PLATO

Republic

Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by

C. D. C. REEVE

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Indianapolis/Cambridge
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71
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Plato.
[Republic. English]
Republic / translated from the new standard Greek text, with introduction, by
C.D.C. Reeve,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-87220-737-4 (hardcover) — ISBN 0-87220-736-6 (pbk.)
1. Political science—Early works to 1800. 2. Utopias. I. Reeve, C. D. C.,
1948- II.Title.
JC71.P513 2004
321'.07—dc22
2004013418
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-737-0 (cloth)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-736-3 (pbk)
 Book 6
The Good
s life . On the contrary, thos
wh o possess the for me r traits
their quick wits wherever c� are car rie d bv ADEIMANTUS: I, at any rate, thought you gave us good measure. And so,
ance leads them, and have no
stability at all. apparently, did the others.
ADEIMANTUS: That's true.
SOCRATES· Those w1·th sta SOCRATES: No, my friend, any measure of such things that falls short in
.' ble ch aracters, on the other
change easily, hand who d o not any way of what is, is not good measure at all, since nothing incomplete is a
whom one would empIoy . '
. battIe are b ecause of the ir greater reliabilitv measure of anything. Some people, however, are occasionally of the opin­
d and wh0 111 not eas.ily moved by fcears, . ·'
it comes to their studies Th ac_t m the same way when ion that an incomplete treatment is already adequate and that there is no
ey are hard to get movmg
culty, as if they are anesth and learn with diffi- need for further inquiry.
. etized, and are constantly fall
mg whenever they have to ing asIeep and ya\vn- ADEIMANTUS: Yes, a lot of people feel like that. Laziness is the cause.
work hard at such thm .
gs.
ADEIMANTUS: They are SOCRATES: Well, that is a feeling that is least appropriate in a guardian of a
.
SOCRATES: Yiet we say t city and its laws.
hat someone must h ave a goo
both characters or he wo d and fine share of ADEIMANTUS: No doubt.
. e the tru
n 't receiv
allowed to rule. ' est edu cat ion or honor, or be
SOCRATES: He will have to take the longer road then, comrade, and put
10

ADEIMANTUS: That's rig no less effort into learning than into physical training. For otherwise, as we
ht. d

SOCRATES: Then don,t were just saying, he will never pursue the greatest and most appropriate
you think this will rarely occ
ur? subject to the end.
ADEIMANTUS: Of course.
ADEIMANTUS: Why, aren't these virtues the greatest things? Is there some­
SOCRATES: He must be
tested, then, in the Iabors,
e
fears, and pleasures \Ve thing yet greater than justice and the other virtues we discussed?
mentioned before· He m
ust also be exercis. ed in ma SOCRATES: Not only is it greater, but, even in the case of the virtues
ever, which we did not ny other subjects, ho\v-
ment1. on but are addin g themselves, it is not enough to look at a mere sketch as we are doing now,
nature can endure the m now, to see whether his
st .1mpor tant sub . ects or while neglecting the most finished portrait. I mean, it is ridiculous, isn't it,
504a like the cowards who shr : i J will shr ink from the m
i k from the other tests. to strain every nerve to attain the utmost exactness and clarity about other
ADEIMANTUS: It is cer
tainly important to find t things of little value, while not treating the greatest things as meriting the
h·at out. But what do you
e
mean by the greatest sub
jects? most exactness?
S�CRATES: Do yo u rem
em be r wh en we d.istm . gm. she ADEIMANTUS: It certainly is. But do you think that anyone is going to let
things in the soul in ord d thr ee km. ds of
er t0 he IP bnn. g out you off without asking you what you mean by this greatest subject, and
courage, and wisdom eac wh at ·
JUS t'
ice , tem per anc e,
h is?3o what it is concerned with?
ADEIMANTUS: IfI didn't SOCRATES: No, I do not. And you may ask it, too. You have certainly
I wouId not deserve to hea
' r the rest.
SOCRATES: Do you a1so heard the answer often, but now either you are not thinking or you intend
remember what preced
ed it? to make trouble for me again by interrupting. And I suspect it is more the
ADEIMANTUS: No, wh
at?
latter.You see, you have often heard it said that the form of the good is the

