Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Alternatives To The Right To Strike For Public Employees
Alternatives To The Right To Strike For Public Employees
Summer 1979
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alaine S. Williams, Alternatives to the Right to Strike for Public Employees: Do They Adequately
Implement Florida's Constitutional Right to Collectively Bargain?, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 475 (1979) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss3/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: DO THEY ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT
FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COLLECTIVELY
BARGAIN?
ALAINE S. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
Public employees in Florida possess a constitutional right that
fellow public workers in neighboring states unfortunately do not
share-a right to collectively bargain, expressed in the declaration
of rights of the Florida Constitution.' Although drafters of that pro-
vision continue ten years later to debate whether such a right was
intended to extend to public employment, 2 the Florida Supreme
Court declared the existence of the right in 19693 and in 1972 prod-
ded the legislature to implement it.'
Public sector collective bargaining is different from the bargain-
ing that occurs in the private sector. Private employees have a
statutory right to strike.' Public employees, on the other hand, gen-
erally are prohibited from striking.' In Florida, the constitutional
* B.F.A. 1971, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1979, Florida State University College of Law;
LL.M. expected 1980, Columbia University School of Law.
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
2. In an address to the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission, Chesterfield Smith, a
member of the 1965 Constitution Revision Commission, expressed his belief that the drafts-
men of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 did not intend it to apply to public employees. Charles Harris,
a fellow 1965 revision commission member, expressed his belief that the right of public
employees to collectively bargain was clearly intended by the 1965 revision commission.
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 38 (July 6, 1977); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings
36-37 (July 7, 1977). See also McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Flor-
ida-Past,Present and Future, 1 FA. ST. U.L. REv. 26, 42-44 n.64 (1973).
3. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969). "[Wlith
the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective
bargaining as are granted private employees by Section 6." Id. at 905 (footnote omitted).
4. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972). The
teachers union filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the supreme court
"to compel the Legislature . . .to enact standards or guidelines regulating the right of
collective bargaining by public employees of this state .... " Id. at 685. The court did not
grant the petition, ruling that its intervention would be premature but warning the legislature
that if it failed to take action within a reasonable period of time the court would develop
collective bargaining guidelines. In 1974 the Florida Legislature enacted legislation imple-
menting article I, section 6. Ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§
447.201-609 (1977)).
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976):
"Nothing in this subchapter. . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of that
right."
6. Only eight states allow a limited right to strike: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1978); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64(1), (7) (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 59-1603 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (precursor construed in State v. Public Employees
Craft Council, 529 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974)); OR. Rzv. STAT. § 243.726 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
476 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.77 (West Supp. 1979).
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
8. See generally Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HAjv.
L. REv. 459 (1971); Kaden, The Potential of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
81 YALE L.J. 772, 781 (1972).
9. See Project, Collective Bargainingand Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 887, 894-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Collective Bargaining and Politics].
10. Id. at 915-16 n.151.
19791 PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
parties are bound to accept. There are two broad categories of arbi-
tration. The first, voluntary interest arbitration, usually arises in
commercial contract situations and involves a voluntary agreement
by the parties to submit to arbitration in the event of a contract
dispute. 7 The second category, with which this article is directly
concerned, is compulsory interest arbitration, whereby the parties
are statutorily mandated to submit to arbitration upon the occurr-
ence of a certain event, usually exhaustion of other impasse resolu-
tion mechanisms. Where arbitration has been adopted, it will most
likely be compulsory for only the more "essential" public employ-
ees, such as police and firefighters.' 8 It is currently mandated in
various forms in nineteen states. 9 In either category of arbitration,
the arbitrator's decision is binding on both parties.
17. Florida provides for voluntary interest arbitration in FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1977). Volun-
tary interest arbitration is also statutorily authorized in three other states: HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 89-11(b)(3) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-11(c) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.706(2) (1977).
18. McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution
of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1195 (1972).
19. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (for essential state workers, including policemen,
firefighters, correctional employees and hospital employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-472, -473c,
-474 (Supp. 1979) (municipal employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1978) (firefight-
ers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 1978) (all public employees); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23-890 (West Supp. 1979) (municipal transit employees); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4)
(Supp. 1977) (municipal employees and teachers), § 979-D(4) (Supp. 1978) (state employees),
§ 1026(4) (Supp. 1978) (university employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4 (West
Supp. 1979) (police and firefighters); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.244 (1978) (local
police, firefighters, and emergency service personnel); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69 (West Supp.
1978) (essential public employees); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838 (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(government employees); NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1977) (local government employees), §
288.215 (1977) (firefighters); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West Supp. 1978) (police and
firefighters); N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (local police and firefight-
ers); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.742-.762 (1977) (police, firefighters, and guards at correctional
facilities and mental hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.7 (police and firefighters),
§ 1101.805 (correctional officers and court employees) (Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-9.1-1 to .4-19 (firefighters, police, teachers, and municipal employees), § 36-11-9 (state
employees) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.450-.470 (Supp. 1979) (uniformed
personnel); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West Supp. 1978) (police and firefighters), § 111.70(4)
(West Supp. 1978) (municipal employees, applicable in 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 27-10-105 (1977)
(firefighters).
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
the governmental entity and the bargaining agent for the employee
organization. 2 The declaration of impasse must be in writing and
is submitted to the other party and the Public Employees Relations
Commission (PERC) .27The parties may engage in permissive me-
diation to resolve the impasse, or they can proceed immediately to
the factfinding phase. 28 A factfinder, called a special master, ap-
pointed by PERC or mutually agreed upon by the parties, is author-
ized to hold hearings, determine facts, and render a decision on
unresolved contract issues.29 Rules, promulgated by PERC, require
the parties to stipulate the issues in dispute prior to submitting the
3
impasse to a special master. 1
Criteria the special master must consider in arriving at his recom-
mended decision include salary comparisons between similar pri-
vate sector employees and comparably sized public employers, the
public interest and availability of funds, and a comparison of the
peculiarities of employment, such as hazards, physical, educational,
or intellectual qualifications, training and skills, retirement plans,
3
sick leave, and job security. '
The special master submits his report, consisting of a finding of
facts delineating the unresolved issues and a recommended deci-
sion, to PERC fifteen days after the hearing. PERC is required to
transmit the recommended decision to both parties within five days
of receipt. The recommended decision is subject to further negotia-
tions by the parties and is deemed approved by both parties unless
a written rejection specifying the causes therefor is filed with PERC
and the other party within twenty days of receipt of the decision."
The next step in the impasse resolution scheme involves the legis-
lative body of the governmental entity. 33 Within ten days of rejec-
tion of the recommended decision, the chief executive officer and
the bafrgaining agent each submit their recommendations for set-
tling the impasse to each other and the legislative body. The legisla-
tive body conducts a public hearing wherein both parties are re-
quired to explain their positions on the special master's recom-
Total Number of
special master
reports issued 27 25 12 40
Number of reports
accepted 3 3 2 13
Number of reports
rejected by employer 14 16 5 20
(Percent) (527V) (64'/) (42%) (50%)
Number of reports
rejected by union 3 1 1 4
(Percent) (11%) (4%) (8%) (10%)
Number of reports
rejected by both 7 5 4 3
(Percent) (26%) (20%) (33%) (8%)
Percent of reports
rejected 89 % 88% 83 % 68%
Percent of reports
accepted 11% 12% 17% 32%
41. McHugh, supra note 25, at 319. See also H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS
AND THE CITIES 170-77 (1971); McKelvey, Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes:
Promise or Illusion?, 22 INDUS. & LAS. REL. Rav. 528, 530-31, 542 (1969).
42. Ch. 77-465, 1977 Fla. Laws 1899, 1900 (uncodified appropriations bill).
43. United Faculty v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
44. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (1977).
484 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
45. United Faculty v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073, 1078-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
46. But see School Board v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
47. See Miami Herald, Mar. 8, 1979, § A, at 6, col. 1.
48. See Collective Bargainingand Politics, supra note 9, at 887.
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land
and the Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a
meaningless instrument without some responsible agency of gov-
ernment having authority to enforce it. . . .When the people have
spoken through their organic law concerning their basic rights, it
is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide the ways
and means of enforcing such rights; however, in the absence of
appropriate legislative action, it is the responsibility of the courts
I
to do so 0
49. School Board v. Public Employee Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
50. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972); cf. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 225 N.W.2d 658
(Wis.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 821, opinions of individualjustices in chambers, 423 U.S. 1301
(1975) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482, cert. denied, 427
U.S. 904 (1976). (By statute, public employees were not allowed to strike. Police and firefight-
ers, however, had a right to compulsory arbitration, while teachers did not. In a suit brought
by the teachers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was a rational basis for the
classification and that the teachers had not been deprived of equal protection of the laws.
Note, however, an important factor distinguishing the Florida situation from that in Wiscon-
sin: Florida's right to collective bargaining is constitutional, as opposed to statutory, and as
such is subject to much stricter judicial scrutiny than that involved with the rational basis
test.)
51. Direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court would be available because the circuit
court in which the action was commenced would be construing a provision of the state
constitution. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). There should be, consequently, a definitive resolu-
tion of the issue.
486 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
52. See Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collec-
tive Bargaining-An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST.
JOHNS L. Rxv. 453, 455 (1977).
53. Public employees' right to compulsory arbitration has also been held to be significant
to the maintenance of labor peace. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964).
54. See generally Bernstein, supra note 8; Kaden, supra note 8.
It is interesting to note that while the right to strike possessed by private employees has
been determined to be a "mandatory" subject of bargaining (Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306
(1948)), meaning that the employer and union must bargain in good faith regarding strike
rights (Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), (d) (1976)), interest arbitration clauses have been declared to be "nonmandatory"
subjects of bargaining-i.e., either of the parties can propose a nonmandatory subject, but
that party cannot insist to the point of impasse that it be discussed or considered (Massachu-
setts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. 678, 679 (1976); Greensboro Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Local 319, 222 N.L.R.B. 893, 896 (1976); Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Local
252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 279 (1975)).
55. In re Newark Teachers Local 481, 118 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972).
56. But see Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 225 N.W.2d
658 (Wis.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 821 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482, cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (teachers' claim that interest arbitration was a necessary, rational
alternative to strikes was dismissed summarily).
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
75. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(f), (g), 2(b); art. IX, § 4(b).
76. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. St. Johns Ry., 16 Fla. 531 (1878). See
also Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976);
Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1975).
The issue usually arises in the context of tax exemptions granted by one legislature being
revoked by a subsequent legislature. See Note, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests
in Governmentally Owned Property,6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1085 (1978). These revocations are
uniformly upheld by the Florida Supreme Court.
77. Whether affirmative action must be, taken by a legislative body to amend or repeal
the law in question or whether the law can be merely ignored is unclear. The tax cases referred
to supra note 76, involved repeals of previously granted exemptions. Williams v. Jones, 326
So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976); Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1975). For an example of the legislature
having the authority to simply ignore a statute, see [1955-1956] FLA. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. No. 055-82, 109, 110 wherein the attorney general issued an opinion allowing the legisla-
ture to overrule by implication a statute providing a four-year limitation on claims bills. (The
legislative body in question had approved payment for an action arising 15 years earlier.)
Also, the legislature often refuses to appropriate funds for programs apparently required by
statute. Regardless of which action is taken, the legislature does have the authority to ignore
its own previous edicts.
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
78. Moral obligations bonds are often used to partially fund state operated authorities and
housing finance agencies. See generally Quirk & Wein, A Short ConstitutionalHistory of
Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 521, 552-61 (1971).
79. See State v. Putnam County Dev. Auth., 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971); Nohrr v. Brevard
County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 309, 311 (Fla. 1971).
80. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 1978); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 965(4), 979-D(4),
1026(4) (Supp. 1978), NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838 (Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN LAWS
§§ 28-9.1-1 to .4-19, § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1978).
81. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26 § 979-D(4)(D) (Supp. 1978).
82. R.I. GEN LAWS § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1978).
492 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
83. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
84. See generally Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 494.
85. See P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 7.
86. Id. at 8.
87. E.g. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89.11(d) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9
(West Supp. 1979).
88. Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panaceaor Pandora'sBox?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 573 (1974).
See generally Grodin, PoliticalAspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration,64 CALIF. L. REV.
678 (1976). The Governor of New York recently agreed to submit to last best offer arbitration
any impasse that may result during contract negotiations between the state and the union
representing state employees. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2.
89. See Witney, Final-Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis Experience, 96 (No.5)
MONTHLY LAa. REV. 20 (1973).
19791 PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
90. See Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration:"Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 186, 202 n.44 (1974).
91. E.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (1978).
92. See Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Proposed Alternative, 26
ARB. J. 226, 232 (1971).
93. See P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 39.
94. Id.
95. West Des Moines Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 266 N.W.2d 118,
123, 128 (Iowa 1978).
96. The format of this chart is derived from that used in P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 47.
494 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
CONCLUSION
97. Presumably, in states that permit rather than mandate arbitration, a number of local
governments and school districts have opted to employ compulsory interest arbitration. It
would generally be provided for by charter, ordinance, executive order, or contract. See, e.g.,
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS Ch. 13-A (1973),
reprinted in State and Local Programs: Maryland, 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 2911,
2923-29 (May 5, 1975).
98. See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 89.11(d) (Supp. 1978) (providing that arbitral awards
items requiring any monies for implementation are subject to appropriations); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.805 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (providing that arbitral awards involving correctional
officers and court employees requiring legislative action are advisory only).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4A (West Supp. 1979).
100. Broward County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd., No. 79-9435 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct., complaint filed May 25, 1979).
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
101. E.g., District 57, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 352 So. 2d 62
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court acknowledged that farmworkers had a constitutional
right to collectively bargain, but said that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was the
appropriate branch of government to grant relief).
496 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVWE W [Vol. 7:475
000
a) 00 '
0 c)- 4) Z
u0 wd
0 0 U2
P
,2
00 cc*
w
.00 04
-4-4
-4 V2
C-'
4 C11 E- U
4--
c ce
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 497
00
c. w crj w
.Z;o
0 '
c
Ini
S CC)
43Sw
4cd .
00 0 q
498 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
o U. wb0 c
~0
U U
o o2
e e
Q 0
o 0
U U
0*
0*
P4-
o. to
0. 1)0. 1
020
el0 Lo
1979] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
'0
c-i
02
0 cd 0
02 0 0
0>
0i 0 0
4 o0
.0
-0
o.
4 * 0
c-i
. . v z2
rA 0210 ZCI-
z2 '00
C>
500 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
-e
"0) _b- 0
- ..- C3O0) 0 d. -.
C11~
0.Lo2~0
t:- t-
C6
c
0
ca
CU
00
4M
oz
C:-
02
02~
02 0.
~~- 0.
-4
0(~2 C/2
19791 PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 501
0) C;
C. )
>e.=
02~S M.
CDC
Q0)
o~U
'4-4
00)
Co
b
0)0
04~C~
o:o a '4
S4~ 0). .- 0 0.
-4
.2 CO
o Co
0. 4
as2O
>0
z0
502 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW IVol. 7:475
+1
0*~
U,
>04 ~
w
w
2P 0
.~ ~ ~.- c~
5~ -4-4-4-4 to
U's-.
C) ~
~ .~ ~ P I-
+~.-o
~ C~
~ ~
2
0 5- ~ *~ >c~
0 ~ G)
~ 0 04-b PC) 5-5- ~ ~ c~
o ~ I1~
* ~
* p-P 0
~4 C)t~ C', C)...1... U, c', w ~ U 0 U -- c~ 0
C)
C)C)
U,0
52- .- 4 z
C)
U2
~C)
o .~
+~ 0
*0
p
pP
.2 ~
.4-,
~0+~0
C)
'.4
CD
U,
5- -~ p
512
-~ c~ ~ -
p ~
C6
0p5-~0
C-. *.~ c~ 0- 0 -~
Cl) c~.s~.
* ~. t-.
* C., C',
p
0
C)
~~4
0
19791 PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
U)
U)
I oo U) Co3
0)
~ >~ 2
,
"0
0
0
0)
0
>
uy,~
'
01 c*' -'
c- W
E-4
*0
c"
0 ci
'4-
r-
0
40 P.
~ Ci2
-~ --.
~'
504 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:475
m m r-
C) ~E-4
Cd1
z
4-4 Q*
V' L' %- C
0
z
E ,