The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism

Author(s): Jaegwon Kim

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 63, No. 3
(Nov., 1989), pp. 31-47
Published by: American Philosophical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3130081 .
Accessed: 13/08/2013 17:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

American Philosophical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE MYTH OF
NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM

JaegwonKim
BrownUniversity

Presidential
Address
delivered theEighty-seventh
before Annual CentralDivision ofthe
Meeting
American inChicago,
Association
Philosophical April28, 1989.
Illinois,

I
Reductionism
ofall sortshasbeenoutoffavor formanyyears.Fewamongus would
nowseriously
entertainthepossibility
thatethicalexpressions orreducible
aredefinable,
in somebroader
sense,in terms or "naturalistic"
of"descriptive" I am not
expressions.
surehowmanyofus can remember, invividenough thatwasonce
detail,thequestion
debatedas to whether
vigorously so-called statements"
"physical-object are translatable
intostatements aboutthephenomenal aspectsofperceptual experience, whether theseare
conceivedas "sensedata" or as somemannerof"beingappearedto". You mayrecallthe
idea thatconceptsofscientific theoriesmustbe reduced,via "operational definitions",to
intersubjectively performable procedureswhose resultscan be ascertainedthrough
observation.Thissoundedgood-properly tough-minded andhard-nosed-but it didn'ttake
longforphilosophers to realizethata restrictive
and scientists of thissortwas
constraint
neitherenforceable nornecessary-not necessary to safeguardsciencefromthe threatof
metaphysics and pseudo-science.These reductionisms are now nothingbut museum
pieces.
In philosophy of mind,too,we havegonethrough manyreductionisms; someof these,
suchas logicalbehaviorism, have beendefunctformanyyears;others,mostnotablythe
psychoneural identitytheory,have beenrepeatedly declareddead; and stillothers,such
as versionsoffunctionalism,arestillhanging on, thoughwithvarying degreesofdifficulty.
Perhapsas a resultof the singularlack of successwithwhichour earlierreductionist
effortshave beenrewarded, a negativeimageseemsto haveemergedforreductionisms in
general. Manyof us have the feelingthatthereis something rigidand narrow-minded
about reductionist strategies.Reductionisms, we tendto feel,attemptto imposeon us
a monolithic, viewof the subjectmatter,the kindof cleansedand tidy
strait-jacketed
picturethat appeals to thoseobsessedwithorderliness and discipline. Perhapsthis

31

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
32 VOL.63,NO. 3
APAPROCEEDINGS,

impression has something to do withthereductionists' ritualincantations of sloganslike

"parsimony", "simplicity", "economy",and "unity",all of them virtuesof a rather
puritanicalsort. Perhaps,too,reductionisms are out ofstepwiththeintellectual styleof
our times:we striveforpatternsof life and thoughtthat are rich in diversity and
complexity and tolerantof disagreement and multiplicity. We are apt to thinkthatthe
realworldis a messyplace and resistsanysimplistic drive,especially one carriedon from
the armchair, towardsimplification and unification.In fact,the word"reductionism"
seems by now to have acquireda negative,faintlydisreputableflavor-atleast in
philosophy of mind. Beinga reductionist is a bitlikebeinga logicalpositivist or member
of the Old Left-anaura of doctrinaire naivetehangsoversuch a person.
At anyrate,reductionism in the mind-body problemhas been out of fashionfortwo
decades; it has been about that long since the unexpectedly early demise of the
psychoneural identity theory, a doctrineadvertised byitsproponents as theone thatwas
in tune with a worldview adequatelyinformed by the best contemporary science.
Surprisingly,the abandonment ofpsychoneural reductionism has notled to a resurgence
ofdualism.What is curious,at leastin termsoftheexpectations set bytheearliermind-
body debates,is the fact that thosewho renouncedreductionism have stayedwith
physicalism. The distinctive feature ofthemind-body theories thathavesprungup in the
wakeof theidentity theoryis thebelief,or hope,thatone can be an honest-to-goodness
withoutat thesametimebeinga reductionist.
physicalist In fact,a correctand realistic
viewof scienceas it is practicedwillshowus, thenew physicalists assureus, thatas an
accountof the"cross-level" relationbetweentheories, classicalreductionism is untenable
everywhere, notjust about thepsychophysical relation.The leadingidea in all thishas
been the thoughtthatwe can assuageour physicalist qualmsbyembracing "ontological
physicalism",1 the claim that all that exists
in spacetime is physical,but, at the sametime,
accept"property dualism",a dualismaboutpsychological and physicalattributes, insisting
thatpsychological conceptsor properties forman irreducible, autonomousdomain. The
issueI wantto explorehereis whether or not a robustphysicalist can, consistently and
swearoffreductionism-that
plausibly, is,whether or nota substantial formofphysicalism
can be combinedwiththe rejectionof psychophysical reduction.
To laymycardson thetable,I willarguethata middle-of-the roadpositionof thesort
just described is not available. Morespecifically, I willclaimthata physicalist has only
twogenuineoptions,eliminativism and reductionism. That is, ifyou have alreadymade
yourcommitment to a versionof physicalism worthy of the name,you mustaccept the
reducibilityof the psychological to the physical, or, failingthat,you mustconsiderthe
psychological as falling outsideyourphysicalistically respectable ontology.Of course,you
mightdecideto reconsider yourcommitment to physicalism; but I willnothereconsider
whatdualistalternatives theremightbe whichare stilllive optionsforus. So if I am
right,thechoiceswe faceconcerning themind-body problemare ratherstark:thereare
three-dualism, reductionism, and eliminativism.

