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Walzer 1963
Walzer 1963
Walzer 1963
Richard Walzer
Oxford
Political thought may concern itself with the ideal society, the perfect
state. It will not then overlook the realities of actual political circum-
stances and the various forms of existing states which are considered to
be deficient or utterly wrong, but those actual states will be judged
by the standard of perfection which the political thinker applies: they
will be considered by him merely as degenerate forms of the true and
perfect state and will serve mainly as a kind of springboard for developing
his constructive ideas. Plato's Republic and Plato's Laws and Plato's
Statesman are works of that kind. It is relevant in our present context
to be aware of the fact that Plato's political thought, based as it is on a
theory about reality as a whole, was not meant or understood as a
theoretical exercise in 'politics' but as a proposal to reform his native
city-state of Athens and other similar Greek states and thus, as he believed,
to restore the genuine Greek life. It is proof of his lasting greatness that
these ideas -like other views of his - turned out to be so suggestive and
fruitful that they were able to live on in different historical circumstances,
divorced from their native soil, and could be transferred to other civili-
sations and be applied to larger political entities than the Greek city-
states had been, to empires and to a universal world state.
* The editor of ,Oriens' has always been willing to accept contributions which
are neither strictly specialist nor written in an esoteric technical language. Hence
I may be forgiven for offering him, on this occasion, a paper in which I try to
throw some light on certain relevant aspects of Islamic political theory in a sim-
plified way. The paper was read to the Oxford Medieval Society in March 1962 and
meant to bring home to a wider audience of scholars that medieval Muslims views on
politics deserve more consideration than is usually granted to them. I am fully
aware of the summary nature of some of my judgements and hope that they will be
understood as a challenge to further and more serious discussions of an unduly
neglected subject.
40
This aspect of Platonism was not popular with Plotinus and the later
Neoplatonists like Proclus who happened to be instrumental in trans-
mitting the Greek tradition of the study of Plato to the later centuries
of Byzantine civilisation and the Italian Renaissance. They emphasised
the religious and metaphysical aspects of Plato's thought as they under-
stood it, and laid exclusive stress on the salvation of the individual soul
through philosophy. Plato's political thought appeared irrelevant in this
context and, accordingly, they minimised its importance 1 • Hence it has
come about that our information about the development of Plato's view
of the perfect state in the philosophical schools of late antiquity is sur-
prisingly scanty. Our main witnesses are Cicero who wrote his De re
publica and the De legibus as the answer of a philosopher politician to the
supreme crisis of the Roman Republic in the first century B.C., the
emperor Julian, who attempted the restoration of the pagan Roman
Empire under the influence of his tutor Themistius with the help of
Plato's philosophy 2, and last, but by no means least, al-Farabi at the
beginning of the roth century in Baghdad-who undertook (though
only in writing) to renew the fading glory of the 'Abbasid caliphate by
refounding it on the pattern of the Platonic philosopher-king. This
little known trend of later Greek Platonism 3 had reached the Islamic
world before al-Farabi's days. Plato's Republic and Laws had already
been made accessible in Arabic translations (cf. EI 2, s.n. Aflatiin)-
whereas the contemporary Latin West was not acquainted with either of
them-and it is more than a reasonable guess to assume that the parti-
cular interpretation of Plato's political thought upon which al-Farabi drew
was extant in Arabic at the same time as well. But it was al-Farabi's
merit to realise how adequately this Greek tradition could be exploited
and used as providing an answer to the crisis of the caliphate which had
developed in his own day.
So much, in a preliminary way, about political theory as professed by
Plato and those like him, as the background to the impressive and daring
use which the Muslim al-Farabi made of it; he set out to adapt it to
circumstances unthought of by Plato, to a world which was as different
from the Greek way of life as it could possibly be: it was based on a holy
book vested with divine authority, the like of which the Greeks did not
know, and it was by no means as thoroughly urbanised and pacified as
the Greek world had been. But the Greeks knew also of a different kind
p. 124 n. 7.
2 Michael of Ephesus, cf. 0. Immisch's second edition of Aristotle's Politics
(Leipzig 1929), pp. XVI ff. and pp. 293-327. A. Dreizehnter, Textgeschichte der
aristotelischen Politik (Leiden 1962), passim.
8 Cf. F. Rosenthal, Muslim Concept of Freedom (Leiden 1960), p. 31 n. 74.
the ways of the divine providence which manifests itself in the ultimately
unfathomable vicissitudes of human history: he cannot venture very far
beyond the exploration of proximate causes, and his conspicuous origi-
nality of approach is ultimately limited to this field.
