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Driving best
Improvised routines driving best practices
practices: investing in
disobedience
Joseph A. Gerard 525
Department of Accounting, University of Wisconsin, Whitewater, Wisconsin, USA
Received 8 July 2018
Revised 11 February 2019
30 December 2019
13 July 2020
Abstract 26 July 2020
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine different processes four organizations use to achieve best Accepted 26 July 2020
practices. There is an apparent contradiction between projects designed to create innovation and rigid rule
following used for productivity. While both contribute to best practices this study describes a third source.
Employees disobeyed rules and, in some cases, the results became best practices. This study identifies three
management responses to deviant employee behaviors.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a multi-case field study design built upon
organizational theory in the area of work structures. It uses qualitative methods based on grounded theory.
Interviews, observations and archival data were used to triangulate findings. Four firms were selected to
participate. One global and one regional accounting firm were compared and contrasted with one global and
one regional manufacturing firm.
Findings – The paper provides insights about how change occurs not only from intentional innovation but
also from disobeying rigid rules designed to enhance productivity. It also highlights three specific
management responses to deviant behavior and the conditions under which each is selected.
Research limitations/implications – Because of the chosen research approach, this research may not
be easily generalized. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to further test the proposed conclusions. The
paper expands organizational routine theory to examine how improvisation may change the structure of a
formal work process.
Practical implications – The paper includes management implications. It suggests that rigid
conformance to rules may inhibit a possible source of best practice innovation and gives management
potential reasons to rethink imposed constraints.
Social implications – Relationships of supervisory action to employee performance and productivity
become more important when innovation and efficiency are sought in an organization. These relationships
should be examined with a specific outcome in mind. There may be a choice between control and discovery
that will require further consideration by management.
Originality/value – Many studies look at processes, procedures and organizational routines, most
assuming that what is designed is implemented. Others consider deviant behavior usually in a negative light.
This paper provides insights into non-conforming actions by employees and the positive unexpected results
that can occur, taking into consideration the studies that took this approach to innovation.
Keywords Organizational change, Organizational routine, Innovation, Improvisation,
Deviant behavior, Best practices
Paper type Research paper

Background/introduction
The manager sitting across from me stared thoughtfully at the production line, then
suddenly turned to me and said: “People are always doing things you don’t want them to do. Qualitative Research in
Accounting & Management
Sometimes it pays off, most times it doesn’t. Either way you’ve got to manage the hell out of Vol. 17 No. 4, 2020
pp. 525-551
a process to keep it working.” Sometimes vilified by managers as a drain on their time and © Emerald Publishing Limited
1176-6093
patience, deviant employee behavior turned out to be the impetus for positive organizational DOI 10.1108/QRAM-07-2018-0048
QRAM change in four organizations that participated in this study. The deviant behavior they
17,4 experienced was not a malicious intention to cause harm, but rather employees asserting
themselves toward a personal preference to simplify work tasks, create clarity of purpose
and make their jobs easier. Much of the literature on deviant behavior is focused at broad
sociological frameworks beyond single organizations (Scull, 1988; Ben-Yehuda, 1990). A
debate exists among sociologists regarding deviant behavior at this broader level and not
526 every researcher embraces the concept of positive deviance. Sagarin (1985) argues that
the term “positive deviance” is, and should remain, an oxymoron that is not accepted by the
research community. He suggests that this phrase confounds rather than clarifies the
concept of deviance. Goode (1991) also cautions about the use of this terminology stating
that he agrees with Sagarin that the phrase is imprecise. However, once removed from this
broader sociological context, positive deviance can be considered for small groups and
individuals. At this lower level, the term becomes more relevant. Spreitzer and Sonenshein
(2004) identified behaviors that failed to conform to rules under the heading “positive
deviance” and suggest that these are intentional behaviors that depart from accepted norms
in honorable ways. This study adopts the Spreitzer and Sonenshein definition of positive
deviance as honorable deviations from accepted norms and concentrates on local workplace
behaviors and follows researchers who focused on specific organizational contexts
(Appelbaum et al., 2007; Dunlop and Lee, 2004; Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2003; Argote and
Epple, 1990). This work is part of a larger research stream originally designed to examine
organizational efficiencies using the concept of organizational routines.
Organizational routines are repeated patterns of behavior linking multiple actors and
used to accomplish an organization’s work tasks (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen et al.,
1996; Egidi, 1993; Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Routines allow repetition and streamline work by reducing active cognitive search. Nelson
and Winter (1982) explain routines using an example of driving a car. When learning to
drive we pay attention to each and every detail, but once we gain experience, we no longer
think about each step (reduce active cognitive search) but simply respond to conditions as
they present themselves. By eliminating cognitive search, we create efficiency. Yet because
routines are multi-actor by definition (Cohen et al., 1996; Feldman, 2000), we can use the
analogy that routine is to organization as habit is to individual. This idea, when applied to
performing work-related tasks, is defined as procedural knowledge (Cohen, 1991; Cohen and
Bacdayan, 1994) and can also be classified under the heading “tacit knowledge” (Polanyi,
1962; Polanyi, 1967). Tacit knowledge is an understanding people possess of how to do
something, yet people who possess such knowledge have difficulty articulating it to others.
This phenomenon is prevalent in most, if not all, organizations. As a result, Nelson and
Winter (1982) include a description of organizational routines as organizational memory.
That is because tacit/procedural knowledge resides within workers who function together in
organizational routines. Together they informally distribute the knowledge throughout the
organization, and it is collectively within the routine that the organization has memory.
While some memory is codified in standard operating procedures (SOPs), much resides as
tacit knowledge within individuals (Walsh and Ungson, 1991).
When considered as repositories of organizational knowledge, routines can be seen as a
means of learning in organizations. Researchers working with organizational learning
theory (Levitt and March, 1988; Argyris and Schön, 1996; Egidi, 1992) suggest that
organizational knowledge is captured and retained through procedural memory. The ability
to replicate the necessary behavior is an indication that learning has taken place. As long as
that knowledge resides in the organizational routine in which it was developed, the
organization retains this memory.
 The literature on organizational routines agrees on a number of points, including the idea Driving best
that routines are patterns of behavior that use tacit/procedural knowledge and involve practices
multiple actors. Many researchers also propose that routines are the behavioral counterpart
to a structural component (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Feldman, 2004; Cohen et al., 1996).
Using the phrase “ostensible” for the structural aspect and “performative” for the behavioral
aspect of routines, Feldman (2003) suggests that performance of a routine creates a shared
understanding of how the organization operates, which in turn informs other routines. The
most complete definition of organizational routines came from Pentland and Feldman (2008 527
p. 236), in which they state that organizational routines “are generative systems that
produce recognizable, repetitive patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple
actors.”
Feldman’s earlier work also identified that upon repeated execution, routines can change
(Feldman, 2000) and that agency is an important consideration. Iterations of routines will
either replicate as intended or adapt. She enumerates four possible outcomes following the
execution of a routine. First, execution can fall short of the intended result; second, it can
produce an unintended outcome; third, it may reveal new problems; or fourth, it may
suggest new opportunities (Feldman, 2000). Responses to unintended outcomes or new
problems leads organizations to repair the routine, while falling short of ideals or identifying
opportunities drives them toward change (Feldman, 2000).
The four organizations that participated in this study establish rules/procedures to
ensure consistency, reliability and efficiency in their work processes. These procedures
become part of the structure of a work process or Feldman’s (2003) ostensive aspect of an
organizational routine. Because these organizations also realized breakthroughs,
innovations and improvements from improvised approaches, there is a tension between
rules used for consistency and efficiency and the potential gains from deviating from
prescribed behavior.

