Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression

Vol. 4, No. 2, May 2012, 134– 150

REVIEW ARTICLE

Successful terrorism: framework and review

Sarah V. Marsden∗

University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, UK

(Received 10 November 2010; final version received 14 April 2011)

Is terrorism successful? This oft-asked but infrequently answered question is at the

heart of understanding terrorism’s use. Effective policy and practice rest on a clear
appreciation of how terrorism succeeds and fails. This paper identifies and reviews
the literature on terrorism’s effectiveness and considers its strengths and
weaknesses. To organise the review, a multi-level framework for conceptualising
the goals of terrorism and its enactors is presented. Crucially, this includes the
perspective of both sides of the conflict dyad, and considers the tactical,
organisational, strategic and ultimate goals of extremist groups. This speaks to
the need for a comprehensive framework within which to situate the question of
terrorism’s goals, and aims to assess the state of the knowledge with respect to
terrorism’s efficacy.
Keywords: terrorism; success; metrics; extremist group goals

Introduction
Consideration of the concept of ‘successful terrorism’ is not without its challenges; few
would wish to describe the bombings, kidnappings and shootings that kill and maim
hundreds of people as ‘successful’. There are obvious tensions when allying the pejora-
tive term ‘terrorist’ (Gearty, 1991) with the traditionally positive concept of ‘success’.
Therefore, given that much comment on terrorism has focused on its immorality (Berry,
1987), it is unsurprising that the ethics of asserting that terrorism ‘works’ has seen some
debate (Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007).
Here, the concepts of success and terrorism are combined to draw attention to the
perspective of the political actor who uses terrorism. Success is in the eye of the
beholder (Johnson & Tierney, 2007), and investigating how extremist actors perceive
terrorism’s effectiveness is important in gaining a better understanding of the phenom-
enon. In the words of one: ‘[t]he only way to make terrorists losers is to understand
when, how and why terrorism works’ (Berry, 1987, p. 294).
Given the potential insights an analysis of terrorism’s effectiveness may bring, it is
surprising that the relative success of terrorism as a political strategy is ‘one of the least
understood socio-political phenomena of the last three decades’ (Sharif, 1996, p. 1).
This neglect is exemplified in the now famous statement by Donald Rumsfeld, that
‘we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror’
(2003). The limited investigation into the outcomes of terrorism campaigns is mirrored
∗
Email: sm992@st-andrews.ac.uk

ISSN 1943-4472 print/ISSN 1943-4480 online

# 2012 Society for Terrorism Research
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2011.582705
http://www.tandfonline.com
 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 135

in the work on political violence as a whole (Crenshaw & Horowitz, 1983), including
the realm of war (Martel, 2007; Mandel, 2006).
Reasons for this lack of focus include the proposed emergence of a ‘new terrorism’,
said to be irrational and millenarian in nature. More pertinently, understanding causa-
tion is highly complex (Crenshaw, 2007). Terrorism’s dynamic nature means that its
effects are diluted and spread over time, with multiple and interacting causes involved
in the outcome of any terrorism campaign (Crenshaw & Horowitz, 1983).
Perhaps as a consequence of the limited work in this area, there is considerable
disagreement over whether terrorism works in achieving its goals. Opinions range
from the view that ‘terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and [that]
the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic itself’ (Abrahms, 2006, pp. 43 –44), to
‘[t]errorism often works. Extremist organisations . . . engage in terrorism because it
frequently delivers the desired response’ (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 49). Others
propose that terrorism may be counterproductive, by hardening the resolve of the
target government and the wider population (Friedland & Merari, 1985).
Without a better understanding of the way violent political actors use terrorism as a
strategy for achieving goals, effective counter- and preventive-strategies will be harder
to develop (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Investigating terrorism’s limitations as a strategy
may also prompt a better understanding of why groups choose nonviolent methods of
goal attainment (Neumann & Smith, 2005). This paper considers the state of the knowl-
edge with respect to terrorism’s success. To organise this effort, a framework of goals is
presented. This is intended to facilitate a better understanding of what terrorism aims to
achieve, why it is selected as a tactic, and how it might be prevented (Neumann & Smith,
2005; Perl, 2005). Alongside this, the paper offers a review of the literature on terror-
ism’s efficacy in relation to the various criteria identified in the framework, concluding
with a discussion of the next steps for the framework and the study of terrorism’s impact.

Framework of goals
Assessment of whether terrorism is effective depends on how we define success (Perl,
2005). This raises a number of challenges. In addition to questions over causality, there
are several layers of analysis that may enter the ring as potential criteria for success. For
example, should we consider 9/11 a sign of al-Qaeda’s success, or, would we be better
looking at their failure to achieve a global Caliphate as indicative of ongoing failure?
Differing approaches as to how to conceptualise the goals of terrorist groups have
contributed to the wildly differing assessments of terrorism’s effectiveness. The follow-
ing conceptualisation responds to this by providing a framework onto which empirical
and theoretical work may be mapped. This allows us to organise work done to date and
identify gaps in the literature, and facilitates a more rigorous assessment of whether
terrorism is successful, based on a clearer exposition of its goals.
A number of categorisations have been proposed to conceptualise terrorism’s
impact. These varied, often overlapping, approaches generally focus on a subset of
the criteria by which terrorism’s goals are measured, for example, considering the
number of successful attacks (Sharif, 1996). A holistic approach is needed to generate
a complete picture of a group’s impact (Abrahms, 2006). Without this, we run the risk
of focusing on ‘continuous metrics such as lower numbers of casualties . . . [while] the
terrorists may be redirecting resources towards vastly more devastating projects’ (Perl,
2005, p. i). For example, preparing for a major campaign, or encouraging complacency
in security services by reducing the number of attacks (Probst, 2005).
136 Sarah V. Marsden

The framework of goals proposed here has been developed by reviewing work to
date on the strategy and goals of terrorism, and their efficacy. It incorporates a range
of criteria identified as important by analysts into a single, unified conceptualisation
(Abrahms, 2006; Atran 2006; Crenshaw, 1995; Cronin, 2009; Harmon, 2004; Hutch-
inson & O’Malley, 2007; Jenkins, Johnson & Ronfeldt,1977; Jones & Libicki, 2008;
Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2002; Merari, 2004; Neumann & Smith, 2005, 2008;
Pape, 2003; Sandler & Scott, 1987; Schelling, 1989; Sharif, 1996; Stohl, 2006;
Weinberg, 1991). A keyword search of major databases was undertaken to catalogue
previous efforts. ISI Web of Science, Expanded Academic ASAP, EbscoHost and
the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences were mined using key words: ‘ter-
rorism’; and ‘success’, ‘failure’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘strategy’, ‘tactics’, ‘aims’ and ‘goals’.
The decision criteria for determining those articles to go forward for inclusion was a
substantial focus on terrorism’s impacts, and the specification of a clearly defined
measure by which terrorism’s effectiveness can be judged. These were collated and
aggregated into the four layers of the framework.
The framework was also informed by insights from the literature on victory in war
(Martel, 2007; Mandel, 2006; Bond, 1996). This provides conceptual support to the fra-
mework and draws relevant parallels between the two phenomena. As with victory in
war, so with success in terrorism; we need to develop organising principles to enable
better informed empirical investigation (Martel, 2007).
The framework of goals of terrorism is presented in Figure 1. Based on four broad
levels of analysis, this represents the various embedded, interacting layers of goals
considered important in analysing extremist groups’ aims. Table 1 details the specific
criteria constituting the four types of goals. These can be employed to assess terrorism’s
success in specific contexts, or in reference to particular groups.
Assumptions underpinning the framework are that, firstly, there is a pre-existing
group, able to carry out acts of terrorism; and secondly, there is an explicit link
between goals and criteria for success. The third assumption is that the four layers

Figure 1. Framework of goals.

 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 137

Table 1. Criteria for success allied to type of goal.

Goal Criteria
Ultimate Regime change
Territorial change
Policy change
Social control
Status quo maintenance
Strategic Change in public attitudes
Enforced obedience
Discrediting or humiliation of government
Negative effect on human rights
Provoking of counter-reaction
Disruption of rule of law
Creation of fear
Creation of revolutionary conditions
Publicity for cause
Agenda setting
Disruption of peace processes
Economic damage
Organisational Morale building
Control and discipline
Mobilising the in-group
Gaining material/financial resources
Gaining human resources
Constituency appeased
Competition with other violent groups
Affiliation with other groups
Dissociation from other groups
Geographical scope
Tactical Number of attacks (increase/decrease)
Intervals between attacks
Number of casualties
Plane hijacked
Increased sophistication of attacks
Hostages taken
Hostage-takers escape

are arranged approximately linearly; thus, tactical goals are short-term features of the
extremist group’s behaviour; organisational and strategic goals are medium term;
and ultimate goals are longer-term propositions. Importantly however, this is an inter-
active framework, with the four factors influencing one another throughout the course
of a campaign of terrorism.
In brief, tactical goals refer to the relative success of an individual attack or series of
attacks, and are judged by how well they are commissioned. Organisational goals relate
to outcomes of violence impacting on the group and its constituency; for example main-
taining a support base or accruing finance. Strategic goals concern the relative success
of the wider impacts of terrorism at the social, economic and political level; for example
in generating fear. Finally, ultimate goals represent the ideal end-state for the group.
Thus, criteria for success move through tactical, organisational and strategic effective-
ness, resulting in the group attaining their ultimate objectives.
Organised by the framework, what follows reviews the literature on each of the
levels, to assess whether the research corpus has found terrorism effective in achieving
138 Sarah V. Marsden

the goals set out in the framework. Throughout this discussion some of the conclusions
may be somewhat stylised (Enders & Sandler, 2006), and neglect the specificities of
time, place and motivation influencing the individual groups involved. However,
given the fragmented nature of the literature on terrorism’s effectiveness (Duyvesteyn,
2007), the review aims to provide a more concise perspective on how terrorism
succeeds and fails.

