Article

Journal of Environment &

Sand Waves and Human Development

2014, Vol. 23(1) 160–185

Tides: Exploring ! The Author(s) 2014

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DOI: 10.1177/1070496513519896

Desertification and jed.sagepub.com

Climate-Induced Migration

Giovanni Bettini1 and Elina Andersson2,3

Abstract
In spite of the growing attention to climate-induced migration, a coherent under-
standing of the matter is lacking—as any articulated governance strategy. Although
such an impasse relates to the unprecedented socioecological processes involved, we
argue that many of the challenges posed by climate-induced migration are not unique
in the history of global environmental governance. Proceeding from this, we compare
climate migration with the issue of desertification. Drawing upon the concept of
environmental myth developed in Political Ecology, we identify common themes
such as scientism, vagueness, and ambiguities in the definitions, and a tendency to
envision one-fits-all solutions that overlook the multiscalar phenomena involved. We
discuss how these traits have contributed to the failure of the desertification regime.
Consequently, we propose that climate migration debates should move beyond such
deficiencies, to avoid the consolidation of policy responses reproducing the same
problems that have characterized the regime on desertification.

Keywords
global environmental change, desertification, political ecology, climate-induced
migration, environmental myths

1
Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, UK
2
Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies (LUCSUS), Sweden
3
Lund University Centre of Excellence for Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability
(LUCID), Sweden
Corresponding Author:
Giovanni Bettini, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, LA1 4YQ Lancaster, UK.
Email: g.bettini@lancaster.ac.uk
Bettini and Andersson 161

The question of how climate change will influence human mobility has
alimented florid discussions in recent years, reaching the top levels of environ-
mental politics. Yet, climate-induced migration (CM) remains a contested
issue. Definitional (Bates, 2002; Brown, 2008; Dun & Gemenne, 2008;
Suhrke, 1994) and methodological (Gemenne, 2011c; Kniveton, 2008; Piguet,
2010) disputes have carved the debate. More importantly, it is unclear what
policy options are suited to tackle the issue, and the different implications of
the conflicting recipes (e.g., Biermann & Boas, 2010; Foresight, 2011; Tacoli,
2009; Warner, 2010) are still uncertain. Symptomatic of such an impasse is the
vagueness with which Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)
2007 (on this, see Bettini, 2013b) and the Cancun Agreements (United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2010) deal
with CM.
In the literature, the common response to such controversies and uncertain-
ties is a call for new analytical frameworks, more empirical research, and innova-
tive governance designs (e.g., Foresight, 2011). Notwithstanding the need for
such advancements, we argue that the impasse that has characterized the debate
on CM is connected to a series of short circuits at the science–policy interface
that also have characterized other socioecological issues and environmental
policy regimes. Such short circuits are related to the ways in which—for CM
as for other environmental matters—scientific knowledge has been constructed,
mobilized to legitimize certain understandings and policy recipes, and commu-
nicated to the public. In spite of this, surprisingly few studies on CM have taken
a comparative approach.
To fill this lacuna, we identify a good candidate for comparison in the
issue and regime of desertification. To begin with, while CM is an environmen-
tal matter still-in-the-making (very few policy measures target it, and no
international regime has been devoted to CM), desertification is a riper
case that obtained relevance within environmental politics and policy
much earlier than CM. Indeed, the fight against desertification was institutiona-
lized through a United Nations (UN) convention in the early 1990s (UN, 1994),
and a vast amount of empirical and conceptual research has scrutinized this
process.
Moreover, we were struck by the fact that desertification and CM, as their
most emblematic visualizations, share images of mounting billows—waves of
sand dunes for the former, tides of climate refugees for the latter. At a closer
look, and in spite of the obvious differences between CM and desertification (in
terms of their temporal scope, of the issues they refer to, etc.), other deeper
similarities appear. As the following sections detail, the two present striking
resemblances in how the problems are defined and constructed, how/what sci-
entific knowledge is produced and transferred to policy circuits, and in the scale
of the envisioned responses.
162 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

These similarities lead us to argue that the more mature case of desertification
provides useful insights for understanding the roots of the impasse that charac-
terizes the CM debate. To articulate the comparison and to assesses how and
why certain forms of knowledge are constructed, maintained, and used in policy
and planning in the two cases, the paper hinges on the concept of environmental
myth as elaborated in Political Ecology (Forsyth, 2003; Lambin et al., 2001;
Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Stringer, 2009; Thomas & Middleton, 1994; Thompson
& Warburton, 1985).
In the following section, to compare the dominant discourses on desertifica-
tion and CM and illustrate their similarities, we sketch the contours of what we
here see as two discursive fields, and articulate the concept of myth drawing on
Political Ecology. We conclude by summarizing the policy implication of the
comparison and highlighting its possible relevance for Political Ecology and
environmental politics.

The Discursive Fields: Two Global Environmental Issues

As anticipated, the aim of this article is to gain insights on the “newer” debate on
CM by comparing it with the older and more institutionalized (and more thor-
oughly scrutinized) case of desertification. Two clarifications are due. To begin
with, we are not offering a systematic comparison of the two cases articulating
all their similarities and differences. This article provides a thorough literature
review, including empirical studies, review articles, and some gray literature,
structured around a number of themes related to the science–policy interface
presented in the following. Neither is our aim to explore how desertification
influences human migration, a topic discussed since the very beginning of the
nexus environment migration (Black, 2001; El-Hinnawi, 1985; Leighton, 2006,
2011; Myers & Kent, 1995). Our objective is to compare the debates and dis-
courses on CM and desertification, seen as two cases of environmental issues
and regimes, situated in their own historical, academic, and political context.
The discursive fields of desertification and CM are inhabited by competing dis-
courses.1 Both issues have been contested matters, and the debates have been
animated by conflicting positions, approaches, and views—which unsurprisingly
have been in a continuous evolution. Drawing on existing literature, we identify
and focus our comparison on the discourse that has been predominant (or
mainstream) for each case.
To identify the dominant discourse on desertification, we depart from the
categorization of global environmental discourses proposed by Adger,
Benjaminsen, Brown, and Svarstad (2001). Within a number of environmental
debates, including desertification, they identify two main discursive clusters: the
dominant Global Environmental Management (GEM) and the alternative popu-
list (Adger et al., 2001) discourse. Our focus is on the former.
Bettini and Andersson 163