Before dealing more in detail with the political thought of al-Fara.bi
and Ibn Xaldiin-who appear to me, rightly or wrongly, to be the most
outstanding political thinkers in the Islamic world-let us look at the
two men more closely.
will be mainly to this particular work. 1 We may very well ask why the
Platonic view of the perfect state could appeal to a Muslim thinker like
al-Fara.bi-it just will not do to assert that it happened by chance. It
may be asked, at the same time, why this 'political' Platonism-which,
as I mentioned before was not considered favourably by the major
representatives of late Greek Platonism -was not popular with the Christ-
ians either: it had, indeed, little to say to people like St. Augustine,
who distinguished between a 'civitas temporalis' and a 'civitas caelestis'
and ascribed a real value to the 'civitas caelestis' only. Plato and the
Muslim prophet both envisaged a realisation of a perfect society here and
now, they were equally interested in this world and in the world-to-come 2 ,
and I believe that this is the reason why al-Fara.bi convinced himself
that Plato's attitude might appeal to a Muslim and be extremely useful
for the urgent reshaping of the caliphate and ultimately assure its defi-
nitive and permanent form. (On the later fate of al-Fara.bi's view
within Islam cf. chapter X in Sir Thomas Arnold's The Caliphate, Oxford
1924, and H. A. R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, London 1962,
p. 144). It is significant in the same context that other works by al-Fara.bi,
the De intellectu and his impressive survey of the sciences, the De divisione
scientiarum, became known to the Schoolmen in the 12th century but that
none of his works which deal with the perfect state was ever translated
into medieval Latin (the Schoolmen did not come to know Plato's Republic
either, and Averroes' Paraphrase of Plato's Republic was not available in
Latin before 1539 (cf. below, p. 48 n. r). Christians brought up in the
Augustinian tradition were in no need of Plato's Republic or of its Arabic
variant.
Ibn Xaldiin was born in Tunis in 1332/732 and died in Egypt in 1406.
He was by no means a political reformer, and if he had been, he would
certainly not have chosen philosophy as the instrument of such a reform.
He did neither recognise the superiority of theoretical reason as al-Fara.bi
and Avicenna (though in a different way) had done nor would he have
conceived of philosophy as magistra vitae and as the high road to the
happiness of the individual and its social and political integration into
a perfect State (cf. e.g. Muqaddima VI 30). Apart from this, the caliphate
was practically non-existent in Ibn Xaldiin's days: it had not only, since
about the time of al-Fara.bi's death, i.e. since the middle of the rnth
century, lost all executive authority but had, since 1258, disappeared
1 I am about to finish a new critical edition of this work with an English trans-
lation and notes. The best translation available at present is by R. P. Jaussen,
Youssef Karam and J. Chlala (French-Cairo 1949).
• Cf. what Ibn Xaldiin, Muqaddima III 25, has to say about this topic.
1 Cf. H. Ritter, Irrational Solidarity Groups, Oriens I, 1948, pp. 1-44. H. Trevor-
Roper, Historical Essays (London 1957), p. 24 ff.
2 This needs further elaboration. Cf. for the time being R. \Valzer, Greek into
Republic 1, which is probably based on the same Greek text which became
known to al-Fara.bi.
Plato's call for the philosopher-king is to be understood as a serious
attempt at reform. Its possible application is widened by al-Fara.bi from
a city-state and from an intentionally small community to an umma, a
'nation', I suppose something of the size of the hellenistic states or of
the Roman or the Persian empires, and beyond that to a community
which comprehends the whole habitable world. I have no exact parallels
in Greek texts but such a conception of a world state does not seem to
me to be alien to later Greek thought (it is not the same as the universal
state of the Stoics). 2 There is no difficulty in applying a conception like
this to the historical circumstances of the 10th century as known to the
Arabs, say, the world of Islam, the Byzantine Empire, India ... all
societies based on a common religious creed. The ruling power can only
be exercised by a monarch whether in the case of perfect or of faulty
states. 3 The qualities with which the ruler of the perfect State is to be
credited are in the first instance philosophical: he must have undergone
a philosophical training in what is considered true philosophy. 4 The
perfect ruler has, secondly, prophetic powers of supernatural insight,
which are however subordinate to his philosophical perfection. This
cannot be derived from the middle books of Plato's Republic but a Platon-
ist could well find evidence for it in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus; more-
over an interest in suprasensory powers and divination is common to
most Greek philosophers and is on the increase in late Antiquity in
general. 5 The philosopher must, in addition, be an accomplished 'orator',
he must be able to translate what he knows into effective and convincing
speech and thus be in a position to work adequately on the imagination of
principle in Islam cf. Gibb-Bowen, Islamic Society and the West I, p. 29.