1. Throughout
I willbe using"physicalism" (andtheircog-
and"materialism"
nates)interchangeably;
similarly, and"psychological".
"mental"

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES 33

II

Pressuresfromtwosourceshave been largelyresponsible, I believe,forthe declineof

reductionism in philosophyof mind,a declinethatbeganin the late 1960's. One was
Donald Davidson's"anomalism of themental",thedoctrinethatthereare no preciseor
strictlaws about mentalevents.2Accordingto Davidson,the mentalis anomalousnot
onlyin thatthereare no laws relatingmentaleventsto othermentaleventsbut none
relatingthemto physical eventseither.Thismeantthatno nomological linkagesbetween
thementaland thephysicalwereavailableto enablethereduction of the former to the
latter. The secondantireductionistpressure came froma lineof argument basedon the
phenomenon of "multiplerealizability"
ofmentalstateswhichHilaryPutnamforcefully
broughtto philosophicalattention,claimingthat it directlyrefutedthe reductive
materialism of Smartand Feigl.3Jerry Fodorand othershave developedthisidea as a
generalantireductionistargument, advancingtheclaimthatthe "specialsciences",such
as psychology,sociology,and economics,are in generalirreducibleto physicaltheory,and
thatreductive materialism,or "typeidentity is generally
theory", falseas a theoryabout
science.4Earlierphysicalistswouldhave regarded the irreducibility
as evidenceshowing
the mentalto be beyondthe pale of a scientificallyrespectable ontology;thatis, they
would have inferred eliminativismfromthe irreducibility. This in fact was Quine's
responseto the problemof intentionality.5 But not forthe latter-day for
physicalists:
them,the irreducibility only meant that psychology, and otherspecial sciences,are
"autonomous", and thata physicalist
can,in consistency and goodconscience,acceptthe
existenceof theseisolatedautonomousdomainswithinscience.
Let us beginwithDavidson. As noted,the anomalismof thementalcan be thought
of as theconjunctionoftwoclaims:first, theclaimthatthereare no purelypsychological
laws,thatis, laws connecting eventswithotherpsychological
psychological events,and
second,the claimthatthereare no lawsconnecting psychological events; withphysical
events. The secondclaim,whichwe mightcall "psychophysical anomalism",is what

2. See Davidson,
"MentalEvents"in EssaysonActions
andEvents(Oxford:
Oxford Press,1980). Thispaperwasfirst
University in 1970.
published

3. See Putnam, "TheNatureofMentalStates"inMind,Language,

andReality:
Philosophical vol.II (Cambridge:
Papers, Cambridge Press,1975). This
University
article
wasfirst
publishedin 1967.

4. Jerry or theDisunity
Fodor,"SpecialSciences, ofScienceas a Working
Hypothesis",
Synthese28 (1974):97-115. See alsoRichard Boyd,"Materialism
without
Reductionism:WhatPhysicalism Does NotEntail",ReadingsinPhilosophy
ofPsychology,
ed. Ned Block(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress,1980).
5. As it is theresponse
ofsomerecent see,e.g.,PaulChurchland,
eliminativists;
"Eliminative
MaterialismandthePropositional Journal
Attitudes", 78
ofPhilosophy
(1981):67-90.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
34 APA PROCEEDINGS,VOL. 63,NO. 3

underlies Davidson's argument against reductionism. The argument is simple anddirect:

the demiseof analytical behaviorism scotchedthe idea thatthe mentalcould be
definitionally reducedto thephysical.Further, psychophysicalanomalism showsthata
nomological reductionofthemental isn'tin theoffing either.The implicit assumption
aboutreduction inthisargument is onethatis widely shared:reduction ofonetheory to
anotherrequires thederivation of thelawsof thereducedtheory fromthoseof the
reducer, and forthisto be possible, termsof the firsttheory mustbe appropriately
connected via "bridge withthoseofthesecond.Andthebridge
principles", principles
mustbe either conceptuallyunderwritten as definitions,
orelseexpress empiricallawlike
correlations laws"or"theoretical
("bridge identities").6
Thisis all pretty straightforward. Whatwasstriking was thefurther philosophical
conclusions Davidson inferredfrom theseconsiderations. Farfrom deriving somesortof
dualism, he usedthemto arguefora materialist monism.His argument is wellknown,
butitbearsrepeating. Mentalevents, Davidson observed,enterintocausalrelations with
physical events.7Butcausalrelations mustbe backedbylaws;thatis,causalrelations
between individual eventsmustinstantiate lawfulregularities.Sincethereareno laws
aboutthe mental,eitherpsychophysical or purely anycausalrelation
psychological,
involving a mental eventmustinstantiate a physicallaw,from whichit follows thatthe
mentaleventhasa physical description, orfallsundera physical eventkind.Fromthis
itfurther follows thattheeventis a physical event.Foran eventisphysical (ormental)
ifit fallsundera physical eventkind(ora mental eventkind).
It follows thenthatall eventsarephysical events-on theassumption thatevery event
entersintoat leastonecausalrelation.Thisassumption seemsentirely unproblematic,
forit onlyleavesouteventsthatarebothcauseless Ifthereareanysuch
andeffectless.
events, it is difficult
to see howtheirexistence can be knownto us; I believewe could
safely ignorethem.So imagine a Davidsonian universeofevents:all theseeventsare
physical events,and someof themare also mental.Thatis to say,all eventshave
physical properties,and somehave mentalproperties as well. Such is Davidson's
celebrated "anomalous monism".
Davidson's ontology individual
recognizes eventsas spatiotemporalparticulars.Andthe
principal structureovertheseeventsis causalstructure; thenetwork ofcausalrelations
thatinterconnect eventsis whatgivesintelligible structureto thisuniverse of events.
What roledoes mentality play,on Davidson'sanomalousmonism, in shapingthis
structure? The answer: Nonewhatever.
Foranomalous monism entailsthis:theverysamenetwork ofcausalrelations would
obtainin Davidson's worldifyouwereto redistribute mentalproperties overitsevents
anywayyoulike;youwouldnotdisturb a singlecausalrelation ifyourandomly and

6. The classicsourceon reduction ofScience(New

is ErnestNagel,The Structure
York:Harcourt,Brace & World,1961), ch. 11.

7. Actuallythe argument can proceedwitha weakerpremiseto the effectthat

eitherwithphysicaleventsor withother
mentaleventsenterintocausal relations,
mentalevents.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 35

