The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons

for Pakistan

(Hashmi 2014)

Introduction:

The establishment of Deobandi Madrassa in 1867 in India was to preserve the orthodox tradition
of Islam. The underlying objective was to reawake the consciousness of Muslim making recourse
to Islamic teachings and the Islamic way of life. There is a vast historical context that focuses on
the emergence of this school of thought in the subcontinent but the main focus of the paper is its
dynamics in India and Pakistan in the post partition period.

The aim of the study is to critically investigate the reasons behind radicalization of Madrassas, if
it is due to the ideology, then why does it happen only in Pakistan and not in India, if it has to do
with the international political environment then why India does not get the “invitation” to play
its role against communism during cold war period? If it is due to the democratic system in India
that blocks extremism of all kinds, then the same democratic system helps flourishes the Shiv
Sina and BJP?

Key Questions:

1. Are all Deobandi madrassas followers of Wahabism? What are the similarities and differences
between the two?

2. What is the level of politisization of Madrassas in India and do they manage to stay away from
Jihadi Politics?

3. To what extent Pakistan’s anti-democratic regime and support to Sunni orthodoxy (Deobandis)
led to Jihadi politics in Pakistan?

4. Do the Democratic structure of Indian society and secular constitution prevent Deobandi groups
to endorse Jihad

5. Contrary to other examples in the world, Indian Muslims despite being in minority do not
support religious groups with violent political agenda, why?

6. Are there lessons to be learnt from India’s experience?

Main Argument:

India, despite being the home of Deobandi school of thought, did not get into Jihadi Politics
because of a strong democratic system and secular constitution that restrain the legislature to
initiate public policy initiatives based on a single religion/sect. Comparatively, in Pakistan
“Islamization” based on Sunni Orthodoxy was initiated as a public policy by the state supported
by international political environment and funding from the outside sources leading to jihadi
politics against Soviets and “Jihadization” of the country since then. This provides two
conclusions;

 Jihad/violence is not endorsed by the school of thought and due to absence of state policy
intervention; Muslim politics in India was not influenced by politics of Jihad.
 Deobandi School is non-violent and that is why Jihad was never endorsed by the school
in India but in Pakistan, state’s role was eminent in misusing the Deobandi ideology for
political purposes.

This paper involves the theoretical interpretation of Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of

Communicative Action and Alexander Wendt’s Theory of Social Construction of Power Politics
to understand the problem. Habermas’ theory provides an explanation that lack of freedom of
expression and autonomy can result into extremism, be it religious extremism or political
extremism, when there is little space, total control and communication gaps within the society,
extreme behaviors are expected. In case of Pakistan, it happened, while in India, because of
being in minority, the Muslim community in general and Deobandis in particular expressed and
spoke every minutes thing that they felt against them, since India has an established democratic
system, one sided, authoritative decisions were not made, even if there were extremism from
Hindu radicals, the society reacted strongly against it. Acceptance, sympathy for extremism does
not exist, as compared to Pakistan, one side flow of information, lack of discourse, made it
possible for radicals to have sympathizers and have significant level of acceptance.

Alexander wendt’s theory of social construction of power politics well describe Pakistan’s
political situation, the idea of Islamic republic as the rulers believe fit , was promoted, the
enemies were created and level of social and religious tolerance was defined by those who
thought they have better understanding of the nation. As a result, a confused nation with no sense
of direction, marred with all sorts of ethnic and ideological difference exists today. The
construction of our honour and identity based on the world view of one particular sect is what
Wendt talks about. As he says that nothing is given, especially in political arena. It is always
constructed based on the interests and needs of the time. The present “Islamic Identity” is also
created which appears to be narrow and self destructive rather than an overarching concept of
“Amn and Salamti” (peace and security) it is more of a myopic view of Islam versus the rest of
the world. Pakistan unfortunately became the victim of such policies. It is not the race, the
geography and problems associated because of it that defined the policies as assumed by few in
Pakistan but a deliberate construction of the geo-political situation, formation of enemies,
creation of alliances and confronting others that has resulted in the problems that Pakistan is
facing now and India managed to stay away from that.
Important highlights with page no:

 Deobandis both in India and Pakistan follow the same ideology. Only those Deobandis
who were involved in Afghan jihad distanced themselves from Indian version of
Deobandi sect. (229)
 Deobandi is the oldest one, came into view in 1867, through the establishment of the Dar-
ul-Uloom seminary in Deoband.(105)
 The Deobandi ullema moved closer to politics and created Jamiat Ullam-e-Hind (JUH) in
1919. (106)
 The radicalization of the Deoband movements can be traced to the policy of conservative
re-Islamization instituted by General Zia-Ul-Haq after his seizure of power in Pakistan in
1977. (107)
 This patronage of Deobandi madrassas by the government, led to the emergence of
Islamic constituencies, which were always ready to vote for religious parties, as they did
when a referendum was held for General Zia, where the choice was largely construed as
one where the people could either vote for the Quran or not. (50)
 This is where the focus of the thesis is, while deobandis in India interpret the same text in
a different manner, the deobandis in Pakistan found themselves interpreting the text
under the influence of International Political demands and policy adoption of the local
regime (43)
 Until 1979, the relation within Sunni doctrine (Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith) and
between Shia and Sunni remained friendly and calm. The first case of sectarian violence
emerged in 1953, when the Jaamat-i-Islami launched a violent campaign against the
small Ahmadiyya community. (108)
 The politicians associated with the Ahl-e-Hadith faction structured a militant group in
1988 named Lashkar-i-Tayeba (LT, renamed Jamaat Dawa in 2002 after banned by the
government) (111)
 The Human Development Resources Minister Arjun Singh echoed the position in
December 2006, saying that the allegation that madrassas were a breeding ground of
terrorists was untrue. (122)
 The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), like other political parties in Pakistan made coalitions
with different governments in pursuit of its interest,” Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam JUI struck
alliances with any party that would win them influence. In the 1970s, for example, they
allied with a Pashtun regionalist party in opposition to Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP), a party that was, in principle, socialist. In the mid- 1990s, in contrast, they allied
with that same PPP, now led by Bhutto’s Harvard and Oxford educated daughter. Its
Ulema were given to Realpolitik with a vengeance and, like just about every party in
Pakistan, not shielded from corruption, in this case because they were clerics… When the
JUI was excluded from power, its Islamic rhetoric became a language of opposition,
 often invoking a discourse of ‘democracy’ and ‘rights’. At the same time, the Ulema of
the JUI were engaged with the madrassas that furthered Deobandi teachings. (145/146)
 The Taliban leadership is in fact a product of Deobandi schools in Pakistan’s frontier
region where they were refugees after the Soviet invasion.410The radical Deobandi
groups are more in Pakistan and Afghanistan but the Deoband’s intellectual and spiritual
base is still in Deoband India. (230)
 Deobandi scholars were associated with the Khilafat movement in the post WW I period.
“Deoband scholars, in particular, identified with Ottoman rule, defending if after WWI
and together with Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), they initiated the broad-based but
unsuccessful Khilafat movement. (178)

Analysis:

Ever since politics has been turned into a religio-politik entity in the sub-continent, the defining
parameters of the indigenous political topology of the region have shifted into the hands of
religious outfits and parties. Looking at it more precisely, the Madrassa system has played a
significant role in either serving religion or politics of religion. Spanning over a century, the
Islamic landscape of India has always remained local and indigenously influenced. The political
activism of these groups has always been benign. The Deoband School in Indian Subcontinent
has always been considered a centre of learning and has focused on individual spiritual well-
being rather than an adaptation of political aspirations.

Comparatively analyzing the socio-religio-political activism of Deobandi Muslims in Pakistan

with that of India, the vigour attached with the historic activities of Pakistani Deoband School
has striking contrasts with their Indian counterparts and their movements. Putting it in
comparative perspective, the Indian religio-political history has been relatively moderate when
balanced against the Pakistani religio-political demands. In India, the Deoband School’s motive
of keeping politics at bay while the focal ambition has been learning and social development of
Deoband Muslims in India. Its efforts to maintain an apolitical colour and endeavours to strictly
follow the Muslim identity and state interests; keeping it at distance from national and religious
scandals.

During the 1920’s Khilafat Movement Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind (JUH) formed alliances with non-
Muslim political parties for the persuasion of their interests. This resulted in a nexus between the
Deoband School and the Congress Party in support of a secular constitution. As a religious
organization, historically a faction of JUH had close association with All India Muslim League
for the demand for partition. However, in the post-partition period JUH dissociated itself with the
Congress Party; the latter patronizing the former in the political arena.After the partition of the
Indian subcontinent, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) shifted its focus from establishment of an
Islamic state to new ambitions defined in light of a secular socio-political landscape in India that
envisaged practicality of religious doctrines. With initiatives to fight for rights of minority
Muslims, the School evolved itself to social reform, education for all, and charity organizations;
completely disposing of the initial prophecy of an Islamic state.

In Pakistan the Deobandi School had been politically involved in major decision making of the
state, influencing policy making at the highest level. From the 1980s onwards, the number of
Deoband seminaries exponentially increased in Pakistan. The Zia regime granted patronage to
these seminaries and used them as instruments of influence in a multi-purpose fashion. In return,
these seminaries provided legitimacy to General Zia’s unconstitutional government. However,
the political setting in which the school operated changed drastically in the post 9/11 period. By
mid-2002, the Deoband inspired madrassas experienced a devastating blow in terms of autonomy
and political legitimacy when the regime of General Musharraf reacted strongly against the
enrollment of foreign students in the madrassas to disrupt any linkages between the institutions
of learning and militancy. Political humiliation deepened the resentment of the Deobani
Madrassas against losing the status acquired during state patronage. Though General Musharraf
maintained that the purpose of madrassa reforms and surveillance was to bring the religious
institutions into the fold of proper administration to avoid any misuse by the extremists groups,
the religious groups considered it as an aggressive action by the state. Today, while the Deoband
School in India aspires to preserve religious institutions of higher learning, the violent struggle
for preserving political status of Deobandis in Pakistan escalates in the form of sectarian divide
and target killing.

Bibliography

Hashmi, Arshi Saleem. The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons for
Pakistan . 2014.

Lodhi, Maryam Siddiqa. Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of the State Policies during General Zia-ul-
Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) Era. 2015.

Shahid, Amir Khan. Puritan Shift: Evolution of Ahl-i-Hadith Sect in the Punjab; A Discursive Study (1880-
1947). 2018.

Puritan Shift: Evolution of Ahl-i-Hadith Sect in the Punjab; A Discursive

Study (1880-1947)

(Shahid 2018)

Introduction

This study focuses on the puritanical impact of Ahl-i-Hadith revivalist movement on the
transition of the Sufi ethos of the Punjab during the late nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth century. The reform movement of Ahl-i-Hadith ultimately questioned this strong
Sufi tradition since later half of the nineteenth century. The study deals with the subsequent
religious transition of a reasonable segment of the Punjabi Muslims. It concentrates on the
particular aspects of Ahl-i-Hadith Movement. Moreover, this study seeks to establish a
connection between the contestation of puritanical Ahl-i-Hadith Movement with the colonial
modernity.

Key Questions:

1. Can we compare the rise of puritanical Islam to the emergence of Protestantism if the
influence of Modernity is reduced to using its tools such as schools and printing etc?

2. Whether the Ahl-i-Hadith movement was really trying to target the supposed Sufi character of
society in colonial Punjab

3. Whether the Ahl-i-Hadith movement was really trying to target the supposed Sufi character of
society in colonial Punjab

4. Can we make a comparison between the collision of Modernity with Christianity and the
collision of Modernity with the Muslim reform and revival movements in India /Waliullahi
movement?

Arguments:

The argument of the study is that the puritanical streak of the Ahl-i-Hadith movement
created a major challenge to the Shrine-centered Islam in India particularly colonial Punjab. A
number of factors such as the influences of Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings, effects of Wahhabi
movement and the collision of Waliullah’s movement with the colonial modernity helped to shape
and reinforce the puritanical attitude of leaders and followers of the movement. The puritanical
upbringing of the pioneers/ulama of the movement influenced the madrasas and the development
of syllabus content that was taught in the Ahl-i-Hadith religious seminaries. Ahl-i-Hadith’s
challenges to Shrine-centered Islam fermented sectarian strife and led to the intensification of
communal antagonism.

Moreover, the larger themes such as the emergence of Protestantism and puritanical streaks of
Muslim movements ought naught to be reduced to the antecedents of Modernity, but on the
other, hand we cannot gain a richer understanding of the phenomenon without identifying their
role. How the reform and revival movements deploy the agencies of Modernity provide insights
into the strategy the revival and reform organizations had drawn up or adopted to carry their
message. The challenge that the Ahi-i-Hadith movement presented to the sufi ethos of the society
in the Punjab was not by default. However, to some extent, the overall consequence/cumulative
impact of the reformist thrust of the other religio-reform movements having puritanical streaks
also vigorously challenged the syncretic ethos of the province by causing incredulity and doubts
about the authority of pirs.

