American Diplomacy

September 6, 2010
www.americandiplomacy.org

Title: Preconditions for Success in Afghanistan

Author: Haviland Smith

Text:

Editor's Note:A retired intelligence professional gives his candid

assessment of what would constitute “success” in Afghanistan and the
chances for reaching this goal.-The Editor

Two successive U.S. administrations have said we must “win” in Afghanistan. David
Kilcullen, one of the world’s leading counterinsurgency experts and preeminent advisor
to the US government, says that we must meet certain markers if we are to “succeed” in
Afghanistan: We must face the realities of historical and contemporary Afghanistan.
There must be agreement between Afghans and Americans on our goals. We must
eliminate the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan. There must be a solid, long-term US
commitment including a flexible timeline.

Defining the issue

However, before those markers can even be discussed, the Obama administration must
define the words “success” and “win.” As the leading free enterprise democracy in the
world, we habitually insist that any enterprise in which we are inclined to invest be
prepared to show us that it is making progress that will profit us. That is no less true for
the Afghan war than it is for Microsoft, yet our goals have never been clearly defined by
either the Bush or Obama administrations.

As a result, there is no way for anyone in this country to measure progress in this war.
Without that ability, we will predictably become more easily disenchanted with our
Afghan war than we would if we knew fairly precisely what it was that America is
fighting for.

Having once defined our goals or what constitutes success, Kilcullen’s four markers
come into play before we can declare any progress, let alone success. Our willingness
and ability to deal with them will be crucial to the result.

Afghanistan’s historical and present realities

Afghanistan is a geographically inhospitable, tribal country whose people are corruptible,
indomitable, bellicose and armed to the teeth. The tribal Afghans have never had or
wanted a strong central government. They have often been invaded by foreign armies
and as a result are strongly xenophobic. Throughout the centuries they have successfully
resisted all attempts at foreign invasion and occupation.

The governing ideals for the Pashtun people are embodied in their “Pashtunwali” or
“Pashtun way” which sets forth a complete code for life. It emphasizes self-respect,
independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge and tolerance toward all
people. The main principles of Pashtunwali include freedom and independence, justice
and forgiveness, honesty and keeping promises, ethnic unity and equality, support and
trust within the Pashtun family and love for and defense of the Pashtun nation and
culture.

In short, the “Pashtun way” is designed to motivate its followers to support their way of
life and resist by force of arms all attempts by anyone, particularly foreigners, to change
it either by force or subterfuge. It is clearly the product of a people who have pretty
much always been under the gun from foreign cultures and who have evolved their own
very efficient way of dealing with such incursions.

The Pashtunwali is the guiding word, subscribed to wholeheartedly by Pashtuns around

the world. That should give us some notion of how welcome our armies are in
Afghanistan, regardless of the purity of our motives.

That is Afghan history and if we are wise we will acknowledge it as such.

Trust in Afghanistan
We must get to the point where the American administration and people believe that the
Afghan political establishment and people share with us a common definition of
“success,” whatever that proves to be. We are, after all, fighting this war for the people
of Afghanistan, not for ourselves.

In the process of formulating our definition of “success”, we need to keep in mind that
there is little in Afghanistan that argues in favor of any readiness on their part to accept
democracy as we know it.

In order to proceed and persist, we have to be able to trust that we are on the same page
as the Afghan population, accepting the fact, as Afghans do, that the election that put
Karzai in power was massively fraudulent. We must understand that that fact does not
make Karzai or his government widely popular in Afghanistan.

In order to be “successful” in Afghanistan, we have to share a vision with the Afghan

people. Without that, it will never work.

The Taliban Sanctuary in Pakistan

As long as there is a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, we will never “win.”
The Pashtun people, who basically comprise the Taliban in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, straddle the border between the two nations. In that fact lies one of our most
difficult problems. If we are to “win” over the Taliban in Afghanistan, we will have to
deny them sanctuary in Pakistan.

The Pakistan military establishment has long supported the Taliban, seeing it as a
potential counterbalance or lever in its conflict with India, its only true enemy on the face
of the earth. They are reluctant to commit resources to the fight against the Taliban in
Pakistan because of its perceived role in any future battle with India. Further, the more
we involve ourselves directly in the struggle within Pakistan with drones and special
operations, the more support we loose within Pakistan. It is a true Hobson’s Choice.

Commitment of American Resources

Our commitment to Afghanistan is very expensive in human life and resources, yet, since
the surge of our troops in Afghanistan, we have clearly not realized any breakthroughs in
reaching our “goals” there.

When we invaded Iraq in 2003, the Army Chief of Staff told us that we would need half a
million troops to successfully occupy that country. The post-invasion period in Iraq
showed clearly that he had a point. We are now dealing with our Afghan problems with
just over 100,000 troops.

