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The Incident in Kabul
Karen E. Boroff, Seton Hall University

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Matthew Pratt, US Army

Captain William Waverly was in the fuel depot area of a United States Army outpost
located on the western edge of Kabul, Afghanistan. As the post’s commanding officer
since his arrival four months earlier in late 2011, Waverly was readying his 20 troops

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and his combat vehicles in preparation for the morning’s security patrol. Soldiers on
these patrols were in “full kit”-- weapons, ammunition, body armor, helmets--traveling
in heavily armored vehicles with sophisticated communications equipment and
mounted machine guns. As was the operating agreement between the United States
and Afghanistan governments, Waverly’s unit had to conduct these patrols always with
a squad of approximately eight policemen from the local Afghan police force. This
Afghan police force would likewise be armed and, if available, in body armor for these
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patrols. While these patrols were joint operations, both the US and Afghan forces
maintained their independence, following orders from their own chains of command.
Responses to incidents on these patrols were hopefully coordinated but orders for each
unit were the controlling authorities to act or react. See Exhibit 1 for a picture of a
Full Kit Uniform, Exhibit 2 for pictures of the US and Afghan armored vehicles, and
Exhibit 3 for a map of Afghanistan.
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The Afghan police force supply system was unable to meet the operational
demands of its force. In other words, it was quite broken. The police forces had
significant issues requisitioning and receiving enough fuel to sustain their required
patrol schedule in the city. Consequently, it was fairly common for American forces,
like Waverly’s unit, to provide fuel to the police in the interest of maintaining
operational tempo in the city. This created an expectation that the fuel was for use by
both forces, even though it was purchased, shipped, and stored by US forces.
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However, a few days earlier, Waverly received the order from his chain of command,
headed up by a US Army two-star general, the senior commander in the region, that,
going forward, the US would no longer provide fuel to the Afghan police for any reason
in an effort to force the Afghan police logistics system to gain efficiency.

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Copyright ©2017 by the Case Research Journal, and by Karen E. Boroff and Matthew Pratt. An earlier
version of this case was presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the North American Case Research
Association. An abbreviated audio version of this case is in West Point Leadership (Boroff and
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Pratt 2017). Dr. Boroff is appreciative of the support she received for this project from Seton Hall
University during her sabbatical. Likewise, she appreciates the support she received from the
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy as a
visiting professor there while on sabbatical. Boroff and Pratt thank the anonymous reviewers, CRJ
Editor John Lawrence, and LTC Daniel Smith for their collective insights. They also recognize the
thoughts from Dean Andrea Bartoli, and Drs. Zheng Wang, Brian Muzas, Borislava Manojlovic,
Philip Moremen and Sara Moller, along with those of Mr. Dean Chang.

The Incident in Kabul 1

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 On this particular winter day, three Afghan police trucks pulled into the post’s fuel

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area. Waverly was doing a gear check with his soldiers, but overheard one of his squad
leaders who reported to him (a US Army Staff Sergeant) tell Ghotai Sharma, Waverly’s

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police force counterpart, “We can’t fill you up.” Sharma, having spotted Waverly
across the gravel lot of the fuel depot, got out of his vehicle, and began walking toward
Waverly. Sharma spoke in his native tribal tongue, Pashto, which Waverly did not
understand. Nonetheless, having spent time in Afghanistan, Waverly knew that the
tone was angry. Sharma was gesticulating and, as he approached Waverly, Waverly saw

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Sharma reach down for his pistol. Sharma’s other policemen, some still in their trucks
and some now outside the vehicles, moved their gun turrets on their trucks in the
direction of Waverly’s vehicles in what seemed to be signaling an intent to use force.
Waverly and his soldiers also heard the distinct metallic click associated with
chambering a 7.62 mm round in an AK-47, the assault rifle of choice for Afghan
Security Forces. Several policemen moved their weapon from a non-hostile shoulder-
carried position to a “low ready” position, a stance assumed when one felt a threat

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existed. In his earpiece, Waverly heard the chatter from his soldiers in their armored
vehicles; they were already coordinating who would engage which Afghan police officer
target should gunfire erupt. This kind of coordination was automatic, derived from
training US soldiers received when they perceived a threat situation.
Waverly knew immediately he had a crisis at hand, one that could quickly escalate
into a deadly conflict. Not long before today, Waverly’s roommate in Afghanistan had
been killed in an “insider attack” incident, where an Afghan ally purposely killed his
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roommate and one other officer. Waverly knew his next step would be critical and
there were only seconds to make a decision.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