I
505a
SOCRATES: We said,I b
eIieve, that .m order to get
b
greatest thing to learn about, and that it is by their relation to it that just
matters, there is a lon the fimest view of these
. ger road and , 1.f one travels .It, things and the others become useful and beneficial. And now you must be
that It was possible to they become clear, bu
g·ive demonstrat1o . ns tha t pretty certain that that is what I am going to say, and, in addition, that we
of the previous disc t wo uld be up to th e standard
.
ussion· 31 All 0f you said tha have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, you know
that our subsequent t was enough • The res
d.iscuss.10n, as It
. seeme ult was that even the fullest possible knowledge of other things is of no benefit to
whether or not it satis d to me, was Iess than exac
fied all 0f you 1s . LOr t. But us, any more than if we acquire any possession without the good. Or do
c-.
you to say.
30 43 you think there is any benefit in possessing everything but the good? Or to b
4d-444e.
31 435
d.
know everything without knowing the good, thereby knowing nothing
fine or good?
198
199
 Book 6
T11e Sun Analogy
ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I
do not.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, yo . SOCRATES: Anyway, I imagine that j ust and beau tiful things won't have
u also know th at. the
to be the good, while the more masses believe plea sur e acquired much of a gu ardian in someone who does not even know why
.
refimed believe it to be knowle
dge. they are good.And I have a hunch that no one will have adequate knowl­
ADEIMANTUS: Of course.
edge of them until he knows this.
SOCRATES· And ' my fr'iend,
that those who beIieve this · cannot sho\v us ADEIMANTUS: That's a good hunch.
· .Is, but m
what sort of knowledge it .
the end are compelled to say tha
10 knowledge of the good. t it is SOCRATES: B ut won't our constit u tion be perfectly ordered if s uch a
guardian, one who knows these things, oversees it? b
ADEIMANTUS: Which is com
pletely ridiculo us.
ADEIMANTUS: It is bound to be. B ut you yourself, Socrates, do you say the
SOCRATES: How could it not
be when the� blam� us for n?t good is knowledge or pleasure, or is it something else altogether?
good and then turn around and knowing the
talk to � s as if we did know it?
say it is knowledge of the I mean, thev SOCRATES: What a man! You made it good and clear long ago that other
good-as 1f we understood
when they utter the word " ,, what they me an people's opinions about these matters would not satisfy you.
good.
ADEIMANTUS: That's absol ADEIMANTUS: Well, Socrates, it does not seem r ight to me for yo u to be
utely tr ue.
willing to state other people's convictions but not your own, when yo u
SOCRATES: What abo ut tho
se who define the good as ple have spent so much time occupied with these matters.
any less full of confusion th asure? Are thev C

an the others.? Or aren't even

admit that there are bad ple th ey compelled to SOCRATES: What? Do you think it is right to speak about things you do
asures?
ADEIMANTUS: Most definit not know as if you do know them?
ely.
SOCRATES: I s uppose it foll ADEIMANTUS: Not as if yo u know them, but you ought to be willing to
ows doesn't it, that they hav state what you believe as what you believe.
same things are both good e to admit that the
and b�d?
d ADEIMANTUS: It certainly SOCRATES: What? Haven't you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are
does. all shameful and ugly things, since the best of them are blind? Do you think
SOCRATES: Isn't it clear, the that those who have a tr ue belief without understanding are any different
n, that there are l ots of sen.
abo ut the good? ous disagreements
from blind people who happen to travel the r ight road?
ADEIMANTUS: Of co urse ADEIMANTUS: They are no different.
. 10