GEM discourses are described by Adger et al. (2001) as “top-down, interven-

tionist and technocratic” (p. 701). They construct their objects as global envir-
onmental issues, requiring urgent and international action. Drawing on Adger
et al., we associate the GEM discourse on desertification with the international
regime for combating desertification initiated with the 1977 Plan of Action for
Combating Desertification (PACD) and later upgraded into the UN Convention
to Combat Desertification (CCD). Born in the aftermath of the UN Conference
on Environment and Development in 1992, CCD placed desertification, together
with climate change and biodiversity loss into a triad of global sustainability
challenges (Adger et al., 2001; Corell, 1999; Ortiz & Tang, 2005; Toulmin, 2006).
A constellation of scientific research circuits, instances of civil society, and
(supra)national governmental institutions (prominently UNEP), promoted
desertification as a global concern (Keeley & Scoones, 2000; Lonergan, 2005).
Initially, the discourse propagated top-down approaches (Adger et al., 2001;
Leach & Mearns, 1996a; Stringer, Thomas, & Twyman, 2007; Warren &
Batterbury, 2004). This was toned down in CCD, which enhanced nongovern-
mental organization’s (NGO) role and acknowledged the relevance of indigen-
ous knowledge (Bruyninckx, 2004; Corell, 1999; Tal & Cohen, 2007).
In polemic with GEM’s top-down character, the populist discourse proposed
a democratization of the narratives and policies for dealing with desertification
(Leach & Mearns, 1996a) and the use of bottom-up strategies to support local
populations’ ability to cope with ecological stresses (Stringer et al., 2007, Swift,
1996). According to this view, which has become a banner of the populist dis-
course, local populations are “rational” actors confronting and adapting to
ecological stresses (Adger et al., 2001; Mortimore, 1989).
For what regards CM, the field has been parted into two factions, which in
the literature are identified as the maximalist and the minimalist schools/dis-
courses (on this, see Castles, 2002; Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Gemenne, 2011b;
Morrissey, 2009; Suhrke, 1994; White, 2011). The maximalist assumes the exist-
ence of a direct causal relationship between environmental stress and migration,
expecting climate change to originate mass displacements. Similar to GEM dis-
courses, it stresses the global and compelling character of CM, pointing to its
possible sheer magnitude and grave security implications. It favors top-down
approaches, advocating an international regime for the protection of climate
migrants—via an extension of the Geneva Convention, a specific legal agreement
targeting climate refugees, or a new provision placed under UNFCCC (2010;
Biermann & Boas, 2010; Docherty & Giannini, 2009; McNamara, 2007; Westra,
2009; Williams, 2008). The minimalist discourse has been critical against the
framing of CM as a global environmental problem (Black, 2001) and has ques-
tioned the mechanistic rationales embodied in the maximalist discourse. It has
stressed the importance of local scales for understanding CM and foresees that
the direct impacts of climate change will be mainly on regional and intraregional
movements.
164 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

Although the maximalist position started losing ground in academia already

in middle of the 1990s (Morrissey, 2009), it can still be considered prevalent (at
least until very recently2) in policy arenas. Indeed, the maximalist’s alarmist
tones and mobilization of security lexicon have been reproduced in NGO reports
and in the media (e.g., Christian Aid, 2007; Environmental Justice Foundation,
2009; Greenpeace, 2008; Knight, 2009; World People’s Conference [WPC],
2010), as well as in governmental documents and statements (Council of the
European Union, 2008; Stern, 2007; United Nations General Assembly, 2009;
German Advisory Council on Global Change [WBGU], 2008).

Real Issues and Environmental Myths

To criticize the science–policy interface of any environmental discourse requires
some degree of sophistication to avoid two traps. First, a critique of the evidence
supporting an environmental discourse should not (necessarily) involve a dismissal
of the potential gravity of the concerned matters—that would mean “throwing the
baby out with the bath water.” Second, a deconstruction of the knowledge
embedded in a discourse should not undermine the possibility for a critical trust
in science. Owing to its exploration of the coproduction of knowledge, politics, and
reality in environmental discourses, Political Ecology avoids these traps, allowing
us to reaffirm the compelling nature of dryland degradation and climate-related
migration while at the same time question the dominant discourses on desertifica-
tion and CM. These questions are at the core of concepts such as environmental
myth (Lambin et al., 2001; Thomas & Middleton, 1994), orthodoxy (Forsyth,
2003; Stringer, 2009), received wisdom (Leach & Mearns, 1996b), or institutional
facts/truth (Thomas & Middleton, 1994; Thompson & Warburton, 1985).
Specifically, through the concept of environmental myth we identify common
salient features in the two dominant discourses. Myth refers to descriptions and
explanations that, although narrating real environmental issues through intelli-
gible, easily apprehensible, and convincing storylines, oversimplify the con-
cerned human–environment interactions. Myths often gain currency as facts
within academy or policy circuits, although at a closer scrutiny they often
come out as “uncertain, highly contested, and misleading” (Forsyth, 2003,
p. 24). Often permeated by a sort of scientism (Warren & Olsson, 2003), they
depict complex socioecological phenomena in simplified models grounded on
heuristic (if not naı̈ve) assumptions seen as scientific theories. They look at their
object through global lenses and generalize explanations that do not take into
account site specificity and scale-sensitive aspects.
Moreover, the evidence for such narratives and explanations is scientifically
weak: these myths often conflict with empirical findings and ignore alternative
interpretations that challenge their claims and provide other types of problem
framing. Although presented as neutral scientific facts, such narratives embody
normative standpoints (Forsyth, 2003; Sullivan, 2000; Swift, 1996).
Bettini and Andersson 165

