RESEARCH PROJECT

School of Law, Mahindra University

TOPIC: India’s policy towards the use of nuclear weapons

As a part of the Internal assessment

For the Academic Year 2023-2024

Prepared & submitted by

M . keerthi (SL22ULBA021)

Submitted to
and Professor Imtiaz Quadri

School of Law, Mahindra University

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all, I would like to thank, Prof. (Dr.) V. BALAKISTA REDDY Dean of
the School of Law at Mahindra University, for initiating the internal assessment as
a credit course, which has provided me with an incredible opportunity to work and
learn.

I would like to convey a sincere thanks to Professor Imtiaz Quadri for his
assistance in choosing the topic and for sharing his thoughts on it.

I sincerely appreciate the opportunity of the School of Law, Mahindra University

which has provided us with helping all their students reach their full potential. My
research paper served as a source of ideas, a means of raising awareness, a means
for sharing impact, validation, and career progress, and an avenue for field
contribution.

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 TABLE OF CONTENT

Sl no SUBJECT PAGE NUMBER

1. COVER PAGE 1

2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 2

3. TABLE OF CONTENT 3

4. INTRODUCTION 4

5. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 4

6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4

7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 5

8. HYPOTHESIS 5

9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 5

10. TENTATIVE CHARACTERIZATION 6

11. 7
INTRODUCTION

12. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIA’S DISARMAMENT 8-9

POLICY

13. NUCLEAR MYTHS AND NUCLEAR TABOOS 10

14. NUCLEAR INDIA 11

15. WHAT DOES INDIA WANT? 12-13

16. THE FUTURE OF INDIA AND NUCLEAR 13-14

RESPONSIBILITY

17. CONCLUSION 14 -15

18. BIBLIOGRAPHY 16

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 INTRODUCTION

Since its start in the 1970s, India's nuclear weapons programme has been the focus of ongoing
discussion and investigation. India has particular difficulties in developing and putting into
practice a nuclear policy that strikes a balance between security, deterrence, and international
non-proliferation standards because it is a nuclear-armed country with a complicated past and
geopolitical setting. India's policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons will be examined in this
study, along with its guiding principles, and development. Nuclear weapons have always been
regarded as the most powerful weapons available. The realization essentially separated them
from the arsenal of traditional military tactics and gave them a symbolic meaning that shaped
national identities and norms. Today, the majority of nations consider the development of
nuclear weapons to be morally unacceptable and incompatible with their national identities and
global perspectives. However, in some states, a positive set of norms supersedes these negative
ones, making nuclear weapons either the regalia of major power status or a symbol of opposition
to terrorist attacks.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

There is still some uncertainty surrounding India's nuclear policy, especially about the precise
parameters of its No First Use (NFU) pledge and the possibility of future policy changes.
Concerns concerning the stability of the regional security environment and the possibility of
unintentional an increase are raised by this lack of clarity. Further complicating its nuclear
posture and intentions is India's development of advanced nuclear technologies, including
nuclear power and hypersonic missiles.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

 To analyze the principles of India's nuclear doctrine and their evolution over time.

 To explore future directions for India's nuclear policy in light of evolving security
challenges and international non-proliferation efforts.

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 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

 Whether India's NFU commitment applies solely to non-nuclear weapon states or extends
to all potential adversaries.

 Whether India is likely to reconsider its NFU policy in the future and under what
circumstances.

 What role can India play in promoting international nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation efforts?

HYPOTHESIS

The stability of the region is at risk despite India's commitment to the NFU because of the
uncertainty surrounding its application and the possibility of future policy revisions.
Furthermore, India's quest for cutting-edge nuclear technologies raises the possibility of nuclear
escalation and threatens global non-proliferation efforts.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study will use a qualitative approach that is based on a thorough analysis of primary and
secondary sources. Academic research papers, statements made by Indian officials, and official
government documents will all be used as primary sources. Books, reports from reliable
international organizations, and news articles will all be used as secondary sources.

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 TENTATIVE CHAPTERIZATION

CHAPTER I - Introduction

CHAPTER II - A Brief History of India’s Disarmament Policy

CHAPTER III - Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos

CHAPTER IV - Nuclear India

CHAPTER V - What does India want?

CHAPTER VI - The future of India and nuclear responsibility

CHAPTER VII - Conclusion

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 INTRODUCTION

India has had a complicated relationship with nuclear weapons, since the early days. Indian leaders,
particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, have taken a public and open position against nuclear weapons. However,
Nehru, a modernist, believed that nuclear technology had a role to play in national development. To a
lesser extent, he believed that nuclear weapons technology could play a role in national defense if nuclear
disarmament efforts failed. These contradictory strands are still visible today, as they have been for much
of India's nuclear policy over the last six decades. India's nuclear policy was also influenced by the
country's international security situation, as well as domestic factors like political change and the
influence of bureaucratic elites. India's decision to build a nuclear force came only in the late 1980s, long
after it was clear that Pakistan had made rapid advances in its nuclear weapons programme with Chinese
technological assistance. a more moderate Indian approach to nuclear weapons, reinforcing the dominant
tendency towards a political rather than a military approach to nuclear weapons. They do not indicate any
dramatic shifts or rapid progress in India's nuclear weapons programme. Nuclear weapons are considered
the ultimate weapons and incomparable to other weapons. since the detonation of atomic bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 but later this has been detached from the understanding of the
portfolio of conventional military means strategists and defense planners and given them symbolic
meanings that affected the norms and identity which was formed. Most countries nowadays working on
developing nuclear weapons which is ethically not acceptable and incompatible with a country’s identity
and international view but in a few states, the negative norms are substituted by a positive set of norms
which results in nuclear proliferation. Weapons can either become symbols of vulnerability to perceived
threats or the regalia of major power status. The question of whether India should acquire nuclear
weapons has been widely debated in the last decade, particularly following China's aggression against
India in 1962 and her subsequent formal entry into the privileged nuclear club. Such careless and
definite opinions as "We should go for an immediate crash programme," "The country's economics will
simply not allow it," and "Let us concentrate on poverty relief and forget about the bomb" should now
give way to rational consideration of the problem in all its aspects. Whether we should pursue nuclear
defense can only be answered by planning and bringing to bear the thinking of scientists, military
strategists, economists, and statesmen. Much fact-gathering will have to take place before the final
decision. THE visits of President Carter and Prime Minister Callaghan in quick succession (in January
1978) focused more on India's nuclear policy, which has been more misinterpreted than misunderstood
in recent years.

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 A Brief History of India’s Disarmament Policy

In the early stages of the nuclear era, Indian leaders were very worried about the development of
the bomb. M. K. Gandhi, renowned as the architect of Indian independence, was an active
opponent of nuclear weapons as morally unacceptable. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime
Minister, was realistic enough to keep the possibility of nuclear weapons development open but
opposed them because, as he put it, "we know that the use of these weapons amounts to
genocide." It is hardly surprising, then, that India has long been at the forefront of calls for
disarmament. It has advocated for universal nuclear disarmament since 1948. It proposed an end
to nuclear testing in 1954. It accepted a non-discriminatory treaty prohibiting nuclear
proliferation in 1965 but backed out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because it
discriminated between nuclear haves and have-nots. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
authorized a nuclear test in 1974, she appeared to be abandoning the Gandhi-Nehru legacy. The
claim that the explosion was "peaceful" was met with scepticism, and there was widespread
disappointment that India abandoned its moral high ground. Few, however, recognized the even
more remarkable fact that, after testing the bomb, Mrs. Gandhi made no move to build an
arsenal, instead returning to the rhetoric of disarmament. A more feasible explanation is that Mrs.
Gandhi had achieved her goal of asserting India's independence (in contrast to its apparent
dependence on the Soviet Union) and could afford to do so now that basic nuclear capability had
been achieved to realign herself with a normative perspective that found nuclear weapons
discomfiting at best. In short, the making of the bomb did not dislodge the sustained Indian
interest in disarmament. In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international agreement that
would prohibit the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Their most comprehensive plan, known as
the Action Plan for complete and universal nuclear disarmament, was presented by Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the United Nations General Assembly's Third Special Session on
Disarmament in 1988. This plan had a specific timeline and included stopping nuclear testing,
refraining from using nuclear weapons, and gradually reducing weapons systems and fissile
material until complete elimination. In 1996, India, along with other members of the "Group of
21," also supported a Programme of Action for total elimination. However, it was discovered that
India had already developed nuclear weapons covertly by that time. This revelation could lead to
the perception that the 1996 proposal was shallow or even hypocritical. India's nuclear policy has
changed over time, showing the country's concerns about strategic autonomy and the global
nuclear order. While India had previously advocated for a nuclear-free world, its commitment to
disarmament declined in the mid-1990s. In 1998, India conducted nuclear tests due to
international pressure and frustration with the NPT's perceived inequities. Following the tests,
India's nuclear diplomacy shifted to defending its decision, dealing with sanctions, and keeping
its nuclear option open. India has gradually progressed from an "outsider" to a potential "insider"
within the non-proliferation regime in recent years. This was made possible by its strategic