The US War in Afghanistan began in 2001, triggered by the attacks on the World Trade
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Center in New York City and the US Pentagon in September of that year. The US,
along with allies from the United Kingdom, Australia, and others declared war on Al-
Qaeda terrorists based in Afghanistan. One of the stated goals of the US during the
first phase of this conflict was to remove the Taliban leaders from power and engage
in regime change, replacing Afghan leaders with democratically-elected officials.
The initial stages of the war were conducted by teams from the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US Special Forces. Allied conventional forces soon
followed and formed the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, in late 2001.
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In 2003, its supervision fell under the United Nations and troops from more than 40
nations helped staff ISAF. The ISAF was frequently just called “the coalition.”
In 2009, shortly after Barack Obama was elected President of the United States,
the President announced a troop surge, an increase of nearly 40,000 soldiers, to help
implement a strategy of protecting the Afghan population from Taliban attacks and
support efforts to reintegrate former insurgents back into Afghan society. This phase
of the war was marked with frustrations inherent in a counterinsurgency fight. It was
often hard to tell the “good” guys from the “bad” ones. The stated enemy was the
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Taliban and those associated with or supporting Al-Qaeda, but distinguishing a

combatant from an innocent civilian was not easily done. An Afghan farmer or official
may have been shaking a US troop's hand one day and planting an improvised explosive
device against that troop the next. Combatants in a counterinsurgency did not always
wear uniforms or fight in formations like on a traditional battlefield. Because of this,
disciplined application of force, that is, its careful use, was even more critical because

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 of the potential for enemies to camouflage themselves in the civilian population. This

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was one of the driving forces behind why more troops were needed to stabilize critical
areas of Afghanistan. Another of these reasons was to help the Afghan National

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Security Forces (ANSF) build capability and capacity in providing security and stability
for their respective regions.
By late 2010 and early 2011, US troop strengths in Afghanistan were at their peak
with over 100,000 troops deployed. This new approach had significant challenges in
achieving its aims. Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remained high, while many

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of the Afghan National Security Forces units taking over security and stability duties
appeared to be ill-prepared to hold off the determined Taliban. By 2012, this war was
becoming the longest war ever fought by the US.
The cohort of new Army officers that arose during the post-9/11 period saw
multiple deployments, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Waverly, many saw their
classmates die on the fields of battle both from the hands of the enemy and from those
who were thought to be allies.

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CAPTAIN WILLIAM WAVERLY
William Waverly was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, the lowest rank of a
commissioned officer, in the United States Army upon his graduation from the United
States Military Academy at West Point in 2006. The US Army was divided into 17
career fields and Waverly selected Armor as his branch. As an Armor officer, he was
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specially trained in mounted maneuver (such as leading tanks and other armored
vehicles), communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, and a wide range of
weapons employment. Shortly after his initial training as an officer, Waverly was
deployed in Iraq as a tank platoon leader in charge of four tanks and sixteen soldiers.
He also had several assignments at Army posts stateside to include executive officer of
a tank company, battalion personnel officer, and brigade operations planner, the latter
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two considered staff positions. After successful completion of the captain’s career
course, the professional development school for captains in the Army, he, now 27 years
old, was deployed to Afghanistan as a unit commander of 150 soldiers. There, Waverly
was responsible for security and stability of a portion of Kabul with nearly 400,000
residents. Waverly had earned excellent Officer Evaluation Reports, the Army’s formal
performance appraisal process. He had also earned several military awards, including
two Bronze Stars. Furthermore, the US Army selected him to earn his MBA at Purdue
University, enabling him to become an instructor of future officers at the United States
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Military Academy. He was scheduled to go to Purdue after his deployment in

Afghanistan. He had received promotions from his entry level officer rank of Second
Lieutenant, to First Lieutenant, to Captain.
As a cadet at West Point, Waverly embraced the core values of the Academy—
duty, honor, country. The Academy’s honor code—“A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal
or tolerate those that do”—were words that stayed with him even after graduation.

THE ORDER ON FUEL

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As both a cadet and an officer, Waverly knew well that much of the Army’s ability to
accomplish its mission was predicated on discipline and adherence to the orders of
lawful military authority. He could recall verbatim the words from Army Regulation
600-20, Army Command Policy: “All persons in the military service are required to
strictly obey and promptly execute the legal orders of their lawful superiors.”1 All

The Incident in Kabul 3

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 officers took an oath to that effect.2 Disobedience to orders was detrimental to both

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the organization and the individual. Waverly knew first-hand how important fidelity
to orders was to success on the battlefield. Like all officers, Waverly understood the

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implications of not following orders. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Failure to Obey Order or Regulation, could not be clearer. Insubordination
could result in dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of pay and allowances, and
confinement in prison. Insubordination could also cost lives.
The order about fuel from the two-star general that Waverly received a few days

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prior, started, as was the practice for all orders, with a task statement. This task
statement here was “to stop giving US-supplied fuel to Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) partners.” The order then followed with its purpose: “to assist the
ANSF logistics system to build capability, capacity and efficiency.” It was required for
all Army orders to state unambiguously the words of the order and then to follow with
the order’s purpose. In this way, every soldier could know the ultimate goal of the
order and orders would not be confused or miscommunicated as these traveled

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downward or laterally in the organization.