Furthermore, the puritanical streaks of the teachings of the movement were emblematic of the
puritanical shifts in the process of revival and reform. This shift had become more conspicuous
as a result of the collision of revivalist movements with Modernity during the colonial rule.

Highlights with page no:

 Though the movement had assumed a radical and militant character in its early years
particularly during the early phases of Mutiny/War of Independence. Therefore, the
British had started labeling the Ahl-i-Hadith as “ Whabis” and because of active
participation of some of the followers of the sect in the Mutiny (1857). The British tried
to equate “ Wahabis” with “baghis” (the rebels). (186)
 Sayed Ahmad Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed were the main proponents of this
movement. (188)
 The Mujahideen continued their struggle even after the martyrdom of their two main
leaders Sayed Ahmad Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed in the battle of Balakot
in1831(189)
 Two of them who popularize the ideology of Sayed Ahmad Saheed in the Indian
subcontinent were Sayed Nazir Hussain and Siddiq Hasan Khan. They led towards
thecomplete conformity to the Quran and Hadith.742 They were called as ‘Wahabi’ yet
they continued to denounce themselves as Wahabis. They called themselves as Ahl-i-
Hadith. (190)
 With the passage of time, Ahl-i-Hadith continued to establish itself and exerted its
influence in the socio-political scenario of Punjab. It was a movement of whom the
adherents were sensitive to the widespread political and social changes of the days. In the
same year the Muslims of India formed All India Muslim League in Dacca, ulamā of
Ahl-i-Hadith constituted All India Ahl-i-Hadith Conference in Ara (Bihar). The Muslims
were granted the right of the separate electorate in the Minto- Morley Reforms in1909
which proved to be the hallmark of the Muslim separatism. (191)
 The ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith were conscious of the organization of Ahl-i- Hadith. All India
Ahl-i-Hadith Conference was established in December 1906 at Arah (Bihar).(193)
 Afterward, holding the meetings of All India Ahl-i-Hadith Conference in the different
parts of the country became a regular characteristic from 1912 till 1944. During this span
of time, it arranged its twenty-four regular sessions. Here are listed only those sessions
which were held in the territory of colonial Punjab. All India Ahl-i-Hadith held its five
regular sessions in Punjab before the partition of India. In Amritsar, its session was held
on 14 to 16 March 1913 under the president-ship of Maulana Abdul Aziz Rahimabadi.
The second gathering took place in Multan under the patronage of Maulana Abdul
Rehman Bahawalpuri, on 9 to 11 April 1920. Its third session in Gujranwala was a mass-
 meeting, held at the request of Muhammad Ismail Salafi on 14 to 16 March 1924. It was
presided over by Mir Ibrahim. Once again it held its session in Multan in 1929. It was
also presided over by Mir Ibrahim. The fifth conference was convened in Fatehgarh
(Gurdaspur) in 1939. (194)
 All these Anjumans Ahl-i-Hadith scattered throughout Punjab were closely linked with
the Anjuman Ahl-i-Hadith Punjab which was directly under the control of All India Ahl-
i-Hadith Conference.(196)
 Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahal, Maulana Kifayat Ullah Delhvi, Maulana Ahmad
Saeed Delhvi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Abdul Majid Badayuni, Daud
Ghaznavi, and Maulana Sana Ullah Amritsari played a great role in the establishment of
Jamiat Ulamā-i-Hind in 1919.(196)
 Ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith could not remain static what was happening in the other Muslim
countries. They took part in the Movements that stated for th,e Muslim brethren. For
example, two kinds of their association have been depicted; their role in the Khilafat
Movement of 1919 and their association with Shah Abdul Aziz of Ariba.(197)
 The ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith took part in the Khilafat Movement in1919. In the Hijrat
Movement during 1920, the ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith were in favour of it. (198)
 Some leaders of Ahl-i-Hadith took part in other political parties. They remained at the
forefront in the creation of Majlis-i-Ahrar. Some of them also joined Indian National
Congress(202)
 All India Ahl-i-Hadith Conference remained static on the matter of support to All India
Muslim League in the struggle for the creation of a separate homeland Pakistan. (207)

Analysis:

Like many other religious organizations, Ahl-i-Hadith worked mainly in the religious domain but
could not escape itself in its engagement in the political affairs of the country. Seeing in the
broader context the ideological discourse presented by the Muslim reform movements of India
worked together in fashioning awareness among the Muslim communities which ultimately
helped in the creation of separate Muslim Identity. There developed a sense of Ummah among
the Muslims living in the whole of the subcontinent.

They were aware of the fact that the provisions of the Quran could not be fulfilled without power
and authority. Therefore, the religious revivalist and reform movements moved towards the
attainment of power. Religion of Islam proved a unifying force which also resulted in the
creation of a separate state of Pakistan in 1947

This study focuses on various dimensions of the political role of ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith
Movement in colonial Punjab. At some levels their role appears similar to that of the Deoband
Movement, at least in two respects; firstly, in terms of imparting anti-imperialist consciousness
among the Muslim population, secondly, by not following a specific political line. For instance,
as of Deoband, it had various groups having diverse political ideas. Though the majority group
was dominated by nationalist Muslim, yet the other group was sympathetic towards Pakistan
Movement. Similarly, the ulamā of Ahl-i-Hadith participated in the formation of Jamiat ulamā -i-
Hind.

It has been viewed that Ahl-i-Hadith cannot be identified with only one kind of political attitude.
After the collapse of Jihad Movement of Sayed Ahmad Shaheed, the remanants of the movement
adopted two ways. One of them continued their anti-British struggle for some decades whereas
the other shunned this attitude and diverted their attention to revive the society through religious
reforms and purification. They set up their own madrasas and maktabs to disseminate their
ideology.

Neither the Ahl-i-Hadith only adopted the singular nationalist Muslim politics nor did it show
any anti-British attitudes. One thing is worth mentioning that they were also impressed by the
radical faction of Deoband since the start of twentieth century. The coming years witnessed that
their role differed as some of them participated in Khilafat Movement, Majlsi-i-Ahrar, Indian
National Congress and Pakistan Movement. In certain matters such as in rise of Ibn Saud in
Arabia, Ahl-i- Hadith in totality adopted the policy of favouring Ibn Saud in Arabia.

Bibliography

Hashmi, Arshi Saleem. The Deobandi Madrassas in India and their elusion of Jihadi Politics: Lessons for
Pakistan . 2014.

Lodhi, Maryam Siddiqa. Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of the State Policies during General Zia-ul-
Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) Era. 2015.

Shahid, Amir Khan. Puritan Shift: Evolution of Ahl-i-Hadith Sect in the Punjab; A Discursive Study (1880-
1947). 2018.

Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of the State Policies during General

Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) Era

(Lodhi 2015)

Introduction:

This paper aims to explore the state-led madrassa reforms initiated under the banners of
Islamization and Enlightened Moderation philosophies which also served as a backdrop of
madrassa-state relations in General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf era. This study has given
an insight of how both the military regimes initiated the madrassa reforms with a great vigour but
on the implementation stages diverted from the projected process. Modification of curriculum in
order to integrate the madrassa system with the formal system of education in both regimes was
the top priority besides resolving financial problems in Zia era and regulating madrassas in
Musharraf era. The essence of the entire reform plans in both eras was declared to bring the
madrassas into mainstream national life.

Key Questions:

1. How and why, both the state-led madrassa reform processes under the banners of Zia’s
Islamization and Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation fell short of bringing any
substantial desired change into the Madrassas system in Pakistan?
2. What were the policy formulation processes adopted by both the military dictators?
3. What were the immediate internal causes that led the state to the madrassa reforms
initiatives?
4. What were the external dynamics that gave impetus to their reform initiatives?
5. How far both of the reforms achieved their targeted goals?

Arguments:

Both of the state-led projects of reforming madrassas got mired into short term political interests
during the formulation and implementation processes in Zia and Musharraf era. In order to
achieve their short term political interests, both the state-led madrassa reforms largely failed in
actualizing their conceived outcomes of bringing about any significant change in Madrassa
System in Pakistan.

It is quite evident here that the interests of madrassa students and on a broader level society were
quite divergent to the interests of madrassa administration and the state who was the real
beneficiaries of implications emerged out of the realm of reforms in both the addressed eras.
Moreover, neither madrassa administration nor the state were really interested in reforming
madrassas for the benefits of the students and graduates in the long run rather reforms served as a
shadow to settle their mutual ‘gives and takes’ which were accomplished successfully as the state
had most of the attributes of a neo-patrimonial state

Highlights with page no:

 The military rulers General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf had a common
pursuit of retaining and prolonging their military regimes. So, they adopted Rational
Choice Approach for the adjustments of their interests. In order to achieve their interests
on the national and international levels they used madrassas. (37)
 On September 1, 1977 Zia disclosed his intentions to Islamize Pakistan in a
pronouncement made publicly in these words: “A presidential form of government
closest to Islamic ideology with president or ameer elected by the entire nation was best
 suited for Pakistan. The president will be checked by a legislature and shall be guided by
the consensus of opinion “Ijma” in the “majlis-e- mushawarat”, the council of advisors
consisting of the ulema possessing unimpeachable character. The president will be
counterchecked by the prime minister and the prime minister by the National Assembly”
(127)
 Introducing religious laws and establishing many institutions such as Shariat Bill, Shariat
Courts48, separate electorate for minorities and state controlled system of collecting zakat
and ushr (Rehman, 2006). In 1980, General Zia-ul-Haq nominated 284 members of
Majlis-e-Shura,49 including ulama (128)
 In the early phase of his Islamization Program General Zia-ul-Haq met several ulama at
Sarghodha who demanded to give autonomy to madrassa and in the light of their
demands, Zia gave a task to the Ministry of Religious Affairs to conduct a survey of
Deeni Madaris and submit a report covering all the issues regarding them. (130)
 The report was of great importance in two ways. Firstly, it scratched the areas of special
interests that the government could focus for the welfare of madrassa and secondly, it
also served as a model for the 1979 survey (131)
 The National Committee for Deeni Madaris headed by Dr Halepota comprising of
renowned educationists and religious scholars was set up by government in 1979. Few
of the tasks were assigned to committee included: Making suggestions to bring
improvement in the quality of madrassa education system and give the students access to
higher education and jobs of all nature.(132)
 The reforms process initiated by Zia-ul-Haq regime was welcomed by the religious
figures of society in the beginning as an effort to unify different theological schools of
Deeni Madaris. (140)
 The real essence of Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation64 appeared in refined form
after 9/11 incident which asserted his philosophy to be based on a two- pronged strategy.
 “The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the
path of socio-economic uplift. The second part is for the West and the US in particular, to
seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socio-economic
betterment of the deprived Muslim world” (177)
 Using instrumental reasoning President Musharraf contended the international
community that he was working to curtail extremism, fundamentalism, sectarianism and
militancy through soci-economic uplift of madrassa graduates through madrassa reforms.
(179)
 On 18th August 2001, the government promulgated Pakistan Madrassa Education
(Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance which aimed
to introduce secular subjects in the madrassa curriculum.(181)
 five years project (2002-3—2007-8) was launched by the government at the cost of $ 100
million aiming to facilitate 8,000 madrassas to teach English, Social Studies and General
Science from primary to Secondary level and Economics, English, Computer Science and
 Pakistan Studies at the Intermediate level with a purpose to integrate both systems of
education in order to abridge the gulf between Madrassa Education and Formal
Education system. (188)
 It was expected that besides strengthening the communication between madrassas and the
government, 1.5 million students of 8000 madrassas would be educated in formal
subjects from primary to secondary level so that they would be able to continue their
studies at the college and the university levels and 32000 teachers would get training to
update their knowledge and to improve their teaching methodologies. (190)
 In June 2002, the cabinet approved a draft law for the registration and financial regulation
of madrassa. Madrassa Registration with the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and
provincial boards was made mandatory and it was declared that madrassas failing to
comply with that condition would either be fined or closed. (197)

Analysis:

It is evident that the state used the madrassa-based parties to protect its interests on the national
and international levels. The state showed extreme flexibilities for them to take part in the
domestic politics while they played an active role for the survival of the military regimes for a
long time assuming the role as a part of government and sometimes as opposition and that all had
been made possible directly or indirectly due to state- led madrassa reform processes.

For instance, MMA which had two dominant madrassa based parties was degraded as B team of
Musharraf as it was quite obedient and friendly opposition and in return Musharraf Government
was reluctant to take action against militants to make the ulama happy. The Election
Commission decided to recognize madrassa certificates as equivalent of mainstream degrees in
Pervez Musharraf’s regime. As a result JUI’s madrassa students got opportunity to contest
elections directly. The military government banned student unions and rallies while the religious
parties used madrassas and mosques backdrop as bases for their political campaigns. LFO25, a
part of 17th Amendment26 supported by MMA justified the military coup of 1999 and as a
reward JUI’s Fazal-ur-Rehman was declared as the leader of opposition. The report shows that
the state cultivated the specific group of religious leaders having pro-military views to achieve
political interests on the national and international levels.