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partnership with the United States, as well as its growing reputation as a responsible nuclear
power. While this has helped to legitimize India's nuclear status, it has not completely alleviated
pressure to sign the NPT or the CTBT. As a result, India remains focused on strengthening its
position vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime and has not demonstrated a resurgence of interest
in nuclear disarmament. However, it would be incorrect to say that its interest in the issue has
completely vanished. Despite acquiring nuclear weapons capability, India has maintained a long-
standing commitment to universal nuclear disarmament. Its enthusiasm for recent global
initiatives is tempered by concerns that they may be discriminatory and biased towards non-
proliferation. Currently, India is pursuing capabilities that it believes are consistent with
Minimum deterrence. The following are the prerequisites for its participation in the disarmament
process: Deep cuts by the US and Russia, as well as multilateral steps towards a convention
commitment. All states to universal disarmament and the adoption of the No First Use principle,
and China and Pakistan are both involved in the process. A critical factor in facilitating India's
participation would be its complete transformation from an outsider to an insider about the non-
proliferation regime.

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 Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos

The academic conversations find the Indian case to be not only the most rewarding but also the
most complex and confusing among newly emerged nuclear weapon states because the country's
(immediate) security motives are less obvious than in other cases. When news of India's
detonation of several As news of nuclear devices in May 1998 spread, public life in India's major
cities erupted into a collective exaltation, which included strangers accepting in the streets, was
overwhelmed by the events taking place in The Pokhran desert. In the days that followed, a wave
of national pride swept through the country. Many observers were confused by the difference
between the objectionable event - in reality, a step forward in the global spread of weapons of
mass destruction - and the enthusiastic emotions it resulted in. Many observers were confused by
the difference between the objectionable event - in reality, a step forward in the global spread of
weapons of mass destruction - and the enthusiastic emotions it resulted in. At the time of the
tests, India lacked both appropriate delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads and a nuclear doctrine
or deployment strategy. When asked by perplexed journalists whether this deficiency would lead
to deterrence instability and thus be detrimental to India's security needs, government officials
responded that the nature of nuclear weapons as unusable, symbolic elements of political power
justified the neglect. This episode reveals the intricate interrelationship between a state's desire
for security and its desire for status. Despite the obvious role of affective cognition in India's
nuclear decision and the inadequacy of security-oriented approaches, the academic debate that
followed these events focused on the threats posed by China, Pakistan, or a combination of the
two as the presumed causing factors behind India's nuclear breakthrough. This episode
demonstrated, to use Barry Buzan's words, that International Relations had failed as an
intellectual project. The case of India suggests that there is not always an immediate causal
relationship between the development of a nuclear weapons programme and changes in the
region's power balance. It also implies that the key events that accelerated India's nuclear
weapons program were generally less significantly related to its regional strategic environment,
and more specifically to changes in the normative characteristics of the Within the country, there
is a nuclear debate. Two aspects of the Indian case are particularly relevant to the nuclear
weapons normative approach and are thus addressed in the following two sections. First and
foremost, the fact that India is the world's largest democracy raises concerns about the
relationship between regime type, norm creation, and the nuclear option. Second, strong
normative guidance India's opposition to the international nuclear regime, which dominated
India's nuclear policy, before 1998, and which fueled India's determination to test and acquire a
full-fledged nuclear arsenal, raises serious concerns about the implications of these dynamics for
global nuclear security Regime of non-proliferation.

