VILLAFLOR, ALWIN BRYAN C.

SECTION IV-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

DOCTRINE: Abandonment, as a just and valid cause for termination, requires a

deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled
with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or her work.

C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 121696. February 11, 1999.]

FACTS: C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL, a business entity engaged in

merchandising and retailing of plastic products and fruits, was charged by
respondent Ramil de los Reyes with illegal dismissal and non-payment of basic
wages and certain monetary benefits. De los Reyes claimed that he started
working as deliveryman of PLANAS in August 1988 and later tasked with selling
fruits until 4 June 1993 when he was allegedly dismissed.
On 15 April 1994 the Labor Arbiter found petitioners C. Planas
Commercial (PLANAS hereon) and Marcial Cohu, its manager, to have illegally
dismissed Ramil de los Reyes. Consequently, petitioners were ordered to
reinstate him with back wages and to pay him salary differentials, 13th month pay
and service incentive pay.
Responding to private respondent's claim, petitioners alleged that they did
not dismiss Ramil de los Reyes who was only their helper assigned to sell fruits
in front of their stall in Divisoria; on the contrary, they claimed he abandoned his
work after PLANAS' manager, petitioner Marcial Cohu, confronted him regarding
reports that whenever the former was not around he would sell the fruits at their
stall at a higher price then pocket the difference. According to Cohu, private
respondent admitted that the reports about his overpricing were true and that
after his admission he did not report for work anymore; instead, he tended the
fruit stall of another employer. To fortify their claim that de los Reyes abandoned
his job and thus was not terminated, petitioners attached six (6) pictures to their
Rejoinder showing private respondent at work in the stall of one Aling Conchita
Paredes located at C. Planas, Divisoria, occupied by his new employer, a certain
Jimmy Chua a.k.a. Sionga, a fruit dealer.
On appeal public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter which declared the
dismissal of de los Reyes illegal as well as the grant to him of back wages and
other monetary benefits

ISSUE: Whether private respondent was dismissed or whether he abandoned his

job
HELD: Somehow, the NLRC abused its discretion in holding that private
respondent simply abandoned his work after he was confronted by his employer
through its manager with the reported overpricing of the fruits that he sold and his
pocketing of the difference. The NLRC considered the pictures of de los Reyes
while at work under a new employment as sufficient proof to substantiate
petitioners' defense of abandonment. We are more inclined to uphold the Labor
Arbiter's findings on this issue of illegal dismissal. From the NLRC's point of view,
it would seem that the abandonment was triggered by the employer's charges of
overpricing and the unlawful taking of the excess amounts. However, apart from
Cohu's plain allegation that he confronted de los Reyes regarding these charges,
there is no evidence on record to prove the veracity of Cohu's claim. It is more
likely that after de los Reyes complained about his low salary, he was no longer
allowed to report for work, hence, was dismissed without cause and without the
requisite written notice. Under the circumstances, it is more logical to suppose
that de los Reyes never abandoned his job. In fact, he even presented his case
before the Labor Arbiter where he sought reinstatement. Our ruling in Sentinel
Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC 36 is relevant ---Abandonment, as a just and valid
cause for termination, requires a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of
returning to his or her work (cited cases omitted; emphasis supplied).
Thus, we sustain the Labor Arbiter's grant of back wages and order of
reinstatement in favor of de los Reyes. Since de los Reyes was illegally
dismissed on 4 June 1993 after the effectivity of RA No. 6715 on 21 March 1989,
he is entitled to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
computed from the date of his dismissal until he is actually reinstated. If
reinstatement shall no longer be feasible, he shall be entitled to separation pay in
accordance with law.

SABA, MARISSA G.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: ABANDONMENT OF WORK

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Sec. 2 Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing the

Labor Code provides: Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the
grounds for dismissal. In case of abandonment of work, the notice shall be
served at the worker’s last known address.

KINGSIZE MANUFACTURING CORP.

VS. NLRC
[G.R. Nos. 110452-54. November 24, 1994]

FACTS: Petitioner is a garment factory. Private respondents were its employees.

Most of the private respondents were hired as early as 1978, the rest in 1987, as
sewers on piece work basis, with the exception of respondents Juancho Bognot
who has an assistant cutter and later supervisor.
Private respondents were dismissed by petitioner for abandonment of
work allegedly because private respondents had not reported for work. When
private respondents presented themselves, they were prevented from entering
the work place by petitioner agent, Charlie Co. on the other hand, they were able
to secure employment at another garment factory.
Private respondents then filed complaints against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of minimum wage. Emergency Cost Of Living
Allowance (ECOLA) and overtime pay and for nonpayment of legal holiday pay
and service incentive leave pay, as well as 13 th Month Pay and Attorney’s fees.
Petitioner then submitted a paper in which they denied the charges against them
and claimed that respondents had abandoned their jobs by not reporting for work
quite sometime. With respect to respondents JUANCHO BOGNOT, it was
alleged that he had been dismissed for “irresponsibility on the job and absenting
himself without leave”
The Labor Arbiter found that, the complainants (private respondents) had
quit their jobs in order to work for another company. The labor Arbiter dismissed
their claim for reinstatement while with respect to Juancho Bognot, found that he
had been illegally dismissed and so ordered him paid backwages for six months.
NLRC reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Were the private respondents illegally dismissed and are entitled for
reinstatement and back wages.

HELD: YES. Failure to give notice before their services were terminated puts in
grave doubt the petitioners claim that the dismissal was for a just cause. Sec. 2
Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular
acts or omission constituting the grounds for dismissal. In case of abandonment
of work, the notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address.
The notice required, as elaborated upon in the decision in PEPSI COLA
BOTTLING CO. VS. NLRC actually consists of two parts to be separately served
on the employee to wit: (1) notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts
or omission for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice to inform
him of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
The Supreme Court held that the requirement of notice is not a mere
technology but a requirement of due process to which everyday employee is
entitled.
SORIANO, CRISANTO C.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT/ABANDONMENT

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: Abandonment as a just and valid ground for

dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume
his employment. Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship. The second element is the more
determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts. Likewise, the burden of
proof is on the employer to show the employee's clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue his employment without any intention of returning, mere absence is
not sufficient.

BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION

OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU)
[G.R. No. 119243. April 17, 1997]

FACTS: Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991

as route helper with the latest daily wage of P119.00. From 19 April 1993 up to
19 May 1993, for a period of one (1) month, complainant went on absent without
permission (AWOP). On 20 May -1993, respondent thru Mr. Rodolfo Valentin,
sent a Memo to complainant, to wit:
"Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why
no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense:
You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19,1993.
For your strict compliance."
In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
"Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi sa inyo [sic] dahil inuwi ko ang mga I anak
ko sa Samar dahil,ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag aalaga sa mga anak
ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong
pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa."
Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru
its Sales Manager, Mr. Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which
reads:
"We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret
to inform you that we do not consider it valid. You am aware of the company
Rules and Regulations that absence without permission for six (6) consecutive
working days is considered abandonment of work.
In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your
employment effective June 17, 1993 for abandonment of work."
Complainants contend that individual complainant's dismissal was done
without just cause; that it was not sufficiently established that individual
complainant's absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified; that
the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such
penalty, respondent should have taken into consideration complainant's length of
service and as a first offender, a penalty less punitive will suffice such as
suspension for a definite period, (Position Paper, complainants).
Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant
was dismissed for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the
Labor Code; that the act of complainant in absenting from work for one (1) month
without official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result
to stoppage of production which will not only destructive to respondent's interests
but also to the interest of its employees in general; that the dismissal of complaint
from the service is legal, (Position Paper, respondent). 3
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the
principle of managerial control, which recognizes the employer's prerogative to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his
employees. The principle allows the imposition of disciplinary measures which
are necessary for the efficiency of both the employer and the employee's. In
complainant's case, he persisted in not reporting for work until 16 June 1993
notwithstanding his receipt of the memorandum requiring him to explain his
absence without approval.
Complainant appealed to the NLRC.

ISSUE: Is there abandonment in this case?

HELD: A scrutiny of the facts discloses that complainant's absence was

precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him
and abandoned the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no
one to whom he could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring
them to the province. It would have been extremely difficult for him to have been
husband and wife/father and petitioners should not be deprived of their means of
livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For all this while,
since private respondent considered them separated from the service, they had
not been paid. The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances,
justified. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an
omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Petitioner's finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is
misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Two
elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship. The second element is the more determinative factor and
must be evinced by overt acts.17 Likewise, the burden of proof is on the
employer to show the employee's clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his
employment without any intention of returning,18 mere absence is not
sufficient.19 These elements are not present here. First, as hold above,
complainant's absence was justified under the circumstances. As to the second
requisite, we are not convinced that complainant ever intended to sever the
employer-employee relationship. Complainant immediately complied with the
memo requiring him to explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his
termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainly refuted any
claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work.20 Without doubt, the
intention is lacking.

SORIANO, CRISANTO C.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: ABANDONMENT

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: To constitute abandonment, two elements

must concur: (1) the failure to report, for, work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor. and
being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. it is the
employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified
refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of
returning.

PURE BLUE INDUSTRIES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
[G.R. No 115879. April 16, 1997]
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the industrial laundry business. It
offers services such as garment washing, bleaching, pressing, dyeing and
finishing. Employed with petitioner as machine operators, stone preparators,
utility helpers, drivers, quality controllers and retouchers were the private
respondents.
In December 1990, private respondents demanded from petitioner the
payment of their thirteenth month pay, wage increases and other benefits under
existing laws. Petitioner, however, filed to comply.
On 27 December 1990, petitioner terminated private respondents' services
.Private respondent contended that their dismissal was brought about by their
decision to join a union (PSSLU) and enlist its assistance to obtain the
aforementioned claims. When petitioner got wind of private respondents' plan, it
allegedly forced them to sign employment contracts for casual and contractual
workers. Private respondents refused, hence, they were summarily dismissed.
Consequently, on 3 January 1991, private respondents filed a complaint
with the NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
overtime pay, night differential. pay, premium for rest day and holiday, service
incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.
For its part, petitioner indignantly denied that private respondents were
dismissed. Although it admitted its failure to pay their (private respondents')
thirteenth month pay, petitioner claimed that it was financially hard up and thus
could not immediately comply with its obligation. Petitioner then countered by
filing a complaint-affidavit dated 28 January 1991 against private respondents for
abandonment. It alleged that private respondents left their jobs on 22 December
1990 after petitioner failed to produce their thirteenth month pay.
On 25 November 1991, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents.
Petitioner's appeal to the NLRC was likewise unsuccessful. On 29
November 1993, the NLRC issued a resolution affirming the Labor Arbiter's
decision and dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Is there abandonment in this case?

HELD: NO. Whether or, not an employee has abandoned his job is essentially a
factual issue and in the case at bar, after a prudent study of the contentions of
both sides, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Labor Arbiter
which have been affirmed by the NLRC.
Jurisprudence has established able judicial yardsticks to determine
whether or not an employee has abandoned his work.
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element
as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere
absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show
a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment
without any intention of returning. Gold City failed to discharge this burden. It did
not adduce any proof of some overt act of the petitioners that clearly and
unequivocally show their intention to abandon their posts. On the contrary, the
petitioners lost no time in filing the case for illegal dismissal against them, taking
only four days from the time most of them were prevented from entering their
work place on 22 August 1991 to the filing of the complaint on 26 August 1991.
They cannot, by any, reasoning, be said to have abandoned their work, for as we
have also previously ruled, the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating the
employer's charge of abandonment.

VILLAFLOR, ALWIN BRYAN C.

SECTION IV-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: ABANDONMENT

DOCTRINE: Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for dismissal means the
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. The
burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of
the employee to discontinue employment. The intent can not be lightly inferred or
legally presumed from certain ambivalent acts. For abandonment to be a valid
ground for dismissal, two elements must be proved: the intention of an employee
to abandon, coupled with an overt act from which it may be inferred that the
employee has no more intent to resume his work

DE PAUL/KING PHILIP CUSTOMS TAILOR vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION
[304 SCRA 448, June 1999]

FACTS: Private respondents, all employees of De Paul/King Philip Customs

Tailor, formed a labor organization called the FFW-Kapatirang Manggagawa sa
De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor and they affiliated with the Federation of Free
Workers.A charter was issued by the FFW in favor of the union and it was
registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
 The union filed a certification election with the Department of Labor and
Employment National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). It filed a notice of strike due
to the dismissal of its union officers, an alleged unfair labor practice.
The union president, private respondent Victoriano Santos, stopped
working. This was followed by the "walk out" of the other private respondents
from their jobs. The union filed against the petitioners a case for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay. The petition for
certification election was dismissed on the ground that the union cannot be the
bargaining agent for two companies. The decision was not appealed.
Private respondents disaffiliated from the FFW. The disaffiliation was
caused by the failure of FFW to send a representative in two hearings of the case
of the private respondents before the labor arbiter. They filed an amended
complaint where they pursued the case in their individual capacities. Private
respondents claimed that they were previously warned by the petitioners not to
organize any labor group nor be a member of any existing labor organization.
They were threatened with dismissal if they did so. Nevertheless, they formed the
Kapatirang Manggagawa sa De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor and affiliated
with the Federation of Free Workers. This allegedly triggered their termination
from employment. Petitioners averred that the private respondents were not
serious in organizing a union and that the union was merely a ploy to exact
money from them. Allegedly, this led to the disaffiliation of private respondents
from the FFW. They denied the dismissal of private respondents. Petitioners
contended that private respondents "walked out" from their jobs preparatory to
their planned strike. However, the majority of the employees did not join the "walk
out" and this embarrassed the private respondents who never returned to their
work. Allegedly, notices were sent to the private respondents urging them to
return to work.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondents' complaint for unfair
labor practice. NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter with respect to the unfair labor
practice declared the respondents liable for illegal dismissal and ordered their
reinstatement and payment of backwagess.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is illegal dismissal.

HELD: The petition must fail. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the
judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner.
Abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow a reversal by the NLRC of a
decision of a Labor Arbiter. Corrollarily, mere variance in evidentiary assessment
between the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter does not automatically call for a full
review of the facts by this Court. The NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft
of substantial support from the records, deserves respect from this Court.
In the case at bar, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter not without reason. We
quote its order, viz:
"The findings of the Labor Arbiter leave much to be desired. While generally, the
finding[s] of the trier of facts should merit respect, it should not be so in this case,
as the same were patently defective. Suffice it to stress that the claim of illegal
dismissal filed by the workers are (sic) entertwined (sic) with the issue on union
busting constitutive of the unfair labor practice charge. Consequently, it would
have been prudent for the labor arbiter to have ascertained the entirety of the
issue on union busting rather than zeroing on (sic) as he did on the specific act of
complainants' termination. [Consequently], the inquiry of the Labor Arbiter on the
specific proof i.e. the absence of "letters of termination" issued by the respondent
to the complainant[s] that would show the unequivocal act of termination is a bit
off-tangent. The absence thereof does not necessarily negate the claim made by
the complainants. cdtai
It is worth mentioning that complainants are one in their stand that
respondents, right from the start of their employment have cautioned them
against joining a labor union. That is why, after they have insisted on forming one
years (sic) after, the management's ire were [sic] bent on them. . . . As candidly
claimed by the complainants, the President of the union, Mr. Victoriano Santos,
along with two others who spearheaded the cause of the union were the first
ones to be barred from entering the premises of the company on April 6, 1993,
while the rest of the complainants followed suit on April 12, 1993. The prohibition
for the complainants to work with the company did not come as explicit (sic) as it
was said to others, like complainant Santos, since others were simply prohibited
from performing their work on account of the removal of their machineries from
their work premises. This was the unwavering account of the union President,
Mr. Victoriano Santos, when he testified on cross during the trial. Consequently,
we are more constrained to believe complainants' side of the story.
Complainant[s], of special note, have been in the employ of the company
for quite a number of years. Some have been in the company for seventeen (17)
long year[s], other (sic) ten (10) or more years which (sic) only few are relatively
new. It would seem incomprehensible therefore that complainants would throw
those productive years of their working life into oblivion by simply walking out and
abandoning their jobs. Certainly, that runs counter to human experience.
These findings negate the claim interposed by the petitioners that private
respondents abandoned their jobs. Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for
dismissal means the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume
his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal
intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. The intent can not
be lightly inferred or legally presumed from certain ambivalent acts. For
abandonment to be a valid ground for dismissal, two elements must be proved:
the intention of an employee to abandon, coupled with an overt act from which it
may be inferred that the employee has no more intent to resume his work. As
correctly found by the public respondent NLRC, it is unlikely that the private
respondents abandoned their jobs considering the lengths of their employment.
Moreover, no overt act was proven by the petitioner from which we can infer the
clear intention of the private respondents to desist from their employment.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: ABANDONMENT; TERMINATION; ITS EFFECTS

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES:
Abandonment means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show "a clear
and deliberate intent" on the part of the employee to discontinue employment
without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient.
An employee who loses no time in protesting his lay off cannot by any
reasoning be said to have abandoned his work
An employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the
worker's last known address. Art. 279 of the Labor Code provides that an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full backwages.

F.R.F. ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. NLRC

[G.R. No. 105998. April 21, 1995.]

FACTS: Petitioner F.R.F. Enterprises, Inc. is a trucking company engaged in

hauling and delivering lubricating oil. In July 1988, it employed private
respondent Rodolfo N. Soriano as helper to go with its tank truck in its trips to
Limay, Bataan to unload its cargo of lube oil products to waiting barges belonging
to the Philippine National Oil Co. Part of private respondent's job was to clean the
truck upon its return to petitioner's office-terminal in Pandacan, Manila.
It appears that many times in the past the attention of private respondent was
called to his failure to clean the truck, especially the dirt which accumulated on
the tank's outer portion. On those occasions, the Operations Manager, Victor
Eugenio, gave private respondent appropriate warnings.
On March 17, 1990 Eugenio again noticed that Soriano had not washed
the truck after its arrival from Bataan. For this reason Eugenio asked him to clean
the truck immediately, but private respondent apparently wanted to take his time
in order to rest. As Eugenio insisted that he clean the vehicle at once, an
exchange of words took place between them, during which private respondent
called Eugenio a "dictator." This angered Eugenio who ordered private
respondent not to work that day. Private respondent thereupon left and never
reported for work again.
On March 21, 1990, private respondent wrote Victor Eugenio a letter 2 in
which he explained that dirt formed around the tank truck as a result of oil
sprinkled during unloading and that it was not possible to clean the truck, as the
Operations Manager wanted him to do, because the PNOC prohibited the
cleaning of trucks at the pier in Limay to prevent the pollution of the waters.
Private respondent complained that he was never allowed to explain his side and
simply made to follow the "coercive, repressive and dictatorial ways of
management." He asked that his dismissal be formally made and that he be
given termination pay in the amount of P5,000.00, based on two years of
continuous service.
Eugenio refused to receive the letter, which private respondent had sent
by registered mail. Instead petitioner F.R.F. Enterprises applied for clearance to
the Department of Labor to terminate the services of private respondent on the
ground of abandonment of work.

ISSUE: (a) Whether there was a abandonment

(b) Whether the dismissal is valid

HELD: (a) NO. Abandonment means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. 8 The burden of proof is on the employer
to show "a clear and deliberate intent" on the part of the employee to discontinue
employment without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient. 9
In this case, petitioner claims that private respondent was told not to work only on
March 17, 1990, as penalty for disobeying an order to him, but private
respondent instead did not report for work anymore after that date. The letter he
wrote four days later, in which private respondent demanded payment of
separation pay, is cited as proof of his decision not to work anymore. What
petitioner does not say, however, is that its Operations Manager, Victor Eugenio,
was apparently incensed by what he thought was private respondent's
disobedience, as a result of which the two had an altercation with private
respondent calling petitioner a "dictator." The epithet, as private respondent
explained in his letter, referred to Eugenio's refusal in the past to let private
respondent explain why it was not possible for him to clean the tank truck before
leaving Limay, Bataan.
Given this background of the incident, it is clear that Eugenio did not only
suspend private respondent for one day but actually dismissed him. Indeed that
private respondent understood Eugenio's order to be not to report for work
anymore is clear from private respondent's letter which makes references to the
"verbal termination of my employment" and "your unjust, baseless and illegal
termination of my employment." Private respondent's demand for separation pay
was an acknowledgment by him that because of the strain in his relation with his
employer, reinstatement was no longer feasible.
On the other hand, the refusal of Eugenio to accept private respondent's letter,
coupled with petitioner's application for clearance from the Department of Labor
to terminate the employment of private respondent, indicates quite clearly
petitioner's intention to dismiss private respondent. Petitioner's claim that it
applied for a clearance only after private respondent had failed to report for work
is a mere pretext. What stands out is that petitioner refused to receive private
respondent's letter and did not give him notice that it considered him to have
abandoned his work before it sought the clearance to terminate private
respondent's services.
An employee who loses no time in protesting his lay off cannot by any
reasoning be said to have abandoned his work. 10 In this case the
circumstances, starting from the sending of the letter of protest of private
respondent and petitioner's refusal to accept it to the filing by petitioner of an
application for authority to terminate the services of private respondent, belie
petitioner's claim that private respondent had abandoned his work. Considering
the hard times in which we are, it is unlikely that private respondent, who is the
sole breadwinner of a family with six children, would simply leave his work,
unless it was to transfer to a better-paying job. There is no evidence that such
was the case.

(b) NO. It was, in addition, made without notice and hearing in violation of
Rule XIV, §2 of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides that —
An employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for dismissal. In
cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
Art. 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full backwages. As explained in the case of
Torillo v. Leogardo: Backwages and reinstatement are two reliefs given to an
illegally dismissed employee. They are separate and distinct from each other.
However, in the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, separation pay is
awarded to the employee. Thus, the award of separation pay is in lieu of
reinstatement and not of backwages. In other words, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to (1) either reinstatement, if viable; or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable and (2) backwages.
In this case, the NLRC cited the strained relationship between petitioner,
particularly its Operations Manager Victor Eugenio, and private respondent as
basis for increasing the rate of separation pay awarded to private respondent in
lieu of reinstatement, from ½ month for every year of service to 1 month pay for
every year of service. For reinstatement would indeed only aggravate the strain
in the relation of the parties.

JR. T.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; GROSS AND HABITUAL

NEGLECT OF DUTIES; PENALTY FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES:
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides the grounds for which an employer
may validly dismiss an employee, among which is gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties.
In Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, (G.R. No. 80587, 8 February 1989, 170
SCRA 69) the Court ordered an employer to pay P1,000.00 to an employee who
was denied due process prior to dismissal. It should be stressed however that
the Court did not intend to fix a value or price on such right of an employee, for
rights, specially the right to due process, cannot be translated in monetary value.
The amount awarded in such cases was intended to serve as a penalty to the
employer who violated an employee's right as well as to serve as an example for
other employers inclined to violate their employees' rights. Considering the
importance of said right to procedural due process, petitioners should indemnify
private respondent the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00).

WORLDWIDE PAPERMILLS, INC. vs. NLRC

[G.R. No. 113081. May 12, 1995.]

FACTS: "Private respondent was employed by petitioner as a packer on July 8,

1982 until his services were terminated on September 28, 1991. It appears that
private respondent incurred excessive unexcused absences from 1986 to 1989,
as summarized in a memorandum dated January 22, 1990 prepared and signed
by the personnel/administrative officer of petitioner, thus:
'In 1986, he incurred a total of 46 days without pay including AWOL but excluding
30 days VL & SL given to him. The following year, 1987, he accumulated about
17. 5 days leave without pay including AWOL after exhausting the 30 days VL/SL
with pay. Followed by 1988, in which after exhausting the 30 days leave with pay,
he again accumulated 60 days leave without pay, 12 days of which AWOL.
Finally, 1989 he acquired a total of 26 days leave without pay including 3 days
AWOL after exhausting the 30 days leave with pay.
Disciplined for unofficial leaves, in 1986, he was admonished, (1) month.
In 1987, he was admonished, warned sternly, and suspended for one (1) week.
While in 1988 for AWOL he was admonished, warned sternly and suspended for
one (1) month. On Nov. 11, he was warned sternly for excessive leave without
pay. Finally in 1989, he got an admonition and consequently warned sternly for
AWOL.
 Sabuya was counselled several times to improve his attendance. On April
11, 1988, he promised not to absent himself, yet, no compliance. Due to having
incurred 12 days AWOL in 1988, he was supposed to be terminated based on
our rule, but due to his asking reconsideration and intervention of R. Brusola,
Union President he was only suspended for one (1) month. A promissory note to
this effect was executed by Sabuya and witnessed by R. Brusola, stressing
among others to improve his attendance in 1989; once he exceeds the VL & SL
granted by the company, he accepts to be terminated; and the next time he is
declared AWOL he accepts the DA of termination.
To summarize it all, no improvement up to this date. In 1989 he has
exceeded the required VL & SL given by the company and aggravated by the
fact that he was disciplined for AWOL twice already for that same year. The
undersigned also called the attention of R. Brusola of this in fact he even talked
to Sabuya several times to improve his attendance but to no avail.'
On February 2, 1990, private respondent wrote petitioner a letter
promising to mend his ways after the personnel officer of petitioner
recommended his dismissal due to his numerous absences.
Private respondents, however, again incurred absences without official
leave on January 2, February 20, June 1, 2 and 3, 1991. He was consequently
suspended effective June 24, 1991. For the third time, private respondents was
suspended for two weeks effective July 22, 1991 up to August 4, 1991 when he
incurred absences on July 5 and 8, 1991.
A week after he had served his latest suspension, private respondents applied
for sick leave covering the period August 12-18, 1991. On August 15, 1991, Ms.
Belinda Luna, the company nurse, paid private respondent a home visit.
However, he was not there. Neither was anybody at home, though the radio was
on Ms. Luna learned from private respondent's son that his father was
moonlighting as a pedicab driver at Bayanan, Muntinlupa, market.
After petitioner was informed of the incident, private respondent's
applications for sick leave was disapproved. Then, on Aug. 29, 1991, petitioner
issued a memorandum to private respondent requiring him to explain within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt why no disciplinary action should be imposed
upon him for his excessive absences without official leave.
In compliance therewith, private respondent gave his answer, thus:
'SIR, ETO LANG PO ANG MASASAGOT KO SA AKING EXPLANATION SA
LOOB NG SIYAM NA TAON PAGIGING MANGAGAWA NG KOMPANYANG
ITO GINANAP KO NG TAMA AT NAAAYON SA REGULASYON ANG AKING
PAGTATRABAHO. MALIBAN SA DI INAASAHANG MAHIGPIT NA DAHILAN SA
SNAHI NG MINSANG PAGPALYA KO SA PAGPASOK.'
On September 21, 1991, petitioner terminated the employment of private
respondent. Thus, on September 30, 1991, the latter filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, praying for reinstatement and payment of backwages. The case was
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No 00-09-05668-91 and it was raffled to Labor
Arbiter Manuel R. Caday.
ISSUE: (a) Whether private respondent was guilty of gross and habitual neglect
by the employees of his duties
(b) Whether there was a valid dismissal

HELD: (a) YES. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides the grounds for which an
employer may validly dismiss an employee, among which is gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that respondent Edwin P. Sabuya had
within a span of almost six (6) years been repeatedly admonished, warned and
suspended for incurring excessive unauthorized absences. Worse, he was not at
home but was out driving a pedicab to earn extra income when the company
nurse visited his residence after he filed an application for sick leave. Such
conduct of respondents Edwin P. Sabuya undoubtedly constitutes gross and
habitual neglect of duties.
In Philippines Geothermal, Inc. v. NLCR , the Court stated thus:
"While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the
disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it affects one's
source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits
accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of
an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law
in protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the
scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic
inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of
justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases
where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interest of management
but never should the scale be so titled if the result is an injustice to the employer.
Justicia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none)."

(b) YES. Our decision in Filipino, Inc. v. The Honorable Minister Blas F.
Ople, et al. 11 does not preclude private respondent's dismissal for, unlike in
Filipino, respondent Edwin P. Sabuya was given notice that the next time he
again exceeds his allowed vacation and sick leaves, or goes on absence without
official leave, he would be terminated from employment. Private respondent did
not heed the warning. His dismissal from employment is, therefore, justified.
On the issue of separation pay, we ruled also in Philippine Geothermal,
Inc. that separation pay of one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service is
equitable, even if the employee's termination of employment is justified.
Finally, on the issue of violation of private respondent's right to procedural
due process, it is clear that the right was violated when no hearing was
conducted prior to dismissal. In Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC 13 the Court
ordered an employer to pay P1,000.00 to an employee who was denied due
process prior to dismissal. It should be stressed however that the Court did not
intend to fix a value or price on such right of an employee, for rights, specially the
right to due process, cannot be translated in monetary value. The amount
awarded in such cases was intended to serve as a penalty to the employer who
violated an employee's right as well as to serve as an example for other
employers inclined to violate their employees rights. Considering the importance
of said right to procedural due process, petitioners should indemnify private
respondent the amount of Five Thousand(P5,000.00)
In other words, dismissal can be sustained provided the penalty of
backwages must be given to the employee.

TANJOCO, MANUEL JR. T.

SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; ABANDONMENT

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES
Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Two
elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relation. The second element is the more determinative factor and
must be evinced by overt acts. 17 Likewise, the burden of proof is on the
employer to show the employee's clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his
employment without any intention of returning, 18 mere absence is not sufficient.

BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL vs NAFLU

[G.R. No. 119243; April 17, 1997]

FACTS: Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991

as route helper with the latest daily wage of P119.00. From 19 April 1993 up to
19 May 1993, for a period of one (1) month, complainant went on absent without
permission (AWOP). On 20 May 1993, respondent thru Mr. Rodolfo Valentin,
sent a Memo to complainant, to wit:
"Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no
disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense:
You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.
For your strict compliance."
In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
"Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo (sic) dahil inuwi ko ang
mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa
mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala
akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.
Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru its
Sales Manager, Mr. Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which
reads:
"We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret to
inform you that we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules
and Regulations that absence without permission for six (6) consecutive working
days is considered abandonment of work.
In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your employment
effective June 17, 1993 for abandonment of work.
Hence, this complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the said employee was validly dismissed on ground of

abandonment

HELD: NO. A scrutiny of the facts discloses that complainant's absence was
precipitated by grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and
abandoned the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one
to whom to the could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring
them to the province. It would have been extremely difficult for him to have been
husband and wife/father and mother at the same time to the children in the
metropolis. He was then under emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical
stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances,
justified. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an
omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Petitioner's finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is
misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Two
elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relation. The second element is the more determinative factor and
must be evinced by overt acts. Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer
to show the employee's clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his employment
without any intention of returning, mere absence is notsufficient. 19 These
elements are not present here. First, as held above, complainant's absence was
justified under the circumstances. As to the second requisite, we are not
convinced that complainant ever intended to sever the employer-employee
relationship. Complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring him to
explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued
for illegal dismissal. These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer
interested in returning to work. Without doubt, the intention is lacking
Moreover, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that complainant was
guilty of abandonment. No evidence other than complainant's letter explaining his
absence was presented. Needless to state, the letter did not indicate, in the least,
that complainant was no longer interested in returning to work. On the contrary,
complainant sought petitioner's understanding. In declaring him guilty of
abandonment, petitioner merely relied on its Rules and Regulations which limited
its application to a six-day continuous absence, contrary to the purpose of the
law. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation
must be fair, just and reasonable. It must be underscored that no less than our
Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights
not only under a general statement of a state policy, but under the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane
and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between capital and labor are not
merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts
must, perforce, yield to the common good.
This court then conclude that complainant's "prolonged" absence without
approval does not fall within the definition of abandonment and that his dismissal
was unjustified. While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and
Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain is that it was
wielded with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus not
allowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light,
petitioner's dismissal was illegal. This is not to say that his absence should go
unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back wages.
In the absence of the appropriate offense which defines complainant's infraction
in the company's Rules and Regulations, equity dictates that a penalty
commensurate to the infraction be imposed.
TANJOCO, MANUEL JR. T.
SECTION 4-B, LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: ALLIED INDUSTRIES

TOPIC: TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; ABANDONMENT

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES:
In the case of Flores v. Funeraria Nuestro, 1 the Court declared that to
constitute abandonment, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In Labor v.
NLRC, 2 we held that two elements must concur for a valid abandonment, viz.:
(1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by some
overt acts.

TRENDLINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. NLRC

[G.R. No. 112923 ; May 5, 1997]
FACTS: The case stemmed from a deadlock in negotiations between the Union
and private respondents regarding the former's demand for an increase of
P25.00 in daily wages, as mandated by the minimum wage law, which the latter
refused to grant. This eventually led to the filing of a complaint against private
respondents for alleged violation of labor standards law.
On July 6, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) on account of deadlock in collective bargaining,
violation of labor standards, and unfair labor practices, specifically, coercion,
retaliatory measures, threats, demotion and transfer of union members.
Conciliation proceedings were then conducted under the auspices of
NCMB Executive Conciliator/Mediator Pilar Tamboboy. Efforts to resolve the
dispute amicably eventually became the precursor of this present petition. The
NCMB proceeded to invite the parties for a series of talks wherein private
respondent Eduardo Yap indicated to petitioners that the demands set forth in
their proposal could not be accommodated without reducing manpower and that
Trendline would be forced to cease operations if retrenchment is not resorted to.
The Union thereafter proposed the following amounts as retrenchment payment,
to wit: (a) payment of one (1) month salary for every year of service computed at
P64.00 per day at 30 working days a month or P1,920.00 per month; (b) payment
of 13th month pay for 1989 computed at one-half (1/2) month salary or P960.00;
and (c) salary payment for the month of July based on the number of days
worked.
Respondent Yap accepted this proposal in spite of limited resources, and
as proof of his intention to comply with his part of the bargain, he even secured
loans from the bank and other creditors to pay the retrenchment benefits of all 47
union officers and members.
When details of the retrenchment program had been finally ironed out on
July 20, 1989, respondent alleged that the union officers and members
"abandoned" their work and waited for the payment of their respective
retrenchment benefits. Twenty-six of them, including the President, Treasurer
and three Directors accepted, upon execution of quitclaims and release waivers,
the grant under the supervised payment conducted by the NCMB. However,
private respondents interpreted this act as an abandonment of work and thus
were constructively dismissed.
On July 26, 1989, the Union filed before the Sub-Regional Arbitration
Branch XII, Iligan City, a complaint against private respondents for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was guilty of abandonment and therefore can be
validly dismissed from employment

HELD: NO. It is clear that in abandonment, the severance of employment is

initiated by the employee's neglect of duty, an act solely attributable to him. In
retrenchment, on the other hand, there is a valid supervening fact which results
in the dismissal or lay-off of employees. Either way, the result is the termination
of an employee's services. The Court is, however, convinced that neither
abandonment nor a valid retrenchment ever took place in the case at bar.
Petitioners argue that they never abandoned their jobs on July 20, 1989;
instead, they were prevented by security guards from entering the workplace.
This assertion was completely rejected by Labor Arbiter Palangan when he
stated that "security guards are not appropriate officials to make a decision for
the management of respondent" 4 and that petitioners' allegation was refuted by
the joint affidavit of the security guards concerned. 5 He also denied petitioners'
imputation of partiality when he gave more credence to said joint affidavit than
the sworn complaint of the individual employees.
There is, however, nothing on record which would justify the Labor
Arbiter's conclusions. He glossed over the fact that the security guards were
under the control of private respondents who alone could have authorized their
actions. The security guards may not be the "appropriate officials" but, certainly,
they acted as agents of the respondents.

NAME: CADAVOS, PEPITO G.

SECTION: 4B LABOR LAW REVIEW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
GROUP: JULY TO DECEMBER 2001 LABOR CASES

TOPIC: ABANDONMENT, ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINE: For a valid finding of abandonment, two factors

must be present, viz (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being
manifested by some overt acts. The herein petitioner failed to present evidence
to justify the dismissal of the private respondents.

COLUMBUS PHILIPPINE BUS CORPORATION vs. NLRC

[G.R. No. 114858-59. September 7, 2001.]

FACTS: Petitioner Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation is engaged in the

business of operating passenger buses. Since the start of its operations in 1990
it has maintained a list of drivers and conductors who rendered service in bus
units allegedly on a “first come first served” basis and compensated purely on
commission. The drivers and conductors/conductress worked for about ten (10)
to fifteen (15) days a month and were allegedly not required to work everyday.
Private respondent Roman Domasig started working as a driver with the
petitioner on August 30, 1990 with a daily income ranging from Three Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P350.00) to Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00), while his wife and
respondent, Zenaida Domasig, was employed as a bus conductress on October
1, 1990 with a daily income of Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00) to Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00). The employment of spouses Domasig with the
petitioner was abruptly terminated on January 21 and 22, 1992, respectively, for
their having allegedly formed a labor union.
The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed in toto the Labor
Arbiter’s decision in favor of the Domasig spouses on the unfair labor practice
and illegal dismissal cases filed by the latter against the petitioner.
The petitioner now challenges the correctness of the NLRC’s decision via
this petition for certitiorari. It alleges that the Domasig spouses like its other
drivers and conductors are not regular employees, that the services of private
respondents were rendered on a ‘first come first served” basis and compensated
purely on commission basis; that they worked for about ten (10) to fifteen (15)
days a month, and only when they felt like doing so.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Domasig spouses abandoned their work and,
hence, were validly dismissed.

HELD: NO, they did not abandon their work and they were illegally dismissed. It
is the contention of the petitioner that the Domasigs were validly dismissed from
work on the ground of abandonment. For a valid finding of abandonment, two
factors must be present, viz (a) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being
manifested by some overt acts. The herein petitioner failed to present evidence
to justify the dismissal of the private respondents.
From the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the absence of the
Domasigs from work was not without valid or justifiable reason. First, on January
21 and 22, 1992, private respondents were asked to relinquish their assigned
buses and from that day forward, they were not given bus assignments. Thus,
under the circumstances, we find the Domasigs’ absences supported with valid
reason. Second, it appeared that the Domasigs never intended to sever their
working relationship with the petitioner. Two weeks after private respondents
were not given bus assignments, they filed their subject complaint for illegal
dismissal with the DOLE. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his
layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work.
March 22, 2004

DEAN MARIANO MAGSALIN, JR.

Arellano University School of Law
Pasay City

Dear Sir:

Greetings of peace and justice in the name of the Almighty!

The other day (March 20, 2004), I receive a sad letter from this esteemed
learning institution, which is esse relayed the information that I was not included
in the list of candidates for graduation leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws,
due to my deficiency in Business Organization 1 where I got a grade of 72.

At the outset, please allow me a few minutes of your precious time to say that I
hailed from Duldulao, Malibcong, Province of Abra. While poor and impoverished
of material possessions, I am proud to say that I am a member of the Itneg
minority, who live a decent and honest life. My father passed away in 1984 and
my mother (who is a mere elementary school teacher) was left to fend for my
seven siblings and me.

Through dint of honest hard work, and with the aid of the Almighty, I successfully
assisted my mother in molding her children to become productive members of
the community. I am a working student since the age of sixteen, and my dream of
becoming a member of the Bar has become the anchorage of our family’s hope
and faith for a better future.

Due to financial constraint, I have to admit that most of the time, which I should
spend with my studies, is stifled by the financial needs of our family, more
specifically to answer for the upkeep of my younger siblings.

While I wish to keep the following information to myself, I am forced to bring the
matter to your attention in the hope that you will understand my predicament and
help me with my situation.

To be candid, our family’s poverty has taken its toll on my studies. Indeed, if only
to complete my payment for last school year’s tuition fees, as well as the
graduation fees, in the amount of P=37,000.00, I bravely and unorthodoxly asked
Dr. James Endo (my employer from 1999 to March 2003) to lend me said
amount. My employer explained his willingness to help; however, only on the
condition that I must mortgage to the company a piece of real estate.
In desperation, a week before the scheduled examinations, I endured the long
travel to Bangued, Abra to seal the transaction with my father’s best friend. At
first glance, he was amenable with the terms of the pro forma real estate
mortgage (which I prepared), however he bought time by asserting that he
wanted my mother to personally give her consent. Again, I negotiated the long
travel back to Duldulao, Abra to fetch my mother. Sad to state, the best friend of
my father (whom I considered as my second father) avoided us when we
returned.

I left my hometown with a broken heart and an empty pocket. My 62-year old
mother gave me hope that she will find ways and means to pay for the required
fees, if only to see his son don the graduation toga and baccalaureate cap.

During the examination date, I repeatedly pleaded with Madame Gina (secretary
of Mr. Florentino Cayco) to allow me to take the examination, but I cannot really
produced even a partial payment and I have no one to blame when I was not
given even a temporary permit. I went home without taking the test for Civil Law
Review.

Continuously, I looked for anybody who can help me with my situation. Instead of
studying for my oncoming examinations like my other classmates, I spent long
hours waiting in line just to be able to have an audience with anybody who can
help me in my financial difficulties. Just to cite a few examples, I talked to United
Capital Resources Corporation (a financing company), Mr. Georence Go (a client
of my employer) and even to Mr. Joey Jimenez (a businessman), but to no avail.
Later, I learned that my mother “bit the bullet” by borrowing from usurers,
agreeing to pay the amount in one year at 20% monthly interest. The required
amount came exactly at the time when I was about to take the examinations in
Criminal and Taxation Law Review.

I have to admit that the foregoing problems took its toll on my removal
examination in Business Organization 1. Truth be told, I never had the
opportunity to review for the said test.

To augment my meager income and help my mother repay her obligation, I

worked as a paralegal at the Lawyers Advocates Circle for a clearer
understanding of the application of the law and thus, a better chance to hurdle
the bar examination. Likewise, I enrolled for the Advance Bar Review at the UP
College of Law, which ended recently.

Last week, my mother and my grandmother arrived in Manila expecting that their
hardships for the past several years will finally bear fruit. It must be stated that
my grandmother has already given me her one-year pension from PVAO for the
Regular Bar Review. Further, I also took the advise of my mother to take a six-
month leave of absence from the Law Firm in preparation for the forthcoming bar
examination. Pointedly, the law firm has given me this leave of absence.

Sir, you can just imagine how shocked and devastated I was when I received the
notice last Saturday (March 20) that informed me that I was not included in the
list of graduating students who will take their march on the 23rd of this month.

I do not wish to reveal this sad result to my mother and grandmother for very
obvious reasons.

Under the foregoing circumstances, I am swallowing my pride as a person to

appeal to your compassion and magnanimity to please reconsider your earlier
decision and allow me to make representations with Atty. Crisostomo Uribe to
reconsider my grade and allow me to graduate this school year.

In God’s hand lies my destiny, but in your hands lies my fate.

May God Bless you and your family. My abiding faith in your sense of
compassion gives me the confidence that you will act favorably on this letter. I
remain

Very truly yours,

Hamilton S. Wacnang
Unit 33 Building 17 BLPC
Pag-asa, Quezon City

Copy Furnished:

MR. FLORENTINO CAYCO

Arellano University School of Law