Despite their lack of scientific rigor, myths tend to be strongly resilient and
generally have a strong effect on policy since they provide justifications for
intervention. They generally suggest simple solutions and their logic and
claims may fit the interests of critical groups and institutions, whose power
they (re)produce (Black, 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Lambin et al., 2001; Leach &
Mearns, 1996b).
Once embodied in hegemonic discourses, myths have gained enough credibil-
ity to have bearing on policy (Lambin et al., 2001). Once a myth has been
embodied in policies and institutions, abandoning it would produce severe dis-
locations to the discourse, ideologically but also practically; when research,
policies, and campaigns are structured around a myth, it offers a raison d’être
for a constellation of individuals, agencies, and institutions whose legitimacy
and status are bound to such narratives.
To summarize, a myth is understandable, paradigmatic, evocative, and con-
veys an intelligible message (often with a grip beyond the strictly rational).
Although full of significance, a myth does not provide a detailed account of
an empirically circumscribed phenomenon nor follows a strictly rational reason-
ing. In that sense myths do not follow principles such as coherence, noncontra-
diction, or adherence to empirical evidence. Their ambiguity is a precondition
for their success, and it allows them to resonate with various discourses and
narratives.3 This conceptual elusiveness invites various actors to ascribe different
meanings to the very same concepts but still converge on them. Hence, this can
serve the purpose of providing clear-cut and evocative storylines appealing to a
broader public while furnishing politicians and donors with strong punch lines,
agendas, and enemies.

The Troubles With Myths

That discourses are structured around resilient nodes is nothing strange per se (a
world without discursive closure is psychotic) nor is the vagueness or ambiguity
of myths. Our focus here is on the specific traits of the concerned narratives and
how that affects the discourse and its operation. In the following sections, we
highlight similar flaws in the dominant discourses associated with desertification
and CM, and show how these block the envisioning and implementation of
effective policies.

Scientism
Both CM and desertification are typical socioecological issues encompassing
both biophysical and social dimensions. Per definition, CM comprises the influ-
ence of biophysical changes on the social processes of human mobility (Adamo
& Izazola, 2010; Massey, Axinn, & Ghimire, 2010). Also desertification emerges
from an inextricable interplay of environmental and social relations and
166 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

processes, with feedbacks and interactions in both directions (Herrmann &

Hutchinson, 2005; Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Olsson, 1993; Reynolds et al.,
2007; UN, 1994). Even a minimal definition of desertification cannot escape
anthropocentric contours. For instance, land degradation is measured as a
reduction of biological productivity and of the ecosystem services from which
humans benefit; the judgment on the gravity of the degradation is gauged with
reference to human values (Warren, 2002). Both CM and desertification thus
challenge the Cartesian construction of a human and a natural sphere.
Nevertheless, this dichotomy is prevalent and has (re)produced the onto-
logical and epistemological gaps between natural and social sciences. As typical
of environmental myths, the two discourses arguably suffer from a form of
scientism, defined by Warren and Olsson (2003) as a perception of a phenom-
enon as mainly biophysical and the disregard for non-(natural-)scientific con-
ceptualization and analytic tools. This leads to severe distortions. The two
discourses contain flawed notions that would have to be abandoned if stringent
cross-checks between methodologies and disciplines were done (Bauer &
Stringer, 2009; Sullivan, 2000). Concepts and explanations developed as heuris-
tics and hypotheses in one discipline are imported with blatant inaccuracies into
other contexts where they often are ascribed the status of facts (Forsyth, 2003;
Stott & Sullivan, 2000).
In the desertification case, the natural sciences have been prominent in the
exploration and explanation of dryland degradation, and these perspectives have
remained dominant in the debate (Black, 2001; Corell, 1999; Forsyth, 2003;
Lambin et al., 2001; Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Swift, 1996). Natural science-
related perspectives tend to underestimate both the specificity and complexity
of the involved social relations and the social science theory or concepts needed
to explore those (Herrmann & Hutchinson, 2005). As a result, explanations of
social relations, processes, and dynamics involved in land degradation are often
partial, oversimplified, naı̈ve, or plainly wrong (Stringer, 2009; Thomas &
Middleton, 1994). For instance, scholars who have questioned the hypothesis
that land degradation depends mainly on inappropriate land management prac-
tices, backwardness and population growth4 have convincingly shown that such
ideas are grounded in oversimplified assumptions of societal phenomena
(Blaikie, 1985; Forsyth, 2003; Leach & Mearns, 1996a; Mortimore, 1989;
Olsson, 1993; Stringer, 2009).
Similarly, the debate on environmental and climate migration, initially domi-
nated by natural sciences (Massey et al., 2010; Morrissey, 2009), has been polar-
ized between environmental sciences and migration studies (Castles, 2011;
Gemenne, 2011b; Morrissey, 2009). Such a polarization has contributed to the
affirmation of oversimplified accounts of how ecological changes are interlinked
with mobility. For instance, a certain degree of scientism has fostered under-
standings of migration flows based on an assumed causality between ecological
stress and increased outmigration. However, such mechanistic and deterministic
Bettini and Andersson 167

ideas do not survive closer empirical scrutiny and appear naı̈ve in relation to
contemporary migration theories (Black, 2001; Jonsson, 2010; Massey et al.,
2010). The permanence of the so-called sedentary bias, which assumes that
populations do not move under normal conditions (e.g., when not exposed to
the pressure exercises by ecological factors; see Bakewell, 2008; de Haas, 2007;
Jonsson, 2010) is another example of such scientism.
This should not sound as an acquittal of the social sciences. In the case of
desertification, the social sciences have been accused of understanding dryland
environments through out-dated ecological theories (Herrmann & Hutchinson,
2005), and of underestimating the gravity of land degradation (Koning &
Smaling, 2005). In the case of CM, migration scholars and other social scientists
have been reluctant to acknowledge the growing impact that climate change will
exercise on migration (Gemenne, 2011a).
To summarize, despite substantial steps toward interdisciplinary perspectives
going beyond dichotomous nature–society divides (Andersson, Brogaard, &
Olsson, 2011), much remains to be done. There are still clear signs of scientism
in the desertification discourse (Bauer & Stringer, 2009). Similarly, the polariza-
tion between environmental and migration research has hampered the under-
standing of CM (Castles, 2011; Gemenne, 2011a).