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 NUCLEAR INDIA

India began developing nuclear weapons in 1947. India conducted its first nuclear test, the
Smiling Buddha, in 1974. On May 11, 1998, India conducted its first nuclear fusion test. Other
than for national prestige, why did India seek nuclear capability? According to a 1996 Defence
Department report, the main reason was to address security threats, specifically China and
Pakistan, both of which have nuclear capabilities. Pakistan declared its nuclear capability on
May 28, 1998, two weeks after India did. Both countries' nuclear arsenals have become more
secure as a result of these actions. India is classified as a nuclear third-tier country. A nuclear
third-tier state, according to Gupta, has "forces that are numerically small, not technologically
advanced, limited in range to their regions, a deterrent capability against first-tier states or
nuclear states in the second tier." The South Asian strategic subsystem defines India's nuclear
force as one order built for the two-class system of nuclear powers established by the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan balances India's nuclear balance against China, after declaring
nuclear weapons states, India and Pakistan adopted a minimum deterrence posture towards one
another. Given their previous conflicts, the nuclear dynamic between the two states is
frightening, especially since Pakistan may be on the verge of becoming a failed state. A shooting
war between India and Pakistan has the potential to devolve into a nuclear exchange. The
currency of great powers is prestige. Possessing nuclear weapons capability earns a state great
power respect, regardless of the size of its nuclear arsenal. Although India's nuclear power is
mainly regional, it provides a certain level of national prestige and fits within the context of
India's desire to be recognized as a great power. In India's Nuclear Bomb and National
Security, Karsten Frey highlights this. Nuclear capability is regarded as a component of political
power rather than military power. India developed nuclear weapons capability to demonstrate
military power and gain acceptance as an emerging great power, not just to defend the status quo.
Nuclear weapons are seen as political tools to bring favorable changes in the international
system. India's nuclear deterrent is not yet robust enough to make major powers like China take
it seriously. India also lacks a second-strike capability with submarine-launched missiles. The
2006 US-India nuclear agreement endorsed India's status as a de facto and de jure nuclear power.
This kind of great power endorsement is needed for India's credibility as an effective balancer.
Beyond nuclear weapons, India's geographic location means its conventional military capabilities
will likely play a crucial role in its ability to serve as an effective balancer in the region.

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 What does India want?