Research question
Accepting that organizational routines represent the behavioral aspect of work and emerge
from an interpretation of structures such as SOPs, systems and organizational rules, I agree
with Feldman’s premise that agency may affect the performance of a routine. Disobedience
to prescribed methods breaks from organizational expectations and signifies the imposition
of individual choices, an example of agency. Therefore, this study focused on workers’/
agents’ elections to deviate from prescribed work methods. Additionally, I was interested in
finding those cases where the organization became aware of the deviation, decided that it
had value and then assimilated it into the prescribed rules from that point on. Because
outcomes vary along a continuum from negative to positive deviation, I reduced my
research question to “How and why organizations decide to capture and accept positive
deviant behavior?” This focus corrects the under-recognized value of workers ignoring
prescribed behavior represented by organizational rules, who consequently enacted best
practices that improved the efficiency, reliability and quality that the original standards
sought to enforce.

Methods
This study used a multi-case field study design built upon organizational theory in the area
of work structures, specifically as it related to work processes and organizational routines
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2010; Pentland et al.,
2011; Feldman, 2000). Qualitative methods were selected because of how well suited they are
to capturing the experience of a work flow and to preserving the depth and breadth of data
QRAM (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007; Locke, 2002; Maxwell, 2004;
17,4 Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). The research design used literal replication logic (Yin, 2003) so
that each case became another experiment in a series, thereby contributing to internal
validity. Results from each field case were interpreted and that information informed the
succeeding case considered. Additionally, once all cases were interpreted, they were
reviewed to ensure consistency across all iterations. Cases were analyzed using methods to
528 preserve the cultural and contextual qualities of individual research accounts to enhance the
authenticity of findings, while ensuring the plausibility of findings by using abductive
reasoning applied to the cases (Lukka and Modell, 2010).

Data sources
The design also embedded multiple levels of analysis. Organizational level phenomena
included interviews with executives and reviews of process-maps, workflow diagrams and
other supporting documentation. Group level events comprised interviews with middle
managers, examination of group procedures and observation of teams executing a
workflow. Individual level phenomena included interviews with individual contributors,
reviews of job descriptions, training plans, test or review logs and observation of individual
work tasks.
The design used a two by two matrix which called for two manufacturing firms, whose
output are tangible products, and two service sector firms, that have intangible outputs. One
of the two firms in each grouping was a large firm, defined as more than 25,000 employees
and global in scope of operations. The other was a small firm, using fewer than 250
employees with a regional scope of operations. These choices were intended to enhance
generalizability. Several firms in each category who met the requirements for industry
sector, size and operational scope were identified and contacted. Willingness to participate
was the final selection criterion and therefore, the first firm in each category to respond
positively was selected for the study.
The small manufacturing firm was an injection plastics molder with about 200
employees. The large manufacturer produced medical monitoring equipment used in
hospitals and employed over 50,000 workers. The small services firm was a regional
accounting firm with a staff of roughly 50 and the large services company was a global
accounting firm with over 100,000 employees worldwide. All four organizations requested
anonymity.
Executives at the participating organizations agreed to several conditions for the study.
First, they allowed me access to documentation about their processes and workflows. Some
of these documents described proprietary methods, and I was asked to neither reproduce
them in any way nor use the terminology they contained. Second, permission to interview
key individuals involved in execution or management of a process was granted (see Table 1
for a summary of interviews). Those selected for interviews were asked to plan on three 90-

Large Small Large Small

manufacturer manufacturer CPA firm CPA firm TOTAL

Executives 2 3 4 4 13
Managers 5 4 4 4 17
Table 1. Supervisors 3 2 3 4 12
Summary of Workers 4 0 3 3 10
interviews TOTAL 14 9 14 15 52
min interview sessions. While it was understood that not every individual would necessarily Driving best
have three full sessions, this condition allowed me the latitude to follow up with additional practices
inquiries after the interview was completed. Most participants were interviewed twice,
whereas more critical informants were interviewed as many as four times. Finally, the firms
agreed that I would be allowed to observe two or three executions of each of the processes
identified.
Several mission critical processes were identified from my interviews with executives in
each of the organizations, and I selected two processes for study in each organization. In the
529
manufacturing firms, one process was new product development and the other an existing
process used for standing orders, which continuously produces a product. New product
development was not a viable choice in the accounting firms. Consequently, I selected two
existing processes, one for audits and the other for taxes. Audit and tax engagements are
similar to standing orders in manufacturing and both are considered mission critical. Three
types of data were collected: interview-data, archival records (specifically documentation
relating to processes, workflow, training or process improvement) and field notes resulting
from direct observation.
Interviews. Interview questions were prepared in advance and honed to ensure coverage
of all areas of research interest. Semi-structured interviews were used, which allowed me the
ability to clarify informants’ statements and to pursue their thought processes
unencumbered by more rigid, fully structured questions. This flexibility was well suited for
a qualitative study where the greatest amount of meaning needs to be captured and
understood within a limited amount of interview time (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003;
Seidman, 2006).
All individuals who participated in interviews agreed to have their responses digitally
recorded. Recorded interviews were transcribed within 24 h of conducting the interview and
the recordings destroyed upon completion of the study. During transcription, gaps in
understanding were identified and follow-up questions created for the next interview with
that informant. The simplest cases of misunderstanding were clarified with an e-mail
exchange.
Interviews included discussions with all levels of the organization except in the small
manufacturer, which was a union shop. Because of contract limitations and a refusal by the
union steward to allow interviews (primarily because the study focused on productivity), no
operators were interviewed although observation was later allowed.
Archival records. Documentation of workflows, process maps, training and planning
sessions were reviewed. Much of this information was considered proprietary to the
organization and no reference can be made to trade names, process methodology or specific
products and customers. I agreed that process charts, engineering specifications and
proprietary information relating to competitive advantage shared by these organizations
would not be reproduced or in any way identified. Documentation was primarily used for
triangulation (Jick, 1979) to validate the collective understanding of workflows expressed in
individual interviews and the work which I directly observed.
Observations. Executives in each organization agreed that I would be allowed to observe
two to three iterations of any selected process. I observed at least two iterations of each
process in the manufacturing organizations. Accounting firms would not grant access to
actual planning meetings because of discussions of client sensitive information. Therefore, I
relied on ancillary interview evidence regarding steps followed during engagement planning
along with reviews of their process documentation (including workflows, checklists and
planning documents). My field notes were rendered to electronic form within 48 h of any site
QRAM visit. Using these varied sources of evidence to build constructs and confirm agreement
17,4 among sources, construct validity was achieved by triangulation (Jick, 1979).