Rescaling Globality
The poor appreciation of spatial and temporal scales is another trait of envir-
onmental myths replicated by mainstream discourses on desertification and CM.
With regard to spatial scales, the construction of the concerned phenomena as
global issues is less innocent than it may appear at a first glance. Obviously, both
CM and desertification have significance beyond local contexts. Nevertheless,
the global character of the narratives is problematic—at least in two ways: for
the detection and generalization of local specificities.
First, a global perspective implies a degree of abstraction which at times
obscures the microphysics of local phenomena and relations, leading to miscon-
ceptions, excessive simplifications, and methodological distortion in providing
quantitative estimates.
For desertification, the top-down vista of the GEM discourse clashes with the
contextual character of land degradation (Warren, 2002): A global lens proves
inadequate to detect and gauge the scattered patterns of soil degradation. In
Warren’s (2002) words, “land degradation probably always occurs at a fine
spatial scale, so that it is difficult to detect at district or country scales” (p. 9).
The global narratives on desertification have proven unable to mirror such
contextuality and in many cases “empirical observation illustrates the contrast
between the general desertification discourses and processes identified ‘on the
ground’” (Adger et al., 2001, p. 691). Also, in the CM case there are aspects
that can be understood only at a microlevel, where it is possible to detect the
168 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

site-specific perceptions, power relations, networks, and local declinations of

structural drivers that determine people’s decisions (not) to migrate.
Second, the global narratives hinge on problematic generalizations of loca-
lized bodies of evidence beyond the location where such degradation is registered
(Grainger, 2009; Stringer et al., 2007; Thomas & Middleton, 1994). For instance,
the generalization of the causal linkage between population growth and land
degradation clashes with empirical evidence. Indeed various studies have illu-
strated that increased population density can lead to an improvement of land
conditions (Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Mortimore, 1989; Stringer, 2009; Tiffen,
Mortimore, & Gichuki, 1994). However, such good examples do not confirm
that there is an improvement of conditions or a reversal of soil degradation
trends on larger scales (Koning & Smaling, 2005, p. 7), but warns against
generalizations.
For CM, generalization of a mobility pattern detected in a specific context is a
challenging enterprise (Campbell, 2010; Carr, 2005; Findley, 1994; Gray, 2009;
Massey et al., 2010; Mortreux & Barnett, 2009). Single explanatory models for
multilevel phenomena risk mixing actors, relations, and processes operating at
different levels (O’Lear & Diehl, 2007). The linkages between events, relations,
and processes with different resolutions (from site specific to global) therefore
have to be singled out and analyzed accurately.
This type of cross-scalar approach is crucial for gauging and understanding
the possible consequences of CM. For instance, different rates of mobility lead
to diverse outcomes and side effects. If one considers large flows of people over a
few decades, it makes an enormous difference if they move in huge lumps or
gradually. Also, the hypothesis that links CM to violent conflicts is often for-
mulated in ways that mix up entities and phenomena at different scales. The
conceived causality between microevents and macroimpacts lacks evidence
(Elliott, 2010; Hartmann, 2010; O’Lear & Diehl, 2007; Smith, 2007). In blunt
words, how does the displacement of vulnerable people escalate to violent con-
flicts on a regional scale?
To conclude, the reading of local cases through a global lens (either in one
sense or the other) is rarely legitimate, and it seems reasonable to put the burden
of the proof to the supporters of the general validity of a specific narrative.
Moving on to temporal scales, the time horizon as well as the pace of the
concerned phenomena cannot be neglected for generalization or simplification.
For desertification, a certain degree of land degradation in the short run does
not necessarily imply degradation in the long rung nor irreversible effects
(Warren, 2002). Desertification, desiccation, and drought are not the same
(Swift, 1996; Thomas, 1997). For instance, the literature on the Sahel region,
because of a series of misconceptions of the climatic system and precipitation
variability, has failed to differentiate long-term tendencies (secular rainfall
decrease, or desiccation), sporadic events (droughts), and cyclical fluctuations
(endemic rainfall variability; Hulme, 2001; Olsson, Eklundh, & Ardo, 2005;
Bettini and Andersson 169

Thomas & Middleton, 1994). Contrary to various interpretations based on

short-term rainfall statistics, climate variability, rather than stability, is the
norm in many areas (Hulme, 2001), as witnessed, for instance, by the reversal
of trends in vegetation cover registered in the Sahel (Olsson et al., 2005;
Tschakert, Sagoe, Ofori-Darko, & Codjoe, 2010). Such confusions in turn facili-
tate the misunderstanding of local responses to such rainfall fluctuations
(Forsyth, 2003; M. Mortimore, 1989; Thomas & Middleton, 1994).
For what concerns CM, the multiple temporalities in which the impacts
of climate change will deploy (comprising abrupt and slow-onset impacts, as
well as more frequent punctual extreme events; IPCC, 2007) influence and
configure different patterns of mobility. For instance, short and long distance
movements present dissimilar characteristic and follow distinct logics. One thing
is moving permanently to another country, another is cyclical or temporary
migration, another again a short-term displacement caused by a natural disas-
ter—they differ in driving factors, motivations, goals, social selectivity, and so
on (Black et al., 2008; Castles & Miller, 2009; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009;
Massey et al., 1998). Such peculiarities should be considered carefully when
generalizing a series of phenomena under such a broad term as climate
migration.