India supports global disarmament but recognizes that timelines are now unreal. It focuses on
encouraging trust in arms control quantities and verification to establish the groundwork for
political commitments. India emphasizes promises such as no first use (NFU) doctrines as
normative building blocks rather than practical postures. Minimalist doctrines in India and
Pakistan demonstrate India's political understanding of NFU. The symbolic arms cuts by the
United States and Russia matter to India politically until the numbers are low enough to have a
direct impact on Indian planning. Multilateral consultative processes with competition are
ideal but difficult to implement. Pakistan's rapid nuclear weapons development aims to counter
India's growing conventional military modernization lead. The transformation of opposing India-
Pakistan relations into peaceful relations is critical to undermining Pakistan's growing nuclear
weapon dependence. Meanwhile, China avoids nuclear engagement with India, ostensibly to
deny India's status as a nuclear weapon state. However, China's NSG waiver in 2008 allowing
global civilian nuclear trade with India challenges this position. After decades of advocating
global disarmament, India remains on the defensive in the face of uncertainty from recognized
nuclear powers. Its colonial history and political sociology have shaped serious status sensitivity
to the non-proliferation regime. India wants to be a part of the rule-making process. India's self-
identification as a "responsible" nuclear power reflects its preference for nonproliferation regime
integration over outsider status. As an insider, India would most likely renew its commitment to
disarmament. India's withdrawal from the Antarctic Treaty after gaining insider status sets a
precedent. The arguments point to a half-hearted Indian disarmament. First, nuclear weapons
provide security, which is unwise to give up in the face of rising threats. However, minimal
deterrence requires little. Interim weapons do not rule out disarmament. Second, nuclear status
confers prestige. However, India does not flaunt its weapons, and its leaders downplay them to
pursue arms control. However, India avoids weapons cachet-seeking behaviors such as active
deployment or rhetorical exaggeration of national security necessity, which could support this
viewpoint. India prefers the prestige of having bombs to that of being a major power. Weapons
use a back seat in terms of security and disarmament concerns. Critics add up the two types of
prestige. Domestic politics will undoubtedly shape any Indian involvement in disarmament or
arms control. Currently, there is widespread agreement that outright abolition is undesirable.
However, perceptions of the non-proliferation agenda's perpetuation with India permanently
excluded will put the government's negotiating positions under intense scrutiny across party
lines. Instead, evidence suggests that India prefers recognition at the highest levels of global
affairs to the prestige that comes with simply having bombs. Weapons play a secondary role in
security thinking, and India has consistently backed disarmament and arms control efforts.
Critics confuse the prestige of coveted major power status recognition, which India ardently

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seeks, with the mere possession of nuclear weapons. Issue volatility is exacerbated by India's
increasingly fragmented, coalition-based parliamentary governance. The near-collapse of the
landmark 2008 US-India civil nuclear agreement due to opposition from India. Just one small
coalition member's support for India's testing/non-proliferation treaty positions demonstrates
both increased pressure resistance and tactically stronger bargaining positions. Practical
arguments predicting half-hearted Indian participation in disarmament dismiss evidence of its
minimalist doctrine and consistent preference for major power status recognition over symbolic
nuclear weapon system prestige or reputation.

The future of India and nuclear responsibility

The passage debates whether India qualifies as a responsible nuclear power based on its nuclear
behaviour and the extent to which other countries recognize it. It concludes that, while India has
generally acted responsibly, universal acceptance of its exceptional nuclear status is still lacking.
Further agreement is required that India's overall NPT compliance record on nuclear exports, as
well as its declaratory no-first-use policy, reflect benign intentions, thus legitimizing its
exceptional status. Calls for India to join the NPT are premature, given its increasingly
responsible behavior, as demonstrated by its recent nuclear trade admission. Framing India as a
nuclear-responsible state and broadening this recognition incentivizes continued responsible
behaviour more effectively than formal NPT membership does now. India is now seeking
membership in international nuclear trade/export control organizations such as the NSG and
MTCR. The US should help facilitate this by fostering consensus for India's inclusion based on
export guideline implementation rather than NPT membership as a prerequisite. This is
contributing to the strengthening of India's domestic export controls. China, on the other hand,
refuses to recognize India's responsible nuclear possessor status and NSG membership. Beijing
should accept India's bid if it is motivated by non-proliferation order protection. However, by
undermining India's legitimate status, China risks increasing isolation by acting as a spoiler.
India's claims to be a responsible nuclear power should be strengthened by increasing evidence
of its commitment to nuclear security and non-proliferation. Contributions to a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty strengthened export controls, and urgent nuclear regulatory authority reform
represent priorities that extend beyond national interests. Questions remain about whether India
will project a responsible image among non-aligned states, a significant bloc if NPT amendment
discussions to formally incorporate India take place. It would be prudent to resurrect moral
authority from its historical opposition to the global nuclear order's discriminatory tiers. Despite
its outsider status, India disrupted the nuclear order status quo by catalyzing exceptional civil
nuclear trade admittance. With the right timing, India's unique ability to advocate seismic global
disarmament shifts through persistent non-proliferation regime challenges could prove
strategically valuable. India has demonstrated broadly responsible nuclear behaviour, but it lacks
universal recognition as a legitimate exceptional case. Calls for India to join the NPT should be

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put on hold; for the time being, responsible behavior is more important than formal participation.
The process of facilitating India's admission to auxiliary nuclear trade groups is continuing. To
strengthen its reputation, India should increase demonstrations of its non-proliferation and
nuclear security commitments. If NPT amendment talks take place, it is prudent to restore moral
authority among non-aligned states. India's exceptional status enables it to leverage disruptive
global disarmament advocacy at an advantageous time.