Data analysis
Data were analyzed using pattern coding methods considered appropriate for grounded
theory building (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007; Locke, 2002; Glaser and Strauss, 1967;
530 Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Charmaz, 2006).
Pattern coding was applied to transcribed interviews, observation field notes, research
memos (researcher notes recorded during the study) and company archival records. A code
was a tag (identifier) that assigned meaning and categorized a particular idea, statement or
fact that was expressed in source documents. Coding involved assigning codes to ideas
contained in paragraphs, sentences, words or phrases that represented a specific construct
or concept.
A code can represent a critical trait or dimension under study such as efficiency. Coding
was accomplished in three distinct phases. First, a priori codes were developed from existing
literature and shaped by my research question. For example, one a priori code I selected was
training, which I created in advance of the fieldwork with the expectation that it would
prove a central concept in generating routine behaviors. The second coding phase occurred
during fieldwork after interviews, observation and field notes were transcribed, reviewed
and completed. Most codes were developed during this data analysis. Important dimensions
and ideas mentioned by multiple interviewees were defined as codes. Traits mentioned by
only one or two interviewees were dropped.
The third phase of pattern coding involved taking all the codes and examining the
relationships between them. Those with the strongest interrelationships were further refined
by looking at the supporting phrases and ideas from interviews, documentation and
observation followed by comparing and contrasting their underlying meanings. Patterns
slowly emerged from the data and categories; for example, the risk code incorporated
individual codes such as operator safety and product safety.
Within-case analysis. Within-case analysis began with an extensive review of interviews,
field notes and documentation for each case. I searched for consistency between interviewee
anecdotes and statements. This, combined with a comparison of observation field notes and
documentation, helped verify that emerging relationships between constructs truly fit the
evidence.
Cross-case Analysis. I searched for patterns by looking at data in divergent ways. Upon
completion of the single case analyses, I was able to make comparisons across multiple
cases. Tables were constructed to summarize codes for each organization. These tables were
compared and contrasted. I also used two by two matrices to compare several dimensions at
once. I selected specific codes and looked for within-case similarities coupled with inter-case
differences. At this point, relationships began to emerge. Next, case pairs were selected, and
similarities and differences were noted for each pair. The coded construct was then
redefined to incorporate any additional learning. Replicating this process across the four
cases accumulated evidence in support of the code definitions. Stories of process design and
change were compared across interviews, documents and observation. Within-case analyses
were combined and compared across organizations. Treating each case as a separate
experiment meant that a new case provided validation of the previous case in a series of
experiments (Yin, 2003).
From this information, process models were built using methods for building grounded
theory from case studies (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007; Locke, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Miles and Huberman, 1994).
 High agreement among interviewees around critical issues, perceptions and Driving best
understandings provided some evidence of internal validity. When this agreement was practices
further supported by observations and archival records, I was satisfied that internal validity
existed (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Locke, 2002; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Lukka and
Modell, 2010). I stopped analysis at the point of “theoretical saturation” (Glaser and Strauss,
1967) which is when incremental learning became minimal because I was observing
phenomena that I had seen before.
531
Case analysis
This manuscript focuses on employee-driven change that surfaced spontaneously in
organizations (Pfeffer, 1982; Feldman, 2000; Weick, 1979; Weick, 1998; Pentland et al., 2011)
as opposed to planned organizational change (Stensaker and Langley, 2010; Collins et al.,
2010; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). I found that employees created positive changes in their
organizations by ignoring the things they were told to do and choosing their own work
methods instead: positive change emerged from disobedience.
For example, a design engineer shared a story about an assembly worker who was
twisting a panel before inserting it into a unit they were building. Questioning this deviation
from the standard operating procedure, he engaged the employee to correct the behavior.
The employee showed him how twisting the panel prevented it from pinching the wiring
that was protruding from the case. Pinched wiring had been a problem in several units.
After conferring with other engineers, the procedure was rewritten to include this formerly
deviant behavior, hence eliminating the wiring problem.
All four participating organizations first create structures for work which they label
business processes. Later, they stipulate necessary behaviors to support those structures,
which represent organizational routines. It should be noted that the actual routine exists
only in performance, or stated another way, execution enacts the structure it supports
(Giddens, 1984; Berger and Luckmann, 1966). When employees deviated from prescribed
behavior and created what turns out to be a best practice (Orlikowski, 2002; Arakji and
Lang, 2010; Marion et al., 2012; Kellogg et al., 2006), it tends to be highly valued by the
organization, yet also represents a rule breach because it challenges prescribed behaviors.
The participating organizations found best practices in instances of this positive deviant
behavior that increased productivity. However, in all four organizations, I also found that
much deviation was contained before it could reoccur and that prompted me to identify how
participating organizations determined whether they suppressed or accepted a deviant
behavior.

Productivity
Productivity is defined in the Oxford Dictionary Online as the effectiveness of productive
effort, especially in industry, as measured in terms of the rate of output per unit of input
(Productivity, n.d.). Managers speak of productivity as “doing more with less” which is
really the ratio of outputs to inputs. Executives and managers spoke at length about their
beliefs concerning employee productivity. They shared anecdotes and provided me many
opportunities to observe employees working, to observe interactions between managers and
the employees who reported to them, and to interview some of those employees. What I was
able to distill from interview data and observational field notes is that managers attribute
productivity to two distinct and conflicting sources, following rigid rules (Gersick and
Hackman, 1990; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Baden-Fuller and Winter, 2012) and pursuing
innovation (Arakji and Lang, 2010; Greve, 2007; Weick, 1998).
QRAM Two paths toward efficiency
17,4 I discovered numerous instances where workers spoke about the rigid rules to which they
must conform. As a machinist stated: “there’s really only one way according to my boss,
‘(his) way or the highway’.” Managers explained that such rules are used to create
productivity in the form of standardization. “I don’t want somebody reinventing the wheel
every time they start a job. They need to take what we’ve done before and stick with it,” said
532 one manufacturing quality manager. Standards were created and enforced as a series of
SOPs (Betsch et al., 1999; Espedal, 2007; Kogut, 2000; Lazaric, 2000; Reynaud, 2005; Zhou,
1993; Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958). A design engineer from the large
manufacturer said: “The consequences are significant enough that we have systems
designed and developed so that there really aren’t exceptions.” Another production manager
added: “You’ve got to do it [follow the defined work steps] [. . .] it would be the loss of your
job. It just wouldn’t be an option to not do it.”
The service side was similar. A senior manager in accounting talked about strict
conformance to rules using an example of the clerical support staff. He said, “They have a
checklist they must follow. Not only will they make sure the evaluations are sent out, they
also have to make sure a quality control review has been signed by a second partner before
they can issue the report. Using their checklist, they’ll issue a report. It has to be footed by
somebody not on the team. And then someone on the team must check each significant item
back to the work papers, one last final check. And then they have to get it back to clerical
before they’ll run the final report and before they let the partner sign the report. Yeah,
they’re working off a checklist.” Another audit manager stated: “And that’s totally from the
top. The audit partners don’t make exceptions to standards.” Speaking about efficiency in
his organization, an accounting partner stated that the audit methodology “is used to ensure
that every audit engagement is done exactly the same. Everything is done up to certain
standards. From that standpoint, it (the audit process) is rigid.”
These views can be summarized by saying that productivity results from consistently
following standardized procedures. At the same time, executives and managers interviewed
defined innovation as an active search for new and better ways to perform work. An
accounting partner said, “You want to save time [on an engagement], you look for ways to
cut down the time from the previous year. At the very beginning and at the very end of an
audit we are, or should be, thinking through what we can be doing differently next year to
make it more efficient.” This approach is identified by its characteristic intention to find
improvements with active search implied. “We’re always looking for better ways to do our
jobs,” said one manufacturing operations manager.
This paradox, that organizations valued rule-structures, which attempt to achieve
productivity through the use of uniform approaches, yet also valued innovation as a path to
productivity, created tension within the organization that according to executives can be
difficult to manage. One accounting/consulting partner said, “You’re always pulled in
several directions. Should you stay with the proven standard or take a chance to find
something better and maybe overrun the (time) budget. It makes you more conservative in
your approach. You wait for those ideas that in your gut seem like real winners. But overall,
you always want to find that better way.” Other informants reiterated that the proven
standardized way is the default because innovation can be risky. Once an efficient approach
was identified, captured and codified (Thompson, 1967; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and
Winter, 1982; March, 1991; March and Simon, 1958; Galbraith, 1973) it was turned into
a written procedure. A written procedure became a new expectation until something better
was found to replace it.
 These approaches did not appear to be harmonious because they existed at extremes Driving best
along a continuum: one rigid adherence to established practice and the other flexible practices
exploration of new possibilities. Yet both were acknowledged by managers as contributing
to productivity in each organization. The second type of improvement is often classified as
innovation in the literature (Anand et al., 2007; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Greve, 2007;
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Massini et al., 2005; Pavitt, 2002). Innovation uses active search
for ideas that can lead to improvement and may use sources external to an organization to
accomplish this (Eaton, 2010; Cool et al., 1997). Pavitt (2002) speaks of the increasing
533
importance of innovation routines looking to external sources. The firms in this study
innovated when managers led efforts to find better ways to accomplish tasks and engaged
other departments along with outside organizations as potential sources of ideas and
comparisons. Once these organizations identified changes that they wished to accept and
keep, these adaptations are formalized and legitimized (Eaton, 2010).
While all the informant firms used rules for productivity and also organized to innovate,
the purpose of this study was to isolate best practices that arose from a third source, one that
involved breaking rules by deviating from expected behavior. This concept exists in the
literature under the name improvisation with its less structured, more spontaneous approach
to innovation (Moorman and Miner, 1998; Weick, 1998). In improvisation, actors make
changes with little or no preparation, and typically no authorization to do so. In essence, this
implies collapsing the time between developing an approach to work and executing that
approach (Moorman and Miner, 1998). It is not a studied approach to change and disregards
most formal rules in its execution. Novelty and speed are terms used by some researchers
(Chelariu et al., 2002) to describe the unplanned nature of improvisation.
While some researchers view improvisation as a type of short-term learning (Miner et al.,
2001) that takes place on the spur of the moment, other scholars think that the spontaneous
aspect of improvisation is overemphasized (Vera and Crossan, 2005) and warn that not all
outcomes from improvisation are positive. Comparing and contrasting innovation and
improvisation in this research, I used the following definitions:
Innovation Process – process based on a conscious decision to seek new information or change
existing processes (active search) many times outside the organization, usually encouraged or
approved (legitimized) by management prior to initiating, and is achieved using an interactive
approach many times as an organized collective.