Missing the Target? Loose Definitions and Weak Policies

Definitional ambiguities are characteristic of both desertification and CM, and it
remains unclear whether desertification and CM are shorthands, blanket terms,
or actually individuate a set of equivalent situations or entities. Such definitional
matters are not (just) the object of sterile academic debates, but can also hamper
the incisiveness of a policy regime. As noted by Thomas (1997), it is critical for
donors and agencies to have “a scientifically credible and agreed definition”
because it matters for how the problem that is to be tackled is framed and
understood (p. 605). The lack of clear and common definitions may open up
for incoherent strategies and ineffective policies, or inaction.
Indeed, the concept of desertification, entailing oversimplifications and over-
generalizations, is in itself elusive and confusing (Warren & Olsson, 2003). As
pointed out by Dregne (1987), “desertification carried the connotation of disas-
ter and required no explanation. Practically everyone knew intuitively that
desertification was bad [. . .] Few persons ever asked what ‘it’ was” (p. 8). It is
imprecise whether it is a process or a state and as unclear are the pace and
reversibility of the concerned changes (Thomas & Middleton, 1994).
Moreover, given the imprecision with spatial and temporal scales that we dis-
cussed earlier, the concept of desertification neither indicates any exact phenom-
ena nor areas at risk. Indeed, the lack of clear definitions of what is under the
jurisdiction of CCD has contributed to the regime’s ineffectiveness by consum-
ing time and resources on definitional debates rather than on well-directed
170 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

action (Ortiz & Inomata, 2009). For instance, representatives from developing
and developed countries were split on how to define desertification—should it be
seen as a developmental or environmental issue? Implying what obligations for
whom? Applying only to Africa, or even Asia, or even Europe (Thomas, 1997)?
Such unresolved tensions on definitions led to an impasse that hampered the
potential for action: They slowed the convention’s implementation, decreased
the willingness to devote funding to CCD, and allowed recalcitrant parties to
delay the negotiations (Bauer & Stringer, 2009; Grainger, 2009).
In the case of climate migration, a multiplicity of terms and definitions blur
the debate (Doevenspeck, 2011). Terms such as refugee, internally displaced
person, or migrant configure disparate situations for the concerned and bear
diverse legal implications, but are often conflated (Kälin, 2010), thereby mixing
internal and international migration or movements characterized by different
degrees of voluntariness.5 Moreover, the fact that CM is often identified with
climate refugees is an extreme case of synecdoche: A small fraction (the “few”
individuals identifiable as climate refugees) representing the whole and poten-
tially hundreds of millions of people whose (im)mobility is going to be strongly
influenced by climate change.6
Designing the global regime for dealing with CM around the ambiguous
synecdoche of climate refugees would likely lead to policies unable to reach
the whole range of situations, only targeting those subjects identifiable as refu-
gees who represent a minority of the concerned populations.
Another possible drawback of definitional ambiguities appears in relation to
the politics of climate change and migration. First, in spite of concerned declar-
ations of intents, very little (in terms of actions and financial pledge) has been
done to tackle climate change. Second, migration is a highly controversial pol-
itical matter, and states are reluctant to give away their sovereignty over border
control and citizenship, even when humanitarian issues are at stake. Against this
backdrop, definitional ambiguities could easily represent an excuse for recalci-
trant actors to delay action and implementation of international agreements. In
effect, various scholars and activists argue against an extension of the Geneva
Convention to climate refugees on similar grounds. The risk is that extending the
convention to CM could, by making the legal definition refugee less stringent,
offer an opportunity for states to escape their duty of offering shelter to refugees
(McAdam, 2010). In general terms, these epistemological fallacies can create
crevices of ambiguity in which hidden and unresolved political conflicts may
hinder action.

Blueprints as Policy Outcomes

The definitional ambiguities and the generalizations embedded in myths have, in
conjunction, a strong influence on policymaking and implementation. By level-
ing out complexities, uncertainties, and local specificities, the ambiguity and
Bettini and Andersson 171

generalizations of myths tend to lead to the construction of oversimplified one-

fits-all solutions, which run a high risk of failure.
In the case of desertification, scholars have elucidated how universal and
oversimplified concepts have been translated into blueprint solutions for
varied local settings, which in many cases has resulted in ineffective policies
and funding allocation (Keeley & Scoones, 2000; Stringer, 2009; Stringer
et al., 2007; Tal & Cohen, 2007). The unsuccessful but still popular idea of
constructing green walls against the advancement of deserts (Andersson et al.,
2011) serves as an example. Also the failure to distinguish between desertifica-
tion and drought has contributed to suboptimal allocation of funds as the two
require very different measures—long-term structural policies and prompt relief
measures, respectively (Thomas, 1997).
The consequences of embodying such myths for the still-evolving CM dis-
course yet remain to be seen. Nevertheless, institutions and policies that over-
look the complexity and site specificity of CM have few chances to succeed.
Recent studies highlight the need to design policy responses that are tailor
suited to the specific social, cultural, and economic context in which they are
implemented to strengthen the ability to respond and adapt to change (Gemenne
& Magnan, 2011). Would the policy responses of a discourse grounded on the
myths discussed be able to do so? Moreover, the predominance of one-fits-all
policy models—for example, putting all the bets on the protection climate refu-
gees—would hamper the envisioning of more secular attitudes and multifaceted
approaches. This could, for instance, include seeing mobility as a means for
reducing vulnerability and anticipating adverse changes.7

Advancing Waves, Rising Tides: The Crisis Narrative

Typical for GEM discourses is also the embodiment of crisis narratives. Such
narratives signify the overwhelming evidence for large-scale ecological degrad-
ation into a “belief that we are on the verge of global catastrophe, placing strain
on a fragile earth” (Adger et al., 2001, pp. 708, 709). They thereby wave the
specter of escalating spirals able to tip an equilibrium state, that is, to destabilize
the whole earth system. Typical of such narratives is also the externalization of
the causes of the threat, often associated with an external enemy we should fight
against (Adger et al., 2001, pp. 708, 709; Bauer & Stringer, 2009; Forsyth, 2003;
Lambin et al., 2001).
Regarding desertification, UNEP translated sparse scientific evidence into a
cohesive crisis narrative supported by the idea that land degradation leads to the
breaking of an ecological equilibrium: After reaching a certain threshold, it
becomes irreversible and leads to socioecological collapse and to escalating
crises. Desertification was launched at UNCOD as an advancing threat, whereby
encroaching sand dunes were swallowing productive land (Forsyth, 2003;
Thomas & Middleton, 1994).
172 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