Tactical goals
Tactical goals relate to the number, scale and execution of an individual act of terror-
ism, for example, a hostage-taking incident or bombing. Here, the criteria for success
include things such as the number of attacks, the number of casualties and the amount
of infrastructure damage. In addition, specific criteria related to the type of attack, for
example whether hostages were successfully taken in a kidnapping, are included. These
logistical aspects are used as a measure of success, allowing the analyst, and the
extremist group, to judge whether specific, operational aims went according to prede-
termined or evolving goals.
Analyses of tactical success have focused on the number, frequency and lethality of
attacks. Work on assessing aggregate terrorism statistics is notoriously difficult (see
Dugan, Lafree, Cragin & Kasupski, 2008; Schmid, 2004). However, research using
the Global Terrorism Database has found that, despite a complex picture, terrorism
has seen a number of peaks and troughs between 1970 and 2006 (Lafree & Dugan,
2009). The data show spikes in 1980 and 1992, reaching a significant peak in 2006
that can be attributed to the war in Iraq (Dugan et al., 2008). Further analysis indicates
that fatal attacks have increased by 65% over the same time period (Lafree & Dugan,
2009). This supports the view that terrorism is becoming both more frequent and more
lethal (Enders & Sandler, 2006). However, this should be interpreted in the context of
relatively low overall rates of terrorism-related casualties and fatalities (Schmid, 2004).
Considering the operational aspects of terrorism, a study assessing data from 1968
to 1977 based on the ITERATE II database concluded that ‘almost all terrorist events
end in success’ (Sharif, 1996, p.111). The chances of success were found to increase
when explosives were used, as opposed to small arms; when explosive devices were
chosen over other tactics, such as hostage taking or armed attacks; and when the
target was infrastructure rather than people (Sharif, 1996). Another study based on
the ITERATE dataset, taking in a broader time-frame, between 1968 and 2007,
found similar results, with 79.6% of attacks carried out as planned (Flemming, cited
in Schmid, 2008). Logistically then, terrorism seems largely successful in achieving
tactical aims (Enders & Sandler, 2006).
Turning to specific types of attack, work has been carried out on a number of tactics
such as hostage-taking and hijacking (Atkinson, Sandler & Tschirhart, 1987). In one
study of hostage-taking events, the hostage-takers escaped on 80% of occasions, and
approximately half of the incidents saw at least some of the group’s demands met
(Atkinson et al., 1987). Comparing this with coercive techniques, for example econ-
omic sanctions, this is a high success rate (Abrahms, 2006; Pape, 2003). Another
study found that 87% of hostage-taking events were successful, with around a
quarter of incidents seeing some demands met (Atkinson et al., 1987). With respect
to airline hijacking, rates of success are again high, with extremists found to have an
85% chance of gaining control of a plane (Merari, 1998). Similarly, three-quarters of
bomb attacks against planes are successful (Merari, 1998), although this is based on
 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 139

data from 1947–1996 and may have changed with continuing improvements in airport
security. Nevertheless, this represents a significant success rate.
Having said this, it is important to recognise the limitations of the data on which
such assessments are based. Many databases use media reports as a primary source;
this is not always reliable, as it depends on the perceived newsworthiness of an incident,
sufficient information about the attack being available, and levels of political control
over the media (Enders, 2007). Failed or unattributed attacks are also easily excluded
from datasets, for example, if an attack’s political motivation is unclear, or where infor-
mation about an aborted mission is not made public (Probst, 2005; Enders, 2007). It is
also worth considering the scale of an attack, and its likely impact (Probst, 2005). For
example, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 had a much greater effect than a grenade
attack in Baghdad, even though both would be considered a single attack for the
purposes of data coding.
It seems that, when it comes to logistical success in achieving tactical goals, violent
actors are largely successful. They are able to commission the attack effectively, and
seem to achieve their immediate aims with a relatively high degree of success. This
is alongside the finding that terrorism is becoming more lethal and, incorporating
events in Iraq, is on the increase. The evidence presented here is in line with a rational
choice interpretation; observing success at a logistical and tactical level encourages
terrorism’s continued use as a tool for political leverage.