Improvisation Process – process based on a decision to take a new approach that may be
conscious or unconscious in the moment (spontaneous), not usually pre-approved or authorized,
and most times initiated by an individual.
The key distinctions are that innovation is a planned choice, whereas improvisation is very
much decided in the moment; and that innovation is legitimized, possessing the authority to
change, whereas improvisation may be considered subversive. These definitions are
supported in the four cases of this field study but in a very particular order. In all the cases,
individuals improvised new methods, which, once accepted by management, were
legitimized, accepted as innovations and then labeled best practices.

Rules, schema and scripts

Employees did not rely on codified, formally written rules when performing work tasks;
instead, they relied on their memory of what needs to be done. Each of the four organizations
created documentation with formal rules to follow, available to workers should they have
questions about how to perform a task. Only the small manufacturer relied on paper copies,
QRAM whereas the others used electronic documentation. These procedures were conveyed to the
17,4 staff and rehearsed. Once memorized, they became cognitive rules for an individual and,
importantly, organizational memory. Walsh and Ungson (1991) define individual memory
as one of the containers/sources of organizational memory. Rules, in this regard, exist as
cognitive structures within the individual (Oliveira and Quinn, 2015) and within the
organization. Employees use their understanding of work processes to direct their work
534 efforts. Oliveira and Quinn (2015) state that such rules may precede routines. This suggests
that internalized rules influence not only how an employee currently performs work tasks
but also what they will consider as possibilities for change in the future. Thus, individual
memory and collectively organizational memory affects how improvisation takes place.
Other research streams refer to such rule structures as schemas (Lau and Woodman,
1995) or scripts (Gioia and Poole, 1984; Lord and Kernan, 1987). A schema is a knowledge
structure related to a particular context that specifies relevant factors and the
interrelationships between them (Crocker et al., 1984). A schema is brought to bear on a
situation when an individual organizes her/his experiences and perceptions. It is a means of
organizing knowledge and making sense of the world.
Scripts are cognitive structures that describe an appropriate sequencing of events.
Scripts help to define schemas because they are appropriate to specific situations (Gioia and
Poole, 1984). Scripts exist in degrees (strong to weak) and one of the attributes of a script is
that it is goal-directed (Lord and Kernan, 1987). This description accurately matches the
type of change identified in this study. Employees deviated from work rules, not for the sole
purpose of disobeying, but in concert with the goal of producing a desired work product
while using simpler, easier, more streamlined or somehow better steps. “I changed these
work steps to simplify my life,” stated one auditor. Lord and Kernan (1987) speak of this as a
hierarchical means-end structure. All the informants in this study had a final work result
clearly in mind when they changed their approach to a task.
All executives stated that identifying and establishing best practices for productivity is
of high importance in their businesses. Consequently, the desire for best practices was
communicated and encouraged throughout their organizations. Adopting best practices
involved behavioral changes because they embodied a new means of performing a job task.
Managers shared anecdotes about productivity increases that were recognized and captured
during the implementation of new business processes. Many times, the measures of
productivity already existed and were used to quantify an increase. Manufacturers tracked
production measures such as time per unit (cycle time), number of units produced in a time
period (velocity), number of units meeting expectations, error rates and several composite
efficiency scores. Similarly, the accounting firms formally tracked productivity measures in
total engagement time, actual to budgeted time related to a specific task, review comments
(error rates) and overall profitability of an engagement.
Deeper analysis of interview transcriptions and field notes from observation led me to
conclude that these approaches fall into the domain of different groups of employees.
Improvement in productivity based on innovation was relegated to managers, designers,
engineers and process experts who set up the original process workflows. “Find a better
way” was a theme that ran through these informants’ comments. On the other, hand
machine operators, staff accountants and low-level workers were asked to contribute to
productivity by conforming to predefined rules that exist to promote efficiency from their
work behaviors. Higher status employees who understand the reasoning behind process
workflows were given the greatest freedom to modify those workflows. Lower status
employees were instructed in the appropriate methods and their sequences. They were
expected to follow them consistently without modification. However, as I further refined my
understanding of interview comments and my field notes from observation of work Driving best
activities, a subtle theme appeared. A third path surfaced that led to productivity from an practices
unexpected source.

Third path
Specifically, I identified situations when employees deviated from prescribed work steps to
simplify tasks and make their jobs easier along the lines of improvisation (Figure 1). 535
Occasionally these deviations created a better way of performing work, which was
ultimately accepted as a “best practice.” It was a common occurrence among the four
organizations and managers spoke about their attitudes toward behavior which broke rules
and their reactions to it. Best practices are defined for this study as highly desirable
behaviors that contribute to an organization’s competitive advantage (Argote and Ingram,
2000; Nag and Gioia, 2012; Wellstein and Kieser, 2011; Argote, 2005; Argote et al., 1990)
because they are sources of efficiency and effectiveness. Specifically, best practices were
actions that “enhanced safety, quality or productivity” according to manufacturing
executives. Because safety was not an issue in accounting because of the nature of the work,
accounting partners defined best practices as actions that “enhance quality or productivity.”

Creation of routines
Work processes in each of the organizations were specifically designed at the time when the
firm developed either new products or services, or when an existing offering was
redesigned. Individuals who were the most familiar with the desired result created
processes. These were very senior people possessing highly refined technical skills, able to
provide a broad perspective, along with the required experience to not only understand the
desired result but also appreciate the rationale of why it was needed. In all cases, these
individuals worked backward from the desired result to create the necessary steps to
achieve it. “A customer comes in with a sketch of a component drawn on the back of a

