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence
of the vacancy
● The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after
the vacancy occurs as it will shorten the 90-day period
Duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted
to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC
RULING
● Petitions are [DISMISSED]
○ Prematurity
○ Lack of merit
● Petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC [GRANTED],
● Directs JBC:
○ To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill
the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
○ To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice;
○ To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for
the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
○ To continue its proceedings. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N the petitioners have locus standi [YES]
● De Castro, Soriano, and Peralta assert their right as citizens and
taxpayers concerned about the appointment of the next Chief
Justice.
● The issues are of transcendental importance, affecting everyone
and raising doubts about the President's authority to appoint
members of the Judiciary.
2. W/N the case presents a justiciable controversy] - [YES]
● The court held that the petitions present an actual case or
controversy ripe for judicial determination.
○ Emphasizes that the JBC initiated the nominee selection
process, making the situation ripe for judicial review.
 ○Identifies key issues, including the JBC's authority to open
and continue the nomination process and the timeline for
submitting the short list.
De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
Trigger Words:
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: Petition for review on certiorari
Summary of Facts:
● Upon assumption of office, Mayor De Rama sought the recall
of the appointments of 14 municipal employees (before the
CSC) on the grounds that they were midnight appointees of the
former mayor which violates S15, A7 of the constitution.
○ While the matter was still pending, 3 of the employees
filed a claim for payment of their salaries, as Mayor de
Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and
benefits, where the appointments were recalled.
● CSC denied the petition due to lack of merit
○ The appointments were valid to pertinent laws (Rule V,
Section 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules)
○ The constitutional provision relied upon by de Rama
prohibits only those appointments made by the
outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to
local elective officials.
● CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground
that they had already been approved by the Head of the
CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for the petitioner’s
failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.
● The petitioner then filed for reconsideration and it was
denied again due to lack of evidence.
● The CA upheld the decision of the CSC and held that there
was no abuse of power of appointment on the part of the
outgoing mayor
○ It also held that RA 7041 does not provide that local
official’s appointment must be made within 4 months
from publication of vacancies.
● Hence this petition.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
W/N the recall of appointments sought by the petitioner is valid? -
NO
Summary of Ruling:
● It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment
initially approved, but only when such appointment and
approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions
of the civil service law and regulations.
● Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of
the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force
and in effect until disapproved by the Commission."
● The appointments of the employees may only be recalled
on the following grounds:
(1) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;
(2) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion
Board;
(3) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or
(4) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and
regulations.
● Since the petitioner has not presented any substantial
evidence proving the violations on abovementioned
grounds or even the abuse of power of the former mayor
regarding her appointment of the fourteen employees,
Supreme Court did not give credence to his contentions.
● The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition
on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those
made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
 ● Therefore, the court held that the appointees cannot be
removed from office because their appointments were
approved by the CSC field office and that the prohibition
only applies to presidential appointments. There is no law
that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Doctrine (if applicable):
Article VII, Section 15, 1987 Constitution
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
● Article VII, Section 15 is only applicable to the presidential
appointments.
● There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.
Doctrine for appointed employees: An appointment issued in
accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately
upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has
assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his
salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved
by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier
than the date of its issuance.
RULING
● Petition for review is [DENIED]
● CA’s Resolution is [AFFIRMED]
○ In other words, the appointments of the 14 municipal
employees are valid and remain.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N Court of Appeals and CSC erred in ignoring his
supplemental pleading- NO
● Acc to Rule 10, Sec 6 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
o Supplemental pleadings are discretionary (CSC was
under no obligation to admit the supplemental
pleading)
o Supplemental pleadings must state transactions,
occurrences or events which took place since the time
the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed
(petitioner’s alleged fraud supposedly occurred at the
same time of the appointments and thus should’ve
been included in original pleading)
● Accordingly, the CSC and CA found that the allegations in his
supplemental pleadings did not constitute “new evidence” that
can be the proper subject of a supplemental pleading but rather
old facts which he failed to raise earlier
● Thus CSC and CA did not err in refusing to give credence to the
supplemental pleading
DETAILED OPINIONS:
Mendoza Dissenting: Validity of the appointments made by the outgoing
mayor is flawed.
● The majority overlooks that Art. VII, (15) is simply an application of
a broader principle that after the appointing authority has lost the
elections, his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of the office, and,
therefore, he should not fill positions in the government unless
required by the imperatives of public service. This rule binds all,
including mayors, who are vested with the power of
appointment, and it flows from the principle that a public
office is a public trust.
● The 14 appointments were made by former Mayor Abeja after she
had lost her bid for re-election. She made the appointments just
three (3) days before she bowed out of the service. Even when
 there was no urgent need to do so, she went ahead and filled the
vacancies in the municipal government a few days before the new
mayor took office.
● The appointments made at the two meetings of the Personnel
Selection Board did not last more than an hour. At both meetings,
Mayor Abeja presided as chairperson. There was just a
perfunctory compliance with legal requirements.
● "Midnight appointments" — whether made by the President or by
a mayor — are bad, because they are made hurriedly, without due
deliberation and careful consideration of the needs of the office
and the qualifications of the appointees, and by an appointing
authority on the eve of his departure from office.
● "Midnight appointments" are bad because, as the Aytona v
Castillo decision puts it, they offend principles of "fairness, justice
and righteousness." They cannot be less bad because they are
made at the local level, by mayors and other local executives.
● As trustee of a public office, the duty of Mayor Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja, as outgoing executive, was to preserve the vacancies in
the municipal government for her successor to fill or not to fill.
o The hurried appointments of respondents detract from that
degree of good faith, morality, and propriety required for
appointments made by a faithful and prudent caretaker in
order to be considered valid.
● an outgoing executive retains the power of appointment up to
the last day he is in his office.
o The exercise of such power is circumscribed by the
requirement that the appointments made must be "few
and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications."
o
o The hurried appointments of respondents detract from that
degree of good faith, morality, and propriety required for
appointments made by a faithful and prudent caretaker in
order to be considered valid.

Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16,
2015
Trigger Words: [Transmittal letters; 800+ Arroyo appointments]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: petition for certiorari; consolidated petitions
questioning the constitutionality of EO 2 for being inconsistent with
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Summary of Facts:
● Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, PGMA issued
more than 800 appointees to various positions in several
government offices.
● Following Section 15, Article 7, of the 1987 Constitution, for
the purpose of the election, March 10 was the cut-off date
for valid appointments, and March 11 was the start of the
midnight ban appointments.
● All of the appointments of the petitioners to their respective
positions were issued before March 10, 2010, BUT:
○ Velicaria-Garafil petition - the transmittal letter from the
Office of the President (OP) to the Malacañang Record
Office (MRO) was received beyond the said date thus
falling during the appointment ban.
○ Venturanza petition - the appointment paper from the
OP to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary was
transmitted beyond the said date thus falling during the
appointment ban
○ Villanueva & Rosquita petition - there were no
transmittal letters of their appointment papers from the
OP.
○ Tamondong petition - the appointment paper from the
OP to the Office of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) was received by the latter beyond the said date
thus falling during the appointment ban.
● On July 30, President Aquino III issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by PGMA
which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
○ As an effect of EO 2, the petitioners were removed from
their appointed positions. Thus, petitions and motions
questioning the constitutionality of EO 2 were filed.
● The Court issued a resolution referring these petitions to the
Court of Appeals (CA) for further proceedings.
● The CA ruled in upholding the constitutionality of EO 2 and it:
● Denied - Velicaria-Garafil petition; and Venturanza
petition
● Dismissed - Villanueva & Rosquita petition; and
Tamondong petition
● With this, petitioners now seek the reversal of the separate
decisions of the CA which dismissed/denied their petitions and
upheld the constitutionality of EO 2.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the said Appointments of the Petitioners were
Midnight Appointments in violation of Sec. 15, Art 7 of the
constitution [YES]
2. W/N EO 2 is valid and constitutional [YES]
Summary of Ruling:
The Court declared that:
1. The appointments of petitioners are VOID.
Reason: Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all 4
elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before
the appointment ban took effect.
2. The EO 2 is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
Reason: Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the
Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of the constitutional ban: the
outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the
country indirectly after the end of his term.

● Actual transmittal of the appointment papers by PGM, are dates
clearly falling during the appointment ban
Doctrine (if applicable):
Elements that should always concur in the making of a valid
appointment:
1. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the
authority.
2. Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal.
3. A vacant position at the time of appointment.
4. Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Note: There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.
Summary of Opinions:
1. BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
a. EO 2 is constitutional but has parts that are not.
b. Of the three only the first relief must be given since
the two reliefs' procedural error warrants an
outright dismissal of their petition.
i. Instead of appeal they asked for a petition
on certiorari on RO 65 instead of 45 ROC
FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ISSUE NO. 1
1. W/N the said Appointments of the Petitioners were Midnight
Appointments in violation of Sec. 15, Art 7 of the
constitution? - [YES]
SC: The court held that all of the petitioner’s appointments are
midnight appointments and are void for violation of section 15,
article VII of the 1987 constitution.
● Valid appointments must have:
○ Signing of the president an appointee’s paper to a vacant
office
○ Official transmittal of the appointment paper
○ receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee
○ acceptance of the appointment by the appointee by his or
her oath or assumption of office
● Midnight or last minute appointment
○ Antonia v Castillo: the issuance of 350 appointments in
one night and the planned induction of almost all of them
a few hours before the inauguration of the new President
may be regarded as an abuse of Presidential Prerogative
○ a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions
○ hence, to deprive new admin of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments
● Elements of Valid appointment
1. authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority:
2. transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal;
3. a vacant position at the time of appointment and
4. receipt of the appointment paper AND acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications
all elements should always apply regardless of when appointment is
made (outside, before, or during appointment ban)
***NO VALID APPOINTMENT IF THE PROCESS LACKS ONE STEP
APPOINTING AUTHORITY
● This provided in the Constitution and laws
● Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment
● The power to appoint, in essence, is discretionary.
● The appointing power has the right of choice or prerogative which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
 himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibility.
○ The choice of the appointee is a fundamental component
of the appointing power.
TRANSMITTAL
● It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper.
There should be evidence that the President intended the
appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an
appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President
months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked
drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment
paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies
the President's intent of its issuance.
○ In this case, appointment papers were not released thru
MRO.
○ Although the president is not prohibited from giving the
appointment paper directly to the appointee, in order to
avoid problem to arise, appointee would then have to
prove that the appointment paper was directly given to
him
● The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal
to be complete involves several steps.
○ The nomination by the President.
○ Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to
confirm said nomination.
○ Acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of
office.
● The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere
offer of a post.
VACANT POSITION
● appointment can be made only to a vacant office cannot be
made to an occupied office
● The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment
validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed
him
● EO2 considers midnight appointments those appointments to
offices that will only be vacant on or after March 11, 2010 even
though the appointments are made prior to said date.
● In light of Sec. 15. Art 7 of the consti, the outgoing President is
prevented from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the
end of his term
ACCEPTANCE BY THE QUALIFIED APPOINTEE
● Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.
● Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance or the
appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office
In this case, petitioners failed to show compliance with all four elements of
a valid appointment.
a. cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect
b. Petitioners themselves admit that they took their oaths of office
during appointment ban.
Hence, the petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for
the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional.
Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
RULING
● Petitions are [DENIED/DISMISSE/VOID].
● EO No. 2 dated 30 is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Trigger Words: [Ad interim appointments, reappointments]
Ad Interim - Takes effect immediately; appointee assumes office
immediately and should be later confirmed by the CoA; made while
congress is NOT in session
Regular - Does not take effect immediately; appointee assumes office
only after confirmation of the CoA; made while congress is in session
on temporary appointments, (3) assails as illegal her
removal as director IV.
○ She alleges that Benipayo’s appointment as Chair is
invalid because it is an ad interim appointment and
was not acted upon by CoA, thus her reassignment
is illegal
Summary of Ruling:
SC denies petition. Ad interim appointments are permanent in character
since it cannot be withdrawn without cause and takes effect
immediately.

Recit Ready Summary

Nature of Case: Petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a ISSUES & HELD
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order
1. W/N the ad interim appointments made by PGMA are
Summary of Facts:
temporary in character and thus violate the constitution?
● Petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc
[NO]
as Acting Director IV of the EID, and was reappointed twice in
temporary capacity. Whereas, PGMA made ad interim
PA: Posits that ad interim appointments can be withdrawn or revoked by
appointments of respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason.
the president at her pleasure, even disapproved or by-passed by
● In 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo issued a
Commission on Appointments, which makes it temporary in character and
Memorandum which reassigned the petitioner to the Law
consequently a violation of sec 1(2) article IX-C of the constitution
Department, and assigned Cinco as the new
Officer-in-Charge of the EID.
SC: The court held that the ad interim appointment made by PGMA is
● Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as
permanent because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
Director IV of the EID. Benipayo denied her request. She then
withdrawn by the president once the appointee has qualified into
filed to the COMELEC en banc for reconsideration. She also
office; being subject to confirmation of CoA does not alter its
filed criminal and administrative cases against Benipayo.
permanent character; and is made during the recess of the Congress.
● During pendency of her complaint in the law department,
However, it is only effective until disapproved by the Commission on
petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that (1) ad
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress, by virtue of Sec.
interim appointments of respondents violate the
16 Article VII of the constitution.
constitutional provisions on the independence of
● Such appointment makes the ad interim appointee part of the civil
COMELEC, (2) their appointments also violate prohibition
service, who enjoys constitutional protection of tenure; that is,
 he/she may not be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law. Thus, it makes the appointment completely and
irrevocable.
○ 2 causes to terminate ad interim appointment based on
constitution (resolutory conditions): (1) disapproval of his
appointment by the Commission on Appointments; (2)
adjournment of Congress w/o commission acting on
his/her appointment.
● Moreso, the renewal of by-passed ad interim appointments do not
violate the prohibition on reappointments under S1(2), A9-C
because reappointments presupposes previous confirmed
appointments. A by-passed ad interim appointment does not
constitute a term of office because there has been no final
decision on the merits for appointment. It is not equal to a
disproved appointment which is final and binding.
2. W/N the ad interim appointments made by PGMA are
prohibited under the constitution [NO]
- While the constitution mandates that COMELEC shall be
independent, such provision should be harmonized with the power
of the president to extend ad interim appointments. Moreover, the
intent of the framers show that such appointments were allowed
due to the need of avoiding disruptions in essential government
services that would otherwise have prolonged vacancies.
- Section 16 Article VII of the constitution give president 2
choices of appointments: (1) regular appointments done
while congress is in session where the president may
nominate a prospective appointee, and pending consent
of CoA, the nominee cannot assume office; and (2) an ad
interim appointment done during recess of congress which
allows the appointee to assume office immediately.
3. W/N the renewals of the ad interim appointments are
unconstitutional [no]
- The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to those who
have been appointed by the president, confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, w/n they complete his term of
office. There must be confirmation by the commission for the
prohibition to apply. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment.
- Thus, the renewals of the appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason do not do not violate the prohibition on
reappointments because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. They do not also breach the 7-year term
limit because their appointments are for a fixed term
expiring in 2008. The continuing renewal of the ad interim
appointment of these three respondents, for so long as
their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not
violate the prohibition on reappointments
- The prohibition on reappointment in sec 1(2) Article IX-C of
the constitution does not apply to a disapproved nor
by-passed ad interim appointment.
- A disapproved appointment cannot be revived because
the disapproval is final, not because the reappointment is
prohibited. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be
revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is
no final disapproval under sec 16 Article VII of the
constitution.
- By-Passed Appointment: an appointment that has not yet
been finally acted upon on the merits by the commission
at the close of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its
consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to
renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed
appointee by virtue of sec 17 of the Rules of the
commission on appointments.
 2. where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term
and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends
RULING ○ Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
Petition is [DISMISSED] member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
serving more than seven years
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
3. where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of
someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term
OTHER NOTES
○ Such a person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
Sec. 16 Article VII of the Constitution:
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
- The President shall have the power to make appointments during
serving more than seven years.
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
4. where the appointee has previously served a term of less than
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
○ Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven
Congress.
years, a reappointment of such person to serve an
unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will
Sec 1(2) article IX-C of the Constitution:
be similar to those appointed under the second sentence
- The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
provision refers to the first appointees under the
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under
Members for five years, and the last members for three years,
any situation
without reappointment.
Sec 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments
4 situations where sec 1(2) article IX-C of the Constitution applies:
- Section 17. Â Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to
1. where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full
President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the
seven-year term.
close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President
○ Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC,
and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not
whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will
again be considered by the Commission.
then be actually serving more than seven years
Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997
Trigger Words: [Bad faith reorg]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Administrative
Summary of Facts:
● Larin was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of violating
Sec. 268 of National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Sec. 3
of RA 3019 because he allegedly gave tax credit to Tanduay
Distillery.
● Following his conviction, the President issued Memorandum
Order No. 164, which created an Executive Committee to
investigate the administrative charge against Larin. The
Committee directed Larin to respond to the charge.
● Meanwhile, the President issued EOnNo. 132, which
streamlined the Bureau of Internal Revenue and abolished
the Excise Tax Service, where Larin was the Assistant
Commissioner.
○ He was not part of the 14 newly appointed Assistant
Commissioners, thus he is claiming that he is illegally
dismissed.
● The President found Larin guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissed him from office. This also includes the forfeiture of
all benefits and disqualification for reappointment in the
government service.
● In the petition, the petitioner challenges the authority of the
President to dismiss them from office, arguing that,
concerning presidential appointees who are Career
Executive Service Officers, the President only exercises the
power of control and not the power to remove.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N [Larin was removed from office properly] - [No]
2. W/N [ the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or
to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132] - [YES]
3. W/N [the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132
tainted with bad faith] - [YES]
Summary of Ruling:
1. The court held that he was not validly dismissed from office
because he was part of the career service, thus he enjoys
the right of security of tenure under the Admin Code. S36 of the
Civil Service decree provides that employees may only be
removed for any cause enumerated in the law.
2. Although he is a presidential appointee, the power of removal
is not inherent in the power to appoint under S16, A7.
3. Also, the court held that even though the president has the
power to streamline government under RA 7645 which
authorizes him to effect organizational changes and PD 1772
which grants the power to reorganize national government, the
court held that EO 132 was done in bad faith because it
created a replacement position that had the same functions
of Larin’s office.
Doctrine (if applicable):
Reorganization is regarded as valid if it is pursued in good faith, for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. However, if
the abolition of positions is done for political reasons or to defeat
security of tenure, or not in good faith, it is considered invalid.
ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N [Larin was removed from office properly] - [No]
Who has the power to discipline the petitioner? (need to answer this first
 ● Larin is a career service officer, who is entitled to security of
tenure, a right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and reinforced
by Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended.This provision
specifies that career service officers can only be removed for
causes outlined in the law.
○ Being a presidential appointee does not grant the
appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at
his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a
career service officer who under the law is the recipient of
tenurial.
Main Question: Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal
cause under a valid proceeding? No
● Proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural
due process.
○ HOWEVER, considers that petitioner was not
dismissed for a valid cause.
● The respondents acknowledge that the administrative case
against the petitioner is based in the Sandiganbayan
Decision.
○ In the case at hand, the very basis of the administrative
case against petitioner is his conviction in the
criminal action which was later on set aside by the
Court.
○ The acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case
necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative
action against him, because in such a case, there is no
more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the
administrative suit"
● The court ruled in the case that Petitioner can not be held
negligent in relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR
○ it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the
certification made by the Revenue Accounting Division
that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes
○ There is nothing irregular or anything false in Larin's
marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno,
the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of the
accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said criminal
cases, and
○ There is no proof of actual agreement between the
accused, including petitioner, to commit the illegal acts
charged.
2. W/N [ the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or to
issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132] - [YES]
SUPREME COURT
● E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely:
a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No.
127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 (SEE NOTES)
○ Sec 48
■ Mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out
and abolition" of offices only and does not cover
the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
○ Sec 62
■ shows that the President is authorized to effect
organizational changes including the creation of
offices in the department or agency concerned.
○ Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
speaks of such other powers vested in the
President under the law.
So what empowers the Prexy?
● Presidential Decree No. 1772 9 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416.
 ○ Expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
○ The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that
■ "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."
■ So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing
said decree.
■ The Constitution itself recognizes future
reorganizations in the government as what is
revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus
● "Sec. 16. Career civil service employees
separated from service not for cause but
as a result of the . . . reorganization
following the ratification of this
Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay . . .
3. W/N [the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132
tainted with bad faith] - [YES]
SUPREME COURT
(Good faith v Bad Faith)
● Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good
faith.
● Dario vs. Mison (on what constitutes “good faith”)
○ Reorganization is considered in 'good faith' if it aims for
economy or efficiency and involves the elimination of
positions, not actual dismissals.
○ However, if the abolition is done for political reasons or to
undermine security of tenure, it is not in good faith and
is considered void. Invalid abolition occurs in cases of
mere changes in position names or when claims of
economy are contradicted by sufficient funds.
● Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 (on what constitutes bad faith, Also
See notes)
○ a) Where there is a significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department
or agency concerned
○ b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created
In the case
● E.O. No. 132, Sec 1.1.2 provides that
■ The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the
Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence
and Investigation Service is hereby created to
absorb the same functions of the abolished
office and service.
● Thus, there are circumstances considered as evidence of bad
faith in the reorganization of the BIR. (in relation to Section 2 of R.
A. No. 6656 b)
● Also in Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems
Group has two newly created Systems Services. Aside from this,
six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three
more divisions of the Assessment Service are formed.
○ In relation to Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 a)
■ This shows that these newly created offices will
lead to significant increase of positions.
In terms of reappointment reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he
● Non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner may have in support of his defense.
violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. ○ The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993
○ Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no petitioner submitted his letter-response dated September
new employees shall be taken in until all permanent 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against him.
officers shall have been appointed for permanent position. ○ Aside from his letter, he also submitted various
● Petitioner is a career executive officer who is holding a permanent documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which
position should have been given preference for appointment in the are evidences supporting his defense.
position of Assistant Commissioner. ○ Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17,
1993 from the Investigation Committee requiring him to
explain his side concerning the charge.
RULING ● It can not therefore be argued that the petitioner was denied due
Petition is [Granted]
process.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is
hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of
OTHER NOTES
seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his
separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
"Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of
Within the Executive Branch. —
sixty-five years in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such
The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are
age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement benefits. SO
hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer
ORDERED
essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down,
phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. . . .
Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the
Office of the President."
1. W/N [ the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order
No. 164 in accord with due process] - [YES]
"Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.
— Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the
SUPREME COURT:
Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any
● Petitioner was given every chance to present his side.
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization
● The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in
structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act." (emphasis ours)
administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a
 Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
"Sec. 20. Residual Powers. — Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law."

Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad

faith in the removal of employees as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2.
No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal
exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been
abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or
consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or
other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any
or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of
bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise
to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

a. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in

the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
b. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created;
c. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms
of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d. Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e. Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof."
Funa v. Commission on Audit Chair, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
Trigger Words: Power of Appointments
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, challenging the
constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit
Summary of Facts:
● In 2001, PGMA appointed Carague as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of 7 years (2001-
2007) and Villar as Commissioner for 7 years also (2004-
2011).
● When Carague retired, and Villar was in his 4th year as
a COA commissioner, he was designated as the Acting
Chairman for around 2 months (Feb 4 - April 14, 2008).
● Eventually he was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA on April 18, 2008, which was
confirmed by the COA.
○ As stated in the appointment papers, he was to
serve as Chairman of COA, until the expiration of
the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on Feb 2, 2011.
○ However, Villar insists that his appointment as
COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of
seven (7) years which is yet to lapse, and argued
that his term of office is up to Feb 2, 2015, which is
7 years from his appointment.
● Meanwhile, San Buenaventura was appointed as COA
Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as
Commissioner, which is until Feb 2, 2011.
● But before the SC could resolve this petition, Villar in 2011,
expressed his intention to resign from the office
through a letter addressed to Pres. Aquino.
○ He vacated his position and Pulido-Tan was then
named by the president as COA Chairman.
● This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Main Issue Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N Villar's appointment as COA Chairman, while
sitting in that body and after having served for four (4)
years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner,
is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution? - NO
● The court held that there can be no Acting Commissioner
of the COA because it goes against the spirit of
independence of the commission.
● Also, S1(2), A9-D of the consti does not prevent the
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman
as long as the Commissioner has not yet served the full
term of 7 years.
● The reappointment barred by the constitutional
provision is a reappointment to the same office, not to a
higher office.
● However, even though he was given a promotional
appointment, it did not give him a new 7-year term
because no appointee can serve for an aggregate term
of more than 7 years.
● Thus, Villar’s appointment for a fixed term of less than 7
years is also void for violating a clear and mandatory
constitutional prescription of a 7-year term.
Summary of Ruling:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
 appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
○ The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the
full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration
of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms
laid down under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX (D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g., COA, COMELEC or
CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and
who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman.
○ Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
of the length of service as commissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will
not exceed seven (7) years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment.
○ The Court clarifies that "reappointment" found in
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX (D) means a movement to one
and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
○ On the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict
legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity
Doctrine (if applicable):
Sec. 1(2), Art. I(D) of the 1987 Constitution - "The Chairman and
Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years,
and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. "
Summary of Opinions:
1. Carpio, J., concurring and dissenting
2. Mendoza, J., concurring and dissenting
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N Villar's appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in
that body and after having served for four (4) years of his
seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of
the term limitations imposed under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution? - NO
SUPREME COURT
● Under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, “The Chairman
and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.”
a. This provision prohibits the "reappointment" of a member
of COA after his appointment for seven (7) years.
b. However, it unequivocally allows promotional
appointment, but is subject to defined parameters.
■ Such as in this case, where promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman is
allowed as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, which is
further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1
(2), Article IX (D) that "the appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor."
● It must be noted that the appointment of Villar, from Commissioner
to Chairman, was not a reappointment. Jurisprudence tells us that
the word "reappointment" means a second appointment to one
and the same office.
a. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the
commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be
precise, but not reappointment.
● The court held that the appointment of then Respondent Villar to
the position of Chairman of COA partakes a promotional
appointment which, under appropriate setting, would be outside
the purview of the constitutional reappointment ban in Sec 1 (2),
Art. IX (D) of the Constitution.
● However, it must be noted that the vacancy in the position of COA
chairman when Carague stepped down on February 2, 2008
resulted from the expiration of his 7 year term. Therefore there is
no unexpired portion of Carague's term. Thus the next appointed
COA chairman should serve a 7-year term. In the case at hand,
Villar has already served four years as commissioner, serving as
COA chairman for a full 7-year term as COA chairman would
unduly extend his term beyond the 7 years fixed by the
constitution.
● Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the
term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer
than what the law provides, if the vacancy calls for a full 7 year
appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a
promotional appointment for more or for less than 7 years. There
is no in between. He or she cannot split terms. It is not within the
power of the appointing authority to override the positive
aforementioned provision of the Constitution.
a. Therefore, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar
who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot
be appointed as chairman when such a position becomes
vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full
term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will
be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the
constitutional ban.
● To add, a commissioner who resigned before serving his 7- year
term can be extended an appointment to the position of chairman
for the unexpired period of the term of the latter, provided the
aggregate of the period he served as commissioner and the period
he will serve as chairman will not exceed seven (7) years.
 a. This situation will only occur when the chairman leaves
the office by reason of death, disability, resignation or
impeachment. However, for reasons other than the
expiration of the original term of Carague, the President
can only appoint the successor of Villar for the unexpired
portion of the Carague term in line with Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX
(D) of the Constitution. Upon the expiration of the original
7-year term of Carague, the President can appoint a new
chairman for a term of 7 full years.
● Moreso, the explicit command of the Constitution is that the
"Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years and appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor designated in a temporary or acting capacity. "
a. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman terms of
office and appointments had already expired.
● Hence, Villar’s appointment in replacing Chairman Carague,
whose term of office as such chairman has expired, the court
declared this as UNCONSTITUTIONAL, as it will destroy the
rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering
of appointments and terms in COA as prescribed in the
Constitution.
RULING
Petition is [PARTLY GRANTED]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague,
whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX (D) of the
Constitution. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES/HELD
2. W/N the following requisites for the exercise of judicial review
of an executive act were obtained in this petition? -
[transcendental importance]
● The court held that the case is of transcendental importance, since
it obviously has "far-reaching implications," and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in
future analogous cases. Thus, the court assumed a liberal stance
and allowed the petitioner to institute the instant petition.
3. W/N the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy applicable
in this case? - YES
● The court found the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant
case in view of the allegation that then President
Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her appointing power in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion.
● It is under the expanded concept of judicial review under the 1987
Constitution, where the corrective hand of certiorari may be
invoked not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government."
4. W/N despite being moot and academic, the case is still
subject to judicial review? - YES
● Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of
Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, the court considered
the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a
moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions
to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely:
a. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. the case involves a situation of exceptional character and
is of paramount public interest;
c. the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
 controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Reynaldo A.
public; Villar's appointment as Acting Chairman, and as Chairman, of the
d. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Commission on Audit, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
DETAILED OPINIONS
CARPIO, J., concurring and dissenting
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting
The appointment of respondent Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as Chairman of
Concurs that Section 1 (2), Article IX-(D) of the 1987 Constitution does
the Commission on Audit (COA) is clearly unconstitutional. Villar's
not proscribe the promotion or upgrade of a commissioner to a chairman,
"promotional" appointment as Chairman constituted a reappointment
provided that his tenure in office will not exceed seven (7) years in all. The
prohibited by the Constitution since it actually required another
appointment is not covered by the qualifying or restricting phrase "without
appointment by the President to a different office, another confirmation by
reappointment" twice written in that section.
the Commission on Appointments to that other office, and another oath of
Dissents in the position that a commissioner cannot be promoted as
office to that other office. In short, Villar resigned as Commissioner, and
chairman in case of the expiration of the term of his predecessor. My view
then accepted a new appointment as Chairman, his second appointment
is that such a promotion is allowable not only in case of death, disability,
to the COA.
resignation or impeachment.
- The Office of the Chairman is a different office from the office of a
The position that a commissioner cannot be promoted in case of expiration
Commissioner.
of a term of chairman has no clear and concrete constitutional basis.
- Chairman has a salary grade higher than that of a Commissioner,
There is nothing at all in the subject constitutional provision which
and is the presiding officer of the Commission while a
expressly or impliedly restricts the promotion of a commissioner in
Commissioner is not.
situations where the tenure of his predecessor is cut short by death,
- The Chairman is specifically authorized by the Constitution to
disability, resignation or impeachment only. Likewise, there is no express
re-align savings of the Commission, 1 while a Commissioner has
provision prohibiting a promotion in case of the expiration of the term of a
no such authority.
predecessor
- The Chairman is the head of the Commission, while a
Premises considered, it is my considered view that the promotion of Villar
Commissioner is not, 2 in the same manner that the Chief Justice
was legal but he could serve up to February 15, 2011 only because his
is the head of the Judiciary while an Associate Justice is not.
tenure should not exceed seven (7) years
Villar was given a term of only three years as Chairman, instead of the
mandatory seven years, to avoid exceeding the maximum term of seven
years. However, the term of office is fixed by the Constitution at seven
years, and the President has no power to shorten this term because that
would mean amending the Constitution. Thus, the "promotional"
appointment of Villar as Chairman to a three-year term is, in itself,
unconstitutional for violating the mandatory seven-year fixed term, apart
from the prohibition on reappointment.
Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
Trigger Words: appointments, acting capacity, Sec of Justice na SolGen
pa.
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for review
Summary of Facts:
● On March 1, 2010, Agra was appointed Acting DOJ
secretary when Secretary Devanadera resigned.
● 4 days after, Agra was also appointed as Acting SolGen by
PGMA.
● Funa (as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer) files the
case questioning the constitutionality of Agra's dual
appointments, as it violated the constitutional prohibition
against holding multiple offices under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
○ Funa contended that the prohibition should apply
irrespective of the nature of the appointment,
underscoring that the Solicitor General's position is
not ex officio concerning the Secretary of Justice,
considering that the OSG is an independent and
autonomous office attached to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) – hence, its unconstitutionality.
● On Agra's account, however, stated that he was first
designated as Acting Solicitor General on January 12,
2010, before assuming the role of Acting Secretary of
Justice. The respondents argued that Agra's designations
were temporary and did not amount to "holding" both offices in
the constitutional sense. They asserted that Agra's service as
Acting Solicitor General was a hold-over until the election of his
successor, during which he received no salaries from the OSG
while serving as Acting Secretary of Justice. Despite conflicting
narratives, Agra admitted to concurrently holding both offices in
acting capacities, a fact deemed sufficient by the Court for
resolving the constitutional question raised by the petitioner.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, violates the constitutional prohibition
against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies – [YES]
Summary of Ruling:
● The court held that the designation is unconstitutional
because in violates Section 13, Article 7. At the heart of
resolving this issue is in the correct interpretation the said
article which states that the President, Vice-President,
Cabinet Members, and their deputies or assistants should
not hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.
○ A related provision, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article
IX-B, imposes a similar restriction on appointive
officials, barring them from holding other government
positions unless allowed by law or the primary
functions of their position.
● The court also held that it is insignificant that Agra was
appointed in acting capacity because the framers of the
Constitution stated that to “hold office” means to possess
or occupy it, whether it is in acting capacity or not.
● Agra, designated as Acting Secretary of Justice alongside
his role as Acting Solicitor General, unequivocally fell
under the scope of Section 13, Article VII and his
simultaneous positions violated the constitutional
prohibition against holding multiple offices during his
tenure. The fact that Agra's appointment was temporary did
not alter this interpretation, as Section 13 imposes a stringent
restriction on the President and Cabinet Members,
encompassing both permanent and temporary appointments.
 Hence, the petition was granted and the designation of officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor General
was declared annulled and void for being unconstitutional
and violative of the Constitution.
○ The prohibition against dual or multiple offices held by RULING
a single official must be interpreted to apply to all
WHEREFORE, the Comi GRANTS the petition for certiorari and
appointments or designations, whether permanent or
prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra
temporary. Such an interpretation aligns with this
as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position
constitutional provision, which aims to prevent the
as the Acting Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and violative of
concentration of powers in the Executive Department
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that l-Ion.
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President,
Alberto C. Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting
the Cabinet Members, and their deputies and
Secretary of Justice. No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
assistants.
● In addition, the court held that Agra’s concurrent
OTHER NOTES
designations as Acting DOJ Secretary and Acting SolGen
did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity
● Codal Provisions/Other Issues & Summarized Ratio
because the OSG is independent and autonomous. Also,
the magnitude of the scope of the work of the SolGen if added
Article VI, Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
to the equally demanding tasks of the DOJ Secretary is too
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
much for only 1 official to bear and would ultimately affect the
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
sound governmental operations and prime performance of
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
one’s duties. However, the court’s ruling considered that Agra
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
was to be considered a de facto officer during his tenure
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
as Acting DOJ Secretary and that all official actions of
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
Agra as a de facto Secretary, assuming that his later
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
designation, are presumed valid, binding, and effective as
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
if he was legally appointed and qualified for office
their office.
Doctrine (if applicable): The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all Article IX-B, Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
On mootness (context: Cadiz was appointed as SolGen during the case’s
pendency).
● The case is deemed of transcendental importance (legal
standing), and the Court assumes a liberal stance, allowing the
petitioner to proceed with the petition. Despite the intervening
appointment of Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as Solicitor General, the
Court decided to address the constitutional issue, citing
exceptions such as a grave violation of the Constitution, a
situation of exceptional character, paramount public interest, the
formulation of controlling principles, and the capability of repetition
yet evading review. The resolution of the issue is deemed valuable
to guide the Bench, Bar, and the public.
Communications, as the Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry
Authority. The petitioner, adopting arguments from Funa v. Ermita, based
his challenge on key pronouncements from Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary and Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma.
What sets this apart from Funa v. Ermita is the fact that the contested
appointments in the Agra case were made in acting or temporary
capacities.
Test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices— Whether one office is subordinate to the other, such that one
office has the right to interfere with the other. **The primary functions of
the OSG are not related to those of the DOJ.