Organisational goals
Organisational goals refer to some of the outcomes of violence, rather than its commis-
sion. Here, aims are related to the group, and its wider constituency. These include
features such as the morale-building function of a terrorist event, and the effect it
may have on gaining material and human resources, for example demanding
weapons or prisoner release via kidnapping. Other potential organisational goals are
enforcing obedience in a particular constituency; appeasing a wider social group agitat-
ing for violence; controlling members of the extremist group; and satisfying their
demands for violence. A further issue is competition with other violent groups.
Described as ‘outbidding’, this sees two groups with similar agendas compete over
human and material resources through, often escalating, violence (Bloom, 2005;
Kydd & Walter, 2006).
Success achieving organisational goals has seen attention focus on group longevity,
the level of support it has in its target constituency, and whether it splinters as a result of
disagreement in the ranks. Looking at longevity, there are differences in the literature.
A widely quoted assessment is that 90% of groups last less than one year (Rapoport,
1992) – a poor success rate. However, in an empirical study of 100 organisations,
groups lasted an average of four years (Vittori, 2008), while another study proposed
a lifespan of between five and nine years (Cronin, 2009). Those most likely to
sustain themselves were relatively autonomous and well equipped to carry out acts
of violence (Vittori, 2008). Those groups with ties to political parties also have an
advantage in the survival stakes (Weinberg, 1991).
It has been proposed that the stronger the support base, the more successful the
group (Enders & Sandler, 2006). Further, where wider social groups approve of terror-
ism, the group enjoys greater legitimacy (Simon & Martini, 2004). One study finds a
relationship between the targets of terrorism and levels of support, arguing that terror-
ism is aided by a localised ‘cluster of passively consenting people’ (Galam, 2002,
140 Sarah V. Marsden

p. 269). Hence, the increasingly globalised nature of support for groups like al-Qaeda
may be a precursor of attacks such as 9/11 (Galam, 2002). Supporters’ attitudes may
also temper a group’s violence (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007). With the IRA and ETA, this
saw restraint in tactics and targeting to avoid alienating their support base (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2007). However, assessing wider support for terrorism is extremely difficult.
Polls and questionnaire data are prone to biases such as question phrasing (Fair &
Shepherd, 2006) and acquiescence response sets (Kam & Kinder, 2007). In addition,
terrorism is not a monolithic construct, and there are differing levels of support for
specific aspects of terrorism, varying across country, gender and socio-economic
background (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Wike & Samaranayake, 2006).
When support turns to active participation, ‘the main resource of any terrorist organ-
isation is its militants’ (Faria & Arce, 2005, p. 263). Without recruits, an organisation’s
ability to plan and carry out attacks is curtailed (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). If the pool of
willing recruits is reduced, so too is terrorism (Faria & Arce, 2005), although, where
violent recruitment techniques are used, the question of ‘success’ is more complex.
While both coerced and willing recruits may signify success for the group, differing
levels of membership motivation should affect how we interpret levels of popular
support and likely tactical effectiveness.
Related to recruitment is organisational size. Larger groups, over 10,000 members,
are 25% more successful in achieving their aims than groups of less than 1000 (Jones &
Libicki, 2008). Hence, the more people willing to take up arms, the greater the chances
of success such that, where there are sufficient ‘hard-core’ members, terrorism becomes
undeterrable (Faria & Arce, 2005). Ideology is also implicated in degrees of success. In
one assessment of 648 groups, those holding a religious ideology never achieved
victory (Jones & Libicki, 2008), whereas groups with smaller-scale goals managed
to achieve concessions in line with their wider aims (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Therefore,
differential success rates perhaps relate more to the scale of the goal, rather than a
group’s ideology. It is also worth considering the intrinsic reward of serving a divine
power, which may see action alone as success, with less focus on wider social impacts.
Dynamics both between and within groups can lead to factionalisation (Wieviorka,
1993), which may impact on a group’s effectiveness. Splits can isolate extreme factions
(Cronin, 2006), particularly where members disagree over whether to engage in the
political process. This can produce a range of outcomes, including radical offshoots,
engaging in the political process, splinter groups that renounce violence and group dis-
integration (Wieviorka, 1993). In Jones and Libicki’s (2008) analysis, of the 648
groups studied, 136 of them splintered into factions. That is over a fifth of all groups
in the RAND-MIPT database, illustrating the high frequency of internal disruption in
violent groups. Whether factionalisation and split lead to greater success depends on
the context, demands and status of the group. However, given that group size and long-
evity are both indicators of increased success rates, a fifth of the groups studied mini-
mised their effectiveness. It is worth remembering the increasing number of ‘groups’
that emerge for particular operations, which may or may not constitute separate organ-
isations, for example, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade thought to be responsible for the
Madrid train bombings in 2004. Also, in some settings, group membership is highly
fluid, with individuals moving between groups, as seen in the various elements of
the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ (Riikonen, 2010). Together, this makes pinning down group
membership and understanding individual group integrity a challenge.
Terrorism can also be used to influence other extremist groups and bolster support,
an approach known as ‘outbidding’ (Bloom, 2005). In a competitive environment,
 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 141

groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have used suicide bombing to gain
recruits and reinforce legitimacy, as well as to target the enemy (Bloom, 2004). This
argument has its critics who argue that mono-causal explanations, such as the outbid-
ding thesis, are too simplistic and that multi-causal explanations are necessary to under-
stand changing levels of support for terrorism (Brym & Araj, 2008). However, in
particular circumstances where there is support for the cause, using suicide bombing
can lead to increasing popularity, as it raises the profile of the group (Brym & Araj,
2008). Others have proposed that such ‘outbidding’ can influence the wider movement
(Crenshaw, 1981). Optimal conditions for this are where more than one group is vying
for supremacy in a movement, and when the support base is prone to switching between
groups (Kydd & Walter, 2006). In this context, the most successful group is that which
is perceived to use terrorism most effectively to represent the needs of the general popu-
lation (Bloom, 2005). This is predicted to lead to more, and more severe, attacks
(Bloom, 2004).
Characteristics of successful groups at this organisational layer include having more
members, lasting longer, having a wide support base and being able to motivate others
to join up. Further, those able to maintain a high number of attacks are better able to
motivate support where circumstances favour outbidding between groups. Finally,
successful groups need to be able to judge the mood of their support, so they avoid alie-
nating them by using too much violence, or targeting the ‘wrong’ people. Effectiveness
here is associated with the nature of the group and its relationship with its constituency.
While all these factors are likely to be influenced and potentially disrupted by counter-
terrorism measures, the behaviour of the group is dependent upon its support base, and
maintaining their favour. Without this, the group cannot recruit or maintain legitimacy,
increasing the chances of factionalisation and split.

Strategic goals
Strategic goals relate to the social and political effects of terrorism. They are the strat-
egies used to make the group’s ultimate goals a reality. Freedman (2007) describes
terrorism as a coercive strategy that tries to ‘influence the other’s choice through the
application of threats’ (p. 319). In the framework of goals presented in this paper,
tactical goals are the tools that operationlise the threat, organisational goals impact
how effectively strategy and tactics are delivered, and strategic goals determine how
ultimate goals are achieved. For example, a group may plant a bomb to coerce a popu-
lation and its government to accede to demands for secession, by generating fear. Thus,
creating fear is the strategy, and secession the ultimate aim, operationalised through the
tactic of bombing.
Success achieving strategic goals rests on the preferences and responses of the
target (Harris, 2006). Some have argued that this is terrorism’s inherent flaw; if the
target’s preferences are poorly understood, or it does not respond in the anticipated
manner, terrorism fails (Neumann & Smith, 2008). The ostensible target helps organise
a wide number of strategic goals. These can be broken down into government, society
and the media. Those strategies directed at the government include attempting to
humiliate or discredit those in power. Strategic goals aimed at society include spreading
insecurity through fear of attacks, as well as what has been described as creating ‘revo-
lutionary conditions’ (Crenshaw, 1981). Finally, strategic goals refer to things such as
agenda setting, where violence puts a particular cause on the political map, such as
attacks against abortion clinics or animal testing laboratories. Strategic goals therefore
142 Sarah V. Marsden