Figure 1.
Third path to
improvement
QRAM napkin and it’s our job to turn that into a final result,” stated a design engineer. He went on:
17,4 “Typically I’ll get involved right from the beginning to find out what the part is, how
complicated it is and the different items that are going to have to go along with it. Once we
determine what their needs are and what the project, is then we have to determine who gets
involved, and how, and when.” Managers in the manufacturing firms articulated
requirements that included such attributes as product features, size, performance, reliability,
536 accuracy and aesthetic appeal. Manufacturing had specialized design engineers who led
efforts to develop a process. As one supervisor stated: “[we develop] a standard workflow of
who does what and when. We take a part from concept to CAD (computer-aided design),
through production and testing and layout the specifications for each step.” For example,
when an engineered product in manufacturing required a certain level of strength or a
specific type of surface finish, design engineers who had the greatest knowledge regarding
materials were summoned to help in the process design. A product designer said, “once we
determine what’s required for let’s say this part here, the operator has to know that they
have to trim the part or check it for flaws, and this is where I would get involved right at the
beginning to determine what’s a good part and what’s a bad part.” Speaking about the
resulting workflow an engineer added: “if it’s been successful, it’ll run through the shop, it
will have very few problems and we’ll have very little scrap.” Additionally, machine set-up,
quality assurance and tool design personnel were included to provide their expertise when
design questions arise.
From an accounting perspective, partners considered requirements such as accuracy,
timeliness, thoroughness and usefulness of the financial information. Accounting processes
were designed and implemented by partners who were most familiar with the specific
output relating to their discipline such as tax or audit. Here too, supporting personnel who
had detailed technical knowledge about key aspects of process design were consulted, such
as managers, senior managers and subject matter experts (SMEs). Because of the global
nature of the larger firm, process change took place at two distinct levels. Said a tax partner:
“There are some process changes that are global in scope; for example, we have client
acceptance processes and engagement acceptance processes and we use a tool that is global
in scope. So, that gets communicated globally. It starts at the top level and goes all the way
down to all of our countries across the world. Then there are processes less common that are
just local based and in that case it would be the partner in charge of our [local] practice that
would communicate that we need you to do X or Y and this is why.”
Processes in all four organizations included the necessary inputs, processing steps, tools
and techniques, output requirements for each product or service provided, supporting
documentation (specifications, procedures, operating manuals, training manuals),
supporting computer systems, assigned personnel and measurement in the form of testing
or review procedures. Inputs in manufacturing included such things as forms used to initiate
a process, or a sub-process, bills of material (including specification sheets describing the
necessary characteristics of the components) and the actual materials. In accounting, inputs
were comprised of schedules, client interviews, checklists, client documentation and prior
period working papers.
Process defines structure. In all cases, work structures were put in place before
considering supporting behavior (process before routine). The degree of formality varied
based on the size of the organization. Large firms used highly formalized methods to
implement a process, which tracked changes and used sophisticated numbering schemes,
whereas small firms used less formal methods relying more on face-to-face interaction and
on the job training. Changes to existing processes followed a similar pattern, with large
firms using elaborate tracking mechanisms in which the latest versions of workflows and
procedures were documented in formal repositories with release dates, release numbers and Driving best
company-wide e-mails to notify people of updates. “We have a procedure that defines how to practices
write procedures,” said one manufacturing engineer at the larger firm. Smaller firms relied
heavily on personal interaction, face-to-face meetings, e-mails and voicemails to notify
organizational members of process changes. “I like that I can get everyone involved in the
work into a conference room and talk it out,” stated a manager at one of the smaller firms.
Process implementation involves training. As part of implementation, of either a new
process or a changed process, each organization produced some form of employee training. 537
The training was designed to ensure that employees were able to successfully execute the
process steps or tasks. Training was intended to create the behaviors necessary to sustain
the process structure. The formality of training depended mainly on the size of the
organization. Larger firms provided more elaborate classroom training, formal certification,
tracking systems for certification, whereas smaller firms used on-the-job training.
The results of training were measured on an individual level. Employees were considered
fully trained when they were able to execute a process task successfully, repeat the task
successfully and do so quickly. This was when the concept of an organizational routine
began to come into play. As familiarity with a task increased, an individual was able to
execute the task quickly and without conscious thought about each step required. At that
point, the task was routinized and an individual routine had been created (Heimer, 1999;
Lazaric and Denis, 2005; Betsch et al., 1999; Winter and Szulanski, 2002; Hodgson and
Knudsen, 2004; Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Weiss and Ilgen, 1985). Routines created
efficiency in a task, which led to productivity gains for the organization.
Individual routines can be conceptualized using the earlier driving example from Nelson
and Winter (1982). The more proficient someone becomes at driving, the faster they can
execute the driving task. In other words, efficiency results in direct proportion to the degree
of routinization achieved. Work task routinization happened in exactly the same way in
these organizations with varying degrees of proficiency achieved (Lazaric and Denis, 2005;
Egidi and Narduzzo, 1997). Productivity increases as a car driver reduces effort to achieve
the same performance. Organizational training seeks a similar result through learning the
steps first and later gaining proficiency once tasks can be executed quickly, smoothly and
without thinking.
A designed process structure dictated the behavior required to support it, and training
was intended to guide the development of that behavior which would create efficiency in an
individual routine. Once employees involved in the process had mastered individual process
steps and skills, they were combined with other actors into a series of interrelated tasks or a
process workflow. This involved coordination of activities. It was when this series of linked
individual behaviors could be executed without much conscious thought about either the
task or the required coordination of the task, that an organizational routine existed. A senior
manager in accounting described their training process: “We have a week-long training for
everybody that comes in. You go through an entire engagement. Everybody gets in this
room with laptops and they create a company. We go through every balance sheet item. And
we have paper copies to look at and we do the whole thing as a group.” While individual
task behavior was routinized often in a classroom setting, a different level of routinization
was required for those executing the work, specifically because the work combined multiple
actors and their aggregate behaviors. I found that organizational routines were created
primarily using on-the-job training. According to an audit partner, employees began to
understand the job and become productive: “when we get them through some planning
meetings and through the cycle a few times. “One can also measure the degree of
routinization at this organizational level based on the efficiency of the coordinated actions.
QRAM In manufacturing, it was typical to introduce a newly trained employee into a functioning
17,4 group with some additional mentoring by managers to assist people “getting up to speed
and fitting into the flow of the work.”
I found three distinct drivers of workflow change in these organizations. The first driver
of workflow change occurred when adjustment is required because of some external force.
Managers indicated that this situation usually resulted from an outside change being
538 imposed on the organization. Within manufacturing this included changes to technology
such as machinery, component parts or tools. It also included changes in physical properties
of materials, such as the melting point of a different plastic or a different configuration of a
purchased component. Accounting firms experienced this imposed change primarily in the
form of new regulatory requirements. Both accounting firms and manufacturing firms
experienced externally driven change from software upgrades, changes in customer
requirements and new approaches developed in the industry. Accounting firms pointed to
revised industry standards driving their need to adopt new practices. Following the outside
notice that a change would be required, a work process was adapted and employees notified.
Additionally, employees involved in the affected aspect of a workflow were typically
retrained. “Many times we need to recertify an employee on a piece of equipment before we
can send them back into the process,” said one production engineer about upgrades in
software and equipment.
The second driver of workflow change was initiated when a problem occurred that was
not caused by human behavior. A process no longer worked as it had previously, or did not
work at all, and the cause of the problem was identified as either technology or the process
design. The result was that the workflow had to be adjusted or fixed. When technology fails,
a machine or computer program would be repaired, modified, or replaced. If a process step
fails, such as the occurrence of a bottleneck, the workflow would be rebalanced or some
corrective automation added. Barring the addition of some new technological features, none
of the four organizations typically retrained employees for this type of change.
The third driver of workflow change was also initiated when a problem occurred, but in
this case, the cause was entirely because of human behavior. An individual involved in a
workflow informally changed a task they perform, how they performed it, or the order in
which they performed it (cf. sequential variety, Pentland, 2003). This was done with neither
the authority nor the permission to make the change. Simply put, an employee deviated from
the prescribed steps of the process and modified the way they worked. If unrecognized, the
new behavior would continue more often than not until some other issue occurred. If no
issues occurred downstream in the process, the deviant behavior would continue
indefinitely. This third level of behavior, deviating from the prescribed performance, became
the focus of this study.