Further on legal standing

● The OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness of the
matter raised by the petitioner. The petitioner's locus standi as a
taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer has already been
established in previous rulings by the Court, emphasizing the
Court's liberal approach in allowing non-traditional plaintiffs to sue
in cases involving constitutional issues of critical significance.

Digester’s notes: Also, the Court has recognized the petitioner in a

previous case Funa v. Ermita (same nature as the case at bar) with his
locus standi having been upheld. So, the Court was like bakit hindi?

Funa v. Ermita

In Funa v. Ermita, the Court adjudicated a petition filed by the petitioner,

challenging the constitutionality of the appointment of Maria Elena H.
Bautista, then Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Funa v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25,
2014
Trigger Words: Duque, CSC Chairman, ex officio member, GOCC
director; Ex – officio capacity – part of it by virtue of holding another office
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
Summary of Facts:
● On January 11, 2010, PGMA appointed Duque as chairman
of the CSC and the appointment was confirmed by the
COA.
● On February 22, 2010, PGMA issued E.O. 864 which
included the chairman of the CSC as ex officio member of
the Board of Trustees of GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC and HDMF.
○ This was based on Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book
V of EO 292 which states the CSC Chairman shall be
a member of boards of gov’t entities whose
functions affect civil servants
● The Petitioner Funa challenged the constitutionality of (a) E.O.
864 for violating Section 1 and Section 2 of Article 9 because
the designation of Duque in ex officio capacity should not be
allowed, (b) Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 And
(c) Duques designation as it would violate the independence of
the CSC and prohibition against holding multiple offices under
Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the assailed provisions and Duque's designation as
Board member of GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC & HDMF
constitutional - NO
Summary of Ruling:
● The Court ruled that the designation of Duque in an ex
officio capacity is not unconstitutional.
○ Section 1 and Section 2 of Article 9 should be read in
line with Section 7(2) of Article 9.
○ It is not allowed as ruled in Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, Duque was covered by the
general rule that he may hold another office if it is
allowed by law or allowed by the primary functions of
his position.
○ Hence, Duque was considered a de facto officer and
his official acts were deemed valid.
● Under Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I – A, Book V of E.O. 292 the
CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing body is
dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board Member
must affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government offices and
employees.
○ However, Duque’s designation as Board Member of the
said GOCC’s is in accordance with the Constitution and
the condition laid down in Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I –
A, Book V of E.O. 292 is dependent on the functions of
government agencies under their respective charters.
○ As board member he was assigned additional
compensation which does not characterize him as an
ex – officio officer and his designation impairs the
independence of the Civil Service Commission as he is
given corporate powers that are not related to his job as
CSC Chairman.
Petition partially granted. The Court upheld Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292 allowing the CSC Chairman to be an ex officio
member of boards affecting civil servants. However, EO 864 and
Duque's designation were declared unconstitutional for violating the
 ● GOCC Board powers encompass non-personnel functions
independence of CSC and the prohibition against holding multiple
beyond the CSC Chairman's primary functions
offices. Duque was considered a de facto officer and his official acts
● Receives per diem allowance, violates the concept of ex
were deemed valid.
officio position in Civil Liberties Union
● As GOCCs under the Executive Branch per EO 292, violate
Doctrine: The President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII
independence guaranteed to CSC under Art IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution applies to all executive departments, bureaus,
● Power of Control doctrine applied, offices under the Executive
and offices including government-owned and controlled corporations
Branch are subject to the President’s control
(GOCCs). Hence, designating the Chairman of the Civil Service
● Impairs CSC independence since the President controls
Commission (CSC), an independent Constitutional Commission, as ex
GOCCs but cannot control independent CSC
officio member of the Boards of GOCCs attached to the Executive
● EO 864 and Duque’s designation void for unconstitutionality
Branch violates the independence of the CSC.
● However, Duque considered de facto officer based on Civil
Liberties Union precedent in 1991
● Hence official acts presumed valid and binding
MAIN ISSUE & HELD
RULING
Petition partially granted. Sec 14 of EO 292 upheld. EO 864 and
1. W/N Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is
Duque's designation void for unconstitutionality.
constitutional - YES
SUPREME COURT: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sec 14, Chapter 3,
● Sec 3, Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states CSC is the Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is UPHELD. EO 864 and the designation of
central personnel agency of gov't responsible for civil service
Duque III are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID. Duque III was a
● CSC Chairman's specific duties under EO 292 involve career
development, employment status, rights and welfare of civil de facto officer and his official acts are deemed VALID. No pronouncement
servants as to costs. SO ORDERED.
● Condition in Sec 14 that the board's functions must affect civil
servants consistent with CSC's duties, hence derived from the
CSC Chairman's position
● SC cited Civil Liberties Union v Exec Secretary (1991)
defining ex officio as authority derived from the official
character of the principal office
● Thus, Sec 14 ruled constitutional as it covers boards whose
functions fall under the primary functions of CSC exercised
through its Chairman

2. W/N Duque's designation as Board member of GSIS,

PhilHealth, ECC & HDMF constitutional - NOSUPREME
COURT:

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, December 13,
2000
Trigger Words: 7-5-3, constitutional commissions appointment; her
term of office ended in 1999 but it’s ok nga 2000 sya nag end bcos of
the good faith principle
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Special civil action of certiorari
Summary of Facts:
● On June 11, 1993, the President appointed petitioner Thelma
P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner of CSC, and
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of
office. Her appointment papers said that her term expires on
February 2, 1999
● However the Gamide sought a clarification of her term, in
reply to her request the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
said that her term would expire on February 2, 2000.
○ Relying on this advisory opinion the Gamide stayed on
till past Feb 2, 1999.
● Chairwoman Corazon de Leon wrote to the COA requesting
opinion on w/n Gamide and her associates may be paid their
salaries even if their appointments expired.
○ The General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued
an opinion that "the term of Commissioner
Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent."
● CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe disallowed the
salaries and emoluments pertaining to the petitioner and
her coterminous staff, effective February 02, 1999.
● The petitioner appealed the disallowance to the
Commission on Audit en banc, however it was dismissed,
as it affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that
the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper
which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that
the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of
her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office
of the President.
Summary of Opinions:
1. De Leon: Concurring and dissenting
a. I concur with the ponencia insofar as it holds that the
salaries and other emoluments which petitioner, as
CSC Commissioner, received after February 2, 1999
should not be disallowed by Commission on Audit
(COA).
b. I respectfully dissent from the ponencia of Mr. Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo insofar as it maintains that the term
of petitioner as Civil Service Commissioner expired on
February 2, 1999 and not on February 2, 2000, and that
the term of the first set of Civil Service Commissioners
appointed under the 1987 Constitution commenced on
the date of its ratification on February 2, 1987 instead of
one year thereafter or on February 2, 1988.
i. He argues that the one-year holdover period for
incumbent commissioners after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution should be considered
part of their tenure, and the terms of the first set
of commissioners appointed under the
constitution start from February 2, 1988, not the
date of ratification in 1987.
ISSUES & HELD
1. Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as
claimed by her] - [Feb 02, 1999]
SUPREME COURT
● The court ruled that the appropriate starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or
qualification, the interval between the start of the term and
the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter.
● In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of
the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the
plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C),
Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987
Constitution that uniformly prescribed a 7-year term of office for
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five
and three years, without re-appointment.
● In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
● There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of
office as this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the
Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).
● Transitionary Provision (Art 18, Sec 15):
o “The incumbent Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year
after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are
sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term
thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than
seven years including service before the ratification of this
Constitution”
o The transitionary provision is one that contemplates tenure and
not term.
o This is not something that affects the terms of offices that are
fixed under Article 9.
*Note: Tenure vs Term
Tenure - represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office.
Term - means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
?
RULING
WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P.
Gaminde as Commissioner, CSC, under an appointment extended to
her by President Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02,
1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until
February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and
other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Audit
insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner
Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de
facto officer frommFebruary 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000. This
decision shall be effective immediately. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018
Trigger Words: [insert Trigger Words here]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Summary of Facts:
● Morales was appointed to a 7-year term following the
resignation of then Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2011 to
avoid impeachment trial in the Senate over allegations of
incompetence and inaction on various cases.
○ Gutierrez left an unexpired term until November 30,
2012.
● Ifurung argued that Morales and her deputies must vacate
their post for supposedly overstaying as they must serve
only the unexpired term of their predecessor.
○ He alleged that Section 8(3) of the Ombudsman Act,
which provides for a full term of seven years for the
Ombudsman and his deputies in case of a vacancy, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Section 11 of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution.
○ He claimed that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was for the Ombudsman and his deputies
to serve only the unexpired term of their predecessor,
similar to other constitutionally created positions.
○ He also insisted that the incumbent Ombudsman and
deputies have overstayed in their positions, as their
terms expired in February 2015.
● The respondents, on the other hand, argue that the term of the
Ombudsman and his deputies is fixed at seven years,
regardless of whether it is a full term or an unexpired term.
They contend that the Ombudsman Act is a valid exercise of
legislative power and is in accordance with the
Constitution.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
W/N Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of RA 6770 also known as
Ombudsman Act of 1989 is unconstitutional for being an outright
transgression of Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8 and 10 of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution? [NO]
Summary of Ruling:
● The Court ruled that Section 8(3) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 is not unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that the
Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission, as
it is not included in the enumeration of independent
constitutional commissions in the 1987 Constitution.
○ Therefore, the Ombudsman and the deputies do not
have the same term of office as the chairman and
members of the constitutional commissions.
○ Moreso, The Ombudsman and the deputies do not
resolve cases by a majority of all its members but rather
are confined within the sphere of their respective
jurisdiction, as it is not a collegial body.
○ In line with this, it is implausible to apply the regular
rotation or cycle in its membership.
○ Also, they do not decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before the Office
of the Ombudsman.
● In regard to the issue of transgression, under Sec. 10, Art. XI,
the undeniable intent of the framers of the 1987
 Constitution was to provide that the rank and salary of the
Ombudsman and his deputies shall be the same as that of
the chairman and members, respectively, of the
constitutional commissions and does not include the "term
of office".
● While, Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of
seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office. The quoted provision of
the Constitution is clear and explicit: (a) the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall serve the term of seven years; (b) that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be reappointed; and (c)
the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in
the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
Sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its own.
Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term
of the Ombudsman and the deputies. For sure, nowhere in
the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any
vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
● This can only mean that it was the intent of the framers that
the appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and
the deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired
term of the predecessor, shall always be for a full term of
seven years. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case
of death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the
Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman shall be appointed for a full
term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3), R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with
Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as it
provides that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve
for a term of seven years.
RULING
Petition is [dismissed]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N all individual respondents should be declared as de facto
Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman as all these positions
are vacant? - NO
- To summarize, pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the
chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional
commissions. Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy
for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as
a result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the
successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven
years.
- Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987
Constitution, the seven-year term of office of the first
appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned
from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of
appointment.
- Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve
a full term of seven ye
- unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or
permanent disability.
2. W/N [the instant petition is the proper remedy] - NO
- The Court observes that petitioner has named only the incumbent
Ombudsman and the deputies as respondents in his petition
although the present controversy deals with the constitutionality of
a legislative act and, corollary thereto, the act of the President in
appointing the respondents allegedly beyond the seven-year term
as prescribed by the constitution and explicated through our
jurisprudential declarations. The Court hastens to add that it was
equally raised in this petition that there were alleged illegal
disbursement of public funds as a result of the pervasive
noncompliance with the constitutional requirement on the
seven-year term of office of the Ombudsman and the deputies;
yet, the petitioner failed to include the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) as a respondent. Notwithstanding these
observations, the Court notes that respondents’ present counsel,
the OSG, would have likewise represented the legislative body,
the Office of the President, or the DBM had they been equally
named as respondents in this petition. Bearing in mind that the
arguments of the OSG relative to the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3)
of RA. No. 6770 would have equally applied to these persons had
they been included as respondents in this petition and that the
Court has already determined that it shall take cognizance of this
case pursuant to its expanded power of review, we shall then set
aside our misgivings on the failure of the petitioner to include the
other respondents in his petition.

Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4,
2012
Trigger Words: [President can remove a deputy ombudsman]
PLEASE NOTE: THIS DECISION WAS OVERTURNED IN THE 2014
PETITION BY GONZALES AND SULIT
Recit Ready Summary
Summary of Facts:
● G.R. No. 196231 – The first case involves a tourist bus that
was hijacked by Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza,
who claimed that he was unjustly removed from service and that
his dismissal and forfeiture of retirement benefits were already
enforced before solving the case, for the reason that he was
accused of Gross Misconduct. Moreso, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon despite pleas by Mendoza,
therefore, 9 months after, he staged the deadly “Manila Hostage
Crisis” that resulted in numerous casualties, most of whom were
Chinese tourists. The investigation found the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez liable for gross neglect of
duty and he was dismissed from service.
● G.R. No. 196232 - The 2nd case was a suit against Wendell –
Barreras Sulit who was the Special Prosecutor who was
accused of acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement with
the Garcia’s (who, together with his family and others were
accused of the crime of Plunder and Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan.). The infamous PLEBARA resulted in
House of Representatives Committee hearings which
adopted a resolution recommending to the President to
dismiss Barreras-Sulit. The President initiated administrative
proceedings.
Both of these cases questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, challenging the constitutionality of Section 8 (2) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
Office of the Ombudsman. - YES
2014 Ruling: NO to Ombudsman, YES to special prosecutor
Summary of 2012 Ruling:
● The court ruled that the Office of the President had the
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over the Deputy Ombudsman (DO) and a Special
Prosecutor (SP) who belong to the constitutionally –
created Office of the Ombudsman.
● The Court ruled that the President has the power to remove
the DO and SP because the President’s administrative
disciplinary power is not exclusive. The Ombudsman’s
authority to discipline administratively, covering all government
offices except only those officials removed by impeachment
should be interpreted with Section 8(2) of Article 7 which grants
the President express power of removal over a DO or SP.
● Also, the Congress intended for the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners.
● The Court also ruled that vesting this power to the Ombudsman
would result in mutual protection and the President should
exercise power in order to prevent it.
● The Court also ruled that the President has this power for the
following reasons:
 ○ Article 11, Section 9 and Section 2: President power to
remove and appoint the Ombudsman
○ Doctrine of Implication: power to appoint carries
power to remove
● The Court also ruled that Gonzalez is entitled to reinstatement
because his acts do not constitute a betrayal of public trust, it
was out of his hands.
2014 Ruling [PARTLY GRANTED]
● The Court voted to grant Gonzales' petition and to declare
Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect
to the Office of the Ombudsman. This conclusion does not
apply to Sulit (8-7) as the grant of independence is solely with
respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include
the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution.
● The Court ruled that the Office of the President does not
have jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a DO and SP who belong to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
○ This is because it would violate the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
(Agreed with Brion’s dissent in the first case).
● The Court also ruled that it would be an intrusion on the
constitutionally granted independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and checks and balances.
● The Court ruled that the Ombudsman can hardly be expected
to place her complete trust in her subordinate officers who
are not as independent as she is.
Doctrine (if applicable):
Doctrine of Implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when
the law expressly provides otherwise (2012)
Summary of Opinions:
1. Carpio: Concurring. Independent bodies are not completely
insulated from other bodies, and can be subject to checks and
balances. 1987 Consti provides that non-impeachable officers
and employees can be removed from office as provided by law.
The Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor are not
impeachable officials and therefore, can be removed as
provided in Section 8 (2) of the Ombudsman Act.
2. Brion: Concurring and dissenting. Section 8 (2) of the
Ombudsman Act runs counter to the independence of the
Ombudsman Office. It would create an absurd situation where
the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on
the integrity of the very persons that can remove or suspend its
members.
3. Abad: Dissenting. The Office of the Ombudsman needs to be
insulated from the pressures, interventions, or vindictive acts of
partisan politics.Section 8 (2) of the Ombudsman Act is void
since it will place the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor under pressure from the President, despite the
constitutional mandate that they are to be independent.
FACTS OF CASE:
G.R. No. 196231
MANILA HOSTAGE CRISIS
● In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave
threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before
the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR)
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando
Mendoza, and four others.
● On July 24, 2008, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request
of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and
evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A08-0670-H for Grave
 Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers.
● On August 26, 2008, case against petitioners in the Office of
City Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated
by any evidence.
● Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers.
● On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H
finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman.
● On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the foregoing Decision.
● On May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the
case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and
action when P/S Insp.
● 9 months since his dismissal, Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on August 23, 2010.
● Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza, a dismissed
policeman, claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police
service.
● Mendoza was distraught by the slow process of the
Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconsideration. He
said the PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila Regional Trial
Court had already dismissed criminal cases against him.
● Armed with an assault rifle, Mendoza hijacked a bus packed with
tourists, and killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage
drama shown live on national television.
● Negotiators tried to talk Mendoza into surrendering and releasing
the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including the
driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Mendoza demanded
to be reinstated to the police force immediately.
● Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Vice Mayor
Moreno to discuss Mendoza's case that led to his dismissal from
the service.
● Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave a
"sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza.
● Mendoza was not pleased/satisfied with the contents of the letter.
● Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) was created to hold
officials accountable for the crisis.
● The Ombudsman, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings
on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body.
● IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those
in whom culpability must lie.
● IIRC made the following findings:
A. By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration
to languish for nine long (9) months without any
justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and
wanton violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to
resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission
(Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure).
B. Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for
reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the judgment
of dismissal and ignored the intervening requests
for immediate resolution.
C. Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious disregard of due
process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing
to provisionally suspend the further
implementation of the judgment of dismissal
 against Mendoza pending disposition of his
unresolved motion for reconsideration.
D. When the two Ombudsman officials received
Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order
resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should
have performed their duty by resolving the
reconsideration that same day since it was already
pending for nine months and the prescribed period for
its resolution is only five days
● On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge against
petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency
in the Performance of Official Duty.
● On March 31, 2011, OP rendered a decision dismissing Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III.
G.R. No. 196232
● December of 2003 - 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and
23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States
smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their
luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers.
● Investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted
by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a
scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth.
● The boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former
Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated
more than P300 Million during his active military service. Plunder
and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed against
Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the
Sandiganbayan.
● On March 16, 2010, the government, represented by petitioner,
Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit")
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea-Bargaining
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into
with the accused.
● On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
● House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public
hearings on the PLEBARA.
● Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution
No. 3, 24 recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit for having committed acts and/or
omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from
office under the Ombudsman Act.
● The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
ISSUES & HELD 2012 CASE
1. W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and
a Special Prosecutor who belong to the Office of the Ombudsman.
/ the Ombudsman Act is Constitutional – YES (NO MAJORITY
VOTE, THUS OMBUDSMAN ACT SHALL REMAIN
CONSTITUTIONAL)
SUPREME COURT
1. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not
exclusive. Section 8 (2), grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor.
● Authority of the Ombudsman
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials
who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
● Authority of the President
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. — (2) A Deputy or
the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process.
● Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President
to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively.
2. By granting express statutory power to the President to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor,
Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
● The removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal
from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8 (2) of R.A.
6770, Congress simply filled a gap
3. The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his
Power to Appoint.
● Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint
carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule,
therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwise — that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other
than the appointing power.
4. Granting the President, the Power to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
● Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's
exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for
any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and
(2) that there must be observance of due process.
The Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely,
"culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust."
2012 RULING
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.
11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged
acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution
and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8 (2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8 (2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD 2012 CASE ● Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, failed to build a strong case for
the government in entering into an agreement which the
government finds "grossly disadvantageous."
1. W/N Gonzales should be removed from due to “betrayal of ● Complete and effective resolution of the administrative case
public trust”? – NO before the Office of the President.
● Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion
that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
DETAILED OPINIONS OF JUSTICES
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust.
● J. Brion (CONCURRING AND DISSENTING): Disagree with the
● The Constitutional Commission found it reasonably acceptable for
conclusion that Section 8 (2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 (which
the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just
empowers the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or a
short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against
Special Prosecutor) is constitutionally valid. The power to
public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
discipline or remove an official of the Office of the Ombudsman
duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers." In
should be lodged only with the Ombudsman and not with the
other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as
Office of the President, in light of the independence the
to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must
Constitution guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman.
be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as
○ The Ombudsman’s duty is to protect the people from
the other grounds for impeachment.
unjust, illegal and inefficient acts of all public officials as
● The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early
established in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. To
resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
amounting to betrayal of public trust.
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures
● Petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position
and influence of officialdom and partisan politics 4 and
from fear of external reprisal by making it an
2. W/N The Office of the President can proceed administratively
"independent" office.
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence
○ Section 8 (2) of the Ombudsman Act runs against the
of any of the grounds for her removal from office. – YES
constitutional intent and should be void. Subjecting the
● The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission
officials of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline and
in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based
place at risk the independence of the Ombudsman and
on his new pleas to lesser offenses.
her officials, and must consequently run counter to the
● The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the
independence that the Constitution guarantees the Office
Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding
of the Ombudsman.
of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
○ Intent of the framers was to make the Ombudsman office
as independent from the office of the president.
■ Commissioner Regalado: “...because if the
Tanodbayan would make the corresponding
reports about failures, malfunctions or omissions
of the different ministries, then that would reflect
upon the President who wanted to claim the
alleged confidence of the people…If he is
toothless, then let us give him a little more teeth
by making him independent of the Office of the
President…”
■ Commissioner Monsod:The Committee discussed
that during our committee deliberations and when
we prepared the report, it was the opinion of the
Committee — and I believe it still is — that it may
not contribute to the effectiveness of this office of
the Ombudsman precisely because many of the
culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety
are in the executive department. Therefore, as we
saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan
which was under the tremendous influence of the
President, it was an ineffectual body and was
reduced to the function of a special fiscal.
The whole purpose of the our proposal is
precisely to separate those functions and to
produce a vehicle that will give true meaning to
the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret
that we cannot accept the proposition.
■ The Executive power to remove and discipline
members of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to
exercise any power over them, would result in an
absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the
integrity and competence of the very persons who
can remove or suspend its members.
○ The absence of a constitutional provision providing for the
removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen
does not mean that Congress can empower the President
to discipline or remove them in violation of the
independence that the Constitution textually and expressly
provides.
○ Second sentence of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution — that it was not the intent to widen the
discretion of Congress in providing for the removal of a
public officer; the intent was to limit its powers. The
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI was provided to
limit the public officers who can only be removed by
impeachment.
■ Commissioner Regalado insisted on adding the
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution to prevent Congress from extending
the more stringent rule of "removal only by
impeachment" to favored public officers.
○ Sections 9 through 12 also provides specific regulations to
the Ombudsman’s deputies.
■ Under this structure providing for terms and
conditions fully supportive of "independence," it
makes no sense to insulate their appointments
and their salaries from politics, but not their
tenure. One cannot simply argue that the
President's power to discipline them is limited to
specified grounds, since the mere filing of a case
against them can result in their suspension and
can interrupt the performance of their functions, in
violation of Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. With only one term allowed under
Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special
 Prosecutor removable by the President can be
reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the
Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and
carefully tried to avoid by making these offices
independent constitutional bodies.
● J. Abad (DISSENTING): Section 8 (2) of the Ombudsman Act
should be declared void.
○ Section 2 provides that only the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed by impeachment and that
other public officers and employees may be removed by
law. But this cannot literally be taken to mean that
Congress may authorize the President to investigate and
remove all non-impeachable public officers and
employees.
○ Congress cannot authorize the President to remove all
non-impeachable officials, especially of independent
bodies as the Constitution percieves them as exercising
functions independent of him as ruled in Bautista v
Salonga where the terms of the members of the CHR,
despite being non-impeachable officials, cannot be
commuted by the President.
○ Ombudsman already had the power to investigate and
take disciplinary action against all officers and employees
in the Office of the Ombudsman. In enacting R.A. 6770,
Congress in effect removed such power of investigation
and removal, insofar as the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor were concerned, from the
Ombudsman and transferred the same to the President.
○ The Office of the Ombudsman needs to be insulated from
the pressures, interventions, or vindictive acts of partisan
politics. The power to impeach is a function of check and
balance under the Constitution. But the power to remove
"public officers and employees" from office, in the realm of
administrative law, is a function of supervision, if not
control. Keeping the Deputies in the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor independent as
the Constitution commands and subjecting them to the
President's control or supervision are incompatible ideas.
○ To say that the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor will remain independent of the President
notwithstanding that he can investigate and remove them
from office at any time is the equivalent of saying that
monkeys grow out of trees. If there is any one that the
holder of public office fears, it is that person who has the
power to remove him.
OTHER NOTES
● Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own
people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them,
including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, it is equally without question that the President has
concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under
specified conditions.
● Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. — (2) A Deputy or
the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process.

Gonzales III v. Office of the President, January 28, 2014
Trigger Words: Ombudsman: the untouchables
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General
Doctrine:
The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office
of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in
an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the
duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons
who can remove or suspend its members.
Summary of Opinions:
1. Leonen: I vote to dismiss the motion for partial reconsideration.
The constitutional challenge to Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770
where the Deputy Ombudsman is concerned should succeed.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core
constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman as expressed in Sec 5, Art. XI - [NO]
- The law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably
with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
● The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the
performance of their duties.
● Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself.
2. W/N Gonzales is guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty - [NO]
- Of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time. When
Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the
case were already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez. Therefore,
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since
he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days.
● Sec. 8 Rule III of AO No. 7 cannot apply to him since he is a
Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is
not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the
motion. In Section 6 of AO No. 7 on the resolution of the case and
submission of the proposed decision, the period for resolving the
case does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed.
● The Ombudsman handles numerous cases that involve the
potential loss of employment of many other public employees. The
Court cannot conclusively state that Mendoza's case should have
been prioritized over other similar cases.
3. W/N Special Prosecutor enjoys the same immunity as the
Office of the Ombudsman - [NO]
- Under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special
Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, insofar as an
extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the
same grant of independence under the Constitution. However, the Court
did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
4. W/N there was undue interest - [NO]
- The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies
within his mandate. The finding of guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al. was
based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al. admitted that they had
arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and Kalaw was allowed to
leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based
merely on his promise to return with the proper documents.
● These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to conclude that
Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the
proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic violators would be
to give them a ticket and to file a case, when appropriate.
RULING
Petition is [partly granted]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare
Section 8 (2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling
on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary,
but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative
liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.
DETAILED OPINIONS OF JUSTICES
● J. Leonen: I vote to dismiss the motion for partial reconsideration.
However, the constitutional challenge to Section 8, Paragraph (2)
of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act insofar as the
Deputy Ombudsman is concerned should succeed.
○ The initial voting of this court on whether Gonzales could
be found liable for betrayal of the public trust was 14-0.
● I agree with Justice Carpio that the Office of the Ombudsman is
also constitutionally accountable. I cannot agree, however, that
this accountability can be extracted by allowing her deputies to be
answerable to two principals: the Ombudsman and the President,
even if this dual accountability is provided by law.
○ The text of the Constitution should be read by one guided
by, but not limited to, the debates that happened when it
was drafted and ratified. It should also be read in the light
of the needs of present times while being sensitive and
addressing precedents existing in our jurisprudence.
● In my view, the Office of the Special Prosecutor may by law be
removed by the President. This is what Section 8, Paragraph (2)
of the Ombudsman Act provides.
○ The Office of the Ombudsman's powers are more
proactive than the prosecutorial powers of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor.
 ● Limitations on PARDON
e. Executive Clemency
Nature of Pardoning Power – Power to reprieve, commute,
pardon, remit fines and forfeitures after final judgment.
Article 7, Section 19(1): Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after convictions by final judgment.
○ Cannot be granted on impeachment cases
○ Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws
without the favorable recommendation of COMELEC
○ Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment
○ Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability
○ Cannot be granted to cases of legislative contempt or civil
contempt
○ Cannot restore public offices forfeited

Forms of Executive Clemencies

● Amnesty – a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by
government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty
usually of political offenses and who are subject to trial but have
not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to
obedience and duty within a prescribed time.
○ Requires concurrence of majority of all members of
Congress (Article 7, Section 19)
● Pardons – permanent cancellation of sentence. It is an act of
grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed. It is remission of guilt, forgiveness of the offense.
○ Plenary pardon: extinguishes all the penalties imposed
upon the offender, including accessory disabilities
○ Partial pardon: does not extinguish all penalties imposed
○ Absolute pardon: pardonee has no option at all and must
accept it whether he likes it or not
○ Conditional pardon: the offender has the right to reject
the same since he may feel that the condition imposed is
more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted

Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, G.R. L-1278, January 21, 1949
Trigger Words: [amnesty, amnesty commission]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
(special action of mandamus)
Summary of Facts:
● Petitioners Jimenez and Barroquinto were charged for
murder committed during WWII before the CFI of
Zamboanga.
● The case proceeded against Jimenez because Barroquinto was
not arrested and Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment
● Before the period for appeal, they decided to submit their
case to the Guerilla Amnesty Corporation (GAC) to avail of
amnesty, as they became aware of Proclamation No. 8 by
Pres. Roxas which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who
may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal
Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
● However, the Commission returned the cases of the
petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits
of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that neither
Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the
offense, hence they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N admitting to have committed the offense is a requisite
for the accused to be entitled to the benefits of the amnesty
proclamation? - NO
Summary of Ruling:
● The Court ruled that admission to a crime does not entitle
one to the benefits of amnesty. According to the court,
amnesty looks backward and abolished and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooked and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged.
○ To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not
proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether
the offense with which an accused was charged comes
within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or
confess having committed it, would be to defeat the
purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was
issued and the Amnesty Commissions were
established.
● To entitle a person to have his case heard by the GAC, he
needs the following:
○ charged with an offense under the RPC,
○ committed during the period from December 8, 1941
to the date when the area where the offense was
committed was actually liberated.
If these elements are present the GAC cannot refuse.
● If admitting to the offense is a requisite before they can
invoke the benefits of amnesty, no one would dare come to
the Amnesty Commission as there is no law preventing
their confession to be not admissible to courts of justice if
he is found to be not entitled to the Amnesty Proclamation.
Summary of Opinions:
1. Tuason (dissenting)
● The Amnesty Commissions are executive
instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the
President. They are not courts; they are not performing
judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate
jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
● When an accused says that he has not committed a
crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also

self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation
imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of
those conditions.
● A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess
the allegations against him before he is allowed to set
out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action.
ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N admitting to have committed the offense is a requisite for
the accused to be entitled to the benefits of the amnesty
proclamation? - NO
- Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction
- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed
the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and
allege the amnesty as a defense.
● It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the
accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the
terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
● Whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
● Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well
as the Amnesty Commissions should take notice of the terms of
said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases
coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said
benefits.
● The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the
evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or
by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public
interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty
Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only as innocent,
for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed
any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or
hero, can not be punished as a criminal.
● There is no necessity for an accused to admit his
responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a
court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or
not to him the benefits of amnesty.
● To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the
investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which
an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation
if he does not admit or confess having committed it, would be to
defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was
issued and the Amnesty Commissions were established.
● If admitting to the offense is a requisite before they can
invoke the benefits of amnesty, no one would dare come to
the Amnesty Commission as there is no law preventing their
confession to be not admissible to courts of justice if he is
found to be not entitled to the Amnesty Proclamation.
RULING
Petition is [granted]
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to
hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto
and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided,
expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So
ordered.
DETAILED OPINIONS OF JUSTICES
● J. TUASON: dissenting
- It is apparent from this order that the Commission acted in the manner
contemplated by Proclamation No. 8 of the President.
- The return of the papers to the court merely follows the procedure
provided in the proclamation, which stipulates "that any case now
pending or which may be filed in the future which a Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission decides as not within the terms of the
amnesty shall proceed in accordance with the usual legal
procedures in the courts without regard to this proclamation."
- The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting
for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are not
performing judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate
jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction.The Court
can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission
how to act.
- Does not think the Commission was wrong in its theory that admitting is a
requisite.
- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an
accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot have
any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the Amnesty
Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those
conditions.
- A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him
before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat
the action.
Notes:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to
one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons
or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work
the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by
the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.

Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Trigger Words: [invoked amnesty but did not admit the committing the
crime]
Recit Ready Summary
Summary of Facts:
● Petitioners and 92 others were charged with the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, or
alias Azarcon.
● Petitioners invoked the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation
No. 8 of the President but during the hearing, only one
defendant (Vera) took the witness stand, categorically
denying the crime. No one admitted the crime.
● Eight Guerilla Amnesty Commission (Commission) held that it
could not take cognizance of the case since the benefits of
Amnesty Proclamation could only be invoked by the
defendants who admitted to the commission of the crime.
● They remanded it to the CFI.
● Petitioners appealed to the CA who also affirmed the
Commission’s decision, stating that it will be the ordinary courts
of justice who should try their case.
● Hence the present petition.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
W/N the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8? - [NO]
Summary of Ruling:
● The Court held that amnesty presupposes the commission
of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not
committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
● By invoking amnesty, it means you’re admitting to the crime
and allegations.
● Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 extends its provisions to all
persons who committed any act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war effort of the enemy.
● The facts presented before the Commission do not
bring such a case wherein they can invoke the Amnesty
Proclamation since the killing of the deceased was
not in furtherance of the resistance movement but
rather due to rivalry between the Vera Guerilla Party
and the Hunter ROTC Guerilla (the organization
where the deceased belongs)
● Also, one of the cases they invoked (Buyco v. People) cannot
be relied on because in that case, the court held that the
Amnesty Proclamation cannot be invoked as petitioner
claims he took no part in the killing, thus no room to apply
the amnesty if he denies the commission of the offense
charged.
Doctrine (if applicable):
Invoking Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and
when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he
cannot have any use for amnesty
1. W/N CA erred in declining to resolve the factual issues
petitioners raised before it? - [NO]
● Argument is untenable because CA correctly ruled that it would be
premature, prejudicial, and useless to make a ruling on the factual
issues presented by the petitioner.
RULING
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals
sought to be reviewed, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1941)
Trigger Words: [With Pardon, past is past…]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Summary of Facts:
● Santos was convicted of estafa in 1930 and sentenced to six
months of arresto mayor + accessory penalties.
● He served his sentence and was released in 1932. However,
he continued to be a registered voter and even served as
the municipal president of Malabon from 1934 to 1937.
● In 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code) was
enacted, which disqualified Santos from voting due to his
previous conviction. Santos then applied for an absolute
pardon, which was granted by the President on December 24,
1939.
● The pardon restored Santos to his "full civil and political rights"
but limited his eligibility for public office to clerical or manual
positions without money or property responsibility.
● Petitioner Cristobal then filed a petition for exclusion of
Santos’s name from the list of voters, on the ground that he
is disqualified based on CA No. 357, Sec. 94, Par. B,
expressing the need to uphold the integrity of the electoral
system and ensure that individuals with criminal records do not
participate in the democratic process.
● However, the court denied the request, raising questions about
the interpretation and application of the law in relation to
pardoned individuals.
● The petitioner argues that the pardon granted to Santos did not
fully restore his political rights, bringing to light the complex
nature of the pardoning power and its limitations in relation to
legislative prohibitions.
● Ultimately, the primary question before the court is the nature
and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief
Executive, which has far-reaching implications for the balance
of power and the interpretation of the law.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the pardon granted to Santos restored his right to vote
and removed his disqualification under Commonwealth Act
No. 357. - YES
Summary of Ruling:
● The Court ruled that an absolute pardon not only blots out
the crime committed but also removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. The disability in this case,
which was the basis for disqualification from voting, was a result
of Santos' conviction. The Court held that the pardoning
power extends to such disabilities and when granted after
the term of imprisonment has expired, an absolute pardon
removes all consequences of conviction. In the present
case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving
no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it
"restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
Therefore, the Court concluded that the pardon granted to
Santos restored his right to vote and removed his
disqualification under Commonwealth Act No. 357.
● The Court also ruled that Santos should not be removed
from the list of electors because:
○ There are only two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction, and (b) that such power
does not extend to impeachment.
 while a pardon may relieve the individual from the
● The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
punishment imposed by the law, it does not erase the fact of
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign has
the crime committed or the conviction itself. In other words,
placed it. As mentioned earlier, absolute power not only blots
the pardon does not negate the historical reality of the
out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting
offense.
from the conviction. Can be granted even after expiration of
● To support this argument, the opinion references legal principles
term of imprisonment; what pardon does in that case is to
and cases. It highlights that a pardon does not eliminate the moral
remove all that is left of the consequences of the
stain or the consequences of the conviction. In many instances,
conviction.
the pardoned individual may still face limitations or disabilities
even after receiving a pardon.
● In the case of Santos, the opinion asserts that the pardon granted
to him did not have any effect since he had already completed his
sentence and regained his right to vote. The separate opinion
RULING acknowledges that the Electoral Code contains provisions that
Petition is [DENIED]
restrict individuals convicted of certain crimes from holding public
office or employment. However, it argues that these provisions are
There is no dispositive portion but the petition for exclusion of Teofilo C.
not considered disabilities resulting from conviction but rather
Santos from the list of voters was denied.
preventive measures enacted by the legislature to safeguard the
integrity of certain positions.
● Ultimately, the opinion concludes that the provision in question
does not conflict with the Constitution and falls within the
Separate Opinion: HORRILLENO, M., disidente:
legislative power to determine electoral disqualifications. It
criticizes the majority for providing an erroneous interpretation of
(Majority of the text is written in Spanish. No hablo Español. Gin run
the pardon, asserting that it is conditional rather than absolute.
ko lang ni sa AI, not sure if gasugid ni sya toud but hopefully we get
Specifically, the pardon restricts Santos from holding certain
the gist of the opinion)
positions involving money or property responsibility, reflecting a
degree of caution in his reintegration into society.
● The majority opinion argues that the pardon restores Santos to
● Lastly, the opinion highlights the difference between the cited
full civil and political rights, including the right to vote. Their
cases from the late 19th century and a more recent decision. It
rationale is based on the understanding that a pardon removes all
argues that the earlier cases, which support the restoration of
disabilities resulting from the conviction, essentially wiping the
political privileges after a pardon, are inconsistent with the later
slate clean for the pardoned individual.
decision. This discrepancy suggests a shift in judicial perspective
● However, the separate opinion takes a different stance. It
over time.
disagrees with the majority's interpretation, emphasizing that
 Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
Monsanto v. Factoran G.R. 78239, February 9, 1989
Trigger Words: [absolute pardon, reinstatement of position]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case:
Petition for review
Summary of Facts:
● Monsanto, who was an assistant treasurer of Calbayog City,
was suspended from office in 1982, and in 1983 was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents, and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of prision correccional to
prision mayor and to pay fine and other civil liabilities.
● She appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court, which
subsequently affirmed. While the motion was pending, she
was given by then President Marcos an absolute pardon in
1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City Treasurer, requesting that she be restored to
her former post since it was still vacant then.
● Her request was referred to the Ministry of Finance which
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date
the pardon was extended and that the civil liabilities
imposed by the Sandiganbayan be satisfied.
● The Minister of Finance then referred the issue to the Office of
the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s request
averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
that the pardon does not reinstate former position. Also,
Monsanto contends that by reason of pardon, she no longer be
compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her
acts.
● Hence, this petition.
1. W/N a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment?
[NO]
● The Court ruled that a convicted public officer, pardoned by
the President, is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement
to his previous office. Therefore, Monsanto is NOT entitled
to an automatic reinstatement for her former post.
○ Pardon cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.
○ It does not restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction.The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post, petitioner must reapply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
● The court also noted that Monsanto had been convicted of
the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and assumed its finality. She is not acquitted. It
is an acquittal that declares there was no criminal liability.
● Contrary to existing jurisprudence (cite Ex Parte Garland, just in
case), the Supreme Court does not subscribe that pardon blots
out guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should
be treated as innocent. As stated in State v. Hazard - pardons
may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant
upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad
character.
● The essence of pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and
the conviction. It cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.
● Also, Pardon is not retrospective. That’s why in this case, the
petitioner cannot be entitled to backpay for lost earnings and
benefits.

As for the second issue, whether the petitioner is exempted from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. It was
held she cannot since pardon cannot absolve civil liability.
Summary of Opinions:
1. PADILLA, J., concurring: concur in the result but on grounds
different from those relied upon by the majority opinion. "Public
office is a public trust." The restoration of the right to hold public
office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a
criminal case cannot be left to inference.
2. FELICIANO, J., concurring: concur in the result. The pardon
extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right
to hold public office and on this ground.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N [the petitioner was exempted from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence] - [NO]
SUPREME COURT:
● Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised
Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence,
or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence.
● Civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation
RULING
Petition is [denied]
WHEREFORE, [the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED.
No costs.] SO ORDERED.
OTHER NOTES
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and
not communicated officially to the Court . . . A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance."
Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases
★ show the unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex
Parte Garland
“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of an offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If
granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching. If granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.”
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or
approved.
Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273 (1987)
Trigger Words: [Conditional Pardon]
Recit Ready Summary
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
Nature of Case:
Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner
Summary of Facts:
● Sometime before 1979, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of two
counts of estafa and sentenced to 11y 10m 22d to 38y 9m 1d
of imprisonment.
● But then the President granted him conditional pardon,
which would be in effect as long as Torres did “not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition
be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law.” Torres agreed and was released.
● In 1982-1986, Torres was charged with a variety of crimes –
estafa and other forms of swindling; grave threats; grave
coercion; illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives; malicious mischief; violation of BP 22 and PD 772 –
cases for which were already pending in court.
● The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend
to the President that Torres’ conditional pardon be
canceled.
○ This Resolution was then transmitted to the Pres. via
the Minister of Justice.
● The President then canceled the conditional pardon, after
which the Minister of Justice issued an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against Torres “by authority of the
President”.
● Torres was arrested and confined to serve the remaining portion
of his sentence.
● Petitioner argued that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment
● He also contends that he was not given an
opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has
been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution.
1. W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of
his original sentence - NO
● The Court ruled that a conviction by final judgment is not
needed for Torres to be considered to have “violated the law”
and thus in violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
because it’s the President’s prerogative to decide whether or
not the terms of the conditional pardon were violated.
○ The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny
● By agreeing to be pardoned, an offender impliedly agrees
to leave it to the President to determine whether or not he
has been abiding by the stipulations of that pardon.
● In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of
his pardon, the Executive Department has two options:
○ to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or
○ to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who "having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
● In the case at bar, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
 ● From the judicial viewpoint, therefore, the petitioner has, since
President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
accepting his conditional pardon not violated any of the penal laws
scrutiny.
of the Philippines as to be subject to recommitment.
Doctrine (if applicable): Effects on rights of a conditional pardon:
pardon is subject to certain restrictions, to be provided for by the
President. Violations of conditional pardons are dealt with by the RPC.
A conviction by final judgment is not necessary to revoke a conditional
pardon. The President has the authority to revoke a conditional pardon
under the Revised administrative Code.

RULING
Petition is [DIMISSED]

WHEREFORE, [this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.] SO ORDERED.

DETAILED OPINIONS OF JUSTICES

● J. (CRUZ), dissenting: Mere accusation is not synonymous with
guilt.
○ That this conviction must be pronounced by the judge and
no other is too obvious a proposition to be disputed. The
executive can only allege the commission of crime and
thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence.
○ If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the
allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.
● But insofar as it allows the President to determine in his judgment
whether or not a crime has been committed, I regard the authority
as an encroachment on judicial functions.
● In the instant case, the government does not deny that the
petitioner has not been finally convicted of any of the offenses
imputed to him. There are several convictions by the lower court,
to be sure, but all of them are on appeal.
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
Trigger Words: [Another Estrada Case, ERAP Comeback, Manila Mayor,
Pardon, Executive Clemency, Civil and Political Rights]
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: Petition for Certiorari and Petition-in-Intervention
Summary of Facts:
● In 2007, Former president Estrada was convicted to the
crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and absolute disqualification to hold public office.
● Following his conviction, PGMA extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon and restoring his civil and
political rights which were accepted and signed by the
former.
● In 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of President and received three (3) oppositions in
the office of the COMELEC, which were all dismissed due to the
ff reasons: (-However, he did not win)
○ the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a
sitting president;
○ the pardon granted to former President Estrada by
former PGMA restored the former's right to vote and be
voted for a public offic
● In 2012, he then ventured into another political arena and filed
a COC vying for a local elective post as Mayor of the City of
Manila.
○ Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against
Estrada, but was dismissed for lack of merit.
● Hence this petition.
NOTE:
● While the case is pending before the Court, Estrada won the
election and was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
● He defeated candidate Lim who filed a motion for intervention in
the disqualification case.
○ He subscribes to Petitioner’s theory that Estrada is
disqualified from holding public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly merit his
perpetual disqualification. He should be then
declared the rightful winner.
● Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of
plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude. And for failing to
consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office? - YES
Summary of Ruling:
● Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
● It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.
● It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does
not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada's
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.

Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardon's text.
Summary of Opinions:
Leonen (dissenting): Lim should have been declared as the qualified
winner and Estrada should have been barred from re-election due to his
perpetual DQ. Any ambiguity on the laws on effect of pardon should not
be applied in favor of the convicted
Brion(concurr’s with majority but disagree on Leonen’s positions on the
RPC perspectives in the montano v factoran case) : Leonen’s
interpretation is misleading and conclusion on superiority of jalosjos
over montano is misplaced and without basis.
ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N the pardoning power of the President cannot be limited
by legislative action [NO]
● The court held that the pardoning power of the President
cannot be limited by legislative action.
● The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency.
● It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the
only instances in which the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations
of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
● Under the 1935 Constitution, wherein the provision granting
pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with
what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action. (Cristobal v. Labrador).
● The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran,
Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action."
● This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the
President's power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically
through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
2. W/N the textual commands in Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC
should be strictly followed [NO]
- The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize
the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the
penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to
grant executive clemency.
- Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance
with law.
- The right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as
falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights (Section 5
of RA 9225).
- ICCPR, to which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the
existence of said right [Article 25(b) of the Convention].
- In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as
a political right.
- Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has
 been restored is incorrect. They do not form part of the controlling
doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land.
3. W/N the disqualification of former Pres. Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him
● While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of
the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition - a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether
local or national position.
○ Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court
acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the
legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a
candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the
date of proclamation
4. W/N the third preambular clause of the pardon did not
operate to make the pardon conditional [YES]
-The third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada's rights to suffrage
and to seek public elective office have been restored.
● Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute.
● Preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its text. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice)
● Arroyo's silence on former President Estrada's political ventures,
after the latter's receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks
volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and
to hold public office.
○ If Arroyo also intended to prohibit Estrada from holding
public office, the prohibition should have been stated in
the pardon itself and not in the Whereas clauses.
Justice Leonen’s Dissent:
- Pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite
the statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," except the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office.
SUPREME COURT:
- However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," to the mind of the Court, is crystal clear — the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute,
meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in
scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political
rights"
- There’s no distinction between [full] political rights and political
rights.
5. W/N COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions [NO]
- The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and
gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
Petition is [dismissed]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-in-intervention are
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections,En banc, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
DETAILED OPINIONS OF JUSTICES
● LEONEN: This case has distressing consequences on the Rule of
Law. By reading an ambiguity in favor of a convicted public officer,
impunity is tolerated.
[FILED ON TIME]
○ This petition unambiguously anchors itself on statutorily
prescribed disqualifications — under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, as well as Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code — which jurisprudence has
explicitly recognized as a valid basis for both a petition for
disqualification and a Section 78 petition.
○ It follows that the petition was filed on time. The petition
was filed on January 14, 2013, after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy, and before the date of
Estrada's proclamation as Mayor on May 17, 2013. This is
within the period permitted by Rule 25, Section 3 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.
[“LEGAL STANDING”]
○ Estrada’s use of legal standing is erroneous. Legal
standing is not equal to party in interest
○ Lim has enough interest at stake in this case as would
enable him to intervene.
[RES JUDICATA]
- Current petition is not barred by res judicata. The 2010
case on Pormento v. Estrada was based on a different
issue. the 2010 case is anchored on the constitutional
prohibition against a President’s re-election, while the
current petition is anchored on Estrada’s conviction of
plunder which carried with accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification.
- The 2010 disqualification cases and RisosVidal's petition
are anchored on different causes of action and, hence,
involve different issues and subject matters. Whatever
pronouncement the COMELEC Second Division made on
the matter of Estrada's conviction for plunder and
subsequent pardon was thus a superfluity. Obiter Dictum
in this case on disqualifications.
- no final judgment on the merits arising from the 2010
disqualification cases. While the 2010 disqualification
cases may have reached their literal end or terminal point,
there was no final judgment on the merits.
[PARDON IS FORGIVENESS NOT FORGETFULNESS]
- Pardon is a private, though official, act of the executive.
Proceeding from the power to execute laws, it merely evinces the
executive's choice to decline from enforcing punishment so as to
mollify penal misery.
- Pardon does not erase the moral stain and the fact of conviction. It
retains the law's regard for a convict "as more dangerous to
society than one never found guilty of a crime"; the convict
remains "deserving of punishment" though left unpunished
[ARTICLE 36 AND 41 RPC DOES NOT DIMINISH PARDONING
POWER]
 - Art 36 and 41 of the RPC refer only to the requirements of
convention or form. It is a procedural prescription. It is only
concerned with how he or she is to exercise such power so that no
other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full
effect. It did not reduce coverage of the presidential pardon since
the limits to presidential pardon remained the same.
- All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the
President wishes to include in the pardon the restoration
of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, he or she should do so expressly.
[ESTRADA’S PARDON DID NOT RESTORE HIS RIGHTS TO VOTE
AND BE VOTED]
- The disposition of PGMA’s pardon to Estrada contained no
categorical statement saying that Estrada’s right to vote and be
voted for elective public office are restored. The argument that his
rights were restored rests on plain inference.
- Essentially, Leonen argues that there was no express or
direct pronouncement in the pardon that gave Estrada his
rights to vote and be voted back, in connection with the
requirements under art 36 and 41 of the RPC. .
- Estrada’s theory that the phrase “restoring civil and political rights”
is to refer to the entire composite of rights and is a sweeping
reference to the collectivity of rights should fail. First, it fails to
consider the consequences of statutory requirements which
specifically refer to the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
Second, it fails to recognize that the language used in the pardon
is equivocal at best, and, worse, the conclusion he derives from
this equivocal language is even contradicted by other examples
previously considered in jurisprudence.
- Moreover, Leonen claims there was no qualifier “full” in
the pardon of PGMA. It is a common practice, so it would
have offered less of an issue in that case. Leonen went to
say, however, it is not the occasion to rule on sufficiency of
the qualifier full. (lol)
- Moreover, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
specifically deal with the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
To an effect, this means that the right of suffrage and to hold public
office are segregated from all other similar rights.
- Segregation of these rights is grounded on the
fundamental distinction between public office as a public
trust, on the other hand, and pardon as a private act on
the other.
- Digester note: By virtue of public trust, therefore, under art
36 and 41 of the RPC, there should be express
statements of restoration of right to vote and be voted
since, the private character of the pardon only applies to
other rights not segregated. (if it makes sense???)
[IN FACT, PARDON’S PREAMBLE AGAINST ESTRADA]
Context: The Preambular Clauses
1. WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates
who have reached the age of seventy
2. WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for
six and a half years
3. WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office[.]
- Preamble may be resorted to only when the instrument is
"ambiguous and difficult of interpretation."
- There is neither an express restoration of Estrada's rights to vote
and be voted for elective public office nor a remission of his
perpetual absolute disqualification. To this extent, it is clear and
unambiguous
- THIRD PREAMBLE: unveils the undertaking made by Estrada
(acknowledged and unchallenged by him through his unqualified
 handwritten acceptance) that he would no longer embark on the in the contest to be elected Mayor of the City of Manila in the May
very same affair, i.e., (elective) public office, that facilitated his 13, 2013 elections.
commission of plunder. The inclusion of the third preambular
clause is not empty rhetoric. It is an indispensable qualifier
indicating that Estrada was pardoned precisely in view of his
promise to no longer seek (elective) public office. Similarly, it
establishes that the grant of pardon notwithstanding, there is no
betrayal of the fundamental policy of aversion against plunder as
an affront to "the larger socio-political and economic context

[2-YEAR LAPSE NOT APPLICABLE]

- Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC: Section 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code allows re-election after 2-year lapse after
sentence, but the said provision should not be deemed to cover
cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.