arbitrarily
reassigned mental toevents,
properties orevenremoved mentality from
entirely
theworld.The factis thatunderDavidson's anomalous monism, mentality doesno
causalwork.Remember: on anomalous monism, events arecausesoreffects onlyas they
instantiatephysical laws,andthismeansthatanevent's mental make
properties nocausal
difference.Andtosuppose thataltering an event's
mental propertieswouldalsoalterits
physicalproperties andthereby affectitscausalrelationsis tosuppose thatpsychophysical
anomalism, a cardinal tenetofanomalous monism, is false.8
Anomalous monism, therefore, permitsmentalproperties no causalrole,notevenin
relationtoothermental properties. Whatdoesnocausalworkdoesnoexplanatory work
either;itmayas wellnotbe there-it's difficult
tosee howwecouldmissit ifit weren't
thereat all. Thatthere areinthisworld justthesemental events withjustthesemental
characteristics
is something thatmakesnocausaldifference to anything.On anomalous
monism, thatan eventfallsundera givenmental kindis a causally irrelevantfact;it is
alsosomething thatis entirely in causalterms.Givenall this,it'sdifficult
inexplicable
to see whatpointthereis in recognizing mentalityas a feature oftheworld.I believe
thatifwe pushanomalous monism thisway,wewillfindthatit is a doctrine virtually
indistinguishablefrom outright eliminativism.
Thus,whatwe see is this:anomalous monism, ratherthangivingus a formof
nonreductive physicalism, is essentially
a form ofeliminativism. Unlikeeliminativism, it
allowsmentality toexist;butmentality isgivenno useful workanditsoccurrence is left
wholly mysterious andcausally inexplicable.Thisdoesn't strike meas a form ofexistence
worth having.In thisrespect, anomalous monism doesrather poorlyevenincomparison
withepiphenomenalism as a realism aboutthemental.Epiphenomenalism givesthe
mentala placein thecausalnetwork ofevents;themindis givena well-defined place,
ifnotan activerole,in thecausalstructure oftheworld.
Theseobservations highlight theimportance ofproperties;foritisinterms ofproperties
andtheirinterrelations thatwe makesenseofcertain concepts thatarecrucialin this
context,suchas law,causality, explanation,anddependence. Thus,theanomalousness
ofmental properties hasfar-reaching consequences within Davidson's framework: within
it,anomalous properties arecausally andexplanatorily impotent, andit is doubtful that
theycan haveanyusefulroleat all. The upshotis thatwe don'tgetin Davidson's

8. Davidsonsaysin "MentalEvents"thathe believesin the "supervenience" of

the mentalon the physical, and thisdoes introducea constrainton thedistributionof
physicalpropertieswhenthedistribution of mentalproperties
is altered. This,
however, does not detractsubstantivelyfromthepointbeingmadehere. For one, it
remainstrue,on the notionof supervenience Davidsonfavors(whichcorresponds to
"weaksupervenience"; see his "Replyto EssaysX-XII"in Essayson Davidson:Actions
and Events,ed. BruceVermazenand MerrillB. Hintikka(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1985)), thatthe removalof all mentalpropertiesfromeventsof thisworld
wouldhave no consequencewhateveron howphysicalproperties are distributedover
them. For another,thesupervenience of the mentalis bestregarded as an indepen-
dentthesis,and mypresentremarks onlyconcernthe implications of anomalous
monism.I considerthe supervenience viewbelowin IV.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
36 APA PROCEEDINGS, VOL. 63, NO. 3

anomalousmonisma plausibleformof nonreductive his anomalousmonism

physicalism;
comesperilously
close to eliminativism.9

Ill

(or "compositionalplasticity")of
Let us now turn to the multiplerealizability
eventsand itsimplications
psychological forpsychophysicalreduction.In a passagethat
impacton the discussions
turnedout to have a profound of the mind-body problem,
Putnamwrote:10

Considerwhatthebrain-state theoristhas to do to makegoodhis claims. He has to

specifya physical-chemicalstatesuchthatanyorganism (notjusta mammal)is in pain
ifand onlyif (a) it possessesa brainof a suitablephysical-chemical structure;and (b)
itsbrainis in thatphysical-chemical state. Thismeansthatthephysical-chemical state
in questionmustbe a possiblestateofa mammalian brain,a mollusc's
brain,a reptilian
brain(octopusesare mollusca,and certainly feelpain),etc. At thesame time,it must
not be a possible(physically possible)state of the brainof any physically possible
creaturethat cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found,it must be
nomologically certainthatit willalso be a stateof thebrainofanyextraterrestrial life
thatmaybe foundthatwillbe capableof feelingpain beforewe can even entertain
the supposition thatit maybe pain.

This paragraph helpedbringon an unexpectedly earlydemiseofthepsychoneuralidentity

theory ofSmartand Feigland inspired a newtheory which
of themental,functionalism,
positionon thenatureof the
is stillthemostinfluential
in spiteofitsassorteddifficulties
mental.11Putnam'sbasic pointis thatany psychological event-typecan be "physically
or "implemented"
realized"or "instantiated" diverseways,depending
in endlessly on the
natureof the organismor systeminvolved,and that thismakesit
physical-biological

9. Davidson'soverallviewsof the mentalare richerand morecomplexthanthe

presentdiscussionmightseemto indicate. I believethattheycontainsomedistinctly
dualisticelements;fora discussionof thisaspectof Davidson,see my"Psychophysical
in
Laws" Ernest LePore and BrianMcLaughlin, on
eds.,Actionsand Events:Perspectives
thePhilosophyof Donald Davidson(Oxford:Blackwell,1984). There have been some
interestingrecentattempts,whichI cannotdiscusshere,to reconcileanomalous
monismwiththe possibility of mentalcausation;see, e.g.,ErnestLePoreand Barry
Loewer, "Mind Matters",
Journalof Philosophy84 (1987): 630-642; BrianMcLaughlin,
"TypeEpiphenomenalism, TypeDualism, and theCausal Priorityof the Physical",
forthcoming; Terence Horgan, "Mental Quasation",forthcoming.

10. Putnam,"The Natureof MentalStates".

and
see his Representation
11. Putnamhimselfhas abandonedfunctionalism;
MIT Press,1988), chs. 5 and 6.
Reality(Cambridge:

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 37

highlyimplausible toexpecttheeventtocorrelate uniformlywith, andthusbeidentifiable

