| | | | | { | i f AR Cuarren 1 ETHICS 0 ARS ay Ge rvemune cate Origin of ethics Ethics as eoamondy Subject matter and point af view lation to other stidies Ethies as selene anal at Ethics and snetaethies stood Possibility of a science of ethics “the emotive theory Vostemotivists A purely philosophical ethics Suggested resolution of the problem ORIGIN OF ETHICS The good life and how to live it most always have been the subject of human speculation,/In all his yaried actions man Sees that not just any way of doing them will lead to success byt’ that there is a right way'and a wroug way. It must have been carly in human history that man saw that this ‘question could be asked of life asa whole: Is there a right and a wrong ay of living, of gathering all these acts into the spending of a life? Is there a pat- tern, a model, an ideal of the good life? J 50, where ean one find it and how strin- gent is the demand that one follow it? We have no récord of any such prim itive speculations, but in the dawn of history we find that man had already askecl these questions and given soine sort of answer to them, In faet, we find rather complex codes of conduct already existing and embedded in the customs of the tribe, This was preseicatific knowledge, subject 0 all the errors and whimsies “of non- scientific thinking, but out of material sug gested by these primitive codes of conduct an awakeried intelligences could science of the good life ‘The trusition from nonseieontific. to ige began, in our Western ith the Greeks. By the sixth ecn- tury before Christ they had reduced prim- itive speculations to some sort of order or system, and integrated them into the 1 body of wisdom called philosophy, isnt period of speculation on Ue structure of the universe, they began in tho days of the Sophists and of Socrates fo toni their iasatiable curiasity on theme selves, on human life and society, Nothing Was too sacred for their penetrating seri: Liny. 8 seafacces and colonizers they had come into clase contact with various sure rouncling peoples avi were struck by the variety of customs, faws, and instititions at prevailed. ‘They began to ask them. ves whether their own wera superior, ishion a id, if 30, why. Tn tif study led (oan txamination of al conduct, aul this part of philosofily they called ethics, 2 form of thos. Both words mean but ethos denotes a more fixed tyyfolof cus. * : tom and is often used to aneaai{ a man’ character. ‘The Latin word for ‘mos; its plural, mores, is the ecu the Greek éthos. From mores the words moral and shoraliye also called moral philosophy. * By derivation of the word, then, ethies is the study of hirwan customs. Some are mere conventions, such as table manners,IIT AND REASON modes of dress, forms of speech, and etiquette, These are fads and fashions, varying in different parts of the world and at different times, and we feel that we can change thean as wo please, They are manners, not morals, But there are other coastoms that scem more fundamental, such as telling the truth, paying our debts, honoring our parents, andl respecting the lives and property of others, We judge that such conduet is not only customary but right, that to deviate from it would be terong, that it results not from arbitrary whim but from some abiding principle in man's own being, These are morals, and it 4s with these alone that ethics deals, Hence Athies ts the study of right and wrong, of good and evil, in human con- dict pace PROBLEM But is any stich study possible? Philos- phy would not bo what it is if it merely took for granted that life has a meaning ‘or purpose and that there is a kind of life iat can be called the good bie. All philos- ophy hegins as skeptical in the sense that it asks questions, but reimains skeptical only if, a estigation, it decides that no answers can be found. There have heen confirmed skeptics in-all ages, who swept ‘away all knowledge including that of mor als, but this skepticism was not directed nore at ethies than at everything else. Our ‘concer here is with some reeent theories that have challenged the position of eth in particular, Ethies deals with valuo jucl rents, and the validity of all value judg- iments has been questioned, ‘They have boun dismissed as mere expressions of per- sonal preference and subjective. attitude, 0 that any scientiially objective study of Uein should be rejected as futile, ince there is no point in trying to uy what might turn out tobe inher- ently incapable of being studied, the very possibility of ethies as serious intellectual gf thekran ety foe on onde soln war & tH That 1 he veaprs oog het 2 discipline should be our first question. Be- fore attempting « solution, we should see first tho connnonly held answer in order to know what is being criticized, then the rccont objections to it with the substitutes olferd, and lastly an intermediate position Hit would weoopt ethies as a science but ‘would merge it with other sciences in such a way that AC would lose its identity: and autonomy. We will consider the following points: (1) What is ethics as commonly wngler= stood? " (2) What of the emotive theory andl allied views? (3) Is purely philosophical ethies pos- sible? (A) Snygested resolution of the prob- Jem. ‘ETHICS AS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD SUBJECT MATTER AND POINT OF VIEW thies as the history of philosophy por- trays it has for its purpose the interpre tion of this fact of Innnan life: the ace Lnowledgmnent of right and wrong in human conduct. We find in the human rage taken gencrally a tendency to judge that there are three kinds of ects: + (1) Those that a man ought to do (2) ‘hose that ho ongig not to do (3) Those that he may either do or not do At thig point in our study wo donot yet determine whether this judgment is simply soto that it isa fact of experience that men do judge this way. So important are these judg- s Gonsidered that men will regulate their whole lives in accordance with them nd will even sacrifice life itself rather than diverge from them. We apply these judg- ments not only to our own conduct but to the conduet of others; we punish people and oven put them to death for doing what we think they ought not to do, or for notsrmes doing what we think they ought to do. ‘The inan who. does. whnicver he tank With no regard for what-he ought, is out. lowed from society and hunted down ike 8 wild beast, ‘ This fact, that men do maki judgments of right and wrong, is the busic fact of ex Perience from which ethics takes its start Philosophy, as an interpretation of humaei life, cannot afford to overlook a fact of such significance, but most investigate it and determine all that it entails, If men are correct in distinguishing right from: wrong, we need to know: why and on what rounds this judgment is justificd, If men ae mistaken in distinguishing right from Wrong, we also want to-kuow why, and for, Without prejadging the case in either way, cthies fa moray sea ae Jorge and legitimate fleld of inquiry. "y distinet branch of learning must havea subject matter tat sateen certain definite aspect or point of view. The subject matter of ethies is human conduct, those actions which a man performs con. seiously and willfully, and for which he is held accountable. ‘The aspect or point of view from which ethics studies human con- duct is that of its rightness or wron; its foughiness/ if we may manufac nour conesponding tot ought, which is the real verb in every ethical judgin iy not interested in what a man does, except to compar with what he ought'to do. We call thase ‘actions right which a man ought to do, nd those actions* wrong whieh a man ought not to do. Ethical writers of almost all shades of opinion agree that the inves Ligation of the ought is the distinctive fea of ethies, the one that separates it from every other study, AELATION TO OTHER stupIrs Besides its relation to the other branches of philosophy, of whieh it forms a pant, 1 Brics's wh Ae Sem 0g fa ‘ “Jao caine toe Shad Ye oral ah thies is also related to Uhe, other human and social sciences. ‘These ‘all have the;* Same broad subject matter, but ethies dif fers from thew by ts distinctive point of Authropoloy and ethis both deal with Ininan customs on various levels of culture! and civilization Anthropology studies the, origin and dovelopment of human customs, without passing _any_judgment_on_their moral rightness or wrongness, but it is this’ Fightness or wiongness alone that interests cthies. Anthropology testifies tothe exist. enco of ‘moral notions, however strange, among primitive tribes; ethies borrows such data from anthropology, but goes on’, (0 criticize the moral value of these con: “cepts and estoms,/ Paychology and ethies both deal wi human behivior, with the abilities and acts! of nan But /psychology studies how saan" Getually docs beliavey fthies how eG oy “W hishavey Sanity and sametity, a wells justed personality and a morally good character, despite an incidental rel ship. between them, axe essentially differ: cnt things; so too are their opposites, made ness and siu, psychic eccentricity and mor al depravity. What motivates a mai toa? deed, good or bad, is different from. the, of the deed he does. ‘thies_is_dependent_on_psychology for nye infatination.on Hin the human mind but always passes on from Toy; iin does set to how he ought to act. Sociology, economics, and political clence study man's social life, and so also does ethics. But the sathe difference off viewpoint remains. ‘These three sciences deal with rnat’s actual social, economic, nd political institutions, what they are and how they function; ethies determines what they ought t be in terms of human j rights andl duties. A hard and fast line be- toreen these thee selences, and between them and cthies, would render all four i. studies impractical. The endeavor to rem edy the social, economie, and political ills xoodness or badf mcnkind involves thics to these three fields, Such a comb) ivn is sometimes called soctal, economic, political philosophy, But ethies, pro ciscly as ethics, always preserves its dis inctive point of view, the out. ‘the study of law is closcly related to uthics. Yet, though both deal with the sugt, the’ cil Taw and the moral Haw Jo not always perfectly correspond, ‘The rudy of/elvil law deals only with external ets and positive legality/ ethics with he will and the tribunal of, cnscience/ There is a difference between erie and sin, legal immunity-and moral ‘worth, outward respectability and true vir= toc of soul. A mingling of ethies and the civil law on a wider field gives us the philosophy of law, the study-of ow laws uglit to be framed and interpreted, study some writers call jurisprudence. application of TTINCS AS SCIENCE AND AIT Ibcen expressed that ethics Tye an Snteresting study but ean never Jc a science. The scientific world is still largely wider the spell of that nivetecnth century anode of thinking originated by Auguste Comte and known as posittetsm, which eliminates all metaphysics from phi- losophy and restricts seientiffe knowled to facts and relations between facts. Ac- cording to this view, the scientifie method is one of exact mathematical measurement, but virtue and vice can never be measured! in this way; science proceeds by prediction hased on hypothesis and followed by ex: perimental verification, but Iuman_con- duet, expecially if regarded as fe unpredictable; seience deals with facts and the Jaws governing them, but ethics only with opinions on what ought to be and- never wholly is; scienee engages in the hardheaded pursuit of wresting from ma- ture her seerets, but ethics is Jost in a nebulous quest for ever-beckoning yet ever- escaping ideals snd aspirations. he dlfeulty is partly semantic an de ponds on one’s definition of seiener. 1 fence is so defined as to apply to the phy ws omly, then ethies will not be a science, Aristoth huad some inkling of this ambiguity when ees cannot yr an exaet e mmst look for no more subject adaits.* But, tough not nn ester seienee, ethies cam be called a science in a broad and philosophe feat use of the term, The word sefence in the sense of any body of systematized knowledge is still in current use, and ethies is surely this. The definition of science as the certain knowledge of things in their causes is traditional among. philosophers ethics preeminently fulfils this definition, 5 the purpose’ or final cause of an Tife, the prineiples. and Ins. gov= ning the use of means to this end, and, ce any scitnce, tries to establish its com clusions with demonstrative thoroughness. Like every other science, including the physical, ethies will have its. dispated points, but these will he shown to revolve 1 core of established truth, Nor iv it right for one group of 8 to rule out of court the legitimate subject ler of another seienee; there is need of ience of the ought, for the ought itself ing explanation quite as insistently as the physical wniverse. Dut is not ethics an art, the art of good if, rather than a science? It is both, we it discovers, explains, and es the rules of sight conduct, ‘Ay an art, in at very broad sense of this term, it applies these rules to the conduct cof an individual wan uid results in the ood life actually lived. A. good life is in- decd a work of art. Bat it is obvious that the art of ethies ust be practiced by each pposson for himself, as the shaper of his destiny and the sculptor of his soul; ethics {experimental "avisalle, Nicomachean th 12, 25,emmy a5 a subject taught and studied ean only Por our prupose it would be too arti- Bi Nit the principles, and so comes ficial to madntain a consistent separation tinder the heading of sce Detween these two phases of ethics, be- Se ‘ther theoretical or pme- tween a first level anda second level of if their pumpose,is the ethieal discourse, hetween ethies talking They autemplation of truth; practical, if about human conduct and ethiet talking sre also directed to action, Since ethical ethics is directed to enable A man to act and live ightly, it is a practical science, standing somewhere between a purely the retical science and its corresponding art ENNICS AND xarrarrmes ‘The distinction between ethies as a science and ethies as an art should he clear enough, for it is one thing to be a student of morals and another thing to live a ‘moral life, Though ethics as a whole is a practical science, it is possible to distin. gush in it its more emphatically practical spect and the theoretical principles on which this practice rests, Accordingly, cur- rent temninology distinguishes between + formative ethics/ or the setting_up of a code of rules for moral living, and jncta. thies/ or Ue ext tion “of the concepts, judgments, and_reasoning_pro- ccesses_used_in_ethies, In common’ with other names of sefences containing the Greck preposition meta (beyond), inc cthies is ethics’ own reflection on itsel, where ethics, passing beyond itself and turning back t0 tako-a evitical look et it- self, judges its own worth as a sefence. It is necessary for ethies thus to become. in- teospective’ and self-conscious, If ethics is the stucly of lnmmah conduet and if the eon struction of a body of ethies is a pivee of human endeavor, the seience of ethies itself should be ethical. This 4¢ could not Joe unless it were truthful, with its. prin- ciples grounded in ascertainable knowl edge anid its conclusions validly and logi cally drawn, Hence metaethics tends to concen itself with Iogie and langunge, since these are the mieans by which ethical knowledge is developed and expressed. tails 4 le daferent aout itself, Wee shall ty to ju concepts, principles, aud conclusions as wo come to them, One reason for introducing, this distinetion here is that some modern cthicians Iiave confined their studies almost wholly to metaethics and others have used metaethies (0 invalidate all. normative ; thics, ‘This threat we must cope with, and thus we come to our sceond main topi recent objections against ethics as com anonly understood. POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE, or ETHICS THE EMO'TIE THEORY David Hume ends his Inquiry Concern- jing Human Understanding ‘with this the- torical outburst: Moras and ein a jects of the unilrstandi ment. wt 0 propely sof taste and se When we rm over libris, persuaded of these principles, whit hayee must we make? fp Af we take in one hand any vokime—of divinity or school metaphysis, for inetance—let us ask Docs contain ny astctrevning ence fing quantity or niomber? No. Does Wt contain | ny esperinental reasoning. concerning matter of fuct ad existence? No, Count it then to the || Mawes, fort can eosin nating but sophistry and ilsion*| 5 Hume's uni Con physics nither than to ethies, Out of the goneval positivistic attitude arose the mod- ‘em seliool of logical positivism, beginning with the Vienna Girele in the early 1920'S * but spreading rapidly to England and the United States, where empiricism and prag- ° seeds of discontent lay fallow © of positivism under Auguste the c, whose chief objection was to metas Aw Try Covering, Human Under stoningcarr Asn) matism had prepared for it a conge ome. The movement is now on the dh dine, being succeeded by the school of analytic philosophy, which continues the same attitude in a more couciliatory form, Tt will suit our purpose better to look the older logical positivism, which repre- sents this position in its ameompromising purity. Beginning, with an understandable rev sion from the. abstract and apparently ningless jargon of many metaphys s, amnong whom Hegel was a chief offender, the logical positivsts analyze the ining of propositions. By their criteria ‘I only two Kinds of meaningful statements: those that are statements: of identity and those that can be verified by experience. Hdentity statements are tautol- cogies, truc but impractical; their domain js that of pure logic and pure mathematics. Only verifiable statements of fact can con- tribute to the advancement of scienti Knowledge. Metaphysical assertions (enol belong to either class and must be dis- carded as neither true nor fale, but mea ingless. What about value judg also are neither tautologies nor st of fact, Int are normative, laying down rules, expressing, the ought, ‘hus they are not cognitive but emotive, ‘They are wishes, and imperative ew with cain tet the validity of the jog they occurs. « The reason why they ate amalyzable i that they are mete "The presence of an ethical symbol ian proposition adkls nothing to its Factual content, Thus #1 say to sonneonie, “You acted wrongly in stealing that fT Trad simply said, “You stole that Th adding that this action is weomg Tam not king any further state i Tam simply” evineing ny moral disapproval of it, We Is as fT had I, “You stole that mone, A808 At boron, wr tition it with the Wi exclamation sas Hoevians_ statement 1 produce Tilt of some We mow TS aval say, “Stal a sentence. which ney 8 SCT as tn fact me pion which ei Be fy expeses wo pe tuo ae y case iy which 0 wld com thicad jog, th heal woal is pte ugs abot Tw eve to said to he ig Tvetion of the etevant tise express fe “ent ft ke sy sero ant the an ee gath_ tion A aie ng. They eal 1 exp Feeling, and 90 10 Tate a {0 aoe ‘The last past of this view, that ethical ised t6 influence action im . L. Stevenson,t al disagreements judgments are nies is developed by who lays stress on thi wad makes extensive use of the persuasive definition. He objects to calling ethical ingless or neither true Mor Dat thinks that their only truth is in the dlseriptive part, that the speaker has vc, not in th such or such any atti tive, part, that this attitude is branded good ‘or bad, right or wrong, the latter part aos the concern of ethics, which Pthorefore but a way of persuading others to age wth me oF at Teast Uo tolerate my Zhe emotive theory has some persuasive argument 1. Philosophers, though by mo means the only offenders, have engaged in mich tract andl apparently meaningless jar- PP gon. ‘They ean he dazzled with words, wh ch olten appear to represent some ig, but which actually refer to nothing Dut other word clusters equally detached from reality, Hthical as well as other state nents can suifer from this disease. 2, The analysis of every statement, both in itself andl in dts connection with other ateaents, isa needed correetive for man's tendeney to disguise emptiness of thought Aye Langage, Truth and Logie, wp TOT. Slovenson, Helles andl Language. |with beguiling verbal masks, Clear Beage, significant reference, and rigorous logic are important in all fds of Knowl. edge. al writing has been notoriously lacking in them, ‘ Tre and false as predicates signify but only: repeat ‘the same thing ‘ ly? As logic would put it: P ¥s true = P. The words! good and bad, right and wrong are predicated" inthe sane way, though with different emotional overtones! These adjectives refer to no definable or ostensiblé charneteristies things, but only desctibe our attitude lo them, 4. The yy ical form of thi words and statements deceives us thinking that they must represent things or properties of things, since we use th same fom of sentenee to express facts and lues. It is the business of logic to cut through the illusions of common speceh. Not all grammatical sentences are logical Propositions; ethical statements are but Veiled imperatives. ‘e rebel against calling value judgments nonsignificant, we should ac- wedge more than one variety of signif- eanee. Value judgments are emotionally sig- nificant, prescriptive of action in ourselves and others, not cognitively signifieant, as enlarging our knowledge of things as they are. Only the latter kind of significance is appropriate to a science, 6. The basic concepts of ethics turn out to be unanalyzable and indefinables At least, cthicians donot agree on defini tions or even on the possibility of defini tion. If this is so, there is no way of fixing the meaning wf such a concept so that it will be the same through all stages of an argument. A conclusion drawn from state- ments containing thein cannot but be sus- pect. This may be satisfactory for persua- sion, but cannot pretend to scientific cogency. ‘These may not be all the arguments the emotivists can supply, but they are typical intel afer Calc estes evertere higher fone ; Sugzectin erp w wlared with emphasis 7 of their approach, The following aré of- fered as counterargament 1. That philosophers and others have * eogaged in too much verbal juggling is. rightly deplored, but. docs not rule out ny valid statements they have made. Emotivists too can be deceived by words. ‘The decisive argument against them is that the emotive theory itself is neither a statement of identity nor verifiable by ox- perience, and therefore falls by its own + 2 Though every statement should be ; subjected to rigorous analysis, itis illogical »: to apply the criteria for one area of study (o another where they do mot fit. Empirical statements are not tejected because they are not imathematical, nor are mathemat- statements because they are not em- Why then should ethical statements neither of pi he rejected because they these, but have their distinctive subject anatter and criteria? If there is no place for them in any classification of meaning. ful statements, that only shows the classi. ioxrfo be incomplet The statement “X is good” cannot be analyzed into “I approve of X” without a distorting shift from the objective to the subjective mode of speech, a difference of meaning and not merely of grammar, “X is yood” means “X is worthy of approval” and gives reasons for “I approve of X” A statement about X is not a statement about me, but about something else dis- {inet from me, even though I can have an Mtitude toward it. Reasons for approval or disapproval hi ive® content and can be tine oF 4. ‘The attempt to reduce ethical judg- ments to wishes, exhortations, or com- mands is unsuccessful, Part of the mean- and precisely the ethical part, is lost. For example, I can command you to do something and want the command obeyed, knowing all the time that I ought not to issue such « command and you ought not to obey it, This implied knowledge is the Apion ek or proais &f broning ss 7 i it bethical Judgment here, and it is. opposed A, Is the ethical judgment but a hidden wish tobe disobeyed? tut this is exactly what T do not wish, though 1 Judge amy conduct and yours to be inn moral, 5. To reduce cthieal judgments to mere ‘emotional expressions of approval, like clapping or hissing, is equally unsuecesstul. ‘There is a difference between actual ap- proval and right approval, The first is a statement of psychological fact: I do ap- prove. Now I can go on to approve or d approve of my approval, to judge that my approval was right or wrong. This is the ethical judgment, and it is no less capable of being te or false than the factual judgment. 6. All basic concepts are unanalyzable and indefinable. A verbal substitute, sch as is found in the dictionary, docs not tell what the thing really is, ‘To demand that everything be defined is to make all Knowledge impossible, including the kins of knowledge the logical posttivists reat care containing indefinables, c are not necessarily invalidated. by’ having indefinables in them, Tw this, ethies is 0 worse off than other disefpline POSTEMOTIVISYS. Recognition that logical positi yone too far led to it was good about it is preserved in the sue: ceeding school of analytic philosophy. ethics, while carrying on the stringent analysis of cthical Tanguage, it makes some attempts at introducing cognitive validity We can but touch on a few of the more popular writers, R. M. Hare® distinguishes descriptive and prescriptive words and en- deayors to build up within our existing Jogic a logic of imperatives, in which some “Tare, The Language of Morals, Freedom and Reason, ningg accompanies the eval cea new logic: based on G9 oF rerundtives words that indicate a pro atte Eee the bition of ogee for foygleal eontoadiction, and 9a ends thent aheary of truth by: which propos tion ix trae not because it squares: with the facts but because 1 side with it, for each man most answer for himself what moral principles he will have. Stephen ‘Toulminf and Kert Baier} are examples of the “good reasons” school of ethics, fnocording to which there must be rea~ Sons for thinking an action worthy of and these reasons furnish, the cojmitive clement in ethies; we ean show the consistency of these reasons, determine their relative weight, and sce how our con- duct squares with the principles we have adopted on our own or have taken from societ We ean Hews a great cent fom these cllorts, but they still Teave us outside the in of ethics, ‘Their only interest speak and cognitive 1m proper do is to determine how we way reason logically about ethies iC we have ready accepted some basie ethical com mnitments. They do not tell us what the ethical life is nor do they even establish that there és au ethical life, We shall have to dink wisdom from deeper waters, A PURELY PHILOSOPHICAL, ETHICS While Joy vany Tine istic analysts consider a sefence of ethies well-nigh impossible, others consider it un- niccessaty. AIL the religions of the world aire concerned with morals and take on the task of showing men how to be good. ‘Theology, the intellectual study of religion, positivists and "Nowell son in Ethics, [Baivr, 1 oval Point of View,oral phases of xc fore make any study of morals redimdant, J The Chr i an religion, which is too ¢o spieuous a fact of our sociely to looked, is especially rich eda al teach- in “and its theology has developed an ® code of morality. Catholies se the term moral theology for that brane of theology, whose business it is to examine the whole field of morals from the stand- point of the Catholic ith, Protestants tend » to focus on Christian ethics, which is not ethics as a purely philosophical study but t of morals from « post-Refor mation view of the Christian revelation, the Christian need a double study Hs, one from a purely philosophical standpoint and another from that of the Christian revelation? One could answer that the two viewpoints are supplementary: cthies Js the study of morals from pure reason, and moral theology or Christian ethics is the same thing as known from 10- vealed sources. This is a basic and valid distinction, but it does not wholly solve the problem, “ According to the theory of total de- pravity, still aceopted in “a toned-down fonn by some Protestant groups, man has been so entirely corrupted by original sin that man’s reason is quite incapable of acting as a guide to the good life and man's corrupted nature eannot serve as a nom of mor is of a natural Ji who do not wish to go so far are proloundly distrustful of human nature. Such a view does seem to ke any purely philosophical ethies fut and those who hold it are constrained to develop a Christian ethies based on God's saving revelation and redemption. ‘The Catholic view of original sin’s ef- fect on human nature is less drastic, and so admits « distinction between philosoph- ical cthies and moral theology. But an- other difficulty arises. In theoretical studies on and should purely philosophical such as metaphysics, epistemology, philo- Japhil andtorceg fd at i thea ogy, we can adequately distinguish be- tern wasn "afi, tween the natural and he supernatural, because ol ther abatent chommoler of such std, i But cthies is a practical sefenee dealing with man as he concretely és and actually +i lives, and according to Catholic belief man cl fives. inthe supernatural order as allen and redecmed. A purely natural s would be valid only for a hypothet- ical man who never existed. . ‘This view is open to several interpre- tations depending on what relation one | holds to obtain between nature and grace. Jucques Maritain® holds that philosophical ‘thics is necessarily subordinated to moral theology for its completion and correction, . + nd that therefore philosophical ethies can- «1 not be an autonomous science. Its subordi- nation is not only one of infraposition, as 7 a science of lesser dignity, but also one of -{ subaltemation, as unavoidably Ieading to ili falschood unless guided and corrected by ist! the higher science of moral theology. “uk, Not all will agree with this view. There a are those who insist that philosophical tics can achieve its own purpose by its | own methods independently of divine reve. + lation, snd that the prineiples it uses and the conclusions it draws aro true for man,” he coneretely exists and actually lives his life in the world today, even though it does not give man the whole truth and is open to supplementation by knowledge of a higher order. Between these two there need be no conflict, since the supernatural does not destroy the natural but rather continues and extends it, Besides, a prac- tical science must Iook at the existential situation. There are millions who have not had the benefit of the Christian revelation, do not know that they actually live in the supernatural order of redemption, do not Exay on Cloiston Philowophy, pp. 38 43, 61-100; Science and Wivdom, pp. 107-127.recive the working of divine grace with them, and must trust entirely to their i vabial powers to construct for whe ‘a ethlesl way of ving. Te monstrous to say that they have the ligation to live morally, as all men have nt Gimnot find out what the moral life or how to liv So there is no need to assume a neces: lity Ietween a Christian thealogy and an ethics autonomous 8 a philosophical study. Ethics, purely natural and rational study, es not deny things outside its sphere t_mercly abstracts from them. Ethies ter the field of theology or use 1, That leaves ethical knowledye but all other s ves are in- asmuch as none of them em- races all truth, To be incomplete is not he false. As far as mates corrections ethies may receive mn moral theology are accidental rather han essential, as due to man’s hasty and fallible use of his reason rather than to an herent defect in human reason itself SUGGESTED RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM Ethics has weathered many storms in its 2500 year history. It is reasonable to cpeet that it will survive the two attempts to discredit it that are described here: the duction of it to logic and language analy- is, and the absorption of it into religion ind theology. ‘To avoid the first pitfall, ethics needs firm grounding in metaphysics and epi smology. A formal study of these two sub- cts is not necessary for the reading of t hook, but at least the student snust bri to hiis study something mote than the posi- tivistic attitude that only the experiin tally verifiable can be admitted as. real. Whether the ought can be derived from the is is a question we take up later, but, whether it can oF not, the ought must he acknowledged as an c 10 AND FASO world and something that ean be grasped hy man's mind, If new studies are needed to show how ethical statements ean be fitted into the logic we now have or if 1 awww logic oped to cope with thom, by all means let us forward thi tsk, that we sont not eminem iinportant part of Inunan experience be- Ge Lae yet Team to. think about it coneetly, but rather learn to think in new and better ways about the expe- rience ave certainly do have. Logteal posi- tivism is primarily an epistemology which drastically reduecs the scope of man's knowledge by eliminating all metaphysics, and. with metaphysies the only possible hasis for ethics. But, since logical positiv- ism cannot estab there is no rea- sun why ethics should’ have to be ap- proached from this narrow standpoint, of the long history of the relations between faith and reason, The difficulty is not so much from the side of reason, which be- ‘gan to speculate long hefore the advent of the Christian faith into history, but rather of the Christian faith’s interpreta- tion of itself and its view of the nature of man, If it em recognize that faith and grace are gifts that enhance rather than suppress the natural goodness of God's creature man, there should be no insoluble conflict etween the two, Then philosoph- ical ethics will be a valuable study of what 1 reason ean show to be the good Nife Ethics, from its sido, is not en tiled to the arrogance it has sometimes shown and should acknowledge its open- ness to knowledge derivable from a higher source, Wt does not thercby become a de- pendent science, but adequately preserves its own sphore, out side of which it should have no. preten- sions, SUMMARY z iyinated in speculation. on the good life, and was systematized into a partof philosophy by the ets fom thee wa deals only with customs of right and wrong, with As traditionally’ conc of ethics is to study that snew distinguish right from wrong and have a fcling for the ought: he subject matier of ethics. is Iuuman conduct its Point of ‘cicw is that of rightness and Wrongness, of oughitnass,/ ‘es fs related to all the human and social scienecs, but is always distinguished from them by its unique point of view, the ought, If ethics is called a science, it fs not in the sense of the experimental seiences, but in the sense of the philosophical sciences. techs, who called it for custom, But it involving the idea worals wd, the purpose 4 fact of experience, MAthigs is a practical and normative science, Tis also an art to he pat n practice in » Only the science ea own life ght Toslay we distingui a code pf tules for mo cthies,"a exit ‘Mnormative ethi al living frou /me mn of tho Janguage ancl concepts used in ethical discourse,/An ade~ quite study needs both, but they need not ays be kept separate. ‘The emotive theory, stemming frou loge tive. They are neither identity nor fable hy exp ‘They are only Aiyguised wishes, exhortations, oF com mands, We are misled by grammatical structure into thinking that ‘they are prop- ositions that can be true or false, Non- cemotivists reject this view as based on too narrow an epistemology and an inadequate teory of meaning. Later linguistic analysts are nore conciliatory, but limit Hemselves almost wholly to examining ethical -lan-~ gu ne think that the sly of morale Delongs to religion that no purely philo- sophie eis i possible, Test be either CInistian ethies or moral theology. Man, redeemed from original sin, now lives” in ae andl no purely ail life is possible for him. A philo- ethics would deal with a hypo thetical man who never existed, Others do not deny this but abstract from it, and insist that a study can be made of man's morals in the natural order, Ethics is in- complete, as all studies are, but that doosi not prevet it from being an autonomous selene “ft QUESTIONS voR DISCUSSION u a i 1 Do we merely assume that the ought isa legitimate abject of study? : Js there any sense in which we can say that the ought really exists? i ‘What sort of being docs the ought have, it has any? ” 2 Are normative seienees really sciences? Do they offer knowledge or { only preseribe action? Ate rules for acting a kind of knowledge or only an expression of wish or will? # 3 Could an eth be built up without any presuppositions? In that 1 case whore would you start snd where would you go from there? 4 Js it tue that man has made wonderful scientific advances but hardly any ethical advances? 1as the study of because it Ins not actually made mon live hotter? Shonld it not snake mien livg better i€ it isa practical science? ethics been futile: tery AND REASON 5 Is ethics superseded by religion? How cane a Christians awho be Fieves that inan actually lives in the supernatural order of faith, study man as if he lived morely in the natural order of philosophy? ‘roulmin, Rramination of inf Atewvon in Rts, ry. Margetan, Rules and Seewe’s arBnct that hies can be quite se sontifle, : Mats say en Ghritan Milos y, GLO, aad his Setonce and MEADINGS totle’s preface to his Nicomachean Bi to his Nicomachean Ethics, et, ch. 1-3, & he bot ase Thome sr amany translations and editions. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics aro continuous, f . . foriing, on yp. 38-43 Targe treatise on human living. ae We am pp. TOT=I3T, coutaln, Ws discussion Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics wets relations between ethics ane seared ‘and Politics, follows Atistalle sectlon by see Theetgy. Matin D'Arcy expresses 8 Tere tion; cach subsequent reference to Aristotle's view in Ruth Nanda Ans (ed.), Monat Prins Ethics or Politics can be understood to inclule ciples of Action, ch. 24. Au penton from a reference to St, Thomas’ Commentary. Protestant viewpoint can be Tound te oul the emotive theory two books are indispensab Letwnann "A. J. Ayer, Languaze, Truth and Logie; and D. Jo Bs Hlaveking, Man ane GC. 1. Stevenson, Ethics and Language. Cv wl cisms of the emotive theory gre found Aust C. Ewing, Edhics, ch. 7; J.D. Mabbott, Intro- vey, a hook of readings clesignedl to, accor pany duction to Ethics, ch, 8-0; and W. IL. Werk- ees gent, contains Aristotle's Nicomacthean ncister, Theories of Ethics, Soe also Stuatt Kéhies, bk, 1, ch. 1-3; and Ayer’s Language, lampshire, Thought and Action; R. M. Hare, Truth and Logic, most of ch. @ The Language of Morals; VM, NowellSwith, thics in a Christian Context. Morals, has on Vagothoy, Hig!Crarren 2 CONDUCT Feo will and deter PROBLEM fe are no good or bad babies, but here are good and bad men, How docs he ehiinge come about? Obviously hy th lives, the conduet, the actions, of the p cor Tess as we wa letermine what moral goodness or badness are ethi and how it gets into the acts one per- ynns and from them into the man him are 01 jell. What soxt of acts can a man do? mn? IF only some, what are these acts ul what differentiates them from the rest? fe can portion out our inquiry as follows: (1) What is human eondue (2) How is human conduct under ou moanent rather than ware control? 7 we do. / (3) Can man control only his will or vont our a have ethical import? (5) How is responsibility entailed in the human act? fn WB + atau 2 Canpatatn rol, between tho: ability to control auselv of ourselves, to-do what we want to-do we it forced on us, so that It we ane held responsible for what wo main things that would pre ent ovr acts from_being_yoluntuy, also his outward acts? being willed by us, ave ynorancijnnd Com: (4) What qualities of the human act mulsin and therefore -a-volumtary act is wu Tit0 he knowingly or deliberately willed, We do not say yet whether it must also be * and for the prescat may overlook the TTS ays Had oa ap wns Adin acts Psychological background HUMAN ACTS Gonna ete ive Vote Man's actions taken collectively make up his behavior or conduct. Behavidr_is 1.4 psychological word and s/ whereas (eondugt_has_an hn body we ca control and those we cannot we can move more it and those whieh, spite of us, between the striped or volun- arto (ation, Man has no moral chars tary mnsles and the smooth or involu tr to begin with, but builds up one for tary muscles, ‘The words voluntary and 4 imself y the way he lives. Befoe we can pohuaary are interesting hen because they al rather than and refer to the fact that ce iological na iat subject to our will. In ethics we should look at man’s conduct, in we are not concerned with the muscles hich moral goodness or baduess ean we use but with the actions we choose to dlo with or without them, and especially ull sorts: of acts capable of becoming —— with the governing factor in us, whatever rally good or bad, or only some of it may be, that we eall the will. For the can speale of the will a our . to be masters seed Givrbnteg A sorbate is applied yumane move words actions ‘from reis classic BF actions deme by man those alone are prope Med Inman which are proper te ee, ew tan fers fru ital al Bis that he ie master of hi action, When ge thove ations slone are propery ella nee str. Now min isnt ugh is season adil, whee Be ive will Is dete ag. the teal of and reason, Therefore thine auton we ly called Inman which proce. fans Bete will, And if any other ation we ‘rom the foregoing we see that ¢ Mablishes its subject matter hy di hing two main kinds of acts: 5, whleli*he “eon ly controls and deliberately wills, and hich -he. Is, held:.responsible. These mstitute Inman conduct and form the ot matter of ethics, 2. Ivoluntaryacts or actsof a: man: e which a man happens to perform, Of which he is not master, whitli he nit” consctously “control or deliber- ewill, and for which, he is. not held onsible: Such are acts done in infaney, Aclirinun, insanity, or Mts of distrue- ; These do not constitute human con- ote carcfully that the distinction here between acts of, the rational order those of the soitient or vegetative It is true tat rational acts, such as pking and willing, are proper to man in ‘sense that he alone can do them, reas sentient and vegetative acts, such eating, sleeping, walking, and growing, tions that man has in common with Ieings, This is how psychology classl- then to understand Inman nature; but es trits to explain human conduct, and hole question is whether man is mas- Thomas, Summa Theologica, V1, q. 1, 0 1. i . ucHT AND mASON ter of h tional, sentien Man who ¢ rin along, by association with or vegel is tho only ere iets oF wot, be they of the ive order we in this world » think, Dut if his: thought it his con scious direetion and control, such thoughts re only acts of « man, not human acts, ‘even though they On the other hand, eating byetheir nature: merely. ani wre of the rational order. ud sleeping are acts that sna does in common with brutes, but they heeome human acts if the man does them know ngly nd will ily: To-put food in Uwe inouth while in a. distracted state, of 1 ig an act of « man, hut to determine Alclberately to ext this foot is fauna e To: be-overeome by drowsiness and fall asleep.is-er-uct of «man, but (0.0 to bed intontionally-for. the. purposo of: sleeping. is 8 Tiuman.act. Henee, though it is impos- sible to have a humen-act-wnless is guided hy intellect and will, the act itself ded cin be of any sont. In other an act can be either physical oor mental jn nature provided it is deliber- ately wil led, PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND What aict of ch oes on nwice? ‘Th me when T merous studies made mike an hy pxychologists on this subject, valuable as Uy may be in themselves, awe of litle help to the ethi not fix th thus pas he «9 ss from ncrally n, since they do ict point at which an act of man may tum into a human act and 1g ethically indifferent to boing ethically significant. An exception anust he lengtly © made. of ’St exposition? is ins Thomas,* whose cl by Aristotle but is carried much beyond him, We ean ive but the briefest digest of it A }iumnan net is the result of an play of Th HAristole, Nlcomacheun Ethics, bk, 1, el Ds, Vi ¢ mania Theilogion, 2,5, Ul, TM, OT,Pier this is not to be done in more modem language, ex and now," OF lern Tangwage, of his eng- ene ann nowy is ive snl We covet esi ee and.” mae Int Te Bt nts. His ability to know be- ont for his decision. He now nd the sensuous is in is horoughly what t0 de and the ee the sens elect; his ability thoroughly what 19.07 ON erdict, the thus knows and to seek why. The stage : i I. [Strictly speaking, intellect and Supreine act of expression of is being Ida ‘not do. ay. achat all they 9 sllieeted person: He cunopts 20 oy} Dut abilitics by which the whole the other of these alternative, practical 7 aie ae vigments of the intellect By a dee p Such egments of the Hn itmont, The Prae- ot ldependent. agents act of cm ersons within the Inge In tical judgment immediatel i yn and doing things inside Aloiion ard _espeessing_the-_altemative , nor are they ‘hoson ie the last_practical judgment. 710. yielding to one alernative rather than he gird to take the following description too other, after delibe isthe deliberate snechanically, It is an interplay of fun fet of the will. It has two moments: taken Fe on te hace ad toe ac tin * lly, a8 a peling to tho atraceen ane kind of doing, thou Aitthe objet and an acquiescence Jn the fone same person, who is the only dar in judgment of the intellect, 1 is called con he whole process, If we speak of the in- _ sent/taken comparatively, a6 & preference Hlcct oF will ns doing anything, we arc of anealterative over the other, 318 called speaking in a loose way to mican that the choice. Then by the act of command, a an,the person, doc them with his inte+ guiding act. of the intellect, fe directs hs ct or will Will in the use of the means to carry his Pr a man to act he must first be at- decision into exeen ‘nally, there come tracted hy soine good, When he perceives the perception thatthe end i attained and good, there arises 3 enjoy IF he sees that it is not only in all there are six acts of ‘the will. {good in itself but also good for him, his ‘Three are about the end: wish, intention, Fiking Ihocomes a Alesice-or «KY A wish. , 2 and enjoyment. ‘Three are about the may remain ineffectual, but if he further °(fmenns: choice, consent, and use, Exch act understands the good as possible of attain-,° of the will is preceded by an act of the ment, this intellectual insight moves his intellect, the most’ important of which is wilt an act of spontancous,intention or deliberation.* : tendeney toward the good, a stretching, forth to gain the object without yet count: weiner wus ing the cost in cllort and loss of oth (eigen ‘of the good Wish preceding is oor, He now turns his intellect to the Bal [Juentofatnabity Intention task of weighing the reasons for and Re Goce against the carrying out of this intention deur esa peta Gholco and the various sets of means by which it ri : tellect is called counsel or [deliberation whose outcome is to arrive at one of wo [practical judgmentst “This is to be done Cem Wl Chese> patna = } Tike the “ghost inthe machine” of Ghent Tile, *St, Thomas, Summa Theologica, Uh gy. 8 and 4 The Concept of Mind, ci. 1. 13, pronmble, In the accompanying scheme the word ,,. jutention is taken int a technical sense. The be ost 4p obtun tn Be opntentio } that precedes. del tHean aly the sponta the wall toward” e Liber bracing a perecived Hood. at iy entirely outsi ie Pe Whether wo shall have aoeh “ens eeognition of this attretion fn start the process of deliberation, « kind Alcbate with ourselves whatlor te vel it OF to resist after de , to yield to it If yielded to by consent tion, the intention persists n of the act, Then we say fact was done with deliberate fn wie! the act is a hnuman vet, ‘The ini- jou and cou et, ut only a spon- tancous tendency. Deliberation-itselfis nota human act unless.we reflect on it and initiate a sce- ‘ondary deliberation, We spontancinsly be: gin to weigh motives for and against our contemplated course of action without ree- ognizing that we are doing so. But if our attention is turned to the fact that we ave deliberating, the question arises whether we should continue onr deliberation ot break it off. If we decide to continue, our act of deliberating becomes a Inunan act, ut the original point at issue is not yet human act, because we have not yet co xented to it but have consented only to de- liberate about it. Such reflections on our an become quite complex. Deliberation consists of a series of prac: ical judgments for and against the con ast pi is not distinct from the simply that one among, all these judgments that the will consents to and accepts. Likewise consent and choice fare not two distinct acis, but the conser to one alternative is the choice of it over its opposite, and vice versa, Only in a ease where no two alternatives are offered could there be consent without choice. It is ob- vious that there cannot be choice without consent. There is no need to consider cach of the aforementioned stages as a stinet act; they blend together in the snost eonlusing 16 + amnich more complicates wuwveniently, We guish the ine facts of the fashion and han -ean be described inst, however, always lcliberate from, the deliberate will, that is, the at which preceded from he act which follows deliberation, The tnost important part of the process fs ¢0M- sent, for it is this which makes the act duis in the sense that it is chargeable to ts, Up to that point it was not a human ist was it is, ge ttn the Fores roinyg exposition so much stress is put ow nature, and so little on the third aspect, the alfective, the realm of the feelings and emotions. But there was reason for this. ‘the feelings ost important part of Jaman life and enter strongly into any net ‘of decision, so much so that there are peo- ple whose lives ate Ted almost wholly on the emotional pine, ‘The question is:,how tinuch ave they masters of their nets? A Fummun act -em be accompanied by very strong, emotions, but for it to be a human act the emotions must be under the per- son's controlInsofar as they are not, the act is to that estent not a human act and the agent is a vietim of internal forces he dloes not govern, Emotions are much con- cere in Ue deliberative process, strength ning, the reasons for or against, and they algo exert great presstire on the will to consent or refuse consent, ‘Thus they net within the process snd alfeet the other two stages without forming a distinct category ‘on the same level, We are dealing here, not with the way a person is tossed about Dy internal storms, but with the making of avrational devision by a selfcontrolled per- son in a period of ealm, We all have somo such moments, and only then are we fit to entrust ourselves with the working out of « major decisio COMMANDED ACTS ‘We think of the will as the controlling factor in us, but we never accomplish any-ee rm tiem ling it. By the will we ing rth Bt the wil cannot to the eg comms the tgs to ery ink, ga, BY thew we dist it © will cannot do the thinkin ion nat the intlet totum ts ate ffl. coe hough rather than that The Hides 0” command itself as when it dee 1 te8eh a decisioi now oF to pal it Bh oa an can command, then, i al Dodily gets and inter etal acts. 1 cide to study, an the de the act of the will tse. 1 take book, turn to the lesson, hen my © Pages these are external bodily Be commande! by the wil] laos np Feet the matter, understand what T einer tf x it in my: memory these nse! Mental acts commande hy the } Thus study is a mined act invaving et of the eyes in reagan of the eae eon ah under nm Which of these is the fuman act? Tt might sccm that only the intemal act of H Hslf is the Buaman act. In tho senso tis is tue, for i iyi the at choice and consent res, ad it hese that give an act its'specitialy I n charset Hence if a man decid wo something with eleur consent of his wil, but is prevented by circumstances from Extrying out his decision, tv is responsible this consent, Thus a man enn be uilty uur in intent although he never gets chance to eatry tout, But commanded acts share in the eon. ent of the will that commands thet, Man i held sesponsible for all that he controls through his will, both for the internal acts of the will itself and for the acts of other s that the will commands. Hoth are human acts, but the former are so in a stricter sense, VOLUNTARINESS After this brief survey of the psycholog- el background of the liuman uct, wo cu s intense Jook at that must take a more intense ie property which characterizes it standpoint, the property of lun Lariness. ae should be evident that there ean m0 Pai thout knowledge. me cannot seek what we do not know. 1 di an be no decision of the will unless en- lightewed by the intellect, whose basins it isto perceive the good, to propose it tho willas something desirable, and (0 pass judgment on the suitability of the means to be used init attainment. The, work O° — especially apparent in te i pata wee the motes for and against cannot be weighed wnlss thoy axe known, There must also be vertence to what one is about, a focussing, df attention on the acts being done so that finan ix conscious or aware of his acts. ‘Advertence is impossible without a certain: amount of rellction, by which the mind; tums back and Jooks at itsolf acting. The Knows that he knows and i! proce ppetson both Iows that he wills : ‘Advertence snd telleotion occur in vary thereby alfecting the Inman ing degree dharseter of the act, An act is a iuman nic only insofar as it is known, Any part} ' oor ciremmstance of the aet that he dock dloes not advert 40 is not attributable to him, ‘This works hoth ways: a man who, willfully ills another without knowing that |! the vietin is his father commits murder» Jot not parscid man who steals sno not knowing that it is counterfeit is mor- ally guilty of theft, though he gets no prof-» it out of it. , To-have a: human’ act; it is not sulf- cient that it-be guided by knowledge; it- must. also be willed, Tt-is-this: union. of + knowledge aud. will which’makes'an act voluntary. After much groping about, Aristotle suggests the following definie ; tion: © that which + done under compution { reason of igeoranco iv invohntary, the volenary world seem to be that of wih the inoving principle is inthe agent imsell, he siines to acts don als. St. ‘Thomas. poi ls! actions can be eall an analogous and © our inodern ws, ; ¢ of the term anim ifence), and that the voluntary seat Mee iat merely the ciscumstances » but the end to which it leads. nition in these terms: nature of a voli he within the ager ne knowledge of the end, ns out that led voluntary onk ry onl Participated. sense ary act that ite together with roughout his whole discussi nt that the ier prince selec to Will. Hence his definition may be jended thus: voluntary, act-is one lich proceeds. from «the. will with -a edge of the end, : foluntariness is one of our simplest wnd st familiar notions, We should not take 0 impression that there Is anything dite or mysterious about it, A voluntary imply a willed act, one in which agent knows what he is abont to do wills to do it. The difficulty is: that me of the words we con ate Uhis kind of act cou xt. To act willingly onc does not have to et gladly and cagerly; to act willfully it not necessary to be wayward or ob- quire that one act vigorously or ostenta- jously; to act deliberately there fs no need bk. A, ch. 1, Thomas, Summa Theologica, LM, 4. 6, « this main discussion of this mater fin 18. ensue nd painstakingly: to act feessary v0 volunteer it is not ne br frecly offer oneself for some work, The Tings words often have these shades of imply. in the orvingly wills what A voluntary act, as the product of = Nowa will guided by his own reason, the actual exercise of his mastership Over his conduct. Though the act is = and finished, it is still referable to its master a his acts Tho basic explanation of why it was done rather than not conc is that he toilled it, and thus it remains forever 1 fated to him, This relation we express by the words responsiblity ancl émptability- They express the same relation between the agent and his act, but they look at the relation from different sides: we say that the agent is responsible, answerable, fneeountable for his act and that the act ie imputable, chargeable, attributable to the agent, To determine the degree of for un act is. the same: ing how far the act qvas voluntary on his part. Tesides the relation between the agknt and his act, there may be a further tela tion of both to reward or prunishment, An 8 transitory thing, Tasting, only. so Tving done, but rewards awl punishments are not always given immedi- nicly onthe doing of a decd. A murderer kills his vietim and is appre- ended years Tater; we feck justified in punishing him nov, though his evil act Jasted only a moment, A soldier receives ‘a medal for bravery long. after the battle is over; we fecl that, thongh his deed is only a memory, something of it remains in him and calls for a reward. Some kind of moral entity must be produced in the doer by his deed to connect him with the reward or punishment to come. Thi city or essential consequence of « Iuuman tact is called merit, ‘To merit something is to carn it, to deserve it, to be entitled prop: 4