Many studies have provided empirical evidence that undermines the credibil-
ity of such narratives (Helldén, 1988, 1991; Herrmann & Hutchinson, 2005;
Lambin et al., 2001; Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Mortimore & Adams, 2001). To
be clear, what a growing number of studies put into question is not the existence
of large-scale problems affecting populations in dryland areas, but the produc-
tion of dramatic images about advancing deserts and the depiction of desertifi-
cation as a global environmental threat (Helldén & Tottrup, 2008). In spite of
their early established groundlessness and flaws (Helldén, 1988; Thomas &
Middleton, 1994) and their decreasing appeal within expert circuits and in cer-
tain policy contexts (Martello, 2004), such narratives and visualizations are still
present in the communication strategies of the dominant discourse.8
Similarly, the maximalist approach to CM mobilizes images of raising waves
of destitute victims on flight (Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Knight, 2009;
Williams, 2008; cfr. Bettini, 2013b; Hartmann, 2010). This is exemplified
by titles such as “Here Comes the Flood” (Bogardi & Warner, 2009),
“The Human Tide” (Christian Aid, 2007), or “The Human Tsunami”
(Knight, 2009). Inscribed in such narratives, we argue, is the idea that, after
certain thresholds, the impacts of climate change in a specific area will result in
the collapse of the socioecological system, leading to displacement of the popu-
lation. Central is the idea that the cumulative impacts of such local collapses will
ignite incontrollable domino effects that may destabilize entire regions global
consequences. However, a series of studies provide counterevidence of various
kinds to such narratives.9

Facts or Heroic Guesses? Limitations of Quantitative Estimates

Another significant feature of environmental myths is that many of the quanti-
tative estimates that back up the mainstream narratives become facts in the
vulgata popularis although they lack sound scientific grounds. This is evident
in the quantitative estimates of the occurrence of desertification and its popular-
ized visualizations: the uncertainties and methodological limitations acknowl-
edged by the original authors of such estimates disappeared in the accounts of
media and in the policy-making arenas while alternative views were often
ignored or marginalized (Swift, 1996).
For instance, the annual expansion of deserts (with figures such as x km of
productive land lost to the desert every year) has been estimated based on con-
tested methods and uncertain or unreliable data (Helldén, 1991; Thomas &
Middleton, 1994). The so-called Lamprey’s Line (used to quantify the march
of the Sahara) is exemplary. Despite its gross approximations and mistakes, the
Line became a fact with policy-prescriptive impacts (Helldén, 1991; Thomas &
Middleton, 1994; Warren & Olsson, 2003).
The (in)famous desertification maps compiled for UNCOD (UN, 1977) pro-
vide another example. They were based on informed guesses of the areas at
Bettini and Andersson 173

(theoretical) desertification risk but, despite their inaccuracy, they were popular-
ized as illustrations of the actual occurrence of desertification and became
emblematic images for promoting the fight against desertification (Bauer &
Stringer, 2009; Thomas, 1997; Thomas & Middleton, 1994). Also the UNEP-
commissioned GLASOD database and the related maps (Oldeman, Hakkeling,
& Sombroek, 1991) have been used to support the GEM narrative, although the
very authors openly acknowledged that GLASOD built more on qualitative
judgments and perceptions rather than on actual measurements (Bai, Dent,
Olsson, & Schaepman, 2008; Sonneveld & Dent, 2009).
These and other (ab)uses of quantitative estimates, crucial for supporting the
crisis narrative and the imaginaries of encroaching deserts, became popular
more because of political, institutional (Thompson & Warburton, 1985), or
cognitive reasons (effective for calling attention, clear, evocative, etc.) than on
the basis of solid scientific grounds and supporting evidence (Swift, 1996).
In the CM case, staggering numbers (foreseeing up to 1 billion climate refu-
gees by 2100) are widespread in academic publications, policy papers, political
statements, and NGOs reports, which treat them as facts (see, e.g., Biermann &
Boas, 2008; Christian Aid, 2007; Council of the European Union, 2008;
Environmental Justice Foundation, 2009; Knight, 2009; Stern, 2007). Given
the consensus among researchers that such quantitative estimates are unreliable
representing “nothing but rule of the thumb” (Piguet, 2010, p. 517), there is
reason to treat such numbers with great caution. First of all, most of the esti-
mates in the CM debate10 are connected to the work of Myers (Myers, 1993,
2005; Myers & Kent, 1995). Although the IPCC (2007) downsizes estimates such
as “at best, guesswork” (p. 365), they have gained credibility by circular refer-
encing: influential publications (usually not entitled to evaluate the numbers),
such as the Stern Review (2007), refer to the numbers that thereby increasingly
become legitimate facts. The widely cited estimates by Christian Aid (2007; in
turn related to Myers, 1993, 2005) got much echo through media resonance
rather than because of empirically grounded science. Also the famous security
hot-spots map (WBGU, 2008), often reproduced for visualizing the severity of
CM and emphasizing its security implications, in fact point out areas at risk, not
the actual occurrence of CM.
In sum, the popularity and legitimacy gained by these numbers has less to do
with their solidity than with other institutional, cognitive, or political dynamics.