with,some"single" type of neuralor physical state. This idea has beenusedbyFodor
to formulate a general antireductionist whose
argument, gist can be quickly summarized.
As we have seen,reduction of one theory to anotheris thought to requirethe
derivation of thelawsof thereduced theory fromthelawsof thereducer via "bridge
laws". If a predicate of the theory beingreducedhas a nomologically coextensive
predicate in thereducing theory,theuniversally quantified biconditional connecting the
twopredicates willbe available foruseas a bridge law.12Letus saythatthevocabulary
ofthereduced theory is "stronglyconnected" withthatofthereducing theoryifsucha
biconditional bridge lawcorrelates eachpredicate oftheformer witha predicate of the
latter.It is clearthatthecondition ofstrong connectibilityguarantees reduction (on the
assumption thatthetheory beingreduced is a true theory). For it would enable us to
rewritebasiclawsof thetargettheory in thevocabulary of thereducer, using these
biconditional lawsin effect as definitions.Eithertheserewrites arederivable from the
lawsofthereducing theory, orelsetheycan be addedas additional basiclaws. In the
lattercase, the reducertheory has beenexpanded; but thatdoes not diminish the
ontological andconceptual import ofthereductive procedure.
But whatmultiple realizationputsin doubt,according to the antireductionist,is
preciselythestrong connectibilityofmental predicates physical-neural
vis.-Avis predicates.
Foranypsychological property, thereis inprinciple an endless sequence ofnomologically
possible
physical statessuchthat,though eachofthem"realizes" or"implements" it,none
ofthemwillbyitself be coextensive withit. Whycan'twe takethedisjunction ofthese
physicalstatesas thephysical coextensionofthementalproperty? Putnamsomewhat
disdainfully dismisses thismove,sayingonlythat"thisdoes not have to be taken
seriously".13 I thinktherearesomecomplex issueshereaboutdisjunctive predicatesvs.
disjunctiveproperties, complexity ofpredicates vs.thatofproperties, etc.;buttheseare
likelyto be contentious issuesthatcan onlydistract us at present.14 So letus go along
withPutnamhereand disregard the disjunctive solutionto themultiple realization
problem.

12. Therearesomecomplex logicalandontological

detailswe areleavingout
here. See,fordetails,
Robert
L. Causey,UnityofScience(Dordrecht:
Reidel,1977).
13. "TheNatureofMentalStates",
p. 437.
14. Notealsothatderivational
reductiondoesnotrequirestrongconnectibility;
set
any ofbridge laws,ofwhatever form andstrength,
willdo as longas it enablesthe
derivation.
required Butthisobviously dependson thestrengthofthetwotheories
andthereseemsto be littleofinterest
involved, thatis sufficiently
generalto say
aboutthis.Therearealsophilosophicalconsiderations
forthinkingthatbiconditionals
andattribute
identities
areimportant in reduction.
Cf.Lawrence Sklar,"Typesof
Inter-Theoretic British
Reduction", Journal the
for PhilosophyofScience 18 (1967): 109-
124.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
38 APA PROCEEDINGS,VOL. 63, NO. 3

In rejecting thedisjunction move,however, Putnamappearsto be assuming this:a

physicalstatethatrealizes a mental eventisat leastnomologicallysufficientforit. Forifthis
assumption wererejected, thedisjunction movecouldn't evengetstarted.Thisgenerates
lawsof theform "Pi -#M",whereM is a mentalstateand Pi is a physical statethat
realizesit. Thus,wherethereis multiple theremustbe psychophysical
realization, laws,
each specifying a physical stateas nomologically sufficient forthegivenmentalstate.
Moreover, Putnam's choiceofexamples inthequotation above,whichareeither biological
speciesor determinate typesofphysical structures and histalkof
("extraterrestrials"),
"species-specificity"and"species-independence"'15 suggest thathe is thinking oflawsofa
somewhat stronger form, "Si-,(M +-. Pi)",which, relativetospeciesorstructureSi,specifies
a physical state,Pi,as bothnecessary andsufficientfortheoccurrence ofmentalstateM.
A lawofthisform statesthatanyorganism orsystem, belongingto a certain species,is
suchthatit has thegivenmentalproperty at a timeifand onlyifit is in a certain
specifiedphysical stateat thattime. We maycall lawsof thisform"species-specific
biconditional laws.".
In ordertogenerate lawsofthiskind,biological speciesmayturnouttobe toowide;
individual differencesin thelocalization ofpsychological functions in thebrainarewell
known.Moreover, giventhephenomena oflearning andmaturation, tothebrain,
injuries
and thelike,theneuralstructure thatsubserves a psychological stateor function may
changeforan individual overitslifetime. Whatisimportant thenis thattheselawsare
relativetophysical-biological structure-types,
although forsimplicity I willcontinue toput
thematter interms ofspecies.Thesubstantive theoretical assumption hereis thebelief
thatforeachpsychological statetherearephysical-biological structure types,at a certain
level of description or specification, thatgenerate laws of thisform. I thinkan
assumption ofthiskindis madebymostphilosophers whospeakofmultiple realizations
ofpsychological states,anditisin facta plausible assumption fora physicalist tomake.16
Moreover, suchan assumption seemsessential to theveryideaofa physical realization;
whatelsecould"physical realization"
mean?
So whatI amsaying is this:themultiple realization argument perhaps showsthatthe
strong connectibility of mentalproperties vis-A-visphysical properties doesnotobtain:
however, itpresupposes thatspecies-specific
strong doeshold.Merely
connectibility todefeat
theantireductionist argument, I neednotmakethissecondclaim;all I needistheweaker
claimthatthephenomenon ofmultiple realization withthespecies-specific
is consistent
strong connectibility,andit seemsto methatthatis plainly true.
Thepointofall thisis thattheavailability ofspecies-specificbiconditional lawslinking
themental withthephysical breathes into
newlife psychophysical reductionism. Unlike

15. "TheNatureofMentalStates",
p. 437.
16. Ned Blocksays,"Mostfunctionalistsarewilling to allow. . . thatforeach
of
type pain-feelingorganism, is
there (perhaps)a single type ofphysical statethat
painin thattypeoforganism",
realizes in his"Introduction:Whatis Functionalism?" in
Block,ed.,ReadingsinPhilosophy
ofPsychology,vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press,1980),p. 172. Sucha lawwouldhaveexactly theform underdiscussion.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 39

species-independentlaws,theselawscannotbuyus a uniform or globalreductionof

psychology,a reductionofevery stateto a uniform
psychological base
physical-biological
acrossallactualandpossible however,
organisms; theselawswillbuyusa seriesofspecies-
orlocalreductions.
specific Ifwe had a lawof thisformforeach psychological state-
typeforhumans, wewouldhavea physical reductionofhumanpsychology; thisreduction
wouldtell us how humanpsychology is physically implemented, how the causal
connections betweenour psychologicaleventsand processes workat the physical-
level,whatbiological
biological subsystemssubserveourcognitivecapacitiesandfunctions,
and so forth.This is reduction in a full-blownsense,exceptthatit is limitedto
individuals
sharinga certain structure.
physical-biological I believe"localreductions"
of
thissortare theruleratherthantheexceptionin all ofscience,notjust in psychology.17
In any case, this is a plausiblepictureof what in fact goes on in neurobiology,
physiological
psychologyand cognitive neuroscience.And it seemsto me thatanyrobust
mustexpect,and demand,thepossibility
physicalist oflocal reductions of psychology just
in thissense.18
Thus,theconclusionwe mustdrawis thatthemultiple of thementalhas
realizability
no antireductionist ofgreatsignificance;
implications on thecontrary, it entails,or at least
is consistent
with,thelocal reducibility
ofpsychology,local relativeto speciesor physical
Ifpsychological
structure-types. statesaremultiply thatonlymeansthatwe shall
realized,
have multiplelocal reductionsof psychology.The multiplerealizationargument, if it
works,showsthata globalreduction is not in theoffing;
however,local reductions are
reductionenough,by any reasonablescientificstandardsand in theirphilosophical
implications.

IV
Somehavelookedtotheideaof"supervenience" fora formulation
ofphysicalismthat
is freeofreductionist
commitments. The promiseofsuperveniencein thisareaappears
tohavebeenbased,at leastinpart,on thehistorical
circumstancethatsomeprominent
ethicaltheorists,
suchas G.E.MooreandR.M.Hare,whoconstructed classicarguments
againstnaturalistic
reductionism
in ethics,at thesametimeheldtheviewthatmoral
are"supervenient"
properties ornaturalistic
upondescriptive So whynotthink
properties.
oftherelationbetween andphysical
psychological inanalogy
properties withtherelation,
as conceived
bytheseethicaltheorists,
between moralanddescriptive Ineach
properties?
instance,thesupervenient are in somesubstantive
properties sensedependent on, or
determinedby,their baseproperties
subvenient, andyet,itis hoped,
irreducible
to them.

17. See on thispointBerent

Enc,"InDefense
oftheIdentity
Theory", of
Journal
80 (1983):279-98.
Philosophy
18. Thispoint,andsomerelated areelaborated
points, in my"Disunity
of
as a Working
Psychology Hypothesis?",
forthcoming.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
40 APA PROCEEDINGS,VOL. 63, NO. 3

Thiswasprecisely
thelineofthinking tohaveprompted
thatappears Davidsontoinject
ofthemind-body
intothediscussion
supervenience problem.He wrote:19

Although thepositionI describe

deniestherearepsychophysicallaws,it is consistent
withtheviewthatmental areinsomesensedependent,
characteristics orsupervenient,
on physical Suchsupervenience
characteristics. might be takento meanthatthere
cannotbe twoeventsalikein all physical respects in somemental
but differing
orthatanobjectcannotalterinsomemental
respects, respectwithoutalteringinsome
physical
respect.Dependence orsupervenienceofthiskinddoesnotentailreducibility
throughlawordefinition:ifitdid,wecouldreduce todescriptive,
moralproperties and
thisthereis goodreasonto believecannotbe done...

Although Davidson himselfdidnotpursue thisideafurther,

many otherphilosophers have
triedto workthissuggestive ideaintoa viableform ofnonreductive materialism.
The central problem inimplementing Davidson'ssuggestionhasbeenthatofdefining
a supervenience relation thatwillfillthetwinrequirementshesetforth: first,therelation
mustbe nonreductive; thatis,a givendomaincan be supervenient on another without
beingreducible to it. Second,therelation mustbe one of dependence: if a domain
supervenes on another, theremustbe a sturdy sensein whichthefirst is dependenton
thesecond, or theseconddetermines thefirst.Butithasnotbeeneasyto findsucha
relation. The maindifficulty has been this:if a relationis weak enoughto be
nonreductive, ittendstobe tooweaktoserveas a dependence relation;
conversely, when
a relationisstrong enough togiveusdependence, ittendstobe toostrong-strong enough
to imply reducibility.
I willnotrehearse herethewellknownarguments proandcon concerning various
supervenience relationsthathavebeenproposed.I willinsteadfocuson one superve-
niencerelation thathasseemedto severalphilosophers20
ly toholdthemostpromise as a nonreductive dependencyrelation,
viz.,"globalsuperve-
nience".Thegeneric ideaofsupervenience is thatthingsthatareindiscernible inrespect
of the"base"(or"subvenient") cannotdiffer
properties in respectof thesupervenient

in Davidson,
19. "MentalEvents", andEvents,
EssaysonActions p. 214.

20. IncludingTerenceHorganin his"Supervenience andMicrophysics",

Pacific
63
Quarterly (1982):
Philosophical 29-43; JohnHaugelandin "Weak Supervenience",
American Quarterly
Philosophical 19 (1982):93.103;JohnPostin TheFacesofExistence
Press,1987);andBradford
(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Petrie,"GlobalSupervenience
andReduction", and
Philosophy PhenomenologicalResearch
48 (1987): 119-130.The
notionofdetermination
model-theoretic workedoutbyGeoffrey HellmanandFrank
Thompson, in "Physicalism:
Ontology, andReduction",
Determination, of
Journal
72 (1975):551-564,is closely
Philosophy to globalsupervenience.
related

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 41

Globalsupervenience
properties. appliesthisconsideration
to "worlds",
givingus the
formulation
following ofpsychophysical
supervenience:
Worldsthatare indiscernible
in all physical
respectsare indiscernible
in mental
in fact,physically
respects; worlds
indiscernible areone andthesameworld.

Thus,anyworldthatis justlikethisworldin all physical detailsmustbe justlikeit in

all psychologicalrespectsas well. Thisrelation ofsupervenience is appropriatelycalled
"global"in thatworlds ratherthanindividuals within worlds arecompared fordiscern-
orindiscernibility
ibility in regardtosetsofproperties. Whatis it fortwoworlds to be
physically,or mentally, indiscernible? For simplicity let us assumethatthe same
individualsexistin all theworlds:21We maythensaythattwoworlds areindiscernible
withrespectto a set of properties just in case theseproperties are distributed over
individualsin thesamewayin thetwoworlds.
It canbe shown that,as hoped,theglobalsupervenience ofthemental on thephysical
does not entailtheexistence of psychophysical laws;22thus,globalsupervenience is
consistentwiththenomological irreducibilityofthementalto thephysical.The only
questionthenis whether it yieldsan appropriate relationof dependency between the
mentalandthephysical, one thatis strong enoughto qualify it as a physicalism. The
answer, I willargue,is in thenegative.
We maybeginbyobserving thattheglobalsupervenience ofthementalpermits the
following:Imagine a worldthatdiffers from theactualworldin someminute physical
detail.We maysuppose thatin thatworldonelonehydrogen atomsomewhere indeep
spaceis slightly displaced relative
to itsposition in thisworld.Thisworldwithone
wayward hydrogen atomcould,consistently withtheglobalsupervenience ofthemental,
be as differentas youpleasefrom theactualworldinanymentalrespect (thus,in that
worldnothing manifests mentality,ormentality is radicallyredistributed inotherways).
The existence ofsucha worldandothersimilarly aberrant worlds doesnotviolatethe
constraintsofglobalsupervenience; sincetheyarenotphysically indiscernible from the
actualworld, theycould,underglobalsupervenience, differradically from thisworldin
psychologicalcharacteristics.23

21. Even withthissimplifying

assumptioncertaincomplications arise;however,
we maydisregardthemforthe presentpurposes.For furtherdetailssee my"Superve-
nienceforMultipleDomains",Philosophical
Topics16 (1988): 129-150.

