Ian H.

Susvilla Remedial Law Review September 14, 2023

Faustino Reyes vs Peter B. Enriquez

G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008

Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes, co-owner of a subject
parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, the other owner of the land being Anacleto
Cabrera. Meanwhile, respondents, Peter Enriquez and Deborah Enriquez (husband
and daughter of Etta Cabrera-Enriquez respectively), claim to be the heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera, Etta's father. Enriquez and his daughter Deborah sold a part of their alleged
portion of the property to Sps. Fernandez. When the latter tried to register their share
in the land, they discovered that certain documents, due to the ownership of the heirs
of Dionisia Reyes, barred them from doing so. Respondents filed a complaint for
annulment/ nullification of such documents and prayed for the repartition and re-
subdivision of the property. RTC dismissed the case upon motion of the plaintiffs on
the ground that what the respondents were seeking were to be declared legal heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera something which cannot be done in an ordinary civil action, as in
this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose. The
CA reversed the RTC. The SC reversed the CA and reinstated the RTC ruling, holding
that since the respondents seek to establish a right or status, the proper remedy is a
special proceeding.

Issue: Whether the respondents have to institute a special proceeding first to

determine their status as Anacleto's heirs before they can an ordinary civil action to
nullify the mentioned documents and repartition the land.

Ruling: An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special
proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact. The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in
interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.12 A real party in interest
is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one
entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must
be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or
a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered
sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such
as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or nullification of transfer certificate
of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,19 this Court has consistently
ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the
matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding."
Lilia B. Ada vs. Florante Baylon
G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

Facts: Florentino and Maximina Baylon died in 1961 and 1974, respectively. They
were survived by their children Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon, and Lilia.
Victoria died in 1981, survived by a daughter, Luz Adanza, one of the petitioners.
Ramon, on the other hand, was survived by respondent Florante Baylon when he died
in 1989. The petitioners allege that Florentino and Maximina Baylon owned 43 parcels
of land in their lifetime and that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land,
appropriating for herself the income from the same. They further allege that Rita used
the income to buy two parcels of land. Because of this, the petitioners wanted to
include those two parcels of land in the partition by filing a civil case. During the
pendency of the case, Rita executed a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, in favor
of her nephew Florante Baylon. The petitioners now seek to rescind the Deed of
Donation.

Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and
half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a
judicial determination that the same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses
Baylon.

Ruling: Yes. The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two
separate, distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission. By a joinder of
actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or
more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause
of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of
which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration
or petition. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition
filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is
a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for
rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the
courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case
has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder
of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of
action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes
of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to
the same would be a nullity. Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the
RTC direct the severance of the petitioners’ action for rescission from their action for
partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this does not
constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The RTC
validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by
the petitioners.
Paulino Navarro vs. The Honorable Antonio G. Lucero
G.R. No. L-9340. October 24, 1956

Facts: The case was originally instituted by Manuel H. Barredo against the Treasurer
of the Philippines, and Ignacio de Guzman and Alfredo Edward Fawcett, all of whom
are Respondents in the case at bar. It was alleged, that on September 16, 1944,
Barredo purchased from Ana Brodeck a lot situated in the Municipality of Pasay,
Province of Rizal subject to redemption within two (2) years covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 16372. The said TCT was cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 76578 was issued, on September 18, 1944, in Barredo’s name, with an annotation
of said option to repurchase, which was not exercised within the period
aforementioned. Defendant Ignacio de Guzman filed a petition for the reconstitution of
said TCT No. 16372, alleging that its original and the owner’s duplicate had been
destroyed or lost and could no longer be found and that said TCT had been cancelled
on account of the conditional sale to Barredo. The court declared said TCT No. 16372
reconstituted and ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue its corresponding
owner’s duplicate. On July 22, 1946, De Guzman executed an affidavit adjudicating
said land to himself as the only child and sole heir of Ana Brodek. In lieu thereof,
another certificate of title was issued to his name. De Guzman executed in favor of
Fawcett, a deed of conditional sale of the lot in question annotated on TCT of De
Guzman. Upon expiration of the period of redemption, Fawcett fraudulently
consolidated his ownership upon said lot and caused TCT No. 862 to be issued in his
name, free from liens and encumbrances. Fawcett conveyed the property to Amado
Acayan, and, as a consequence, TCT No. 862, was cancelled, and another one,
bearing No. 863, was issued in favor of Acayan. Thereafter, Acayan assigned the
property to, Paulino Navarro, in whose name TCT No. 1371 was issued. Owing to the
fraudulent reconstitution of TCT No. 16372, and the subsequent conveyances of the
lot in dispute, there are now two (2) certificates of title thereon, namely, TCT No.
76578, in Barredo’s name, and TCT No. 1371 in Navarro’s name.

Issue: Whether venue was improperly laid when the case was filed in the Court of
First Instance in Manila while the property in question is located in Pasay City.

Ruling: The first involved exclusively a personal action, unlike the case at bar, which
mainly seeks to quiet the title to an immovable property, and, hence, it is a real action.
Pursuant to Section 392, actions for the recovery of real property, or all for the
determinations of any right or interest therein, shall be tried in the country where the
real property, is situated, whereas section 395, declares that “in all other cases, the
action must be tried in the county in which the Defendants, or some of them, reside at
the commencement of the action.” Actions in personam are transitory. However, if
besides said actions, the complaint sets up a real action, or even an action quasi in
rem, such as foreclosure of a real estate mortgage “shall be commenced and tried in
the province where the property or any part thereof lies.” Where a personal cause of
action is joined, or personal relief is prayed, in a complaint in action relating to real
property whose venue is laid in the county of the location of such property, the
Defendant is generally entitled to have the venue changed to another county in which
he resides. There appears to be, however, an exception to this rule where the cause
of action as to the real property is the primary object of the action, and the personal
cause of action, or the prayer for personal relief, is merely incidental to such object.
Sandejas vs. Robles
81 Phil 421

Facts: This is an appeal from a CFI of Iloilo order that dismissed the plaintiff's action
on the defendant's request because the action was precluded by a prior judgement.
The appellants claim that the CA erred in maintaining the legality of the CFI's
judgement during the Japanese occupation for the following reasons:

1.The aforementioned court lacks the authority to hear the matter, let alone make the
contested ruling.

2.Assuming for the sake of argument that the puppet CFI of Iloilo lacks jurisdiction, the
decision was made without giving the plaintiff a chance to appear in court, which
violates the Constitution's due process guarantee.

This relates to the resolution by the CFI of Iloilo on the sale of the three land parcels
situated in the Municipality of Passi, province of Iloilo. By submitting their responses
to the complaint, the appellants consented to the CFI's jurisdiction. They were
informed of the hearing date, but when the case was called, their attorney requested
and was granted permission by the court to withdraw his appearance on behalf of his
clients on the grounds that it was challenging to communicate with them. The hearing
was scheduled for that day's afternoon, but because the appellants failed to show up,
judgement was handed down stating that the parties' contract had been resolved and
directing the appellees to restore the P5,723.60 to the appellants that they received
from the latter as payment for the P35,000 agreed-upon purchase price. The Panay
guerilla forces had already taken control of the region by that point, and the puppet
Republic of the Philippines could no longer claim control over the majority of the
territory. Because the lawsuit was conducted in rem, the CFI of Iloilo lacks jurisdiction
over the real estate or the property, making the aforementioned judgement
unenforceable.

Issue: Whether the action is an action in quasi in rem (action against the whole world).

Ruling: No. The action constituted by the appellant’s is in personam and not quasi in
rem. An action in personam has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the property, to determine its status. It is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and
based on jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, of the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The action quasi in rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstances that in the former, an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object
the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. The
absence from trial of the appellants was due to their own fault. Appellants’ contention
that they were deprived of their day in court is untenable. The appeal was dismissed.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 108017, 3 April 1995

Facts: Security guard Torzuela and attorney got into a fight, which led to the situation.
The former shot and murdered the latter at a fair. The petitioner, the decedent's widow,
filed a lawsuit for damages against Torzuela & Safeguard and/or Superguard,
Torzuela's purported employers. The trial court dismissed the complaint against
Superguard & Safeguard because there was no indication of Torzuela's negligence in
shooting Dulay or that it was done while he was performing his duties, which is
required to establish a quasi-delict. Additionally, it determined that the case was for
damages based on an offence punishable under the Arts. Those originating from
quasi-delict are separated from those under RPC sections 100 and 103. The
petitioners disagree with the contested ruling and contend that quasi-delicts include
intentional and voluntarily done acts as well as negligent ones. Petitioners further
assert that private respondents are principally accountable for their negligence in the
hiring or management of their employees under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioners further contend that Article 33 of the New Civil Code makes Torzuela's
shooting of Dulay liable.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint was proper for failure to allege
negligence attributable to private respondents since quasi-delicts are limited to acts of
negligence

Ruling: No. It was erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss the complaint
simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to
private respondents. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Art 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Art. 2176 covers not only
acts committed w/ negligence, but also acts w/c are voluntary & intentional.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act WON he is
prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
(if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, & would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the 2,
assuming the awards made in the 2 cases vary. “Physical injuries” in Art. 33 includes
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the RPC.
It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, & attempted
homicide. In this case, where the accused is charged w/ homicide & not w/ reckless
imprudence, a civil action based on Art. 33 lies. Under Art. 2180, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The
liability of the employer under Art 2180 is direct & immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee & a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. Thus, it is incumbent upon private respondents that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection & supervision of their
employee.
Garchitorena vs. De los Santos
G.R. No. L-17045, June 30, 1962

Facts: The plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the CIF-Camarines Sur, alleging and claiming
that they are the absolute owner of two parcels of land, under tax declarations Nos.
2604 and 2606, situated in the barrio of Abucayan, municipality of Goa, province of
Camarines Sur, that they and their predecessors-in-interest having been in possession
thereof for more than 40 years, the defendants, all surnamed De los Santos, had
conspired with one another to claim, ownership or title to the parcels of land and had
thus disturbed their possession thereof. On January 10, 1955, the defendant Rosa De
los santos moved for an extension of time to file an answer and for impleading as
plaintiff of Juan Garchitorena, brother of the plaintiffs. The defendant Vicente De los
Santos filed an answer to the complaint, praying that it be dismissed on the ground
that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment. On February 9, 1966, the
defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata and
estoppel by judgment. The motion was denied. On March 7, 1955, the defendant set
up a counterclaim for damages, P100 for every three months as compensation for the
use of the parcels of land and prayed for a preliminary writ of mandatory injunction
and for any other just and equitable relief. On 10 March 1955 the plaintiffs answered
the counterclaim denying it. Trial was held. After the plaintiffs had rested their case on
September 20, 1955 the defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of estoppel by judgment. This motion was denied. On June 4, 1957 the
defendants filed a statement and an amended answer alleging that in a previous action
against Juan Garchitorena concerning ownership or title to the parcels of land litigated
herein, they (the defendants) were declared owners thereof, and praying that they be
so declared, and that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them for damages and attorney's
fees as itemized in their counterclaim. On June 7, 1957 the plaintiffs replied to the
amended answer. Trial was resumed. After the testimony of the first witness presented
by the defendants, the Court found that Juan Garchitorena, being in possession of the
parcels of land in litigation, was an indispensable party, and ordered the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to implead him as defendant and to file the amended complaint
within ten days from 26 November 1957. The ten-day period having lapsed without the
plaintiffs filing the required amended complaint, on February 4, 1958 for failure to
prosecute the Court dismissed the case with costs. A motion for reconsideration, to
which the defendant objected, was denied.

Issue: Whether the court erred in dismissing the complaint on the failure of the
plaintiffs to implead the indispensable party as the defendant.

Ruling: No. To order an amendment to a complaint within a certain period of time in

order to implead as party plaintiff or defendant one who is not a party to the case lies
within the discretion of the Court. And where it appears that the person to be impleaded
is an indispensable party, the party to whom such order is directed has no other choice
but to comply with it. His refusal or failure to comply with the order is a ground for the
dismissal of his complaint pursuant to section 3, Rule 30, of the Rules of Court which
provides: When plaintiff fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these rules or any of order of the court, the action may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. In Bautista vs. Teodoro,
Jr., 54 Off. Gaz. 619, this Court upheld the dismissal by the trial court of a complaint
for failure of the plaintiff to comply with its order, either to amend her complaint or to
file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of notice and within an extension of
time prayed for by her and granted by the court.

Multi-Realty Development Corporation vs. Condominium Corp.

G.R. NO. 146726, June 16, 2006

Facts: In the 1970s, Multi-Realty constructed a 26-storey condominium at the corner

of Ayala Avenue and Fonda Street in Makati City, known as the Makati Tuscany
Condominium Building (Makati Tuscany, for short). Makati Tuscany consisted of 160
condominium units. Two hundred seventy (270) parking slots were built therein for
apportionment among its unit owners, while the remaining 98 were to be retained by
Multi-Realty for sale to unit owners who would want to have additional slots. The
Master Deed was filed with the Register of Deeds in 1977. Multi-Realty executed a
Deed of Transfer in favor of MATUSCO over these common areas. However, the
Master Deed and the Deed of Transfer did not reflect or specify the ownership of the
98 parking slots. Nevertheless, Multi-Realty sold 26 of them in 1977 to 1986 to
condominium unit buyers. MATUSCO did not object, and certificates of title were later
issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the buyers. MATUSCO issued Certificates
of Management covering the condominium units and parking slots which Multi-Realty
had sold. Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also a member of the
Board of Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two Multi-Realty executives be
allowed to park their cars in two of Makati Tuscany's remaining 72 unallocated parking
slots. In a letter, through its counsel, MATUSCO denied the request, asserting, for the
first time, that the remaining unallocated parking slots were common areas owned by
it. On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty, as plaintiff, filed a complaint against MATUSCO, as
defendant, for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. Multi-Realty alleged therein that it had
retained ownership of the 98 unassigned parking slots. In its Answer with
counterclaim, MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it
for reformation of their contract. By its own admission, Multi-Realty sold various
parking slots to third parties despite its knowledge that the parking areas, other than
those mentioned in Sec. 5 of the Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO. MATUSCO
prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor dismissing the complaint. After trial, the
RTC dismissed the complaint, likewise the counterclaim. The trial court ruled that
Multi-Realty failed to prove any ground for the reformation of its agreement with
MATUSCO relative to the ownership of the common areas. CA rendered its decision
dismissing the appeal of Multi-Realty.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff had a cause of action against the respondent for
reformation of their contract?

Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff has cause of action. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code
provides that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years
from the time the right of action accrues:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.

The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law
of pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former
is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is a formal statement of
the operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of
right and depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is
governed by the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the cause of action
but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have
occurred. A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff's
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the
subject to which they relate - person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict
or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have
been violated. To determine when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for
reformation of an instrument may be brought and when the right of the petitioner to file
such action accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be considered
because an action for the reformation of an instrument may be brought under said
Rule:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.

In sum, one has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an

instrument when his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when
there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof by another
concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive
controversy between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal
interests. This may occur shortly after the execution of the instrument or much later.
A party to an instrument is under no obligation to seek a reformation of an instrument
while he is unaware that any opposition will be made to carry out the actual
agreement. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an equitable cause
of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has
been discovered or ought to have been discovered. The mere recording of a deed
does not charge the grantor with constructive notice of a mistake therein but is to be
considered with other facts and circumstances in determining whether the grantor be
charged with notice actual or constructive. In the present case, petitioner executed the
Master Deed in 1975. However, petitioner had no doubt about its ownership of the
unassigned parking lots, and even sold some of them. Respondent did not even object
to these sales, and even offered to buy some of the parking slots. Respondent assailed
petitioner's ownership only in 1989 and claimed ownership of the unassigned parking
slots, and it was then that petitioner discovered the error in the Master Deed; the
dispute over the ownership of the parking slots thereafter ensued. It was only then that
petitioner's cause of action for a reformation of the Master Deed accrued. Since
petitioner filed its complaint in 1990, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.
Unimaster Conglomeration Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997

Facts: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc.

entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's products
in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The Dealership Agreement contained a stipulation that
“All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of
Quezon City” Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban
against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages and breach of contracts,
and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two motions,
one for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue and the other prayed
for the transfer of the injunction hearing its counsel was not available. The court issued
an order allowing the issuance of preliminary injunction and a motion denying the
motion to dismiss on the reason that Unimasters’ place of business is in Tacloban City
while Kubota’s principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accord with the Rules
of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election
of the plaintiff. Hence, the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed
both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special
action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of
Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid. The Court of Appeals decided in favor
of Kubota and it held that: “the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership
Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising
thereunder only and exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City.” Subsequently,
Unimasters filed a motion for reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate
court.

Issue: Whether the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting the venue
to a specified place.

Ruling: No. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine
enunciated that as long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or restrictive
words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of the action,
the parties do not lose the option of choosing the venue Absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, venue stipulations in a contract should be considered merely as
agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Unless the
parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that
they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a
definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are
not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them
should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation
should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place,
Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option
of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
United Paragon vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150959 August 4, 2006

Facts: Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario, for brevity) was a regular employee working as a
foreman of petitioner United Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC, hereafter). On
January 18, 1996, Cesario received a termination letter bearing date January 16, 1996
and signed by UPMC's Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano M. Daniel, informing
Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective thirty days after his
receipt of the letter. The termination was on account of Cesario's violation of company
rules against infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee, it being alleged therein that
Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, a certain Jerry Romero, as well as
for unlawfully possessing a deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.
The matter was brought to the grievance machinery. Having failed to reach a
settlement, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
Accordingly, the complaint for illegal dismissal was referred to Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Murly P. Mendez of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Regional Branch
No. V, Legaspi City, where at the same was docketed as VA Case No. RB5-657-04-
002-96. Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered a decision in Cesario's favor and ruled
that the termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was arrived at through gross
misapprehension of facts. UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision insofar
as it ordered Cesario's reinstatement which UPMC sought to avert by offering
separation pay instead. The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the desired reconsideration.
Unsatisfied, UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel, elevated
the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunction, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44450, asserting that the
Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of
the law and denial of substantial justice. The CA, without going into the merits of the
petition, dismissed the same on the following grounds: The petition for certiorari was
not the proper remedy in order to seek review or nullify decisions or final orders issued
by the Labor Arbiter; The verification in the petition is ineffective and insufficient
because it was merely signed by the company's Personnel Superintendent without
alleging or showing that he is authorized for the said purpose and that the verification
was based on knowledge and information; The petitioner's ground of grave abuse of
discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of justice are actually dwelling
on the appreciation of facts, which cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner UPMC is now with this Court.

Issue: Whether the public respondent court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition
after finding that the verification portion of the petition was ineffective and insufficient
in the absence of allegation or showing that Feliciano Daniel, as personnel
superintendent was duly Authorized to file the petition.

Ruling: The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been
committed by the CA in its challenged decision. True, ample jurisprudence exists to
the effect that subsequent and substantial compliance of a petitioner may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. But to merit the Court's
liberal consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of
the petition would defeat the administration of justice. Here, petitioner has not
adequately explained its failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed
by its duly authorized officer. Instead, it merely persisted in its thesis that it was not
necessary to show proof that its Personnel Superintendent was duly authorized to file
that petition and to sign the verification thereof and the certification against forum
shopping despite the absence of the necessary board authorization, thereby repeating
in the process its basic submission that CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 is merely a
continuation of the proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator and that its Personnel
Superintendent was impleaded as one of the respondents in Cesario's complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Vicar International Construction, Inc., vs. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation
G.R. No. 157195. April 22, 2005

Facts: This controversy originated from a Complaint6 for unjust enrichment and
damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar
International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust
Company. These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar. In
obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back" provision were
executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the
equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them
back.8 For the total loan of ₱30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid FEB an aggregate
amount of ₱19,042,908 in monthly amortizations. FEB maintains that Vicar still had an
outstanding balance of about ₱22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of
sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300
square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional
collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced ₱17,000,000 which, Vicar
claims, should have been applied to its loans. The regional trial court (RTC) quashed
the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latter’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated September 30,
2002, the RTC denied the corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge. The CA dismissed the assailed Resolution dated
October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the Certification against forum
shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that
she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation. On November
23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an "Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s Certificate."
Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion absent any compelling reason for
petitioners’ failure to comply at the first instance with the required certification,
therefore cannot accept their subsequent compliance."
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari.

Ruling: The present Petition for Review is meritorious. The Court stresses once more
that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.
While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of
substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice. Petitioners candidly admit
that they inadvertently failed to attach the above Resolution to their CA Petition. In
preparing the Petition, their counsel supposedly worked overnight without sleep. She
wanted to file it immediately to avoid the trial court’s quashal of their counterbond.
Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretary’s Certificate was
attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the October 23, 2002 CA
Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in filing the following day their
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s
Certificate." Respondent FEB asserts that the CA’s dismissal of the Petition -- arising
from petitioners’ failure to attach a duly executed verification and certification against
forum shopping -- is well within the appellate court’s authority, pursuant to Sections 3
and 5 of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent alleges that the
instant Petition, being based on the ground of excusable negligence, is actually a
motion for new trial. As such, the Petition must allegedly fail, because petitioners did
not execute and attach an affidavit of merits. Citing several cases excusing
noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping, the Court
held that "with more reason should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since
petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show
proof that the signatory was authorized to do so." The Court further said that the
subsequent submission of the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting that the signatory to
the certification was authorized to file the action on behalf of petitioner, mitigated the
oversight. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus
defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping." The
Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition.
Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to
file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum
shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed.
Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due to
inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretary’s Certificate to their
Petition for Certiorari.
Rosalina Buan et al vs. Officer-In-Charge Gemiliano C. Lopez
G.R. No. 75349, October 13, 1986

Facts: On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in the SC a special civil action for
prohibition to the end that respondent Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila, be "perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously
revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and
threatening the physical demolition of their respective business stalls in the places
specified in such licenses or permits. They also sought a temporary restraining order
in view of Mayor Lopez' actual threats of physical demolition of their respective small
business establishment at 12:00 noon today." Petitioners claim to be five of about 130
"licensed and duly authorized vendors of religious articles, medicine herbs and plants
around the Quiapo Church, Manila," bringing suit 'for themselves and all others
similarly situated as themselves." They allege that their licenses "were revoked or
cancelled (by respondent Mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process of laws," written notice of such cancellation
having been served on them, the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) authorizes
the same only "for violation of the law or ordinances or conditions upon which they
have been granted " and no such violation had been committed by them.

Issue: Whether the special civil action will prosper.

Ruling: The petition is denied. The action must in the first place be abated on the
ground of lis pendens, or more correctly, auter action pendant pendency of another
action between the same parties for the same cause. It appears that on July 7, 1986
there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
8636563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting
Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.. It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa
Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc." The president of the Samahan is Rosalina
Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo. Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo
are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar, described in the petition before this
Court as suing "for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves. The
petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at
bar: the members of the Samahan had been legitimately engaged "in their respective
business of selling sundry merchandise, more particularly religious articles, flowers
and ornamental plants, and medicinal herbs. There thus exists between the action
before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as Identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the
Identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action, will regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in
the action under consideration. The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum
shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the
courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the
administration of justice. The Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions,
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party
concerned." The rule applies with equal force where the party having filed an action in
the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition and a restraining order
or injunction in the regional trial court (or vice-versa). It would seem that after the filing
by Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo (president and press relations officer,
respectively, of the Quiapo Church vendors' association known as the Samahan) of
the petition in this case, "for themselves and all others similarly situated as
themselves" (i.e., the members of the Samahan; who are vendors in the area of
Quiapo Church) they came to the belated that in view of the pendency of the Identical
action filed by them in the Regional Trial Court (Case No. 86-36563), they were
vulnerable to the accusation of "forum shopping," and thus amenable to its dire
consequences. Yet another reason exists for the denial of the petition. Not one of the
petitioners or the "others similarly situated as themselves" had a valid and subsisting
license or permit as of the date of the filing of their petition in this Court, August 5,
1986, all licenses and permits having expired prior thereto. This is confirmed by the
few receipts submitted by petitioners which all set out expiry dates before August 5,
1986. The petitioners thus have no basis whatever to postulate a right to ply their trade
in the Quiapo area or elsewhere. The argument that the non-renewal by the municipal
authorities of their licenses was in effect a cancellation or revocation thereof without
cause is puerile. Finally, the action for prohibition has become moot and academic by
the occurrence of the acts sought to be inhibited. The petitioners' permits and licenses
have all expired; hence, there can be no occasion whatsoever to speak of the inhibition
of any revocation or cancellation thereof. And the "physical demolition of their
respective business stalls" has already been consummated.

Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., vs. Hon. Alfredo R. Enriquez

G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005

Facts: Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application for registration of title before the RTC
of Pasig City (LRC No. N18887). The land registration court granted the application.
The decision became final and executory. The National Land Titles and Deeds
Administration (now LRA) issued Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names
of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.
Petitioners, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887 alleging
that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their
respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of
registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The
Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses. Petitioners filed another
motion to declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show
that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October
1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998. Petitioners questioned the
inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA
Administrator denied the request and explained that the inconsistencies in the date
was due to oversight and that the decrees were actually issued sometime between
August 8 and 13 1998. Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a
motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. The Register of Deeds of
Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. Three days
after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The
case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds
that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section
24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the
legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case. The LRA
declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration
case is a proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a
party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not
admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have
filed a motion to lift the order of general default. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and reiterated the LRAs
ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens.
Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order
of general default in the land registration case.

Issue: Whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare

void the decrees and titles.

Whether petitioners can file the motion to declare void the decrees issued by the land
registration court in LRC case no. N-18887 despite the fact that the court has not lifted
the general order of default.

Ruling: On the first issue, the court held in the negative. Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or
to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to
vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against
persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the
institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as
well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of
the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered. As decreed by Section
76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution of
an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its
institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the
certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its
registered owner. The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis
pendens because the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon
which this office will base its action. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the
application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not
original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as
contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading
to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly
denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.

On the second issue, the court also held in the negative. Reconveyance is based on
Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, which states that "xxx in all
cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title xxx." An action for
reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although the
decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered
owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance
is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not
passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in
court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value
and preserve the claim of the real owner. In its comment, the LRA states that under
Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners’
failure to move to lift the default order did not give them standing in the case. As long
as the court does not lift the order of general default, petitioners have no legal standing
to file the motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the applicant.
Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:

Sec. 26.Order of default; effect – If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant to present
evidence.

By the description in the notice "To All Whom It May Concern", all the world are made
parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order. Where an appearance
has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered against persons
who did not appear and answer. Considering the facts and arguments as presented
above, we hold that the motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing
in the land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice of
lis pendens. However, we disagree with the LRA and the appellate court’s observation
that petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift
the order of general default should be filed before entry of final judgment. The land
registration court granted the application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and
issued a certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion on 16 July
1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general default, the
order of default could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of time. In Lim
Toco v. Go Fay, this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the party
defaulted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss
of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or
be entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered
by the court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds
provided in what is now Section 3, Rule9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the default
order. Those who did not file an answer should be considered as having lost their
standing in court from that stage (Republic v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when
they file a motion to set aside the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned in
Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).In land registration
cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of general default was deemed to
have been issued based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings
(Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to
adduce any evidence showing that the order of general default was lifted. Records
disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners
filed a motion to declare as null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of
general default is lifted by the court, petitioner could not be considered as a party to
the action. They are deemed movants whose personality as far as the case is
concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not
been lifted. Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their
motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void,
they took the role of oppositors to the application for land registration. The appellate
court stated that "in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of petitioners to
hasten or expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the part of the
petitioners, however, it could not." Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act between
the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding and the strict requirements for a notice of lis pendens.
The facts in this case show that petitioners have not complied with the requirements.

Johanne J. Peña & Erlana G. Vda. De Inocencio vs. CA

G.R. No.126275, November 11, 2004.

Facts: Respondent Dura-Tire & Rubber Industries, Incorporated (Dura-Tire for brevity)
is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of vehicle tires
and other rubber products. Among the customers of the respondent were petitioners
Johanne J. Peña and Erlana G. Vda. de Inocencio who, by themselves, were also
engaged in the business of buying rubber products from the respondent and of selling
the same to their customers under the business name Largestone Enterprises
(Largestone). Largestone was also the authorized sales agent of respondent Dura-
Tire. The petitioners would purchase rubber products from the respondent on credit
for delivery to their customers, after which the petitioners would pay the respondent
for the said purchases. On May 8, 1991, the respondent and petitioner Inocencio
entered a surety agreement in which the latter bound and obliged herself, jointly and
solidarily, with petitioner Peña to pay to the respondent, when due, all money
indebtedness or obligation of any kind incurred by petitioner Peña in the past and/or
thereafter, arising from or growing out of any sale, whether on credit and/or forwarding
on consignment, for sale or return goods and deliveries, as well as customers’
accounts guaranteed by petitioner Peña,and to pay on demand any said indebtedness
upon his default. Petitioner Peña signed the agreement as a witness. In partial
payment of the said purchases from the respondent, petitioner Inocencio issued the
following Philbanking Checks and also drew and issued to the respondent Philippine
National Bank. However, these checks were returned by the drawee banks for either
of the following reasons: "closed account," "payment stopped," or "drawn against
insufficient funds." The petitioners, likewise, failed to pay for the balance of their
account. On June 10, 1992, the respondent filed a Complaint with the RTC of Manila
against the petitioners for the collection of their account, plus interests and attorney’s
fees. The petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the decision, nor a
motion for new trial, and appealed the decision instead. On March 19, 1996, the CA
promulgated a decision affirming the decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the same.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in declaring the petitioners in default for their failure
to file their pre-trial brief within three days from their receipt of the Order of the trial
court.

Ruling: Yes. We agree with the petitioners that the trial court erred in declaring them
as in default for their failure to file a pre-trial brief at least three days before the
scheduled pre-trial set on February 19, 1993 and to appear before the trial court on
said date and time. Under Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, the parties and
their counsel are mandated to appear before the court for pre-trial and if the
defendants fail to do so despite due notice and without any justifiable reason therefor,
they may be declared as in default, conformably to Section 2, Rule 20 of the said
Rules. The parties are also mandated under Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989
to file their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference
and if the defendants fail to do so, they may be declared as in default. The parties and
their counsel must be served with copies of the order of the court setting the case for
pre-trial, either by personal delivery or by mail under Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, or by substituted service under Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. The rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt
thereof by the addressee, except when the addressee does not claim his mail within
five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, in which case, the service
shall take effect within the said period. The certification from the postmaster would be
the best evidence to prove that the notice had been validly made. However, if there is
nothing on record showing how, when, and to whom, the delivery of the registry notices
of the registered mail was made, the court should not rely on the notation "return to
sender: unclaimed" to support the presumption of constructive service. As admitted by
the petitioners, a copy of the January 4, 1993 Order of the trial court was sent to and
received by their counsel on January 14, 1993. A copy of the same order was placed
on a sealed brown envelope, addressed to the petitioners. The records also contain a
registry notice addressed to the petitioners at "Pandacan, Manila." There is no showing
that the notice was sent to or received by the petitioners. In fact, the respondent even
failed to submit to the trial court a certificate from the postmaster stating that the clerk
of court sent a notice of registered mail to the petitioners’ counsel and that the latter
received the same. And yet, the trial court declared the petitioners as in default for
their counsel’s failure to appear for pre-trial and to file their brief three days before
February 19, 1993. We are, thus, convinced that the trial court erred in declaring the
petitioners as in default, in allowing the respondent to adduce its evidence ex parte,
and in rendering judgment by default against the petitioners. However, it must be
stressed that the petitioners failed to file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a), Rule
37 of the Rules of Court despite receipt of notice of the trial court’s decision. The
petitioners had the right to appeal the judgment by default on the ground that the said
judgment was contrary to law or the evidence. They were, however, proscribed from
assailing the trial court’s Order dated February 19, 1993 declaring them as in default.
The burden of proof is on the petitioners to establish their defenses by a
preponderance of evidence while the burden of proof is on the respondent, as plaintiff,
to prove by a preponderance of evidence the material allegations of its complaint. If
the defendants admit the material allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff is then
relieved of its burden. We do not agree with the contention of the respondent that the
petitioners drew and issued the checks to it in payment of obligations separate from
those covered by the sales invoices appended to its complaint. The respondent failed
to adduce any sales invoice issued by it showing sales and deliveries of the products
to the petitioners or to their customers for which the latter drew and delivered the
checks. We are convinced that the said checks were drawn and issued by the
petitioners to the respondent in partial payment of the products covered by the said
sales invoices. In fine, the petitioners are jointly and severally liable to the respondent
in the principal amount of P329,944.50.

Crisologo vs. Globe

G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005

Facts: Petitioner was an employee of respondent company. When she was promoted,
she became entitled to an executive car. In April 2002, she was separated from the
company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
NLRC which later dismissed the complaint. The Petitioner filed for certiorari with the
CA assailing the dismissal. Pending said petition, Respondent filed a civil case with
the RTC an action for recovery of possession of the car with application for a writ of
replevin with damages docketed as case MC04-2480. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping but was denied by the
trial court. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Petitioner also filed
with the CA a motion for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to enjoin proceedings in
the replevin case before the trial court. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to
declare defendant in default in Civil Case No. MC04-2480, which was granted by the
trial court. Respondent was thus allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of default but it was denied by the trial
court. The trial court rendered a judgment by default, declaring respondent having the
right of possession over the subject motor vehicle and ordered the petitioner to pay for
damages, attorney’s fee, and cost of suit. Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was denied
for being the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Thus, Petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration, alleging that the filing of
said petition is the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was
ruled that a defendant declared in default has the remedy set forth in Sec. 2, par (3)
of Rule 41.

Issue: Whether the Petitioner’s filing of review on certiorari with the SC citing Matute
case is the proper recourse for a judgment by default rendered by the trial court.

Ruling: No. The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to assail
the default judgment rendered by the trial court. The Matute case is of 1969, vintage
and pertained to the old Rules of Court and has already been superseded by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with the
Court of Appeals under Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. The Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002

Facts: Petitioner Remington Industrial Sales Corporation's (Remington) filed a

complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against Industrial Steels, Ltd.
(ISL) with Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel (Asia), Ltd. ISL
and respondent moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; but was
dismissed by the trial court. ISL then filed its answer to the complaint, while respondent
(Asia) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional
factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend the
complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive
pleading thereto. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion in with the
CA stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said
Amended Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the special civil action be suspended. The trial court noted the
amended complaint, while the appellate court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
recourse.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective complaint
under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the query posed
before us is: can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer
has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the
higher court.

Ruling: No. In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed
judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to
which the defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Section
2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means
that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason
for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision,
substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in
the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer. The amendment of the complaint would not prejudice
respondents or delay the action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite
its disposition. The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioner's right to amend the complaint as against
respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, the
plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims
asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.