-

Benedict ~e Spinoza (1632-77)

3.01. Introduction
~ the life and teachin~ of Spinoza we find embodied the harmony of the inteJle
ctual
by
and moral excellenc_;JThis essentially Hellenic ideal, however, was achieved
an Oriental, ~or Spinoza was a Jew. Thus he is the symbol of w_hat is best in the
East and West. He laid down the. most uncompromising monotheism in the west
which essentially reminds one of the Vedanta p.hifosopby. Hence Schwe gler
suggests_that his system is a consequence of his nationality, an echo of the East.
Baruc h Spj~oza, as he was.named.originally; was born on ~he 24th November,
his
1632 in Amsterdam. He was well educated by trader parent. However, his genius
led him to have a different doctrine about, God and he was, theref
. ore, excommu-
nicate d from the Jewish synagogu.e abo~t 165~. Spinoza dedicated his life to his
lone_ly musin g, living on the meagre pitta~ce derived from the grinding of scientific
glasses. He lived a life of frugal in~ependence which he did not exchange for
of
anything, in spite of many tempting offers. In 1673 he was offered a chair
za
philosophy at Heidelberg with full freedom to teach the subject. However, Spino
at
wisely declined the offer. In early January, 1677 he fell ill and succ~mbed to it
an early age of 44.
The most celebrated work of the philosopher is Ethica. His other writings are:
The Princi ples of the Philosophy of Descartes (1670), . Tractatus Theologico-
ly
Politi cus (1670), Tractatus 4e lntellectus Emendatione,Epistolae, and the recent
discovered but important Treatise Conce rning9 od and Man. No philos~pher in the
history of P,hilos~phy has been as variously interpreted as Spinoza. The conflicting
C.
systems of pantheism and atheis.m, idealism and empirici~m, nominalism and
as
realism, naturalism .and acosmism have b~n attributed to him(! Ie was known
a 'hid~ ~s atheist' in his time but Novalis prefers to call ~im 'God-intoxicated
mysti cysuc h diverse ~~oun ts of his philosophy follow because he has been more
criticised than understood. Besides, the forbidding nature of the scholastic
terminology and the geometrical nature of the presentation are also contributory
1

factors towards the misconception of his thought. In order to estimate the just
appreciation of Spinoza we have to find out the relation in which he stood to his
predecessor Descartes. ·
220 A Critical History of Wester
n Philosophy
3.0 2. De sc ar tes an d Sp in
oz a
. .
Fo r a lo ng tim e Sp in oz a co ns ide red to be De sc ar
wa s tes m ad e co ns ist en t. Th
.
estimate of Sp mo za wa s gr tly facilitated by th e re ma rk • • is
ea of Le ib m tz .
th at Sp mo za
'on ly culti.vated ce rtam · ,
se eds of De sc ar tes ' ph ilo so ph y. In sp ite · f h
Po llo ck , af ter a 1ea med Com mentary sh ow ed th at Sp . o t e fa ct that
, m oz a wa s ne ve .
at all, we fin d Ca ird repea . . . _. r a cartesian
ting th e ol d vi e~ . "I n th e
are few differences from Sp mo zis tic _philosophy
De sc ar tes wh ich ca nn ot there
development of Cartesian be tra ce ~ to th~ nec~ssa
principles." 1 W ell De sc ar ry
bu t then the latter di d no t tes gr ea tly m flu en ce d Sp
follow Descartes. ~ e ph inoza,
pluralistic scepticism and ilo soph y of ~ es c~rte s en
Spinoza' s philosophy is deq in
in a learned article in M in a ~ratest agarnSW t. Le on
d of 19 23 , su ms up th e ph ~o th ,
three fundamentals of (i) ilo so ph y of :o es ca rte s m
th e doctrine of di sc ret e id the
must be cle ar an d distinct, ea s, fo r in or de r to be tru
(ii) Creational De ity , fo r e they
consists in Hi s po we r of ul tim ate ly th e es se nc e of God
creating an d co ns er vi ng
Voluntaristic metaphysic th e or de r of th in gs , an d (iii) the
s, for in the las t res or t,
supervenes ov er the intell bo th in m an an d Go d, will
ect. Bu t th es e fu nd am en tal
in the following manner. s ca n le ad on ly to sc ep ticl~m
Cogito ergo s~m showed tw · . ·
o things. F~rst; th e ul~imate
is lumen naturale, i.e .~ the gu ar an tee of an y t~~~
na tu rc flig ht.of cle ar in tu
as th e source of id ea s, the iti on : Bu t ~f,i nt ui tio n be
ri it cah supply on ly di sc ta~ en
cogito le.d to the criterion· of on ne cte d id ea s. Se co nd
clearness and. di sti nc tn es ly , th e
wi th on ly discrete ideas . s bu t thi s_ tes t·c an fu rn ish us
No w if the-idea be discre
ca n be no true intrinsic co te an d u~ co nn ~c ted;-~hen there
nnexions in them: As su ch
system of knqwledge. De th er e ca n be nc freal an d·rational. "
scartes sa w that ther~ co ul
to an oth er and ye t he dema d be nopa ss ag e fr61~f ~n
nded t_ha t his me tho d sh ou e id ~a
a sy ste m in su ch a wa y th at ld lea<f to-the' ~ons tn ict io
one idea should lea d to th ~-b f
connection. At this sta ge e·n ex t, iii a ch ain· of ne ce
Descartes looked upon Go ss ar y
principle fo r connecti~g d fo r su pp ly in g th e ne ce
and conserving t~e sy ste ss ar y
Cartesian ph ilo so ph y en m of th ou gh ts.
ds in scepticism ~Th e ye ra -
is th e only t~ ch sto ne of cit y of Go d, sa id De sc ar tes
knowledge, the only 'va lid ,-
and scepticism . 'T o on e g~ ar an tee ag ain st any{d
wh o pa ys attention to Go o6~t
nothing at all ca n e~ist wh d's .im me ns ity , ·it·is 'd -ear-tha t .
ich does no t de ~n d on hi
th in g th at subsists, bu t of m. Th is is ti ue ·,-rioU»:1ly of ev er y
all order, of every law , an
go od ne ss . In th e las t res d of ev ery re as on of tru th an d
ort the ·fundamental tru th
sc ien ce an d the fundamen s of ma th em ati cs , th e la ws of ,
tal principl ~s of th ou gh t ar
tc, be ete rn all y true. Bufih e va lid be ca us e Go d wi lls th em
e arbitrary will of a tra ns ce
va lid ity ·o f th e first princ nd en t Go d ca nn ot ex pl ain th e
iples, for De sc art es po in ts
if He so desires. Th e ;valid ou t th at Go d ca n ch an ge th em
ity of first principles co ul
ha d lai d do wn th at first tru d ha ve be en sa fe gu ar de d if he
ths ar e true, therefore, Go
d wi lle d th em . In ot he r wo
rd s
1. Even B. Russell in 1946
in History of Philosophy wr
modification of Descarte ites tha t 'th e metaphysics
s'. (of Spinoza) is a
Benedict de Spinoza 221
he ought to have like Spinoza, subordinated the will to the intellect. But Des~artes
by voluntarising the inteJlect of God has taken away the only plank on which he
had fixed the safety board of knowledge. .
When in the light of the veracity of God Descartes strives to explain error in
human knowledge, he shows the same bankruptcy of his metaphysics. First, the
powers of man are so feeble that he is in~apa,~le of understandi ~g the _w~rks of G~.
Rather inconsistently Descartes also wntes, We ought to submit to d1v10e authonty
rather than to our own judgment, even though the light of reason may seem to us
to suggest with the utmost clearness and evidence something opposite." Secondly,
all things depend on God who works according to ways inscrutable to us. Thus God
becomes for us an asylum of ignorance. Lastly, the inte11ect is subordinate to the
will in man. The man wills almost infinitely even when the inte11ect is highly
limited. Hence man can hardly hope to have any knowledge.
The philosophy of Spinoza, then, is a vehement protest against these
fundamentals of Descartes. His teaching is for a system of interlocking ideas and
for a true rational system in which inte11ect is the sole mistress. Only in this light
it will be possible to do justice to the contribution of Spinoza.
Two fundamentals of Sp~!"oza?s phiJosophy. According t~ Descartes an idea
is true if it is clear and distinct. B.ut even if an idea is so, we can affirm its existence
but we cannot trac~ ·-o ut it; 'cori·Q~ction',~ith other ideas. However, without any
connection l?~tween"ide·~~-'there'f aD be no
feaj"k~o~ledge. ·Spinoza starts with a
different assumpt~oh altogether. He b~gins with the unity of all that e~jsis- A thing
apart from its connections wit~ any other thin is an abstraction and unreal on that
account. In or er, t ere.ore-, that~ thing be true it must'follow rom the whole
reality. Qod is cons_idered to be the sole conservingc~us~ of_the uqiverse but then
the God of Spin.q za is infinite, immu~ble and etem_al intellect. A p!incipl~ is ·e ternal
not because God wil~s it but H~ understands it ,and.by 'u nqerstanding He creates it. ·
Thus the uni.verse reµi~ins t~oroughly ratfo~al a_n d-intellectual. God Himself being
logical or 'ration.al ·ailows .thin~s to follow from him with _intellectual necessi~y.
Hence his well-known languag~ is that everytbing follows_fprm God with the same
necessity as three ari_gles.of a triarigle =2 rt.: angles follo~s from the definition of
a triangle. This ~n_sist~nce o? the rauonal nature of the reality alone justifies the
possibility·~f real connextion in_th_i_ngs and_in:k~o~l~dge. Th_us the.two assumptions
of. the .rationality of
, ~ ., .
God arid the
, .:,.
reaHty..._
.. . . .. ;
o fevery
...
, :.. idea
., .
,
so far as it follows from God ,
give nse to a~ i;ipsolute._moµot~~ism. or·panth~ism . . ~
. E~en ~hen _Spiryo~}~. ~o~_to-b~:~e~ar~e~ as ~rtesi~_~, ~e cannot forget .tha·t
De_~ artes suppl~e_d ~-_ poWerft;Il imptils_e f?r.the Ph:ilosophy of Spi~oz,j. We find that
the 1mportant_~eapons i-~ th~ am_1oury 9_f Spinoza were forged. in the·philosophy
of ?escartes but·he used.them to establi~h a system ~ith an opposecfconclusion.
W1th_these_observ~t~ons)et us try to interpret his philosophy systeinatic~lly. ·
•. . . ..
222 A Critical History of Western Philosophy
3.03. Method of Spinoza
Spin~za has cast the ':ho le w?rld in tJ!S for?1 of~ geo
metrical t~eorem. He treats
human passions and actions as 1f they were ime
s, planes and sohds. He seems _to
have directly derived from Descartes this use of
the geometrical method. In one
of the correspondences of Descartes, we find the
following passage: "In order that
it may be profitable for each and all io read you
r meditations con_taining as they
do so much subtlety, and in our opinion, so much
truth . ... it would be well worth
the doing if, hard upon your solution of the difficul
ties, you advanced as premises
certain definitions, postulates, and axioms and then
ce drew conclusions conducting
the whole proof by the geometrical method in the
use of which you are so highly
expert. Thus would you cause each reader to have
everything in his mind, as it were,
at a single glance, and to be penetrated throughout
with a sense of the Divine being."
Descartes _himself seems to hav~ approved of the geom
etrical method but he t~ought
it to be unnecessary. However, Spinoza owned it as
the method of reaching the truth
as well as a convenient order of presenting his phil
osophy.
After the manner of Euclid, Spinoza in his Ethi
ca, gives 27 definition~, 20
axioms and 8 postulates. However Spinoza was mor
e than his piethod and the most
important contributions are given in the append
ices and longer scholia. This
geometrical method is responsible for many unfo
rtunate conclusions but the most
objectionable feature of it is that it gives dogmatic
colour to his philosophy ..First,
he does not tell us why there should be just these
27 definitions or 20 axioms and
no other. Besides, his axioms are not self-evident.
Again, we find other difficulties ,.
of the geometrical method, but at this stage let us trace
the influence of the.method ·
on his philosophy.
1. First, the geometrical metaphor is indirectly resp
onsible for his pantheism. •
In geometry there is only one presupposition of the
single reality, namely, space
and all other lines, planes and solids are but mod
ifications of that all-embracing ,j
space. Similarly, according to Spinoza, there is onl
all other t iilgs are ut mo 1 1cations of that real
ity.
one · I
Not only in geometry there is only one reality but
that reality of space follows
from the negation of 1ts modification like squares,
t~iangles etc. A square by its~lf
is not real, but its reality is precisely that which
it will have by cutting off or
removing its periphery. In the same way the infin
ite space can be r~ached only by
removing all the figures, lines and planes. In
other words, the pure space is
unlimited and any square or triangle only determin
es it or makes it limite.d. Thus
runs the famous maxim of Spinoza that every
determination ·is negation. The
supreme reality of spinoza has no qualities or dete
rmination. It is the indeterminate
ground of all that exists just in the same way in which the formless clay is the
material groun~ of all pitchers and pots .
2. Again, in geometry there is no movement. The trian
gle once formed remains
in that state . The relation which the angles bear
to one another, or to the sides of
Benedict de Spinoza 223
the triangle remains constant. Now Spinoza having cast the world in geometrical
form has made it static. Thus he denies any freedom of will as a consequence of
geometrical reasoning. If we grant that there is a triangle with certain properties,
one has to further grant that all angles of a triangle =2 rt. angles The conclusion
follows of necessity. Spinoza hopes to deduce everything following necessarily
from the nature of the substapce. Of course, man seems to be free but, according
to him, it is the result of illus~ry pictorial thinking. Man is conscious of his desires
and actions, but not of the conditions that determine them. A man, in states of
intoxication, does a great many things and in that state he Feels free. Later on he
realises that it was not he but the liquor which was working out into those actions.
Similarly, when a man sees with the eye of reason then he will find that he can no
more think himself acting otherwise than he has acted. His action is determined
and is not free.
If there be no real movement, then there could be no real causes. Everything
follows in the same way in which conclusions follow in geometry. However, the
truth of geometry is eternal or timeless e.g. the angles of a triangle =2 rt. angles
is true for all times. Henceverything in the philosophy of Spinoza is eternal or
should be viewed Sub specie aeternitatis. Instead of causes we can find only the
eter~ftl reason of all things in substance or God)
\_Just as it is illusory to maintain that man has free will to do an thin , so in
like manner God has no end or purpose for ·which He can work. he teleogical
conception of God makes Him finite. "If God works for the sa e of an end, He
necessarily seeks something of which he stands in need." This necessarily makes
God imperfect. The teleological conception according to Spinoza, follows from
anthropomorphism. Man thinks God to be a sYperman. Just as a man seems to run
after an end so he-thinks that God also has some unfulfilled desires: -Thus the use
of geometrical method led to the denial of personality to God.
Spinoza started with the unity of all things. This also presupposed a method in
which everything may be shown to follow orderly. For this reason probably Spinoz_a
chose the geometrical method. There is littl_e doubt that he also consid~d the
geometrical method as the best method of presentation for we find that he explains
the intricacies of Hebrew Grammar in the same fashion. But the best reason seems
to be the impersonal, exact and disinterested nature of mathematics which strongly
appealed to him. Mathematics does not allow personal views to distort the truth.
Human beings following their prejudices to prevail, would have remained in eternal
ignorance "had not mathematics, which deals not w·ith ends, but only with the
essences and properties of figures, pointed out to them another standard of truth."

3.04. Comments on the Geometrical Method

Whatever might have been the reason which prompted Spinoza to adopt the
geometrical method, we cannot justify its use in philosophy.
224 A Critical History of Western Philosophy
1. Any philosophy must explain all the varied experien
ce of life. Nothing can
be omitted from the thought compass of philosophers
. However, mathematics of
its very nature is partial and abstract. In geometry we
ignore the size, area, colour
etc. of the figure and concentrate on its extension alon
e. But why should we isolate
some features? Yes, it becomes necessary in any scie
nce for the convenience of
study, but then its limitation should be well kept in
view. The truth of geometry
is universal for it ignores actual state of affairs. But wha
t gives it universality, for
-the same reason makes it utterly limited. The a priori
nature of geometry cannot
disclose empirical truths. But in philosophy we cann
ot ignore concrete reality.
Hence the geometrical method with its inevitable abstracti
on cannot be thrust upon
in philosophy. If we, without caring for the limitatio
n of mathematics, use the
geometrical method then of its very nature we will
get partial and one-sided
conclusion. Spinoza treats man as if he were pure intellect
without any feeJing. Like
geometry he starts with a few thoughts and travels
in their direction without
digre~ion. This · vertical consistency prevents him
from giving his system
horizontal consistency as well. Thus in his.thought-ca
lculus a large sphere of life
.remains neglected and .unexplored. He begins with gran
d unity, but misses the
multiplicity. . .
. 2. Mathematics no doubt gives exactness of conclusio
n b.ut then it has certain
presuppositions. u ·ice every science it _is not only ab~t
ract but it has certain
assumptioD', e.g., in geometry we ass.w~e that there is
space. But who is g(?ing t9
~valuate i~ assumption? Mathe:giat1c~ cannot do it but is
left for philosophy to find
out the ~aliqity of it$ ~ssurription. At least ~en etd meta-ma
thematics to understand
the philosophicai implica'tfo~ of its.statements. For thi~
re,ason matiie~atics carin,ot
b~ equ'ated_:wit~ pht}9sophy. 13y .using Jhe geometric
al metho.d in philosophy,
SpiQ9za ·h~s identified a part wit1' the whole, something
abstract with t~e--concrete.
In current language .w.e say that Spinoza has confused
the analytic statements of
geometry 'with synthetic statements of science and com
mo~sense. ·-
3. Again, we. have seen that no facts of experie~ce can
be excluded. Actions,
movements and ends are the most glaring facts of expe
rience. We cannot explain
them ·away_by declaring them to be iHusory ..Even if they
are illusory, at best they
as -such still ·need explanation. Ho\Yever, Spinoza by
·his logico-mathematical
considerations was led to -deny the reality of human actio
ns·. But deny movement
and we cannot explajn &nything. Spinoza uses the frequent
metaphor of geometry.
He says _that all angles ~fa tria~gle =2 rt. angl~s follows
fro·m the definition of a
tri~ngle. :ijut does it follow from a triangle?"No, iqs the
human intellect with its
~ovi~g and pulsating interest ~hich moves the de~!
)iti~n of a.triangle to yield the
conclusion. Yet this moving interest is'denied by Spin
oza.
The use of the geometrical method unn(?cess~ril
y committed· him ·~ to
determinism. We find that he has to admit a certain·freed
om, movement and feeling
in man, when he _comes to teach human bondage
and freedom. Thus if the
geometrical inethod was the legacy of Descartes it was
an unfortunate legacy.
 Ben edi ct de Spi noz a 225

rib ute s and Mo des

3..05. Th e Do ctr ine of Sub sta nce , Att
wledge fall into any of the three
V ~"" :°rd ing
of sub
to Spi
stan
noz
ce,
a
attn
~II
but
our
cs
obj
and
ec1
mo
s of kno
des. So we shall exp lain eac h one of the
m.
cat ego nes ts
sta nce : Spi noz a had the vtst on of the unity of all thin gs. As suc h he star
Sub
eth ing fro m wh ich eve ryth ing can be sho wn to foll ow nec ess aril y. Thi s
wit h so~ is
ow ing Des car tes he def ine s "th at wh ich
som eth ing he cal ls sub stan ce wh ich foll nee d
lf, i.e., the con~eption of wh ich doe s not
in itse lf and is con cei ved thro ugh itse had
to its for ma tion ." Of cou rse , Des car tes
the con cep tion of ano the r thin in ord er out tha t
sub stan ces on Go d but Spi noz a poi nts
cal led min d and bod y als o dep end ent not
con trad icti on in term s. A sub stan ce can
the phr ase 'de pen den t sub sta nce s' is we re
end on any thin g else . As suG h the re can be onl y one sub stan ce. If the re
dep ay
tha n one sub sta nce Ule n the y wo uld lim it eac h oth er and thus wo u)p take aw
mo re
f-su ffic ien cy. Thi s one sub stan ce, he also cal ls Go d wh om he def ine s as
the ir sel
tely infi nite ; tha t is, sub stan ce con sist iqg in i~fi nite attr ibu tes each
a "Be ing abs olu or
ess enc e". Thu s the sub stan ce is infi nite
of wh ich exp res s ete rna l and infi nite for
tan ds tha t wh ich is uni qu.e ly ind ivid ual
unl imi ted . By inf init e, fi rstl y he und ers or
y 'in it~e lf' .. Ord ina rily we con cei ve
the sub sta nce can be , con cei ved ·onl say
a h oth er thjt;1gs. For exa mp le, wh en we
und ers tan d thin g by com par ing it wit ·~f yel low col our
thaf t the ora nge is yello'Y, the n ~e .me' an tha. t• ~rang~ has a .qua lity -
can be
l.-B ut Spi ~oz a te11s us tha t sub stan ce
.