22. At leastnot in a straightforward

way. See my"'Strong'and 'Global'
Supervenience Revisited", and Research
Philosophy Phenomenological 48 (1987): 315-
326.

23. This particular can be largelymetbyformulating

difficulty globalsuperve-
niencein termsof similarity
betweenworldsratherthanindiscemibility.
See my
"'Strong'and 'Global'SupervenienceRevisited".

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
42 APA PROCEEDINGS, VOL. 63, NO. 3

Ifthatdoesn'tconvinceyouoftheweaknessofglobalsupervenience as a determination
or dependency relation,considerthis:it is consistentwithglobalsupervenience forthere
to be twoorganisms in ouractualworldwhich,thoughwhollyindiscernible physically,are
radically different
in mentalrespects(say,yourmolecule-for-molecule duplicateis totally
lackingin mentality).This is consistent withglobalsupervenience becausetheremight
be no otherpossibleworldthatis just like thisone physically and yetdiffering in some
mentalrespect.24
It seemsto me thatindiscernibility considerations at thegloballevel,involving whole
worlds,are just too coarseto giveus thekindof dependency relationwe shoulddemand
ifthementalis trulydependent on thephysical.Likeit or not,we treatindividuals, and
perhapsalso aggregates ofindividuals smallerthantotalworlds, as psychological units,and
it seemsto me thatif psychophysical determination or dependencemeansanything, it
oughtto mean thatthe psychological natureof each such unitis whollydetermined by
itsphysicalnature. That is,dependency or determination mustholdat thelocal as well
as the globallevel.
Moreover, talkofwholeworldsin thisconnection, unlessit is anchoredin determina-
tiverelations obtaining content;it is difficult
at thelocal level,has littleverifiable to see
how therecan be empirical evidencefortheglobalsupervenience thesisthatis notbased
in evidenceabout specificpsychophysical dependencies-dependencies and correlations
betweenspecificpsychological and physicalproperties.In fact,it seemsto me thatwe
mustlook to local dependencies foran explanation of globalsupervenience as well as its
evidence.Whyis it thecase thatno twoworldscan existthatareindiscernible physically
and yetdiscernible psychologically? Or whyis it thecase that"physical truthsdetermine
as somepreferto put it? I thinkthisis a legitimate
all the truths,"25 questionto raise,
and as faras I can see the onlyanswer,otherthan the responsethat it is a brute,
unexplainablemetaphysical fact,is in termsof local correlationsand dependencies
betweenspecific mentalandphysical properties. Iftheglobalsupervenience ofthemental
on the physicalwereto be proposedas an unexplainable factthatwe mustaccepton
faith,I doubt that we need to take the proposalseriously. Specificpsychophysical
dependenciesholdingforindividuals, and otherproperpartsof the world,are both
evidencefor,and an explanatory groundof,globalsupervenience.
The troubleis thatoncewe begintalkingaboutcorrelations and dependencies between
specific psychologicalandphysical properties,we arein effect talkingaboutpsychophysical
laws,and theselaws raisethespecterof unwantedphysicalreductionism. Wherethere
are psychophysical laws, there is always the threat,or promise,of psychophysical
reduction.We mustconcludethatsupervenience is not goingto deliverto us a viable
formof nonreductive materialism.

is consistent
24. Thisshowsthatglobalsupervenience of"weak
withthefailure
See
supervenience". my"'Strong'and'Global' Revisited".
Supervenience

25. See HellmanandThompson, and

Determination,
Ontology,
"Physicalism:
Post,TheFacesofExistence.
Reduction";

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 43

So farI havereviewed threeinfluential formulations of nonreductive materialism-

Davidson's anomalous monism, thePutnam-Fodor doctrineofpsychological autonomy, and
supervenient physicalism-and found each of them wanting either as a materialism or as
a antireductionism. In thisfinalsection, I wantto advancea directargument to show
whytheprospects fora nonreductive physicalism aredim.
Letus firstofall notethatnonreductive is nottobe a form
physicalism ofeliminativ-
ism;thatis,itacknowledges themental as a legitimate
domain ofentities. Whatsortof
entities?Hereletus,forconvenience, makeuseoftheDavidsonian scheme ofindividual
events, thinkingofmentality to be exhibited as propertiesoftheseevents.Thus,as a
noneliminativist,the nonreductive physicalist believesthatthereare eventsin her
ontology thathavemental properties(e.g.,beinga pain,beinga belief thatsnowis cold,
etc.). I arguedearlier,in discussing Davidson'sanomalousmonism, thatif your
noneliminativism is tobe morethana tokengesture, youhadbetter findsomerealcausal
workforyourmentalproperties. The factthata giveneventis a mentaleventof a
certainkindmustplaysomecausal-explanatory roleinwhatotherevents occurandwhat
propertiestheyhave. Thus,I amsupposing thata nonreductive physicalist is a mental
andthatto be a mental
realist, yourmental
realist, properties mustbe causalproperties-
propertiesinvirtue ofwhichan evententers intocausalrelations itwouldotherwise not
haveentered into.
Letme nowmakeanother assumption: psychophysicalcausation takesplace-that is,
somemental eventscausephysical events.Forexample, a suddensharppainfeltin my
handcausesa jerky withdrawal ofthehand. It is truethatin a Davidsonian domain,
all eventsarephysical; thatis,every eventhassomephysical property. But when I say
thatmental events causephysical events, something stronger is intended, namely anthat
event,in virtueofitsmental property,causesanother eventto havea certainphysical
property. I believethatthisassumption willbe granted bymostofus-itwillbe granted
byanyone whobelieves thatat leastsometimes ourlimbsmovebecausewehavecertain
desiresandbeliefs.26 WhenI walkto thewaterfountain fora drink ofwater, mylegs
movein thewaytheydo inpartbecauseofmydesireforwaterandmybeliefthatthere
is waterto be hadat thewaterfountain.
Thereis a further assumption thatI believeanyphysicalist wouldgrant.I call this
"thecausalclosureofthephysical domain"; it
roughly,says this:anyphysical event that
hasa causeat time t hasa physicalcauseat t. Thisis theassumption thatifwe tracethe
causalancestry ofa physical event,we neednevergo outsidethephysical domain.To
denythisassumption is toaccepttheCartesian ideathatsomephysical eventshaveonly
nonphysical causes,andifthisis truetherecan in principle be no complete andself-
sufficient
physical theory ofthephysical domain.Ifthecausalclosure failed,ourphysics
wouldneedto refer in an essential
wayto nonphysical causalagents, perhaps Cartesian