WAVERLY’S COMMAND STRUCTURE,

THE AFGHAN FORCES, AND THE KABUL OUTPOST
Structurally, Waverly operated in an organization that was typical for the Army. As a
captain, he reported to a battalion commander, who was at the rank of Lieutenant
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Colonel (LTC). This LTC reported to a Brigade Commander, who was at the rank of
Colonel. The Division Commander was the two-star general who gave the order to
stop supplying fuel. That general was one of four in Afghanistan at that rank, each one
in charge of one of the four sectors of Afghanistan. The two-star general reported to
a four-star general, who was the commander of all US forces in Afghanistan. The
organizational hierarchy with associated ranks is simplified and depicted on the
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following page in Figure 1.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) was comprised of a two-force
structure that provided security in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army (ANA)
was one of these two forces. This force was akin to the army of any country. The
second force was the Afghan National Police (ANP). Sharma belonged to this latter
force, and specifically a subunit of the ANP called the Afghan Uniformed Police. His
rank was the equivalent of a New York City police chief. The members of the Afghan
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Uniformed Police protected Kabul by keeping the public order, and working on
counter-narcotics missions and protecting against terrorism. See Figure 2 on the next
page for this simplified organizational structure.
While the missions of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
were very different, both divisions vied for the same resources (money, equipment,
personnel, as examples), from the Afghan government, which, in turn, led to intra-
group conflict. It was typical to have the Afghan National Army get resources that the
National Police felt it should get. The unintended consequence of this intra-group
conflict caused each force to become more reliant on US financial, logistical and
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training support.

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 Figure 1: Simplified US Army Organizational Chart

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Figure 2: Simplified Afghan National Security Forces Organizational Chart
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Waverly’s command outpost in Kabul was about seven acres in size. It had two
primary purposes. The first was to guard a power plant. The US Army Corps of
Engineers had built this plant to supply power to the western part of the city and to
the post itself. The second purpose of the outpost was to serve as the location from
which the US Army staged operations into outlying areas. These operations were ones
mainly associated with providing security and stability in the city. In all cases, the US
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Army and the Afghan municipal police force jointly conducted these security and
stability maneuvers. In this way, the US Army hoped to build both capacity and
capabilities within the Afghan government to protect its citizenry once the United
States forces eventually departed. While these were joint operations, soldiers from each
side were never intermingled on patrols and they each maintained their own chains of
command.

The Incident in Kabul 5

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 t
The outpost, just off a major road into the city, was heavily guarded, with guard
towers and security gates. Besides the power plant, the outpost contained the barracks

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for the Army troops. The Afghan police also resided in the barracks at this outpost,
again to help improve the transfer of knowledge from one force to the next. The US
vehicles and equipment were also stored there. This included the M-ATV, the Army’s
workhorse vehicle for its operations, as well as firearms, military gear, and
communications equipment. The post was the living center for all troops mustered

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there. The post was the fuel depot for all operations, and held two fuel storage
containers, called fuel blivets. These were huge collapsible storage tanks for fuel,
designed for easy set-up and take-down. The physical layout of the post is depicted in
Exhibit 4.
Waverly and his Afghan police counterpart, Ghotai Sharma, lived on this same post
in Kabul. However, as tangible evidence of the uncertainty of allies, the US and Afghan
living and sleeping quarters (really just tents) were separated by a concrete barrier. This

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barrier was a form of protection against what were becoming more prevalent friendly-
fire attacks. Waverly considered Sharma a bit untrustworthy, always angling for a way
to bolster his power and prestige in the area. Waverly, though, never feared for his life
at Sharma’s hand, and Sharma had cooked a few meals for Waverly and his troops.
While Waverly knew nothing about Sharma’s police officers, Sharma was diligent and
loyal on every joint patrol. Even so, Waverly did believe Sharma did not live by
Waverly’s code for officers. As an example, the US Army, at the urging of the Afghan
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government, regularly destroyed poppy fields. The Afghan government believed that
poppy crops, and their subsequent production into opium, were providing funds for
the insurgency. Destroying the crops, the Afghan government believed, would cut off
that source. Somehow, though, the poppy fields that Sharma’s relatives owned always
seemed to escape destruction.
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GUNS AT THE READY

Waverly, now at the fuel blivets, saw and heard the elements of a crisis situation. He
had seen a close friend die in an insider attack and knew that insider attacks accounted
for about 15% of coalition troop deaths in this war, a rate far, far exceeding any other
war in which the US had fought. He had orders to follow. His sergeant has already
told Sharma “no gas” and this had been witnessed by everyone. What was he now
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going to do?
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 Exhibit 1: Full Kit Uniform

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The Incident in Kabul 7

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 Exhibit 2: M-ATVs

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The top photograph is a US Army Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-

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ATV). The bottom photograph is the tactical vehicle used by the Afghan National Police.

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Figure 1:
US Army M-ATV

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Afghan Police
Patrol Vehicle
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Exhibit 3: Map of Afghanistan

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 t
Exhibit 4: The Outpost in Kabul

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Guard Towers manned with US Soldiers Concrete Barriers Small Gate (not guarded)

Afghan Police Tents

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US Army Tents

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US M-ATVs Afghan M-ATVs Heavily Guarded Security Gate with Barriers

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The Incident in Kabul 9

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NOTES

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1 Headquarters Department of the Army. 2008 (March 18). Army Command Policy. AR 600-
20, Washington, DC: Department of the Army.
2 This oath is as follows: I, _____, having been appointed an officer in the Army of the
United States, as indicated above in the grade of _____ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign

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and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So
help me God." See 5 U.S.C. § 3331, Oath of Office.

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No
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Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860