4 This is in the case of al-Fara.bi-and, presumably, in the case of the Greek
author whom he follows-no longer Plato's theory of Forms nor other Platonic
tenets but, with the exception of political theory, Aristotelian-peripatetic philo-
sophy with a tinge of Neoplatonism.
5 Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951), pp. 236 ff.
cordingly the emperor Julian aims at imitating the pattern of the philosopher-
emperor Marcus and the warrior Alexander, ad Them. 253 A. Cfr. Rostagni, Giuliano
l'Apostata, p. u8 n. I.
' Cf. R. Walzer, Galen on Jews and Christians (London 1949), pp. 44 f., 60 f.,
Greek into Arabic, pp. 2II ff.
Oriens 16 4
1 Cf. for this and the following sections Theophrastus Ile:pl e:60-e:~e:(ac;; as re-
ported by Porphyry, De Abstinentia III, 25 (p. 150, 29 ff. Nauck).
2 Cf. e.g. the colonisation of Cyrene and Pindar Pythien 4 (R. W. B. Burton,
Pindar's Pythian Odes, Oxford 1962, p. 151 f.)
8 Cf. A. H. M. Jones, The Greek city from Alexander to Justinian (Oxford 1940),
passim.
4 Medieval Muslim culture was above all an urban culture but the cities never
achieved political autonomy. Cf. Gibb-Bowen, Islamic Society and the West I,
p. 276.
1938), pp. 3 ff., 28 ff.; W. Capelle, Griechische Ethik und romischer Imperialismus,
Klio 25 (1932), pp. 86 ff.
humanity (cf. e.g. Cicero, De officiis III 24). They may try to overcome
other species like animals by taming those which can be domesticated
and destroying beasts of prey. There alone force may be used. This is the
general Stoic and Peripatetic view of later centuries. 1 Trade and every
exchange of goods must be regulated by voluntary agreement. This is
the natural behaviour of men: whoever fights for the sake of fighting
and power is in an abnormal and unnatural state.
I have no doubt that these ultimately Stoic ideas which al-Farabi
reproduces here were meant in his source as a picture of the Roman
Empire and the pax Romana as it may have appeared to a Platonic
philosopher who believed in Plato's ideal state and Plato's philosopher-
king. We have sufficient parallels to show that such a criticism of the
Roman Empire and the Pax Romana was not uncommon. 2 Is it too far-
fetched to look for al-Farabi's author within the circle of Themistius
who prepared the emperor Julian to restore the pagan empire on the base
of Plato's religious and political philosophy? He failed, and St. Augus-
tine's contempt for the secular state and conception of the City of God
won the day. Are we not right in admiring al-Farabi for proclaiming the
message of Plato to the world of Islam, which is so utterly different from
the world of the Greeks? He too lived like the late Romans in a highly
developed civilisation, which embraced a very wide area of the world
known to him.
5
Ibn Xaldiin lived almost four centuries after the days of al-Farabi
and the first serious impact of Greek thought on Islamic life. The days
had gone when one could conceive the idea of improving Islam both in
its religious and secular aspects by understanding it in Greek terms and
by using Greek natural theology as a means of bringing Islam to its most
perfect form. The original impulse of Islam had reasse~ed itself powerfully
at all levels of life (cf. above p. 43 n. I). But although the superiority of phi-
losophy was no longer proclaimed-Averroes had been fighting a losing
battle, and his attitude is no longer as straightforward and unambiguous
as the stand taken by al-Farabi-one cannot fail to observe that the
impact of philosophy on Islamic thought is none the less considerable.
If we look at Ibn Xaldiin's political thought, it is obvious that he is
familiar with the Greek analysis of political entities and has digested it
but it opens many. It just blurs the real issue if one compares his emphasis
on power with Machiavelli. 1 The importance of the factor of power had
been deeply felt by Greek and Muslim thinkers before, and to isolate
this particular topic is, in my view, just wrong quite apart from the
fact that lbn Xaldiin nowhere worships power for power's sake. Nor
is it adequate to classify lbn Xaldiin as a sociologist; it is certainly
justifiable to single out sociological sections of Ibn Xaldiin's for
Muqaddima for separate discussion but we must be fully aware of the
fact that we may then present his thought in a manner which he would
hardly recognise as his own.
I am inclined to think that one may in a sense compare Ibn Xaldiin
with Aristotle. One could easily use Aristotle's Ethics (and also other
treatises of his) as an introduction to Greek values and to the Greek way
of life. Such a procedure will not always and everywhere be completely
adequate, but the salient features will none the less stand out impress-
ively. 2 In a similar way the political sections of Ibn Xaldiin's Prole-
gomena can be used as a guide to the understanding of the Muslim world
and of Islamic history, and it has actually been used for this purpose
by leading historians of our own day. Obviously we have to take Ibn
Xaldiin's particular prejudices into due account as we have those of
Aristotle. Neither Aristotle nor Ibn Xaldiin lives at the beginning of the
civilisation to which they belong, they can both look back to centuries of
history. Ibn Xaldiin becomes, in reflecting on the experiences of past and
present history, aware of the forces which have made Islam great, which
have been instrumental in producing changes and new development, of
those which are likely to lead to improvement and those which are certain
to guarantee defeat and destruction. He seldom ventures beyond the
limits of the vast Islamic territory. But since he is a serious and powerful
thinker many results of his learning and his wise judgment are as uni-
versally valid as Greek political ideas and can be considered as a per-
manent contribution to the progress of political thought.
This is obviously not the occasion for giving a full analysis of the
political thought to be found in lbn Xaldiin's Prolegomena. It is surpris-
ing that such an analysis has, to the best of my knowledge, never been
published. It would mean for instance describing the argument in detail,
explaining his method of reasoning, showing his background in religious,
legal and philosophical tradition and examining the way in which he
uses his written historical sources. Sweeping generalisations are no
1 Cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam(Cambridge 1958),
p. 84 ff. But cf. H. Ritter (above p. 46 n. 1) p. 2 ff.
2 Cf. e.g. C. M. Bowra, The Greek Experience (London 1957) passim.
major and minor events in Islamic history, but it is not difficult to apply
his views to history throughout and to events of the present day. One
of the most impressive applications, in my view, of the factor of <a$abiya
to a more general topic is to be found in III 28, where he treats at length
the change of the caliphate, the spiritual and secular authority, into the
mere secular sovereignty of kings, not as an issue of political theory but
in a masterly survey of Islamic history as a whole and a thoroughly
adequate interpretation.
This chapter seems also to me to illustrate very well both Ibn Xaldii.n's
dependence on an old and partly non-Islamic tradition and the highly
original way in which these ideas were applied to new and unheard of
issues of his own day. Thus a fresh approach gave new meaning to a tradi-
tion which appeared to have been already completely absorbed as a
commonplace of moral philosophy. In III 28 (cf. also III 25) Ibn Xaldii.n
uses the terms gaq,ab ('irascibility' 'spirited soul' '0uµ6~') and sahwa
(desire, em0uµ(llC) for the irrational faculties within the human soul, and
thus, like many Muslim writers on moral philosophy, ultimately follows
Plato's trichotomy of the soul (cf. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 221;
p. 171 n. 1). These irrational faculties are in themselves neither good
nor bad but they can become useful only when acting under control. 1
Neither Plato nor Ibn Xaldii.n-nor al-Farabi or Miskawaih-ever set
out to argue away irrational emotions and desires, they tried to explain
them and to give them their proper place. They did not contemplate
eradicating them altogether but subordinating them to a higher prin-
ciple. In the case of Plato and his Greek and Muslim followers this
higher principle was represented by human reason and philosophical
knowledge, which had eventually turned into an almost dogmatic
acceptance of a natural theology. This unconditional pride in human
reason was, as we have seen, no longer valid for Ibn Xaldiin, who had
exchanged it for divine authority and the revealed Holy Law. But other-
wise his analysis of the irrational factors is the same, and his attitude
to the irrational in general does not change: he can even point to the
Prophet himself as a shining example for the importance of justified
anger and wrath. Moreover, he can apply the appreciation of the irrational
conveyed to him by the philosophical tradition to the <a$abiya, the
irrational feeling of solidarity which pervades the tribal force; and this
gives it a new and permanent value. Once understood and appreciated
from the point of view of the authority of the Holy Law, it can be used
1 Cf. E. R. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational, Journal of Hellenic Studies 64 (1944),
pp. 16 ff. The Greeks and the Irrational (cf. above p. 48 n. 5), pp. 207 ff.