[ON SOVEREIGN WILL]

- Local election only, so does not involve the sovereign will
- No amount of votes can cure a candidate's ineligibility
- In the context of constitutional democracy, the sovereign will is as
effectively expressed in the official acts of public institutions. The
Filipino people speak through the Constitution they have adopted

[LIM IS THE QUALIFIED CANDIDATE W/ HIGHEST VOTES]

- Maquiling: the 'often-quoted phrase' from Topacio (2nd highest is
not the winner) was a mere obiter dictum
- Aratea v. COMELEC and Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC: if
ineligible, then candidacy has effects of being void ab initio; votes
then are stray votes
- Applying these principles, the votes cast for private respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a disqualified and ineligible candidate,
must be held as stray votes. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo S. Lim is
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
Trillanes IV v. Alameda, CA-G.R. SP No. 159811, March 1, 2021
Trigger Words: [ failed coup d‘ etat ]
Recit Ready Summary
Summary of Facts:
● Trillanes was charged for the crime of rebellion and coup
d'etat, for his participation in the Oakwood mutiny.
● Pursuant to Proclamation 75, which granted amnesty to
those committed crimes in relation to the Oakwood mutiny,
Marine standoff, Manila peninsula hotel standoff,
○ Petitioner was issued a certificate of amnesty.
● As a result, his charges were dropped by judge Alameda.
● However, in 2018, Duterte issued proclamation no 572 which
declared the amnesty of petitioner revoked since he did not
comply with the requirements for the amnesty to be
afforded to him.
○ The proclamation led to the issuance of warrant of
arrest and hold of departure order
● The RTC in an evidentiary hearing, following the omnibus
motion of the DOJ claiming the amnesty was void, revoked the
amnesty of petitioner on the grounds that petitioner failed
to offer substantial evidence to prove he applied for the
amnesty. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and case
for hearing so that he may adduce evidence on the factual
issues, but was denied. Hence the petition.
○ Petitioner argues that there was grave abuse of
discretion on the respondent court when (1) it
upheld the validity of PN 572, (2) reopened the
rebellion case, and (3) did not allow him to present
evidence.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N amnesty may be revoked? [YES]
2. Who may revoke it? [The Chief Executive/ President]
3. When may it be revoked, if at all?
4. W/N the amnesty granted to the petitioner is valid? [YES, as
long as he complies to the pre-conditions of application.]
5. W/N the subsequent revocation of that amnesty by Pres.
Duterte’s proclamation valid? [YES]
Summary of Ruling:
1. To the Court, logic and experience point to the proposition
that a conditional amnesty may be revoked.
2. Under Proclamation No. 75 and Concurrent Resolution No. 4,
the implementation of the amnesty process was delegated to
the executive branch, through the DND and the Office of the
President.
3. A conditional amnesty previously granted may be revoked if it is
later found that the grantee breached the conditions upon which
the amnesty was granted or if it becomes known that he failed
to fulfill them originally.
4. The grant of conditional amnesty to the petitioner was subject
to, among others, the pre-conditions of application and
admission of guilt or criminal culpability in writing. If it is then
found and known that he indeed failed to fulfill these conditions
originally, then the grant of amnesty becomes susceptible to
revocation.
5. Yes, because the amnesty benefits emanate from the amnesty
proclaimed by the President concurred in by Congress.
Doctrine (if applicable): In the Philippines, Article VII, Section 19 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the power to grant amnesty lies
exclusively with the President subject to the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress:
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power
to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.”

RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders of 25 September 2018 and 18 December 2018, having been
issued by the respondent court that no longer had jurisdiction on a
dismissed criminal action and that acted with grave abuse of discretion,
are SET ASIDE and VACATED.
OTHER ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N Proclamation no 572 is invalid?
● Petitioner claims that PN 572 is (1) a bill of attainder and an
ex-post facto law, (2) double jeopardy, and (3) violation of due
process and equal protection.
● The court held that:
○ (1) Not a bill of attainder since the PN does not seek
to punish without judicial trial, it merely allowed
continuation of criminal proceedings against him. Also not
ex-post facto law since it is not a penal law.
○ (2) the dismissal of the case was by reason of an ex-parte
motion to dismiss which is deemed that petitioner has
given his consent to dismissal. Thus, the requisites of
double jeopardy were not met.
■ Double jeopardy: (a) 1st jeopardy attached prior
to the 2nd, (b) 1st jeopardy was validly
terminated, and (c) and jeopardy is of the same
offense. 1st jeopardy attach only, (ill) after
arraignment, (illi) valid plea, and (v) accused was
acquitted or convicted, or case dismissed w/o
consent of accused.
○ (3) due process is present in the filing of an omnibus
motion to effect the arrest of petitioner, and it did not allow
warrantless arrest. No violation of due process clause
since there is substantial distinction due to his purported
non compliance.
2. W/N the court erred in reopening of the rebellion case due to
the finality and/or immutability of the 2011 order? [yes]
● While the doctrine of immutability does not allow modification of a
final judgment, it has exceptions: (a) correction of clerical errors,
(b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice, (c) void
judgments. (d) circumstances after the finality rendered its
execution unjust.
● In this case, the final judgment of the court may be set aside
for being void if it is found that the revocation of amnesty is
legally and factually sound. This is because the order to
dismiss the case was based on the amnesty. (Ang amnesty
ang rason ngaa gin dismiss). By necessary implication, any action
that arose from an amnesty becomes void as well if it is void.
● If the action challenged is void, it must be attacked through a
proper procedure. It cannot be attacked collaterally. In this case, it
attacked the judgment through the omnibus motion which prayed
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
○ It can be attacked collaterally, only if it is void in its face. In
this case it is not since the revoked amnesty is not clear
on its face of the judgment.
3. W/N the court erred in not allowing him to present evidence.
[yes]
● The respondent court satisfied itself by merely conducting a
summary hearing through affidavits and documents in spite
of petitioners request to be afforded the opportunity to
present his evidence and subpoena his witness. This denial
deprived him of his procedural due process.
● The peculiarity of this case (i.e use of amnesty to dismiss
petition), the case necessitates a full evidentiary hearing.
NOTES
● AMNESTY
○ Emanates from the power to pardon. It took its roots from
states power to pardon but has acquired a legal identity
distinct from pardon. Pardon, recognize criminal nature
and guilt, amnesty does not.
○ It is issued usually after wars to encourage
reconciliation and as a peace-making tool in the
resolution of on-going conflicts and combatants to
surrender and cooperate with the state.
● CHARACTERISTICS OF AMNESTY POWERS:
○ (a) Substantive limits: scope and coverage, purpose,
persons or classes, time, territory, effects of amnesty.
■ General amnesty: whole class of persons w/in
a territory
■ Limited amnesty: qualifies grant to persons
favored, place and time/
○ (b) Procedural: Preconditions (i.e filing of applications
etc) or conditions for retaining (i.e no more convictions).
■ Absolute amnesty: does not lay down specific
requirements. Just passing of law.
● Operative act: passage of law which
grants amnesty ipso facto. Only need to
show he is covered or belongs to a group.
■ Conditional: lays down requirements; can be
revoked through (a) repealing law, or (b) failure to
comply wth conditions by the agency
implementing actual grant.
● Operative act: passage of law AND
compliance with procedure laid down.
○ SOURCE: Art VII sec 19: amnesty lies with the President
with concurrence of the Majority of congress.
■ Proclamation 75 was enacted in compliance with
constitution. PN 572 revoked only individualized
grant.
■ PN 75 is a conditional amnesty
FULL FACTS OF CASE:
● Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV stood charged in 2007 with the
crime of rebellion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Branch 150.
● He also stood charged in 2003 with coup d'etat before the RTC of
Makati - Branch 148.
● 24 November 2010- President B.S. Aquino III issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 75, Series of 2010, which granted amnesty to all
active and former personnel of AFP and the PNP who have or
may have committed crimes in connection with, in relation to, or as
an incident of the Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off, and the 29 November 2007 Manila Peninsula Hotel
Take-over.
● 13 December 2010, both Houses of Congress concurred with said
proclamation.
● The Department of National Defense was tasked to process
applications and to determine whether or not an applicant was
entitled to the benefit of amnesty.
○ An Ad Hoc Amnesty Committee promulgated Circular No.
1 dated 21 December 2010 or the Rules and Procedures
in the processing of Amnesty Applications pursuant to
Proclamation No. 75.
● Pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation No. 75, Trillanes was
issued a Certificate of Amnesty which stated that he was granted
amnesty on 21 January 2011 for his participation and involvement
in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood Mutiny and the 29 November 2007
Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege.
● 18 August 2011, Trillanes filed a Manifestation with Ex Parte
Motion to Dismiss, which prayed for the dismissal of the rebellion
case.
○ He attached the Certificate of Amnesty and argued that
any possible criminal liability on his part had been fully
extinguished by the said grant of amnesty.
● 07 September 2011, respondent Presiding Judge Elmo M.
Alameda issued an Order that dismissed the rebellion case.
○ He explained that, taking into consideration the Certificate
of Amnesty and Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the
petitioner’s criminal liability had been extinguished.
○ No appeal or motion for reconsideration was taken against
the said Order.
● A similar motion to dismiss was filed in the coup d'etat case which
was also granted by the RTC Makati – Branch 148.
● 31 August 2018, President R.R. Duterte issued Proclamation No.
572, Series of 2018, and in that:
○ President Duterte has declared the grant of amnesty to
former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV under Proclamation No.
75 as void ab initio.
○ This decision is based on Trillanes' failure to file an Official
Amnesty Application Form and his refusal to admit guilt for
the crimes related to the Oakwood Mutiny and Peninsula
Manila Hotel Siege.
○ As a result, the Department of Justice and Court Martial of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines are ordered to pursue
all criminal and administrative cases against Trillanes, and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are instructed to apprehend him for trial
and recommittal to the detention facility.
● 07 September 2018, the Department of Justice filed a Very Urgent
Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure
Order (HDO) and Warrant of Arrest (Omnibus Motion) against the
petitioner.
● It alleged that because of Proclamation No. 572,a rebellion case is
still pending, and the prosecution/Department of Justice (DOJ)
needs to present its evidence.
● Because the petitioner has the means and resources to potentially
flee the country, a hold departure order is deemed necessary to
prevent the individual from leaving the Philippines.
● A similar motion has been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati - Branch 148, related to a criminal action for coup d'etat.
● An order dated 10 September 2018, the respondent court
scheduled the Omnibus Motion for summary hearing on 14
September 2018.
● 11 September 2018, the Supreme Court, acting on the petitioner's
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
issued a Resolution denying Senator Trillanes' request for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) and/or Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO).
● The denial is based on the understanding that the issues
surrounding whether Trillanes filed an amnesty application and
admitted guilt are factual in nature, and trial courts, particularly the
Makati Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), should be allowed to
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction to address and resolve these
matters related to the legality of Proclamation No. 572, Series of
2018.
● 14 September 2018, in a summary hearing Trillanes filed a
Comment/Opposition.
○ He argued that the rebellion case can no longer be
reopened or revived because the Order of 07 September
2011, which dismissed the said action, had long become
final and executory; that the amnesty granted by
Proclamation No. 75 completely extinguished his criminal
liability such that he stood as if no offense had been
committed.
● The DOJ countered that the grant of amnesty to the petitioner was
void ab initio because the petitioner never filed a duly
 accomplished application form, as evidenced by a Certification
issued by Lt. Col. Thea Joan Andrada, and did not admit his guilt,
as evidenced by an article from GMA News.
● Trillanes asserted that the DOJ had the burden of overcoming the
validity of the Certificate of Amnesty.
○ The certification that his amnesty application could not be
found and the news article that he did not admit his guilt
were not sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity
that attended the issuance of the Certificate of Amnesty.
● 05 October 2018, RTC Makati Branch - 148 conducted an
evidentiary hearing of the identical omnibus motion filed by the
DOJ in the coup d'etat case.
● 25 September 2018, the respondent court issued the first assailed
Order which granted the DOJ's Omnibus Motion.
○ It ruled that there were factual and legal bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 572;
○ The petitioner failed to offer substantial evidence to prove
that he actually applied to be granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 75 and that he expressly admitted his
guilt to those crimes committed pertaining to the Oakwood
mutiny.
○ Since the amnesty granted to the petitioner was
revoked, the Order of 07 September 2011 which
dismissed the case against him, in effect, was a void
order and therefore cannot attain finality.
● The petitioner consequently filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Set the Case for Hearing and
Reception of Evidence of the Parties which prayed that the first
assailed Order be reversed and that the respondent court
schedule a hearing so that the parties may adduce their evidence
on the factual issues referred to by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES & HELD
[ON ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE ABUSE]
Petitioner’s Arguments
● The petitioner, believing that he has been aggrieved, filed the
instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with very
urgent application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.
He contended that:
The Honorable Presiding Judge gravely abused his discretion in a
manner amounting to excess of jurisdiction in refusing to admit:
○ the Certificate of Amnesty issued by the Department of
Defense as proof that he applied for and/or was granted
amnesty under Presidential Proclamation No. 75, series of
2010
○ Documentary evidence and/or to allow petitioner to
present testimonial evidence to prove his factual claim
that he applied and was granted amnesty under
Presidential Proclamation No. 75, series of 2010
The Honorable Presiding Judge gravely abused his discretion in a
manner amounting to excess of jurisdiction when he:
○ Re-opened Crim. Case No. 03-3126 despite the weight of
prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that final and
executory cases are immutable and may no longer be
re-opened
○ Upheld Presidential Proclamation No. 572, series of 2018,
despite the fact that the same is clearly illegal and/ or
unconstitutional and/or in fact constitutes a clear
transgression by the President of the exclusive power of
the judiciary to rule on the legality and/or constitutionality
of presidential proclamations, among others, as clearly set
forth under Section 4(2) and 5(2)(A) of Article VII of the
Constitution
 ● 18 March 2019, the Court denied the petitioner's application for a ● The US Supreme Court, in Burdick v. Unites States, clarified that
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. while the distinction between pardon and amnesty may not be of
legal importance as to their ultimate effect, there are nonetheless
incidental differences of importance.
● 1949 case of Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, the distinction was
acknowledged by our Supreme Court:

The Court’s Opinion

PARDON AMNESTY
● The petitioner seeks relief through the writ of certiorari,
prohibition, and injunction. (please see notes for definition of terms and granted by the Chief Executive by Proclamation of the Chief
application) and as such it is a private act Executive with the concurrence of
● A petition for certiorari and prohibition, therefore, lies when an which must be pleaded and Congress, and it is a public act of
officer gravely abuses his or her discretion. proved by the person pardoned, which the courts should take
● In the absence of a clear legal right (one of the requisites of writ of because the courts take no notice judicial notice.
thereof
injunction) , the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. granted to one after conviction; granted to classes of persons or
● Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. communities who may be guilty of
Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is political offenses, generally before
not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of or after the institution of the
actual, existing right is not a ground for an injunction. criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction
Amnesty vis-a-vis Pardon
looks forward and relieves the looks backward and abolishes
● In an amnesty, crimes committed are removed from legal scrutiny
offender from the consequences and puts into oblivion the offense
and, from the point of view of law, forgotten.
of an offense of which he has itself, it so overlooks and
● It is distinguished from other forms of immunity because of the been convicted, that is, it obliterates the offense with which
political context of its grant. abolishes or forgives the he is charged that the person
● The United States' constitutional provision empowering the punishment, and for that reason it released by amnesty stands
President to grant reprieves and pardons has been interpreted as does "not work the restoration of before the law precisely as
the legal basis for declarations of amnesty. the rights to hold public office, or though he had committed no
● Amnesty, per the 1877 case of Knote v. United States is included the right of suffrage, unless such offense.
in pardon and the distinction between them is treated as one of rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in
“philological interest rather than of legal importance.”
no case exempts the culprit from
● The traditional notion that amnesty fundamentally emanates from
the payment of the civil indemnity
the power to pardon.