include a large number of criteria against which success may be judged, influencing the
ruling body, wider society and the fourth estate.
‘Provocative terrorism is designed to bring about revolutionary conditions rather
than to exploit them’ (Crenshaw & Horowitz, 1983, p. 387). This statement demon-
strates a number of key features associated with group success. Provoking a dispropor-
tionate response from the government can be an important aim (Crenshaw, 2007). This
is exemplified in Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Merari, 2004),
which states that, in the face of continued guerrilla action, ‘[t]he government has no
alternative except to intensify its repression. The police networks, house searches,
the arrest of suspects and innocent person, and the closing off of streets make life in
the city unbearable’ (Marighella, 1969). Democracies are particularly susceptible to
this strategy, as they are often required to respond to calls for revenge, while at the
same time upholding human rights (Crenshaw, 2007). In this situation, reacting with
excessive force disenfranchises the population (Kydd & Walter, 2006), and in
extreme circumstances may see revolt against the government (Martin, 2003).
Hence, the target responds in a way favourable to the extremist group, generating
greater support for their cause (Neumann & Smith, 2005, 2008).
Two causes of popular revolt have been hypothesised (Beuno de Mesquita &
Dickson, 2007). Firstly, that the population sees the ‘true nature’ of the government
by its reaction. Secondly, the negative impact of a crackdown on poverty and
disenfranchisement makes the population more inclined to rise up (Beuno de Mesquita
& Dickson, 2007). This is particularly the case where governments respond to terrorism
indiscriminately, perceived as demonstrating indifference to society’s norms (Beuno de
Mesquita & Dickson, 2007). This moves more members of the moderate majority to
support the extremist group (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003). In an international
context, where groups are state-sponsored, this can even lead to war (Merari, 2004).
However, it is difficult to isolate terrorism as the cause of revolt, in the midst of often
chaotic political and social events. Even in the relatively transparent conditions of
Spain’s 2004 election, it is very challenging to understand the impact of the Madrid
train bombing on the ballot, and Spain’s subsequent withdrawal of troops from Iraq,
despite al-Qaeda’s efforts to claim victory (Rose, Murphy & Abrahms, 2007).
Some government responses can erode human rights, witnessed by the controversy
over control orders in the UK, which allowed terrorist suspects to be placed under
virtual indefinite house arrest. This can lead to an increasingly radicalised population
(Hoffman, 2004). More seriously, we see empirical support for the impact on human
rights in transnational terrorism’s relationship to increased extrajudicial killings and
disappearances (Piazza & Walsh, 2009). Effects are also seen in the increasing scope
of Western society’s legislative framework (Gearty, 2007). In addition, terrorism can
lead the populus to lose faith in its government. If the state is unable to defend or
protect its people (Crenshaw, 1978) or way of life, ‘disorientation’ may result,
leading to a sense of alienation from a country’s leadership (Neumann & Smith,
2005, 2008). Counter-terrorism’s challenge is to maintain civil liberties, ensure
public protection and avoid handing a public relations victory to extremists.
At the state level, terrorism is used to disrupt peace processes and generate
conditions closer to the group’s aims (Inbar, 1996). There is some evidence for
terrorism’s success in this regard. In a sample of 14 peace agreements, political violence
led to three out of four deals failing, whereas peace saw six out of 10 treaties ratified
(Kydd & Walter, 2002). Terrorism’s success in disrupting peace processes is down
to the group’s ability to generate mistrust between those in favour of peace (Kydd &
 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 143

Walter, 2002). This is because violence exploits the doubt that the other side are
able to abide by the peace deal (Kydd & Walter, 2002). This is most successful
where the relationship between parties is weak, and when the level of trust falls
below that required to continue cooperative attempts at peace-making (Kydd &
Walter, 2002).
At the societal level, terrorism aims to generate fear and victimisation (Schmid &
Jongman, 1984; Friedland & Merari, 1985). This can result in psychological outcomes
including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Galea et al., 2002), elevated stress levels
(Mansdorf & Weinberg, 2003) and depression (Tucker et al., 2007). Broader psycho-
logical effects, stimulated by the discourse of conflict (Mueller, 2005) include behav-
iour change (Goodwin, Willson & Gaines, 2005) and increased anxiety (Slone,
2000). Further impacts are seen in the negative impact on community relations and
an increase in hate crime (Kaplan, 2006), often caused by polarisation between commu-
nities (Crenshaw, 2007). A central part of successful terrorism is generating and
exploiting fear and insecurity, making terrorism a unique weapon in attempting
change (Schmid & Jongman, 1984). Assessing fear of terrorism and threat perception
is highly complex, as it is influenced by gender, location, age and people’s values and
beliefs (Goodwin et al., 2005). Caution should therefore accompany any interpretation
of the social impacts of terrorism, as this is a far from uniform phenomenon.
The recently adapted phrase ‘terrorists want a lot of people watching, and a lot of
people dead’ (Jenkins, 2006, p. 119), illustrates the media’s power to disseminate
information aimed at prompting change. This frames terrorism as violent and coercive
communication (Martin, 1985). Without the power of journalism to spread images of
destruction alongside the group’s message it can lose meaning (Wilkinson, 1997).
The media’s reach in publicising acts of violence facilitates many acts of terrorism,
and can see extremist actors seek out publicity (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). This was
exemplified by al-Qaeda’s, Ayman al-Zawahiri, when he stated that ‘we are in a
battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the
media’ (Zawahiri, 2005).
Media exposure forces the group’s agenda onto a wider stage (Crenshaw, 1978);
without it, the group can struggle to instill fear and promote its cause (Crenshaw,
1978). In an analysis of terrorists’ memoirs, five publicity-related goals were identified:
to generate sympathy; to increase recruitment; to demoralise the target; to demonstrate
vulnerability; and to polarise the political situation (Gerrits, 1992). Therefore, if ‘the
most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention’ (Crenshaw, 1981,
p. 386), the more ‘professional’ (Gerrits, 1992) the group is in doing this, the more suc-
cessful they will be. Where effective the group gains legitimacy and broadens its
support base (Neumann & Smith, 2005, 2008). Accurate assessment depends on the
degree of press freedom. In countries suffering excessive government control of the
media, a group’s ability to promote its agenda will be limited, as will the analyst’s
chances of interpreting the evolving situation.
As we have seen, there are significant and lasting effects of terrorism at the strategic
level. These include provoking an indiscriminate response from the government,
leading to the population suffering, economically or socially, and potentially losing
faith in those in power. Terrorism is also successful when it is able to influence the
human rights agenda, and demonstrate the government’s inability to protect its
people. Success can be seen in the disruption of peace processes and generation of
fear, often facilitated by media coverage. Terrorism’s wide-ranging strategic impacts
support the conclusion that ‘contemporary terrorism has a very high capacity of
144 Sarah V. Marsden