Criteria to assess deviant behavior

A designed process was considered a formal structure in each of these organizations
because it reflected all the decisions and rules believed necessary to produce desired
outcomes. Given that decisions and rules were documented as procedures, policies,
specifications and workflows, this structure was an aspect of formalization in organizations.
Deviation from a prescribed process was, in essence, breaking the rules. But not all rules
were considered equal. There was a hierarchy of importance. Between manufacturing and
accounting, there was a greater similarity in not only what was enforced but also how.
Manufacturing firms specified their decision criteria as safety, quality and productivity in
that order. Accounting firms used quality and productivity as criteria, also in priority
sequence (safety is not a concern in accounting because of the nature of their work, Driving best
specifically not working with machinery or tools and less physical demands). practices
Safety was the first and foremost consideration in both manufacturing plants. Safety was
identified during interviews with executives, line managers and machine operators. If
operators break safety rules, injury or death can result. Therefore, it was critical that
employees follow the prescribed steps “to the letter” as one manager said. However, safety
extends beyond the manufacturing facility when you consider product safety. An unsafe
product could cause financial loss, injury or, in extreme cases, death to a customer. “Both
539
internal plant safety, and external product safety, are considered equally important,” and
must be ensured according to a quality assurance manager. The production manager of one
plant put it this way: “If it affects customer safety, then Quality Assurance gets involved.
They make sure we follow it so we’re in compliance with laws and regulations. The first line
of defense or maybe the last line of defense is sitting right here (indicating operators and the
immediate team).” The concern with operator safety can be shown with this statement from
a production manager: “We had an ergonomic issue with that bench,” he said pointing
toward a workstation. “They had to lift a unit, turn it, put it down [. . .] there were three or
four lifts depending on how they did it and it’s an ergonomic issue because it’s a hundred
units per day and they’re picking it up four times, you do the math, they’re lifting tons.” One
production engineer said, “Generally [the priorities are] safety, quality and productivity in
that order. Changes result if I have operators not doing something or I have them doing
some different method and we have an ergonomic issue like there’s a risk of them cutting
themselves on the metal shield.”
The concern for product safety was extended to include product quality. “Quality is
number one, actually quality and safety, if there’s an ergonomic issue,” said an operator.
Quality was defined as a characteristic of a product or service being provided.
Manufacturing and accounting firms alike considered this aspect when assessing deviant
behavior. Manufacturing quality was defined in the participating companies as
conformance to specifications, reliability, durability, functionality, aesthetics and ease of
service and support for the products they produced. Accounting quality was defined as
accuracy, thoroughness, timeliness, reliability and value-added information (additional
suggestions by the audit or tax team that add value for the client). If employee behavior in
any way negatively impacted quality, all firms incurred additional work to correct the
situation. Moreover, a firm’s reputation and credibility could be tarnished by such an
occurrence. According to one manufacturing product engineer: “When we have a problem, it
costs us far more to fix that problem once it reaches the customer, than it would if we caught
it on the line. If a defect reaches the customer, we jump through hoops for that customer, not
just to correct the problem, but to make sure they’re happy with us. Word of a problem
spreads like wildfire out there and you just can’t afford to have a customer unhappy with
you.”
Accounting firms considered quality their primary determinant for making decisions
regarding deviant behavior. One audit partner, speaking about a quality control group, put
it this way: “We have charged those individuals with one thing [. . .]. and one thing only [. . .].
and that is audit quality. Do not let something get past you unless it should. So, they are the
ones that hold us all to higher standards. It really isn’t about efficiency, it is all about quality.
Because you know, one of our competitors is no longer with us today [Arthur Andersen
implied], it was a great firm [. . .] a lot of great partners got dragged down and toppled
because of some really bad decisions made by a couple of partners.” A tax partner added
that “You care about the efficiency and making sure that you get compensated, but at the
QRAM end of the day, it is quality first. “Another accounting manager said, “Quality equals trust
17,4 and we need the client’s trust to be able to do this job.”
Productivity was the third consideration relating to deviant behavior. It was considered
important by manufacturing and accounting managers alike, but far less than quality, and
much less than safety in manufacturing, as evidenced by some of the previous discussion.
An operations manager at the smaller manufacturer said, “Every competitor does the same
540 thing, you can take a tool and run it in anybody’s machine. So, you have to offer something
else, the strength of your organization, whether you can do it quicker, or more efficiently.”
And although that statement emphasizes the importance of productivity, other managers
were quick to say that efficiency really is a third priority behind safety and quality. A
production engineer stated: “It would have to be a really big productivity hit to make us
force them [employees] to do something.” Productivity was viewed as something that could
be improved over time with training, coaching and mentoring. However, ignoring quality
and/or safety were considered grounds for termination. “We try not to be overly
confrontational about it, but we do want to help them and help correct it and need to
maintain a level of efficiency,” said a tax partner.