imposed upon him by the
sentence"
● Although amnesty took its roots from the State's power to
pardon, it has since acquired a legal identity distinct from
pardon.
● Amnesty refuses knowledge while pardon refuses action.
● In amnesty, the State does not deny the criminal nature of an
action but it refuses to discover who committed a crime and from
bringing him to trial.
● Pardon, on the other hand, recognizes both the criminal nature of
an action and the guilt of the perpetrator, but refuses to punish and
impose the sanctions for such act.
● In the Philippines, the idea of amnesty, dates back to the Spanish
colonization. While early records are scarce, there are
documented instances from the American occupation onward that
reveal a consistent pattern. Amnesties are typically issued after
wars or political events to facilitate reconciliation and encourage
cooperation with the State. They have served as tools for
peace-making, urging combatants to surrender and avoid further
bloodshed.
The circumscribed nature of amnesty
● The State's power to grant amnesty, although long
recognized, is not infinite or boundless.
● The exercise of such authority is sourced from the State's legal
system, whether it be through its Constitution, statutory law,
or its customs.
● Regardless of the source of such authority, courts recognize
certain limits and formalities of the amnesty power and
characterize them into two groups: substantive and procedural.
○ Substantive limits and formalities
■ Substantive formalities pertain to the scope and
coverage of the amnesty. The term includes the
crime or offenses subject of the amnesty power,
its purpose, the persons or classes of persons
covered, the time frame, territory or geographical
areas where applicable, and the extent of liability
extinguished by such grant.
○ Procedural Limits and Formalities
■ Procedural formalities pertain to the mechanisms
and technicalities that operationalize the grant of
amnesty. It may encompass the steps to be
undertaken by an individual seeking the grant, the
process to be implemented by the
amnesty-granting authority, the period within
which one can avail of an amnesty, and the
conditions attached to the amnesty.
The power to enact amnesty laws, initiate amnesty process, and
grant amnesty
● The traditional or historical view confers absolute amnesty
power, to include the determination of its bounds and
limits, to the Chief Executive or head of government,
as such power emanates from the power to pardon, which
is a power vested upon such political organs of the
government.
● The Federalist Papers: No. 74, Alexander Hamilton, in
arguing that, on top of his command of the military and
naval forces, the pardoning power rightfully belongs to
the Chief Executive.
○ the principal argument for reposing the power of
pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often
critical moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to
 the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of
the commonwealth
● In the Philippines, Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the power to grant amnesty lies
exclusively with the President subject to the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress:
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.”
● The enactment by the State of an amnesty law does not
necessarily operate to grant the benefit bestowed by the amnesty
to an individual.
● While the power to grant amnesty to persons or groups of persons
may lie with the chief executive or the legislature, depending on
the system that prevails in a specific sovereign territory, the
amnesty processes that it entails, as discussed above, are usually
delegated to other agencies of government.
○ The actual grant of the benefits to covered persons under
the amnesty law or proclamation is performed by the
agency or entity duly designated, subject only to such
review or oversight as may likewise be provided.
○ Disposed differently, it is to say, that the benefits are
granted by the amnesty law or proclamation, but these are
conveyed by the duly designated agency via an
individualized act.
● Under Proclamation No. 75, the grant of conditional amnesty is
undertaken by the covered individual being made to apply to be
benefitted, with the implementation being delegated to an agency
in the executive branch – the initial evaluation conducted by the
DND ad hoc committee and, on appeal, subject to the final
determination of the President
● To the Court, the delegation of actual implementation details, to
include crafting of rules by which to process the applications of
covered persons under the amnesty proclamation, to an agency in
the executive branch, does not, in any way, infringe upon the
authority of the President to grant amnesty.
● The Court sees no usurpation of authority by a subordinate
agency that implements the actual grant of amnesty as, after all,
the amnesty benefits emanate from the amnesty proclaimed by
the President concurred in by Congress.
Where the power to grant it is lodged, and how it may be exercised?
1. There is no dispute that Proclamation No. 75 was enacted in
compliance with the above-discussed constitutional standards;
e.g., granted by the President with the concurrence of a majority of
the members of Congress. The wisdom behind the grant of
amnesty to those who participated in the Oakwood Mutiny, the
Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila Peninsula Hotel Take-over is
likewise not assailed. The instant case, therefore, does not
involve the substantive aspect of the said amnesty
proclamation. The general grant of amnesty by Proclamation
No. 75 was not revoked or repealed by Proclamation No. 572.
Only the individualized grant to the petitioner was revoked.
2. Proclamation No. 75, is a conditional amnesty decree. Under
its provisions, those who intend to avail of the amnesty must
comply with the conditions imposed. The grant of amnesty,
conditional as it is, being never meant to be automatic,
availing of its benefits required an individual application that
is to be evaluated by the DND ad hoc committee, and
ultimately, if necessary, an appeal to the Office of the
President.
[ON POWER TO REVOKE CONDITIONAL AMNESTY]
● There’s no clear constitutional basis directly related to revocability
of previously-granted amnesty.
 ○ In the UN, only Peru and Angola have constitutions that
refer to irrevocability of legal effects of amnesty. Peru -
produces effects of res judicata and probiting reopening of
related case; and Angola - states legal effects of
amnesties are valid and irreversible.
● But it is known that grants of amnesties have been revoked
either:
○ 1.) broadly - direct appeal or abrogating amnesty law
itself
■ Even if amnesty is conditional/unconditional, it
can be revoked by repeal of amnesty law by the
State body
● (ex. Argentinian Amnesty Law of Nat’l
Pascification of Sept 1983 - prealed by
Argentitnian Amnesty Nullification Law -
launching criminal prosecution of military
junta who benefited from amnesty law)
■ Can be nullified if validity thereof is challenged.
(ex. El Salvador - SC declared unconstitutional an
amnesty law granted to those who participated in
acts against humanity)
○ 2.) individually - grantee fails to comply with conditions of
amnesty/requisite process
■ revocation may also be effected against specific
individuals without nullifying the entire amnesty
law.
● (ex. Revocations could apply to
individuals who distort information on
offenses)
● To our SC, logic and experience point that conditional
amnesty may be revoked.
○ Grant of a conditional amnesty is subject to compliance
with certain conditions prior to or after the grant of
amnesty
■ It can be revoked if grantee breached
conditions upon which amnesty was
granted/becomes known he failed to to fulfill
them originally
○ In the case at bar, Trillanes was submit to a condition of
application and admission of guilt/criminal culpability in
writing. Then if it is knon, his grant of amnesty becomes
susceptible to revocation.
○ Effects of non-compliance with procedural formalities are
like a conditional pardon, which requires compliance first
with basic requirements, and can be recommitted if
condition is violated or not fulfilled.
○ SC believes that this precept applies by analogy to
conditional amnesties.
■ In a conditional amnesty, quid pro quo relationship
between State and individual is to the effect that
former will “forget” latter’s crime, but if he does not
comply with terms of amnesty, then he will be
prosecuted for crime “forgotten”.
● Under Proclamation No. 75 and Concurrent Resolution No. 4 -
implementing an amnesty process was delegated to
executive thru the DND and Office of the Pres.
○ This is not alien concept, and is practice of other countries
on individualized conditional amnesties.
○ Determination if individuals complied with conditions rests
with said entities, and they also have power to confer
amnesty upon satisfaction of requisite conditions.
○ They also have the coincidental power to deny an
application or, in the case of a previously granted,
individualized amnesty, to cancel and revoke the prior
grant.
[POWER TO REVOKE AN INDIVIDUALIZED, CONDITIONAL
AMNESTY, NOT ABSOLUTE]
 ● Under no circumstance of any amnesty-granting body that to
revoke an individualized conditional amnesty is absolute.
○ Must only be when there is failure to comply with
conditions.
● While prerogative to revoke lies with President, its exercise is still
purview of judicial review.
○ Courts can, after all, determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion as part of judicial power.
4. W/N President gravely abused his discretion in revoking - via
Proc. No. 572, the amnesty previously granted to Sen.
Trillanes? - NO
Petitioner’s Arguments:
● Argues the following:
○ Proc. 572 is a bill of attainder and an ex-post facto law,
prohibited by the Consti
○ It would place him in double jeopardy
○ Violates due process and equal protection clauses
SUPREME COURT:
[IS PROC. 572 A BILL OF ATTAINDER OR AN EX-POST FACTO LAW -
NO, IT IS NEITHER]
● Characteristics of Bill of Attainder:
○ Legislative act inflicting punishment without trial.
○ It is banned to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and not
usurp the judicial function.
○ Its most essential element is a total lack of court
intervention in the finding of guilt and determination of
penalty.
● Characteristics of an Ex-Post Facto Law
○ deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled
○ In order for constitutional prohibition against ex-post facto
law, person must actually be lawfully protected and
entitled to benefits of amnesty proclamation
■ If person w/ conditional amnesty fails to comply
with conditions, there is no protection. Revocation
of conditional amnesty is only a necessary
consequence.
○ Constitutional proscription is aimed against the
retrospectivity of penal laws
● Proclamation No. 572
○ It is an executive act and NOT a legislative act.
Revocation of conditional amnesty does not impute guilt
upon the accused, and does not seek to inflict punishment
without judicial trial.
■ Simply allows for resumption of prosecution
or the continuation of the criminal
proceedings whch was suspended by an
improperly granted amnesty. Thus, it is not bill
of attainder.
○ It is also not a penal law, it does not define a crime
nor mete out penalty and again simply allows
prosecution or resumption of proceedings for a crime
already punished. Thus it is not an ex-post facto law.
[WILL PROC. 572 PLACE PETITIONER IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY - NO,
IT DOES NOT AND IT WILL NOT]
● Nature of a Double Jeopardy
○ DJ means that when a person is charged with an offense
and the case is terminated by acquittal or conviction
without consent of accused, accused cannot be again
charged with same offense.
■ Ratio is State should not be allowed to repeated
attempts to convict an individual which subjects
 him to embarrassment and expense or a state of
anxiety and insecurity.
○ Section 7 of Rule 117 of RoC provide requisites:
■ First jeopardy attached prior to second
■ First jeopardy is validly terminated
■ Second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first
○ A first jeopardy attaches only:
■ After a valid indictment, before a competent court,
after arraignment, when a valid plea has been
entered, if accused has been acquitted/convicted,
or case dismissed or terminated without
express consent
● In the Case of Trillanes
○ His rebellion case was dismissed by reason of his
ex-parte motion to dismiss, which deems him to
expressly give his consent.
○ The first jeopardy did not attach when the rebellion case
was previously dismissed. Consequent actions for the
same crime of rebellion will not expose him to double
jeopardy.
[DOES PROC. 572 VIOLATE HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION - NO TO BOTH]
● On Due Process
○ Trillanes claims that Proc. 572 authorized his arrest
without a warrant, and assails Sec 2 (2) of said
proclamation which states:
■ AFP and PNP are ordered to employ all lawful
means to apprehend Trillanes [...] recommitted to
the detention facility [...] to stand trial for crimes
he is charged with.
○ There is nothing within the section authorizing President
or person under his direction to make unwarranted arrest.
■ There is special emphasis on “employ all
lawful means to apprehend petitioner”, and
proclamation was never assumed the
authority to direct a warrantless arrest.
○ The filing of an Omnibus Motion to effect Trillanes’ arrest
again indicates due process against warrantless arrest
was not openly violated.
● On Equal Protection
○ Trillanes asserts Proc. 572 is unconstitutional for violating
equal protection clause as he was specifically named, and
was only person adversely affected.
○ Nature of Equal Proetection
■ No class of persons shall be deprived of same
protection laws
■ Does not require absolute equality
■ Does not prohibitbit discriminatio as to things that
are different
■ Simply requires requality among equals as
determined according to valid classification
● Classification, to be valid must: rest on
substantial distinction, germane to the
purpose of the law, not be limited to
existing conditions only, apply equally to
all members of same class
○ While Proc. 572 indeed only applied to petitioner, it does
not violate equal protection clause.
■ His discrimination is based on a valid and
substantial distinction - that being his
non-compliance with the conditions in the
amnesty proclamation.
● Proc. 572 only revokes benefit of amnesty
granted to him. It would not revoke
amnesty benefits to other grantees of
 Proc. 75, if they complief with the
conditions of amnesty proclamation.
5. W/N respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, without taking ample time to pause and ponder,
whether or not it retained jurisdiction, summarily and
cursorily considered the Omnibus Motion upon a matter
involving a criminal action that it has long-ago dismissed? -
YES
Petitioner’s Arguments:
● Trillanes insists he has satisfied and complied with conditions o
amnesty grant and that President had no factual basis to revoke
amnesty previously granted
● The September 7 Order of the respondent court was final, and no
court should no longer be able to revive the criminal action by
warrant of arrest
● Prayed for fair opportunity to be duly heard on DOJ’s move to
have him re-arrested
● Instead, respondent court satisfied itself with mere summary
hearing.
○ This is in comparison with RTC Makati 148 that took its
time to hear evidence of DOJ and Trillanes, respondent
court did not duly hear and receive evidence, instead
leaned on understanding of void judgements and the
doctrine of finality of judgements.
SUPREME COURT:
[ON Final, immutable judgments and orders, general rule and
exceptions ]
● The Doctrine of Finality
○ a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified [...] even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law
○ Judgement is finala nd executory when period prescribed
for appeal (15 days) lapses. Acts violating this principle is
struct down.
○ At the same time, it has exemptions:
■ Correction of clerical entries
■ Nunc pro tunc entries
■ Void judgements
■ Circumstances that transpire after finality are
unjust and inequitable
● In the Case at Bar
○ There is no dispute that neither an appeal nor a
motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed
within the reglementary period to assail the Order of
07 September 2011 and that it has already attained
finality
○ But, Respondent Court (RTC Makati 150) deemed its Own
Order to be a void judgement with no legal and binding
effect - so doctrine of finality did not apply.
■ It was as if there was no order issued, and its
jurisdiction remained.
[ON Void order, vis-a-vis revoked amnesty]
● Void Judgements
○ Judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties, or if
it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process
○ A court with no jurisdiction can only dismiss the action or
acts its performs, judgement it renders shall be null and
void.
○ Concept of void jusgment has been extended by the SC
also to judgments rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
○ The SC is of the view that an order dismissing a criminal
action based on an amnesty becomes a void judgement if
 amnesty is revoked due to failure to comply with
conditions.
● In the Case at Bar
○ If the revocation of the petitioner's amnesty is legally
and factually sound, September 7 Order can be set
aside for being a void judgment beyond ambit of
doctrine of finality
[ON Remedies in assailing or attacking a void judgment or final
order]
● An action to challenge a judgement as void must be commenced
through proper procedure in the appropriate tribunal.
○ Even if the judgement is void, aggrieved party must resort
to appropriate proceeding.
● 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide two remedies for aggrieved
parties to annul final and executory judgement:
○ Filing a verified petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38
○ Other remedy is for a party to file a verified petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47
○ There is additional relief through direct action or collateral
attack against judgement void on its face
● A void judgment, therefore, may be directly or collaterally
attacked.
○ Void judgments may be directly attacked either in same
proceeding or separate original action.
■ In a separate original action, aggrieved party by
void judgement may seek nullification through
petition for relief (limited to grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake)
○ Collateral attack may be done through original action
whose purpose is obtain a different relief, and the validity
of the supposed void judgment is attacked as a mere
incident
● In the Case at Bar
○ The prosecution did not file an action for the annulment of
or for relief from the September 7 Order, nor did it move
for issuance of certioari to invalidate the Order.
○ The alleged void Order, dismissing the rebellion
charge was attacked only through Omnibus Motion
filed in the same case - which is a COLLATERAL
ATTACK.
○ Tested against the outlined procedural standards above,
the remedy resorted to by the DOJ cannot be anything
else but irregular and improper.
[The Order of 07 September 2011, not void on its face, therefore not
susceptible to collateral attack]
● A final judgement being collaterally attacked must be void upon its
face.
● In the Case at Bar
○ Order of 07 September 2011 is not void upon its face, and
for the SC it is regular in form and its alleged defect is not
apparent.
○ During the Order’s issuance, the respondent court had
subject matter jurisdiction to act on Petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, and it already acquired jurisdiction over persons
of the parties.
○ The ground invoked to assail the validity of the Order
(revocation of conditional amnesty due to non-compliance
with conditions) is not readily obvious on its face.
■ It requires submission of evidence outside those
originally available to the respondent court to
show invalidty.
■ Since the ground for invalidity is not obvious upon
the face of the Order - therefore the Omnibus
Motion which was a collateral attack upon a final
order should be disallowed.