achieving its broadest and most typical first strategic objective, the wrecking of
normalcy and political order’ (Harmon, 2004, p. 282).

Ultimate goals
Ultimate goals are the primary objectives of the group. Ideologically, groups may be
aligned to nationalism, separatism, racism, vigilantism, ultra-left, religious fundament-
alism, millennialism and single issue campaigns, which often guide their objectives
(Wilkinson, 2001). Ultimate goals consist of five categories: policy change, social
control, territorial change, regime change and maintaining the status quo (Kydd &
Walter, 2006). These are a group’s most important aims, facilitated by the tactical, stra-
tegic and organisational goals already discussed. Judged by these criteria, terrorist
groups are far less successful, although it is important to consider partial success,
where a group achieves some significant goals, but not complete victory.
Again, research demonstrates diverse opinions. Some propose that terrorism enjoys
considerable success (Pape, 2003) and others that it is partially successful (Merari,
2004), while still others pronounce it a failure (Abrahms, 2006). Several cases are
repeated in support of terrorism’s effectiveness: the FLN in Algeria, in their fight for
independence (Crenshaw, 1978); the Irgun in Israel, whose violence contributed to
the end of the British mandate in Palestine (Martin, 2003); and Hezbollah, who effec-
tively pushed peacekeepers from Lebanon in 1984 and 2000 (Atran, 2006; Pape, 2003).
There are fewer large-scale studies examining the ultimate success of campaigns of
terrorism. One notable exception is that of Robert Pape (2003), whose analysis of
suicide bombing is often cited as evidence of the coercive power of terrorism. His
research looked at all suicide attacks from 1980 to 2001, disaggregated into 11 cam-
paigns of terrorism. Of these, six led to some of the groups’ aims being addressed,
such that the target government altered their policy in line with group demands.
However, these are predominantly partial successes and do not constitute a complete
victory. For example, as Abrahms (2006) points out; while the Israeli Defense Force
withdrew from parts of the Gaza Strip in 1994 – classified as a success by Pape –
there was a simultaneous increase in the number of settlers, constituting a failure for
Hamas. This demonstrates the need for clear criteria for success, an appreciation of
all the various levels of analysis, and understanding of the group’s wider aims.
Evidence of terrorism’s failure is presented in an analysis by Abrahms (2006). This
assessed 28 groups and their 42 policy objectives, of which 7% were achieved. He com-
pares this unfavourably with the literature on economic sanctions, considered effective
34% of the time (Hart, 2000), leading to the conclusion that terrorism is an inefficient
way of achieving political goals. In a large-scale study, looking at how extremist groups
end (Jones & Libicki, 2008), of 648 groups operating between 1968 and 2006, only
10% ended because they had achieved their ultimate goals. The majority of groups
ended by joining the political process. It is a moot point whether this constitutes
success or failure; recognition by the political system may be a significant milestone
for a group, leading to longer-term change in line with original aims.
A further assessment using a different dataset concludes that ‘the overwhelming
majority of the many hundreds of terrorist groups which have existed in the second
half of this century have failed miserably to attain their goal’ (Merari, 2004,
pp. 384–385). Therefore, in line with Schelling, this review of work on terrorism’s
success at achieving ultimate goals supports the view that ‘acts of terrorism almost
never appear to accomplish anything politically significant’ (Schelling, 1989, p. 20).
 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 145

