SAMMIE

De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for the writ of habeas data on the ground that respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte as
the incumbent President of the Philippines is immune from suit during his incumbency.

Writ of habeas data- The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.Then Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte won the 2016 presidential election. A key agenda of the Duterte Administration
was the relentless national crackdown on illegal drugs. This prompted several human rights advocates to heavily criticize the
strategies and devices forthwith adopted by law enforcement agencies in pursuing the crackdown. Among the vocal critics of the
crackdown was Sen. De Lima. Meanwhile, during the privileged speech of De Lima on the senate he told Duterte to stop the alleged
extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown, and urging her colleagues in the Senate to conduct investigations of
the alleged victims. In return, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De Lima, including denunciations
of her corruption and immorality. The statements prompted her to initiate this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against President Duterte.

Issue: May the incumbent Chief Executive be haled to court even for the limited purpose under the Rules on the Writ of Habeas
Data?

Ruling of the court:

I. Origin of Presidential Immunity from suit
The concept of executive immunity from suit for the Chief Executive can be traced as far back as the days of Imperial Rome.
Justinian I noted in his Corpus Juris Civilis that Roman law recognized two principles connected with the development of what we
now know as executive immunity from suits:
1. princeps legibus solutus est (the emperor is not bound by statute);
2. quad principii placuit legis habet (what pleases the prince is law)
These two principles remained dormant until their revival in feudal Europe, particularly in England.

Professor Guy Seidman in his book explains the development of the maxim "the king can do no wrong”. The maxim has actually
stood for four different propositions at various points in English legal history.
1. The King is literally above the law and cannot do wrong by definition; this understanding of the maxim reached its zenith
in the 17th century under the banner of the "divine right of Kings."
2. Even if the King's actions are not lawful by definition, there is no remedy for royal wrong doing through ordinary
legal channels; one might term this a "procedural" or "remedial" understanding of the maxim
3. A third meaning, which actually represents the true historical origin of the maxim, is that the King has no power or capacity
to do wrong; this was literally the case with Henry III, who assumed the Kingship while in his minority
4. A fourth meaning is precisely the opposite of the first: it means that the King is eminently capable of doing wrong but
cannot do so lawfully.
Although the maxim clothed the King with immunity, equitable remedies remained available, such as the development of the doctrine
of ministerial accountability and impeachment. Due to increasing demands for the accountability of government officials and to the
eventual removal of the King's participation from political and state affairs, the immunity once enjoyed by the monarchs started to
wane.

II. American Development of the Concept of Presidential Immunity

The American Founding Fathers were well aware of the doctrine of "the king can do no wrong."

Blackstone's Commentaries summarized and explained the legal doctrines concerning government accountability.

As per Balckstone’s there are two remedies: private injuries and public oppression.

For private injuries his answer is double:

first, there is a remedy is the petition of right, and while it is only as 'a matter of grace' that the king provides the compensation
requested, he is mostly to permit this charity;

second, Blackstone cites Locke to the effect that the King is unlikely to inflict much damage personally, and immunizing him is a
fair price to pay for the benefits of the regime.

For 'public oppression': in most cases the answer is clear — "a king cannot misuse his power, without advice of evil counsellors, and
the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished."

Thus, American law followed this concept of the king can do no wrong' as well as other common law doctrines of England until the
former began to develop independently after the revolution of 1776. Common law concepts, including the principle that 'the king can
do no wrong,' carved out a legal path and conception different from their English roots considering that the USA had an elected
President instead of a hereditary King to control the reigns of governmental power. As such, the immunity given — be it to the
President or to the lowest government official — rested no longer on established English political theory based on the Common Law
but rather on public policy considerations. Some of the public policy considerations in upholding official immunity of public officials
are:
(a) the absolute immunity of judges being necessary to ensure judicial independence(Bradley v. Fisher); and
(b) policy considerations enunciated in Bradley for judges being equally applicable to executive officials because the civil liability
would cripple the proper administration of public affairs (Spalding v. Vilas).

Moreover, they also have different types of immunity granted to officials like the President. Immunity can be classified either by
(a) extent, i.e., absolute or qualified; or
(b) duration,i.e., permanent or temporary.

Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions fell within the scope of his duties, and that his
actions are discretionary rather than ministerial, that is to say, that the conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant
or routinely office work but rather the challenged action must involve personal judgment. Further, in Butz v. Economou, the US
Supreme Court held that absolute immunity can only be invoked if it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the
conduct of the public business. In other words, absolute immunity attaches to the function instead of the office.

Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove that at the time of the commission of the act
complained of, he possessed a good faith belief that his actions were lawful. This was known to be the subjective element.

In Wood v. Strickland, the US Supreme Court ruled that aside from the aforementioned subjective test, it is also important to show if
the public official should have known that his act constituted a violation of the rights of the claimant. If the government official should
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De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

have known that his acts violated the claimant's rights, then immunity is not granted to the government official; otherwise, the
government official is entitled to qualified immunity. This is referred to as the objective test. This two-tiered test to determine the need
to grant qualified immunity was modified in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, where the US Supreme Court removed the subjective test
reasoning that inquiring into the subjective motivation of government officials would be "disruptive of effective government." Harlow
now requires a two-step analysis in the determination of whether or not a government official is entitled to qualified immunity; first, as
a threshold matter, the court must determine if the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the
alleged wrongful action; and, second, the court must determine whether the official should reasonably have known the action was
contrary to law.