Responses to deviant behavior

Each of the four organizations had similar responses to a deviant behavior that met their
criteria. They demonstrated three specific reactions: ignore the behavior, suppress the
behavior or accept and assimilate the behavior as a best practice.
Response 1: ignore the behavior. The most common response in all organizations was to
ignore the deviant behavior. Manufacturing managers considered whether the behavior
posed a threat to safety (first), quality (second) and productivity (third). For example, when
assembling a product one procedure called for taking a part with the left hand and inserting
a screw to hold an assembly together with the right hand. One worker took parts with her
right hand and assembled with her left. When questioned, the worker explained that this
method was easier for her because she was left-handed. The manager along with a design
engineer and a quality control manager determined that this deviation posed no safety issue
for this worker. Second, this practice would not negatively impact the quality of the product.
Lastly, it did not hinder productivity, and in this case actually preserved it and possibly
enhanced it. The quality control manager summarized this point. “It’s got to be a timesaver
and it’s got to accomplish the same goals. If it does that, I don’t have a problem with it.” A
production manager in the other manufacturing company put it this way: “I think it comes
down more to personal preference, one person likes the way I set it up and the next
individual can’t even conceive of doing it that way. As long as the net result is the parts are
going out the door in the same amount of time, I’m okay with it.” Another design engineer
shared this observation: “Quite a few of them [operators] called me over to show me a
different method. It still accomplished what I wanted them to accomplish, and it was saving
them some effort and energy so I said that’s fine if you want to do it that way. But it was
very informal. I didn’t change the procedure.” In all these instances, managers chose to
ignore the situation.
A similar example presented itself in the accounting firms. Checklists were frequently
used to ensure that all the necessary work was performed relating to some facet of an audit
engagement. A senior auditor was jumping around the checklist taking tasks out of
sequence. The engagement partner along with the manager discussed the situation. They
concluded that as long as all the work was accomplished, and because the tasks were not
sequence dependent in this case, it did not matter in what order work was performed. There
would be no negative quality effect and this approach did not hurt productivity. In this
particular case, the audit manager told me that she felt the variety in work tasks actually Driving best
helped this senior auditor stay focused on the entire engagement. They chose to ignore the practices
situation. Ultimately, a decision to ignore deviant behavior was based on evidence that
safety, quality or productivity had not been negatively affected in any way.
Response 2: suppress the behavior. The second response that was frequently chosen in
these organizations was to suppress the deviant behavior. Quality and safety issues in
manufacturing and quality issues in accounting evoked an immediate containment
response. The plant manager of one of the manufacturing plants said following of safety
541
issues: “It makes me have to police things more. It makes me have to follow up with more
people.” Another manager said, “It can become a hassle when other people internally aren’t
doing what they should be doing.” The response in both manufacturing organizations
followed similar steps. First, managers spoke with a worker to determine the reason for the
deviation. Management’s basis for disallowing the behavior was communicated to the
employee and then suggestions for improving the situation were discussed. If no
improvement was noted during the next iterations of the process, managers verbally warned
the worker. If things still did not get better the verbal warning was followed by a written
warning. Failure to adhere to management demands at that point resulted in suspension,
usually without pay, followed by termination if the situation continued when an employee
returned. Accounting responses were actually much quicker. A manager or partner
confronted the offending employee and offered assistance and training. They spoke with a
deviant employee, possibly several times, and then if improvement was not forthcoming,
dismissed the individual. As one manager put it: “The partners just don’t make exceptions.”
Response 3: accept and assimilate the behavior. The third response to deviant behavior in
these organizations was accepting the behavior and adopting it as a desired future practice.
Four things had to happen in order for a best practice to emerge successfully. First, the
practice had to be recognized as being superior. There needed to be recognition of value, that
is, benefits must exceed costs of the new practice. Second, there had to be a consensus that
the value was real. Third, there had to be a legitimizing ritual that formally accepted the
practice. Lastly, the practice needed to be added to organizational memory.
Recognize the value. When an organization recognized the value of an improvisation, it
meant that management was overlooking the violation. It was choosing to ignore that the
behavior was a deviation from prescribed actions and instead focused on how the practice
may benefit future iterations of the process. For that to happen there was also an agreement
that the value was tangible. These behaviors represented better ways of performing work
derived from employees who tried something new and different. The range of behavior
represented is highly varied from slight deviations to completely new approaches. Managers
needed to agree that a new approach would deliver better results in the future. Additionally,
the results needed to be consistent across customers/clients.
Gain consensus regarding real value. To be considered a best practice worthy of
assimilation into the current workflow structure, the behavior had to be recognized as
superior to existing work methods by the relevant actors. Managers were clear that
“benefiting the organization,” meant that a behavior increases safety, quality or
productivity. In the accounting firms, agreement was required at both the manager and
partner levels. Discussions between partners were many times brief but direct. It was very
much concerned with how applicable it was across client industries and how easily the
practice would be accepted by the work teams. In the manufacturers, managers conferred
with engineers to validate the result and ascertain that no unforeseen issues would ensue
from adoption.
QRAM Legitimizing ritual. Once agreement was reached in the firms regarding the value of the
17,4 new practice, some formal ritual took place to accept the new practice. Its adoption had to be
mandated, or at least encouraged and therefore, its existence was communicated throughout
the organization. Accounting partners sent out e-mails defining how the work would be
conducted in the following audit or tax periods. Managers and senior managers reviewed
the memos during staff meetings and verbally emphasized their acceptance of the new
542 approach. These communications from the hierarchy provided legitimacy to the practice. As
one staff accountant stated: “Once I see an email from (named partner) and my manager
says ‘hey, you need to do this’ it’s a done deal. That’s the way things are from then on.”
Both large and small manufacturers changed their SOPs to reflect a practice formally. It
was the process of updating procedures by committees in which managers (and owners in
the small firm) actively participated that granted the legitimacy needed to adopt a new
practice.
Updating organizational memory. The final stage for a best practice to take hold was to
add it to organizational memory. The communication of best practices, included under the
legitimization step, was the beginning of this phase. While best practices were handled
similarly in manufacturing and accounting, a significant difference occurred between small
and large organizations.
In small firms, best practices were communicated in face-to-face meetings or ad hoc
training sessions in which people try out the new methods “hands-on.” This experiential
learning hastened the assimilation of a practice by exposing the staff member to all the steps
and, in using a shared environment, allowed people to actively compare experiences and
discuss any reservations. The interaction seemed to enhance both the speed of assimilation
and acceptance. As one audit manager stated: “once people see that this is a better approach,
they stop wasting energy fighting it and get on with making it work.” A quality engineer
said, “they try it, it works, and they’re sold. That’s why I’ve got to make sure it works before
I show it to them.”
In these smaller firms, active practice became part of building a new routine.
Routinization allowed these individuals to create new scripts and schemas. In essence, new
rules were created to be internalized which allowed new capabilities, efficiencies and
knowledge to be captured and added to organizational memory. As these practices were
used in the work environment, multiple executions of a process reinforced the rule structures
and deepened memory. Smaller firms also had an advantage in their staff’s access to the
highest levels of management/ownership. With a reduced number of locations, there was a
familiarity with all key members of a firm’s executive group. Proximity allowed a level of
contact not available in larger firms. Staff members used this to their advantage. “I can talk
to anybody I want,” said an accounting intern, “and that makes me more confident I won’t
make stupid mistakes.”
Large organizations communicated new procedures and process maps formally. They
had sophisticated tracking systems that identified the latest versions of all critical
documentation. Work methods that were considered best practices were typically
incorporated into written procedures and were formally communicated in memos and plant
postings. They also had local managers explain new methods on-the-job and reinforced
them in day-to-day practice. Large firms used similar methods in a local plant or office
where adoption of a practice could be easily encouraged, and new behaviors reinforced.
However, at remote locations adoption was slower, at best, because of several factors.
“Distance creates empowerment,” said one accounting manager. “People don’t conform to
what they aren’t required to.” Another accounting partner stated that distant locations do
not interact directly very often. Additionally, global operations enhance delays because of
temporal and language barriers. Even locations in close proximity such as Minneapolis, Driving best
Chicago and Milwaukee shared much less than one might think. Manufacturing echoed this practices
sentiment. “We don’t communicate well outside our facility,” said a design engineer.
Implementing best practices in a larger firm had a built-in time lag if it happened at all. Yet,
larger firms did possess some powerful internal resources for overcoming delays. Both large
firms used SMEs who crossed regional reporting lines regularly. Once these experts adopted
a best practice, they dispersed it across boundaries to other areas of the company. SMEs
were a principal vehicle for the formal communication of best practices. A practice at the 543
larger accounting firm that aided the dissemination of best practices was how they handle
staffing. Staff members were assigned and rotated through a variety of engagements. “What
they learn on one project, they tend to use on another,” said one tax partner. Employee
rotation forced coordination with other members of different project teams, and informally
shared best practices became more widely known.
Another reason given for the difficulty in moving best practices between locations in a
larger organization was that particular locations were inclined to develop a local identity.
Once it was established, there was an internal resistance to influence from outside locations,
albeit inside the same organization. One partner said, “a larger office will have a different
feel to it than a medium-sized or smaller office [. . .] in a larger office, people will be more apt
to identify themselves with select groups.” When I tested for this in the smaller
organizations, results were quite different. The identity of the firm remained more powerful
even when a workgroup identity exists. Close proximity seemed to matter because critical
communication could be accomplished face-to-face. All levels of employees in smaller firms
spoke of the company as “we” and relate best practices to the organization rather than to
their particular workgroup or to themselves as individuals. When I interviewed people in the
larger two firms, they tended to speak of the company as “they” and relate best practices to
their particular team or workgroup.
Once people were aware that new methods were being adopted, routinization began. This
was a process of assimilating new behaviors in support of the new practice/process. New
rules were learned, schemas adjusted as necessary and new routine behaviors practiced
until mastered. A part of this adjustment involved updating scripts (internal rules), which
sounds easy but remains a difficult step to accomplish regardless of firm size. It required
several iterations of a process in the manufacturing firms. Once people had used the new
methods several times, they no longer referred to documentation but internalized the actions
to procedural memory. Once well-rehearsed, a best practice became part of the
organization’s memory. This was faster if employees viewed the new practice as much
better than what they had previously. As one machine operator said: “I tried all sorts of
things to make this (process step) work better. Once I got this (new practice) from my
manager, it worked like a champ and saves me loads of time.” Positive perception of a
practice led to stronger and more rapid acceptance by manufacturing and accounting
personnel alike. “Acceptance is way better when the new method actually makes their jobs
easier,” said an accounting partner.

Discussion
This study examined change in four organizations that resulted from improvised behaviors
that failed to conform to prescribed ways of performing work. Rules had been formally
documented in process descriptions, SOPs and training manuals. Formalized rules have
been studied by many researchers (Lazaric, 2000; Oliveira and Quinn, 2015; Ortmann and
Sydow, 2017; Reynaud, 2005). All would consider rules to be some form of predefined
expectation for the actions taken and/or the results to be achieved. In the current study,
QRAM when individuals departed from a predefined work structure and improvised work tasks, it
17,4 was most often for convenience sake with the objective of simplifying the work and making
a task more manageable. When discovered, this improvised behavior compelled
management to choose between three alternative responses: ignore the behavior, suppress
the behavior or accept the behavior.