Myths: Sticky Matters That Detach From Science

As anticipated earlier, myths are resilient also because they serve as core elem-
ents in the narratives of a discourse and abandoning them would produce dis-
locations that may threaten the very existence of the discourse. In more secular
terms, such myths and institutional facts become vital for guaranteeing the
maintenance of the credibility, saliency, and political momentum accumulated.
174 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

The resilience of myths partially explains the problematic role that scientific
research assumes in environmental discourses.
While sound science develops through iterative processes, undergoes paradig-
matic shifts, and maintains an inherently critical and reflexive attitude, dis-
courses built around myths tend to lock themselves into their simplified, clear-
cut narratives lacking solid scientific grounding. Consequently, they disconnect
from research. They also “politicize” science (Thomas, 1997, p. 603), by putting
improper demands on it (e.g., expecting blueprints and stable facts) or by mis-
appropriating scientific results (presenting them as stable facts and straight-
jackets to clear-cut solutions). The discourses may therefore cut themselves off
from scientific advancement as they are not able to integrate findings and alter-
native interpretations which would risk undermining their indisputable logic.
This facilitates the emergence of denial narratives in scientific and advocacy
communities, which in turn undermines the credibility of the discourse’s scien-
tific base.
The mythical ingredients fulfilled a crucial role in promoting the combat
against desertification. The initial popularity of the discourse in policy circuits
was favored by the ambiguity and elusiveness of the concept, and more rigorous
scientific input, including incorporation of critical perspectives and counternar-
rative findings “could puncture the ambiguity on which the political viability of
the CCD depends” (Grainger, 2009, p. 425). Indeed the discourse has suffered
from a lack of openness to scientific advancements, inability to deal with uncer-
tainty and complexity, and the poor use of empirical accounts. Such a discon-
nection from science is not an isolated case but permeated the emergence and
progress of the international regime relating to the UNCCD. While science had
a pivotal role in the early UNCOD phase, it later became sidelined (Bauer &
Stringer, 2009; Corell, 1999; Thomas, 1997). According to Thomas (1997), sci-
ence was somehow scapegoated for the failure of the PACD, because of its
inability to provide stable facts and simple solutions. Corell (1999) notes that
experts served more to provide legitimacy to the convention than they were able
to influence the outcomes of the negotiations. Moreover, at a time when strong
critiques to the orthodoxies had already emerged, the discourse proved not to be
open to such alternative views, basically not favoring the creation of new know-
ledge (Corell, 1999; Grainger, 2009).
The uneasiness in relation to science is also manifested in the difficulties that
the mainstream discourse has had in absorbing the emerging evidence of a
greening of the Sahel, which suggested alternative understandings of the region’s
climatic regime (Hulme, 2001; Olsson et al., 2005; Tschakert et al., 2010;
Warren, 2005). Such findings produced a deep dislocation in the discourse and
created further skepticism in the academic community as they challenged a set of
key assumptions and thus the very foundation of the discourse.
The isolation from emerging research and the dependence on the myths has
influenced the efficiency of the CCD framework. A review by the UN Joint
Bettini and Andersson 175

Inspection Unit, commissioned by CCD’s Conference of Parties, listed poor

scientific input among the causes of the weak efficacy of the convention (Ortiz
& Tang, 2005), relating, for instance, to poor institutional learning that con-
tributed to the ineffective implementation of CCD (Bauer & Stringer, 2009).
The lack of scientific rigor has also resulted in policies that may have
increased vulnerability of the people they were initially meant to support by
misdirecting interventions that would have better supported local needs and
obscuring structural conditions behind marginalization (Herrmann &
Hutchinson, 2005; Olsson, 1993). For instance, the (inaccurate) focus on the
practices of local populations as a main cause of land degradation resulted in
ineffective and misplaced policies, some of which have increased the vulnerabil-
ity to land degradation while worsening the livelihood conditions in places where
they were introduced (Leach & Mearns, 1996b; Stringer, 2009; Thomas &
Middleton, 1994).
Although the CM discourse has not yet been institutionalized nor undergone
a closure comparable to the desertification case, it also shows a similar tendency
to short circuit the relation between research and policy. Indeed, the myths that
we discussed above (such as mechanistic views on causation and incorrect gen-
eralizations, imprecise quantitative estimations, the CM-security-conflict nexus,
the focus on climate refugees) are repeatedly reproduced by politicians, NGOs,
and in media. Their success and permanence, despite they are all seriously ques-
tioned (when not discredited) by the latest research, indicate the risk that the
dominant CM repeats the mistakes of the desertification case. For instance, can
a discourse centered around the orthodoxy that ecological stress leads to dis-
placement integrate research findings that show how climate change will in many
cases reduce people’s mobility, instead of generating ulterior migratory flows (cf.
Barnett & Webber, 2010; Foresight, 2011)? Is there a risk that the institutional
inertia associated with a protocol on climate refugees would oppose such
integration?

Trading Credibility for Saliency

Both researchers and policy makers may benefit from a well functioning and
open dialog. The former can gain status, attention, funding, and the chance to
influence policy design, while scientific findings can provide a source of strong
legitimacy to policy proposals in favor of the latter (Grainger, 2009). A condi-
tion for this win–win situation is that the science translated into policy arenas
maintains a high standard and degree of credibility in the broader scientific
community. If not, its pivotal role as support for decision making and source
of legitimacy gets undermined (Bauer & Stringer, 2009).
In short, solid scientific grounds are vital for an environmental discourse to
hold a strong long-term position. The attractiveness, clarity, and resonance of
myths can, in the short term, provide saliency (in public, media, and research
176 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

milieus), but myths, also through the detachment from science that they create,
undermine the credibility of the whole discourse and in turn its ability to gain
political momentum and attract funding for policy development.
What happened in the case of desertification is a clear illustration of how the
isolation of a discourse from science contributes to its weakening. In the process
of elaborating PACD and CCD, the usage of attractive but poorly grounded
myths guaranteed attention and (a certain amount of) political momentum, but
at the expense of the solidity of the scientific basis.
According to Grainger (2009), policy makers side-lined emerging scientific
knowledge and alternative interpretations of desertification to preserve the pol-
itical viability of the desertification agreements. The complex dynamics and
bargaining that originated from the agendas and vested interests of various
involved actors (e.g., governments, international organization as UNEP and
the UNCCD apparatus, NGOs) in part explain that.
In reaction to the shortcomings of such myths, a strong denial discourse (see
Adger et al., 2001) emerged whereby alternative perspectives became dominant
within academia. As a consequence, the scientific grounds of the hegemonic
discourse lost its standing. For instance, the inability of CST to keep
UNCCD on solid science grounds has hampered UNCCD’s scientific reputa-
tion, authoritativeness, and impact (Bauer & Stringer, 2009). The questionable
scientific credibility of the desertification discourse has contributed not only to
the inefficacy of the implementation of UNCCD but also to the failure to attract
stable political attention and funding to a degree similar to what was achieved by
other environmental regimes (Conliffe, 2011; Ortiz & Inomata, 2009; Ortiz &
Tang, 2005; Thomas, 1997).
There are insights that this experience offers to the CM debate. Although
myths have contributed to the significant attention CM has gained, the question
is how long such political momentum will last, and to what extent dominant
narratives will undermine the credibility of CM discourses in the longer run. For
instance, can a regime on CM maintain credibility and attract funding if it is
structured around scary but scarcely grounded figures foreseeing hordes of hun-
dreds of millions climate refugees? The same can hold for a series of other
assumptions and explanations based on poor science: A regime embodying
such weaknesses would risk, similar to the desertification case, to lose credibility
not only among scientists but also in political contexts.

