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"Eloquence Is Power-" Hobbes On The Use and Abuse of Rhetoric 2014
"Eloquence Is Power-" Hobbes On The Use and Abuse of Rhetoric 2014
“Eloquence is Power:”
Hobbes on the Use and Abuse of Rhetoric
I thank Tina Skouen and Timothy Raylor for their very helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper.
Rhetorica, Vol. XXXII, Issue 4, pp. 386–411, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-
8541. ©2014 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights re-
served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article
content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website,
at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/RH.2014.32.4.386.
“Eloquence is Power” 387
1
The literature on the subject of Hobbes and rhetoric is extensive. It is beyond
the scope of this essay to present a comprehensive literature review. Rather, I intend to
trace, in broad outline, an important and persistent debate among Hobbes scholars
regarding his debt and fidelity to the rhetorical tradition.
2
Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1985),165.
3
Leviathan: Or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and
Civill. Ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), X, 55. All subsequent
references to Leviathan are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text.
388 RHETORICA
4
The exact nature of Hobbes’s role in the preparation of this translation is a
matter of some uncertainty. It has long been thought that Hobbes’s student, William
Cavendish, the third Earl of Devonshire, may have translated the treatise under
Hobbes’s direction. Quentin Skinner, citing an unpublished work by Karl Schuh-
mann, declares that the Briefe is not the work of Hobbes. See Skinner, Hobbes and
Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5, n.20. Whether
the translation was done by Hobbes or by his student under his direction, it is likely
that the Briefe reflects Hobbes’s view of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Moreover, it is clear that
whatever the circumstances of the translation, Hobbs’s place in the history of rhetoric
was initially secured by his association with the Briefe.
5
Brief of the Arte of Rhetorique. The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy,
ed. John T. Harwood (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).
“Eloquence is Power” 389
6
Logic and Rhetoric in England: 1500–1700 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961),
364.
7
Logic and Rhetoric, 388.
8
Logic and Rhetoric, 388.
9
Indeed, contrary to Howell’s suggestions, Hobbes’s Aristotle does recommend
the use of metaphor: “An Orator, if hee use Proper words and Received, and good
Metaphors; shall both make his Oration beautifull, and not seem to intend it; and shall
speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Novity, and sweet-
nesse” (Briefe, 109). While Hobbes would later express reservations about metaphoric
language, there is little in the Briefe to suggest that either Hobbes or Aristotle believe
that orators must eschew metaphoric language.
10
Strauss, Leo. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1952), 35.
11
Political Philosophy, 35.
12
Strauss documents in detail Hobbes’s reliance on the Rhetoric and identifies
“the 8th and 9th chapters of the first part of the Elements, the 10th chapter of the
Leviathan, and the 11th , 12th , and 13th chapters of De homine” as showing the particular
390 RHETORICA
influence of Aristotle. He then presents parallel passages from these works and
the Rhetoric which dramatically demonstrate the depth of Hobbes’s indebtedness
to Aristotle’s treatise (Political Philosophy, 36–41).
13
Despite his “zealous reading” of Aristotle Hobbes cannot be considered an
Aristotelian. On differences between Aristotle and Hobbes on rhetoric’s relation to
politics see Tom Sorell, “Hobbes’s UnAristotelian Political Rhetoric,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric (1990), 96–108: also useful is James Zappen, “Aristotelian and Ramist Rhetoric
in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan: Pathos versus Ethos versus Logos,” Rhetorica (1983),
65–91: Zappen concludes that “Hobbes’s rhetorical method defies strict classification
as Aristotelian, Ramist, anti-Ramist, or counterreformist. It is a composite of materials,
adapted to problems immediately at hand, both historical and theoretical (90).”
14
William Sacksteder’s Hobbes Studies (1879–1979): a Bibliography (Bowling Green,
OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 1982) in-
cludes only six entries about Hobbes and rhetoric. However, since about 1975 the
scholarship on the subject has increased enormously with rhetoricians, philosophers,
political scientists, literary historians, and other contributing to the understanding
of Hobbes as a theorist and practitioner of rhetoric.
15
The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977),
29–30.
16
The English Grammar School to 1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1908; reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1968), 440.
“Eloquence is Power” 391
as Gary Remer calls it, has had a significant influence on the scholarly
interpretation of Hobbesian rhetoric.17 The occasion of that break, if
it occurred at all, was Hobbes’s accidental discovery of Euclidean
geometry. John Aubrey, his biographer, recounts that Hobbes “being
in a gentleman’s library Euclid’s Elements lay open, and ‘twas the
forty-seventh proposition in the first book. He read the proposition.
‘By G,’ said he, ‘this is impossible!”’18 Upon further reading he be-
came convinced of the truth of the proposition and, says Aubrey, “this
made him in love with geometry.”19 The result, as Quentin Skinner
argues, was that “during the 1630s Hobbes not only turned away
from the studia humanitatis; he also turned against the humanistic
disciplines, and above all against the idea of an art of eloquence.”20
Although Hobbes turned away from rhetoric, Skinner believes he
returned to it in the Leviathan where “he undoubtedly exhibits a new
willingness in this final version of his civil philosophy to combine
the methods of science with the persuasive force of eloquence.”21 So
complete was this return to rhetoric, says Skinner, that in Leviathan
Hobbes provides readers “with a detailed reassessment of the art of
rhetoric and its constituent elements.”22
Not all observers accept Skinner’s conclusion that Hobbes ulti-
mately experienced reconciliation with rhetoric. Bryan Garsten de-
nies that Leviathan can be construed as part of the humanist tradition.
Garsten concedes that “Hobbes believed that eloquence would make
his arguments more attractive, but that fact alone is not enough to
make Leviathan a ‘contribution to’ or an ‘endorsement of’ the Renais-
sance rhetorical tradition.”23 Rather, “the new function of Hobbe-
sian rhetoric was to minimize uncertainty and controversy. The new
rhetoric moved men to act according to the dictates of science. It mo-
tivated and managed, but it did not invent arguments of its own.”24
In Garsten’s view, Hobbes turns rhetoric into merely “a servant of
science” and thus any reconciliation was illusory.
17
Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1996), 177–79.
18
Aubrey, John. A Brief Life of Thomas Hobbes, 1588–1679. (http://oregonstate.edu
/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/hobbes life.html).
19
Brief Life.
20
Rhetoric and Reason in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 256.
21
Rhetoric and Reason, 342.
22
Rhetoric and Reason, 356.
23
Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 29.
24
Saving Persuasion, 28.
392 RHETORICA
25
Golden Lands, 52.
26
The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 23.
27
“The Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation,” Political Theory (2008): 827.
“Eloquence is Power” 393
28
Hobbes’s Thucydides, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1975). All subsequent references to Hobbes’s translation are to this edition and
will be cited parenthetically in the text.
29
See On the Ideal Orator, trans. James M. May and Jacob Wisse (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2001), II, 51–64a. Antonius says that “among the Greeks . . .
the most eloquent people, being far removed from such public activities [in the
forum], applied their energies not only to every other splendid subject, but espe-
cially to the writing of history” (138). He continues to say that Thucydides “eas-
ily surpassed everyone in his skillful use of language. His tightly packed content
makes him so dense that the number of his ideas almost equals the number of his
words” (138).
394 RHETORICA
30
Briefe, 116.
31
Briefe, 115. “Animation” is Hobbes’s rendering of energeia and the English term
captures the dynamic quality of Aristotle’s concept: “energeia is motion.” Aristotle, On
“Eloquence is Power” 395
that Thucydides’ rhetorical skill was essential for him to provide wise
counsel to his readers. “Two things,” says Hobbes, are apparent in
Thucydides’ writings: “truth and elocution. For truth consisteth the
soul, and in elocution the body of history. The latter without the for-
mer, is but a picture of history; and the former without the latter,
unapt to instruct” (16).
The lessons to be learned from the History are obviously remi-
niscent of the familiar beginning of De Inventione where Cicero ob-
serves that “wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good
of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly
disadvantageous.”32 Cicero himself seems to have Thucydides’ ac-
count in mind a few lines later as he confesses that when reviewing
“the ancient misfortunes of mighty cities, I see that no little part of
the disasters was brought about by men of eloquence.” Translating
Thucydides must have helped convince Hobbes that political orators,
“men of eloquence,” were responsible for disastrous consequences in
both ancient Athens and early modern England. And an important
part of Hobbes’s political program, beginning with his translation of
Thucydides (though he would rarely invoke the authority of Cicero),
is to find a way to achieve a union of wisdom and eloquence in his
own time. Thucydides is instructive in this effort because, unlike the
reckless orators he chronicles, he achieves eloquence by combining
truth and elocution in a unified and edifying narrative. He is able to
do so, according to Hobbes, only because he avoids the impetuous-
ness of political oratory for the contemplative medium of history. For
Hobbes, then, rhetoric may not discover the truth, but in the proper
hands it can place truth before the eyes of those who need to see it.
Hobbes’s Aristotle
Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 1411b, 249.
32
Trans. H. M. Hubbell, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), I.i.1.
33
In Leviathan Hobbes says “scare any thing can be more absurdly said in
natural Philosophy, than that which is now called Aristotles Metaphysiques; nor more
repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more
ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques” (XVVI, 402–03).
396 RHETORICA
recalls having “heard him say that Aristotle was the worst teacher
that ever was, the worst politician and ethic - a country fellow that
could live in the world as good; but his rhetoric and discourse of ani-
mals was rare.”34 William Crooke, Hobbes’s publisher, reports that
“Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his Translation the Rhetoric of Aris-
totle, as being the most accomplish’d work on that Subject, which the World
has yet seen, having been admir’d in all Ages, and in particular highly
approv’d by the Father of Roman Eloquence, a very competent Judge.”35
A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique is not only an English translation
of a “most accomplished work,” but it is also a particular kind of
translation.36 In the subtitle of the Briefe Hobbes tells us that this is
a work “containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his
Three Bookes on that subject.” In other words, this is work is what
early modern readers would recognize as an epitome, a translation
which captures the essence of a classical text. In The Scholemaster
Roger Ascham recommends the epitome as a method for teaching
Latin to English boys.37 And of course the Brief began as just such a
pedagogical exercise intended to perfect the Latin skills of Hobbes’s
student, William Cavendish.
John Harwood observes that the subtitle also indicates that
“while undeniably a translation, the work is also interesting as
a ‘reading’ and an interpretation of Aristotle.”38 Indeed, it is this
translation that provides Hobbes with his fundamental definition
of rhetoric—a definition that Hobbes returns to again and again
throughout his career. Hobbes renders Aristotle’s definition of rhe-
34
Aubrey, Brief Life.
35
“To the Reader,” the preface to The Art of Rhetoric, with a Discourse of the Laws
of England, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury, vol. 6, ed. William
Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1839), 422. This preface is not included in Harwood’s
edition of the Briefe.
36
The presumed text for this translation is Hobbes’s earlier Latin translation
from the Greek text (Harwood, “Introduction,” 2). The first printed translation of the
Rhetoric in England is Theodore Goulston’s Latin translation, Aristotlis de Rhetorica seu
arte Dicendi Libre Tres (1619). Harwood notes that Hobbes’s Latin version is “perhaps
one-third the length of Theodore Goulston’s more scholarly Latin translation” (2).
37
Ascham, Rodger. The Scholemaster. Renascence Editions. http://www.luminarium
.org/renascence-editions/ascham1.htm. Ascham gives the epitome a qualified recommen-
dation: “Epitome, is good priuatelie for himself that doth worke it.” However, the
condensed nature of the epitome may mean that readers who have not themselves
translated the text may not fully appreciate the classical work.
38
Harwood, “Introduction,” 13. Harwood’s introduction is an invaluable guide
to the Briefe. Among other things Harwood meticulously details where Hobbes varies
from John Freese’s English translation, The “Art” of Rhetoric (13–23). Harwood also
contrasts differences between Goulston’s and Hobbes’s Latin texts (5).
“Eloquence is Power” 397
39
Briefe, 40.
40
Briefe, 41.
41
Briefe, 41. See note 5.
42
1355a, 34.
43
Rhetoric and Reason, 256.
44
Rhetoric and Reason, 257.
45
1354b, 32, for example.
398 RHETORICA
24). So in defining the end of rhetoric as victory rather than the finding
of possible persuasive means Hobbes may very well be attempting
to correct the definition of a “former author.” Hobbes may have felt
the need to offer a “corrected” definition to enlist Aristotle’s corrobo-
ration of Hobbes’s own conclusions about the unfortunate excesses
of political oratory. This definition is not the only point in the Briefe
where Hobbes’s adds a phrase to Aristotle that supports Hobbs’s po-
litical predilections. Harwood concludes that Hobbes engaged in “a
pattern of politically expedient additions.”46 Thus in discussing the
ends of the types of government Hobbes the Briefe says that the end
of monarchies “is the safety of the people” even though that phrase is
not found in Aristotle.47 By thus defining the end of oratory as victory
and the goal of monarchy as the people’s safety Hobbes has managed
to secure Aristotle’s endorsement of his own political preferences.
The definition of rhetoric found early in the Briefe becomes
Hobbes’s definition and he continues to employ it in his later
works. Thus in De Cive Hobbes says the end of eloquence “(as all
the Masters of Rhetorick teach us) is not truth (except by chance)
but victory.”48 Later, in The Elements of Law he says “eloquence is
nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say.”49
This victory, or “winning belief of what we say,” results from the
speaker’s skillful use of opinion rather than a rigorous adherence
to truth. Here Hobbes agrees with Aristotle that the material of
rhetoric is “commonly held opinions [endoxa].”50 In Chapter 3 of
the Briefe the translation reads “the Principles of Rhetorique out of
which enthymemes are to be drawn; are the common opinions that
men have . . .” A few lines later this is reiterated: the “in Rhetorique
the Principles must be common opinions, such as the judge is al-
ready possessed with.”51 These common opinions, in turn, primar-
ily derive from “the passions of the Hearer,”52 “for the begetting
of opinion and passion is the same act.”53 Thus Hobbes’s con-
46
Briefe, “Introduction,” 21.
47
50. Italics original.
48
De Cive: The English Version entitled in the first edition Philosophical Rudiments
Concerning Government and Society, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), X.xi, 137.
49
The Elements of Law, Natural & Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1928), II.8.14, 140.
50
Rhetoric, 1355a, 33.
51
41.
52
69.
53
Elements, I.13.7, 52.
“Eloquence is Power” 399
54
Talking Wolves: Thomas Hobbes on the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 158.
400 RHETORICA
55
De Cive, X.ix, 136.
56
De Cive, X.xi, 137.
57
Elements, II.9.14, 141.
58
De Cive XII.xii, 154, Hobbes’s italics. Compare Elements of Law, II.8.13, 139.
59
De Cive XII.xiii, 155, Hobbes’s italics.
60
De Cive XII.xii, 154.
“Eloquence is Power” 401
61
The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury, vol. 6, ed. William Molesworth
(London: Bohn, 1839). All subsequent references to Behemoth are to this edition and
will be cited parenthetically in the text.
402 RHETORICA
of civil war, this same educated elite could employ their pulpits and
platforms to return England to a “lasting peace” (237).
62
Rhetoric and Reason, 5.
63
This citation is to the final unnumbered section of Leviathan entitled “A Review,
and Conclusion.”
404 RHETORICA
64
Rhetoric 1356a, 38.
65
1356a, 38.
66
Briefe, 69. Compare Kennedy’s translation: “a person having all these qualities
[practical wisdom, virtue, good will] is necessarily persuasive to the hearers . . . The
means by which one might appear prudent and good are to be grasped from an
analysis of the virtues; for a person would present himself as being of a certain sort
from the same sources that he would use to present another person; and good will
and friendliness need to be described in a discussion of the emotions” (1378a, 121).
67
1356a, 38.
“Eloquence is Power” 405
“tye himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him
he Counselleth, to Action: As he that dehorteth, deterreth him from
it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common
Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make
use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of oratory, to
perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following
their advise.”
Leviathan, XXV 154–55
68
1358b, 48.
406 RHETORICA
Thus the counselor must avoid the devices of rhetoric and should
instead
propound his advise, in such form of speech, as may make the truth
most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as
significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will
permit. And therefore rash, and unevident Inferences; . . . obscure, confused,
and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the
stirring up of Passion . . . are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellour.”
Leviathan, XXV, 156 [italics original].
whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their In-
terests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes
others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which asunder
are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many
brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one an-
other with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under
the pretence of Counselling it.
Leviathan, XXV, 157–58
“I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may
fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it
is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed, or envious
Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the
Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility
of Practice.”
Leviathan, XXXI, 221
69
116.
408 RHETORICA
70
II.v., 111.
71
1406b, 229.
72
110.
“Eloquence is Power” 409
Conclusion
73
A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student, of the Common Laws Of England,
ed. Alan Cromartie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), “Introduction,” xiv.
74
Dialogue, 11.
75
Dialogue, 95.
410 RHETORICA
76
De oratore I.34–35, 65.
77
De oratore II.55, 239.
78
Elements II.5.4, 111. In Elements II.5 Hobbes presents the “conveniences and
inconveniences,” that is, the advantages and disadvantages of the three forms of
government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. An important “convenience” of
monarchy is its relative imperviousness to the appeals of the passions, an advantage
that drives largely from the absence of political oratory in such a system. Elements
II.8.14, 140.
79
II.5.3, 110.
“Eloquence is Power” 411