26. Fora forceful

statement
ofthispointsee FredDretske, Behavior:
Explaining
Reasons
ina World
ofCauses MIT Press,1988).
(Cambridge:

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
44 APA PROCEEDINGS,VOL. 63, NO. 3

soulsandtheir psychic ifitistogivea complete

properties, account ofthephysical world.
I thinkmostphysicalists wouldfindthatpicture unacceptable.
Nowweareready toderivesomeconsequences from theseassumptions. Supposethat
a certainevent,in virtueofitsmentalproperty, causesa physical event. The causal
closureof thephysical domainsaysthatthisphysical eventmustalso havea physical
cause. We mayassumethatthisphysical cause,invirtue ofitsphysical property,causes
thephysical event.The following question arises:Whatis therelationshipbetween these
twocauses, onemental andtheother physical? Eachisclaimed tobe a causeofthephysical
effect.Therearetwoinitialpossibilities thatwe can consider.
First,whenwe are facedwithtwopurported causesof a singleevent,we could
entertain thepossibilitythateachis onlya partial cause,thetwotogether making up a
fullorsufficient cause,as whena carcrashis saidto be causedbythedriver's careless
brakingandtheicycondition oftheroad. Appliedto ourcase,it saysthatthemental
causeandthephysical causeareeachonlya partial cause,andthattheytogether make
up one sufficient cause. Thisseemslikean absurdthingto say,and in anycase it
violatesthecausalclosureprinciple in thatit regards thementaleventas a necessary
constituent ofa fullcauseofa physical event;thus,on thisview,a fullcausalstory of
howthisphysical eventoccursmust,at leastpartially, go outsidethephysical domain.
Couldit be thatthementalcauseand thephysical causeare each an independent
causeofthephysical
sufficient effect? The suggestion thenis thatthephysical is
effect
overdetermined. So ifthephysicalcausehadn'toccurred, themental causebyitself would
havecausedtheeffect.Thispicture is againabsurd:from whatwe knowaboutthe
physiology oflimbmovement, wemustbelievethatifthepainsensation causesmyhand
towithdraw, thecausalchainfrom thepaintothelimbmotion mustsomehow makeuse
ofthecausalchainfrom an appropriate central neuraleventto themusclecontraction;
it makesno senseto thinkthattherewasan independent, perhaps causal
telekinetic,
pathfrom thepainto thelimbmovement. Moreover, theoverdetermination ideaseems
toviolatethecausalclosure principleas well:inthecounterfactual situationinwhichthe
physical causedoesnotoccur,theclosureprinciple is violated.Fortheidea thatthe
mentaland thephysical causeare each an independent sufficientcauseinvolves the
acceptance ofthecounterfactual thatifthephysical causehadnotoccurred, themental
causewouldhaveoccurred andcausedthephysical effect.Thisis in violation of the
causalclosureprinciple.
Thesetwowaysoflooking at thesituation areobvious nonstarters. We needa more
plausibleanswer tothequestion, howarethemental causeandthephysical causeofthe
singlephysical effectrelatedtoeachother?Giventhatanyphysical eventhasa physical
cause,how is a mentalcause also possible?This I call "the problem of causal-
explanatory exclusion",fortheproblem seems to arisefrom the factthat a cause,or
causal explanation, of an event,when it is as a
regarded full, sufficientcause or
explanation, appears other
toexclude independent purported causes or causalexplanations
ofit.27

detailin my"Mechanism,
ingreater
27. Thisideais developed and
Purpose,
Exclusion",
Explanatory 3
Perspectives
Philosophical (1989),forthcoming.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 45

At thispoint, youmight wanttoprotest: whyall thisbeating aroundthebush?Why

notjustsaythemental causeandthephysical causeareoneandthesame?Identifica-
tionsimplifies ontology andgetsridofunwanted puzzles.Consider saying thatthereare
in thisglasstwodistinct substances,H20 and water; that is, consider saying thatwater
andH20 co-occur everywhere as a matter oflawbutthattheyaredistinct substances
nonetheless. Thiswouldinvitea hostofunwanted andunnecessary puzzles: giventhat
whatis in theglassweighsa totalof tenounces,howmuchof theweight is to be
attributed to thewaterandhowmuchto theH20? Bydropping a lighted matchin the
glass,I extinguish it. Whatcausedit? Was it thewateror theH20? Weretheyeach
onlya partialcause,or was theextinguishing of the matchoverdetermined? The
identification ofthewaterwiththeH20 putsall thesequestions torestina single stroke:
thereis hereone thing, nottwo. The identity solution can worksimilar magicin our
present case: thepainis a neuralstate-here thereis one cause,nottwo. The limb
motion wascausedbythepain,thatis tosay,bya neuralstate.The unwanted puzzles
vanish.
All thisis correct.Butwhatdoestheidentity solution involve?Remember thatwhat
is forusat issueis thecausalefficacy ofmental properties ofevents their
vis-a-vis physical
properties. Thus,theitemsthatneedto be identified areproperties-that is,we would
needto identify mentalpropertieswithphysical properties. If this could be done,that
wouldbe an excellent of
way vindicating thecausal of
powers mentality.
But thisis precisely theroutethatis barredto our nonreductivist friends.The
identification of mentalproperties withphysical properties is the heart of reductionist
"typephysicalism". Theseproperty identities
wouldserveas bridge lawsparexcellence,
enabling a derivationalreduction ofpsychology to physical theory.The identities entail
psychophysical correlationsofbiconditional form,stableoverpossible, or nomologically
possible,worlds, andthis, wehavebeentold,isexcluded byDavidson's mental anomalism
and Putnam's multiple realization
argument. So the identity solution is out of the
question forthenonreductive materialist.Is thereany other to
way respond to the causal
exclusion problem, a waythatfallsshortofidentifying mental withphysical attributes?
Thereis one,butit isn'tsomething thatwouldbe palatableto thenonreductivist. I
believethattheonlywayotherthantheidentity solution is togivea general accountof
causalrelations involvingmacro-events as "supervenient causalrelations", causalrelations
thataresupervenient on micro-causal You
processes. put a kettle of water on thestove
andturnon theburner; andsoonthewaterstarts to boil. Heatingthewatercausedit
toboil. Thatis a causalrelation at themacro-level. It is natural to think ofthiscausal
relation as supervenient on certain causal
underlying processes at the micro-level. The
heating ofwater supervenesontheincreasing kineticenergy of water molecules, and when
theirmeankinetic energy reachesa certainlevel,watermolecules beginto movein
turbulence, someof thembeingejectedintothe air. Boilingis a macro-state that
supervenes on justthesemicro-processes. A sharppaincausesan anxiety attackfive
secondslater.What'sgoingon? Again,it is tempting, andnatural, to thinkthus:the
painis supervenienton a certainunderlying
neuralactivity,and thisneuraleventcauses
anotherneuraleventto occur. The anxietyattackoccursbecauseit is supervenient on
thissecondneuralevent.
The generalmodelofsupervenient causationappliedto macro-causalrelationsis this:
macro-eventm is a causeor effectofeventE in virtueof thefactthatm is supervenient

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
46 APA PROCEEDINGS,VOL. 63, NO. 3

on somemicro-event, n, whichis a causeoreffect ofeventE.28The suggestion thenis

thatwe use thismodelto explainmentalcausation: a mentaleventis a cause,or an
effect,of another eventin virtueof thefactthatit is supervenient on somephysical
eventstanding in an appropriate causalrelation to thisevent.Thus,mentalproperties
are seenas deriving theircausalpotential fromthephysical on whichthey
properties
supervene. Thatis themainidea.
Butwhatsortofsupervenience relation is involvedin thispicture?Globalsuperve-
niencewe considered aboveobviously willnotdo; itdoesnotgiveus a wayofspeaking
ofsupervenience ofspecificmental propertieson specific
physical sinceitonly
properties,
referstoindiscernibilityholdingforworlds.Supervenient inmysenserequires
causation
talkofspecificmental properties
supervening onspecific physical andthis
baseproperties,
is possibleonlyiftherearelawscorrelating psychologicalwithphysicalproperties.This
is whatI havecalledelsewhere "strong supervenience", andit can be arguedplausibly
thatsupervenience ofthisstrength entailsthepossibilityofreducingthesupervenient to
thesubvenient.29 I willspareyouthedetailshere,butthefactthatthisform ofsuperve-
niencedirectlyinvolves psychophysicallawswouldbeenough togivepausetoanywould-
benonreductive physicalist.I amnotentirely certainthatthissuperveniencesolutionwill
suffice;thatis,I am notcertain thatanything shortoftheidentitysolution willresolve
theexclusion problem. However, I believethatitis theonlyalternativetoexplore if,for
whatever reason, youareunwilling orunabletogoforpsychophysical attribute
identities.
ButI doubtthatthissolution willbe foundacceptable bythenonreductivist anymore
thantheidentity solution.

28. Forcritical ofthismodel,

discussions "EventSuperve-
see BrianMcLaughlin,
nienceandSupervenient
Causation",
SouthernJournal 22, TheSpindel
ofPhilosophy
Conference
Supplement (1984):71-91;PeterMenzies,
onSupervenience "AgainstCausal
Mind97 (1988):560-574.
Reductionism",

29. I am putting thepointsomewhat tentativelyherebecauseit involves several

currentlycontentious issues.Fora general argument forthispoint, see my"Concepts
ofSupervenience", Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch 45 (1984): 153-176;
sectionIII; and"Supervenience
especially, as a Philosophical Concept", forthcoming in
Metaphilosophy. However, thisargument makesuseofinfinite and
disjunctions
conjunctions (actually,infinite areall one needs;see "Supervenience
disjunctions as a
PhilosophicalConcept").If theargument is found objectionablebecause of this
feature,it couldbe supplemented withan argument modeled on myargument in
sectionIII aboveagainst the Putnam-Fodor thesis.
antireductionist This means that
thesupervenience relation neededforthemodelofsupervenient causationsketched
heremustrequire thateachsupervenient property havea nomologically coextensivebase
property to
relative the given physical There
structure. are,I believe,
plausibleconsider-
ationsin favor ofthisstronger supervenience as a basisfortheconceptof
relation
supervenient causation(or thereductionofcausalrelations); however, I cannotgo into
thedetailshere.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES 47

Ifnonreductive acceptthecausalclosure
physicalists ofthephysical
domain, therefore,
theyhaveno visiblewayofaccounting forthepossibility
of psychophysical
causation.
This meansthattheymusteithergiveup theirantireductionism or else rejectthe
ofpsychophysical
possibility causalrelations.
Thedenialofpsychophysical causation
can
comeaboutin twoways:first, youmakesucha denialbecauseyoudon'tbelievethere
are mentalevents;or second,you keepfaithwithmentaleventseven thoughyou
acknowledge thattheyneverenterintocausal transactions withphysical processes,
constituting theirown autonomous causal world. So eitheryou have espoused
eliminativism,orelseyouaremoving furtherin thedirection
ofdualism, a dualismthat
positsa realmof thementalin totalcausalisolation fromthephysical realm. This
doesn'tlookto memuchlikematerialism.
Is theabandonment of thecausalclosureof thephysical domainan optionforthe
materialist?I thinknot: to rejectthe closureprinciple is to embraceirreducible
nonphysical causesof physical phenomena.It wouldbe a retrogression to Cartesian
interactionist
dualism,something thatis definitive
ofthedenialofmaterialism.
Our conclusion, therefore,has to be this:nonreductivematerialism
is nota stable
position.Thereare pressures of varioussortsthatpushit eitherin thedirection of
outrighteliminativismor in thedirectionofan explicit
formofdualism.30

30. Mythanksto RichardBrandt, andErnest

Shoemaker,
Sydney Sosa for
comments
helpful on earlier andto DavidBenfield,
versions, andBrian
Loewer,
Barry
fordiscussing
McLaughlin withmesomeofthetopicsofthispaper.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:00:25 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions