Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Using fault tree analysis in the Al-Ahmadi town gas leak incidents
Khaled Alkhaledi a,⇑, Sami Alrushaid b, Jasem Almansouri c, Ahmed Alrashed d
a
Industrial and Management Systems Engineering Department, College of Engineering and Petroleum, Kuwait University, P.O. Box 5969, Safat 13060, Kuwait
b
Kuwait Oil Company, Kuwait
c
Kuwait Fire Department, Kuwait
d
Science Department, Public Authority for Applied Education and Training, Kuwait

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The gas leak incidents that occurred in Al-Ahmadi, Kuwait, were considered to be unprecedented phe-
Received 3 January 2015 nomena worldwide. Three gas explosions occurred between January 2010 and November 2010: two
Received in revised form 22 April 2015 occurred at different houses that were connected to the Kuwait Oil Company natural gas network in
Accepted 30 May 2015
north Al-Ahmadi, and one occurred at a house in south Al-Ahmadi that was not connected to the network.
Available online 30 June 2015
These explosion incidents triggered an immediate investigation. The fault tree analysis was used to iden-
tify the type and the source of the leaking gas and to determine how the leaking gas reached the surface.
Keywords:
Four different source hypotheses were investigated: leaks from the natural gas network, leaks from the
Al-Ahmadi
Kuwait
sewer network, leaks from wells and boreholes in and around the town of Al-Ahmadi, and leaks from
Gas leakage underground geological formations. The study concluded that the leaking gas in the Al-Ahmadi incidents
Gas explosion was natural gas and of geological origin. The natural gas gradually migrated from deep hydrocarbon
Formation fractures reservoirs upwards through cap-rock fractures. The gas collected in the Dammam formation and soil near
Dammam formation the surface and then leaked into the air. The analysis and the results of this investigation can serve as a
useful reference if any similar gas leak incidents happen elsewhere.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction supplied KOC’s houses through high-pressure and low-pressure

Al-Ahmadi was established in 1945 to host the headquarters
and primary offices of the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), which has
the primary responsibility of producing oil and gas from reservoirs
in the state of Kuwait (Ray, 2004).
KOC owns 1600 residential houses in Al-Ahmadi to accommo-
date their employees. A gas network was constructed in 1950 to
supply KOC’s houses. In 1976, KOC released three land blocks in
south Al-Ahmadi to the government to build government houses
to accommodate the limited income citizens.
KOC is responsible for maintaining the town’s gas, water and
sewer networks for all 1600 houses, and since introducing the
gas network in Al-Ahmadi, there have been no records of gas
explosion incidents. KOC has updated the gas networks. The new
networks were constructed from a corrosion-resistant plastic
material pipes and were commissioned in 2008. The old network
was isolated from service in the same year. The new network
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +965 24987994; fax: +965 24847893.
E-mail addresses: kalkhaledi@gmail.com (K. Alkhaledi), sfaoilcmd@gmail.com
(S. Alrushaid), Jasem.mansouri@falghanim.com (J. Almansouri), Ahmedbufursan@
yahoo.com (A. Alrashed).
distribution pipes.
On January 28, 2010, a gas explosion occurred inside a bedroom
of KOC-owned house number 18 at 19 Crescent Street in north
Al-Ahmadi, and on February 3, 2010, another gas explosion
occurred inside another KOC-owned house, number 71 at 15
Avenue in north Al-Ahmadi. A teenage girl was treated for first
degree burns. The house’s walls were cracked and burned (see
Fig. 1). The causes of these incidents were not identified, but gas
leakage from the KOC’s network was suspected because a few com-
plaints were received about a gas odor in the air.
At a location far from KOC-owned houses, a third gas explosion
occurred on November 11, 2010, at a government-owned house,
number 635 at block number one in south Al-Ahmadi, which was
not supplied with gas from the KOC network. This incident
prompted the consideration of other possible sources of gas leak-
age (see Fig. 2).
Measurements obtained inside and outside KOC and govern-
ment houses showed high levels of gas. After the above-normal
gas readings were known, the Kuwait Fire Department (KFD) tem-
porarily evacuated the residences in north and south Al-Ahmadi as
a precautionary action to insure the public safety from any hazards
from harmful gas.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.05.015
0925-7535/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192
Crack Burn
Fig. 1. Cracks and burn marks inside the bedroom and bathroom walls.
Al-Ahmadi Town
Block 1
Fig. 2. Satellite view showing the location of the explosion incidents in Al-Ahmadi.
A study was conducted by Al-Rashed (2014) to locate and to
identify the gas leakage source. Intensive geochemical surveys rep-
resented by 47,626 gas readings were conducted inside and around
block number 1 of Al-Ahmadi using an up-to-date soil gas detector
(Crowcon gas detector). Inspection of the iso-methane contour
map of the surveyed area revealed that the study area was charac-
terized by low-to-medium gas leakage intensity (0–500 CPS).
Extremely high local anomalies were recorded in the west part of
the Al-Ahmadi town, which attained gas intensities up to 4000
CPS. Al-Rashed’s investigation could not determine the reason
behind the gas leakage, but it guessed that the source of the gas
could be either nearby surface leakage from gas networks or natu-
ral gas leakage from deep formations. The study did not survey the
area around KOC houses.
Earlier investigations could not find the source and the type of
the leaking gas in Al-Ahmadi. Therefore the first objective of this
study was to identify the sources and the type of the leaking gas,
while the second objective was to determine how the leaking gas
reached the surface. Fault tree analysis (FTA) was used to investi-
gate four different contributing theories of the gas leak’s suspected
origins and type.
The FTA method is primarily used in the safety fields to deter-
mine the causes of system failures and to promote the safety of
complex systems. FTA was developed in 1962 at Bell Telephone
Laboratories by H. A. Watson to study the safety of the launch con-
trol system for Minuteman missiles. It was used to assess and
improve system safety in industries including aerospace, defense,
railroad, automotive, oil and gas, chemical processing, and the
nuclear industry (Lacey, 2011).
FTA is applied to investigate potential faults and its modes and
causes by using a graphic modeling technique that displays the
various combinations of faults, failures, and human errors that
could lead to the incident event. FTA can also be applied to identify
185
the potential causes of system failures before the failures actually
occur. It can also be used to evaluate the probability of the top
event occurring using analytical or statistical methods (Ericson,
1999). Since there were no reliable maintenance or failure data
for Al-Ahmadi gas leak incidents, this study did not attempt to
do risk assessment or calculate failure probability.
There was no available reliable or objective data about the shal-
low formations located up to 300 m underneath Al-Ahmadi town
because previous studies had only focused on deep geological for-
mations where oil could be found. Therefore, shallow formation
data had to be collected to construct an FTA deductive logic dia-
gram for this study.
2. Method and results
Fault tree analysis was used to determine the source and the
type of the leaking gas and to analyze all possible scenarios of
how the gas could have reached the surface.
FTA was applied in this study as a systematic safety analysis
tool that proceeds deductively from the occurrence of Al-Ahmadi
gas leak incidents, and expands outward and downward to identify
the many contributing causes. FTA proceeded from one event to
many sub-events by asking ‘‘How could this event have hap-
pened?’’, contributing causes to the gas leak incident were identi-
fied and then listed as a part of the next lower level of analysis
(sub-faults). These sub-faults were then connected as influencing
inputs to the upper level using either ‘‘AND’’ gates or ‘‘OR’’ gates.
An ‘‘AND’’ gate states that all sub-fault events were necessary for
the gas leak incidents to occur; an ‘‘OR’’ gate states that any of
the sub-faults is sufficient to generate the gas lean incidents
(Mahar et al., 1990).
Four different hypotheses of possible causes were tested in this
investigation, namely leaks from the KOC’s gas network, leaks from
the sewer system, leaks from the wells and boreholes in and sur-
rounding Al-Ahmadi, and leaks from underground geological for-
mations beneath Al-Ahmadi (see Fig. 3). Various site
measurements and tests were used for each suspected contribut-
ing cause that may have led to the Al-Ahmadi gas leak incidents.
2.1. Hypothesis one: leak from the gas pipes network
There are two different gas pipe networks in Al-Ahmadi, namely
the old and the new gas networks. The old network consisted of
two parts; the first was the gas pipes inside each KOC house, and
the second was the gas pipes outside the KOC houses and through
the town. The new gas pipe network is located only outside KOC
houses through the town; it functionally replaced the second part
of the old network. The objective of the first hypothesis was to find
out if any part of the KOC’s gas pipe network was causing the gas
leakage incident (see Fig. 4).
2.1.1. Old gas pipe network; inside the KOC houses
All KOC houses use gas exclusively for stove cooking. The gas
pipe was constructed of carbon steel, and it connected the stove
with the outside gas network. The main valve that connects the
inside house pipe with the outside pipes was closed to ensure that
no gas was supplied during testing. The internal ½ in pipes at all
KOC houses in Al-Ahmadi, including the two KOC houses where
the explosion incidents occurred, were investigated using a pneu-
matic pressure test for any gas leak (ABSA, 2012).
The pneumatic pressure test results indicated that the gas pipes
inside the tested houses and the cooking stove were generally in
good condition and well maintained. It was concluded that the
internal pipes were not a contributing cause of the gas leak inci-
dents; therefore, they were ruled out.
186 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192

Fig. 3. Gas leak primary fault tree analysis layout.

Fig. 4. Fault tree analysis layout for Al-Ahmadi gas pipes network.

2.1.2. Old gas pipe network; outside the houses
Although the old gas pipe network had been out of commission
since 2008, it was necessary to evaluate the pipe to insure that
there was no residual gas leakage. The old gas pipes network out-
side both the KOC and the government houses was made of carbon
steel materials. The old gas network consisted of four inches gas
main and the one inches gas branch line coming off the main
and connecting to a gas meter outside KOC houses.
Four testing methods were used. The first was the excavation
and exposition of fuel gas lines for visual inspection, the second
was the measurement of the lower explosive limit (LEL) level
around the majority of houses, the fourth was guided wave ultra-
sonic technique (GWUT) examinations of the steel pipes’ structural
integrity.
Visual inspection results showed that some parts of the carbon
steel pipes were corroded, deteriorated, and perforated, and others
were in good condition (Jones, 1995). There was discoloration of
the soil around the deteriorated pipes (Hoeks, 1972), which indi-
cated the presence of gas. The time frame of the leakage was
unknown; some of the gas leak discoloration could have happened
before the pipe was decommissioned.
Gas samples from inside the old pipes were tested, and the
results showed the presence of natural gas, although the concen-
trations were not high enough to account for the quantity of gas
leaked throughout the town. Thus the old, decommissioned gas
pipe network alone could not have been the cause of the gas leak
incidents, but the pipes helped the natural gas spread around the
town faster.
2.1.3. New gas network pipes outside the houses
The new gas pipe network around KOC and government houses
was put into service in February, 2008. The new gas network is
constructed of high-density polyethylene (HDPE), which is resis-
tant to corrosion (Murty, 2010). The new network consisted of
two parts; the first was the four inches gas main outside the KOC
houses and through the town currying the gas at 0.5 psi, and the
second was the one inches gas branch line coming off the main
and connecting to an outside gas regulator and meter, where pres-
sure reduced to 0.3 psi for distribution inside the houses.
The new gas network was isolated from the manifold feeding
station by turning off the primary valve. The new HDPE gas pipes,
which normally operate at 0.5 psi, and the regulator valves were
tested using air pressure at 5.0 psi.
No gas leak was found in the four and one inch pipes or in the
regulator valves, and based on the test results the new gas pipe
network was not considered to be a contributing cause of the
Al-Ahmadi gas leak incidents.
 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192 187

2.2. Hypothesis two: Leaks from the sanitary sewer network

Sewer pipes primarily contain the gases found in air (nitrogen,

oxygen, carbon dioxide, etc.), but the decomposing waste materi-
als, industrial solvents, and gasoline in public and private sewer
systems can generate sewer gases (Ojha et al., 2012). Methane is
a constituent of sewer gas, which includes a mixture of toxic and
non-toxic gases, such as hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, ammo-
nia and nitrogen oxides (Hutter, 1993). Methane and hydrogen sul-
fide are explosive components of sewer gas, which is why sewer
gas poses fire or explosion risks (Hensher et al., 2003). There could
have been a possibility of gas leaks from the sewer network into
the houses. There are a variety of ways for the sewer gas to enter
homes; it can enter through a dry trap, a crack in the plumbing
pipes or a blocked vent pipe, etc. (Butler et al., 2011). A leak from
the sanitary sewer network which runs through Al-Ahmadi and
connects to all houses was investigated (see Fig. 5).
Fig. 6. Possible leakage causes from earth boring.
Sewer cameras were used to inspect the sewer pipelines, and all
were found to be in fair condition. Also visual inspection of resi-
dential plumbing and ventilation features were found to be in good
condition and well maintained, not offering those entry points for identifying and investigating all boreholes within a radius of three
gases from the sewer system. kilometers around Al-Ahmadi (see Fig. 6).
The sewer gas leak hypothesis was tested by taking 12 air sam-
ples from the sewer systems around Al-Ahmadi (Barsky et al.,
2.3.1. Hydrocarbon wells
1986). The testing results showed both the normal presence of
An oil well is a hole bored into the ground that is designed to
sewer gases (including methane, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon
transport petroleum oil along with natural gas to the surface. A
dioxide) and the unusual presence of natural gas components other
well that is designed to produce only gas is called a gas well. Oil
than methane (ethane, propane, and butane) (Nasr et al., 2014).
and gas wells are sealed with casing components between the pipe
The source of the abnormal natural gas components was not
and the formation to prevent any unintended oil or gas leakage
known. Additional air samples were taken from inside homes
(Nelson et al., 2006).
and no typical sewer gas components were detected other than
Deep oil wells in Al-Ahmadi penetrate the underground geolog-
methane, which could have come from natural gas. The sewer
ical formations (Omar et al., 1981); some of these formations may
gases were ruled out from being the source of the explosions.
contain gas reservoirs. If the casing components of the oil or the
gas wells around Al-Ahmadi have any cracks, natural gas could
2.3. Hypothesis three: leaks from earth boreholes surrounding Al- have escaped through the cracks to the upper formations or even
Ahmadi to the surface, causing the gas leak incidents. This hypothesis
was tested by investigating the oil and gas wells within a radius
Boreholes in Al-Ahmadi are narrow shafts bored in the ground of three kilometers around Al-Ahmadi.
and can be used for many different purposes, including production A total of 42 oil wells were identified, and no gas wells were
of hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas, pipe and tank cathodic found within the radius. The status of each identified well was
protection, and extraction of water. Deep boreholes in Al-Ahmadi evaluated by measuring well pressures and inspecting the casing
can penetrate the underground formations and reach gas and cement conditions.
reservoirs. The results showed that the oil wells had normal pressures, and
Natural gas could escape through the boreholes to the upper the well casings and cementing had no cracks and were in good
formations or even to the surface. This hypothesis was tested by condition. It was concluded that oil and gas wells around

Fig. 5. Possible leakage causes from earth boring.

188 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192
Al-Ahmadi were not a contributing cause to the gas leak incident
phenomenon.
2.3.2. Cathodic protection wells
The cathodic protection system is a technique used to control
the corrosion of a metal surface. Cathodic protection wells vary
in depth and size (Baeckmann et al., 1997). There were 36 such
wells installed at various locations in Al-Ahmadi since 1961 to pro-
tect the buried gas pipe network (i.e., carbon steel pipes) and other
steel structures. Out of the 36 wells, 25 were shallow ground beds
that were between two and five meters deep, while the remaining
11 were deep ground beds (22–76 m deep). Each deep ground bed
consisted of a casing pipe, anodes with cables, and coke breeze. The
deep well anode bed casings were mostly flanged, but some cas-
ings were not flanged (Peabody, 2001). Some cathodic protection
wells may not have been sealed as thoroughly as hydrocarbon
wells, which could have allowed natural gas to leak along the bore-
holes from the lower to the upper formations or even to the
surface.
Wireline logging, which is a detailed record of the geological
formations penetrated by the boreholes (Darling, 2005), was per-
formed in all 11 deep cathodic protection wells. The logging test
confirmed the presence of gas in all tested wells. Gas samples were
taken from the surface and from deep inside all 11 deep ground
beds, and analysis of them indicated the presence of natural gas.
It was concluded that the cathodic protection wells were a possible
pathway by which natural gas could have escaped from under-
ground sources.
2.3.3. Water wells
Natural gas can also leak from the water wells or the casing of
the water wells around Al-Ahmadi, according to Johnson (2014).
This hypothesis was tested by identifying water wells within a
radius of three kilometers around Al-Ahmadi. Three shallow wells
with low water levels were identified. The status of each identified
well was studied by collecting and analyzing water and rock sam-
ples. Gas readings were taken at the surface using instruments to
detect any gas leakage from the wells or their casings.
The gas readings were found to be normal at all three shallow
water wells, which indicated the wells were not leaking any gas.
2.4. Hypothesis four: escape of gas from underground formations
beneath Al-Ahmadi
The previous tested hypotheses could not explain the gas leak-
ing incidents’ causation. This prompted the consideration of possi-
ble gas escape from the underground formations as another
hypothesis (see Fig. 7).
This part of the investigation of the Al-Ahmadi gas leak events
was faced with a significant challenge. There was no data about
Fig. 7. FTA for underground possibility of gas leakage.
the sub-surface formations located up to 300 m underneath
Al-Ahmadi because previous studies had only focused on geologi-
cal formations at depths between 300 and 1220 m, where oil could
be found. Shallow formation data had to be collected specifically
for this study.
2.4.1. Geological investigation
Two seismic studies, one two-dimensional and one
three-dimensional, were performed to better visualize and to
map the formation’s geological and geophysical structure under
Al-Ahmadi with particular attention on the near-surface region. A
shuttle radar topography mission (SRTM) was used to obtain
detailed surface elevation data.
From the images, two major cap-rocks were identified; the Rus
(shallow) and the Al-Ahmadi (deep). Both cap-rocks would consti-
tute an effective barrier to contain hydrocarbon reservoirs if they
were to remain undisturbed (Watts, 1987). The Al-Ahmadi ridge,
the arch-shaped set of geological formations over the hydrocarbon
reservoir beneath Al-Ahmadi town, was also identified (Kusky,
2009). A 3D seismic model was developed to assess the potential
pathways of hydrocarbon gas under Al-Ahmadi. Natural gas was
present in high concentrations in the Dammam formation beneath
Al-Ahmadi town and was limited to the Al-Ahmadi ridge zone,
where the formation is unusually near the surface (see Fig. 8).
In this zone, the surface layer above the formation becomes as
thin as six meters and extends geographically from the south tank
farm (STF) to beyond the north tank farm (NTF) with a width of
approximately 500 m (see Fig. 9).
Fracture is the physical separation of an object or material into
two or more pieces. If a fracture develops perpendicularly to the
material’s surface, it is called a normal fracture; if it develops par-
allel to the material’s surface, it is called a shear crack or disloca-
tion (Cherepanov, 1979). Fractures can provide permeable
pathways for gas to migrate through a formation.
A series of 25 fractures, the Al-Ahmadi ridge fractures, that were
mainly oriented north–south were identified from the seismic
images and were further evaluated as potential gas leak sources.
Gas tends to leak out more where surface sediments are thinner,
that is, at the top of the ridge. The Al-Ahmadi ridge fractures were
the primary channels for fluids to penetrate the Dammam forma-
tion and reach the surface (see Figs. 10 and 11).
Another simulation was performed using Petrel softwareÒ to
locate the exact location of the gas pockets in the formations
beneath Al-Ahmadi. The software also helped to estimate the gas
pockets’ sizes and depths. The simulation results showed the pres-
ence of gas in the Dammam formation and under the Rus forma-
tion, and they were validated by the findings of the earlier
seismic studies. The gas was escaping to the topsoil and forming
scattered pockets in the Dammam formation and surface sediment
(see Fig. 12).
2.4.2. Al-Ahmadi near-surface profile and physical properties
After finding the gas pockets in the Dammam formation and
surface soil, additional studies were conducted to determine why
the pockets formed there and how the natural gas leaked through
them.
Al-Ahmadi’s shallow sub-surface has two parts, the quaternary
sediment and the Dammam formation. The quaternary sediment
(or surface soil) extends from the surface to about nine meters
deep, and the Dammam formation ranges from nine to about
200 m deep (Mukhopadhyay et al., 1996). The surface soil is arid
and brittle (Alsharhan et al., 2001). It receives relatively little
annual rainfall. It is primarily sand (Abdul et al., 2002). The
Dammam formation is composed of sand and rock.
An earlier study of the soil’s uppermost five meters was exam-
ined to determine whether natural gas could leak through the soil.
 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192 189

Fig. 8. Seismic surfaces showing the relative concentrations of natural gas and underground formations.

Al-Ahmadi Ridge
NTF
The dry bulk density of a soil is inversely related to the porosity
of the soil (Buckman et al., 1960). The bulk density increases with
N
depth because deeper subsurface layers have more compaction
STF
caused by the weight of the above layers (Saxton et al., 1986)
(see Fig. 13). Al-Ahmadi’s surface soil has a high bulk density with
Dammam an average of 1.6 gm/cm 3 (Alsarawi et al., 1998).
Natural Gas Permeability is a measure of how well a porous medium trans-
Rus
mits a fluid. The permeability values of Al-Ahmadi’s soil were
found to range from 1.6  106 to 11.7  106 m/s, which are moder-
Radhuma ate values. The permeability values decrease with greater depth in
Al-Ahmadi’s surface soil (see Fig. 13).
The hydraulic conductivity of the soil is a measure of the ease
with which fluid moves through the soil, and it depends on the per-
meability of the soil and the fluid’s viscosity. Alsarawi et al. (1998)
Fig. 9. The Al-Ahmadi ridge zone with north and south tank farms.
found that the uppermost part of Al-Ahmadi’s soil has a high
hydraulic conductivity (3.7 m/s), and that the hydraulic conductiv-
ity decreases with increasing depth (see Fig. 13). That means that
Bulk density is the mass of many particles of a material divided fluid, including gas, moves much more easily through the upper
by their total volume (i.e., the mass of a unit volume of dry soil). part of the soil than through the lower layers.

Fig. 10. A 3D view for the 25 fractures in the formations.

190 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192

Fig. 11. A 2D Seismic view showing fault profile through the Al-Ahmadi formations.

Gas
Pockets

Surface
Soil

Natural
Gas
Dammam
Formation

Fig. 12. 3D Cross-section map showing gas migration to Dammam formation and gas pockets.

Fig. 13. Relationship between Al-Ahmadi’s soil permeability, bulk density, and hydraulic conductivity and depth.
 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192
Pockets
Fracture
Fig. 14. Evidence of pockets and cavities the Dammam formation.
A field visit was made to a quarry near Al-Ahmadi to more clo-
sely examine the Dammam formation. It was found to be porous,
permeable, and fractured. This layer can hold gas pockets, facilitate
the movement of gas, and permit gas to escape to the surface soil
through fractures (see Fig. 14).
It can be concluded that the Dammam formation and the sur-
face soil are good places for gas to collect after it leaks upward
from deeper reservoirs. They are poor gas barriers that permitted
natural gas to form pockets and then escape through them to the
surface air.
2.4.3. Drilling wells
Two additional testing methods were used to better understand
the gas occurrence at shallow subsurface levels.
The first method included drilling four wells to a depth of
approximately 50 m (not reaching the Rus cap-rock) to collect
empirical geological data. Gas, clay, and rock samples were taken
from the four wells, evaluated, and analyzed. It was determined
that hydrocarbon gas exists in the Dammam formation layer. Gas
measurements between the surface and cap-rock layers obtained
from the wells showed different gas readings at different depths.
The second testing method included drilling 90 pairs of obser-
vation wells, of Type A and Type B, throughout Al-Ahmadi. Type
A wells were about 15 cm in diameter, drilled to four meters deep,
and then secured by perforated PVC pipe and gravel; Type B wells
were about 10 cm in diameter with slotted pipe, drilled to ten
meters deep, and secured with gravel pack. The ten-meter wells
were cased in the first four meters, and then the other six meters
were perforated to let the gas enter below the four-meter mark.
Type A wells were compared with Type B wells to see at what level
Type A
2 m Dist.
4m
10 m.
6m
Fig. 15. Typical arrangement of observation wells (Type A and B) at each selected location.
191
the gas entered the wells (see Fig. 15). Gas readings were taken
using gas monitoring instruments (GMI), and soil samples were
collected at approximately one-meter intervals.
The observation wells results helped locating the area of high
gas level. The high gas region extended from north to south
Al-Ahmadi over the Al-Ahmadi ridge zone.
Gas samples were collected and analyzed for composition, and
the data was compared with KOC gas data from the Magwa,
Burgan, and Al-Ahmadi oil fields, which are located below
Al-Ahmadi town. The comparison results showed that the gas type
collected from the shallow observation wells was similar to the gas
type from those oil fields. It was concluded that the source of the
leaking gas was the Magwa, Burgan, and Al-Ahmadi reservoirs.
3. Discussion
Investigating the possible causes of the Al-Ahmadi gas leak inci-
dents was a challenging task because they were recent incidents,
and there were insufficient precedents for analysis methodology.
It was suspected that the potential source of the gas leak could
be one or a combination of the following: the gas pipe network,
the sewer system, the wells and boreholes in and surrounding
Al-Ahmadi, and underground geological formations.
A structured fault tree analysis was used to determine the root
cause of the problem. The first three suspected sources were ruled
out after investigation. Site inspections, laboratory results, and 2D
and 3D seismic data collection helped to investigate the incidents.
Testing tools and technologies allowed different scenarios to be
modeled and reconciled with the available evidence. All laboratory
results showed that the natural gas type of the samples taken from
tested wells was similar to the type found in the reservoirs beneath
the Al-Ahmadi cap-rock, indicating that the samples’ original
source was those reservoirs.
The natural gas gradually migrated (over a long period of time)
from deep hydrocarbon reservoirs upwards through cap-rock frac-
tures. This agrees with the results of Carman’s study (1996), which
showed that the Burgan oil reservoir structure was an anticlinal
dome with 30 fractures.
The Dammam formation and the surface soil are porous and
permeable, which allowed the natural gas to accumulate in cavities
and pockets within them. Some of the natural gas then leaked into
the air around the KOC’s north houses and Al-Ahmadi’s govern-
ment houses. Where the airborne gas encountered any source of
ignition at the explosion locations, the fire triangle (fuel, oxygen,
and heat) would have been completed, resulting in those explo-
sions (De Haan et al., 2011).
20 cm ø PVC Pipe
Gravel & Cement
15 cm Solid Pipe
Type B Well
192 K. Alkhaledi et al. / Safety Science 79 (2015) 184–192
4. Conclusion and recommendations
A fault tree analysis study helped to determine that the leaking
gas in the Al-Ahmadi incidents was natural gas of geological origin.
It is believed that formation fractures, soil and sub-surface proper-
ties, and cathodic protection wells provided paths by which the
natural gas moved from deep hydrocarbon reservoirs over a long
period of time to the surface air.
New oil and gas explorations are being conducted in many dif-
ferent places worldwide. The analysis and the results of this study
can provide a useful reference if any similar incidents occur
elsewhere.
Additional study of the geological structure of Al-Ahmadi is
needed to detect local faults and any possible gas movement from
fractures for the future. Local authorities must be prepared for sim-
ilar incidents, which could be more severe than those observed
previously. It is highly recommended that Al-Ahmadi residents
relocate to a safer location.
References
Abdul, M., Suleiman, M., 2002. Soil Properties and Characteristic in Kuwait for
Agricultural Development. In: Paper Presented at the 17th World Congress of
Soil Science (WCSS), Bangkok, Thailand.
ABSA., 2012. Standard pneumatic test procedure requirements for piping systems
(second ed.). Issued by Pressure Equipment Safety Authority <http://www.
absa.ca/forms/AB-522%20Standard%20Pneumatic%20Test%20 Procedure%
20Requirements.pdf>.
Al-Rashed, A., 2014. Detection of natural gas leakage in Al-Al-Ahmadi area, South of
Kuwait: A preliminary study. Nat. Sci. 12 (3), 87–93.
Alsarawi, M., Massoud, M.S., Wahba, S.A., 1998. Physical properties as indicators of
oil penetration in soils contaminated with Oil Lakes in the Greater Burgan Oil
Fields, Kuwait. Water Air Soil Poll. 102 (1–2), 1–15.
Alsharhan, A.S., Rizk, Z.A., Nairn, A.E., Bakhit, D.W., Alhajari, S.A., 2001.
Hydrogeology of an Arid Region: The Arabian Gulf and Adjoining Areas, first
ed. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherland.
Baeckmann, W.V., Schwenck, W., Prinz, W., 1997. Handbook of Cathodic Corrosion
Protection, third ed. Gulf Professional Publishing.
Barsky, J., Que Hee, S., Clark, C., Trapp, J., 1986. Simultaneous multi-instrumental
monitoring of vapors in sewer headspaces by several direct-reading
instruments. Environ. Res. 39 (2), 307–320.
Buckman, H.O., Brady, N.C., 1960. The Nature and Property of Soils, sixth ed.
MacMillan, New York.
Butler, D., Davies, J., 2011. Urban Drainage, third ed. Taylor & Francis.
Carman, G.J., 1996. Structural Elements of Onshore Kuwait, Geoarabia, vols 1–2.
Cherepanov, G.P., 1979. Mechanics of Brittle Fracture. McGraw Hill, New York.
Darling, T., 2005. Well Logging and Formation Evaluation, first ed. Gulf Professional
Publishing, Oxford, UK.
De Haan, J.D., Icove, D.J., 2011. Kirk’s Fire Investigation, seventh ed. Pearson Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey.
Ericson, C., 1999. Fault tree analysis – A history. In: Proceedings of the 17th
International Systems Safety Conference <http://www.relken.com/sites/
default/files/Seminal%20Documents/ericson-fta-history.pdf>.
Hensher, D.A., Button, K.J., 2003. Handbook of Transport and the Environment
(Volume four). Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherland.
Hoeks, J., 1972. Effect of Leaking Natural Gas on Soil and Vegetation in Urban Areas.
Centre for Agricultural Publishing and Documentation, Wageningen,
Netherland..
Hutter, G.M., 1993. Reference Data Sheet on Sewer Gas (Hydrogen Sulfide, Carbon
Dioxide, Methane, Ammonia, Biological Agents) <http://www.
meridianeng.com/sewergas.html>.
Johnson, S.K., 2014. Natural Gas in some drinking water due to leaky gas wells, not
fracking, but contamination by deep water and fracking fluid remains the
subject of debate. J. Unconvent. Oil Gas Resour., <http://
arstechnicacom/science/2014/09/naural-gas-in-some-drinking-water-wells-
linked-to-fracking/>.
Jones, D.A., 1995. Principles and Prevention of Corrosion, second ed. Prentice Hall.
Kusky, T., 2009. Encyclopedia of Earth Science. Infobase Publishing, USA.
Lacey, P., 2011. An application of fault tree analysis to the identification and
management of risks in Government Funded Human Service Delivery. In:
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public Policy and Social
Sciences.
Mahar, D.J., Wilbur, J.W., 1990. Fault Tree Analysis Guide. Reliability Analysis
Center, Rome, New York.
Mukhopadhyay, A., Alsulaimi, J., Alawadi, E., Alruwaih, F., 1996. An overview of the
tertiary geological and hydrogeology of the Northern Part of the Arabian Gulf
Region With Special Reference to Kuwait. Earth Sci. Rev. 40, 259–295.
Murty, K., 2010. All-in-One Manual of Industrial Piping Practice and Maintenance,
first ed. Industrial Press, New York.
Nasr, G., Conner, N., 2014. Natural Gas Engineering and Safety Challenges.
Downstream Process, Analysis, Utilization and Safety. Springer, New York.
Nelson, E., Guillot, D., 2006. Well Cementing, second ed. Sugar Land, Tx.
Ojha, V.K., Dutta, P., 2012. Intelligent Gas Recognition System: Analysis and Design
Issues. Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, Germany.
Omar, S., Al-Yacoubi, A., Senay, Y., 1981. Geology and groundwater hydrology of the
State of Kuwait. J. Gulf Arab. Peninsula Stud. 1, 5–67.
Peabody, A.W., 2001. Peabody’s Control of Pipe Corrosion, second ed. NACE
International.
Ray, K., 2004. A Historical Atlas of Kuwait, first ed. The Rosen Publishing Group,
New York.
Saxton, K., Rawls, W., Romberger, J., Papendick, R., 1986. Estimating generalized
soil-water characteristics from texture. Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J. 50 (4), 1031–1036.
Watts, N.L., 1987. Theoretical aspects of cap-rock and fault seals for single - and
two-phase hydrocarbon columns. Mar. Petrol. Geol. 4, 274–307.