This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.

143
On: 21 Dec 2023
Access details: subscription number
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK

Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Israel

Guy Ben-Porat, Yariv Feniger, Dani Filc, Paula Kabalo, Julia Mirsky

Israel

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429281013-26
Guy Ben-Porat
Published online on: 29 Jul 2022

How to cite :- Guy Ben-Porat. 29 Jul 2022, Israel from: Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Israel
Routledge
Accessed on: 21 Dec 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429281013-26

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions,
re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or
accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

21
ISRAEL
Between Religion and Secularism

Guy Ben-Porat

Religious identity played an important part in the three recent elections in Israel and differences
over the role of religion in public life are part of the political impasse. Questions regarding rights
and duties, from demands for civil marriage to military draft exemptions for religious young
men, underscore many political debates and delineate one of Israel’s main schisms. While there
are developments in the past three decades that can be described as secularization, religion
continues to play a significant role in political and public life. The complex relation between
Jewish religion, Jewish nationality and the ( Jewish) state has a direct bearing on Israeli politics
and society, both affected by simultaneous secularization and religious revival. Studying these
developments requires expanding beyond the arena of formal politics, where parties contend for
influence, and where legislation and policies are crafted. Rather, due to circumstances explained
next, economic and demographic changes that led to individual, everyday life decisions and
practices must also be acknowledged. This chapter will begin with a historical overview of reli-
gious–secular struggles and compromises in the Zionist movement and the state, with a focus on
the status quo and its demise. The second part will describe the religious–secular alignment of
Jewish Israelis and the political parties representing them. Finally, in the third part, the dynamics
of religious–secular relations will be explored outside formal politics, in civil society and prac-
tices of everyday life.

Dilemmas of a Jewish State

Zionism, like many modern national ideologies, had a complex relation to religion. Emerging in
the late 19th century, Zionism called for a break with the past and to replace Judaism, a religion
identified with the old world, with Jewishness, a modern identity based on culture, ethnicity, a
historical sense of belonging to the Jewish people and a proactive approach toward the future.
It was a rebellion against Jewish Orthodoxy that objected to modern national ideals, in view
that Jewish redemption would come about with the advent of the Messiah. In his programmatic
book, The Jewish State, Theodor Herzl, one of the founders of the movement, outlined a secular
state, where religion is kept out of politics and remains a private matter and an individual choice:

Shall we end by having a theocracy? No. Faith unites us, knowledge gives us freedom.
We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the

DOI: 10.4324/9780429281013-26 287

 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples
in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their
barracks.
(Herzl, 1988)

Zionism, however, could not entirely divorce itself from religion that remained essential.
First, religion provided the national movement with unifying symbols, rituals (some secular-
ized) and history. Second, national boundaries and questions of belonging adhered to religious
principles of matrilineality and conversion. And, third, territorial claims were based upon his-
torical continuity, the bible and a divine promise. Consequently, different compromises often
described as “consociational” (Ben-Porat, 2013; Susser and Cohen, 2000) had to be made that
later enabled the political system to resolve religious conflicts and maintain stability and democ-
racy (Don-Yehia, 2000).
The visit of the UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1947, whose goal was to make
recommendations for Palestine after Britain announced it would end its mandate, required the
Zionist movement to cooperate with the religious parties. To ensure that the Agudat Israel, the
ultra-Orthodox religious party (the ultra-Orthodox, known also as Haredim, opposed Zion-
ism), would support the Zionist position, a letter was sent by David Ben-Gurion, Chairman
of the Jewish Agency Executive. The letter, which became a cornerstone of religious–secular
arrangements known as the status quo, stated that the future Jewish state will maintain rules of
Kashrut ( Jewish dietary restrictions) in state kitchens, declare the Sabbath an official day of rest,
maintain Jewish family values and acknowledge religious rights to separate education. The com-
mitments in the letter were somewhat vague, but it laid down a basic agreement on the Jewish
character of the State of Israel that enabled secular and religious political elites to formulate
compromises and avoid conflicts (Don-Yehia, 2000).
After independence, the status quo was formalized and developed, included also the nation-
al-religious party, stating duties, obligations and jurisdictions. The status quo operated as a
guideline for religious–secular negotiations and governing coalition agreements during the first
decades of statehood (Susser and Cohen, 2000). As promised, the government granted auton-
omy to the ultra-Orthodox school system. In addition, ultra-Orthodox yeshiva (high learning
institutions) could defer the obligatory military service and in practice exempt themselves from
duty. Three other components had a more direct effect on the lives of secular Jews: the designa-
tion of Saturday, the Sabbath, as the day of rest, with the mandatory closing of stores and public
services; the required observance of Jewish dietary rules (kashrut) in public institutions; and the
Orthodox monopoly over burial, marriage and divorce.
The approach, known as the ethos mamlahtiyut, placed the state at the center of collective life
of the Jewish nation and upheld the functionality of the status quo for reinforcement of consen-
sus with respect to the state. The leading political parties, as well as the majority of Jewish Israelis,
in this period, were occupied with challenges of state-building and concerned with external
security threats that marginalized secular–religious differences. Politically, the consensus was
secured by political interests and cooperation between the dominant Labor Party and the major
religious national party (the Mizrahi). This cooperation allowed the Labor Party to dominate
foreign policy and security policy in return for Orthodox monopoly over significant aspects of
public life. For the ultra-Orthodox party, reluctant to take part in the Zionist project, exemp-
tions from military service, autonomy for their education system and gradually also funding for
their institutions was enough to ensure their implicit support.
Beyond legislation and formal institutions regulating private lives, the status quo included
informal institutions that helped overcome disagreements. These included refraining from

288
 Israel
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

formal and binding decisions over controversial matters, favoring of coalition partnerships over
majority rule, allowing religious autonomy in specific areas and attempting to shift disputes
from national-political to judicial and local arenas. The majority of nonreligious Israelis were
generally supportive of the compromises as they continued to relate to codes, values, symbols
and a collective memory that could hardly be separated from Jewish religion (Kimmerling, 2004:
354). The gap between religious groups and a large proportion of the secular population was
narrowed not only by common symbols but also by the widespread loyalty shared to the idea of
a “Jewish state” and the instrumentality of religion for maintaining boundaries. Consequently,
both symbolic and practical political considerations kept Jewish religion inside the political life
of the nation and the state, facilitating political compromises. The secular idea of a Jewish state
referred to ethnicity or culture, but religion was called up as the gatekeeper to provide the cri-
teria for inclusion and exclusion (Ben-Porat, 2000; Ram, 2008).

Secularization
The agreements that sustained the status quo gradually eroded in light of societal changes and
conflicting demands. The laws that provided religious orthodoxy with authority over major
milestones in society, ranging from marriage and divorce to burial, were no longer in con-
sensus. Ideologically, secular Israelis who called for freedom – described in terms of religion –
state separation, freedom from religion or religious freedom – were a minority but politically
active and present since the 1950s (Ben-Porat, 2013). In the 1990s, three major changes further
undermined the foundations of the status quo: globalization and consumer culture, the immi-
gration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and more assertive nonreligious groups that offered
new interpretations to Jewish identity. The modest collectivist ethos and the limited material
resources available in early statehood provided a protective shield for the status quo. Conversely,
globalization and economic growth that took off in the 1990s introduced new incentives and
preferences. New lifestyles rendered the restrictive arrangements of the status quo difficult to
maintain. Individualism, hedonism and consumerism began to organize Israeli middle-class daily
life (Carmeli and Applebaum, 2004) and the desire for new experiences and the new leisure
patterns – shopping on the Sabbath, or nonkosher food – were often incompatible with the
religious restrictions of the status quo. For religious people, also influenced by consumer culture,
the religious rules held firm although some challenges to religious authority have emerged, in
relation to the use of the Internet or mobile phones for example.
The million immigrants who arrived in Israel from the between 1989 and 2000 were not
only more secular than their Israelis peers (Ben-Rafael, 2007; Leshem, 2001), many of them,
due to intermarriage in the FSU did not meet the Orthodox criteria of Jewishness (Ben-Rafael,
2007). Consequently, immigrants were granted citizenship under the Law of Return (1970)1
but were not considered Jewish by the Orthodox establishment2 unless they would go through
an Orthodox conversion process. The sheer scale of this immigration produced a critical mass of
demand for Russian culture and imported products, including pork. Russian food stores, selling
nonkosher and other imported food products were established across the country. The status quo
agreements and the Orthodox monopoly caused considerable difficulties for the immigrants,
especially for those not recognized as Jews who, among other difficulties they experienced,
could not marry in Israel, strengthening the demand for change.
Ideational developments also took a new turn of challenging the Orthodox monopoly,
demanding that alternative Jewish identities be recognized by the state and receive an equal
stance to Jewish Orthodoxy. This included Reform and Conservative Judaism, initially small
and based mainly on immigrants from English-speaking countries, but with substantial backing

289
 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

from their related communities in the United States. This backing not only enabled them to
function without government funding but also to expand and reach out also to native Israelis.
An additional set of alternatives known as secular or cultural Judaism developed in the 1990s.
The open and critical reading of texts and, more important, the reinterpretation of rituals and
commandments directly challenged religious orthodoxy and the status quo (Ben-Porat, 2013).

Religion: Come Back?

Religious authority, in the form of the rabbinate and affiliated institutions, was losing its author-
ity not only because of the secular demands for religious freedom or practical individual deci-
sions but also because of a tarnished image. Allegations of corruption, insensitivity, rigidity and
poor service were often waged against religious authorities and incorporated in the demands
of secular entrepreneurs for change. Yet the majority of Israelis, including those who defined
themselves nonreligious, took part in religious rituals during holidays (Passover) and preferred
religious ceremonies. Jewish Orthodoxy, therefore, acted as what Grace Davie (2007) described
as a vicarious religion: “performed by an active minority but on the behalf of a much larger
number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the
minority is doing.” The role religion played in private lives and its role as a gatekeeper of the
national boundaries has rendered the possibility of separating state and religion unlikely, even
for those who described themselves as “nonreligious.” Israelis accepted restrictions on marriage
and burial choices, activities on the Sabbath and the sale of nonkosher meat. All perceived
constitutive to the Jewish character of the state or their own Jewish identity, part of a necessary
compromise between religious and secular, or simply an issue of minor importance that did not
affect their everyday lives enough to justify its politicization.
Jewish Orthodox groups, on their behalf, sought not only to defend the status quo and their
influence, but even to expand it. Initiatives to encourage nonreligious Jews to adopt a more reli-
gious way of life, to place religious nationalism in a leadership position and to expand religious
authority combined to curb secularization. Active encouragement of secular Jewish Israelis to
adopt a religious way of life (hazarah be-teshuvah) dates back to the crisis that affected Israeli soci-
ety in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Beit-Halahmi, 1992) or even the 1960s, when it
was one among other spiritual trends (Caplan, 2007). The return to religion has been orches-
trated by religious entrepreneurs who specialized in finding ways to the hearts of nonreligious
Jews, using different strategies. The religious campaign included yeshivot (religious educational
institutions) dedicated to the hozrim be-teshuvah (those returning to a religious way of life) along-
side various additional institutions that organized seminars and lectures and produced learning
materials for general circulation. The number of secularists who turned religious is unknown;
ultra-Orthodox (haredi) spokesmen mention numbers reaching into six figures, but researchers
estimate their number at around 40,000 and that the overall influence of the hozrim be-teshuvah
on the size of the haredi society is minor (Caplan, 2007: 101–2).
The most important upsurge of religiosity was among Mizrahim ( Jews who immigrated
from Muslim countries and their descendants) with the rise of Shas, a political party that gained
prominence from the 1980s onward. Combining ethnicity and religiosity, Shas advocated a
return to tradition against the secularization forced on Mizrahi immigrants. Shas organized
its activities using an extensive network of educational and welfare institutions, constituting a
substitute for the receding welfare state and thereby reinforcing the party’s standing with both
the state, which used it as an intermediary, and with its voters, who became more dependent
on this party network (Levi and Amreich, 2001). Through its extensive educational and welfare
network, Shas became an important player in promoting religious (and anti-secular) Jewish

290
 Israel
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

identity. The party’s constituency was not necessarily Haredi, as its voters often identified with
its social and ethnic message, but the vote for Shas was a vote for a more religious state (Susser
and Cohen,2000: 120). Shas’s electoral power, enhanced by its education and social network,
enabled it to promote different proposals to curb the secularizing trends.
Religious Zionism was part of the Zionist movement but, until the late 1960s, it settled for
the secondary role of managing the religious institutions. A younger generation of Religious
Zionists who took power after the war of 1967, however, was no longer willing to accept its
marginal role. Gush Emunim (“Bloc of the Faithful”), which appeared on the scene during the
1970s, constituted an attempt by the Religious Zionists to make headway into a position of
leadership while fusing religion, politics and territoriality (Schwartz, 1999: 83). The settlement
of the territories – areas with historical and religious significance – was for Religious Zionists
the fulfillment of religious commandments and national duty. The national revival that Gush
Emunim offered replicated many of the symbols and practices of secular Zionism but instilled
them with religious meaning. Hiking the land, community life, Hebrew culture and, especially,
pioneering became the markers of the new movement (Ben-Porat, 2000).
The three counter-secularization developments – hazarah be-teshuvah, the growth of the Shas
party and Gush Emunim – shared a common agenda to protect, first, what they describe as “the
Jewish character of the state” and, second, the authority of religion in public and private lives. In
recent years, the process of religious resurgence came to be known as Hadata and received both
media and academic attention. This process also aroused opposition among secular Israelis who
perceived the attempts to change public institutions (among them the military and education
curriculum) as a threat to their way of life.

Israeli Society: Religious and Secular

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2018), 45% of Jewish Israelis describe
themselves as secular, 25% as traditional, 16% as religious or very religious and 14% as ultra-Or-
thodox. In a different survey conducted in 2009 (Arian and Keissar-Sugarmen, 2012), 3% of
Israelis described themselves as secular and anti-religious, 43% as secular, 32% as traditional, 15%
as religious and 7% as ultra-Orthodox. The differences between the surveys reflect not only the
time passed but also the different categories offered and mostly the fuzziness of the categories.
Measurements of beliefs, values and practices suggest a more complex and multidimensional
map. Many of those who describe themselves as secular participate in religious rituals and adhere
to some religious norms. Conversely, many of those who describe themselves as traditional or
even religious, make choices that can be described as “secular” in the sense of defying religious
laws or norms. People who shop on the Sabbath often do not regard themselves as secular, pro-
vide pragmatic and instrumental reasons for defying religious commandments and obey other
commandments (Ben-Porat and Feniger, 2009; Ben-Porat, 2013).
Whereas religious Orthodox Jews and committed secularists demonstrate a more or less
coherent pattern, the majority of Israelis show different levels of belief and attitudes and a selec-
tive choice of practices and rituals (Levi, Levinson and Katz, 2002). The selective and partial
fulfillment of religious commandment is neither random nor necessarily the result of “sloppi-
ness.” Rather, patterns of religiosity can display a pattern of commitment to “Jewish popular
culture” (Liebman, 1997), be a conscious choice of individuals who choose to modernize but
not secularize (Yadgar, 2010) or result from an ethnic heritage that provides a more relaxed and
flexible model of religiosity (Leon, 2009).
Nevertheless, the schism between religious and secular plays a major part in Israeli politics,
religious identities overlapping ethnicity, class and values. One set of debates involves the role of

291
 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

religion in public life, demands of secular Israelis for freedom of marriage or public transporta-
tion on the Sabbath (day of rest), face resistance of the religious who demand that the “Jewish
character of the state” be observed in public as well as private domains. In addition, recent
attempts of religious parties and organizations to introduce more religious curriculum in public
schools, demands to allow gender separation in the academia and attempts to prevent women
from military roles where they serve next to men, all part of what is described as Hadata, raise
new tensions. A second set of debates involves the privileges of ultra-Orthodox stemming from
the status quo, especially the exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from military service and the
demand to include secular studies (English, math and sciences) in the autonomous ultra-Ortho-
dox education system. Finally, the overlap between religious identity and opposition to territo-
rial compromises adds another dimension to the religious–secular divide.

The Changing Political Landscape

The political arena, to a large extent, reflects the changes described earlier. First, the parties who
were partners to the status quo have changed dramatically. Second, new parties emerged, in
many cases with more adamant demands regarding questions of religious freedom and religious
authority. Third, new alignments were formed between parties and a division between parties
identified with the secular camp and parties identified with the religious camp. While many of
these parties have had to compromise some of their demands, statements and demands have had
a considerable impact on the public debate. Fourth, despite statements and debates, the political
system remained deadlocked, unable to agree upon enforcement of the status quo or to devise
new agreements.
The Labor Party, formerly Mapai (Party of the Workers in the Land of Israel), the former
leader of the secular camp has all but ceased to exist. The party, dominating pre- and early state-
hood, whose leader and first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, was the initiator and main
partner to the status quo agreement and the mamlahtiyut ethos. The party’s dominance, however,
gradually eroded and in the 1977 elections, when it was defeated for the first time, its partner-
ship with the National Religious Party (NRP) ended. The party maintained its pragmatic or
moderate approach to religious issues and the status quo, in hope of future cooperation with the
religious parties. In 2020, the party was decimated to three parliamentary seats and its influence
became marginal (Katsman and Ben-Porat, 2019).
Meretz, the liberal party, a combination of three parties (the social democratic MAPAM and
the liberal Shinui and Ratz) was formed in 1992. The three parties, despite differences, were
united over questions of territorial compromise, human rights and demands for religious free-
dom. Initially led by Shulamit Aloni, a longtime liberal activist, the party was at the forefront of
secular struggles against the status quo and what was described as the continuous encroachment
of religion. The party advocated civil marriage, public transportation on the Sabbath, equality
for LGBT and religious freedom. At its peak, between 1992 and 1996, the party held 12 seats
in the parliament but since then has gradually lost power. In the elections of April 2020, Meretz
joined forces with the Labor Party, both fearing they could fall below the threshold, and cur-
rently holds three of the seven seats of the united party.
Meretz’s loss of power can be attributed also the rise of secularist parties with a more centrist
and neoliberal agendas, with strong anti-ultra-Orthodox platforms. In the elections of 1998, the
Shinui (change) party offered a new secular agenda. The party’s platform combined secularism,
a neoliberal economic agenda and a centrist position regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Led by Yosef (Tommy) Lapid, a popular journalist, the party’s platform was directed against the
religious establishment and the ultra-Orthodox. The party demanded the state stop subsidizing

292
 Israel
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

ultra-Orthodox institutions and large families, enforce military draft and put an end to exemp-
tions for yeshiva students and allow religious freedom. In the 2003 elections, that party gained
an impressive number of 15 seats and became the third-largest party but later fell apart and was
dissolved. In 2010, however, a new party named Yesh Atid (there is a future) was formed, repli-
cating Shinui’s agenda with greater electoral success. Led by Yair Lapid (also a former journalist
and Yosef Lapid’s son), the party won 19 seats in the 2013 elections (the second-largest party),
11 seats in the 2015 elections and in 2019 became part of the new Blue and White party.
Finally, parties representing the immigrants from the former Soviet Union also adopted a
secular agenda, a response to the immigrants’ concerns and difficulties. First, the large number
of immigrants not considered Jewish by the rabbinate implies that, among other problems, civil
marriage not available, they cannot marry in Israel. Second, the secular lifestyle of the immi-
grants and especially their consumption of pork, was a source for conflicts in many cities. And,
finally, religious leaders and politicians throughout the years treated the new immigrants with
disdain. Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel our Home) formed in 1999 and led by Avigdor Lieberman, is a
right-wing, secular party, advocating a hawkish foreign policy and a hostile stance toward Arab
citizens of Israel. Holding only seven parliament seats but a pivotal position in the attempts to
form a government, the party’s demands included draft for Yeshiva students, civil marriage and
freedom for businesses to operate on the Sabbath.
The representation of nonreligious, or secular, Jewish Israelis, has undergone several changes.
Previously, voters were unevenly split between the large and more moderate Labor Party and
smaller, more liberal activist parties, located on the “left” (pro-territorial compromise) of the
political spectrum. While the Labor Party disintegrated and with Meretz remaining small, new
parties have taken upon themselves to represent the secular public. Shinui, Yesh Atid and espe-
cially Yisrael Beiteinu, adopted a more centrist or even hawkish, right-wing, platforms but also
a more militant approach, especially against the ultra-Orthodox parties. Accordingly, questions
like civil marriage, public transportation on the Sabbath or the draft of Yeshiva students remain
central and divisive.
The status quo, or the expansion of religious authority, was supported by different parties
with different agendas. The Likud, the party dominating Israeli politics since 1977, is supported
by many voters with a traditional approach to religion. Traditional Jews demonstrate a flexible
approach to religion in practical everyday life decisions or cultural choices but remain conserv-
ative regarding rituals and respectful toward rabbinical authority. Menachem Begin, the Likud
leader, stated after the 1977 elections that

We shall follow the name of our Lord forever. . . . I announce that the government
of Israel will not ask any nation . . . to acknowledge our right to exist . . . we have
received that right from God.
(Quoted in Filc, 2006: 118)

This religious rhetoric and the use of religious symbols underscored not only the new part-
nership between the Likud and religious-nationalist parties but also echoed the traditionalist
elements with the Likud and the rejection of Labor’s secularism (Ben-Porat and Filc, 2021).
Support of the status quo was the result not only of the religious sentiment of many Likud voters
but also of political considerations. Since 1977, religious parties were part of Likud’s govern-
ing coalitions, based upon the maintenance of the status quo and responding to new religious
demands, funding of independent educational institutions among others.
Religious Zionists were part of the Zionist movement, combining adherence to religious
Orthodoxy with nationalism. After statehood, the NRP was partner until 1977 to many

293
 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

Labor-led government coalitions. The party’s efforts concentrated on the preservation of the
status quo arrangements, and its platform did not suggest any substantial changes in religion and
state relations. The rise of a new generation of Religious Zionists no longer willing to accept
religious Zionism’s marginal role, and the shift of focus to the settlement of the territories
captured in 1967, brought the partnership to its end. The “historical alliance” with the Labor
Party was replaced by a new alliance with the Likud, committed to advance the settlement pro-
ject. Paradoxically, while the settlement movement’s power kept growing, the NRP’s political
power decreased by more than 50%. From 1977 until the party’s transformation in 2008, the
NRP regularly won only 4–6 Knesset seats. However, its extra-parliamentary power was far
more significant as Gush Emunim had immense influence on government policy (Katsman and
Ben-Porat, 2019).
In 2008, the party rebranded itself as “The Jewish Home,” in an attempt to reverse its polit-
ical decline. In 2012, Naftali Bennett, a successful entrepreneur, became the party leader in
partnership with Ayelet Shaked, a nonreligious women. The party, alongside commitment to
the settlements project presented a neoliberal and conservative agenda aimed at new constitu-
encies, religious and secular, winning 12 parliamentary seats and joining the Likud’s governing
coalition. The growing influence of the party through its control of significant ministries raised
opposition from the outside for what secular Israelis perceived as the growing influence and
imposition of religion [Hadatah] in public life, as the party took a more activist position, meshing
religious attachment with national identity (Katsman and Ben-Porat, 2019). The party, however,
was unable to replicate the success of 2012, splitting and losing electoral power. In the 2020
elections, the party reunited after Bennett and the more religious faction split, and it gained six
parliamentary seats.
Ultra-Orthodox Jews (“Haredim”) are divided into many factions, among the Ashkena-
zim ( Jews of European descent) and Sepharadim ( Jews from Muslim countries). “Agudat Yis-
rael,” representing Ashkenazi Haredim, was established in 1919 in Palestine. Although Haredim
rejected Zionism and did not take part in the movement, it gradually accepted compromises like
the status quo agreements. The party also participated in the elections and was able to use its
power to negotiate not only sectoral interests like military exemptions and budgets but also to
maintain the Orthodox influence in the public sphere, over issues like marriage and divorce or
the observance of Shabat. Ultra-Orthodox parties and politicians are subordinated to religious
councils where important decisions are made. The councils’ rulings do not allow women to
be elected as Knesset Members and, until recently, also forbade its members of parliament to
serve as ministers. In 1988, the party was split and reunited again in 1992 as the UTJ (“Yahadut
HaTorah HaMeuchedet”).
Frustrated with their marginal position in the ultra-Orthodox world in general and in “Agu-
dat Israel” institutions in particular, Sepharadic Jews under the leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yossef
formed Shas. Like UTJ, Shas demands that the laws of the state be guided by religious rules.
But, unlike Ashkenazi Haredi parties, first, Shas constituency extended well beyond the Haredi
world and included also traditional non-Orthodox (Masorti) Mizrahim in peripheral towns and
neighborhoods. And, second, the party delegates willingly took upon themselves ministerial
positions (Katsman and Ben-Porat, 2019). From the 1990s onward, the party championed a
religious revolution and a spiritual revival aimed at changing the balance of power between the
secular majority and the religious minority (Tessler, 2003: 167). In 1999, the party enjoyed its
biggest success in the ballots, 17 seats in the parliament. Later, its power declined, winning nine
seats in the April 2020 elections (Katsman and Ben-Porat, 2019).
Haredi parties, especially Agudat Israel, maintained distance from Zionism and later the state
but gradually accommodated and increased their political involvement. Initially, the political

294
 Israel
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

status of Agudat Israel was bolstered by the fact that since the late 1970s, the two major parties,
Labor and Likud, could not form a coalition without them. This position allowed them various
political gains – state funding for their independent and unsupervised school system and higher
learning institutes and more deferrals of military service for young men (Katsman and Ben-Po-
rat, 2019). Similarly, Shas held a moderate position regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that
enabled it to cooperate with both Likud and Labor. In the March 2020 elections, however, both
parties declared their commitment to the “right-wing” block formed by Netanyahu and the
Likud, forgoing their former flexible position, entrenching the religious–secular schism and its
overlap with the overarching political split between right and left.
The institutional power of the status quo was derived from the political context in which it
was created, the ideological consensus and the dominance of the Labor Party that enabled con-
structive compromises. These compromises were more and more difficult to sustain as religious
and secular demands clashed and the politics of accommodation that characterized the status quo
was replaced by a “politics of crisis” that undermined stability, split the political system (Susser
and Cohen, 2000) and eventually rendered it ineffective. The political standstill was not unique
to questions of religion but was indicative of a deeper and wider political crisis and an unstable
political system. Dissatisfied with the status quo, or with the difficulty to enforce it, both secular
and religious Israelis became frustrated with the political system. While formal changes of the
status quo were marginal, both camps refusing to compromise but enable to enforce their agen-
das, changes did occur in other arenas.

From Politics to Courts and to Civil Society

Marriage, burial, conversions, military service, business and leisure operation on the day of rest
were part of a growing list of disagreements between religious and secular and a growing rift. For
nonreligious Israelis, for different reasons, the enforcement of what was perceived as religious
rules was no longer acceptable. Demands for alternative marriage services, for example, were
raised by Jewish Israelis who rejected the Orthodox ceremony perceived unfitting to their way
of life, allotting women a marginal role. For Russian immigrants, not recognized as Jewish by the
Orthodox rabbinate, or LGBT couples denied the option of marriage, the Orthodox monopoly
of marriage was more detrimental. Changes in leisure patterns and growing consumerism, to
take another example, raised demands for operation of commerce on the Sabbath. And, the
rising number of religious young men who deferred their military service (deferral in practice
meaning exemption) was no longer acceptable for those serving.
The judicial system became an alternative for secular politicians and groups frustrated with a
deadlocked political system. Questions such as civil marriage or the draft exemption of Ortho-
dox men were pushed aside by politicians in power who preferred to remain on the sidelines and
avoid decisions rather than anger religious or secular voters. The weakness of the political system
meant that the courts soon became an alternative institution to which the secular public would
turn in hope of a clear and binding decision. Individuals and groups appealed to the courts
initially requesting a solution to tangible troubles, but later these submissions were expanded
to include questions of principle. The Supreme Court was an agent of liberal values (Mautner,
2011) that, beginning in the 1980s, adopted an activist approach, extending its jurisdiction from
protection of concrete, personal rights to ensuring the realization of general public values and
reducing the scope of issues considered non-judicable (Mautner, 2011: 57–8).
Two basic laws with a constitutional status, passed by the parliament in 1992, provided the
court with greater capacity to intervene in political life. The Law on Human Dignity and Free-
dom and the Law of Freedom of Occupation were part of what was described as a “constitutional

295
 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

revolution” that supposedly took part in Israel in the 1990s. Although this may not have been
the intention of the government and the Knesset, these basic laws granted the court the right
of judicial review and the possibility to make decisions in cases in which the basic laws and new
legislation seemed to clash. In actual practice, the basic laws had fairly limited power; the rights
they promised could be infringed by new laws, as long as these did not contradict the values
upheld by Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, were passed for a valid purpose and did not
diverge from what was absolutely necessary to serve this purpose (Shafir and Peled, 2002).
The courts became an important arena for secular groups and individuals that appealed for
the right of businesses to operate on the Sabbath, to import nonkosher meat, marry outside the
rabbinical jurisdiction or be buried in a civil burial ceremony. But in spite of several important
victories in the courts, recognition of marriage conducted abroad allowing to avoid the rabbin-
ate, for example, the overall result of the legal struggles not only was limited in scope but also
turned out to be a two-edged sword. For its critics, the Supreme Court has amassed extensive
powers and, in its intervention in religious–secular affairs, it became a route bypassing the pol-
itics of accommodation (Susser and Cohen, 2000). The growing involvement of the Supreme
Court in what were previously considered political questions alienated it from important reli-
gious groups, which saw the court as a secular, antireligious entity.
Neither the formal political arena nor the courts was necessarily the “place” where the new
rules of the game were shaped. Rather, secularization advanced by actions, small and large,
that circumvented the status quo rather than directly challenging it. Frustrations with political
systems and declining faith in political change resulted in growing apathy and withdrawal, but
also with different initiatives and alternative courses of actions. These actions had two impor-
tant advantages for secular entrepreneurs compared with formal political channels. First, they
replicated other initiatives and matched the political culture that developed in Israel, in which
informal solutions to problems were found more productive. Second, they were able to benefit
from the neoliberal economic policies and the freedom of choice these policies supposedly
offered (Ben-Porat, 2013).
The political stalemate and the inability of the government to produce efficient and stable
policy decisions shifted action elsewhere. Citizens and political entrepreneurs found alter-
native courses of action – legal, semi-legal and even illegal – that circumvented the political
system. Entrepreneurs, with different motivations, identified the needs and desires of groups,
provided alternatives for marriage, burial or shopping on the Sabbath and challenged reli-
gious authority institutionalized in the status quo. Motivations were political-ideological goals
(promotion of civil marriage) and, in other cases, they were economic (opening businesses
on Sabbath). These choices and strategies, based on different combinations of ideological
or economic motives, at times consciously challenged the status quo with a clear political
objective (civil marriage or burial). Many other times, however, these were individual choices
that took advantage of opportunities (private marriage or burial services) and had no political
aspirations (Ben-Porat, 2013).
More recent developments, however, indicate that secularization, despite changes in some
arenas, remains superficial and fragile. The continuing inability to change marriage laws is
indicative not only of religion’s institutional power, backed by religious parties, but also that the
Orthodox monopoly is accepted by the majority of Jewish Israelis. Similarly, while for many
Israelis, trading on Sabbath was seen as a fait accompli, new initiative in 2018 by government
ministers and city mayors attempted, if with limited success and against some opposition, to limit
commerce on Sabbath through legislation and fines. Ideology and political struggles explain
only part of the changes that have occurred in the past two decades. Civil marriage (conducted

296
 Israel
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

abroad), civil burial, shops selling pork and the rapidly expanding commerce on the Sabbath
are all evidence for a secularization process unfolding in Israel since the early 1990s. During the
same period, however, not only have religious parties and institutions continued to hold formal
power, but many Israelis have also declared that they feel closer to religion than ever before and
take part in different religious activities. Women in Israel were still prevented from eulogizing in
some state cemeteries, and religious leaders order their disciples serving in the military to refuse
to serve alongside women and to leave the room when women singers appear. These are just
few examples that demonstrate that Israel, in spite of secularization, is nowhere close to being
a secular state or society.
A new word “Hadata,” meaning and attempt to de-secularize and make religious presence
and authority stronger, was introduced to describe the changes. Secular, or nonreligious Israelis,
and political parties representing them, claim that religious parties are attempting to change the
status quo and impose religion and religious dictums upon them. Hadata, or “religionalization,”
implies the growing presence of religion in public life and possibly dominance or even hegem-
ony (Peled and Peled, 2019) of religious Zionism. This includes not only the political system but
also growing presence of religious commanders in the military, more religious content in school
systems and growing perceptions that Israel is becoming more religious (Peled and Peled, 2019:
19). Religious Zionism, according to Peled and Peled (2019: 215) “has been making inroads
into several key fields of Israel’s social life – education, the media, fine arts, the military” – in
order, as they put it, to “move from the back seat into the driver’s seat.”

Conclusions
Religious and secular politics were contained in early years of statehood by an overarching con-
sensus, secular ambivalence toward religion and a political leadership able to reach the formal and
informal agreements known as the Status Quo. The Status Quo was able to de-politicize many
of the religious debates and questions, shifting them to the judicial realm, engaging them as local
questions and avoiding controversial decisions. The changes – demographic, sociocultural and
economic – that began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s undermined the status quo.
Secularization, with various demands and initiatives to lessen religious authority, and religious
demands to maintain and strengthen that authority, rendered old compromises irrelevant and
new ones difficult to achieve.
The re-politicization of religious questions, with new demands and needs, could not be
resolved neither in the political system, facing an ongoing governance crisis, nor in the legal sys-
tem, constrained by legitimacy concerns that questioned its ability to intervene. Consequently,
the political debates, and more importantly political actions, shifted to other spheres where
entrepreneurial actions and individual decisions created alternatives. But, while initiatives that
circumvent rather than confront existing laws created “secular spaces,” largely privatized, where
nonreligious Israelis can make their own choices, they have not resolved the major issues regard-
ing the role of religion in Israeli public life. In these new comfort zones – secularized spaces –
Israelis had new choices regarding significant rituals and everyday practices of shopping and
leisure. Secularization, consequently, was both political and de-politicizing. Political, in bring-
ing institutional change but de-politicizing in allowing individuals to settle for comfort zones
achieved with limited if any struggle. Moreover, the simultaneous growing power of religious
institutions and parties have not only limited secularization and maintained strong power holds
but may even reverse some of these developments. Political struggles for and against religious
authority, inside and outside formal politics, are likely therefore to remain part of Israeli politics.

297
 Guy Ben-Porat
Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 22:25 21 Dec 2023; For: 9780429281013, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429281013-26

Notes
1 The law grants Israeli citizenship to “the child or grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, and the spouse
of a Jewish child or grandchild.”
2 According to Jewish Orthodoxy, a Jew is “someone who was born to a Jewish mother, and who does
not belong to another religion, or someone who converted to Judaism.”

Bibliography
Arian, Asher and Ariela Keissar-Sugarmen. 2012. A Portrait of Israeli Jews Beliefs, Observance, and Values of
Israeli Jews 2009. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
Beit-Halahmi, Benjamin. 1992. Despair and Deliverance: Private Salvation in Contemporary Israel. New York:
SUNY Press.
Ben-Porat, Guy. 2000. “In a State of Holiness; Rethinking Israeli Secularism,” Alternatives 25(2): 223–246.
Ben-Porat, Guy. 2013. Between State and Synagogue: The Secularization of Contemporary Israel. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ben-Porat, Guy and Yariv Feniger. 2009. “Live and Let Buy, Consumerism, Secularization and Liberal-
ism,” Comparative Politics 41(3): 293–313.
Ben-Porat, Guy and Dani Filc. 2021. “Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” Religion
and Politics: 1–24.
Ben-Rafael, Eliezer. 2007. “Mizrahi and Russian Challenges to Israel’s Dominant Culture: Divergences
and Convergences,” Israel Studies 12(3): 68–91.
Caplan, Kimmy. 2007. Internal Popular Discourse in Israeli Haredi Society. Jerusalem: Shazar Center (Hebrew).
Carmeli, Yoram and Kalman Applebaum. 2004. “Introduction,” in Y. Carmeli and K. Appelbaum (eds.),
Consumption and Market Society in Israel. New York: Oxford University Press.
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). 2018. Israeli Society According to Religion and Religiosity. press release 27.
6. 2018 (Hebrew).
Davie, Grace. 2007. “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge,” in N. Amerman (ed.), Everyday
Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Don-Yehia, E. 2000. “Conflict Management of Religious Issues: The Israeli Case in a Comparative Perspec-
tive,” in R. Hazan and M. Maor (eds.), Parties, Elections and Cleavages. London: Frank Cass, pp. 85–108.
Filc, D. 2006. Hegemony and Populism in Israel. Tel Aviv: Resling (Hebrew).
Herzl, Theodor. 1988. The Jewish State. New York: Dover.
Katsman, Hayim and Guy Ben-Porat. 2019. “Israel: Religion and Political Parties,” in Jeff Haynes (ed.),
Routledge Handbook of Religion and Political Parties. London: Routledge.
Kimmerling, Baruch. 2004. Immigrants, Settlers, Natives: The Israeli State and Society Between Cultural Pluralism
and Cultural Wars. Tel-Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew).
Leon, Nissim. 2009. “A Post-Orthodox View on Mizrachi Traditionalism,” Pe’amim 122123: 89–115 (Hebrew).
Leshem, Elazar. 2001. “The Immigration from the Former USSR and the Religious-Secular Schism in
Israel,” in Moshe Lissak and Elazar Leshem (eds.), From Russia to Israel: Identity and Culture in Transition.
Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad Press (Hebrew).
Levi, Gal and Zeev Amreich. 2001. “Shas and the Mirage of Ethnicity,” in Y. Peled (ed.), Shas: The Chal-
lenge of Israeliness. Tel-Aviv: Miskal, pp. 126–158 (Hebrew).
Levi, Shlomit, Hanna Levinson, and Eliahu Katz. 2002. Jews, Israelis: A Portrait. Jerusalem: Israeli Democ-
racy Institute (Hebrew).
Liebman, Charles. 1997. “Prospects for Jewish Secularism,” Alpayim 14: 97–115 (Hebrew).
Mautner, Menachem. 2011. Law and the Culture of Israel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peled, Yoav and Horit Herman-Peled. 2019. The Religionization of Israeli Society. London: Routledge.
Ram, Uri. 2008. “Why Secularism Fails? Secular Nationalism and Religious Revivalism in Israel,” Interna-
tional Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 21: 57–73.
Schwartz, Dov. 1999. Religious Zionism: Between Rationality and Messianism. Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved (Hebrew).
Shafir, Gershon and Yoav Peled. 2002. Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Susser, Bernard and Asher Cohen. 2000. Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Tessler, Ricki. 2003. In the Name of the Lord: Shas and the Religious Revolution. Tel-Aviv: Keter (Hebrew).
Yadgar, Yaacov. 2010. Masortim in Israel: Modernity Without Secularization. Tel-Aviv: Shalom Hartman Insti-
tute, Bar-Ilan University, and Keter.

298