wti ich is fou nd jn oth er thin gs ifs wel of the

~nl y by refe rrin g to itse l~.-r tiis .in; isten~~ pp _the uni que nes s
und ers too
nce
d
pre ven ts , it. fi:.o,m· hav ~ng _~ ny ~qu~ lifi qitj oo·. We . ~~m1ot s~y t_h~t t~e
sub sta
is mo ral or inte lled u~~ for the se term s. Jimit'Him. ~f.G od is .mo ral, the n
sub sta nce . is
za points out that evec,v 'determinatio11
He can not be imm ora l. Thu s ·Spino .
os,t posJtiv,e wit hou t.an y l~mit~i~~n. _T he
negation. He nce hi~ ~~b stan ce.b ec? rii~ s,m oth er'
It is.finiteJ c:,r'it ~s lim ited on an sid es QY
act ual tab le is'n ~ rea lJo r itis _finit e .. ~o on
en jill -qu alit ies of col our , we i~h t and
bod ies . Jts pute rea lity is reache(J wh d. He re
stan ce·c an ·o nly oe·n ega tive ly.d esc ribe
are abs trac ted fro m it. H~ nce, the sub
fam ous ma xim of Spi noz a is: Eve ry.d (!terminatioil'is neg ation. As·soo n as ~e
the n
ine :or qua lify ·sub sta nce by des crib i~g •i t we lirnitjq F_o r,iiistan ce, as soo
det erm
as we say tha t sub ~ta nce -is !oy~; we
af onc e_: den y cru el_ty"-t o it: Sim ilar ly, any
sha ll
r~c tly tell s.us vvh <!t it _is n<;>t :1 Lat er on?we
des crip tion of wh at s·u 6st a·n ce·i s, i_n~ nin g
xim wft h reg ard ~o.- his t~a chi ng con cer
fin d tha t Spi noz a.su ppl em ent s thi~· m~ ce
.c ont ext , Spi noz a-p ain ~ out tha t sub stan
'Inf init e attr ibu tes '·; Nev erth ele$s; fo ~~is imp lies
be des crib ed as wh at it-is not '. Bo t this is~als o fru e·th at eve ry neg atio·n
can
rma tion . F
· or in~ tanc e; whe ri we ~~y this _bro wn thin g is not a boo k, the n
som e affi iot be
e obj ect to wh ich the nam e 'bo ok'.ca:m
it, ind irec tly potnt&·out tha t it is som ipo st_·
tna:t Spi noz a hel d tha t .s ubs tan ce•i.s the
app lied . We s~a ll soo n see , the r~fo re,
-- -- -- -- -- -- ·-
,
. ' . ·,

Hegel and the Hegelians b~ve raised _this

.
maxi_m to an important logical principl~
,

of their system.
1.
at th~ b
. asis of _He'~ l's 9ialectic ,·method, 'concrete universal' and
The simp le <;onver~ of this lie~ .. .. . . .
."' . . ,·
dialectical advance. . . '
 226 A Critical History of Western Philoso h
'P y
positive entit~. Thus, it is both true that
substance can be descri e b
negations and also t at it is the most positive enti
ty. Most probably we shall be__Qett!r
h~lped if we follow his own accou~t o~ ~~e
vP.57Jf s_~!>~nce. .
noza has so defined s Ubstance that it can~ot
. . .
but be infinite, smce if it were
finite it would mean that it is limited by som
ethmg else. However, the substance
is self-determi n,ed and self-contain ed and noth
ing can affect or modify it. He also
call sitcausa sui. To begin with 'cause' means for
us an invariable relation between
two successive events. Spinoza is not using
the term for temporal connections at
all. He is trying to find out non-temporal ratio
nal connection. A cause, according
to him, explains phenomena and does not sim
ply describe them. By 'explanation'
is meant the showing of necessary connexion
between phenomena which means,
the establishment of a logical relationship betw
een them. For exampJe, a concJusion
is said to be necessarily connected with its prem
ises. Similarly, by saying that the
substance is the cause of the universe, Spin
oza wants to hold that it foJ1ows
necessarily from the substance. This kind of casu
al explanation for Spinoza is best
seen in the purely deductive system of Euclid's
geometry. Hence, the oft-repeated
statement of Spinoza is that everythin2 follo
ws from substance in the same way
in which all the angles of a tringle are together
equal to two right angles foJ1ows
from the definition of a tringle .. Hence, by
descr.ibing. substance as Causa sui,
SQinoza means that the reality is a self-exp

-
whole.
lanatory, ail-incJusive , inter-related
As Spinoza is picturing reality through geo
of reality as a logical system in which time
metrical metaphors, so he conceiy es
has no place. Therefore, he defines
substance as eternaL

~:1
,'>
..r)It:'By eternity, I mean existence itself, so far as it is
sole ly from the
' '

conceived necessarily to foilow

V ! definition of that is eternal.' ·
Y L In othe1: words, eternity fo!Jows from the very
essence of the substance. The
very essence .of the substance is that itis. Hen~e,
the substance is non-temporal and
duration-less. It cannot be described as ever-las
ting. In other words, no terms
pertaining to time can be meaningfully applied
to it. This is important to note, since
'eternal' means: .
· ·
(z) either that which endures through all time
s. This is the sense in which the
~od of religion is described as eternal. He is
said to persist through aJI
times. Hence, Yahwe described himself: 'I am
that I am'.
(ii) or, ~tern~] ~ay mean non-temporal. This is
best seen in logical relationship
of 1mpl~cat1on. For example, given .the prem
ises in a syilogism, the
concJ_us1on follow_s. The relation is not one of
temporal priority in which
premises appear fust and the condusion foilows
next. The premises and
concJusion are found together and one cann.ot
be without the other. In the
same way, the substance and its essence are time
lessly interlocked.
 Benedict de Spinoza
227
There is also another characteristic of sub . .
. toS moz.a n I
it_!_s one or s1mp e. ts oes not require elaborate explanation here ' ame ,
more than one substance, then they would limit one an th _ · If there were
. f' . . o er, and none of the
therefore, wou Id b em mite m the sense of being unaffect db m,
. e Yanother. Howe
if we argue that there are a number of substances which t d . ver,
· · d · h' ye O not mteract as
Le1bmtz assume m JS monadology then the difficu1ty wo Id · . · '
. . ' u arise With regard
to the umty and harmony of the umverse. If one has to trust h' .
. . . . . JS expenence, then
this world certamly presents a multJphc1ty. Even if there is no· co 1 t h
. . . . mp e e armony
certamly obJects•
do appear m mutual interaction How
• ·
can a Lei'bn't • '
1 z, assummg
a numbe~ of mdependent ~onads, explain this·interaction? Leibnitz had to assume
~he doctnne:of_P:e-establishedHarmony toaccountfor the unity and inter-action
rn the mult1ph~1ty. But we shali- also•see that this doctrine of pre-established
harmony_~as faded to explain the unity. Hence, Spinoza, consistently adhering to
the defimt10n of substance and its infiniteness rightty held that there could be one
substance only. · ·

3.06. Implications of the Doctriil~ofSubstance .·

fSo far we have seen tha~ Spin~zair~i~r~ s~b~Yll_l_c~ as one, irifinite, self-caused and
eternal reality from which all (hings f.01Jow,1;1ece~.sarily. Apparent1y,thisis also the
description of God in th~ology.-For thi:s· reasor{Spino~a ca11s'substances as God.
/ This created troubl,e for Spinoza"'in his lif~-~i~¢:~ith the resylt that he ~as despised,
decried and denounced by his contein.poraries~ts real,.impl!cation ~as not-'>een fu11y
realised even now. We shall ·comment on this a Jittle 'later. Again, as God or
~ , I • •

substance is an all-inclusive whole, outside of which nothing can lie, so Nature

conceived as a whoie is identical.with 'abct-.,Hence, God and·Nature are one. This
·of
is known as pantheism,' accordin~ to whicii,the t~alfry a·single God 'permeates
and indwells all things. . '• ' I •• • .. • • • .