In Zia regime too, madrassa graduates were provided opportunities to play roles in the national
mainstream. Barelwi ulama joined Majlis-i-Shura nominated in 1981 and they also became
active participants in government departments including Federal Shariat Court27, Council of
Islamic Ideology28, Shariat Appellate Benches and Ruet-i-Hilal Committee. In 1985 elections
they emerged as Nizam-e-Mustafa Group having a strong hold of JUP who favored the martial
law authorities. So, in this context Zia used religious political parties and Majlis-i-Shura to rule
as those were not representatives of the entire society. The force of tradition or legitimacy from
religious or other sources may play a role in the survival of some rulers as it was obvious in Zia
regime.

Military and religious leaders considered the secular mainstream parties as their common enemy.
In order to achieve common interests, both administrators initiated reforms in their regimes to
strengthen their interest based religious sector and exert influence through them.

Bibliography
Lodhi, Maryam Siddiqa. Madrassa-State Relations: An Analysis of the State Policies during General Zia-
ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) Era. 2015.

The Shias of Pakistan

An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority

(RIECK 2015)

Introduction:

This study deals mainly with three aspects of Shi‘ism in Pakistan which are to a large extent
interwoven: first, the activities of such individuals and organisations which can be termed “Shia
communalists” and who have assertively defended both the distinct identity and full equal rights
of the Shia minority whenever they perceived those to be in danger; second, the development of
a class of Shia ‘ulamâ’ in Pakistan, (many of whom have played leading roles in communal
organisations), and its internal conflicts which have focused outwardly on Shia religious
doctrines, but which have also been about rivalry for social status and sources of income; and
third, conflicts with the Sunni majority, which have been numerous and some- times violent
already during the first three decades of Pakistan, but have become a serious problem only since
the 1980s, with sectarian fanaticism mushrooming and violence directed against the Shia
minority multiplying, reaching frightening dimensions in the years after 2003.

Key Questions:

1. How Shia Organizations operate in Pakistan and what are their conflicts with Sunni
Organizations?
2. Is the Shia-Sunni conflict a matter of identity crisis?
3. How Shia have been influenced and indulged with different political regimes of Pakistan
since its inception?
4. How class of Shia Ulema developed in Political sphere of Pakistan and what problems
they faced?
Arguments:

The Shias of Pakistan are the world’s second largest Shia community after that of Iran, but
comprise only 10-15 per cent of Pakistan’s population. In recent decades Sunni extremists have
increasingly targeted them with hate propaganda and terrorism, yet paradoxically Shias have
always been fully integrated into all sections of political, professional and social life without
suffering any discrimination. In mainstream politics, the Shia-Sunni divide has never been an
issue in Pakistan.

Shia politicians in Pakistan have usually downplayed their religious beliefs, but there have
always been individuals and groups who emphasised their Shia identity, and who zealously
campaigned for equal rights for the Shias wherever and whenever they perceived these to be
threatened. Shia ‘ulama’ have been at the forefront of communal activism in Pakistan since 1949,
but Shia laymen also participated in such organisations, as they had in pre-partition India.

Highlights with page no:

 Shi‘ism in Pakistan is heir to more than 700 years of history of Twelver Shias on the
Indian subcontinent, which has also included some powerful regional kingdoms and
principalities ruled by Shias since the fourteenth century. Factors contributing to the
spreading of Shi‘ism in the subcontinent have been the strong influence of Persian culture
among subsequent dynasties of Muslim rulers and the key role played by itinerant
preachers who followed in the conquerors’ footsteps in converting many of the Hindu
natives to Islam. (327)
 The role of Shias in the development of “Muslim nationalism” in India has indeed been
significant both in the framework of the All-India Muslim League, which ultimately led
the struggle for Pakistan, and in those organ- isations and movements, which with
hindsight can be considered as having paved the way for that goal (31)
 While the principality of Awadh (Oudh) in the central Ganges plain has been the most
important Shia stronghold in India since the early eigh- teenth century, Shi‘ism also took
roots in the Punjab and other regions that would become West Pakistan in 1947, namely
parts of Sindh, the Kurram valley and Gilgit-Baltistan. (328)
 The percentage of Shias in Pakistan (no longer comprising East Pakistan since 1972) is
approximately the same as that of Shias in the predominantly Sunni Muslim world
today(238)
 Ever since the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, Shias have claimed that they have made
crucial contributions to that country’s emergence and consolidation after independence.
(146)
 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the iconic founding father of Pakistan (who had nominally con-
verted to Twelver Shi‘ism around 1904), was rather annoyed by such demands and parted
ways with overzealous Shias in the 1940s, but he did give some promises regarding equal
 rights which have often been quoted in later decades. By 1946 most Shias in those Indian
states which would become Pakistan in 1947 had been converted to unconditional support
for Jinnah’s Muslim League (328)
 Under General Musharraf, who ruled Pakistan from October 1999 until his forced
resignation in August 2008, there were initial attempts to rein in “sectarianism”, starting
with a ban on Lashkar-i Jhangvî and Sipâh-i Muhammad in August 2001 and followed by
a ban on Sipâh-i Sahâba and the TJP in January 2002. The treatment of the TJP, which
had never commit- ted or abetted violence, on the same footing with the rabidly anti-Shia
Sipâh-i Sahâba was another example of the policy of “symmetry” or “bal- ance” to the
detriment of Shias followed already after the 1963 riots. But both organisations banned in
2002 continued to function under new names, the TJP as Islâmî Tahrîk Pâkistân (ITP)
(335)
 The Shia community is an important minority within the “Muslim qaum”, and the
thirteen centuries old traditions of the Shia community make it obligatory that they act
hand-in-hand with all Muslims for common national interests while safeguarding their
own religious interests. As the Muslim League is the greatest representative organisation
of the 100 Million Muslims in India, and as it has declared Pakistan its goal, the Shias of
the Punjab will preserve the unity of the Muslims and will work for this goal. (45)
 This wave of violence against Shias occurred against the background of a generalised
campaign of terror by extremists in Pakistan, spearheaded since 2007 by the Tahrîk-i
Tâlibân-i Pâkistân (TTP) which claimed more than 10.000 lives in the years 2009–12
alone and was closely related to the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan. But Shias have
been at risk of becom- ing random victims of terror more than any other group of
Pakistan’s citi- zens. (336)
 Anti-Shia terrorism has thus emerged as the most important issue for Shia communal
organisations in the last decade, and it has affected also the silent majority of Pakistan’s
Shias who have never been much interested in their activities (267)
 Shi‘ism reached the Indian subcontinent almost as early as Islam itself. Its history in
India of more than a thousand years is characterised by many ups and downs, which to
some extent have paralleled the fate of Shi‘ism in the Muslim world as a whole. Although
the gradual Muslim conquest of India, starting with Muhammad bin Qasim’s invasion of
Sindh (711 A.D.) and reaching its heyday in the sixteenth century, was generally led by
Sunni Arabs, Turks, Afghans and other Central Asians, Shias from the same countries of
origin and from Iran have in most cases participated in their military campaigns and
occupied administrative posts, and they became rulers over parts of India themselves for
centuries (1)

Analysis:

Although the different Shia organisations which have been active in Pakistan since 1948 have
never mobilised more than a fraction of its Shia citizens, they have been successful in safeguard-
ing their full equality before the law. Fears of a possible “loss of identity” of the Shia qaum in
the overwhelmingly Sunni state, which were wide- spread among Shia zealots until the 1960s,
have also turned out misplaced. As for the Shia public religious ceremonies, they are nowadays
more than ever threatened by violent attacks from Sunni extremists, but the law enforcement
agencies are doing their best to protect them country- wide at great cost every year.

Anti-Shia violence of all kinds is universally condemned by the political class, but unfortunately
most political leaders in Pakistan have so far not mustered the courage to tackle its root cause,
namely religious extremism, in a forceful manner. Instead they indulge in regular appeals for
“sectarian harmony”, while at the same time often trying to appease hate-preachers and even
terrorists. Shias in Pakistan are nowadays threatened by terrorist violence, but they are far from
being an oppressed minority. Throughout the history of the young state they have been fully
integrated at all levels of Pakistan’s society, and they have stood up for their rights whenever that
was perceived to be necessary.

Bibliography
RIECK, ANDREAS. The Shias of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority. 2015.