The second classification of immunity is based on duration, which may be permanent or temporary. This classification was brought
about by footnote 31 in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that executive immunity could be derived
from Article 1, Section 6 of the US Constitution. Temporary immunity or congressional immunity from arrest provides temporary
immunity to legislators from litigating even private suits while "at Session" of Congress as public officers, while permanent immunity
or the immunity for speech or debate provides immunity from liability in law suits that arise out of the performance of public duties of
democratic deliberation

III. Philippine Concept of Presidential Immunity

The concept of executive immunity was first tackled in 1910: Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,

But while the case law cited inForbes depended on principles of executive immunity prevailing in foreign jurisdictions, the Philippine
concept of presidential immunity diverged in 1981. In Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution states that:

Section 15. A The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done
by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The Philippine court in facts still followed the concept of presidential immunity from suit even if it was not explicitly provided in the
1987 Constitution. Proof of this was the case of Saturnino vs. Bermudez.

IV. Current State of the Concept of Presidential Immunity

The concept of presidential immunity is not explicitly spelled out in the 1987 Constitution. However, the Court has affirmed that there
is no need to expressly provide for it either in the Constitution or in law. Furthermore, the reason for the omission from the actual text
of the 1987 Constitution has been clarified by this exchange on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. According to Fr.
Bernas, “ The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune
from suit. “

Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does not
distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit.
The lack of distinctions prevents us from making any distinctions. We should still be guided by our precedents.

Accordingly, the concept is clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding such
office.

V. Applicability of Presidential Immunity to a Proceeding for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data

Sen. De Lima wants us to apply principles established by the US Supreme Court in the celebrated cases of Nixon and Clinton,
supra.

But the decision of the SC was purely based on the aforementioned information that such decisions, though persuasive, are not
binding as case law for us.

As earlier asserted, the Philippine concept of Presidential immunity from suit diverged from its foreign roots, from the time of the
amendment of the 1973 Constitution. Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The
immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit
are part of his duties and functions as President. Furthermore, no balancing of interest has ever been applied to Presidential
immunity under our jurisprudence. We are not prepared or willing to recognize such a test without constitutional, statutory, or
jurisprudential basis.

Both Sen. De Lima and the OSG disagree on whether or not the statements of the President regarding her have been part of the
discharge of the President's official duties, but the declaration of SC herein that immunity applies regardless of the personal or
official nature of the acts complained of have rendered their disagreement moot and academic.

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Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure
14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. (Pg. 37)

In 1998, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded
his popularity.

All of the appointed members and department head resigned. A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and
bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country.
To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelope.There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.

Estrada and his counsel filed a petition stating that "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

Issue:
1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question.
2. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
3. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
4. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity.
5. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Ruling:
1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question.
Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo
administration."

The court reject the private respondents submission. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of
constitutional law. The court cited the US case of Baker v. Carr, in which it says that, “Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions', not of
'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a rmer delineation of the inner and
outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case is Tañada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what
it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.

Distinguish between legal questions from political questions:

The Political question doctrine:

A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.”

The intrinsic constitutionality of pork barrel is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government
but rather a legal one which the constitution itself has commanded the court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power.

The court further addressed that, there are legal istinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear.
EDSA I
1. involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
2. is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review.
3. EDSA I presented a political question.
EDSA II
1. is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only a ected the o ce of the President.
2. is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
3. EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and
4. of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which is the cutting edge of EDSA People
Power II is not inappropriate.

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Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.

2. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.

In Section 8, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:

"SECTION 8. A In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

The main issue in this case is whether the president did resign from his office. The court ruled that Resignation is not a high level
legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace after the oath taking of the respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from
his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. And using the totality test, the court ruled that the petitioner
indeed resigned as the president.

Aside from totality test, the diary of Secretary Angara became an important evidence to testify that Estrada resigned from his post. In
one of his entries named: "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," which was published to the Philippine daily inquirer shows that
Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at
EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo
(Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined
the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of
support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a
president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation." Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently. The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. Senator Pimentel repeated to
the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would
be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary
Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace." This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay
in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued pilling up until former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, for a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power. There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage,
the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points:
(1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation;
(2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and
(3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Again, we note that the resignation of
petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.
According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, he explained that if the enveloped is opened, on Monday, he will leave the palace adding that he
is tired, he does not want any more of this and it was too painful for him. (The court says this shows an intent to resign.)

According to the diary of Angara, there second round of negotiation. This second round of negotiation cements the reading that the
petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It
was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath- taking.

In summation, the court hold that, the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on
this supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

3. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

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Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

In the question whether the president is temporarily unable to discharge his powers and duties of the presidency, "Congress has the
ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner
provided for in section 11 of Article VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter
revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.

Following Tañada v. Cuenco , we hold that this Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government."

Following Tañada v. Cuenco , we hold that this Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government."

The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be
decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is thede jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

The court now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted
by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is
now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that
when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him

Functus Officio(having performed by his or her office)- A decision of the municipal court in an ejectment case becomes functus officio
upon rendition of decision by the Court of First Instance in the same case without the municipal court's decision being executed.

The court also laid down the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the
great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that "(t)he State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption." It ordained that "(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." It set the rule that "(t)he right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel."

It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous
powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The Office of the
Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-
sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

5. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his
right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases.

The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.

The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of
irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile
criminal cases. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr. just in the Teehankee, this court ruled that theevidence proffered by the petitioner is
insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner,
i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates.
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