Again, as substance is infinite and whatever tti~re· is .f~Hows from God ~r

substance, so God is said to be causa sui or self-creative._'I)lis at once makes clear
what Spinoza meant by' God. In _WesterQ u,eology Go·d is. take(l.~o be a-personal
Being, having will, intellect and feeling ... He is· also said t? be the creator -of the
universe. Spinoza denies_this concept of God. AfCo,<;l_in~ t_o him, God can create
only out of so·m e pr~-existing' ni'aite'r. This;-f ~~ld)ri~~e _matter co-'etemal with God
and ultimately,wquld l~d fo ciuali-~ni an_dp?,ft~ mo~ism. Later on, Kant in his own
way has shown that a creator ·a bd~~{ ni9,sh:an'be. a~ ·*tc_hitect or a des~gner, but
not an infinite God: io/ flji-~~ir~aso4t :spino_z.a :<;onsi.steli~ly maintaining monism,
~enied the concept of;~:~re'~tor ·_c;o·qt Furth~r; the concept of a ,creator God would
lead us to suppos~ the f.~aiiif ~ftbe' te~.poral'or~er. It would mean ~hat there was
a time when there wa~· ~16 world 'and there would be a time when there would be
no world. But we ~a~e-~irC?acif s~en 'th"at natµre or substance is ete~al or Iion-
temporal. . ,.. ' ',- •! I
 22 8 A Critical History of Western Philo
sophy
Further God and Nature are identical
and nature is gove~ed by etema_l
. b , interr elatio nship. Under this rational order there ts laws,
1.e., y 1ogtca1 no roo m for chaos
or arbitrariness. Everything is strict · d E h' f 11
ly determine . ver yt _1~g o _ows necessarily
in the same way in which implicates
follow from a propos1t1on. Gtven 'Al
it follows l Sis P',
I. No not-P is S.
II. Some P is S.
III. Some not-S is not-P etc.
Again, nature being causa sui is sel
f-creating. Hence, .it means that Na
fully intelligible by itself alone, and ture is
, there is no necessity for appeal
transcendent God. This is known as ~ng to a
Spinoza~s materialis.m. The importa
to note that logical determinism has nt.thing is
no room for voluntary freedom. Th
have different contexts altogether. e two things
'Determinism' of Spinoza has nothi
about the freedom of will in man wh ng to say
ich pertains to voluntary a~io~. Ho
we follow Spinoza and his doctrine wever, if
of determinism, then the freedom of
comes to be denied. God, being cau will also
sa sui is said to be a free cause. ·Bu
cause' is meant that there is nothing t by 'free
outside of him by which.th.isJlctio
determined. But God cannot be said n will be
to.have any will or feeling at.all. Go
is simply an all-inclusive, int~rrelated d as nature
.logicalsystem. A logical\y~tem has
for will. Similarly, ·mathema~ical
enjoyment~So God has no wilf or
a tQe,orem has n.o room -for.'.will, :activ
~o room
ity or
feeliri'g. Hence~ by equ(ltirig_:God wi_
Spinoza speaks of an impers()nal Go di.Nature,
_·sy_stem of Spinoza is_pantheism. d. He ric e,J rom a the 91o gi,cal ~ta~cipoint the
. .. . . : . · .-. ,. .. . ' .- ,;, .
i-, - .· Pantheism is not qu
ite popular in the West and eviden~e
t' pantheism, hav~ng its ·root in Plotinus ~ho~l)hat Western
was Indfap in prigin~ C~~stf~ 1y; hav
.fou. ndation in Judaism was anti-pant ipg its
, hei stic : Wh en Jes us sai: d. tha fb~ ndhls
were one, then, the Bible says, Jew • • . .. '. . ' ' . ·-; ..:..'.::;~_.-_.;fl, father
s sought to kill him becau~ ~ of. tW~ ~la
... ~

As pantheism maintains that all is sphemy.

God so trees, rivers and] n~nforate
are God. Hence, God in pantheism objects too
tends to imperso_na~: .autth?ci~g.o
Christians hearkens.to the prayers, alle
viate~ the suffering o(devoiees:atid
f Je:Ws and
and punishes each man according to rewards
his ~9 r~ . Thereforei; 'h~:1f personal.
denying the concept of a creator, and
• apersonal God.who t brk:f a~o~dingNotowhis by
inscrutable ways, Sp~noza d~ni:~ ~~e • . . ,,•.• , • .,, ..... ; ·' ,
._ onJ.y typ~-o~,~~l.i~or( ~~~~~-iY~~ rea
•. i.· '~

W estemers~ For.this re~on ·&p l ~-o the

ino:ia ·was bra~9est as .a) !JJQe~o~:s:'aJli~
As there is nothing over and above ist '.
yod~' so·a1f is._G6ci'an,feveiyfhing
from God. F~r this_teason_a4ct i'~-~i4 follows
of the .universe . .So .God,:accotciin
.~\ ,et tie Jrid w~ iifµ g ~p_d·p~a~i~~.1jii_n~iple
t_to:.,~p1 ~9za; :,
iii~t.~~d;of ),dng .r~g~!_ded as
tran~ndent_ is ~eallr an imm~~e_ri~
creating reahty 1s known as lf.atur< ¢r~~n?: R~:~~r:i~~r
.t~~.p.o_d.
1.N~turqns,a~ord1ng- _to,,.Sp1~~?\ fi.g a~--~_se!f-
:?(~1!~te
static aspect, in its as ~t of a creativi,p am:, m its
ro4,µc(ii ati re"isJch§~ a\ nat~ra ~tu
i.e.~ sum~to~l of. all that ;exists : He rata,
ni/ nat~r'e··i( a:::~~f.:lxP.l~µ_af?.ry ·a_n
contained system. No w if we eniph d s_elf-
. asize··the ro1e·6 fitafur~,.a~:a_-~elf-exp
• . . ·,
, • _, ~ lanawry
-
-~ )-•- . ..:.--:_

~ :- ';, f ,:' .
~
.. ,; ~; ~ -;;_'--:;°'--;
 Benedict de Spinoza 229
re, then this will be
reality and if we emphasize the statement that God is natu
connected system one
tantamount to atheism. Here nature is conceived as one inter
omena, physicai and
intelligible and self-contained cosmos, inclusive of alJ phen
there is nor room for
psychical, past, present and future.• In such a generalisation
We shaJJ find that things
God. But, there are occasions where nature is suppressed.
es. And modes are like
of human experience have been called by Spinoza as mod
nal aspect, the world
the ever-vanishing waves that never are. In this phenome
is All. In this phase he
appeared to him unreal and God as fuJJy real. God alon~
the cosmos. Here Hegel
becomes God intoxicated mystic and denies the reality_of
observes:
termed Acosmism
Spinozism might really just as welJ or even better have been
.to ·the worl d, finite
(than atheism), since according to its teaching it is not
-to the ascribed, but
existence, the universe, that reality and permanency are
as
rather to God alone the substantial.
-

n an ~II-inclusive, self-
One wonders ~s to why God should have bee~ br~µghfl
explanatory syst e~ of nature: ~d -_i_f ,Go~-does· m~~~~,
.theri why sh9u ld he be
tends to obliterate it.
equated with µature .whic;~·i-n~te~d ·ofJM,rtj~g_·r eti~ ous·fire
in things whic h were
We shall find that Spinoza is t_ry~ng tp'te ath a~out God _certa
then this religion is not
never taught aboµt him. If Spinoza is: tea~lii~g'a ~eligio~,
ing coul<:1 be better
only anti -Je~ sh b1:1t ~s _also ail_tf-theistic. · This· new _te~ch
nature. We shaJl learn
understo~d, a_ccor~ng to ·s p1n6 ~, ~y ~qu~_ti9g''God ·wit~
attributes arid modes .
more abou t ii-If w~ foilow Spin 9za's dodrin~ concerning·
..,. ' : ,, , : . I , • , l' , .,. ', I • ,
•

'·. ,.. '

3.07. Attr ibut es

may be either es;in tial
Ther e can be nosu bs~ n~ with~u_tat~b utes . H~e ver, they
i.e:;w itho ut whic h the
or accidental. ·Toe essential attributes·define a ·substance,
tes are those variable
substance wou ld·cease·to·be substance. The accideh.talattribu
b_e.wha t it.is.
char~cters wm~h a -s-~bstance can lose_with ~t ceasing -~o~
stituting the essence
By .' attri bute ' i mean that which,i~t~llect per,ceiv.p$ _as-~on
·of substance, '. . . . ·. ,_, .. · . - . . -~ . . ' . : ..

lect perc eive s? This

Are _th~ attributes Sdb j~Jt ~?-A ie they\~rbat,t hehu ma~ intel
'attri bute s' if we accent
is an interpreia~9ti·w1nch :caifbe put on-ih~ definition 'o f
' the first part of.'the seni en~: 'Ho~ev:er;: subjectivism· is· foreign . to Spin oza' s
to whic h there coul d be
thinking. He was brought iip ip. scholastic logic, according
be long to the substance
__ no substanc~ wit~o,it;( ~;a_ttributes~ ·Hence, attributes do
ite, so-i t has an infinite
as its ess_ence. As'-th~$ribstarice is self-contained and is infin
an infinite number 6f
'number. of attrib¥ie~;:a:e n~, _the.substance of Spinoza has
e-infinite_~y. At thi~ ·
attJibut~; each _9f whi chexpresses the essence of the substanc . ' "
- . .. .
and the Germ an Ideali sts'--P hiioso j,hy, April, · 1946: Also
,
1. Cop l~n, ~-~·• .'P~~ eism
- Spi?o
in_ .7:.8
·· · . _ · . :: . ' ·
see Hampshire, S.; Spu,oza, A Pehcan Boo~ ppi 46f.
 230 A Critical History of Western Philosophy
stage one is reminded of the dictum' every determination is ?egat~on' and according
to this dictum the substance was interpreted as an empty Bemg without any content.
Now it appears that like a juggler out a~ empt.y h.at~ Spinoza has fille~ the colourles~,
blank substance at a single stroke with an mfm1te number of attnbutes. But this
criticism is unjust, since we have already remarked earlier that substance has no
finite attributes which limits the substance. But an infinite nu~ber of attributes,
each of which boundlessly or infinitely expresses the essence of substance cannot
make the substance limited. In other words, under two conditions an attribute can
limit the substance, namely,
1. If an attribute excludes the possibility of other attributes, i.e. if one
determination negates other determinations, and,
2. If an attribute by itself is finite. Now God has infinite attributes which
neither limit one another, nor the substance. They are co-existent properties
each of which equally manifests the essence of the substance. Thus the
infinite number of attributes, each infinite in itself leaves the substance
indeterminate. Further, each attribute taken by itself does not limit the
substance, but manifests its nature infinitely and boundlessly.
One wonders whether an infinite number of attributes can co-exist without mutual
exclusio
___, n By way af illustration his point on this score, Spinoza holds that out of
.
an iI!_finite number of attributes, human intellect can perceive only two, namely,
extension and thought. Here thought and extension, as Descartes had made familiar, ·
are qmte independent of each other. As such these two attributes do not limit each
_ other. Further, each of them is infinite in its own kind. Thus, there is possibility
of an infinite number of attributes, coexisting together which neither limit one
another nor the substance.

3.08. Parallelism of Though t and Extension

The doctrine of infinite attributes follows deductively from the dt:finition of
substance: But Spinoza might have been additionally satisfied about it because of
its adequacy in solving the problem of mind-body relationship. Descartes had held
mind and body to be relative substances which were quite independent of each
other. In spite of its usefulness in evading conflict between science and religion,
mechanism and Grace, the dualism of Descartes did not work well. First, there could
be only one substance and if there were more than one, they would limit each other
and would destroy their mutua~_substantiality. In the eye of Spinoza the phrase
'relative substances' seemed self-contradictory . Secondly, Descartes himself could
not help noting their mutual interaction which went agai~st his dualism. This
position further deteriorated in later Cartesians who upheld the theory )of
O£casionalism. According to this theory extension is not the cause of thought and
vice-versf:1, but. one is the occasion of the other. However, it was maintained that
God'intervened at such occasions in causmg cfi'tnges in mind and body. Spinoza
Benedict de Spinoza
231
did not favour this perpetual appeal to the inscrutable will of a mythical God. For
this reason Spinoza rejected cartesian dualism and rejected the substantiality of
mind and body. He regarded mind and body, extension and thought as two of the
many inseparable aspects of a single, all-inclusive reality. Being co-existent
attributes of the substance, thought and extension cannot interact.
How are they related? Well, only like can cause the like.-l'he...two, therefore,
c@not interact, butthey run parallel to each other. They_are infinite but independent
of one-another, each capable of expressing God infinitely in its own way. God is
extended as well as thinking. These two are but two inseparable aspect of the same
thing, like the convex and concave of the same lens. From one viewpoint God
appears as infinite extension, as from another angle, he appears as infinite intellect
in the same way in which the same person is known as Jacob as well as Israel. No
one aspect can exist without the other. Sub~tance thinking and substance extended
are one and the same substance, apprehended n<;>w through one Attribute, now
through the other. To every m9de.of extension corresponds a mode of thought, in ·
the same order or series. A circle and an idea of a circle are one and the same thing,
looked at from the angle of extension and thought respectively. But this parallelism
excludes materialism as well as idealism, for matter cannot explain mind, nor mind
can explain matter.
This parallelism, with the doctrine ofinfinite attributes, shows that not only God
but everyth ing has an aspect of infinite viewpoints but we human beings can know
only two, namely, extension and thought. But we may leg~timately ask, why are
we condem ned to two attributes alone? If thougµt can know extension, why can
it not know the other attributes as well? Both these ,questions Spinoza could not
answ~r satisfactorily. He pointed out that human beings can know only two for they
are embodi ed spiri~. But then everything is end9.wed·with infinite viewpo ints and
so human beings too have mariy more aspects than two. Besides, if intellec t can
know some~hing .other than itself, extension, than how ~an it not know ·other
attributes as wei~? Once grant that thought can, overstep its bounda ry, there is
nothing which can be excluded fr.om its grasp'. Again, in ~tri9t paraUelism, this
concess ion to intellec t shows something corresponding to which there is nothing
in extension..Henc:e, in spite of paralle~ism Spinoza has his idealistic leaning.
There are certain inconsistent poib.ts I n.the doctrine of attributes. First, there
seems to.be . .no:- -iogical reason why the i~determinate substan ce which has no
determipation s~ould have any attribute-at all. The solution of filling the empty
substan ce with attributes appears to be highly a priQri and verbaL Second ly, there
is no principle underlying the attributes. They are infinite but they are independent
of one a~other: !"fence, the substance is.simpl y an aggrega te and not an organised
whole of the attributes. Such an aggregate can· never give us the true unity which
is the real aim of Spinoza to establish. Besides, to call such an aggr ~f.attributes
infini_te is to confoun d the term. The 'infinite attribut es' simply mean~ i:iuri1erical
infinite or false infinite of endlessness or indefiniteness. Lastly, his definitio n of
 232 A Critical History of Western Phiiosophy

attn'butes 1s
· s0 ambi'guous that ultimately it amounts to saying attributes really
. . . .
qualify nothing, since the very nature ~fan attr~bute IS that it should b.e.cons1s t~nt
with some state of affairs and inconsistent with others. B_ut an attnbute which
continues to qualify under infinite number of circums~ances IS :acuou s. Hence, the
infinite number of attributes )eaves the substance as mdetermmate as before. The
illustration of thought and extension as infinite does not help the case. What is the
meaning of infinite thought? Is it the pure consciousnes~ of the Ved~nti_ns or the
pure thought of Aristotle which has no content? A consc10usne~s which is .no~ t~e
consciousness of any object is nothing. The same trouble hes about mfmJte
extension. The very nature of extension in the concrete is that it should be Jimited.
Further can a substance be both extended and inextended (thought)? As Jong
as we picture' thought and
extension as two paraHel Jines, we can go on with their
co-existence. But this pictorial · thinking should not blind us to their identity.
According to Spinoza, mind and body are one and the same. Later on, Samuei
Alexander,1 elaborated this theory of Spinoza and he he) d that mind and body are
identical. The object contemplated is the brain and the same thing Jived through
and enjoyed is the mind. Strangely enough, but quite consistently with Spinozism,
Alexander held that thought is extended. It was this difficulty which led Leibnitz
to deny extension in favour of the reality of spiritual inextended monads alone. _

___,3.09. Modes
j
The attributes, even when they do belong to the substance, do not explain the finite
things of human experience for they are infinite. In·his doctrine of modes, Spinoza
hopes to explain the world of finite and individual things. However, at the outset,
we wonder whether the finite modes can ever be derived from the substance and
attributes in the light of his saying that "only the infinite can follow from the infinite,
the finite can follow on] y from the finite". Hence we find that modes'keep the nature
of the substance as much indeterminate as the possession of the attributes did. Into
this ·seeming contradiction we shall enquire later. So now Jet us fol1ow what he has
r to say about the modes. ..
"By mode", says Spinoza, "I understand affections of substance or that which ·
is in a_nother, t?rough which it is also conceived". The modes are individual things
of fimte expenen~e. They are to the substance wh~t the waves are to tfie sea, shapes
that perpetually die away that never are; They can never exist without the substance
!hough the su~stance can exist without them. He seems to hoid that they are either
10
anoth~r or 10 G~. Every mode-is in God for nothing can exist without God.·But
then agam says Spmoza, "That which is finite and has a determinate existence
cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever
follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal. It
1. Space, Time and Deity,Vol. I, pp. 101 103 105
~ " , , .
J.V. Bate~an, Professor's Al.exander's proofs of the spatiotemporal
Philosophical Review 1940, pp. 316- 17. nature of mind, The
·
Benedict de Spinoza 233
must, therefore, follow from God o~ from some attribute of God, in so far as He
is considered as affected by some mode, ... (or) in so far as He is modified by
modification which is finite and has a detenninate existence." 1 To these two ways
of looking at modes, he returns again and again. Modes are said to be actual in so
far as they exist at a certain time and place·. Viewed in this way they do not follow
from God but from the interminable series or connection of finite things. But modes
are said to real when we conceive them under th~ form of eternity. As such they
are to be viewed as they are in God. Every mode is rot lost for every idea of an
individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the idea of the eternal and
infinite essence of God ... for. the force by which individual thing perseveres in
its own existence follows from the eternal necessity of the divine nature." 1 Thus
Spinoza sometimes regards the modes to be real affections actually existing in God
and sometimes looks upon t~em as mere illusions created by abstraci imagination
which views things as separated and unrelated. We shall soon see that both these
views can be reconciled but then they wouJd·Jeave the substance as indeterminate
as before. However, before we cmiclude that- the system of Spinoza is really
acosmic nihili_sm·let us see what he hasfo say about the other kind of mode which
he calls infinite. · ·

3.10. The lnfinite:M~,

Most probabiy Spinoza at ·this .stage sought to reconcile the finite and the infinite
for in the last resort the\ ~6i,Id-of firitt~ things· has to be explained in terms of the
absolute reality... He:hopes-to_bridge this gulf between the infinite substance.and
finite things with the _help.of the_oty.of infinite _modesi_As ~odes.they belong to the
finite world.and as in-fi~ite they belong to the ~rder of.substance as well. "Every ·
mode which exists-botlr,necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow, either
from the absolute-nature of some attribute.of God, or from an attribute modified
by a modification ~hi_~-h-exists necessarily and as'infinite." Thus infinite modes (i)
follow immediately'fro_m attribut.es like-th.e infi~ite.inteUect fol}owi(!g immediately
from thought, a'rid motion ,and rest'frorrl; t6e attribute-of ~~!ension"~rJii) they foll ow
from the attrib~te alieaay modified like the whole unive~se which_ though contains
fleeting ~nd'fjn,i~et~~og_is ~~ a·w~t>~~infinite andpermane~t. Tbe infinite intellect
followingimmedi~tely ffom the absolute ~ttribu,te of thoug_ht'is that which while
it remains ·onewith itself, js·yet the grouttd of aH·ideas. Thus this infinite mode of
infinite intell~ct realty--J:iieans _a coilscJ.?usness·· which·containing all ·other finite
thoughts an~_ideas c9ilti_nu.es tc>'be th«fsanie; ~lence it means an all-embracing self-
conscio_u sn~. Howe~er., ~pinoµ nevef clearly lays down its nature. Aga-in, he says
that motion-an~.r~s.t_inpn,~ia_tel.y fo)l_ow fro~ extension. This means that Spinoza
,does not.Jegard ex~~~jQn:.a~"purely· passive,,but according to him extension is
essentially endowe~ -~ th-activity. ·
~~t th_e infini_te/ mode ~lso follows from .the attribute already modifi~d by a
rpod1fi~at10_11. In this_ sense the whole universe is itself regarded as infinite mode.
_The thmgs m the um verse are no doubt finite but the univers~ _as -a whole, ~s the
1. Italics ours.
234 A Critical History of Western Philosophy
sum-total of all finite things is said to be infinite. This can be explained by
saying that men as individual beings come and go but man as the species remains
forever. In the same way the individual things are finite but together they are
infinite.
Before we discuss the relation of the substance and modes, it would not be out
of place to point out that the term 'infinite mode' does not give any meaning to
the world of finites for the endless chain of finite things fails to give the finite in
the same way in which the summation of zeroes cannot give a positive number or
the addition of points cannot yield a line. His indefinite chain of modes should not
be falsely called infinite.
3.11. Monism and Pantheism
Reverting to the earlier question we have to decide whether Spinoza is to be
regarded as a pantheist or not. Pantheism is the doctrine according to which the
things or modes have no existence of .their own. They are mere illusion or
abstractions drawn by ima~ination. l~. the last analysis pantheism lays dawn that
G<fcialone is real and all other finite things are suppressed or annuHed in the
existence of God. This question has to be answered for Spinoza regards modes
sometimes as fictitious and at times he regards them as real. As held before the
modes are said to be m God and as such they are eternal and real. But he also holds
that the modes to be modes are det~rmined not directly by God but by other modes
and as such the modes being temporal and finite cannot follow from the infinite
substance and therefore are unreal. ln the light of these conflicting tendencies let
us try. to explain his philosophy with the help of his own illustration.
~ ough the modes cannot exist without the substance yet there are passages in
Spinoza which show that really nothing exists except the substance and its ever-
perishing modes. This relationship of the substance with the modes is of the same
nature as of the plane of its various figures inscribed in it In order to simplify the
illustration let us liken the substance to the infinitely extended plane and the modes
,may be like-wise compared to the many squares on it as in a graph.paper. Now the
position, extent and area of each square are determined by surrounding squares. .
They also in turn are determined by other surrounding squares and there seems to
be no limit to the chain. Hence any one square is determined by other squares and
not by the infinite plane itself. In the same way each mode is in other things and
through which it is conceived and determined. Interpreted in this way the mode is
unreal and does not follow from the substance.
However, there is another.sense in which a mode is in God and by virtue of this
positive nature it perseveres in its existence: This eternal nature of the mode follows
from the following considerations:
(a) Each finite thing, as in the graph each square, results from the infinite totality
or multiplicity. However, this totality or natura naturata as infinite mode is directly
caused by God. Therefore, .,tach mode fol)aws fiow Qod.
(b) Again, the modescanno ceived to be existent without the s stance.
Benedict de Spinoza 235
Th US the being of the substanc e is the necessary ground for the understanding and
. tence of the modes.
ex1s • .
(c) Lastly, the substanc e 1s the ~ure bemg or the ~ositive essence. Now even
he finite mode must have some bemg, even though 1t may be momentary in the
~ame way in which a square in the plane must have some extension at least.
· Thus each mode is real when it artici ates in the natu al
t~ ctual, wbeo it i~ seen ta b~ detecwi.oed ?>' the infinite multiplicity of all
other finite things. But still the question remams, why has Spinoza given apparently
contradictory stateme nts about the modes? now Spinoza had to talk of the modes
for he had to explain the individual things of the world. But he seems to suggest
that modes as modes really do not exist. Their sole reality, as of the square in the
graph, lies when it is pure being. The square is said to be real by virtue of its being
extended. But mere extensio n, which is said to constitute the reality of the square,
really annuls it. A square is a square because of its area, extent and position, but
these qualities do not follow from the plane. The real qualities by virtue of which
a square become s an actual thing ~re determined by the multiplicity of things and
not by the substanc e.1 Thus Spinoza is really pantheistic for he negates the actuality
of things. The same trend is to be detected in his theory of Infinite modes.
The doctrine of infinite modes aims at reconciling the multiplicity of things with
the infinite substance. But here as elsewhe re what Spinoza gives with one hand he
takes away with the other. There are places where Spinoza sa·y s that the nature is
God and God is nature. He himself ~ints dµt that God is natura naturata looked
as the total aggregate of the finite things. This infinite mode in the form of the whole
universes he says, is the first in the descent from the subst,ance and the last in ascent
of finite things. But then, natura naturata does not mean the sum-total of the modes
as actual things for the followin g reason: ·
1. Finite things, like squares on the graph, come much later. The substanc e, as
the infinitely extende d plane, remains the only eternal reality. As such the sum total
of the squares cannot be said to constitu te the original plane.
2. Besides, the original infinitel y extende d plane can be reached , not by adding
the squares but by removin g them away. The·natura naturata to b'e merged in 1uztura
naturans means the negation of all finite things.
. This pantheis tic tendenc y in negatfng the world of finite things is further s_een
10 Ethics
and his theory of knowl¢d ge. A point as point cannot be understood as
long as it is not viewed in a line· a line as line does not exist a·s long as it is not
. '
Vle~ed in relation to a surface ancfthe upward urge for the completion of knowledge
cont~nues. Howeve r, though a point cannot exist without a line·yet it ceases to be
a ~omt When merged in a line. Similarl y the finite things as finite cannot exi st
With h ' ..
out t e substanc e but being merged in the substan ce -they cease to be.

1. A thing · 581"d . spat1otemp

But
is to be act"al when it can be known through sen~-orga ns m ·
oraI frame.
a thing i·s
rea I w hen 1t
. 1s
. pennanen
t and eternal. ·
 A Critical History of Western Philosophy
236
3.12. Criticism of Spinoza's Pantheism
. . . th · tic and nihilistic and we doubt whether any monistic
Thus Spmoz1sm ts pan ets . • ..
. lse It remains a vast structure of ]og1ca1consistency but
system can be anyt h mg e · . d
•th s proved vast]y unconvincmg. It has prove repe11 ent for
for that very reason 1 a . .
. . · 1· t' But is man pure]y rationa]? No, he remams a seething
It IS purely rattona IS IC. . . . . . '
• f
surging sea o emo 1 t'on and fee1ing Yet Spmoza, hke the vadantms m India, has
• • • .•
. a
·
completel y ignore d them . Trust Spinoza and hts logic and we are promised
. . .
sublime height from which to view things sub specie aetermt~tzs. But th~ hig?er
we ascend, we to our utmost dismay, instead of the promised sunshme fmd
ourselves enveloped on all sides by the chi11y wind. . . _'
The rationalist Spinoza is 'saturated with the strong conf1denc~ m the
omnipotence of the reason and the rational constitution of true rea1ity._' This
rationalism leads him to abstractionism for he lays down that that a]one is true which
is clear to reaso~. All other things which cannot be clear]y demon~trated· as
belonging to the total structure of thought must be fegarded as i1Ius9ry. The
multiplicity of finite things as finite cann~t follow,from the infinite. A~ such they
are set aside. This gives him an abstract unity from which multipli~ity has
disappeared. But abstractionism is a vicious method. The abstract man means a
rational being. It is certainly more .clear and siQ1pler than a concrete -mari -wit~ a
large num~er of other qualities besides anima1ity and rationality. But we doubt
whether _the abstract man is more real than the concrete man. ·
. Again, grant to Spinoza tha·t the substance .alone is r~al and it follo~s. that
everything temporal is illusory created by imagination. But then. the question_still
remains, how has illusion arisen? What is the locus of this fictitious world of finite
things? By-calling the world imaginary created by hu.man intellect d~es.not ~xplain
i~; When everything is eternal, how has temporal emerged; when all .i s iight, how
has shadow come? · ··
. ..
Spinozism does n.o t satisfy the intellect in spite of its intelle~tualisrri for it
, ex~lai?s aw~y the f~nite things. However, the finite things ·are our .data 0 ~ focts
which, as philosophers, we want _to explain.:By declaring them to b~.-~-q n-exi;tent
we do not understandthem. It simply_means th~t there ar~ no daJa for philosop_~y.
Bu~.de~y the dat~ ~nd we de~y. the conclusio_n which i~ -°i>hilo,s ophy_itself. Thus
Spmozism when, ~ti~ most true, is m(?st.~elf-coiltra~cto~y. No conscious being can·
court self-contradiction and much 1 S · H · · ·
. .. ess. pmoza. owev_er, self.._contradiction begins
toshowitselfwhenthemn ermanrebelsagainsthisph ilos·oph ·S ; . . 't
th h" h'l 1 h . . -. y. pmozawasgrea er
an is P_ osop Yand 10 his Ethics h~ tries to impart certain arri'ount ;f freed~m
and etermty even to finite individuals. So let us tr t d • ,·• · · ·
is the final aim of his philosophy. . y o un erstand_~is Ethi.cs wJuc_h

3.13. Ethics of Spinoza

. .
Spinoza's philosophy no doubt is highly intellectual bu. t h' • ·_ . · · .
. 1s aim 1s pract1ca 1.
.,