Conclusion
Extremist groups have multiple, interacting aims; these include tactical, organisational,
strategic and ultimate goals, all of which are useful criteria for assessing the success of
individual groups. In response to these goals, governments have developed a plethora
of responses in efforts to reduce terrorism’s reach, incidence and impact. These range
from military intervention to promoting community cohesion. Work on counter-
terrorism’sefficacy is even less well developed than attempts to understand terrorism’s
success. In a major review of the literature, only seven of 20,000 studies, evaluated the
effect of counter-terrorism empirically (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006).
Lum and colleagues’ review highlighted a number of key points about counter-
terrorism’s effectiveness. Target hardening, for example installing metal detectors at
airports, reduced terrorism, but there was a substitution effect which saw nonavia-
tion-targeted terrorism increasing (Cauley & Im, 1988; Enders, Sandler & Cauley,
1990; Enders & Sandler, 1993, 2000). Increasing punishment had little deterrent
effect (Landes, 1978); similarly, United Nations resolutions were largely neutral in
their impact, without practical measures such as target hardening (Enders et al.,
1990). Military retaliations, such as the attack on Libya by the United States in
1986, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, lead to short-term increases in terrorism and
may have little positive impact over the long term (Silke, 2005; Brophy-Baermann
& Conybeare, 1994; Sherman, 2005). However, recent work examining a major mili-
tary intervention in Northern Ireland demonstrated a reduction in terrorism by the IRA
(Lafree, Dugan & Korte, 2009). Another review of counter-terrorism’s effects (Lafree
& Ackerman, 2009) highlights work demonstrating that targeted assassinations in Israel
(Hafez & Hatfield, 2006) and Northern Ireland (Lafree, Dugan & Korte, 2009) have had
little discernable impact on terrorism. Work to date demonstrates the urgent need for
greater focus on understanding how and why counter-terrorism succeeds and fails.
It is important to emphasise the interacting nature of the goals described in the frame-
work, and the dynamic effects that counter-terrorism may have on any gains from using
terrorism. For example, choosing particular tactics that target the ‘wrong’ victims can
impact on recruitment and support, important organisational goals. Similarly, conflict
within groups can lead to ultimate goals being lost; often the final objective is so far
away that minor aspects of doctrine or tactics take on disproportionate importance,
which can lead to factionalisation and split (Freedman, 2007). Hence, although the
multiple goals described in the framework are presented in discrete themes, they
should be interpreted and applied holistically, as part of the dynamic context in which
terrorism campaigns evolve and die. In a field as complex as terrorism and political vio-
lence, relationships are not straightforward linear constructs, and are likely to change
across time, influenced by the political and social context in which they operate.
Much more research is needed to explore how the various layers influence one another.
Overall, the evidence for terrorism’s efficacy is a mixed story. Crudely put, groups
which use terrorism are relatively successful in carrying out terrorist attacks, and are
influenced by a number of organisational factors, response to which indicates their
likely success. Terrorism campaigns have wide-ranging impacts at the social and
political level with respect to strategic aims, but are much less effective at achieving
ultimate goals. While some intermediate goals are attained, these represent only
partial successes, leaving ultimate policy goals largely unfulfilled.
This conceptualisation hopes to offer a useful framework by which to organise
existing and future work, and provides scope for developing a more rigorous set of
146 Sarah V. Marsden

metrics for analysing terrorism’s effectiveness. Importantly, the approach includes the
perspective of both the violent political actors and their adversaries, allowing greater
clarity when discussing success and failure. It also has utility for counter-terrorism,
as it facilitates a better understanding of how counteractions may impact on a
group’s varying aims. This is particularly important as terrorism’s impact is often in
the hands of the opponent (Neumann & Smith, 2008).
The preceding illustrates the need for a holistic view of terrorism’s success, as
progress in one area may result in, or coincide with, regress in another (Perl, 2005;
Abrahms, 2006). Given the varying ways in which success is manifest, it is important
to investigate each group in its specific context. Without embedding specific measures
of success in their wider setting, it is very difficult to interpret what they mean for a
group’s progress or regress. Hopefully, the framework allows for terrorism’s
dynamic nature, and the application of a changing set of criteria. Depending on the
nature of the campaign, tactics and aims of the group, and the broader historical,
political and social context in which a campaign plays out, different measures will
come to the fore.
The review has highlighted the need to consider the complex nature of terrorism’s
effects; it is for future research to respond to questions of when and why terrorism is
successful. Specifically, what are the particular conditions under which groups
achieve their ultimate aims? Why is terrorism effective in one context, but a failure
in others; and what is most effective in building resilience to terrorism and why? In
addition, it remains for the framework to be tested by applying the knowledge base
on individual groups that use terrorism. In-depth engagement with those who use
terrorism, and those tasked with countering it will allow a better understanding of
how and why terrorism is chosen as a strategy, and what its likely effects may be.

Notes on contributor
Sarah Marsden is a PhD Candidate at the University of St Andrews examining the relative
success of terrorist groups. She is also working on a research project investigating progress
and regress in the ‘War on Terror’. Sarah has carried out a range of research, looking at engage-
ment with terrorist offenders; disenfranchisement and radicalisation in community contexts; and
the evolution and characteristics of terrorist groups.

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