Conclusion: Beyond the Binary Reality/Myth

Our comparative study shows that the unripe discourse on CM and the mature
discourse on desertification share salient features. Drawing on a close reading of
existing literature, we have shown how certain features substantially contributed
to the failure of the desertification regime that did not live up to its ambitions. It
did not tackle land degradation, nor did it safeguard the political momentum
Bettini and Andersson 177

and media attention it had gained. Despite the lessons to be learned from the
desertification case on the risks connected to structuring a regime around envir-
onmental myths, the dominant CM discourse reproduces mistakes that prevent
success in the fight against desertification.
Political Ecology helped us avoid the two traps that worried us—so no
babies were thrown out with the bath water and the value of trusting science
was safeguarded. What lies beneath these difficulties is nevertheless a ticklish
and recurrent question for environmental debates: We once again stumbled
on the fracture between the real and the concepts/narratives/explanations
through which discourses make sense of it. Political Ecology strongly refuses
to neglect such a fracture or, even worse, to attempt to bridge it—two
approaches unfortunately as common as harmful within environmental pol-
itics. The search for alternative ways of narrating environmental issues, once
the nontransparency of the real is acknowledged, is not straightforward. For
instance, Leach and Mearns (1996a), in their seminal book on received wis-
doms and environmental blueprints, implicitly discuss the implications of such
fracture. Although they expose the oversimplifications, imprecisions, and
ambiguities that characterize received wisdoms (and myths), they recognize
that some form of simplification is inherent in the construction of any explan-
ation or narrative able to make intelligible a picture otherwise fragmented,
site specific, and too complex. Their conclusion seems to be that it is possible
to replace the criticized explanations/narratives with others of different con-
tents and implications, but not to wholly abandon simplified narratives. Their
solution consists of a democratization of expertise and public policy, inspired
by the acknowledgment of the conditionality of knowledge—which implies
seeing science/knowledge as “uphold[ing] different social and political com-
mitments and claims” (Leach & Mearns, 1996a, p. 31), or as relative to
different regimes of truth. Such a suggestion leaves us partially unsatisfied.
To substitute myths with narratives/explanations open to science and to avoid
Malthusian and colonial imaginaries, surely removes some of the most detest-
able traits of various environmental regimes. Nevertheless, it does not indi-
cate where to anchor environmental politics once such myths dissolve. The
fall of myths (and the acknowledgment of the fracture) drags down also the
faith in the possibility to ground environmental politics in an immediate
nature or in any science pretending to have a direct access to the real. The
question of where, outside the outside of nature, to find anchoring points for
positing environmental politics (thus going beyond critical deconstruction) is
still to be explored.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
178 Journal of Environment & Development 23(1)

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article: We are grateful for the financial support of the
research project Globalisation Informed by Sustainable Development (GLOBIS, contract
number 227055) and the Linnaeus Centre LUCID, funded by the Swedish Research
Council Formas.

Notes
1. We refer to discourses as entities constitutive of and determining social relations and
objects, rather than as merely argumentative or cognitive entities or processes (Laclau
& Mouffe, 2001). In this view, discourses therefore trespass the linguistic or argu-
mentative sphere.
2. According to recent interventions (Bettini, 2013a; Felli, 2012; Methmann & Oels, in
press), the maximalist discourse is losing further grounds, even in policy arenas, in
favor of a set of narratives stressing the role of migration as an adaptation strategy.
3. See the concept of discursive affinity developed by Hajer (1995).
4. The GEM discourse emphasized internal forcing among the causes of desertification,
stressing the impacts of wrong indigenous land use practices and of population
growth (Adger et al., 2001; Herrmann & Hutchinson, 2005; Sullivan, 2000; Warren
& Batterbury, 2004).
5. On this, see Barnett and Webber (2010), Bates (2002), and Biermann and Boas (2010).
6. The bottom line seems to be that the concept of climate refugees can embrace only a
minor part of the phenomena grouped under the term CM, as acknowledged even by
supporters of the term. Biermann and Boas (2010), although advocating for a gov-
ernance system for protecting climate refugees, acknowledge that such a term would
individuate only a minor share of the hundreds of millions people expected be hit by
the most severe impacts of climate change.
7. See on this Tacoli (2009), Barnett and Webber (2010), and Foresight (2011).
8. This can be exemplified by the Green Wall of Africa, a megaproject promoted by the
UNCCD and funded by the African Union and the European Union over a 10-year
period.
9. For instance, see Black et al. (2008), Castles (2011), and Gemenne (2011a).
10. For a schematic account of this point, see Foresight (2011) and Gemenne (2011c).

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Author Biographies
Giovanni Bettini is lecturer at Lancaster University, and holds a PhD in sustain-
ability Science from Lund University. His research revolves around global cli-
mate politics and environmental security, with a special focus on the issue of
climate-induced migration.

Elina Andersson is a PhD candidate in Sustainability Science. Her work explores

land degradation issues from a political ecology perspecive, and focuses specifi-
cally on the role of collective strategies in land management in a Ugandan
smallholder farming setting.