[The Order of 07 September 2011 cannot be attacked through a
motion in the same proceeding]
● While collateral attacks may be resorted to through mere motions,
they must also be made in another action or proceeding NOT
in the same action where the assailed judgment originated.
● In Reyes Datu: validity of a judgment/order of the court which has
become final may only be attacked by a motion in another case.
● El Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca (Basis of Rulings)
○ “We accordingly hold that, assuming the judgment to have
been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the
proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not
by motion in the cause.”
● In the Case at Bar
○ Even assuming September 7 Order was void on its face
and may be collaterally attacked, Respondent Court
(RTC Makati 150) could not have set it aside and
revive the criminal action via a motion by DOJ in the
same dismissed case.
○ DOJ failed to follow procedural rules and merits the
denial of its Omnibus Motion.
○ Respondent Court(RTC Makati 150) also gravely
abused discretion in allowing DOJ expedience of the
motion to question final Order issued years earlier.
[Ample opportunity required so that parties may fully present their
evidence - WAS NOT OBSERVED BY RESPONDENT COURT]
● The issue of W/N Sept 7 Order is a void judgement and outside
doctrine of finality requires inquiry into factual basis of Proc. 572 -
or the compliance or non-compliance of Trillanes.
○ Since the ground of invalidity is not readily evident, this
controversy should be settled in an action wherein issue
of Order’s invalidity will be the principal concern.
○ There should also be ample opportunity for claims and
evidence to be adduced and evaluated.
● In resolving factual issues, Respondent Court satisfied itself by
merely conducting summary hearing - despite Petitioner
requesting to be afforded reasonable opportunity to present all his
evidence, and subpoena his witnesses.
● To the Court, the denial of the petitioner's request to be given
reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence and present
testimonies of his witnesses deprived him of procedural due
process.
○ Even if assuming respondent court had jurisdiction to
nullify September 7 Order on basis of the Omnibus Motion
which SC finds would have been untenable, it committed
grave abuse of discretion by tackling Omnibus Motion
cursorily
■ This gave Trillanes no opportunity to fully present
his evidence
● SC is of the view that the peculiar circumstances of the case
necessitate a full, evidentiary hearing.
○ The summary hearing approach by Respondent Court is
in stark contrast to hearing in-full-measure by RTC Makati
who also tackled a Omnibus Motion in the coup d’etat
case.
○ In addition, Certificate of Amnesty - attesting a grant of
amnesty to the Petitioner was read by RTC Makati 148
FAVORABLY, but for the Respondent Court it was
appreciated UNFAVORABLY against him (RTC Makati
150)
■ RTC Makati 148 received documentary and
testimonial evidence and heard testimonies of
other witnesses who witnessed Petitioner’s
appearance and submission of amnesty
application.
 ■ Respondent Court (RTC Makati 150) only limited
to hearing oral arguments and receiving affidavits.
○ Both had same fact patters and same set of rules and
should elicit the same results.
■ But divergent outcomes came out.
● SC is again of the view that if one approach had been taken
that allows reception of evidence in full measure - there
would be common answers to common questions.

Tinio v. Duterte
Trigger Words: Train Law, presidential immunity, quorum, regressive, pls
note na kakasend lang ni Sir nito so wala siyang specified topic basaha
niyo lang tanan nga issues
Recit Ready Summary
Nature of Case: Petition for certiorari and prohibition
Summary of Facts:
● The TRAIN Law was a tax reform package introduced by
the Duterte administration in 2017 to fund its infrastructure
plan.
● It amended the National Internal Revenue Code and imposed
additional excise taxes on fuel, coal, and other basic
commodities.
● However, its passage was marred by alleged constitutional
violations, such as the lack of quorum in the House of
Representatives when the bicameral conference committee
report was ratified, and the origin of the revenue bill in the
Senate instead of the House.
● Moreover, the law was challenged for being regressive and
violating substantive due process and equal protection, as it
burdened the poor and marginalized sectors with higher taxes
on essential goods.
● Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
Main Issue(s) Relevant to the Topic:
1. W/N the Court may take cognizance of the consolidated Petitions -
YES
2. W/N the petitioners violate the principle of hierarchy of courts - NO
3. W/N the Congress, as an institution, is an indispensable party which
should have been impleaded in the Petitions - NO
4. W/N Tinio, et al. violate the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit in their Petition - YES
5. W/N the TRAIN Act was validly enacted into law - YES
6. W/N the provision amending Section 151 of the Tax Code is a rider -
NO
7. W/N the TRAIN Act is violative of the due process clause? - NO
8. W/N the TRAIN Act violative of the equal protection clause and
Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution? - NO
Summary of Ruling: Petitions dismissed. RA 10963 (Tax Reform for
Acceleration and Inclusion Act is constitutional. (See full digest for more
details)
FACTS OF CASE:
● In 2017, precursor bills to the TRAIN Law, namely House Bill 5636
and Senate Bill 1592, received urgent certification from President
Rodrigo Duterte to fund the ambitious "Build, Build, Build"
infrastructure program. Eventually, these bills were consolidated
and passed as RA 10963, or the TRAIN Law, amending the
National Internal Revenue Code and introducing increased excise
taxes to finance the infrastructure initiative.
● On December 13, 2017, the bicameral conference committee
(BCC) report finalizing the consolidated TRAIN bill is alleged to
have purportedly violated the constitutional quorum requirement
under Article VI, Section 16 (2), as House Speaker Pantaleon
Alvarez and other majority leaders were accused of rushing the
flawed ratification. Despite these controversies, President Duterte
signed the TRAIN bill into law as Republic Act No. 10963.
● The law amended excise tax provisions, imposing additional levies
on diesel, coal, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and
other basic commodities.
● On December 14, 2017, a day after signing the law, President
Duterte voiced concerns about the potential inflationary impact of
the additional taxes, urging Congress to explore ways to mitigate
adverse effects.
 ● In 2018, petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed by
petitioners seeking to nullify the TRAIN Law, citing constitutional
violations such as breaching the House majority quorum
requirement (Article VI, Section 16 (2)), alleging that the coal tax
did not adhere to the requirement that revenue bills originate from
the House (Section 24, Article VI). Furthermore, claims of
substantive due process and equal protection violations under
Section 1, Article III were made, contending regressive taxation.
Additionally, the alleged breach of Section 28 (1), Article VI, which
directs Congress to establish a progressive tax system, was
emphasized. Petitioners argued that the imposed taxes on basic
goods disproportionately affected underprivileged families and the
poorest sectors.
MAIN ISSUES & HELD
1. W/N the Court may take cognizance of the consolidated
Petitions - YES
SUPREME COURT:
● The prerequisites for the exercise of judicial review are
present, including existence of actual case or controversy,
legal standing, earliest opportunity, and lis mota centering on
constitutionality
● The expanded power of judicial review allows determining
grave abuse of discretion by any branch of government,
including the constitutionality of statutes
2. W/N the petitioners violate the principle of hierarchy of courts
- NO
SUPREME COURT:
● Direct resort to the SC is justified by:
○ Presence of genuine constitutional issues requiring
most immediate resolution (Art VI, Sec 16 (2) on
quorum and Sec 24 on revenue bills)
○ Issues are of transcendental importance involving
alleged threats to fundamental rights from regressive
taxes
● Under Tagaytay v. Guerrero (1996), direct resort is allowed
due to exceptional character of case, overarching
significance, or emergency
3. W/N the Congress, as an institution, an indispensable party
which should have been impleaded in the Petitions - NO
SUPREME COURT:
● Although Congress has interest as creator of law, the
impleading of House Speaker Alvarez in representation of the
House substantially complies
● Citing Rep. Lagman v. Senate President Pimentel
(2018),Congress was deemed impleaded as a party in G.R.
No. 236295
4. W/N Tinio, et al. violate the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit in their Petition - YES
SUPREME COURT:
● The lack of qualifications to presidential immunity under the
1987 Constitution prevents distinguishing between official and
unofficial acts
● Citing De Lima v. President Duterte (2019), the President
cannot be sued during incumbency for any acts done in
official capacity
● Hence, President Duterte should merely be dropped, not the
entire petition dismissed
5. W/N the TRAIN Act was validly enacted into law - YES
Petitioner's arguments:
● The petitioners contend that the TRAIN Act violated Section
16(2), Article VI, alleging an "utter lack of quorum" during the
ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report. They urge the Court to
address this issue, citing Arroyo v. De Venecia.
● To substantiate their claim, petitioners present a video
recording and a photograph of the session, suggesting a lack
of quorum.

SUPREME COURT:
● Legislative power is exclusively vested in the collegial
body of Congress. In simple terms, only Congress, acting as
a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, can constitutionally wield legislative
power.
● However, it is equally inherent in the Constitution that
Congress is empowered to determine and adopt its own rules
of proceedings. Section 75, Rule XI of the Internal Rules of
the House of Representatives, for instance, underscores the
quorum requirement, consistent with the constitutional
provision preceding it.
● Regarding the alleged “lack of quorum, the Court rejects this
proposition, emphasizing the internal nature of such
matters. Acknowledging the House's power to establish
quorum, the Court asserts that questioning quorum
during a valid session is an internal matter for the House
to resolve. The Court underscores that any challenge
must conform to the parameters of the Internal Rules.
● Basically, the Court refuses to delve into the internal
proceedings of Congress, emphasizing the separation of
powers. It invokes the enrolled bill doctrine, stating that the
signing of the bill and certification by House officials are
conclusive of its due enactment. Petitioners failed to meet the
burden of providing clear and convincing evidence to
challenge these legislative acts.
● Merely filing a case questioning the existence of quorum
doesn't automatically grant it the authority to scrutinize the
proceedings of a coequal branch of government. Historically,
the Court has consistently refrained from delving beyond the
contents of official documents. Petitioners, seeking an
exception to invalidate an act of Congress due to alleged
irregularities, bear the burden of substantiating their claims
with clear and convincing evidence. Regrettably, petitioners
failed to meet this burden. The enrolled bill doctrine, along
with the conclusiveness of Congressional Journals, is
applicable. Despite the possibility of looking beyond the
Journal, petitioners' evidence is deemed insufficient. The
Court reiterates that filing a case on the quorum issue doesn't
automatically compel it to scrutinize the proceedings of a
coequal branch. To justify such scrutiny, petitioners must
convincingly substantiate their claims, a duty they failed to
fulfill.
● Accordingly, the Court is duty-bound to make a
straightforward application of the doctrine in Arroyo that
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of non-compliance with rules of procedure
which itself made.
6. W/N the provision amending Section 151 of the Tax Code is a
rider - NO
Petitioner's arguments:
● Section 48 of the TRAIN Act, which amends Section 151 of
the Tax Code to increase excise taxes on coal, originated
from the Senate version of the bill (SB No. 1592) and was not
part of the House version (HB No. 5636).
○ Thus, it violates the constitutional requirement that
revenue bills must originate exclusively from the
House.
(OSG) Respondents' arguments:
● The Constitution only requires revenue bills to originate from
the House, but does not limit the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate.
SUPREME COURT:
● Section 48 is NOT an unconstitutional rider since the
Constitution does not prohibit the Senate from proposing
amendments to a revenue bill originating from the House.
○ Tolentino v Secretary of Finance
■ The Constitution simply means that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bill ,
bills authorizing an increase of public debt,
private bills, and bil;ls of local application
must come from the HOR.
■ Does not also prohibit the filing in the Senate
of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
 of the bill, so long the action of the Senate is
withheld pending the receipt of the House Bill
○ Abakada Guro Party List v Hon., Exec. Ermita
■ Court upheld the changes introduced by the
Senate for being “germane to the subject
matter and purposes of the house bills.
Application in the case
● Thus, amendment to Section 151 of the tax Code
introduced by SB no. 1592 serves the stated purpose of
HB no. 5636
○ Evident in the committee report and the sponsorship
speeches
■ Main thrust of the law includes rationalizing
internal revenue taxes and ensuring that the
government is able to provide better
infrastructure, health, education and social
protection by raising sufficient revenues
through the expansion of VAT and increase
on several excise taxes.
○ Both the HB No. 5636 and Sb No. 1592 contains
provisions for the earmarking of the incremental
revenue to be generated by the law.
● Here, the increased excise taxes share the House bill's
purpose of raising revenues for infrastructure and social
services. Thus, Section 48 does not violate the "origination
clause."
7. W/N the TRAIN Act is violative of the due process clause - NO
(Note: constitutionality is presumed, petitioner has the burden to prove
unconstitutionality )
Petitioner's arguments:
● The increase in excise taxes results in higher prices of basic
goods like diesel, coal, and LPG, imposing an unreasonable
and confiscatory burden amounting to a deprivation of
property without due process.
○ These are also key components for other basic
commodities and services such as food, electricity ,
and transportation
● This is felt most acutely by low-income and poor families,
especially those in rural areas
● The relief measures like cash transfers are insufficient to
offset the added burden to these marginalized families.
Respondents' arguments:
● The law aims to promote general welfare.
● Poorest households get cash transfers, fuel vouchers, fare
discounts, rice discounts and skills training.
○ The burden was studied and found reasonable.
SUPREME COURT:
Presumption of constitutionality
● Presumption of constitutionality is afforded to tax
legislation that requires that in order to invalidate a
revenue measure by virtue of due process clause, the
same must amount to confiscation of property.
○ Mere allegation does not suffice
○ There must be persuasive proof
● Petitioners failed to prove the unconstitutionality of the
law
○ Petitioners presented statistics and surveys
○ BUT none are truly determinative of the cumulative
effects of the train act on low-income households.
Section 82 of the law provides incremental revenues to be generated
by the TRAIN Act
● Based on this it can be inferred that there are numerous
monetary and social welfare measures specifically designed
to assist households in the marginalized sector in coping with
the effects of the TRAIN Act.
● Direct and indirect benefits must be considered against the
the increase in the price of commodities
○ To determine the whether the overall impact of the
law is truly oppressive that amounts to violation of
due process
● With that, the petitioners fail to consider the impact of
social welfare provisions which are designed to aid the poor
such as fuel vouchers, fare discounts, and free skills training.

In summary
● While the law may negatively impact marginalized sectors,
petitioners failed to present compelling proof that it amounts
to a violation of due process.
● The COURT presumed the law's constitutionality.
Congress studied its effects and provided relief
measures for poor families. Petitioners did not factor
these measures in their arguments.
● The wisdom of a tax law is beyond judicial review.
○ The Court is not prepared to substitute its own
judgment with the wisdom and sufficient of the TRAIN
Act’s provisions, especially that the available records
shows that it has been studied and considered by the
congress and the executive branch through the DOF.
8. W/N the TRAIN Act violative of the equal protection clause
and Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution - NO
Petitioner's arguments:
● Violates the equal protection clause
● The excise taxes expressly discriminate against and burden
the poor.
● The law is regressive, violating the constitutional directive (
Sec 28 (1) Art VI 1987 Constitution) to Congress to evolve a
progressive tax system.
Respondents' arguments:
● There are no express discriminatory classifications in the law.
○ Rule on uniformity of taxation does NOT call for
perfect uniformity
○ BECAUSE, Perfect equality in taxation is hardly
attainable.
● Sec 28 (1) Art VI 1987 Constitution on progressive tax system
does not constitute a basis on declaring a legislation
unconstitutional.
● TRAIN Act intended by Congress to be progressive.
○ Also DOF presented that TRAIN Act was designed
not to trigger price shocks, especially in terms of
prime commodities.
SUPREME COURT:
● Abakada Guro Party List
○ State may make reasonable and natural classification
in exercising its power of taxation.
● In the TRAIN Act there are no classifications found.
● Also there are no provisions that disfavor the low-income
● However, the court cannot go beyond what the legislature
has laid down in the absence of clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
○ Without sufficient proof, petitioner’s polemics are
purely hypothetical, argumentative and one-sided.
● Also, there are safeguards in the law that cushions the effects
for the more destitute sector of society
○ This shows recognition of the discriminatory nature of
the law
○ Court holds that this serves to illustrate
reasonableness and soundness
TRAIN Act may not be struck down for being regressive
● Tax is considered regressive when it does not consider the
taxyp[er’s ability to pay.
● Indirect taxes are undoubtedly regressive in their very nature
● Constitutional provision does not prohibit the imposition of
regressive taxes
○ BUT it merely directs Congress to evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
○ Moral incentives to legislation
● Regressity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce.
○ Not judicially enforceable rights
 ● US v Ballin (1892) - method of determining quorum left to rules of
each chamber
RULING
Petitions dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares as CONSTITUTIONAL Republic
Act No. 10963, otherwise known as the Tax Reform for Acceleration and
Inclusion (TRAIN) Act. Accordingly, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISMISS the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 236118 and G.R. No.
236295;
(2) DENY petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction contained in both Petitions; and
(3) DENY the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, Status Quo Ante Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 3
December 2018 filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 236295.
The Court also resolves to DROP former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
as a party respondent in G.R. No. 236118. SO ORDERED.

OTHER NOTES
Procedural Facts:
● Petitions filed in 2018, four months after the TRAIN Law was
enacted
● Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for a TRO in December 2018
Codal Provisions:
● 1987 Constitution
○ Art. III, Sec 1 - Due Process Clause
○ Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) - Quorum Requirement
○ Art. VI, Sec. 24 - Revenue Bills
○ Art. VI, Sec. 28(1) - Progressive Tax System
Jurisprudence:
● Arroyo v De Venecia (1997) - internal rules of the House are
beyond judicial review
● De Lima v. President Duterte (2019) - reaffirming presidential
immunity from suit