Conclusion

India's nuclear trajectory has covered significant ground from independence to its current
position, which is primarily guided by deterrence stability imperatives. While dormant, its
traditional disarmament advocacy keeps underlying significance and utility. Meaningful Indian
participation in global disarmament efforts is contingent on regime obstacles' willingness to
admit India as a full insider member based on its responsible behaviour. In exchange, active
Indian contributions on multiple non-proliferation fronts have the potential to catalyze this shift
from exception to the norm. since independence, India's nuclear policy has evolved significantly,
shaped by competing impulses of security, status, and ideals. Under Nehru and Gandhi, India
was initially committed to global disarmament but eventually pursued nuclear weapons for
deterrence against perceived threats from China and Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, India's
acquisition of nuclear weapons did not result in the country abandoning its traditional
disarmament stance. For the sake of prestige, India adopted a no-first-use policy and avoided
overt weaponization or nuclear warhead branding. This aligns with India's aspirational self-
conception as a "responsible" nuclear power, as well as its preference for recognition as a leading
global player over the symbolic cachet of nuclear weapons. Given India's contested outsider
status among great powers, domestic consensus views outright abolition as too soon. However, if
granted formal recognition on par with other nuclear weapon states, India is likely to re-energize
its disarmament advocacy. Overcoming India's sense of exclusion from the nuclear order is thus
critical to eliciting its cooperation on arms control and disarmament. However, the pace remains
gradual. Although growing civil nuclear partnerships confirm India's responsible behaviour,
universal recognition of India's exceptional status remains lacking. Rather than forcing India into
formal treaties like the NPT, it is more sustainable to patiently encourage India's voluntary
contributions as a leading power. To strengthen its position among non-aligned states, India
should be encouraged to highlight its non-proliferation commitments. Simultaneously, India can
use its disruptive representation to positively shape disarmament agendas from within at an
important moment in which popularity is building for reevaluating global nuclear security
frameworks. India has shifted from ideological moralism to pragmatic restraint in the nuclear
arena. The source analysis highlighted India's evolving but unresolved nuclear policy direction. It

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explores the tensions between pragmatism and idealism that continue to drive India's nuclear
diplomacy. While India has demonstrated relative nuclear responsibility, full integration into
nuclear decision-making forums remains patchy and contested. However, India has long-held
disarmament sympathies that could resurface if the right incentives of formal recognition among
elite nuclear states with the ability to positively influence collective security outcomes are
provided. A balanced assessment is provided that avoids overly harsh indictments while pressing
India to seize opportunities to productively reassert its nuclear exceptionalism in the service of
progressive arms control goals. For India, political understandings and the establishment of
confidence serve as the basis for disarmament rather than quantity. Although there are obstacles,
it wants opponents to participate in consultative processes. India's defensive position is shaped
by its ambiguous status concerning nuclear powers. As someone who is inside a regime, your
enthusiasm for disarmament could increase. Politicians at home will closely examine
involvement to prevent any perceived injustices. Arguments against India's disarmament fail to
take into account its minimalist doctrine or its preference for major power status over the
prestige of nuclear weapons. In a world where nations are developing and utilizing nuclear
weapons, India's strategic independence needs to be preserved. But let us not lose sight of the
fact that, even with its nuclear arsenal, India feels that global nuclear disarmament would
strengthen its security, not weaken it.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Perkovich, George. 2001. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 2. ed.
Berkeley:
University of California Press

Frey, Karsten. 2006. India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security.

Tannenwald, Nina. 2005. Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. International
Security, 29

For a full account of the technology, see Ted Greenwood, George W. Rathjens Jack Ruina,
"Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation" Adelphi Paper No. 130
(London, 1977)

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