SOCRATES.· Well, isn ,

· also clear that _m
· t It SOCRATES: Do yo u want to look at shameful, blind, and crooked things,
5 things that are believed to . any people would choo
be J ust or beaut1ful even se then, when you might hear fine, illuminating ones from other people? d
wo uId act, acquire things, if they are not, and
. and form beIie1s , .
r-. accordmgly .? Yc .
isfiied to acquire things et no one Is sat-
that are be1·1eved to be go And Glaucon said:
everyone seeks the thing od. 0n the contrarv
s that are good· In this are . .,
mere reputation. a, everyone dis dains By Zeus, Socrates, do not stop now, with the end in sight, so to speak! We
10 ADEIMANTUS: Right. will be satisfied if you discuss the good the way yo u discussed justice, tem­
SOCRATES: That, then, is perance, and the rest.
what every sou1 p ur�ues, and
everything. The soul has for Its sake do es SOCRATES: That, comrade, would well satisfy me too, but I am afraid that
a hunch that the good Is som
e 1 and cannot adequate
zed . . . eth mg
• , but it is puz- I won't be up to it and that I will disgrace myself and look r idiculous by
lY grasp J ust what 1t 1s or acqm·
op.1m. on about it that it has re th e sort of stable try ing. No, bless you, let's set aside what the good itself is for the time
about the other th'mgs, and so
'f
I any, that even . . it . es th e benefit
nuss being. Yo u see, even to arrive at my current beliefs about it seems beyond e
those other thmgs may give.A re we to acc ept that even the,
506a best people in the cih, • ,, t 0 whom we entr u the range of o ur present discu ssion.32 B ut I am willing to tell you about
·
m the dark about som st eve ryth ·
mg, m ust remain thus
ething 0f thIS · k'md and imp. what seems to be an offspring of the good and most like it, if that is agree­
ortance?
ADEIMANTUS·. That,s th able to you ; or otherwise to let the matter drop.
e 1ast thing we wo uld do.
32 See 532a-534d.
200
201
 Book 6
The Sun Analogy

wiU pay^notheftime111611'7116 ab°Ut ^ father remamS a debt Vou GLAUCON: No.

SSffippjaMBasssr
SOCRATES: And I think there cannot be many—not to say any—others
that need such a thing. Or can you think of one?
GLAUCON: NO, I cannot.
an illegitimate account oTttTkM^ ^ ** «*ing you
SOCRATES: Aren't you aware that sight and the visible realm have such a
GLAUCON. We win take as much care as possible. So speak on. need?
GLAUCON: In what way?
reminded you y°U and
SOCRATES: Surely sight may be present in the eyes and its possessor may
occasions. s on many other
try to use it, and colors may be present in things; but unless a third kind of
GLAUCON: Which things? thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this specific purpose, you
know that sight will see nothing and the colors will remain unseen.
other such 8°°d' 3nd ma"y
GLAUCON: What kind of thing do you mean?
GLAUCON.- do. SOCRATES: The kind you call light.
GLAUCON: YOU are right.

»lves and p„!lt a s7n je 71it,11 " ""'N* ^ A"d SO"

we reverse our-
SOCRATES: So it is no insignificant form of yoke, then, that yokes the
sense of sight and the power to be seen. In fact, it is more honorable than
single one, and caU it whatTach t0 ^ ^ WC SUPP°S£ there 15 a
any that yokes other yoked teams. Provided, of course, that light is not

srxr ts—•« -
GLAUCON: That's true. something without honor.
GLAUCON: And it is surely far from being without honor.
SOCRATES: Which of the gods in the heavens would you say is the con­
GLAUCON: Absolutely. troller of this—the one whose light makes our sight see best and visible
things best seen?
SOCRATES: With what of ours do we see visible things?
GLAUCON: The very one you and others would name. I mean, it is clear

^:Prt^r„rur„rsrth-
GLAUCON: With our sight.
that what you are asking about is the sun.36
SOCRATES: And isn't sight naturally related to that god in the following
o
way?
GLAUCON: Of course.
GLAUCON: Which one?
™ - — — SOCRATES: Neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be—namely,
the eye—is the sun.
GLAUCON: NO, not reaUy.
GLAUCON: NO, it is not.

fcS^"ingT^Soffcfo Way' D°hheanng a"d SOt""1 "eed »°">« SOCRATES: But it is, I think, the most sunlike of the sense organs.
GLAUCON: By far the most.
SOCRATES: And doesn't it receive the power it has from the sun, just like
UlZtZfpZ" " Pamm*" "« ™> '*»• »«ns «tet an influx from an overflowing treasury?
14 See 596b5-10. GLAUCON: Certainly.
See Glossary of Terms s.v. what it is.
36 Helios—the sun—was considered a god.
202
203
 Book 6
The Line Analogy

fZTTES: The "" iS °0t ** " *» »n't * seen by sigh, SOCRATES: The sun, I think you would say, not only gives visible things
the power to be seen but also provides for their coming-to-be, growth, and
GLAUCON: It is.
nourishment—although it is not itself coming to be.
GLAUCON: I would. 5

SOCRATES: Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of
knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their existence and
being are also due to it; although the good is not being, but something yet
GLAUCON: HOW? Tell me more. beyond being, superior to it in rank and power.

. C„°,R,« L^XTES: X X
^ „d see„ nl^'S;
i IO°8ER M™»^ >*<«
~
And Glaucon quite ridiculously replied:

GLAUCON: Of course.
By Apollo, what daimonic hyperbole!37 c

SOCRATES: It is your own fault, you compelled me to tell my beliefs about it.

- ^EDTSHELUN'RET"!* ^ <° GLAUCON: And don't you stop, either—at least, not until you have finished .->
eyes? 7 dMt'y a°d s'Bht is •- those very same discussing the good's similarity to the sun, if you are omitting anything.

GLAUCON: Indeed. SOCRATES: I am certainly omitting a lot.

GLAUCON: Well don't, not even the smallest detail.
s 'hbSame Way'WhM " on SOCRATES: I think I will have to omit a fair amount. All the same, as far as
knows, ,„d manifestly is now possible, I won't purposely omit anything. ,c

SRS zi zz:zz Tr
bereft of understanding. 8 " e le s thls way and thab a"d seems
GLAUCON:

SOCRATES:
Please don't.
Then you should think, as we said, that there are these two
things, one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the vis- d
GLAUCON: Yes, it does seem like that. ible—I do not say "of the heavens," so as not to seem to you to be playing

' SZZPZZ z:z tvh"

cause of knowledge and truth
WHATRS M,TH W ,HE
n°Wer "' e form
^
of the good. And as the
the sophist with the name.38 In any case, do you understand these two
kinds, visible and intelligible?
GLAUCON: I do. 5
edge. Both knowledge ancOruthare*K "Xf X °bjK' °f k»«y'-
a think correctly, y„„ LsrThi"k X d u™ "
8 Bm 'f y°" are '° SOCRATES: Represent them, then, by a line divided into two unequal
than they. In the visible realm u S°u °ther and more beautiful sections. Then divide each section—that of the visible kind and that of the
509a like, but wrongly thought to be the S "tn8hdy th°Ught t0 be su»~ intelligible—in the same proportion as the line.39 In terms now of relative
knowledge and truth as eoodlik K SUn °' ^ ^ *S rigbt to tllink of clarity and opacity, you will have as one subsection of the visible, images. e
^ the good-for thetZrfS d "8 '° *** ** d*« °f1" By images I mean, first, shadows, then reflections in bodies of water and in 510a
or tne status of the good is yet more honorable

PRDROTH'X^XZ'RX1
• mean,you surely do no, thinlt ,ha,
z YOU ARE ,AIKM8 AB°UY

*" "«•*
37Socrates' claim ends with the words dunamei huperechontas ( superior in . . .
power"), Glaucon responds with the punning daimonias huperbolh. Hence the joke.
38 The play seems to be on the similarity of sound between orano ("the heavens ) and
orato ("visible").
i» more detail. N° """"k °fomen-Please! Instead, examine our analogy in

b GLAUCON: HOW?
VISIBLE INTELLIGIBLE
204
205
 Book 6
The Line Analogy

all close packed, smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort
Do you understand?
GLAUCON: I do understand.
SOCRATES: Then, in the other subsection of the visible, put the originals
o these images that is, the animals around us, every plant, and the whole
class of manufactured things.
GLAUCON: I will.
SOCRATES: Would you also be willing to say, then, that, as regards truth
and untruth, the division is in this ratio: as what is believed is to what is
10 known, so the likeness is to the thing it is like?
b GLAUCON: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Next, consider how the section of the intelligible is to be
divided.
GLAUCON: How?
SOCRATES: AS follows: in one subsection, the soul, using as images the things
that were imitated before, is compelled to base its inquiry on hypotheses pro-
=> ceeding not to a first principle, but to a conclusion. In the other subsection,
y contrast, it makes its way to an unhypothetical first principle, proceeding
from a hypothesis, but without the images used in the previous subsection
using forms themselves and making its methodical inquiry through them.
10 GLAUCON: I do not fully understand what you are saying.
SOCRATES: Let's try again.You see, you will understand it more easily after
° nd rhXPEL"T' u I™ ^ that StUdCntS of 8—etry calculation
nd the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three
inds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their methodical
5 th6m " kn0Wn'Th- ^ey treat as hypotheses and do
not think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or
o others, as if they were evident to everyone. And going from these first
°U8h the re"la,nmS stePs> th^y arrive m full agreement at the
p nt they set out to reach in their investigation.
GLAUCON: I certainly know that much.
5 make^hir ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ USC ™lble fo™s and
them bu rT* T ' alth°Ugh they are not thinking about
ar" T th°Se °ther Chln8S that they are like? They make their
g
arguments with a view to the square itself and the diagonal itself not the
"T A 7 a"d ^ «>*"• The very £
make and draw, of which shadows and reflect,„ warer are i^6S, .
la that J" Ufn 3S lmagCS 111 seeklnB t° see those other things themselves
la that one cannot see except by means of thought.
GLAUCON: That's true.
SOCRATES: This, then, is the kind of thing that I said was intelligible. The
soul is compelled to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not traveling
up to a first principle, since it cannot escape or get above its hypotheses, but
using as images those very things of which images were made by the things
below them, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to
be clear and to be honored as such.
GLAUCON: I understand that you mean what is dealt with in geometry and
related crafts.
SOCRATES: Also understand, then, that by the other subsection of the
intelligible I mean what reason itself40 grasps by the power of dialectical
discussion, treating its hypotheses, not as first principles, but as genuine
hypotheses (that is, stepping stones and links in a chain), in order to arrive
at what is unhypothetical and the first principle of everything. Having
grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows
from it, comes down to a conclusion, making no use of anything visible at
all, but only of forms themselves, moving on through forms to forms, and
ending in forms.
GLAUCON: I understand, though not adequately—you see, in my opinion
you are speaking of an enormous task. You want to distinguish the part of
what is and is intelligible, the part looked at by the science of dialectical dis­
cussion, as clearer than the part looked at by the so-called sciences—those
for which hypotheses are first principles. And although those who look at
the latter part are compelled to do so by means of thought rather than sense
perception, still, because they do not go back to a genuine first principle in
considering it, but proceed from hypotheses, you do not think that they
have true understanding of them, even though—given such a first princi­
ple—they are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of mind of
the geometers—and the others of that sort—thought but not understand­
ing; thought being intermediate between belief and understanding.
SOCRATES: YOU have grasped my meaning most adequately. Join me, then,
in taking these four conditions in the soul as corresponding to the four sub­
sections of the line: understanding dealing with the highest, thought deal­
ing with the second; assign opinion to the third, and imagination to the last.
Arrange them in a proportion and consider that each shares in clarity to the
degree that the subsection it deals with shares in truth.
GLAUCON: I understand, agree, and arrange them as you say.
40 Autos ho logos.

206
207