A look at a topographical map of Afghanistan will tell even the dullest among us that
Afghanistan is a far more geographically complicated and challenging country than Iraq
and that if we are to “win” there, we will probably need more troops than we needed in
Iraq. In fact, Afghanistan, with its valleys, mountains and lack of infrastructure is a
military nightmare.

America’s Timeline
Finally, if we decide to try to “win” in Afghanistan, we will have to back off the 2011
withdrawal deadline given by President Obama and be prepared to extend our
involvement there, perhaps by additional decades. The most optimistic estimates from
General Petraeus now range around a military commitment of at least seven years.

America will have to back that commitment at the ballot box. Given our inability as a
nation to commit to anything much farther out than the next election, we will clearly have
to be convinced that such a commitment is in our national interest.

That will not be an easy task to accomplish.

Conclusion
It is impossible to find real experts on counterinsurgency who believe we can “win”
without meeting the above requirements.

Can we really expect Americans to get behind an effort that has so many internal
contradictions? Can we trust Karzai? Would we settle for anything less than democracy
in Afghanistan? Would we accept stability, irrespective of the Afghan form of
government?

Pro-war voices in our country are those profiting politically, emotionally, militarily or
economically from our involvement in the Afghan counterinsurgency program. It is hard
to find academics and other experts and truly well informed people on Afghanistan
realities who believe that we can meet all of the requirements for “victory” in
Afghanistan.
Even the most optimistic supporters of the war acknowledge that the Afghan Army and
Police, two elements absolutely critical to our “success,” are a major problem. After
eight years of prodding, support and training, they are still not fit to do the job for which
they have been trained. Returning troops from Afghanistan roll their eyes when asked
about such Afghan readiness.

And can we expect the Afghan people to get behind an illegitimately elected Karzai
government? Will the Pashtun Taliban support a Pashtun President (Karzai) whose
government is complicit in killing his own people (the Pashtun Taliban)? How does that
fit with Pashtunwali?

Do our military leaders, intelligent and schooled experts in the history and practice of
warfare, really believe that they can somehow change historical and current Afghan
realities and successfully invade that country and change its governance and culture?
That is repeating the same act, yet again, while hoping the outcome will change. Isn’t
that the clinical definition of insanity?

And then, Americans were sold both Iraq and the second invasion of Afghanistan as part
of the “war on terror.” Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism prior to our invasion. Al
Qaida exited Afghanistan during our first invasion and has not since returned in
significant numbers.

Additionally, given our exceedingly difficult economic circumstances, is it objectively

important to continue to pour our treasure into the Middle East when that treasure may
well be the only practical answer to our problems at home? Are our real problems ever
going to come first?

That, in turn asks whether or not we are prepared to “stay the course” in Afghanistan, or
for that matter, in Iraq which now appears to be in ethnic and sectarian gridlock.

The now-abandoned military draft ushered in our professional, all-volunteer military

establishment, thereby removing from voters the most effective way they had to object to
the conduct of specific wars. We removed the check and balance of the vote as it was
wielded during the Viet Nam War. That makes it relatively simpler for any given
administration to wage war unfettered, particularly if it is dealing with a supine Congress,
as was the case of Iraq in 2003.

Finally, there is the question of US national interests. Terrorism is a problem for us. It is
in our national interest to deal with it. However, terrorism has nothing to do with
Afghanistan. There are few if any terrorists there. If we want to go after terrorism right
now, Yemen would offer far greater rewards. Can we afford another such adventure?
Because if we undertake it, the people we seek to “beat” will simply move to another
venue. That is the nature of mobile, unfettered terrorism. Such is not the case for the
well equipped and armed military.
But do we want to try to “wipe out” terrorism with our military power? Can we even
hope for that to succeed? Every time we have confronted Middle East terrorism with our
military power, we have watched it morph into insurgency. Insurgencies are far more
difficult to defeat than terrorism. It can be argued that for that reason, we need to
carefully review our counterterrorism strategy, perhaps considering less reliance on our
military resources.

Unfortunately, with the advent of the new, professional military, we have politicized that
establishment as never before. Whatever his reasons, if President Obama chooses to
continue in Afghanistan, he can probably do so without fearing Congressional
intervention.

What he cannot escape are Afghan historical, cultural, tribal and political realities. Even
though he and his advisors may be inclined to dismiss them, they are there to be dealt
with. It seems highly unlikely that, given all our own economic and political realities, he
will be able to continue our Afghan military involvement sufficiently long to achieve any
sort of “successful” conclusion.

About the Author: Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. A graduate of Dartmouth, he served
in the Army Security Agency, undertook Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined
the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he
worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff
and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in
1980, he has lived in Vermont.
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