544 Responses
Management chose to ignore a behavior when what the non-conforming individual was
doing was isolated and wouldn’t negatively impact another worker. As one manager stated:
“while it may make their (an employee’s) job easier, as long as it doesn’t make someone else’s
job harder, or more risky, or less productive, I really couldn’t care less.” When
manufacturing management chose to suppress a behavior such as slower than expected
process pace, the typical statement was “If someone can’t keep up with the pace, we may
have to let them go. But that’s usually after a long period of time. It’s not like a serious safety
violation where they’re fired on the spot.” Responses were similar in accounting: “I’m
confident they will get faster over time. It’s when someone refuses to do the job correctly
that I don’t want them on another engagement.” These responses are in line with what
Feldman (2000) identified as either an “unintended outcome” or a “new problem” from the
execution of a routine. She indicated that the response would be to repair the routine. The
responses in all four informant firms to either stop people from repeating a behavior or
adjusting a behavior (as in picking up the pace) were accomplished through management
coaching, penalties, or retraining.
Management chose to accept a deviation as a best practice when the improvised behavior
led to improvements in productivity, quality or safety. This began with an evaluation of the
new practice to confirm that it was superior to existing methods. Once verified as a best
practice, the new behavior was captured, specified/codified and assimilated into existing
process structures. This was in the form of process maps, SOPS, training manuals and
supporting documentation. These cases met Feldman’s (2000) “new opportunity” criteria
leading to a permanent change in the respective organization. And as Feldman had pointed
out, agency was a critical part of a routine either replicating or, as in the cases here, adapting
it.
It was easier for smaller organizations to assimilate best practices because of their ability
to gather virtually everyone affected in one room and discuss the change. Larger firms dealt
not only with size differences (the number of affected employees), but also with physical
distance, language and temporal differences because of their global structure. The disparate
groups of employees affected could not be assembled as a single group. Therefore, the larger
organizations assimilated best practices through rewriting standards, procedures,
guidelines and incorporating them into training programs. It should be noted, however, that
for the larger organizations, size caused them an additional challenge. Local work team and
office identities caused resistance to adopting best practices quickly and consistently. Each
group felt it had a right to choose its own practices to some extent. Because of this, the large
organizations in this study used specialists in the form of SMEs to proliferate the use of best
practices and used job rotation to help assimilate best practices.

Agency in routines
Structure is considered part of the ostensive aspect of routines (Feldman and Pentland,
2003). In all four firms, structure was provided by artifacts and supporting information
systems (Pentland and Feldman, 2008; Orlikowski, 2002). External structure for a routine
became a cognitive schema within a routine once workers internalized these procedural
rules. These companies used procedural rules as a means of ensuring safety, quality and Driving best
productivity which represented their highest aspirations for their work environments. practices
Reynaud (2005) spoke about employees adapting to rules that relate to routines. This was
accomplished when employees internalized the rules in these four firms. Lazaric (2000) as
well as Oliveira and Quinn (2015) use the term internal cognitive structure to represent these
internalized rules. The findings from the current study also suggest that Oliveira and Quinn
(2015) were correct in stating that rules may precede routines.
Agency has long been acknowledged by researchers as part of organizational routines 545
(Oliveira and Quinn, 2015; Feldman, 2000). Agency is important to this study precisely
because rules were imposed. A worker evaluated whether or not a rule provided them the
time savings, ease and simplicity that they required. When a worker found that a rule no
longer met their need, they changed their behavior relative to performing the task which in
turn affected other workers’ tasks (the definition of an organizational routine as being multi-
actor activities). The decision to stop following a procedural rule was a conscious choice by a
worker. Once a worker changed their behavior in a routine, other workers adapted
accordingly. It was when management became aware of an unauthorized change and
assessed its impact that a decision was made as to their preferred response specifically, to
ignore, suppress or accept the behavior.
Ignoring the breach was the easiest choice because the impact was judged to be negligible.
The practice of re-training employees was common among participant managers when the
organizational response was to suppress behavior. The purpose of re-training employees was to
reinforce existing rules by forcing compliance. This choice ensued from management’s belief
that negative effects for safety, quality or productivity were at stake. Accepting the deviance
initiated the longest chain of events. Management first evaluated the behavior and determined
it to be superior to existing practices. Following that determination, the practice was formally
acknowledged (legitimized), adopted and codified into new procedural rules. These new rules
were again routinized through training (accepted and internalized) by workers across the
organization at which point organizational memory changed. This finding reinforces Ortmann
and Sydow’s (2017) claim that rules can constrain but also enable creativity and agrees with
Moorman &Miner’s (1998) position on the power of improvisation.
Limitations. This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. Even
though I was able to study fully the two regional firms, I was limited to Midwestern
operations for both of the global organizations. Time and budget limitations prevented
investigation of remote locations. Executives in both global manufacturing and accounting
firms said that most of our discussions would apply to international locations with three
exceptions: differences in local laws, local custom and language. A second limitation is that
qualitative field case studies are somewhat idiosyncratic by their very nature. It can be
difficult to generalize results. This study was designed to preserve generalizability as much
as possible through its use of two industry sectors and the inclusion of two different sized
organizations in each sector. I chose the two industry sectors of manufacturing and
accounting to represent tangible product and intangible service offerings. However,
generalizability will need to be demonstrated through replication. There is more to learn
from not-for-profit organizations and governmental units. Additionally, industries where
risk is extremely high such as airlines, hospitals, and military units, might enhance our
understanding of how safety issues affect responses.

Conclusion
This study contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, it enriches the
existing literature on positive deviance. The findings support the argument of
QRAM Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2003) that there is value in accepting the existence of such a
17,4 concept. The study illustrates choices to disobey rules for the betterment of completing
a task. By refining the task, the organizational routine was improved, and the company
benefited in the long run. Positive deviance, represented as disobedience in this study,
was not a figure of speech but a dynamic force that was tapped to positively affect
organizational outcomes.
546 These deviations began with employees attempting to improve or simplify their
individual work tasks. Their actions, once accepted as best practices, were assimilated into
organizational routines that changed the way work processes were conducted in each of
these organizations. The study highlights the potential value of positive deviations from
prescribed behaviors. It adds disobedience as a potentially positive means to enhance the
key characteristics that were identified as critical factors by participants in this study
namely, safety, quality and productivity. This reinforces the findings of Oliveira and Quinn
(2015) that rules may precede organizational routines and Feldman’s (2000) claim that
routines can serve as a source of continuous change.
Second, the study augments our understanding of agency and its ability to positively or
negatively affect the outcomes of organizational routines. It supports the idea that the
ostensive or structural dimension of routines is dominated by a cognitive structure or
schema (Lazaric, 2000). The study revealed management’s thinking regarding this schema
and how they either reinforce or retrain that structure to preserve desired outcomes. It casts
structure as a direct reflection of an individual’s internalization of organizational rules and
places agency at the forefront of possible improvements. Ad hoc behaviors affected more
than organizational routines because once codified, it led these four firms to permanent
modification of not only the task at hand but also the underlying artifacts, processes and
systems.
Third, the study delineates three specific responses to behavior that deviates from
organizational rules found in the four participating organizations. The responses were to
ignore, suppress or accept a deviation. Additionally, the study specified criteria used in each
of these organizations that guided their response choice. The critical factors were safety,
quality and productivity. The study also contributes four unique cases to existing literature
that bridge a divide between product and service firms. It revealed courses of action
possessing more similarity than might be expected.
Finally, it encourages a reexamination of how productivity is achieved in organizations.
It moves from a top-down creation of rules using enforcement as the chief means to achieve
productivity from lower-level employees to an integrated effort engaging all actors in a
routine to actively investigate and implement best-practices. While firm size suggests that
this may be difficult in large, especially global organizations, it must be noted that it is
already happening in both global firms from this study albeit without encouragement.
In the end, there may be merit to organizations rethinking forced compliance as the
primary means to productivity and other improvements in organizational routines. One
might consider this an investment in disobedience.

Research implications. There are several possible research implications. We need to expand
the importance we place on emergent change in building organizational capabilities. We can
move beyond rules as formal codified procedures and acknowledge the role agency plays in
improvising new rule structures driven from individual behavior. Acceptance of a more
localized understanding of the term “positive deviance,” taken as nondestructive
disobedience at an individual level, deserves to occupy a place in organizational research
that currently seems somewhat sparse. Future research may investigate how scripts and Driving best
schemas supply a basis for the structural side of organizational routines. Other approaches practices
could consider ways that individuals interpret procedural expectations in their
understanding of assimilated rules. A deeper appreciation of the workings of scripts might
allow us to refine our organizational routine theory in ways that reveal subtle differences in
process structures and allow us to better understand how improvisation supports
refinement of work tasks and organizational change.
547
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Corresponding author
Joseph A. Gerard can be contacted at: gerardj@uww.edu

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