Professional Documents
Culture Documents
How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents
How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to this content.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to
national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate-
gic analysis.
Alan G. Stolberg
October 2012
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart-
ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-
ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications
enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-
sified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-
sent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them
to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in-
terest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
*****
ii
*****
ISBN 1-58487-550-X
iii
vi
vii
ix
xi
—Dwight D. Eisenhower
INTRODUCTION
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
A COMPARISON
97
Oversight.
98
99
100
101
Strategic Context.
102
103
104
105
106
107
Risk Assessment.
108
109
Feedback Mechanism.
Brazil, South Africa, the UK, and for the most part
the United States, have no formal feedback mechanism
in existence that would tell the government when
components of the strategy were successful and when
they were not. As it has done with other policy and
strategy documents, the Australian Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet reviews the progress of
the 2009 White Paper quarterly, based upon submis-
sion of information from the DoD. These reviews are a
long time tradition in the Australian government and
are considered important in light of the need to dem-
onstrate the ability to meet electoral commitments
made by a new government. In the case of the United
States, while there has not been a feedback mecha-
110
Requirement.
111
112
Organization.
113
114
115
Coordination.
116
Stakeholders.
117
Audience.
118
119
Constrained or Unconstrained?
120
121
122
Risk Assessment.
123
Approval Authority.
Feedback Mechanism.
124
ENDNOTES
125
126
17. This paragraph and the one above are excerpted from
Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Centu-
ry,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide
to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and
Strategy, 4th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, July 2010, pp. 2-3.
20. Mahnken, p. 3.
127
128
129
130
57. Kevin Rudd et al., Labor’s Plan for Defence: Election 2007
Policy Document, Canberra, Australia: T. Gartrell, November 2007,
p.2, as referenced in Walters, p. 2-3.
58. Walters, p. 6.
63. Ibid.
131
72. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
78. Carl Ungerer and Anthony Bergin, “The Devil in the De-
tail: Australia’s First National Security Statement,” Policy Analysis,
132
82. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
133
104. Ibid.
134
117. Ibid.
135
123. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
136
140. Ibid.
137
150. Cawthra.
138
156. Cawthra.
157. Ibid.
139
172. Ibid.
173. Le Roux, emails to the author, June 24, 2011 and April
16, 2012.
140
141
191. Ibid.
142
202. Ibid.
208. Letwin.
143
218. Ibid.
144
230. Omand, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011; and
Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.
145
244. Ibid., p. 3.
250. Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Ambassa-
dor Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special
Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff), email to
the author, June 4, 2012.
146
260. Rice, email to the author, May 30, 2012; and Hadley,
email to the author, May 30, 2012.
147
269. Ibid.
273. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; and
Department of State, “Broader Middle East and North Africa
148
278. Ibid.
281. Ibid.
149
289. Ibid.; and Dr. Joseph J. Collins (lead for the National War
College “Red Team” in summer-fall 2005, and current Professor
of National Security Strategy, National War College, Washington,
DC), in discussion with the author, November 28, 2011.
291. Ibid.
293. Ibid.
299. Ibid.
150
307. Ibid.
151
312. Ibid.
315. Ibid.
152
153
*****
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Dr. Alan G. Stolberg
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil