Wyn Q. Bowen, Hassan Elbahtimy, Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran (Auth.) - Trust in Nuclear Disarmament Verification-Palgrave Macmillan (2018)

TRUST IN NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT
VERIFICATION
Wyn Q. Bowen, Hassan Elbahtimy,
Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran
Trust in Nuclear Disarmament Verification
Wyn Q. Bowen • Hassan Elbahtimy
Christopher Hobbs • Matthew Moran
Trust in Nuclear
Disarmament
Verification
Wyn Q. Bowen Hassan Elbahtimy
Head, School of Security Studies Centre for Science and Security
King’s College London Studies, Department of War Studies,
London, UK School of Security Studies
King’s College London
Christopher Hobbs London, UK
Centre for Science and Security
Studies, Department of War Studies, Matthew Moran
School of Security Studies Centre for Science and Security
King’s College London Studies, Department of War Studies,
London, UK School of Security Studies
King’s College London
London, UK
ISBN 978-3-319-40987-0 ISBN 978-3-319-40988-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7
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Acknowledgements
This book is the culmination of several years’ research involving the com-
bined efforts of a range of people and organisations. First and foremost, we
would like to thank all those involved in the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI)
who devoted time, with the approval and support of their direct employ-
ers, to the development and implementation of the King’s College London
research project. It was the experience of the UKNI and the particular
challenges encountered as part of that work that set the scene for the
research behind this book. Experts from the UK AWE, the Norwegian
Radiation Protection Authority and the Institute of Energy Technology, all
contributed significantly to the design process and brought an enormous
weight of knowledge and experience to bear on the simulation. Particular
thanks on this front go to Keir Allen, Attila Burjan, David Chambers,
Styrkaar Hustveit, Thomas Plant and Ole Reistad. Our thanks also go to
Detective Chief Inspector Gavin Webb for his valuable contribution to the
design and execution of the simulations.
The simulation took place at Kjeller, near Oslo, and we owe our hosts a
debt of gratitude for welcoming us to this working nuclear facility and
accommodating the disruption that our presence undoubtedly caused.
Special thanks here go to Tore Ramsøy, Steinar Hoibraten, Svein Mykkeltveit,
Paula Nunez and Pavel Tishakov. We also thank the students who partici-
pated in the simulation. They played a key role in the success of the project
and we appreciate their dedication and hard work. Supporting universities
included Hamburg University (Germany), Texas A&M University (USA),
Tomsk Polytechnic University (Russia), Tomsk State University (Russia),
Witwatersrand University (South Africa) and the American University in
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Cairo (Egypt). We are particularly grateful to Claudio Gariazzo, James

Larkin, Malte Göttsche, Gerald Kirchner, Frederik Postelt, Nabil Fahmy,
and Sameh Aboul-Enein, for their role in co-ordinating the participation of
their institutions. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues in the
Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London,
with particular mention to Diane Cooke for her help in preparing the final
manuscript. CSSS brings together a range of researchers with nuclear-
related interests in a uniquely collaborative academic environment, making
it an exciting and productive place to work.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance

and Practice 19
3 Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification:

Opportunities and Challenges 51
4 The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence 75
5 Simulating Disarmament Verification: Design and Methods 99
6 Trust and Verification: Empirical Insights 121
7 Conclusion: Looking to the Future 149
Bibliography 155
Index 169
vii
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Conceptualising trust and the practice of verification 93

Table 5.1 Summary of data sources 117
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In January 2007, a letter calling for a ‘world free of nuclear weapons’ pub-
lished in the Wall Street Journal by four former US statesmen reinvigo-
rated the debate on nuclear disarmament.1 The authors were former
Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Secretary
of Defence Bill Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn, and their strongly
worded letter evoked an increasingly uncertain international security envi-
ronment where the risks associated with nuclear weapons have come to
outweigh their benefits as tools of deterrence. The argument held all the
more weight for the fact that the authors were all veterans of “America’s
cold-war establishment with impeccable credentials as believers in nuclear
deterrence”, and their warning resonated loudly across the international
community.2
The timing was also fortuitous, since it chimed with efforts to launch a
new global disarmament movement that aimed to take a different path to
traditional disarmament activism. The ‘Global Zero’ movement was estab-
lished in late 2006 by Bruce Blair, a former Minuteman ballistic-missile
launch-control officer, and Matt Brown, who had served a term as
Secretary of State for Rhode Island. The goal of their fledgling organisa-
tion was to “advocate the kind of pragmatic actions that mainstream poli-
ticians and foreign-policy experts could endorse, while preserving, as a
destination, a goal that seemed inspiring”.3 Given momentum by the
highly-publicised intervention by the so-called “four horsemen of the
© The Author(s) 2018 1

W. Q. Bowen et al., Trust in Nuclear Disarmament Verification,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_1
2 W. Q. BOWEN ET AL.
Apocalypse”, the movement received endorsements from a host of high-

profile backers, including US President Barack Obama. Indeed, nuclear
disarmament was a theme that featured prominently in President Obama’s
foreign policy rhetoric from an early stage in his first term in office. In
April 2009, he gave a landmark speech in Prague in which he unequivo-
cally committed the United States to the goal of a world free of nuclear
weapons. This speech “highlighted the growing importance attached to
the question of disarmament in the nuclear arena”.4 High-level support of
this nature set the Global Zero initiative apart from “the old ‘ban the
bomb’ crowd”, and in February 2010, the Global Zero Commission set
out its vision for a four-stage process leading to “the phased, verified, pro-
portionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by
2030” at a well-attended conference in Paris.5
More recently, the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (HINW)
initiative opened a new front in the debate on disarmament. This initiative
was launched with a conference in Oslo in March, 2013 and sought to
reframe the debate on nuclear disarmament in humanitarian terms. A
recent research paper on the issue noted that “the potential use and the
physical effects of nuclear weapons have not been part of an international
and public discussion since the 1980s”, and the HINW initiative aimed to
address this lapse in considerations of nuclear weapons, their role and their
value.6 The first conference was attended by representatives from 128
countries, and was followed by equally well attended conferences in
Narayit (Mexico) in February 2014 and Vienna (Austria) in December
2014. The last conference adopted a ‘Humanitarian Pledge’ document
where countries agreed: “to cooperate with all stakeholders ‘to identify
and pursue effective measures’ to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons”, and “to cooperate with all relevant
stakeholders, states, international organisations, the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent movements, parliamentarians and civil society, in
efforts to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of
their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks”.7
The HINW initiative was endorsed by some 160 member states at the
2015 NPT Review Conference, yet perhaps its most significant contribu-
tion to the disarmament agenda was its role in supporting the move
towards negotiations to achieve a legally binding prohibition on nuclear
weapons.8 Indeed, William Potter notes that “The ban treaty is, in at least
some respects, an outgrowth of” the HINW initiative.9 The momentum
generated by the HINW movement, served as a driver for work within the
INTRODUCTION 3
2016 UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament. This,

in turn, led to a recommendation by the OEWG that the UN General
Assembly convene a conference “open to all States, with the participation
and contribution of international organizations and civil society, to nego-
tiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading
towards their total elimination”.10 Negotiations on a ban treaty duly fol-
lowed, and on 7 July 2017, 122 nations voted in favour of a permanent
and legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. The ban treaty will
officially enter into force once accepted by 50 states.
Certainly, the ban treaty negotiations were not without challenges. As
Sagan and Valentino note, “None of the nine states that possess nuclear
weapons even attended the negotiations”.11 Moreover, the sole participat-
ing NATO member cast the only vote against the treaty, having forced a
vote when many believed the treaty would be adopted by consensus. And,
from a legal perspective, the final treaty that emerged from the process will
do little to change the status quo. Those states possessing nuclear weapons
raised objections to the treaty and the negotiation process that preceded
it. Indeed, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom issued a
strongly worded joint statement in response to the adoption of the treaty:
“We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore,
there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with
respect to nuclear weapons. For example, we would not accept any claim
that this treaty reflects or in any way contributes to the development of
customary international law”.12 Ultimately, Sagan and Valentino claim
that “With not a single nuclear weapons state signing up as a member,
even the treaty’s strongest proponents acknowledge that it is a largely an
aspirational document designed to promote disarmament by delegitimiz-
ing nuclear weapons”.13
Whatever the broader and lasting impact of the treaty, the nuclear
weapons ban represents the culmination of recent efforts to reinvigorate
the global nuclear disarmament movement. It has thrust nuclear disarma-
ment under the international spotlight and, by extension, reaffirmed the
importance of work around nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.
The Enduring Appeal of Nuclear Weapons

For many disarmament advocates, the significance of the prohibition on
nuclear weapons cannot be overstated. Beatrice Fihn, the executive direc-
tor of ICAN argues that, “By stigmatizing nuclear weapons – declaring
them unacceptable and immoral for all - the international community can
start demanding and pressuring the nuclear-armed states and their military
alliances to deliver what they’ve actually promised: a world free of nuclear
weapons”.14 Yet, amidst this understandable enthusiasm and optimism, it
is important to note that the trend in the nuclear arena seems to be moving
firmly in the opposite direction, with nuclear weapons regaining promi-
nence amidst rising instability and uncertainty. While France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States have all reduced their arsenals in
recent years, these reductions have been accompanied by significant moves
to modernise nuclear forces. Take the United States, for example. In a
recent study, Wolfsthal, Lewis and Quint highlighted plans for the United
States to spend approximately one trillion dollars “maintaining the current
arsenal, buying replacement systems, and upgrading existing nuclear
bombs and warheads”.15 In this context, Woolf provides a comprehensive
overview of plans to modernise all aspects of the US nuclear triad, from
the move to replace current land-based ‘Minuteman’ intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs) with a “new Ground-based Strategic Deterrent
around 2030”, to development work on a new class of ballistic missile
submarine that “will replace the Ohio-class Trident submarines as they
reach the end of their service lives”.16
Clearly, the election of President Trump has added another dimension
to this issue. Based on the various statements he has made over the past
three decades, Michaels and Williams argue that “it is clear Trump will not
show the same interest as Obama, even at a rhetorical level, in a world
without nuclear weapons because they provide a bargaining chip and flex-
ibility in decision-making”.17 Indeed, his stated view is that the US nuclear
arsenal has been “allowed to atrophy and is desperately in need of mod-
ernization and renewal”.18
Needless to say, there is a strong link between the evolution of the US
nuclear arsenal and that of Russia. Indeed, this link was made explicit in
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review: “Russia’s nuclear force will remain a
significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are prepared
to reduce U.S. forces”.19 It is therefore significant that Russia is “in the
middle of a broad modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
forces”.20 Moscow is shoring up its nuclear capabilities as evidenced by the
introduction of the new Borey-class SSBN, with three currently in opera-
tion. The Russian Navy has plans to construct five more by 2020 and plans
to diversify its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force.21
INTRODUCTION 5
Of course the logic here goes both ways; it is 10 years since Lieber and
Press “predicted that ‘growing U.S. capabilities will pressure Russia and
China to reduce the peacetime vulnerability of their forces’ through ‘logi-
cal’ precautionary steps, including larger nuclear forces coupled with more
offensive postures”, yet the argument still holds relevance.22 Alongside
Washington’s efforts to modernise its nuclear triad, “it is developing both
its missile defenses and counterforce capabilities, which would include
the use of conventional weapons, such as those associated with the
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program”.23 These develop-
ments have been perceived as a threat by Moscow. Ultimately, Kristensen
and Norris argue that, “Overall, the nuclear modernization effort will
present Russia and the international arms control community with new
challenges. Unless a new arms control reduction agreement is reached in
the near future, the shrinking of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal that has
characterised the past two decades will likely come to an end”.24
In Europe, a similar process of modernisation is underway. French
President Hollande committed some 180 billion euros to upgrading the
country’s nuclear weapons in the period 2014–2019.25 In his speech on
19 February 2015, President Hollande followed a well-established French
tradition of reaffirming the role and value of deterrence in French strategic
doctrine. Indeed “France is the only Western nuclear State (and one of the
only countries with a military nuclear capability) in which the Head of
State or Government devotes an entire public speech to nuclear deter-
rence, on average once every five years”.26 It is also noteworthy that “In
spite of the continued debate on the relevance of deterrence, which takes
various forms (such as the 2009 Prague speech, and the international con-
ferences on the so-called ‘humanitarian dimension’ starting in 2012…),
[France] does not feel even remotely threatened, politically speaking, by
any kind of pressure in this field [of disarmament]”.27
In the United Kingdom, the issue is more complex. ‘Trident renewal’,
the catch-all term used to describe the process of replacing the country’s
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery – four Vanguard-class subma-
rines, Trident II D5 missiles and associated warheads – is a controversial
issue that has generated considerable public debate.28 The saga dates to
2006, when the then Labour government committed to replacing Trident,
a move supported by a subsequent parliamentary vote, in March 2007,
that supported the Government’s decision to “take the steps necessary to
sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond”.29 Since
then, the replacement has been the subject of considerable criticism from
non-governmental organizations and, more recently, from the new-look

Labour opposition. Despite the controversy, however, the modernization
process is almost certain to proceed. Contracts amounting to some 900
million pounds have been awarded for design work and the “main gate”
decision regarding the number of SSBNs to be constructed is planned for
late 2016.30
While almost all the established Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are
modernizing their nuclear forces, other states possessing nuclear weapons
are seeking to expand and diversify their arsenals. Of the original nuclear
weapon states, China is the only one that is currently “quantitatively
increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal”. Beijing has invested much of its
defence budget in expanding its nuclear options, including work on a
submarine-based deterrent that can deliver a secure second-strike capabil-
ity.31 The US Department of Defense claims that the soon to be com-
pleted Jin/JL-2 SLBM weapon system will give the Chinese Navy “its first
credible sea-based nuclear deterrent”, thus significantly augmenting its
existing land-based capabilities.32 This does not necessarily imply a shift in
Chinese nuclear posture – Cunningham and Fravel argue convincingly
that despite popular perceptions, “China will not abandon its strategy of
assured retaliation in response to an increasingly clear U.S. commitment
to strategic primacy” – but it does evidence the enduring strength of
China’s commitment to underpinning its military capabilities and aspira-
tions with a credible nuclear deterrent.33
Elsewhere, in South Asia, India has poured significant resources into
expanding its nuclear arsenal, and particularly the development of a cred-
ible sea-based deterrent. The country’s first SSBN, the INS Arihant, has
been undergoing sea trials and weapons tests and, when inducted formally
into the country’s arsenal, will complete India’s nuclear triad.34 Not to be
outdone, Pakistan has invested in a “large nuclear weapons production
complex” and now “has the capability to produce perhaps 20 nuclear war-
heads annually”.35 Islamabad has also, since 2011, pursued the develop-
ment of tactical nuclear weapons as a response to the “presumed existence
of an Indian Cold Start war doctrine”.36 This doctrine, “which emerged in
2004, suggests rapid but limited retaliatory incursions into Pakistan to
seize and hold shallow slices of territory in response to a terrorist event in
India involving Pakistanis”.37 Further to the East, North Korea continues
work on its illicit nuclear weapons programme and, following a test in
January 2016, Pyongyang claimed that North Korean scientists had suc-
cessfully miniaturised nuclear warheads to mount on ballistic missiles.38
INTRODUCTION 7
Clearly, this brief insight into the various efforts underway to moder-
nise and expand nuclear arsenals cannot be divorced from contemporary
points of tension and conflict around the globe. From China’s power pro-
jection in Asia, to Russia’s thinly-veiled nuclear threats over what is per-
ceived as western interference in Moscow’s affairs in Ukraine, there is a
range of issues vying for priority on the international security agenda.
Little surprise, then, that questions of deterrence and nuclear strategy are
once again in vogue as nuclear powers consider the new challenges posed
by a complex and multipolar security landscape. Simply put, “The condi-
tions do not now exist to allow other nuclear-armed states to join with the
United States in taking additional steps to reduce the role and number of
nuclear weapons. Russia and China are not moving away from reliance on
nuclear weapons. Extended deterrence cannot be changed in ways that
eliminate the requirement for the capability to deploy nuclear weapons
with nonstrategic delivery systems in support of US allies. […] Put differ-
ently, the desired ‘solid international consensus against nuclear weapons’
is not plausible in current circumstances”.39
Beyond the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament

While recent geopolitical developments appear to have diluted hope for
progress towards disarmament, there have been some positive develop-
ments. To understand the nature of progress here, however, we must look
beyond the political arena and consider efforts to establish the technical
architecture upon which a future political process of disarmament, what-
ever its form, would rest. For the political face of disarmament is but one
aspect of what would undoubtedly be an extremely complex and multifac-
eted endeavour. Equally important are the technical questions that would
underpin any move towards disarmament. How would nuclear warhead
dismantlement be verified effectively? What technologies would be
required? Who would have ownership of the process? How confident can
we be in the veracity of any results? Simply put, “any future disarmament
regime would need to be underpinned by a verification regime that can
demonstrate with confidence that nuclear disarmament has taken place”.40
This is not to suggest that scientific and technical developments can be
completely isolated from the political process, or made immune to the ebb
and flow of political currents. Indeed Nancy Gallagher highlights the
flawed logic of those who argue that verification processes and decisions
can be wholly “depoliticized” by “entrust[ing] them to an ‘epistemic
community’ of technical experts whose shared commitment to a set of

values, causal beliefs, and research methods provides an ‘objective’ basis
for verification design”.41 Furthermore, the experience of history drives
Gallagher to argue that “Without reliable political guidance […] technical
experts had either to avoid core controversies or to propose solutions that
made sense given their own assumptions but that lacked support from
policy makers who thought differently about arms control and verifica-
tion”.42 Yet as the weighty question of retention versus abolition continues
to occupy centre stage and provoke debate in the political sphere, there is
room at the fringes for the scientific community to explore the technical
space between these poles.
Certainly, the scientific community has been active in its efforts to
advance verification technologies. One of the earliest examples in the open
source literature is that of a US initiative, Field Test 34, conducted at the
height of the Cold War.43 In 1967, the US Department of Defense (DoD)
and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) collabo-
rated on an project to “develop and test inspection procedures to monitor
the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons”.44 Conducted across
four nuclear facilities, the project gathered “evidence relating to the
amount of classified information revealed, and the credibility of the dis-
mantlement process tested”.45 The so-called ‘Black Sea Experiments’,
conducted in the late 1980s, provide another pertinent example with a
more international flavor. This initiative saw US and Soviet scientists col-
laborate on a project to “study the utility of various tools for verifying
limits on nuclear weapons at sea”.46 Then, “In the autumn of 1996, in
anticipation of a future US-Russian accord mandating further reductions
in nuclear warheads beyond START I and the ultimately unimplemented
START II, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation commissioned a technical study to identify on-site
‘Transparency and Verification Options’ that could be implemented at
DOE facilities—particularly Pantex and Y-12—to monitor warhead dis-
mantlement”.47 These early efforts, discussed in more detail later in the
book, sought to push technical boundaries. Yet they also represented
politically significant developments, not least because they demonstrated
that progress on verification is possible and even desirable in times when
the political salience of nuclear weapons is heightened.
More recently, the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI), the unique collabo-
ration between a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and a non-nuclear weapon
state (NNWS) in which the research behind this book is rooted, has been
INTRODUCTION 9
among the most prominent of contemporary international efforts to

engage with disarmament verification. The UKNI emerged from a
contentious NPT Review Conference in 2005 and constituted the first
partnership between a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and a non-nuclear
weapon state (NNWS) to explore various aspects of nuclear arms control
and disarmament verification. The initiative began with a peer review exer-
cise that saw Norway “critically examine the work the UK had unilaterally
undertaken in relation to nuclear warhead dismantlement verification over
the preceding years”.48 This led to a broader programme of activity, the
cornerstone of which was a scenario-based approach to exploring the chal-
lenges of disarmament verification at a bilateral level.
Other examples include, the launch in 2014 of a USD 25 million aca-
demic partnership in the United States focused on research and develop-
ment in nuclear arms control verification technologies.49 Washington is
also funding a new international partnership for nuclear disarmament veri-
fication, an initiative launched in December 2014 with the aim of increas-
ing cooperation and understanding around the technical obstacles to
disarmament.50 Elsewhere, China has also invested in the field. In its 2014
national report ahead of the NPT Review Conference, China reported
research on a range of verification technologies, from the authentication
of nuclear warheads and components to dismantlement monitoring tools.
The Challenges of Verification

The cumulative contribution of the various initiatives and projects men-
tioned above has significantly advanced international thinking on disarma-
ment verification. Certainly, considerable scientific advances have been
made since the early forays into verification research. Developments such
as the information barrier approach, the template approach and the attri-
bute approach, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 have opened up new
avenues of research and represent creative and innovative attempts to har-
ness cutting edge technology in the name of disarmament verification.
Despite these advances, however, the progress of scientists and technicians
is limited by the enduring and seemingly insurmountable problem that has
always framed research in this area: the fact that 100 per cent verification
is technically impossible given the secrecy surrounding nuclear warheads
because of security and non-proliferation concerns.
This single statement summarises in simple terms the central challenge
to the verification enterprise, while at the same time opening the door to
a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its out-
comes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verifica-
tion inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that
falls well short of absolute certainty. Outcomes here represent expressions
of confidence in the degree to which it is believed that the inspected party
has adhered to agreed protocols. These can be informed expressions of
confidence, but they cannot be taken as absolute truth.
Crucially, the problem here introduces an important human factor into
the scientific process. For many looking from the outside in, the technical
arena is often viewed as a rigidly structured one that is grounded in experi-
mentation and verifiable evidence. Yet in the context of verification, this is
not the case. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology
are blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by percep-
tions. The practice of verification involves two distinct groups – host and
inspectors – each driven by their own, potentially conflicting, interests and
objectives. The context can be highly cooperative, yet there is always
ample opportunity for deception and the relationship inevitably has the
potential to be adversarial. In theory, determinations of compliance should
be evidence-based and objective. In practice, the human factor, and per-
ceptions of intentions in particular, adds an element of subjectivity that has
considerable potential to distort judgements and conclusions.
These issues raise a number of questions regarding the role and influ-
ence of the human factor in the verification process. To what extent, for
example, do the personal interactions between host and inspectors have a
significant and lasting effect on the outcomes of the verification process?
Do perceptions of host intentions influence the confidence levels of inspec-
tors? What role do communication and information management (if any)
play in this respect? These questions hint at the complex interplay between
evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that overshad-
ows the science of verification. And it is precisely this uncertain space, too
long ignored, that this book explores.
In this context, our study has three principal objectives. First, the book
will consider the nature of those human factors with the potential to
impact upon the verification process. Our goal here will be to probe the
scope and limits of this overlap of technical tools and processes with the
less tangible sphere of human perceptions and emotions. This will involve
careful consideration of terms such as ‘confidence’, understood as an
evidence- based judgement concerning the capability of the inspecting
team to suitably account for all items under their jurisdiction, at all points
INTRODUCTION 11
in the monitoring process, and ‘trust’, broadly defined as the expectation

of favourable behaviour in a reciprocal and mutually vulnerable relation-
ship. Unlike ‘confidence’, trust entails psychological and behavioural com-
ponents and relates above all to perceptions of intentions. These terms are
often used interchangeably and without discrimination, yet questions
regarding their meaning, relationship and influence speak to the core of
what we regard as a ‘blind spot’ in research and thinking on verification as
a technical process.
Second, the book will explore the extent to which human factors exert
an influence on the verification process. In this supposedly data-driven and
dispassionate technical process, to what extent are perceptions shaped by
personal interactions and the dialogue and informational exchange that
occurs between host and inspectors? More importantly, is there evidence
to indicate that these perceptions influence final outcomes? The answers
to these questions have important implications, not least for the training
of inspectors as part of any future disarmament regime. Ignoring the influ-
ence of perceptions and emotions could potentially distort the interpreta-
tion of verification outcomes. For if the human factor constitutes an
interactional variable in the verification process, it must be considered a
moderating condition for a causal relationship and be factored into think-
ing around the process as a whole. The analysis here will draw on original
and extensive empirical data gleaned from a two-year, scenario-based
research project conducted with support from the UK Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE) and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency
(NRPA). This project adopted an innovative approach to verification
research in that it sought to isolate, in so far as is possible, human factors
for study.
Third, and on a larger scale, the book will break new ground in disar-
mament verification research as the first comprehensive and systematic
analysis of the role and influence of human factors in the practice of verifi-
cation. In this regard, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of
the functioning of verification at the ground level. It is our firm belief that
disarmament verification, and indeed arms control verification more
broadly, is an inherently multidisciplinary area of research and practice.
With this book, we hope to evidence this belief with data drawn from
empirical research. Beyond this, we hope that the research set out here will
help expand the study of verification beyond traditional scientific and
technically focused approaches and encourage a more holistic approach to
this area of activity.
While our findings are drawn from empirical research, it is important to

note that our conclusions are not exhaustive. If our research has shown us
anything, it is that the human dimension to verification, even at the opera-
tional level, constitutes an intricate and multifaceted web of influencing
factors. In this book we will explore many aspects of the role and influence
of human factors in the verification process, but our research is not all-
encompassing. Indeed, we view this work above all else as the first step in
a broader effort to explore the human face of this immensely important
area of arms control.
Structure and Content

The following chapter will open with a conceptual consideration of verifi-
cation and the different approaches taken to defining it within the nuclear
field. This achieved, the chapter will examine the role and significance of
verification within broader debates and policies regarding non-
proliferation, arms control and nuclear disarmament, as well as the chal-
lenges to effective verification. The analysis here will be supported by a
concise history of the practice of nuclear arms control verification that
traces the evolution of verification regimes in the bilateral context – pre-
dominantly between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia and in the con-
text of multilateral treaties such as the nuclear safeguards regime of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Chapter 3 will tackle the challenges and key consideration that would
need to be taken into account in the implementation of a future verifica-
tion regime for nuclear warhead dismantlement. After conceptually out-
lining the dismantlement process it will discuss in detail the difficulties of
balancing the protection of sensitive proliferation relevant information
with necessary intrusiveness to judge compliance in this context. The
strengths and weaknesses of key verification technologies and procedures,
including those that have been specifically developed for use in this envi-
ronment will also be discussed.
Chapter 4 will explore the nature of the human factors at stake at the
operational level of the verification process. In particular, the analysis will
consider the relevance, use and value of the terms ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’
in thinking about verification processes and outcomes. These concepts
pervade the verification lexicon, regularly used interchangeably and indis-
criminately by authors and commentators. As a result, their meaning has
become confused and their explanatory value distorted. Yet ‘confidence’
INTRODUCTION 13
and ‘trust’ and, more importantly, the relationship and tension between
these concepts, goes to the heart of our research on the role and influence
of human factors. The chapter will seek to elucidate these concepts and
their relevance to verification and, in the process, develop a conceptual
lens through which the empirical research can be viewed. In addition, the
chapter will set out a series of hypotheses regarding the influence of human
factors in the verification process. These will then be tested against empiri-
cal data in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5, we will set out the case study that is the source of the
empirical evidence underpinning the book. At stake here is a fictional veri-
fication regime (although enacted at an operational nuclear facility in
Norway) involving a detailed inspection scenario for a particular stage in
the disarmament process. The scenario represents a ground-breaking
attempt to isolate for study the human factors influencing verification and
this chapter will discuss both its nature and its suitability for the task at
hand. In particular, this discussion of our original approach will include
important methodological details on how the scenario was designed to
balance freedom of thought and decision-making on the part of the
inspectors, with a rigorous and highly choreographed exercise that ensured
replication across different test groups.
The sixth chapter will analyse the empirical evidence gleaned from
seven iterations of the verification scenario, described in detail in the pre-
ceding chapter. The nature and significance of this data will be explained,
before it is weighed against the working hypotheses set out in Chapter 4.
Among other things, the chapter will demonstrate that the interactional
elements inherent in any nuclear inspection activity, from information pro-
vision strategies to facility access to host attitudes, frame the experience of
inspectors and exert a subtle but significant impact on their final judge-
ment regarding levels of compliance. The extent of this influence is diffi-
cult to accurately quantify, yet it is our contention that within the
verification process, the perceptions of inspectors in particular can be sub-
tly influenced and shaped in a manner that contributes to the construction
of an environment that is more conducive to higher levels of verification
confidence.
Chapter 7 will begin by drawing together the various strands of argu-
ment that have appeared throughout the book and make the case that
human factors exert a subtle but significant influence on the verification
process. We will argue that our findings have important implications for
work on verification and arms control more broadly. Rather than think-
ing of verification as strictly a data-driven activity, our research demon-

strates the need for human factors, and more particularly trust, to be
considered an integral part of the verification process. Trust is an unavoid-
able interactional variable, that is to say a moderating condition for a
causal relationship. Failing to recognise and account for this, the influ-
ence of trust will likely undermine any verification process for nuclear
dismantlement.
The concluding chapter will look forward and consider the implications
of our findings. In the academic context, the conclusion will argue that
our research has opened a new front in verification research and set the
path for future work. In the policy context, we argue that the research
demonstrates the need to look beyond the technical arena in search of
innovative approaches to solving verification problems. Verification
research and policy must take a holistic and multidisciplinary approach
that draws on a broader set of intellectual tools and fully accounts for the
complexity of the process.
Notes
1. George P. Shultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street
Journal, January 4, 2007, www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636.
2. “The Growing Appeal of Zero,” The Economist, June 16, 2011, http://
www.economist.com/node/18836134.
3. Ibid.
4. Matthew Moran and Matthew Cottee, “Bound by History? Exploring
Challenges to French Nuclear Disarmament,” Defense & Security Analysis
27, no. 4 (2011): 341.
5. “Global Zero Action Plan” (Paris: Global Zero Commission, February
2010), 3, http://www.globalzero.org/files/gzap_6.0.pdf.
6. Heather Williams, Patricia Lewis, and Sasan Aghlani, “The Humanitarian
Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative: The ‘Big Tent’ in Disarmament,”
Chatham House Research Paper (Chatham House, March 2015), 5, https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/
20150331HumanitarianImpactNuclearWilliamsLewisAghlani.pdf.
7. Michael Linhart, “Pledge Presented at the Vienna Conference on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” (Foreign Ministry of Austria,
December 8, 2014), https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/
Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_Austrian_
Pledge.pdf.
INTRODUCTION 15
8. Andrey Baklitskiy, “The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Future of the
Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today (Arms Control Association,
July 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_0708/Features/
The-2015-NPT-Review-Conference-and-the-Future-of-The-Nonproliferation-
Regime.
9. William C. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,”
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59, no. 4 (July 17, 2017): 75.
10. “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations: Note
by the Secretary General” (United Nations, September 1, 2016), 19,
http://undocs.org/A/71/371.
11. Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty:
Opportunities Lost,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 16, 2017, http://
thebulletin.org/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-opportunities-lost10955.
12. United States Mission to the United Nations Department of State., “Joint
Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United
Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the
Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” July 7, 2017, https://
usun.state.gov/remarks/7892.
13. Sagan and Valentino, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Opportunities
Lost.”
14. Beatrice Fihn, “Stigmatize and Prohibit: New UN Talks on Nuclear Weapons
Start Today,” Huffington Post, February 21, 2016, http://www.huffington-
post.com/beatrice-fihn/stigmatize-and-prohibit-n_b_9287144.html.
15. Jon Wolfsthal, Mark Quint, and Jeffrey Lewis, “The US Trillion Dollar
Nuclear Triad” (Monterey, CA: James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation
Studies, January 7, 2014), 4–7.
16. Amy Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments,
and Issues” (Congressional Research Service, August 8, 2017), 16, 23,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf.
17. Jeffrey Michaels and Heather Williams, “The Nuclear Education of Donald
J. Trump,” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 62.
18. Donald J. Trump, “Foreign Policy Speech - Video Recording,” YouTube,
April 27, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q_s6cXSv_8.
19. “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (Washington DC: United States
Department of Defense, April 6, 2010), 30, https://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_
Review_Report.pdf.
20. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 3 (May 1, 2015): 1.
21. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Putin’s ‘Red October’: Russia’s Deadliest New
Submarine,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/
2015/03/putins-red-october-russias-deadliest-new-submarine/.
22. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear
Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006):
7–34; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured
Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability,”
International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 8.
23. Cunningham and Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s
Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability,” 8.
24. Kristensen and Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” 86.
25. Véronique Guillermard, “Dissuasion Nucléaire: La France Ne Baisse Pas
La Garde,” Le Figaro, February 20, 2015, sec. Policy, http://www.lefi-
garo.fr/politique/2015/02/19/01002-20150219ARTFIG00420-dis-
suasion-la-france-ne-baisse-pas-la-garde.php.
26. Bruno Tertrais, “Deterrence According to Francois Hollande” (Fondation
pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 1, 2015), 1, https://www.frstrategie.
org/publications/notes/web/documents/2015/201510.pdf.
27. Ibid., 2.
28. Tom Waldwyn notes that ‘Trident renewal’ refers to three separate but
closely related issues: “the replacement of the Vanguard-class SSBN, the
eventual replacement of the Trident II missile and the replacement of the
UK’s present stock of warheads. The immediate focus is on replacing the
four Vanguard-class boats with a new class of SSBNs”. See Tom Waldwyn,
“Renewing Trident: Facts Concerning the Future of the UK’s Submarine-
Based Nuclear Capability,” IISS, May 5, 2015, http://www.iiss.org/en/
militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2015-090c/may-b1c8/european-
defence-bcf2.
29. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministry of Defence, “The Future of
the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent,” December 2006, 7, https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-
nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994.
30. Waldwyn, “Renewing Trident: Facts Concerning the Future of the UK’s
Submarine-Based Nuclear Capability.”
31. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 4 (2015): 77.
32. Ibid., 81–82.
33. Cunningham and Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s
Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability,” 9.
34. “What Lurks Beneath,” The Economist, February 6, 2016, https://www.
economist.com/news/asia/21690107-nuclear-arms-race-sea-what-lurks-
beneath.
35. Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan” (Stimson
Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 3,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/27/normal-nuclear-pakistan-
pub-61043.
INTRODUCTION 17
36. Jaganath Sankaran, “Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution

to an Exaggerated Threat,” International Security 39, no. 3 (2014): 121.
37. Ibid.
38. Jack Kim, “North Korea’s Kim Says Country Has Miniaturized Nuclear
Warheads,” Reuters, March 9, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-northkorea-nuclear-kim-idUSKCN0WA2QM.
39. Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
(Stanford University Press, 2015), 238.
40. “The UK - Norway Initiative: Report on the UKNI Non Nuclear Weapon
States Workshop” (London: Ministry of Defence, December 7, 2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/28423/120426_2011_ukni_workshop_final_rpt.pdf.
41. Nancy Gallagher, “The Politics of Verification: Why ‘How Much?’ Is Not
Enough,” Contemporary Security Policy 18, no. 2 (1997): 141.
42. Nancy Gallagher, The Politics of Verification (Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999), 117.
43. David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy, and Andreas Persbo, “Verifying Warhead
Dismantlement: Past, Present and Future,” Verification Research Reports
(London: VERTIC: East West Institute, 2010), 22, https://www.east-
west.ngo/idea/verifying-warhead-dismantlement-past-present-and-
future.
44. “Demonstration Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Report (Washington
DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 1969),
https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Cloud_Gap_Demonstrated_
Destruction_of_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.
45. Cliff, Elbahtimy, and Persbo, “Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past,
Present and Future,” 2010, 22.
46. Thomas Cochran, “Black Sea Experiment Only a Start,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 45, no. 9 (1989): 13.
48. Ibid., 64.
49. “NNSA Announces Recipient of $25 Million Grant to Improve Nuclear
Arms Control Verification Technology,” National Nuclear Security
Administration, December 4, 2014, https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediar-
oom/pressreleases/consortium.
50. Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, “International
Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV),” December
4, 2014, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/ipndv/.
CHAPTER 2
Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature,

Significance and Practice
In his seminal research on verification and trust in arms control, Allan

Krass notes that “no word has suffered more from scepticism and cynicism
in superpower diplomacy than ‘trust’”. Clearly, this observation reflects
the fact that in a shifting and uncertain international arena, where national
interests reign supreme, any rhetoric prioritising trust between states is
inevitably counterbalanced by an approach that seeks to verify claims and
agreements, and to ensure that national interests are safeguarded as a state
enters any bilateral or multilateral commitment. Consequently, the con-
cept of verification pervades all aspects of international relations.
Verification may be described as the hard edge, often ignored, of the
highly publicized political agreements and treaties between states, and
particularly adversaries. It grounds political rhetoric by addressing the
practicalities of treaty implementation and is designed to provide a mea-
sure of reassurance to relevant parties that mutually agreed commitments
are being fulfilled. It seeks to identify problems associated with the imple-
mentation of practical measures, while at the same time serving a deterrent
function with regard to those who would engage in deception. In the
security context, verification is viewed as a potential means by which states
can break out of the so-called ‘security dilemma’ by accepting constraints
on their defence-related activities if they can be assured that others are fol-
lowing suit.1 This mitigates the prospect of destructive and escalatory
spirals of military build-ups, by creating conditions that are more condu-
cive to cooperative security agreements.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_2
While verification is inevitably overshadowed by the political and diplo-

matic intrigue that surrounds the negotiating process at the state level,
those in power are acutely aware of its importance as a means of safeguard-
ing the political capital invested in an international agreement. The nature
of international politics means that the conditions surrounding agree-
ments are never entirely certain, and so verification provides a safety net of
sorts for involved parties. Perhaps the best known and succinct reflection
of this awareness is Ronald Reagan’s adoption of an old Russian proverb
for talks with Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. The dictum ‘trust but
verify’ resurfaces frequently in the discourse of contemporary politicians
and diplomats – most recently in the context of the nuclear deal agreed
between Iran and the P5+1.2 Crucially, in the nuclear arena, this preoc-
cupation with verification has filtered down from the political arena to
pervade all aspects of the nuclear enterprise. This is not surprising given
the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the potential costs of decep-
tion, and the possibility of dual-use materials and technology being
diverted from civil nuclear programmes for weapons purposes. The prob-
lem is, the frequency with which the term is used belies the confusion that
surrounds it.
In practical terms, verification translates as a process or system, where
information or evidence is collected and then assessed, usually with a view
to confirming that specified requirements have been fulfilled by the vari-
ous parties to an agreement. The concept hails from the scientific tradition
of the natural sciences, where it is defined as the “establishment of a fact
or theory” or “evidence that provides proof of an assertion”.3 The etymol-
ogy of the term evokes a clinical and objective process, where evidence
governs outcomes and there is no room for subjectivity. In popular and
political commentary, then, verification is often presented in binary terms:
a party has either fulfilled specific obligations as part of a treaty or agree-
ment, or it has not. In this book, we challenge this view. More than this,
we argue that the binary lens through which verification is viewed is
inaccurate and reductive. In reality, verification is a complex and nuanced
phenomenon that rarely, if ever, provides absolute certainty.
Consider Reagan’s statement, “trust but verify”, mentioned above. In
testimony to US Congress in 1999, then Senator Joseph Biden took issue
with the fact that this phrase is regularly taken at face value and out of
context. To illustrate his point, Senator Biden made reference to the use
of the term upon agreement of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF)
Treaty agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987.
VERIFICATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE… 21
President Reagan used the phrase to highlight the robust nature of the
verification measures agreed under the treaty, described as “the most
extensive system if weapons inspection ever negotiated by two countries”.4
Yet even as he emphasised the intrusive nature of the verification process,
Reagan was aware of its limits: “President Reagan said in his pushing the
INF Treaty that no verification was possible completely…The military
under President Reagan said the INF Treaty was verifiable to the extent
that they could not do anything that would materially alter the military
balance”.5 In other words, verification could bring a degree of assurance,
but not a guarantee of certainty.
If verification is generally challenging in any security context, it is par-
ticularly demanding in the nuclear disarmament context, where nuclear
weapons and related facilities rank among a state’s most sensitive assets.
There are myriad influencing factors overlaying technical processes in this
area. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in the following chap-
ters, but chief among them is the extent to which national security consid-
erations prohibit the provision of information or evidence relevant to the
verification process to those charged with its conduct. More than this, any
potential disarmament verification regime must navigate the double bind
of national security considerations and the obligation for NPT member
states to avoid spreading proliferation sensitive information.
Against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that verification
can never be perfect or absolute. Rather, as in the case of Reagan and the
INF, it is a case of degrees of certainty, or, put another way, how much
uncertainty is acceptable. Requirements in this regard will typically be sub-
ject to cost-benefit calculations and may vary considerably between differ-
ent types of agreements, depending on both the significance of what is
being verified, the nature of the verification process envisaged, and the
relationship (past and present) between the parties involved. Before
engaging with verification at the conceptual level and in the particular
context of nuclear warhead dismantlement, however, it is first necessary to
consider how this concept has featured in broader efforts to control, limit
and reduce nuclear weapons relevant materials, systems and numbers since
the beginning of the nuclear age. Developments in verification thinking
and practice span several decades, and there is much to be learned from
the experience. This chapter will thus provide a brief historical overview of
significant bilateral and multilateral verification activities. The goal here is
to understand the evolution of verification as a broader practice and gener-
ate insights into the shape and requirements of future verification regimes
for nuclear disarmament, as well as the key factors that will influence their
effectiveness.
The chapter begins by considering the control of atomic energy and the
safeguards system managed and implemented by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Although focused on monitoring and safeguard-
ing civil nuclear activities, the safeguards system that underpins the
Agency’s approach arguably represents the most intrusive form of multi-
lateral verification employed in the nuclear arena to date, as well as being
the only one that accounts directly for the quantity and quality of the
nuclear materials held by state parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The safeguards system that is at
the heart of the non-proliferation regime has also encountered and adapted
to a number of serious proliferation challenges, such as the Iraqi nuclear
challenge, and these tests of the system offer additional insights. The chap-
ter will then explore verification in the context of nuclear testing, initially
at the state level through national technical means and later through mul-
tilateral structures such as the CTBTO. The chapter concludes with a dis-
cussion of verification as it relates to bilateral arms control between the
United States and Russia as they have sought to reduce numbers of deliv-
ery vehicles and launchers capable of supporting nuclear weapons. The
exploration of different nuclear verification systems will identify common
themes, such as onsite access, which will be explore in more detail in the
specific context of nuclear warhead disarmament in the next chapter.
Preventing Proliferation in the Nuclear Arena

While nuclear technology has many important peaceful applications, it is
inherently dual-use in nature. That is to say, there is always the potential
for civil materials, equipment and knowledge to be exploited as part of
military programmes whose aim is to produce nuclear weapons. As a con-
sequence, proliferation concerns over the diffusion of nuclear technology
and knowhow have been present from the very start of the nuclear age.
This point is clearly illustrated in a joint statement from the leaders of the
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in 1945, soon after the
US dropped atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The statement,
from the three countries with the most advanced nuclear knowledge at the
time, recognized the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and high-
lighted the need to “prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive pur-
poses”.6 It went on to argue that atomic energy should only be spread
once a system of “effective enforceable safeguards against its use for

destructive purposes can be devised”.7 In this context, the idea of safe-
guards referred to a system of verification measures designed to provide
assurance that civil nuclear activity would not be exploited for military
purposes.
Early efforts aimed at preventing proliferation were carried out bilater-
ally. Recognising that the spread of nuclear knowhow was inevitable, the
United States sought to control its application. The cornerstone of this
approach was the ‘Atoms for Peace’ plan, presented to the United Nations
by President Eisenhower in 1953. Through this ambitious programme,
the United States transferred nuclear technology to many countries
around the world. The deal underpinning the programme was relatively
simple. The US would partner with states to provide support in the form
of nuclear technology and expertise. In return, participating states would
be required to sign a safeguards agreement with Washington that would
place constraints on their use of this technology and provide “verifiable
assurances” that it would not be used to produce nuclear weapons.8 Driven
by a strong appetite for nuclear technology, a host of these bilateral agree-
ments were quickly negotiated and by June 1959, the United States had
arrangements in place with some 42 countries.9
Alongside this US-led approach, efforts were also underway to estab-
lish regional and international organisations that would promote and
regulate the peaceful use of atomic energy. The most significant of these,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957,
and was heavily shaped by the ideas in Eisenhower’s 1953 speech. Indeed
the evolution of the IAEA went hand in hand with the progress of the
Atoms for Peace programme. The twin goals of Eisenhower’s plan – to
facilitate the spread of peaceful nuclear technology and to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons – were reflected in the IAEA Statute,
approved by 81 nations in 1956. Article II of the Statute states that, “The
Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall
ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or
under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any
military purpose”.10 The means by which these objectives were to be
achieved included a robust safeguards system that would be applied at “at
the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or
at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of
atomic energy”.11
At the same time, efforts were underway in Europe to develop a struc-

ture that would impose regional control and regulation on nuclear activi-
ties. Stephen Gorove notes that the establishment of the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1957 “was prompted not only by
West Europe’s shortage of conventional fuel, which was brought into
sharp focus during the Suez crisis of 1955, but also by the desire to make
certain that [West] Germany’s nuclear effort would flow into peaceful
channels”.12 The objectives of EURATOM aligned closely with those of
the IAEA, namely to “bar the production of nuclear weapons, open every
factory using fissionable material to international inspection, and insure
peaceful uses” of nuclear technology.13 Described by Müller as “verifica-
tion between friends”, safeguard measures applied under this regional
agreement also served as an important means of overcoming “residual
distrust” between long standing adversaries.14
Despite these initiatives and others, such as the European Nuclear
Energy Agency (ENEA) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), fears over the potential for nuclear weapons
to proliferate and spread persisted. The nuclear domain was an exciting
one that held enormous potential, and governments, private companies
and universities were all engaged in efforts to harness the power of civil
nuclear technology. As research programmes advanced, however, the fun-
damental science of nuclear fission and fusion became more accessible in
the public domain. Academics breaking new research ground published
their findings in scientific journals and disseminated technical insights to a
global audience. This, in turn, gave additional momentum to broader
research efforts in the field.
The creeping spread of nuclear knowledge was one of a number of fac-
tors that led US President Kennedy to predict in 1963 that there might be
‘fifteen or twenty or twenty-five’ nuclear weapons powers within the next
decade.15 At that point, it had become abundantly clear that many coun-
tries beyond the five states that had exploded nuclear weapons by the mid-
1960s were capable of developing them. It was all the more important,
therefore, to formalise the non-proliferation architecture that would serve
as the bulwark against this threat. Negotiations towards a formal treaty
took place in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC)
from 1965 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) opened for signature in 1968, before entering into force in 1970.
The NPT gave legitimacy to the work of the IAEA, and its system of
safeguards. The Treaty was also built on the promise of a ‘grand Bargain’
between what were designated the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Essentially, the five NWS agreed
to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons know-how or direct assis-
tance to other states, while pursuing negotiations towards nuclear disar-
mament. In return, the NNWS agreed to refrain from the pursuit of
nuclear weapons and accept IAEA-administered safeguards on their civil
nuclear activities. These ‘full-scope’ or comprehensive safeguards were
designed to verify that all source and fissionable material in a given state
were used for peaceful purposes only. Consequently, they were, and con-
tinue to be, applied to all nuclear facilities in a country, not just the item
specific agreements for nuclear materials or technology transferred under
bilateral agreements.
Developing a Safeguards Regime

While IAEA safeguards have “evolved” since their introduction, the fun-
damental objective of these verification measures remains the same: the
“timely detection” of the “diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
material” from peaceful activities.16 A “significant quantity” (SQ) is for-
mally defined as “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which
the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be
excluded”.17 Recommended to the IAEA by the experts that made up the
IAEA Standing Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI),
these figures allow for a rough projection of the quantity of material that
would be required to convert the material in question into a nuclear
weapon.
IAEA significant quantities vary according to the type of nuclear mate-
rial in question – the SQ is set at 8kg of plutonium, while it rises to 25kg
of high enriched uranium – and allow for material that is unavoidably lost
in the manufacturing process.18 It is important to note, however, that
these figures are also contested. In a 1995 paper, Thomas Cochran and
Christopher Paine argued that “the direct-use SQ or threshold values cur-
rently used by the IAEA are technically indefensible. The IAEA is clinging
to incorrect values for the minimum quantity of nuclear material needed
for a nuclear weapon, even for low-technology first nuclear explosive by a
non-nuclear weapon state”.19 In any case, the significant quantities out-
lined by the IAEA remain in force and continue to frame the contempo-
rary safeguards process.
In order to verify nuclear activities and ensure no diversion has taken

place, states with a safeguards agreement in place are first required to pro-
vide the IAEA with a declaration regarding their nuclear material and
related activities, including technical data and operating records. The
IAEA then assesses the ‘correctness’ of this declaration through on-site
inspections and the application of specially designed technical tools.20 For
example, tools used in support of nuclear material accountancy track the
flow of material through a facility, helping ensure that material has not
been diverted. These are supported by surveillance and containment tech-
niques aimed at detecting unreported activities. Surveillance can be car-
ried out both as part of an onsite inspection and remotely via IAEA
installed camera systems. Containment methods typically include the use
of unique identifiers, known as tags, for specifying key items and seals
designed to detect unauthorised access to them, thereby helping preserve
the physical integrity of an area. Although none of these methods are fool
proof, applied in combination they help to ensure chain-of-custody and
the continuous monitoring of nuclear material once it enters the safe-
guards process.
These measures are intrusive and demand full engagement of partici-
pating states. Yet, it is important to note that they have, from the very
outset, been subject to constraints. In devising and considering the appli-
cation of the various tools and methods that comprise the IAEA approach
to safeguarding nuclear materials, NPT negotiators were forced to “weigh
the value of additional assurances” against the “possibility that more veri-
fication requirements would become a disincentive for membership”.21
The logic of the market was a significant influence in this regard, and key
NNWS such as Germany and Japan pushed back on some of the more
stringent measures initially proposed by NWS due to concerns that they
would be placed at a commercial disadvantage. The compromise was that
application of intrusive safeguards measures, such as on-site inspections,
would be kept to a minimum and confined to agreed “strategic points”.22
This resulted in a system which in the opinion of some analysts was
“designed more for its non-intrusiveness than for its effectiveness”.23
Verification Weaknesses: Iraq and North Korea

Membership of the NPT increased to over 100 states by the end of the
1970s. While this included most industrialised nations, there were still
some notable absences. China and France, both NWS, did not accede to
the NPT until 1992 and a number of developing nuclear countries from
regions marked by regional rivalry remained non-signatories. On the
whole, however, the trend towards expansion continued in the 1980s and
1990s as the Cold War ended and relations between former rivals improved.
By 1995 NPT membership was close to universal and its original 25-year
duration was extended indefinitely. On one hand this represented signifi-
cant progress in efforts to limit proliferation. As the non-proliferation
regime gained momentum, the constraints on proliferation – normative
and other – also gained force and the dire predictions of President Kennedy
lost weight. On the other hand, the non-proliferation enterprise did not
progress unchallenged. The proliferation-related activities of a number of
states such as Iraq and North Korea called into question the effectiveness
of the IAEA’s safeguards system and posed a threat to the NPT more
broadly.
A state party to the NPT since 1969, Iraq had contemplated a ‘nuclear
weapons option’ since the early 1970s.24 It was Iraq’s purchase of the
French-built Osirak reactor in 1976 that first aroused initial international
suspicions, largely due to its size, which was deemed unsuitable for power
generation or research, but sufficient to produce weapons-significant
quantities of plutonium. This led to a heated debate within the interna-
tional community as to whether IAEA safeguards, in place at the Osirak
reactor, would be capable of detecting the diversion of significant quanti-
ties of plutonium. Israel, convinced that such an undetected diversion was
both possible and likely, took matters beyond the diplomatic arena and
destroyed the reactor by means of an air strike in June 1981.25 At the time,
the reactor was in the final stages of construction. Rather than put an end
to Iraq’s nuclear weapons ambitions, however, this setback reinforced
Baghdad’s desire to acquire the bomb and prompted Saddam Hussein to
initiate a covert programme that took the country to the ‘threshold of a
nuclear weapons capability’ by 1991.26
In order to minimise the risk of detection, Iraqi efforts focused on the
production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) through the indigenous
development of enrichment technology, procurement of unsafeguarded
uranium and experiments related to weaponisation. While eventually
uncovered by the WMD disarmament regime put in place following Iraq’s
defeat in the Gulf War, these activities progressed undetected by IAEA
safeguards for almost a decade. This case illustrates a fundamental limita-
tion of safeguards at that time: their limits in detecting undeclared activi-
ties. With routine inspections restricted to pre-agreed sections of declared
nuclear facilities, there was little chance of the IAEA discovering Iraq’s
clandestine weapons activities, as these took place at either secret nuclear
sites or within areas of declared facilities to which the IAEA did not have
access. In principle, the IAEA could have asked to conduct ‘special inspec-
tions’, which would have provided inspectors with access to additional
areas of declared sites. Such measures had never been employed, however,
and the IAEA was discouraged from invoking these inspections by mem-
ber states as they were deemed politically sensitive.27 The case of Iraq also
served to highlight safeguards weaknesses regarding information provi-
sion, with states only required to declare information on new nuclear facil-
ities “as early as possible” before nuclear material was introduced.28 This
later allowed Iraq to argue that it was not at fault for failing to declare its
enrichment activities, as they did not involve significant amounts of nuclear
material.29
Drawing on the experience of Iraq, the IAEA performed better in
detecting North Korean nuclear weapons activities. It took Pyongyang
more than six years to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(CSA) with the IAEA after it had signed up to the NPT in 1985. This
despite pressure from the Soviet Union, a long-time supporter of North
Korea’s nuclear programme. And when the CSA was signed, North
Korea’s declaration contained a number of ‘surprises’, with Pyongyang
declaring a previously unknown small operating Magnox reactor, two
much larger Magnox reactors under construction and a reprocessing
plant.30 Built indigenously, these reactors were of a similar design to those
that had been used by the United Kingdom to produce plutonium for its
nuclear weapons programme.
Initial IAEA analysis, which included the forensic examination of pluto-
nium samples provided by North Korea cast doubt on its declaration. In
particular, its claim that spent fuel from its Magnox reactor had been
reprocessed just once lacked credibility. Rather, the evidence suggested
that there had been several reprocessing campaigns, implying that North
Korea had separated more plutonium than it had reported. Satellite imag-
ery, provided by the United States, showed what appeared to be two cam-
ouflaged nuclear facilities, not present within North Korea’s declaration.
To try and resolve these discrepancies, a special inspection that would
authorise the IAEA to visit the undeclared facilities was requested by the
IAEA. This was rejected by North Korea and Pyongyang responded by
threatening to withdraw from the NPT. Tensions escalated as sanctions
proposed by the United States were countered by the threat of war.
Although this crisis was diffused through high-level talks, North Korea
would later go on to develop and test its first nuclear device in 2006, pro-
duced with the undeclared separated plutonium from its Magnox
reactor.
The proliferation challenges posed by the cases of Iraq and North Korea
prompted a comprehensive review of the safeguards system in the early
1990s. It had become clear that it was essential for the IAEA to be able to
verify not just the ‘correctness’, but also the ‘completeness’ of a state’s
safeguard declaration. In order to achieve this, the IAEA would need to
increase the intrusiveness and broaden the scope of its verification efforts
so it could actively look for undeclared nuclear activities. Consequently,
new measures related to information provision, access and the use of tech-
nical tools were codified in the Additional Protocol (AP), which was intro-
duced in 1997.
Under this more robust standard, participating states are required to
provide information on past, present and future activities, across the entire
nuclear fuel cycle, including research and development. With the North
Korean case demonstrating the utility of information obtained through
national technical means (NTM), member states were also encouraged to
provide the IAEA with intelligence of relevance to the proliferation activi-
ties of other countries. Inspector access was no longer limited to previ-
ously agreed ‘strategic points’, but was instead expanded to cover any part
of a nuclear facility. The prospect of inspections at short notice was also
introduced, where requests for access were to be granted in as little as two
hours. The IAEA Secretariat was also now encouraged to make full use of
its right to conduct special inspections. Finally, a number of new technical
tools were added to the repertoire of inspectors, including the use of envi-
ronmental sampling that could be used to obtain additional information
on the isotopic and chemical properties of materials, making it harder for
unauthorised activities to go undetected.
The Challenge of Assessing Compliance

The expansion of safeguards activities as part of the Additional Protocol
has provided the IAEA with a much wider range of information upon
which it can base safeguards judgements. Despite these advances, how-
ever, determining cases of serious non-compliance and distinguishing
these from reporting oversights or interpretative differences is far from
straightforward. This is due, at least in part, to the absence of an established
definition of safeguards non-compliance, which complicates efforts to dis-

tinguish between technical versus material breaches.31 There is also the
intrinsic challenge of assessing intent and determining whether actions
were inadvertent or deliberate.
In some cases, such as those of Iraq, Romania, North Korea and Libya,
determining non-compliance may be straightforward. In the case of Libya,
the process was facilitated by Qadhafi’s admission at the start of the IAEA’s
investigation into Libya’s nuclear activities in 2003, that Tripoli had con-
travened its safeguards obligations and pursued a nuclear weapons pro-
gramme for decades.32 In other cases, however, potential proliferation
related activities may be more ambiguous and it can be challenging to
determine whether safeguards violations are indeed the result of a state’s
clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, beyond the techni-
cal details of any one case, the political and diplomatic consequences of
being found in non-compliance make the assessment process a complex
and politically loaded one. The IAEA Board of Governors is composed of
member state representatives and is thus never immune to the influence of
global geopolitics. The cases of South Korea, Egypt and Iran provide use-
ful examples in this regard.
In 2004 South Korea informed the IAEA that it had performed small-
scale uranium enrichment and conversion experiments in both 2000 and
the 1980s without notifying the Agency as required under its safeguards
agreement. Yet the case was not straightforward since Seoul claimed that
the experiments had been carried out without government knowledge or
authorization. The IAEA investigation that followed concluded that these
activities did not constitute safeguards non-compliance. Rather, they were
categorised as a reporting “failure”, a decision that sat uneasily with some
member states.33 The US Department of State, for example, was initially
split on the IAEA’s assessment of South Korea’s nuclear activities.34
Accordingly to Findlay, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton believed that Seoul should be found in
non-compliance and the case referred to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), a move that would have represented a significant diplo-
matic escalation of the issue. This was in stark contrast with the views of
Korea experts within the Department of State, who felt that this would
place South Korea on a par with other more severe cases of proliferation
and significantly undermine relations with a key US ally in the region.
Washington ultimately endorsed the latter view, with the United States
using its influence to lobby ‘other members of the agency’s board of
governors to ensure that it [South Korea] was not found in non-compli-

ance’.35 This clearly demonstrates the complex, political dimension of the
broader safeguards regime, and highlights the fact that verification out-
comes are often tied to global geopolitics.
In the case of Egypt, it was open source research that alerted the IAEA
to the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities in the country that dated
back decades. An IAEA report in early 2005 noted Egypt’s “repeated fail-
ures” to report the use of “small amounts” of nuclear material to conduct
experiments relating to plutonium separation and uranium enrichment.36
These were subsequently confirmed following a series of on-site inspec-
tions and discussions between Egyptian and IAEA officials. On the surface
at least, this appeared to be a clear violation of the safeguards agreement
Egypt had signed with the IAEA in 1981. In assessing Egypt’s nuclear
activities, however, the IAEA took a similar line to the South Korean case
and announced that the activities in question did not constitute non-
compliance with its safeguards agreement. Instead, its failures to report
the aforementioned activities in a timely manner were noted as a “matter
of concern”, a decision that again caused controversy, not least within the
Agency itself.37 Pierre Goldschmidt, the IAEA Deputy Director General
for Safeguards at the time, was one of the more high-profile figures calling
for Egypt to be found in non-compliance.38 Goldschmidt was concerned
about the potential for the cumulative effects of the South Korean and
Egyptian cases, occurring in short succession in the mid-2000s, to under-
mine the credibility of the IAEA and the safeguards regime. In a s ubsequent
academic article, Goldschmidt noted the likely political and procedural
influences that contributed to the IAEA position – “In its decision not to
report Egypt to the Security Council, it is likely that the board took into
account the South Korean precedent, its wish not to put Egypt in the
same category as Iran, Egypt’s cooperation with the agency, and the cor-
rective actions it had already taken” – but argued that “none of these pos-
sible justifications can be considered satisfactory”.39
In general terms, these examples highlight some of the tensions that
accompanied the evolution of the IAEA safeguards verification regime. In
the safeguards context, the technical demands of the verification process
are overlaid with a layer of complex politics and bureaucracy that has the
potential to distort or reshape possible outcomes according to diplomatic
and political priorities. The potential here is all the greater when issues
relating to non-compliance are ambiguous or uncertain. “What is non-
compliance? How does one distinguish non-compliance from ‘minor
reporting oversights’? What happens if the ‘mistake’ is a one-time inci-

dent? Who decides that a state is in non-compliance?” – These are some of
the questions that the subjective dimension of the safeguards process
engenders. Crucially, these are perennial questions whose answers are
never entirely fixed and depend heavily on the surrounding diplomatic and
political context.
Verifying Iran’s Nuclear Activities: A Case Study

in Complexity
If South Korea and Egypt illustrate the challenges that arise when assess-
ments regarding compliance are clouded by the subtleties of context and
the problems of determining intent in the event of small-scale misdemean-
ours, the case of Iran demonstrates a much more complex web of prob-
lems. Indeed, there is arguably no better case for illustrating the scope of
potential challenges that may be encountered when attempting to verify
nuclear activities. In 2002, revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facili-
ties thrust Iran’s nuclear programme into the international spotlight and
prompted an IAEA investigation into claims that Tehran had engaged in
illicit nuclear activities. Iran was referred to the UN Security Council in
early 2006 and was subsequently subject to six UNSC Resolutions relating
to its nuclear activities.40 In 2011, the IAEA published a report setting out
evidence relating to the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme.
It was only in 2013, after more than a decade of political and diplomatic
wrangling, and in the context of an oppressive sanctions regime, that Iran
agreed the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) with the P5+1, a step that ulti-
mately led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that set
out the terms for significant rollback of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear activities from a verification per-
spective were twofold. First, from the point at which Iran’s undeclared
nuclear activities were made public in 2002, the IAEA was engaged in a
constant effort to elicit information from Tehran regarding various aspects
of its nuclear programme. Yet sufficient information was not forthcoming
and when the Agency first found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards
Agreement in 2005, the accumulated concerns of the IAEA Board of
Governors were expressed in a resolution that called on Iran “To imple-
ment transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal require-
ments of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include
access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use

equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and develop-
ment locations” – this in addition to suspension of enrichment activities
and other measures.41
The perceived failure of Iran to provide adequate information, particu-
larly with regard to alleged research on weaponisation-relevant issues
remained a point of contention for well over a decade and constituted an
important factor influencing subsequent punitive action, from the IAEA’s
decision to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council to the vari-
ous rounds of unilateral and multilateral sanctions that followed. Yet the
situation was by no means straightforward. Iran consistently challenged
IAEA calls for additional information, claiming that it was acting within
the limits of its Safeguards Agreement. And the IAEA acknowledged that
determining non-compliance based on these complex and nuanced issues
of information provision was challenging. In 2009, for example, an IAEA
legal advisor stated that Iran’s failure to provide information on reactor
design plans was “inconsistent” with its obligations under its subsidiary
safeguards arrangements. However, the advisor went on to add that “it is
difficult to conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in
itself constitutes non-compliance with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards
agreement.42 Ultimately, Iran’s failure to provide adequate information on
various nuclear activities was deemed “inconsistent” with its safeguards
obligations, yet the point here is that the Iranian experience highlighted
certain limits, ambiguities and loopholes in the safeguards process. To this
day, Kerr notes that “whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The
treaty does not contain a mechanism for determining that a state-party has
violated its obligations…The UN Security Council has never declared Iran
to be in violation of the NPT; neither the council nor the UN General
Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. However, the
lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has
apparently had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has
taken action in response to the IAEA Board of Governors’ determination
that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement”.43 In practical terms, this
situation had tangible and important consequences on the ability of the
IAEA to assure the international community that Iran was not diverting
material to a nuclear weapons programme.
Second, the Iranian case has also demonstrated the practical challenges
of using intelligence-derived information and verifying weaponisation
related activities. Despite the IAEA obtaining ‘consistent and detailed
intelligence’ from several states that indicated that Iran had performed
research and development work of relevance to nuclear weapons, the
Agency struggled to engage Iran on these issues.44 Despite sustained inter-
national pressure, Iran repeatedly turned down requests for access to facil-
ities such as the Parchin military complex where these activities are believed
to have taken place. Tehran dismissed allegations of weaponisation-related
research as fabricated and also referred to national security concerns and
the need to protect classified information on its own conventional weap-
ons programme as reasons for restricting IAEA access to sites of concern.
Only recently have the IAEA and Iran begun the process of resolving
suspected weaponisation activities. The Iranian case also demonstrates
how verification becomes an increasingly difficult task the longer a case of
possible non-compliance endures. Over the past 15 years, the IAEA has
produced hundreds of technical reports, conducted countless interviews
with Iranian scientists and other experts and collected gigabytes of techni-
cal verification data in different formats and from multiple nuclear sites.45
The sheer volume and diversity of this information makes noncompliance
assessments ever more complex, leaving greater scope for interpretative
differences.
Verification and Nuclear Testing

While the focus of the chapter to this point has been on IAEA safeguards,
the effort to prevent diversion of nuclear materials to weapons pro-
grammes, there are other nuclear contexts where verification has also
proved challenging. The issue of nuclear testing provides a good example
in this regard. The 1950s saw the United States, the Soviet Union and the
United Kingdom increase the size and destructive power of their nuclear
arsenals. Major developments here included the construction of hydrogen
bombs, weapons with a yield many orders of magnitude greater than the
nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Inevitably, the devel-
opmental process involved trials of the weapons, yet testing was unpredict-
able as scientists were still coming to terms with the physics behind these
new devices. In 1954, for example, a hydrogen bomb tested by the United
States at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands detonated with nearly twice
its predicted yield, vastly increasing the area of dangerous radioactive fall-
out and irradiating a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon. Several of
the crewmembers suffered radiation sickness and the incident was widely
reported by international media.46 This incident dramatically illustrated
that the consequences and implications of nuclear testing were much

broader than previously thought and it intensified pressures to ‘ban the
bomb’, bring an end to nuclear testing and avoid what was portrayed by
anti-nuclear activists as an inevitable march towards nuclear
armageddon.47
The first concrete step towards limiting nuclear testing was taken in
1955 when the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
Canada and France entered into discussions on this issue at the UN
Disarmament Commission. These negotiations soon ran into difficulties
with disagreements over the scope of such an agreement, namely whether
it should be focused solely on nuclear testing or also include limitations on
conventional forces and fissile material production. However, it was the
issue of verification that arguably constituted the main barrier to progress,
with the major powers taking opposing positions. Writing in a letter to US
President Eisenhower in 1956, USSR Premier Bulganin claimed that a
nuclear explosion could not occur “without being recorded in other coun-
tries” and consequently advocated for an immediate cessation of nuclear
testing.48 In contrast, the United States was concerned that the size of the
Soviet landmass would render small underground explosions indistin-
guishable from earthquakes. Taking the view that the establishment of an
international verification system was a necessary prerequisite for such a
ban, Eisenhower replied to Bulganin that in order for such an agreement
“to be effective, and not simply a mirage”, a system of inspections and
control was required.49
This viewpoint was gradually taken on board by the Soviet Union who
incorporated international controls into their 1957 revised test ban pro-
posals. The next three years saw some progress with states adopting volun-
tary moratoria on nuclear testing, while technical experts met to work out
what an international verification system might encompass. However, this
period of optimism was short-lived, with France carrying out its first
nuclear test in 1960 and the Soviet Union and United States resuming
testing a year later. Efforts to achieve a test ban, despite numerous discus-
sions, had faltered in part over deeply ingrained verification differences.
Areas of contention included the frequency and coverage of on-site
inspections, the numbers and locations of verification stations and the
level of international involvement. Western powers pushed for a system of
intrusive inspections under international control, while the Soviet Union
wanted limited inspections, with stations nationally owned and operated.
As talks stalled, focus shifted to achieving a more limited agreement that
did not cover underground testing, the most challenging area for verifica-
tion. This removed a considerable element of contention and the United
States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom went on to negotiate the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which entered into force in October
1963 and banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space
and underwater. Verification was not explicitly outlined within the treaty,
but the three environments were chosen so that existing national technical
means would be capable of detecting violations. In the case of the United
States its Atomic Detection System made use of ground-based sensors
capable of detecting seismic, acoustic and electromagnetic signals, com-
plemented by satellite systems that could detect the distinctive double-
flashes of nuclear detonations.50
Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban

Further progress towards a comprehensive test ban was made between the
United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s with the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and its companion treaty, the Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE) of 1976. Both sought to restrict the
development of powerful new nuclear weapons by establishing a maxi-
mum threshold for testing in any environment: a yield of 150 kT for any
individual explosion. A significantly greater, aggregated yield of 1,500 kT
was agreed to provide for large nuclear explosions for civil purposes.
In contrast to the LTBT, discussions surrounding verification of the
TTBT progressed quickly, with an informal scientist-led approach yield-
ing a protocol in less than two months.51 This included unprecedented
technical data exchanges on the location and geology of testing sites,
with information on the yield of planned tests provided in advance to
assist the calibration of seismic sensors. For the PNE more intrusive veri-
fication measures were necessary to ensure that individual devices above
the 150 kT threshold could not be hidden within the background noise
of a group explosion. These included onsite inspections by the verifying
party, where rock samples could be taken to verify geophysical data and
associated facilities could be visited. The use of technical equipment
onsite by the inspection party was also permitted. In order to ensure that
this would only capture treaty relevant data and not other potentially
sensitive information, the hosts were permitted to certify this equipment
in advance.
Despite the relatively rapid progress in agreeing verification measures,

challenges remained. There would still be an intrinsic degree of uncer-
tainty when converting seismic data to yield measurements, making it
impossible to categorically refute allegations, such as those made in the US
media, that the Soviets were cheating.52 As a consequence, ratification was
delayed, with the United States and the Soviet Union agreeing to observe
the 150 kT limit, but without the accompanying verification regime. The
testing of new, more accurate onsite technologies in the late 1980s helped
allay these concerns and the treaties were finally ratified in 1990, just in
time for the Soviets to monitor two US nuclear explosions before both
sides adopted unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapons testing.
An International Verification System to Monitor

Nuclear Testing
The end of the Cold War and the extension of the US and Soviet morato-
riums presented an opportunity for further progress to be made on ending
nuclear testing. With the Conference on Disarmament beginning negotia-
tions on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1994. The next two
years saw fierce debates over the scope of the Treaty and how it would be
verified, with “a thousand points of disagreement” within the working
document.53
Technical verification issues were now relatively well understood fol-
lowing decades of discussions through fora such as the Group of Scientific
Experts (GSE). In negotiations, states sought to incorporate a system that
would be “universal and internationally and effectively verifiable”.54 This
was reflected in the International Monitoring System (IMS) adopted,
which incorporates multiple complementary elements – hundreds of seis-
mic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring stations –
aimed at identifying “a nuclear explosion with a yield of 1 kT TNT
equivalent with at least 95 percent probability”.55 More controversial
issues included the potential use of national intelligence, the process for
triggering an on-site inspection and whether states or the International
Data Center (IDC), the recipient of monitoring data, should perform the
analysis.56 NTM was ultimately included in the treaty, albeit in a broad
sense “consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law”, and it was agreed that the IDC would make data available to state
parties while also producing its own analysis.57
Onsite inspections could be triggered upon request from a state party,

if approved by two-thirds of the Executive Council. In this context,
inspections presented a somewhat unique challenge given the large size of
a potential area of relevance, set within the Treaty at a maximum of 1,000
square kilometres. Verification methods included visual inspections from
the ground and overflights, the use of penetrating mapping technology
to explore underground structures, and radiological environmental
sampling.58 The CTBT also incorporates confidence-building measures,
whereby states can voluntarily report on chemical explosions with yields
larger than 0.3 kT and invite inspectors to visit the test sites.
Although the CTBT is not yet in force, its IMS is operational and has
been collecting and analysing data for more than a decade. During this
time, North Korea has tested six nuclear devices, which have served as a
useful test-bed for the system. Each of these tests (2006, 2009, 2013,
2016 – twice and 2017) were picked up by the seismic sensors of the IMS,
with the epicentres each time narrowed down to a known nuclear testing
site, well within the CTBT-mandated 1,000 square km maximum inspec-
tion area. For the 2006 and 2013 tests, IMS stations also detected radio-
active noble gases, which can provide valuable information on the type of
nuclear material used, and potentially even the weapon design. For exam-
ple, the radionuclides collected from the 2006 nuclear test suggested that
plutonium (as opposed to highly enriched uranium) had been used.
However, there are limits to what can be ascertained remotely. For exam-
ple, following the 2016 nuclear test, Pyongyang announced that it had
successfully tested a small thermonuclear device. This has been disputed,
with analysts arguing that the estimated yield is more consistent with a
boosted fission weapon. Despite the significantly larger 2017 test an ele-
ment of uncertainty still remains as it is not possible to provide a definitive
distinction from existing IMS data. An onsite inspection could provide
further clarifying information, but this has not been possible in the case of
North Korea.
Beyond the North Korean case, and even without the treaty entering
into force, the feasibility of onsite inspections has been practically tested,
with a large Integrated Field Exercise performed in Jordan in 2014.59 This
exercise, based around a scenario involving an undeclared underground
nuclear test, helped to demonstrate the readiness and utility of onsite
inspection tools, prompting the CTBTO executive secretary to declare that
“all components of the [CTBT] verification regime” had been mastered.60
Efforts to Reduce Nuclear Weapons Numbers

Serious and prolonged discussions between the superpowers on limiting
numbers of nuclear weapons have taken place since the mid-1960s, fol-
lowing improved relations after the nuclear standoff at the heart of the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. By this point nuclear weapons numbers had
risen into the thousands, creating a strategic stalemate of mutually assured
destruction, with each side deterred from initiating a first strike by the
knowledge that the inevitable retaliation would lead to their own demise.61
Yet actions taken to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons have so far been
“inherently conservative” designed “not so much to create a new stability
but to consolidate one that already existed”.62
The research and development of anti-ballistic defences in the late
1960s, which had the potential to intercept incoming nuclear tipped mis-
siles, increased the risk of a disarming first strike. In order to preserve the
strategic balance and “control the anti-ballistic missile race” the United
States and the Soviet Union entered into Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), which culminated in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and
the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972. These limited the number and
extent of anti-ballistic defences and capped strategic nuclear weapons
numbers at existing levels. Verification for these treaties, as was the case for
the TTBT, was to be carried out through national technical means,
although a number of important precedents were set. SALT I was the first
agreement that measured weapons-specific items. Calculations here were
complex, with differences in US and Soviet force structures taken into
account when “attempting to create a sense of parity”.63 A principle of
non-interference was also established where parties agreed “not to inter-
fere” or to use “deliberate concealment” to impede verification activities.64
There was also recognition that the agreements were not all-encompassing
and that it was likely that some activities would be judged as ambiguous.
As a result, a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was created as a
forum for resolving compliance issues.
In implementing SALT I, national technical means were largely ade-
quate for monitoring violations due to the Treaty’s focus on accounting
for large items such as strategic launchers. However, a lack of clarity in the
Treaty text did create challenges when judging compliance. While dis-
cussed and largely resolved within the SCC, they were nevertheless seized
upon as evidence of non-compliance by unilateralists on both sides. For
example, with the Soviet Union’s approach to compliance based on
“narrow interpretations” of the treaty texts, it could be argued that their

actions violated the spirit of the agreements.65 Nevertheless arms control
discussions continued, with a follow-on treaty, SALT II, signed in 1979
that sought to reduce strategic weapons, while also constraining changes
in weapons characteristics, such as the use of systems with Multiple
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). To aid verification
“externally observable differences” were built into similar non-nuclear sys-
tems and the deliberate denial of telemetry relevant to weapons character-
istics was banned. However, even with these new measures, requirements
under SALT II were arguably “beyond the ability of national technical
means alone” to verify compliance.66 With verification becoming an
increasingly politicised issue and with US-Soviet relations in decline, a
situation precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979, SALT II was never ratified.
Onsite Inspections at Nuclear Weapons Facilities

Improved relations between the superpowers in the mid-1980s combined
with a change in Soviet leadership led to a renewal of arms control. During
this period, Gorbachev sought to reorient the Soviet Union’s strategic
aims and increase openness and transparency in its activities. This paved
the way for new arms control initiatives with the more intrusive verifica-
tion measures that the US had long been in favour of.
In the early 1980s, new systems such as the SS-20 demonstrated
improving Soviet theatre range missile capabilities that threatened the
strategic balance in Europe. Arms control talks resulted in the Treaty on
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), signed in 1987, which was
significant for several reasons. It was the first treaty that eliminated an
entire class of weapons that were both modern and effective. It also estab-
lished a “principle that asymmetric reductions were acceptable to achieve
a goal of greater stability” with the Soviets agreeing to destroy twice as
many missiles as the US.67 Moreover, its verification mechanism was by far
the most intrusive applied to nuclear weapons to date, acknowledged as
“unprecedented in [its] variation, degree and intrusiveness”.68 The INF
Treaty was also significant in its clear recognition that “perfect verifica-
tion” was both unnecessary and infeasible, instead adopting the approach
that an effective system should be able to detect violations that “moved
beyond the limits of the treaty in a military significant way”.69 Given the
large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials retained by both sides,
the detection limit was set relatively high. For example, SS-20 missiles
were set at 50 items, which could have carried a maximum of 150
warheads.70
Under the INF Treaty, national technical means were combined with
the use of onsite inspections, necessary to verify relatively small missile
components, with different modes of inspection agreed for every step of
the dismantlement process. Baseline inspections were performed to verify
declared inventories, followed by inspections to observe the elimination
process and its termination.71 Once completed, there was continuous por-
tal monitoring of the perimeter of the facility, which included the X-raying
of exiting vehicles. This helped ensure that if missiles had escaped the
dismantlement process they could not be transported offsite. There were
also short-notice inspections that could be triggered at any point, with
inspectors authorised to use measurement devices, radiation detectors and
cameras to check for undeclared activities. Under this regime hundreds of
inspections were carried out at facilities across many countries.
Further Reductions in Nuclear Weapons Numbers

Progress in arms control continued with the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) of 1991, which had been under discussion for nearly ten
years. Focusing on long-range nuclear forces, such as heavy bombers and
strategic ballistic missiles, verification under START built on the “prin-
ciples and procedures” developed for INF and SALT.72 This included the
use of national technical means, large-scale data exchange and different
types of on-site inspection. Verification was extended from the launcher
to the re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles. This was a necessary step to
confirm that missiles contained no more than the agreed number of war-
heads attributed to them. Given the sensitivity of the items and facilities
under verification, managed access techniques were employed. These
provided inspectors access under conditions designed to ensure that pro-
liferation relevant design details were not revealed. Practically, this
included measures such as the shrouding of re-entry vehicles, so that
inspectors could ascertain the number of warheads on a selected missile,
without being exposed to technical design information.73 A follow on
treaty START II was signed 1993, but never came into force. This would
have banned all MIRV-ed ICBMs and limited SLBM warheads, relying
largely on the same verification regime as for START. Arms control
efforts around this time stalled in part due to renewed US interest in
missile defence. Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002

prompted Russia to abandon the ratification of START II later that year.
However, arms control dialogue between the two states continued,
resulting in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), known
as the Moscow Treaty, signed in 2002. While pledging to significantly
reduce the number of strategic weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200,
from the 6,000 warhead-level allowed under START, it did not include
any of the verification measures that had become commonplace in arms
control treaties, with the Treaty text comprising just a single page. SORT
was a compromise between the United States, who under Bush had
pushed for a non-binding agreement to ensure maximum flexibility in a
changing international security environment, and Russia, who sought a
formal treaty for political reasons.74 In the absence of specific verification
provisions, information derived from START related verification activi-
ties was used to assess compliance with SORT.75
Progress towards a follow-on treaty was slow, with New START even-
tually signed by the Obama administration in April 2010 – over four
months after START had expired. Entering into force in February 2011,
New START further reduced strategic offensive nuclear forces, although
it differed from START in that it focused on an aggregate total number
of warheads, rather than imposing sub-limits on different systems. This
change reflected “a lesser concern with Cold War models of strategic and
crisis stability” and the US desire to maintain the ability to restructure
its nuclear forces.76 There were also differences in warhead counting,
with parties declaring the total numbers of warheads deployed across
their force, as opposed to assuming that every missile and bomber car-
ried the same number of attributed warheads. This provided further flex-
ibility by allowing the parties to reduce forces without eliminating
launchers. New START also confirmed the relationship between offen-
sive and defensive weapons, noting that this “will become more impor-
tant as strategic nuclear arms are reduced”.77 Verification under New
START remained similar to its predecessor, with streamlined provisions
designed to reduce cost and improve efficiency. Despite recently strained
US-Russia relations, verification under New START has proceeded
smoothly to date, with neither side reporting any compliance concerns.
Over the past five years the United States and Russia have shared more
than 10,000 notifications, with both sides conducting 18 onsite inspec-
tions each year.78
Conclusion: The Limits of Progress

This Chapter has sought to provide a brief history of key nuclear verifica-
tion initiatives. In doing so, it has attempted to highlight the complexities,
challenges and progress made over the last 60 years. While often thought
of as a dispassionate and technical process, history has shown that verifica-
tion is influenced by a multitude of factors. First and foremost, international
politics and relations between states play an important role in shaping veri-
fication systems, determining what verification techniques may be used
and how, and when they can be applied. The evidence shows that states
will often advocate for fundamentally different approaches, disagreeing on
verification requirements and key questions such as how much is enough.
Consequently, the regimes that come into being inevitably constitute a
compromise between different positions, and do not necessarily represent
the best technical solution to various verification challenges.
When it comes to verification judgements and outcomes, these can be
far from straightforward and may be strongly influenced by external fac-
tors, such as broader strategic interests. Even within a particular state,
different domestic constituencies of interest may disagree significantly on
interpretations and practicalities of compliance. Those opposed to arms
control will tend to seize upon violations or even ambiguities as clear evi-
dence of deliberate cheating, while those in favour may interpret these as
minor and unavoidable oversights or unintended consequences. This said,
history has also shown that verification need not be perfect, so long as it
can provide sufficient confidence that state parties are in compliance with
their international commitments and obligations. Successful efforts should
focus on detecting militarily significant actions, rather than fixating on
arbitrary or minor violations.
In constructing nuclear verification systems, it is clear that a core con-
cern is the intrinsic tension between necessary levels of intrusiveness and the
need to guard against the release of militarily- or commercially-sensitive
information. For early efforts, this balance was tilted towards the informa-
tion protection end of this spectrum, with systems reliant on either national
technical means or the limited use of on-site inspections. Over time, how-
ever, verification systems have become more intrusive as a result of lessons
learnt from past failures and in response to changing verification require-
ments. Ultimately, there is now a strong consensus around the idea that
on-site inspections are a vital component of nuclear verification regimes and
that it is possible for these to be performed in sensitive military installations.
This is supported by the existence of a wide range of tested tools and

approaches that inspectors can utilise to check the ‘correctness’ of a state’s
declaration. These have been developed and refined over decades of verifi-
cation activities across different regimes. Techniques such as managed
access have been successfully used to collect important verification data
while minimising the risk of sensitive information being revealed during
inspections. All this said, verification activities have not been conducted in
all potential environments, such as in the aftermath of a nuclear weapons
test or at a facility where nuclear warheads are dismantled.
Clearly, progress in this space has not gone unhindered. There have
been a number of significant challenges to nuclear verification regimes,
most notably with the IAEA safeguards system. A number of prolifera-
tion cases have demonstrated the particular challenges associated with
verifying the ‘completeness’ of a state’s declared nuclear activities. While
this is equally true in principle for other regimes in other contexts, the
nature of the regimes currently in place means that it has yet to prove a
significant obstacle to progress. For example, in US-Russia bilateral dis-
armament efforts to date, both sides have retained large arsenals of
nuclear weapons, offsetting any advantage that might be gained from
cheating through incorrect declarations. Clearly, this situation would
change if reductions led to much smaller arsenals since, as Freedman puts
it, “when it comes to nuclear weapons, small numbers really matter”.79 A
significant strategic advantage could be gained by holding weapons back
during dismantlement at low numbers. This challenge is compounded by
the difficulty nuclear weapons states will face in accounting accurately for
past activities. As discussed by Perkovich and Acton, material production
records that now trace back more than 60 years are not always complete,
and this before even attempting to take into account process losses and
material used in testing.80 Yet the case of South Africa’s disarmament
offers hope in this regard. Despite considerable technical difficulties for
the IAEA in determining its production history, Pretoria’s transparent
and cooperative behaviour “built trust” and fed into the ultimate judge-
ment that South Africa had not hidden an undeclared stockpile of HEU.81
Ultimately, the history of verification across the nuclear enterprise has
produced a significant body of knowledge that forms the basis of current
and future work. In particular, it serves as the backdrop to longstanding
research and development efforts in the specific area of nuclear warhead
dismantlement.
Notes
1. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics
30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
2. Barton Swaim, “‘Trust, but Verify’: An Untrustworthy Political Phrase,”
Washington Post, March 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/trust-but-verify-an-untrustworthy-political-phrase/2016/
03/11/da32fb08-db3b-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html.
3. ‘Verification’ in Collins English Dictionary
4. David Shipler, “The Summit - Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty
and Vow to Work for Greater Reductions,” New York Times, December 9,
1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/09/world/summit-reagan-
gorbachev-sign-missile-treaty-vow-work-for-greater-reductions.html?page
wanted=all&mcubz=3.
5. Government Publishing Office, “Congressional Record - Senate,” October
12, 1999, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRECB-1999-pt17/pdf/
CRECB-1999-pt17-issue-1999-10-12.pdf.
6. The White House, “Declaration on the Atomic Bomb by President
Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and Kind,” November 15, 1945,
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/history/
dec-truma-atlee-king_1945-11-15.htm.
7. Ibid.
8. James Tape and Joseph Pilat, “Nuclear Safeguards and the Security of
Nuclear Materials,” in Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation:
Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, ed. James E. Doyle
(Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), 19.
9. 86th Congress, “Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Agreements for
Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the
United States,” June 30, 1959.
10. “The Statute of the IAEA,” Text, Approved 23 October 1956, Entered into
Force 19 July 1957, (June 2, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/about/
statute.
11. Ibid.
12. Stephen Gorove, “Inspection and Control in EURATOM,” The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 23, no. 3 (1967): 42.
13. Ibid.
14. Harald Müller, “The Evolution of Verification: Lessons from the Past for
the Present,” Arms Control 14, no. 3 (1993): 334.
15. John F. Kennedy, News Conference in Washington DC, 21 March 1963.
16. IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” International Nuclear Verification
Series No. 3 (Vienna, 2002).
17. Ibid., 23.
18. Ibid.
19. Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium
and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons
(Washington DC: National Resources Defense Council, 1994), 3.
20. C.F. Norman et al., “The Importance of Correctness: The Role of Nuclear
Material Accountancy and Nuclear Material Analysis in the State Evaluation
Process,” IAEA Safeguards Symposium, (2010).
21. Gallagher, The Politics of Verification, 148.
22. Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Safeguards System Moves into the 21st
Century,” Supplement to the IAEA Bulletin 41, no. 4 (December 1999):
S-3.
23. Leonard Weiss, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Strengths and
Gaps,” in Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, by Henry
Sokolski (Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press, 1996).
24. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and
Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 105.
25. Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osirak Revisited,” International Security
7, no. 2 (1992): 114–42.
26. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and
Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 130.
27. Wolfgang Fischer and Gotthard Stein, “On-Site Inspections: Experiences
from Nuclear Safeguarding,” Disarmament Forum 3 (1999): 49.
28. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency
and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” June 1, 1972.
29. IAEA General Conference, “Iraq’s Non-Compliance with Its Safeguards
Obligations,” September 16, 1991, 37, 41.
30. David Fischer, “The DPRK’s Violation of Its NPT Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA Excerpt from ‘History of the International Atomic Energy
Agency’” (IAEA, 1997), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/dprk.
pdf.
31. John Carlson, “Defining Compliance: NPT Safeguards Agreement,” Arms
Control Association, May 8, 2009, https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2009_5/Carlson. The 2001 edition of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary,
does define “non-compliance” as “a violation by a State of a safeguards agree-
ment with the IAEA” and gives several examples of how this could occur.
However, this document is aimed at improving international understanding
of safeguards and has no legal status. IAEA Safeguards Glossary, IAEA, 2002,
www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-Glossary.
32. William Tobey, “A Message from Tripoli: How Libya Gave up Its WMD,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 3, 2014, http://thebulletin.
org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834.
33. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” November 11, 2004, 7.
34. Trevor Findlay, “Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance
Reporting,” Project on Managing the Atom (Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2015), 73–74.
35. George Perkovich and James Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,”
Adelphi 396 (2008): 89.
Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt,” February 14, 2005, 5.
37. Ibid., 6.
38. Findlay, “Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting,”
76.
39. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance,” Survival 51,
no. 1 (2009): 154.
40. Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with
International Obligations” (Congressional Research Service, May 31,
2016), 9, http://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/united-states/
congress/congressional-research-service-reports/irans-nuclear-program-
tehrans-compliance-international-obligations-0.
Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt,” 3.
42. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International
Obligations,” 8.
43. Ibid., 12.
44. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement,” November 8, 2011, 15.
45. Correspondence with IAEA Safeguards Analyst via email, 21 August 2016.
46. Jeff Kingston, “Blast from the Past: Lucky Dragon 60 Years on,” The
Japan Times, February 8, 2014, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opin-
ion/2014/02/08/commentary/blast-from-the-past-lucky-dragon-
60-years-on/#.WaWPBtOGM01.
47. “1960: Thousands Protest against H-Bomb,” BBC News, April 18, 1960,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/18/new-
sid_2909000/2909881.stm.
48. Department of State, “Letter from the Soviet Premier (Bulganin) to
President Eisenhower Regarding Nuclear Weapons Tests, 17 October
1956,” in Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959, Volume I, 1960, 695.
49. Department of State, “Letter from President Eisenhower to the Soviet
Premier (Bulganin) Regarding Nuclear Weapons Tests, 21 October 1956,”
in Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959, Volume I, 1960, 697.
50. US Department of State, “Technical Forms of Nuclear Test Limitation and
Registration,” Memorandum of Conversation (NSA, April 20, 1957),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB7/docs/doc04.pdf.
51. Edward Ifft, “The Threshold Test Ban Treaty,” Arms Control Today 23,
no. 3–4 (March 4, 2009): 385–96.
52. Ibid.
54. First Committee, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (United
Nations General Assembly, December 6, 1993), 4, https://www.ctbto.
org/the-treaty/.
55. Martin B. Kalinowski, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Verification,” in Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions, by Rudolph
Avenhaus et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2006), 135–52.
57. “Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty” (Preparatory Commission for
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 1996), 35,
https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf.
58. Kalinowski, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Verification,” 140.
59. “Integrated Field Exercise 2014: CTBTO Preparatory Commission,”
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization, November 3, 2014, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/
integrated-field-exercise-2014/.
60. CTBTO, “Largest-Ever CTBT on-Site Inspection Exercise Concludes
Successfully,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission, accessed August 29, 2017,
https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2014/largest-ever-
ctbt-on-site-inspection-exercise-concludes-successfully/.
61. Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,
1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 4 (2010): 77–83.
62. Lawrence Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 4 (2009): 14–30.
63. Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit, “Politics, Verification and Arms Control,”
The Washington Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1984): 114–25.
64. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Interim
Agreement Between the United States of American and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” May 26, 1972, https://www.
state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm.
65. Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,”
International Organisations 41 (1987): 395.
66. Lowenthal and Wit, “Politics, Verification and Arms Control,” 119.
67. Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Control and
Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,” Report
(Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2010), 7, https://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85466/.
68. Harald Müller, “The Evolution of Verification: Lessons from the Past for
the Present,” Arms Control 14, no. 3 (n.d.): 341.
69. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” 50.
70. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons.”
71. Müller, “The Evolution of Verification: Lessons from the Past for the
Present,” n.d., 341.
72. Ibid., 342.
73. National Research Council, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-
Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities (National
Academy of Sciences, 2005), 62, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11265/
monitoring-nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-explosive-materials-an-assess-
ment-of.
74. Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty” (Congressional Research Service, February 7, 2011), 14–15.
75. “The Value of New Start Verification,” Arms Control Association 1, no. 9
(July 21, 2010): 1–4; Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
“Interim Agreement Between the United States of American and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.”
76. Woolf, “Nuclear Arms Control,” 18.
77. Ibid., 19.
78. Ibid., 20.
79. Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament.”
80. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” 61–64.
81. Ibid., 70.
CHAPTER 3
Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

Verification: Opportunities and Challenges
The previous chapter explored some of the ways that the idea of verifica-
tion has found expression in the nuclear arena. From the complexities of
IAEA safeguards, to the challenges associated with bilateral and interna-
tional treaties, this brief and eclectic overview of verification-related initia-
tives provided an insight into the evolution of the concept and its
application. Of particular interest here is the fact that the scope of nuclear
verification activities carried out under bilateral and international treaties
to date has been limited to civil materials and facilities, delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons and the remote identification of nuclear tests. The New
START Treaty provided inspectors with “the opportunity to confirm that
the actual number of warheads emplaced on a designated missile matches
the declared figure at the pre-inspection briefing”, but this did not go
beyond visual confirmation.1
Nuclear warheads and their components, including weapons-grade fis-
sile material, have so far been excluded from such agreements. Clearly, if
nuclear disarmament were to be achieved, this situation would have to
change. Indeed, the very idea of disarmament is inextricably linked to the
potential for relevant actors to effectively verify the dismantlement of
nuclear warheads. This was highlighted in the last review cycle of the NPT,
where the UK government emphasised that ‘developing and agreeing
effective measures for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads
will be an important precondition for fulfilling the goals of Article VI of
the NPT.’2

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_3
Despite the absence of any formal agreements regarding nuclear war-

heads and the dismantlement process, a number of studies have sought to
explore the challenges and opportunities for conducting verification
activities in this most demanding environment. The United States has
arguably been the most significant player in this regard. As early as 1963,
an initiative named Project Cloud Gap was established to explore the
“feasibility of theoretical arms control and disarmament measures”.3 This
initiative culminated in Field Test 34, an exercise to test the “verified
dismantlement of nuclear weapons” in the summer of 1967.4 The pur-
pose of exercises such as these was to probe the mechanics of dismantle-
ment verification, in particular the extent to which classified information
might be released during the verification process at different levels of
inspection intrusiveness.5 Another verification milestone was passed at the
end of the Cold War, when US and Soviet scientists undertook a short
series of unofficial experiments to verify the presence of nuclear weapons
at sea, on- board a Soviet cruiser in 1989. Known as the ‘Black Sea
Experiments’ these represented the first instance “where foreign scientists
were allowed to take radiation measurements on an operational nuclear
warhead”.6
These early efforts to explore the extent to which nuclear warhead dis-
mantlement could be effectively verified without compromising security
represented an anomaly of sorts, occurring as they did during a period that
was overshadowed by the US-Soviet arms race. Yet they played a crucial
role setting the path for subsequent thinking and technical development
in this area. Nearly a decade after Field Test 34, the US Department of
Energy, undertook a new two-year study into the potential components of
a future verification regime for nuclear dismantlement.7 This was carried
out in support of the on-going START III negotiations, a treaty that was
ultimately never signed. The study explored the level of confidence that
could be assigned to the dismantlement process, the possibility that classi-
fied information would be revealed and the disruptive impact that such a
system would have on operations at existing dismantlement facilities.
Established the same year, the Tri-lateral Initiative between the US,
Russia and the IAEA, sought to explore whether the IAEA’s nuclear safe-
guards systems could be extended to include nuclear weapons materials
and facilities.8 It concluded in 2002, with the claim by IAEA Director
General Mohammad El-Bharadei that the techniques trialled could, in
theory at least, enable the IAEA to “verify any form of fissile material with-
out disclosing sensitive information”.9
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT VERIFICATION: OPPORTUNITIES… 53
Of course, the United States and Russia are not the only states to have
carried out research into disarmament verification. In 2000, the United
Kingdom initiated its own unilateral disarmament verification programme,
with a focus on the challenges of authenticating warheads and their com-
ponents. Here too, researchers sought to explore the full range of verifica-
tion measures that could be applied to the disassembly process.10 The
United Kingdom has also sought to innovate in verification research. In
the mid-2000s, following the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference
to reach consensus, work began to develop a partnership between the
United Kingdom and Norway. The UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) was
unique in that it brought together, for the first time, a NWS and a NNWS
in a collaborative effort to probe various technical and procedural chal-
lenges relating to disarmament verification.11
Elsewhere, China has also been active in this space, claiming to have
been carrying out research into authentication and chain of custody tech-
nologies regarding nuclear dismantlement for some time.12 Outside of the
government sector research has been carried out by academic and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), with a focus on new innovative
technologies that might support future verification efforts.
Drawing on some of the research stemming from these various initia-
tives, this chapter provides an overview of the key considerations that must
be taken into account when designing and planning for the implementa-
tion of a future verification regime for nuclear warhead dismantlement.13
While it draws on the history of disarmament verification, it does not seek
to provide a detailed historical account. Cliff, Elbahtimy and Persbo have
published a comprehensive account to which we could add little.14 Rather,
it focuses on identifying the key challenges involved in verifying nuclear
warhead dismantlement, before discussing how different verification
approaches and technologies could be used to mitigate them. In doing so,
it provides important context for the design of the simulation that under-
pins this study and is outlined in Chapter 5.
Starting with a discussion of the dismantlement process, the chapter
examines the life cycle of nuclear warheads and the key steps involved in
their retirement. This is followed by consideration of the complex chal-
lenges associated with verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement, with a
focus on how to balance the risk of undetected cheating with the duty to
prevent the transfer of classified information. This issue, in particular, has
been at the crux of dismantlement verification research since its inception.
It is not a tension unique to nuclear warheads and can be found in other
verification regimes, although it is particularly strained in this context. The

strengths and weaknesses of key verification practices and technologies,
including those that have been developed specifically for use in a future
nuclear warhead dismantlement regime are then examined. This is fol-
lowed by a brief summary of the UKNI, the first study to probe the prac-
ticalities of dismantlement verification, with a focus on the interaction
between the host and inspecting parties. Much of the innovation here
relates to the focus on human factors within the dismantlement verifica-
tion process and its findings are particularly relevant for our study.
The Practice of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

It is believed that in excess of 100,000 nuclear weapons have been manu-
factured over the last seventy plus years by ten states.15 Two of these weap-
ons were dropped on Japan in 1945, while another 2,625 were used in
nuclear testing.16 Over time, this enormous collective stockpile has been
dramatically reduced – some estimates claim by over 80 per cent – and
current assessments put the combined number of nuclear weapons in the
world today at approximately 15,000.17 Clearly, then, a considerable body
of knowledge exists regarding the disassembly and disposal of nuclear
warheads.
This is a well-tried and tested process, practiced across different nuclear
weapon states and facilities. Much of the knowledge and insights here
have been driven by progress and modernisation. Disassembly and dis-
posal represents important and necessary final steps in the life cycle of a
warhead as it ages, eventually becoming either unreliable or obsolete as
new nuclear weapons are developed to take its place. While nuclear weapon
dismantlement is a common practice, however, there exists relatively little
information on this process within the public domain. This is not surpris-
ing given the secrecy that surrounds nuclear weapons programmes and the
particular sensitivity of the items and technology contained within a war-
head. Yet it does mean that the capacity of scholars working from open
sources to fully unpack the complexities involved in the process is limited.
With this in mind, the following sections focus on the major components
of a nuclear warhead and key steps and considerations that must be taken
into account during dismantlement.
Nuclear warheads are complex in structure containing both hazardous
and classified materials and components. There is no uniform warhead
design and those states in possession of nuclear weapons are all influenced
or constrained by a range of shaping factors, from access to fissile materials

and technology to considerations regarding the explosive yield and deliv-
ery mechanism. States may also choose to manufacture more than one
type of warhead, with the United States currently maintaining seven dis-
tinct designs within its nuclear arsenal.18
The most basic type of nuclear weapon derives its energy purely from
nuclear fission. These so called ‘first generation’ devices have been devel-
oped by all nuclear weapon states and share a number of common compo-
nents, including fissile material, high explosives, detonators, cabling and
electronics, all housed in an outer casing. More advanced weapons will
contain additional elements, for example, in a thermonuclear weapon a
fusion secondary stage is added containing other materials such a lithium
deuteride – the fuel from which energy is liberated via the process of
nuclear fusion. Modern weapons are typically complex devices, containing
multiple sections and subassemblies, the US B61 free-fall thermonuclear
bomb, for example, is composed of thousands of different parts.19
At its simplest, dismantlement can be thought of as the process whereby
a nuclear warhead is reduced to its various constituent elements, with the
steps followed roughly similar to those undertaken in assembling the war-
head in the first place, but in reverse.20 In consecutive stages, the warhead
is reduced to its fissile core and various waste streams of disassembled
components.21 The exact process and the tools and procedures required
will differ depending on the warhead being dismantled. However, reduc-
ing this complexity into some generic steps can serve to highlight some of
the major activities. For example, in the dismantlement of a ‘first genera-
tion’ fission weapon, there are two major steps. The first is the mechanical
removal of the physics package from the warhead, containing the fissile
core and high explosives, leaving behind an empty shell.22 This is then fol-
lowed by a second disassembly step, during which the physics package is
deconstructed, and the fissile core separated from the high explosives.23
The administrative and chain-of-custody procedures surrounding
nuclear warheads differs from one country to the next. In the case of the
US there are two government departments that share responsibility for
nuclear weapons.24 The Department of Energy is responsible for the
design, manufacturing and testing of nuclear warheads, while the
Department of Defence serves as the custodian of deployed and stored
warheads.25 For warheads in service, the first stage of the dismantlement
process takes place while the warhead is under military control. If deployed
or stored overseas, these weapons leave the active stockpile and are trans-
ferred to a base on the US mainland. Once there, the warhead will be

separated from the delivery vehicle and transferred to the custody of the
Department of Energy. It is then, as a general rule, transported back to the
facility where it was initially assembled.26 Once there, the physics package
is separated from the warhead, before being further disassembled in spe-
cial cells called ‘gravel gerties’, designed to contain an accidental explosion
or any radioactive contamination.27 High explosives are disposed of onsite
through incineration, while the fissile material and other components are
returned to the different nuclear complexes where they were produced.
For example, high enriched uranium and secondary stages are sent to Oak
Ridge National Laboratory while tritium gas canisters return to Savannah
River National Laboratory.28 It is at this point that warheads are typically
considered dismantled, even if the products of the process may still have a
long life ahead of them.29 For example, the fissile material from nuclear
warheads will be processed into different forms and then either put into
long term storage or reused.30 For example, HEU can be down-blended
to LEU, fabricated into nuclear fuel and burnt in a power reactor. Clearly,
the greater the proportion of different waste streams that are destroyed,
the more irreversible the dismantlement process.
Challenges in Verifying Nuclear Warhead

Dismantlement
Although the dismantlement of nuclear warheads occurs regularly within
nuclear weapons complexes around the world, to date it has only been
carried out under conditions that are strictly controlled and overseen by
national authorities. Opening the process up to bi-lateral or international
verification would create significant challenges, not least because of the
inevitable tension between the level of intrusiveness required to demon-
strate compliance, and the need to ensure that sensitive design details are
protected. Transparency versus secrecy is a binary opposition at the heart
of all nuclear verification regimes. Too much transparency is unacceptable
from a security perspective, too little is unacceptable from a verification
perspective.
The level of intrusiveness necessary to ensure effective compliance also
depends heavily on the nature of the item to be verified and its broader
significance. Take US-Russian arms control efforts, for example. The large
nuclear arsenals retained by each side serve to offset the risk posed by
cheating; there is less incentive to cheat when both sides have such big
arsenals. This means that detection goals can be set at relatively high levels,
typically tens of nuclear weapons, a target that could be achieved with rela-
tively un-intrusive verification procedures. However, when it comes to
monitoring nuclear warhead dismantlement, a step that is usually thought
of as happening at low numbers of nuclear weapons, it is clear that more
intrusive measures would need to be employed as the diversion of a single
weapon could prove strategically significant. Linking back to the previous
chapter, it is likely that the verification requirement for this system would
be more akin to IAEA safeguards measures, where detection goals are set
to correspond to the minimum amount of nuclear material that could be
converted into a single nuclear weapon.
Deception and Diversion

In the design of any verification system, it is necessary to consider the dif-
ferent ways in which cheating might occur, so that mechanisms can be put
in place to minimize this risk. With regard to a future nuclear disarmament
regime, major violations would involve the diversion and retention of
nuclear warheads, nuclear material or key non-nuclear components.
Generally speaking, there are two ways this could be achieved: through
the introduction of ‘dummy’ warheads; or by the diversion of nuclear
weapons components during the dismantlement process. Consequently,
an effective verification system would need to address these challenges in
a satisfactory manner, be capable of distinguishing between real and
dummy warheads and then ensure relevant items were not diverted at any
point during dismantlement.
This is no simple task given how nuclear weapons are employed and the
relatively small size of the fissile material and other key components within
them. On this point, Cliff, Elbahtimy and Persbo argue that the risks can
only be mitigated if verification measures are applied from the point at
which nuclear warheads are de-mated from their delivery vehicles.31 This
in itself is not an insurmountable task, given that under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) and its successor, thousands of inspections
have been carried out at nuclear weapon launch sites in the United States
and Russia. Although warheads have not been directly inspected or
removed from their delivery vehicles as part of these activities, there exists
both precedent and a considerable body of experience to drawn on when
considering how foreign inspectors might perform verification activities at
military sites.
In terms of detecting diversion, the types of procedures and technolo-

gies employed would have to be carefully weighed, not just against prolif-
eration concerns but also against safety and security risks. From a safety
perspective, the materials used in nuclear weapons are both radioactive and
fissionable and if improperly handled could cause a criticality incident,
resulting in potentially fatal doses of radiation for those nearby. Warheads
also contain high explosives, which, while relatively stable, must be handled
carefully to avoid accidental detonations. With regard to security, the risks
begin with simple theft of materials, components and information, and that
risk does not only emanate from external actors. Examples from the civil
nuclear industry highlight the great risk posed by ‘insiders’ – individuals
with authorised access to nuclear facilities – who have stolen both nuclear
material and sensitive information for various reasons.32 Consequently,
both safety and security concerns will likely serve to limit both the access of
inspectors and their direct involvement within the dismantlement process.
It is non-proliferation concerns, however, that present by far the great-
est challenge. Nuclear weapons contain a wide range of highly classified
components, information about which could facilitate further prolifera-
tion, whether ‘horizontal’ (facilitating the efforts of those seeking to
acquire nuclear weapons) or ‘vertical’ (including supporting the efforts of
possessors to refine and enhance their nuclear arsenals). This includes
information on the warhead design, the features and properties of the fis-
sile materials and the nature and arrangement of its other constituent
components. All of this could potentially be released to inspectors during
the verification process. Furthermore, sensitive information is not just
confined to the weapon itself, details regarding the design of dismantle-
ment facilities and the tools and procedures employed may also provide
clues as to the makeup of the nuclear weapon being disassembled. To
illustrate the point, it is worth noting that the 1967 Field Tests identified
more than one hundred items of classified nuclear weapons-related infor-
mation that could potentially be revealed to inspectors during the dis-
mantlement process.33 This included weapon shapes, the elemental or
isotopic content of nuclear materials and information on weaponisation
related components.34
Balancing the risk of undetected cheating with the undesirable release
of classified proliferation relevant information has been the focus of dis-
mantlement verification research to date. Studies have explored possible
diversion routes and the different procedural and technical verification
options that could negate these, while still protecting nuclear weapons
sensitive information. It is clear from these efforts that there exists no

simple solution and that an effective approach will require a combination
of complementary measures. It is these measures and their application that
are discussed below, with a focus on the performance of onsite inspections
where access is managed by the host team, the use of technology tailored
to prevent the transmission of sensitive information, and various other
techniques designed to ensure that the chain of custody is preserved.
On-Site Inspections Through Managed Access

Given the size and complexity of a warhead and its constituent elements,
remote sensing of the type employed in early arms control treaties – satel-
lite imagery, etc. – would clearly be inadequate for verifying nuclear war-
head dismantlement. Effective dismantlement would require a more
‘hands on’ approach and any future regime will undoubtedly depend
heavily on inspections carried out at the facility level by suitably qualified
inspectors. Although once a contentious issues in arms control, attitudes
to onsite inspections have changed over time following their extensive use
within the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.35 There now exists a
strong track record of on-site nuclear verification activities at civil and mili-
tary facilities, and this would serve as an important point of reference in
the design of a dismantlement verification regime. Under START, for
example, this approach constituted a core element of the Treaty and there
was “almost unlimited application of on-site inspection measures”.36
Onsite inspections also play a key role in the application of IAEA safe-
guards. IAEA inspectors carry out hundreds of site visits and these provide
the Agency with a wealth of technical measurements, as well as a means of
gathering the visual observations of highly trained and perceptive inspec-
tors. Outside of the nuclear arena, lessons can also be drawn from efforts
to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. The approach in the chemical
weapons context has been a powerful combination of “systematic on-site
and automatic monitoring verification measures”.37 Furthermore,
inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) have usually had almost “universal, unimpeded access” to rele-
vant facilities in the countries in question, although the recent experience
of Syrian chemical disarmament shows that the possibility of deception is
ever-present.38
In the disarmament context, however, it is clear that there would inevi-
tably be limits on the type of access that inspectors could reasonably expect
within a facility housing nuclear weapons. The act of separating a nuclear

warhead into its constituent components greatly increases the amount of
classified proliferation-relevant information that could potentially be
transferred, making the possibility of unfettered access for inspectors an
unrealistic one. Consequently, on-site inspections at a dismantlement
facility would have to be carefully managed, both in terms of physical
access to sensitive areas and the types of sensing equipment employed.
Fortunately, managed access procedures have already been widely used
across different verification regimes, with often basic approaches including
‘placing cloth shrouds over pieces of equipment, turning off computers,
locking up documents, specifying locations where samples may be taken,
and allowing inspectors to visit rooms selected at random’.39 For a dis-
mantlement facility, access to particular areas would certainly have to be
limited and consideration would thus have to be given to alternative, indi-
rect but complementary means of verification. History has shown that
limiting access opens up possible diversion routes. This was the case in the
Iraqi weapons programme, for example.
On the flip side, research has shown that if access is not carefully man-
aged, it is almost inevitable that nuclear weapons relevant information will
be released. Both of these challenges were illustrated by the 1967 Field
Tests, which explored the interplay between the likelihood of undetected
diversion and the exposure of classified information during the dismantle-
ment process. In these experiments, the type of access granted to inspec-
tors varied from purely visual observations to the use of advanced sensing
equipment, including the use of X-rays to scan the interior of the weapon
and neutron counters and gamma spectrometers to probe the properties
of the fissile material.40 Inspectors were not permitted to be present during
the removal of the physical package from the warhead as this was deemed
too sensitive, but could inspect the facility, the weapon and its constituent
component before and after the operation had taken place. Throughout
the exercise the hosts actively sought to cheat, through the introduction
of ‘dummy’ warheads and the diversion of nuclear material. They
attempted to conceal these actions by adjusting the inspectors sensing
equipment so that it would provide erroneous readings. The spectrome-
ters, for example, were calibrated to deliver readings that implied the pres-
ence of greater amounts of fissile material than was actually the case,
serving to mask diverted material.
Ultimately, these exercises found that classified information was released
at all access levels, from 32 separate items at the lowest level to 112 items
at the highest. However, these results should be caveated by the fact that
there was no attempt “to hide or conceal classified information associated
with the test weapons”, for example, through the covering of sensitive
components.41 It was also noted in the report that “much of the classified
information exposed [through visual inspections] could be protected by
[a] redesign of facilities and equipment”.42 The facilities used in the Field
Tests were not just dedicated to dismantlement but also served a variety of
other nuclear weapons related purposes. In terms of distinguishing real
warheads from dummies this was achieved approximately 50 per cent of the
time at the lowest access level, rising to 80 per cent at the highest level of
access.43 However, detecting the diversion of nuclear material during the
dismantlement process proved to be more challenging, with evasion efforts
only uncovered approximately 4 per cent of the time. It is worth noting on
this point that the authors of the final report on the Field Tests suggested
that even this relatively small risk of getting caught might still provide an
effective deterrent against cheating. The risk could be further reduced
through the addition of continuous perimeter portal monitoring (PPM).
This was used in the START and INF treaties at missile production plants,
where vehicles leaving a facility were searched to ensure they did not include
a treaty limited missile.44 In the context of nuclear warhead dismantlement,
such a system would need to be highly intrusive, able to detect small
amounts of nuclear material and components leaving the facility.
On the whole, then, the managed access approach that would certainly
form part of a dismantlement verification regime poses opportunities and
challenges in equal measure. The design process for a dismantlement
regime would undoubtedly benefit from the considerable body of existing
knowledge and experience in the broader area.
Information Barriers and the Authentication

of Warheads
As suggested above, distinguishing an actual nuclear warhead from a

‘dummy’ during the dismantlement process, while at the same time pro-
tecting sensitive information, is a considerable challenge. It is possible that
the latter could be achieved by limiting inspections to purely visual obser-
vations under managed access conditions, however, studies have shown
that this is likely to only provide ‘very low’ levels of confidence that actual
weapons are being destroyed.45 It is clear that to deter cheating and deter-
mine the presence of real warheads, deeper probing is required.
Given that a key component in all nuclear warheads is the fissile mate-
rial, authentication efforts to date have tended to focus on verifying the
presence or absence of weapons grade HEU or plutonium. There are
three general ways to confirm the presence of fissile materials. The first is
through passive detection, where the radiation emitted by fissile material
undergoing natural radioactive decay is measured. The second and third
approaches utilise active detection techniques, where fissile materials are
bombarded with either X-rays or neutrons. X-rays can identify the charac-
teristic high-density of fissile materials, while neutrons will induce fission
events, which, in turn, will emit radiation.46
In the weapons context, it is far simpler and safer to employ passive
detection as this mitigates the risk that the introduction of additional neu-
trons could trigger a chain reaction, potentially detonating the nuclear
weapon under inspection. However, while the presence of fissile materials
can be confirmed by the detection of naturally emitted radiation, this is
not sufficient to confirm the identity of a nuclear warhead. Other additional
signatures would need to be collected in order to distinguish materials
used in warheads from those used for other purposes. These might include
information on the composition and mass of the fissile material, the com-
bination of which could be used to form a distinctive ‘fingerprint’ for each
type of warhead.47 Yet these properties, which vary across different weapon
types, are considered highly classified information that cannot be directly
shared.48 Consequently it is necessary to employ an indirect form of detec-
tion, which can determine the presence of weapons-grade nuclear material
while at the same not reveal sensitive information on its key properties.
Efforts to this end have focused on the development of so-called ‘informa-
tion barriers’ – technology that essentially places an information filter
between the physical process of detection and its output.49
Broadly speaking, information barrier technology has taken two dis-
tinct developmental paths. The first path seeks to capture a specific and
limited amount of information that can then be compared to a pre-agreed
‘template’ of the warhead under inspection. This relies on involved parties
agreeing on a set of key technical attributes that are representative of the
nuclear weapons in question. As an example, for the Tri-lateral Initiative
of the late 1990s involving the IAEA, the United States and Russia, these
attributes constituted the presence of nuclear material with a weight above
a minimum mass threshold and an isotopic composition within a specified
range.50 The information barrier was then designed to measure whether a
warhead met these criteria, with its output delivered as a simple yes or no
answer to the inspecting party. The intrinsic simplicity of this approach

explains its appeal to those engaged in the technical dimension of disarma-
ment verification research, however it does have its weaknesses. For prolif-
eration reasons, it is not possible to release detailed information on the
defining characteristics of a nuclear weapon. Consequently, selected attri-
butes can only be minimum thresholds and cannot provide complete
assurance that a genuine and unaltered nuclear weapon is present. In addi-
tion, the act of defining specific attributes may provide hosts with informa-
tion on what types of diversion scenarios are least likely to be detected.
The second path advocates more comprehensive data capture, with an
information barrier designed to measure the complete radioactive spec-
trum of a warhead. In contrast to an attribute measurement, this provides
a far more “complex and unique fingerprint”.51 This can then be com-
pared against a spectral library of warhead templates, with a match con-
firming that they are “materially identical”.52 This offers the potential to
distinguish between warhead types while also assuring ‘that no fissile
material has been diverted’.53 In theory this approach can provide a much
higher degree of authentication, than the attribute approach. However, it
suffers from the major obstacle of how to create sufficiently detailed war-
head templates without releasing sensitive information. This fundamental
challenge has meant that this method has received relatively little atten-
tion, at least until recently. New research on the use of a “zero-knowledge
protocol” has the potential to create warhead templates without sensitive
information being measured.54 This approach utilizes zero knowledge
proofs, a cornerstone of modern cryptography, which can be used to pro-
vide a measure of confidence that a transaction or statement is correct,
while at the same time ensuring that nothing is revealed about the under-
lying data. If a practical system based on this principle can be successfully
developed for nuclear warhead dismantlement verification, it could pro-
vide high statistical confidence that an item is indeed identical to a genuine
nuclear warhead, without the risk of releasing design information.
While the use of information barriers as a means of taking essential
measurements without necessarily releasing sensitive information repre-
sents an innovative approach, it also brings its own challenges. If informa-
tion barriers are to be employed, the authenticity and integrity of these
devices must be assured. In other words, steps must be taken to ensure
that they have not been tampered with beforehand to produce erroneous
readings. As previously discussed, this was an evasive tactic successfully
employed during the Field Tests.
Who, then has final responsibility for the information barrier? It is likely
that any NWS hosting an inspection would “insist that they must be able
to manufacture [and retain oversight of] any authentication equipment to
be used on their warheads”.55 Consider if inspectors were permitted to
manufacture their own information barriers. The host country would have
to ensure that the devices were not capable of gathering or transmitting
any data beyond that agreed between host and inspector. Yet allowing the
host to retain full responsibility for the information barrier would simply
present the inspection team with another version of the same problem.
These problems continue to occupy the minds of verification researchers,
but there are already a number of relatively straightforward approaches to
dealing with these challenges. In the Tri-lateral Initiative, multiple copies
of key equipment were produced, samples of which (randomly selected)
could be taken away and examined by each side to check for tampering.56
Other copies would remain at the facility for use in the dismantlement
process.
The information barrier, then, goes a considerable distance in address-
ing some of the core challenges arising from the sensitive nature of the
information at the heart of the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Ensuring Chain-of-Custody
Any effective regime for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads
would rest on two main pillars: warhead authentication and chain of cus-
tody. Comprehensive and effective verification would depend first and
foremost on the ability to confirm the identity of the nuclear warheads to
be dismantled. Yet as the discussion above indicates, this seemingly
straightforward task raises a host of challenges. The identity of the
warhead(s) confirmed, the focus of the verification process would then
shift to ensuring the chain of custody, namely that the warhead(s) were
successfully dismantled without the fissile materials or components being
diverted at any stage. In this context, nuclear warheads and their
components would have to be fully monitored and overseen by the

inspecting party all the way through to final disposition in order to guar-
antee no unauthorised interference. Yet it is here that the problem arises
since, as discussed previously, it is unlikely that inspectors will be able to be
present during the performance of certain key dismantlement steps, such
as the removal and handling of the physics package. It is also important to
recognise that the entire disarmament process would likely take weeks or
months to complete, with days of activity separated by periods of storage
and, potentially, the movement of materials between dismantlement facili-
ties. The cost and time demands of this prolonged dismantlement sched-
ule would have an important bearing on the extent to which inspectors
could remain in-country.
In order to help ensure chain-of-custody under these conditions, exist-
ing verification regimes employ a sophisticated system of tags, seals and
remote monitoring. These techniques have been used most notably in
support of IAEA safeguards to provide assurances against diversion. As
discussed in the previous chapter, tags are used as part of IAEA Safeguard
inspections to uniquely identify particular objects and allow these to be
tracked over a prolonged period of time and, if necessary, in different loca-
tions. These are frequently used in combination with seals designed to
deter and detect unauthorised access or tampering with items or equip-
ment. Similar devices could be applied to the containers that house the
warheads, its components and the various rooms in the facility where dis-
mantlement activities take place. As the warhead or its components enter
or leave a facility, or indeed specific area, tags and seals can be checked to
confirm the identity and integrity of the various items. The reliability of
these measures depends in large part on their resilience to removal or tam-
pering without detection. Newer generations of tags and seals include fea-
tures capable of automatically detecting efforts to circumvent their
function and may even incorporate camera surveillance systems so any
changes can be reported in real-time.
Crucially, there is a track record of efforts to adapt these tools for the
disarmament verification context in anticipation of future arms control
agreements. In 1999, for example, Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) developed an ‘Integrated Facility Monitoring System’ to demon-
strate how chain of custody could work in a nuclear dismantlement pro-
cess. This system monitored warheads from the point of authentication till
disposition and storage.57 A key part of this process was the use of inte-
grated tamper indicating devices (ITID) – a combination of seals, infrared
tags and video cameras – that were applied to warhead containers and
components. This system had the benefit of providing “uninterrupted
surveillance of the sealed container, as opposed to periodic checks of seal
integrity”.58
Recent Efforts to Address Dismantlement

Verification Challenges
The chapter has thus far sought to both highlight some of the core chal-
lenges facing researchers working in the area of disarmament verification
and provide insights into some of the approaches and technologies being
used to address them. In doing so, the chapter has drawn on some of the
past initiatives and exercises that have marked the evolution of verification
research and practice in this space. To close the chapter, then, it is fitting
that we focus our attention on one of the more recent initiatives that has
sought to innovate in both form and technology, and the one that framed
the research underpinning this book.
As mentioned in the introduction, the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI)
was established in 2007 and constituted the first time that a NWS and a
NNWS conducted collaborative work into the verification of nuclear war-
head dismantlement. The Initiative commenced with a review of work in
this area, both UK and other, with the aim of identifying the most promis-
ing and appropriate avenues for new joint research. The first key finding
from this study was that while information barrier technology had consti-
tuted an area of research interest for decades and used in past initiatives,
there was relatively little publicly available information on its workings. It
was determined by the Norwegian research team that for a NNWS to put
faith in a future disarmament regime, it would be essential for additional
details on the design and application of this key part of the nuclear dis-
mantlement verification toolkit to be made available. The second major
conclusion was that previous dismantlement verification efforts had tended
to focus on technical solutions to verification challenges, with relatively
little attention paid to the influence of human factors in this process. On
this point it was also noted that previous studies had been carried out with
only limited levels of realism, with verification approaches explored either
theoretically or through experiments on a narrow part of the dismantle-
ment process and, crucially, under unrealistic conditions. It was thus
decided that the UKNI would attempt to bridge these gaps through a new
programme of cooperative work into both the information barrier and the
practical application of different inspection methodologies.
Work on the information barrier was carried out in parallel with both
sides developing their own device based on a previously agreed joint
design. To mitigate the risk that the Norwegian side could be exposed to
sensitive information it was decided that the information barrier would
not be used in the detection of actual nuclear warheads. Instead they

would be tasked with detecting a substitute for weapons-grade fissile
material – a radioactive cobalt source. As such the information barriers
developed were intended to serve as a ‘proof of concept’ as opposed to
devices that could be used in an actual nuclear warhead dismantlement
process.59 Development followed a similar approach to the Trilateral
Initiative with the output of a measurement simply represented as a green
or red light – the former when the gamma radiation spectra detected
matched that of previously agreed attributes for a cobalt source and the
latter if it did not.
The exploration of different inspection methodologies was carried out
through a series of simulations. Realism was added through the creation
of detailed backstories including a notional treaty between two fictional
states and a range of relevant data including “historical and political infor-
mation, resources and economic capabilities, and security interests/issues
of concern”.60 This conveyed a broader cooperative approach to security
taken by both states, where there existed limited incentives to cheat and a
shared interest in the “success of the verification regime and in demon-
strating compliance”.61
In the first iteration of this exercise it was decided that in order to fur-
ther minimise the risk of inadvertently transmitting sensitive nuclear weap-
ons related information, Norway would play the role of the NWS hosts
and the UK that of the NNWS inspectors. Under the agreed scenario, UK
inspectors would verify the dismantlement of a single ‘nuclear warhead’ at
a working Norwegian nuclear site. This was to be achieved in several
stages, an initial familiarisation visit to the dismantlement site, followed by
the negotiation of a tailored verification protocol and then finally a moni-
toring visit during which the ‘nuclear warhead’ would be dismantled.
Each of these steps was played out over the course of several days in order
to provide, to the extent possible, a real verification process.
The initial onsite familiarisation exercise was carried out in September
2008, with the aim of acquainting inspectors with the facility and inform-
ing discussion of the application of different verification measures during
the subsequent dismantlement process. The negotiations that followed
were also informed by the results of past studies, discussed earlier in this
chapter, which provided insights into the approaches that could best pro-
tect sensitive information while at the same time providing transparency
around the dismantlement process. It was concluded that the verification
approach would be built around a system of managed access. Inspectors
would not be present during certain sensitive operations, such as the sepa-
ration of the physics package, but would apply tags and seals to help ensure
chain of custody for the warhead and its components. Information barrier
measurements would be used to authenticate the warhead and compo-
nents when dismantled, complemented by a system of portal perimeter
control.62 Agreed verification measures and detail on how they would be
applied were encapsulated in a monitoring agreement, approved by both
sides. This took into account the design of the dismantlement facility and
potential health and safety concerns that might arise during the planned
inspection.
The monitoring visit during which the ‘nuclear warhead’ was disman-
tled took place in June 2009. Given the broader cooperative context in
which this took place, it was decided that the host team would make no
attempt to deceive or cheat and that they would actively respond to all
reasonable requests from the inspection team. This approach reflected the
desire to explore the practicalities of verifying nuclear warhead dismantle-
ment in a realistic environment, as opposed to probing potential diversion
pathways and associated complexities. The dismantlement process took
place over several days after which the inspection team was able to declare
“with a high degree of confidence” that the nuclear weapon had been
disassembled without material or components being diverted.63
This was a notable result in itself, yet it was the interaction between
both sides during the exercise that yielded a number of particularly inter-
esting and original insights. Firstly, the researchers found that a “proactive
host helps facilitate the process and increase inspector confidence”, imply-
ing that the attitudes and behaviour of the host party can influence verifi-
cation judgements.64 Although it should be noted that this was not
presented as a straightforward, linear process. There were frequent “heated
debates” between the two sides, resulting from the host’s “very restricted
approach” to access.65 Although ultimately resolved, this demonstrates the
likely conflicts that could occur when operating under managed access
conditions. Another important observation was that “health and safety
considerations dictated some host responses to inspector requests”, served
to further restrict inspector access.66 Here it was noted that a malevolent
host might employ these tactics to open up diversion routes, highlighting
how health and safety issues could potentially reduce inspector confidence
if poorly managed.
A follow up exercise was undertaken in 2010 with the aim of exploring
the practicalities of verification in a high security environment. Here it was
recognised that the security aspects of the previous exercises were only
“played lightly” and consequently, were not completely reflective of the
real nuclear warhead dismantlement facility.67 The 2010 exercise was held
in the UK within an Atomic Weapons Establishment site, with the two
countries switching roles and the Norwegian team taking on the role of
the inspectors. Run over three days, it focused on a familiarisation visit to
a nuclear warhead storage facility, during which the inspecting party tested
the application of different seals, for the purpose of informing future veri-
fication discussions. A similar backstory was used to the 2008–2009 exer-
cises, albeit with a couple of crucial differences. The host was told to place
a “heavy emphasis on security as a first priority” and be “reactive rather
than proactive” in response to inspector requests.68 While still cooperative,
this was something of a contrast with the collegial approach adopted pre-
viously and the safety and security protocols were deemed “more intrusive
than expected” by the inspectors, serving to significantly limit their time
and access within the facility.69 More broadly the relationship between the
parties was observed to be more “adversarial” in nature.70 These factors
clearly influenced judgements on the part of the inspectors, as although
the overall objectives were completed, the inspectors expressed “a low
level of confidence in the outputs from the visit”.71
Conclusion
This chapter has explored some of the key challenges that must be consid-
ered in the context of nuclear warhead dismantlement verification. At
stake here are a number of fundamental questions: What proliferation sen-
sitive information is at risk of release during the verification process? What
steps might be taken to offset these risks? How might participants in an
adversarial relationship seek to deceive the other side and either hide war-
heads or retain their key constituent components? Clearly, in the context
of a future disarmament regime at low numbers of nuclear weapons, the
diversion of a single warhead, a small amount of nuclear material or a par-
ticular component could amount to a militarily significant violation.
Alongside the challenges, we have also considered some of the
approaches that have been explored as part of the effort to address these
challenges. These include well-established methods, borrowed from other
verification systems such as managed access and the use of tags and seals to
ensure chain of custody, and perimeter portal monitoring to provide assur-
ance against diversion. They also include innovative tools and techniques
that have been specifically designed with dismantlement verification in

mind, such as information barrier technology. While these approaches
have never been formally applied in the context of any arms control treaty,
they have emerged from an active and often innovative area of research
stretching back more than 50 years.
On the whole, the chapter considered these issues from a technical per-
spective – and this reflects the majority of work in the area to date. Yet as
the final section on the UKNI demonstrates, the technical dimension is
not the only one. The unexpected result of the UKNI exercises was that
human factors can also exert a shaping influence on the verification pro-
cess and its outcomes. And it is on this aspect that the remainder of our
book will focus. In the next chapter, we will explore in detail the human
factors in verification and develop a conceptual lens through which the
findings of our research can be viewed and understood.
Notes
1. Rose Gottemoeller, “‘New START Verification’, Remarks Delivered at the
United States Institute of Peace” (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Verification, Compliance and Implementation, July 26, 2010), https://
2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/145126.htm.
2. “National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Presented to NPT Prepcom” (United
Kingdom, May 2014).
3. Atomic Energy Commission, “Project Cloud Gap and CG-34, Demonstrated
Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. Note by the Secretary,” April 12, 1967,
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/cloudgap/aec-staff041267.pdf.
4. James Fuller, “Going to Zero: Verifying Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement,”
in Cultivating Confidence: Verification, Monitoring and Enforcement for a
World Free of Nuclear Weapons, by Corey Hinderstein (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 127.
5. NTI, “Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” Field Test
Program: Final Report, Volume 1 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, January
1969), https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Cloud_Gap_Demonstrated_
Destruction_of_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.
6. David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy, and Andreas Persbo, “Verifying Warhead
Dismantlement: Past, Present and Future,” Verification Research Reports
(London: VERTIC: East West Institute, 2010), 36, https://www.east-
west.ngo/idea/verifying-warhead-dismantlement-past-present-and-
future.
7. The Department of Energy, “Transparency and Verification Options,” An

Initial Analysis of Approaches for Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement
(Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, May 19, 1997), https://
fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/dis/.
8. Thomas E. Shea, “The Trilateral Initiative: A Model for the Future,” Arms
Control Association, June 11, 2008, https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2008_05/PersboShea.asp%23Sidebar1.
9. IAEA Director General, “Statement to the Forty-Sixth Regular Session of
the IAEA General Conference,” IAEA, September 16, 2002, https://
www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-forty-sixth-regular-session-
iaea-general-conference.
10. A. Richings, S. McOmish, and P. Thompson, “Nuclear Treaty Verification
at AWE, Aldermaston,” IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards,
October 2014, 3.
11. John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “The 2005 NPT Review Conference:
Mission Impossible?,” The Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (2005):
271–301.
12. United Nations, “Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the People’s Republic of
China,” April 2014, 8, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/doc-
uments/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom14/national-reports/China.
pdf.
13. It should be noted that some of the more in-depth findings from several of
these studies remain classified and have not been released.
Present and Future,” 2010.
15. John D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 38.
16. Ploughshares Fund, “World Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles,” March 2, 2016,
http://www.ploughshares.org/world-nuclear-stockpile-report.
17. Ibid.
18. Brookings Institute, “50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons Today,”
Brookings Institute, April 28, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/
research/50-facts-about-u-s-nuclear-weapons-today/.
19. “The B61 (MK-61) Bomb,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, January 9, 2007,
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/B61.html.
20. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Dismantling U.S. Nuclear
Warheads,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 1 (January 2004): 73.
21. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, “Dismantling the Bomb
and Managing the Nuclear Materials” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, September 1993), 37.
22. Ibid., 38.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 18.
26. Ibid., 38.
27. The Department of Energy, “Transparency and Verification Options,” 29.
and Managing the Nuclear Materials,” 39.
29. The Department of Energy, “Transparency and Verification Options,” 6.
and Managing the Nuclear Materials,” 10–11.
32. Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan, A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats:
Lessons from Past Mistakes (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, 2014).
34. NTI, “Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” 76.
35. Onsite inspections were an issue of intense debate in the negotiation of
many early arms control treaties, with the United States and the Soviet
Union frequently adopting opposing and incompatible positions due to
issues that included distrust and broader politics. For a discussion of the
politics and verification during the Cold War see Lowenthal and Wit,
“Politics, Verification and Arms Control”; Nancy Gallagher, “The Politics
of Verification: Why ‘how Much?’ Is Not Enough,” Contemporary Security
Policy 18, no. 2 (1997): 138–70.
36. Müller, “The Evolution of Verification: Lessons from the Past for the
Present,” 1993, 340.
37. Ibid., 349.
38. Ibid.
39. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Viewpoint: Verifying a Multilateral Ban on Nuclear
Weapons: Lessons from the CWC,” The Nonproliferation Review 5 (1998):
87.
40. NTI, “Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” 43.
41. Ibid., 76.
42. Ibid., 105.
43. Ibid., 87.
45. Ibid., 33.
46. Steve Fetter et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science and Global
Security 1, no. 3–4 (1990): 226.
47. Steve Fetter, “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament” (Washington, DC: Henry

L. Stimson Center, October 1996), 10.
48. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons.”
49. Brian Anderson et al., “Verification of Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement,”
Peer Review of the UK MoD Programme (British Pugwash Group,
November 2012), http://britishpugwash.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/BPG-Verification-Report.pdf.
50. Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood, “IAEA Verification of Fissile
Material in Support of Nuclear Disarmament,” Managing the Atom
Project (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, May 2015), 7, http://www.belf-
ercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/iaeaverification.pdf?
51. Alexander Glaser, Boaz Barak, and Robert J. Goldston, “A Zero-
Knowledge Protocol for Nuclear Warhead Verification,” Nature 510, no.
7506 (June 2014): 498.
52. Glaser, Barak, and Goldston, “A Zero-Knowledge Protocol for Nuclear
Warhead Verification.”
53. Alexander Glaser, Boaz Barak, and Robert J. Goldston, “A New Approach
to Nuclear Warhead Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol”
(53rd Annual INMM Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management,
Orlando, FL, July 15, 2012), 3.
54. Glaser, Barak, and Goldston, “A Zero-Knowledge Protocol for Nuclear
Warhead Verification,” 497–502.
56. Ibid., 55.
57. Eric Gerdes, Roger Johnston, and James E. Doyle, “A Proposed Approach
for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement,” Science and Global
Security 9, no. 2 (2001): 115.
58. Ibid., 122.
60. Ibid., 71.
61. Ibid., 74.
62. Ibid., 78.
63. Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom – Norway Initiative: Research
Into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement,” The 2010
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Ministry of Defence, May 3, 2010), 19,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/28426/npt_revcon_2010_jwp.pdf.
64. “The UK – Norway Initiative: Report on the UKNI Non Nuclear Weapon
States Workshop,” 3.

Present and Future,” 2010, 89–90.
66. Ibid., 73.
67. “The United Kingdom – Norway Initiative: Further Research into
Managed Access of Inspectors During Warhead Dismantlement
Verification” (Ministry of Defence, March 31, 2010), 3, https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/uk-norway-initiative-on-nuclear-warhead-
dismantlement-verification.
68. Ibid., 4.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 11.
CHAPTER 4
The Human Side of Verification:

Trust and Confidence
The previous chapters set out a concise history of verification, both in the
broad area of arms control and non-proliferation, and in the specific con-
text of nuclear warhead dismantlement. This overview demonstrated that
verification has, for many years now, been a highly active area of research,
development and application. Insights were also provided into the innova-
tive ways in which the scientific community has sought to harness techno-
logical advances to address the challenges around authentication in nuclear
warhead dismantlement. From engineering to informatics, approaches
here draw from a range of scientific disciplines. Yet, significant as these
advances are, their scope remains limited, as they have only sought to
address technical aspects of verification challenges.
It has long been accepted that 100 per cent certainty is not possible in
the implementation of any verification system. This is particularly true for
warhead dismantlement because of the secrecy that necessarily surrounds
all aspects of the development, possession and protection of nuclear weap-
ons. As discussed in the previous chapter, alongside obvious national secu-
rity concerns, Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also prohibit, among other things, the transfer of
proliferation sensitive information. This limits verification intrusiveness,
inevitably resulting in possible verification outcomes, which are framed by
a significant degree of uncertainty. For those charged with the act of veri-
fying dismantlement, there can be no absolute truth. Verification out-

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_4
comes simply represent expressions of confidence in the degree to which

it is believed that the inspected party has adhered to agreed protocols.
These expressions of confidence may be based on informed judgement
and supported by various pieces of verifiable evidence, but compliance
beyond all doubt simply cannot be proved.
Against this background, those working in the area of verification have
pursued two closely related research objectives. On the one hand, they
have sought to develop and refine technical tools and methods that can
offset or reduce uncertainty by prioritizing the integrity of any data gath-
ered. The approach here accepts that the process is characterised by an
incomplete evidentiary chain and seeks to facilitate more effective verifica-
tion by ensuring that the information inspectors are permitted to gather is
indeed accurate and authentic. On the other hand, they have sought to
explore and design new ways of gathering additional information at vari-
ous stages in the verification process without violating national security
priorities or international obligations regarding the transfer of proliferation-
sensitive information.
Broadly speaking, this perspective rightly assumes that many of the
barriers to effective and meaningful verification are technical. Yet view-
ing verification through a solely technical lens is also fundamentally lim-
iting to the extent that it presents the situation in monochrome; the
complexities of disarmament verification are reduced to scientific or
engineering problems of greater or lesser degrees. This does not reflect
the reality of the monitoring and verification process or its outcomes.
Indeed, this perspective ignores a key element in the verification equa-
tion: the involvement of a human element and a process of interaction
between at least two distinct parties over a particular period of time. This
aspect of verification is unavoidable – inspectors will always be required
on-site to oversee and direct the necessary technical activities, to interact
with the inspected party and facility, and to form judgments and draw
conclusions regarding levels of compliance – yet it is woefully understud-
ied. A 1986 report by the Canadian government is one of the few verifi-
cation-focused studies to even acknowledge that, “verification is more
than a technical exercise”.1 Virtually no attention has been devoted to
understanding whether and to what extent human interactions and the
interpretative process on the part of inspectors exert an influence on
verification outcomes. A notable exception here is a 2009 paper by Wyn
Bowen and Andreas Persbo, which draws attention to the role of human
factors at the operational level. This paper draws on practical examples,
THE HUMAN SIDE OF VERIFICATION: TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 77
such as the UKNI and the work of the UN Special Commission

(UNSCOM) in Iraq during the 1990s to illustrate the arguments made,
yet the study does not make any claim to extensive and focused empirical
research on this issue.2
It is this human element, long ignored, that is at the core of our study.
The chapter begins by exploring the challenges associated with articulat-
ing and defining this intangible facet of verification. What do we mean
when we talk about the human factor in this context? How might it influ-
ence verification outcomes? At the centre of our analysis here is the issue
of perception, for it is this subjective and often emotive human attribute
that, in our view, characterizes the ‘blind spot’ of verification. Simply put,
perceptions carry interpretative weight, even in a supposedly dispassionate
and scientific process, a point that has been largely ignored in verification
research to date. An understanding of the role played by perception in the
verification process and, more importantly, the intersection of perception
and evidence in this space, will set the ground for a more holistic approach
to thinking about disarmament verification more broadly. Building on this
discussion, the chapter then devotes itself to the development of a concep-
tual framework within which the empirical data underpinning our
research – set out in detail in Chapter 6 – can be examined.
The Human Factor in Disarmament Verification

The starting point for our discussion is the nature of the human factor in
disarmament verification. What does this term represent and how can it
be defined? The answer to this question is not straightforward as it
requires us to move away from the material and quantifiable certainties
of the technical arena and look instead towards some of the abstract and
contested issues more commonly debated in the social sciences. At the
most basic level, the human factor in this context refers to the percep-
tions, assumptions, values and biases that those involved in the practice
of verification may bring to bear on the process and its outcomes. The
inspectors responsible for verification on the ground are generally drawn
from engineering and scientific disciplines and are capable of implement-
ing complex technical processes, recording data outputs and, most
importantly, making sense of these outputs for broader audiences: nota-
bly, policy-makers. Yet they are also individuals with particular social,
cultural and political backgrounds, and this inevitably brings a degree of
subjectivity to this work.
The tension between scientific objectivity and human subjectivity has

long been a source of academic debate and is frequently represented in
terms of a dichotomy that Stephen Jay Gould describes as the “supposed
battle called the Science Wars”:
The two sides in this hypothetical struggle have been dubbed “realists”
(including nearly all working scientists), who uphold the objectivity and
progressive nature of scientific knowledge, and “relativists” (nearly all
housed in faculties of the humanities and social sciences within our universi-
ties), who recognize the culturally embedded status of all claims for univer-
sal factuality and who regard science as just one system of belief among
many alternatives, all worthy of equal weight because the very concept of
“scientific truth” can only represent a social construction invented by scien-
tists (whether consciously or not) as a device to justify their hegemony over
the study of nature.3
For the realists here, objectivity is equated with “fairness and impartiality.
Someone who ‘isn’t objective’ has allowed prejudice or self-interest to
distort a judgment”.4 In this context, the pursuit of objectivity has led
scientists and technicians to place their faith in numbers, in what Porter
terms the “quantification of the modern world”.5 This reliance on num-
bers is understandable as, among other things, quantitative approaches
provide for a replicable research process and a clear, relatively straightfor-
ward means of evaluation. Yet this Manichaean opposition is reductive, for
as ecologist Edward Rykiel notes, “there is a continuum between the arti-
ficially dichotomized aspects of science: objective versus subjective, value
free versus value laden, neutral versus advocatory”.6 The lines of distinction
here are blurred; while scientists and engineers may struggle against sub-
jectivity, they cannot eliminate it entirely. The processes and outcomes of
technical endeavours can never completely withstand the weight of subjec-
tive interpretation particularly when a set problem requires interaction
with other human beings and achieving 100 per cent certainty is not pos-
sible by applying purely technical means. Clearly, a more holistic under-
standing of any process of scientific inquiry and its conclusions demands
that we consider, to the extent possible, the nature and influence of the
human factor.
In the field of verification for arms control and non-proliferation pur-
poses, two terms with particular relevance to the human factor pervade
discussion and debate: trust and confidence. Indeed, much of the litera-
ture in this area is devoted to considering the barriers to trust between
states and their leaders, and how these might be overcome through
confidence-building measures in service of agreements to limit the spread
of arms or promote disarmament or reductions. These terms feature
prominently in rhetoric related to the state-level politics and policy deci-
sions that frame verification in the context of arms control and non-
proliferation. Yet confidence and trust also hold great relevance for our
efforts to understand the operational mechanics of verification and how
the human factor impacts on processes and outcomes at the working level.
Simply put, these terms relate directly to the point of intersection between
perception and evidence at the heart of our study. They encapsulate the
enduring tension that characterizes the experience of those involved in
monitoring and inspection activities related to verification: the need to
balance the certainties of evidence against the interpretative possibilities
that present themselves in its absence. It is our contention that it is this
interplay between trust and confidence in the judgment-forming process
of inspectors on the ground that constitutes the essence of the human ele-
ment of verification. To understand this perspective, however, it is neces-
sary to consider the nature of trust and confidence. What do these terms
signify? And how should they be viewed in relation to each other? It is
only by answering these questions that we can begin to fully understand
their explanatory value in this area.
The Nature of Trust and Confidence

The first point to note with regard to trust and confidence is that the
explanatory power of these terms is limited by the confusion that frames
their use. In his seminal study, The Logic and Limits of Trust, Bernard
Barber sums up the problem well: “trust and all its seemingly related con-
cepts – faith, confidence, alienation, malaise – are not defined. One word
is used to refer to different things, and different words are used to describe
the same thing”.7 A cursory comparison of the definitions set out in the
Oxford English Dictionary illustrates the point. Confidence is described as
“The mental attitude of trusting in or relying on a person or thing; firm
trust, reliance, faith”, while trust is defined as “Firm belief in the reliability,
truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence or faith in a person
or thing, or in an attribute of a person or thing”.8 The fluidity with which
the terms are deployed is an indication of their ontological proximity –
trust and confidence should be viewed as points on a spectrum rather than
entirely distinct concepts. Yet the fact that their boundaries of meaning are
not clearly delineated also leaves room for indiscriminate use and confu-
sion. In short, confidence and trust are ‘essentially contested concepts’.9
In practice, this is certainly true for their use in the arms control and
non-proliferation context. In both the academic and policy arenas, it is
common to hear trust and confidence used interchangeably in discourse
on verification. At the least, the terms are used alongside each other with-
out any effort to discriminate or distinguish between them. This is under-
standable since both terms relate to the broader effort to ascertain
compliance and, beyond this, intentions, but this linguistic fluidity
undoubtedly obscures some of the conceptual nuances at stake.
Furthermore, the confusion is compounded by what Barber describes as
the assumption that, “the meaning of trust, and of its many synonyms, is
so well known that it can be left undefined or to contextual implica-
tions”.10 Yet failure to adequately define and map the nature of these con-
cepts is problematic in an area already suffering from considerable
uncertainty due to problems regarding authentication and gaps in the evi-
dentiary chain. We will argue below that trust may be distinguished from
confidence in a number of ways, and this has important implications for
the study and practice of verification.
At the most basic level, trust and confidence share common ground in
the sense that they both constitute essential elements in the social interac-
tions that take place between actors in various settings. In her work on the
subject, Carol Heimer takes as her starting point the inescapable fact that
“social interaction is risky, and people have ample cause to be uncertain
about each other’s intentions”.11 Trust and confidence provide social
actors with ways to cope with and reduce the uncertainty that frames these
encounters. Put another way, their practice serves to “reduce complexity”
in social systems.12 The concepts also overlap with regard to expectations
regarding behaviour and intentions. To be more precise, Niklas Luhmann
argues that both concepts “refer to expectations which may lapse into
disappointments”.13 Yet this fundamental issue of expectations is also
where trust and confidence begin to diverge.
Consider the following example of a worker who has driven to his place
of employment every weekday in the same well-serviced car for a signifi-
cant length of time. On any given workday, the individual in question is
confident that his car will be fit for purpose and that he will successfully
undertake the journey. Certainly, he cannot rule out the possibility of a
rare and unexpected issue affecting the car’s ability to run, yet a consider-
able body of relevant knowledge – the car’s service history, his own com-
petence and experience as a driver, etc – and first-hand experience of the

car’s performance suggests that the vehicle will run as normal. In this
scenario, Luhmann’s basic statement regarding expectations that may
lapse into disappointments applies. Yet the body of empirical evidence
available to the individual constitutes an important additional variable in
the equation here, one that shapes expectations, reduces the probability of
disappointment and, ultimately, influences the individual’s decision to
drive the car to work. In other words, confidence here may be regarded as
an evidence-based judgement on the part of an informed actor with relevant
experience and competency.
Consider now the same individual placed in the unusual situation of
having to ‘hitch-hike’ or solicit transport to work from a random, passing
vehicle. In this scenario, the individual may well have no knowledge or
past experience of the newly encountered driver and vehicle. There are a
number of expectations – that the driver is competent, that the driver is
acting with sincerity, that the vehicle is fit for purpose – but the situation
features a host of uncertainties – the vehicle could have a history of break-
downs, the driver might not take the individual concerned in the desired
direction – and few points of reliable evidence. This scenario calls for an
element of trust since the individual seeking transport is vulnerable to a
certain extent and must place faith in the intentions and planned actions
of the driver.
In this context, Luhmann’s take on trust is informative: “If you choose
one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disap-
pointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust
[…] Moreover, trust is only possible in a situation where the possible dam-
age may be greater than the advantage you seek. Otherwise, it would
simply be a question of rational calculation and you would choose your
action anyway, because the risks remain within acceptable limits. Trust is
only required if a bad outcome would make you regret your action”.14
Trust, then, relates much more to the perception of intentions in a situation
of mutual vulnerability where evidence is lacking or ambiguous.
It is worth noting that this perspective finds resonance elsewhere in the
literature. In their analysis of the subject, for example, sociologists David
Lewis and Andrew Weigert make the point that, “trust begins where pre-
diction ends”, hinting at the departure from an evidence-based approach
to the formation of judgements and decisions.15 This link to prediction is,
as Morton Deutsch notes, an “element common to many usages of
trust”.16 Clearly, the evidentiary base that features so prominently in the
concept of confidence is never entirely absent from the development of

trust. It is possible to have confidence without trust, but a high level of
trust always requires a certain measure of confidence. Indeed, confidence
normally plays a central role in building trust and demonstrating positive
intentions. This said, trust can ultimately bring a relationship well beyond
the realm of evidence. As Lewis and Weigert go on to argue, “Initially,
people trust only when given evidence that the other is trustworthy, but as
trust is gradually established and deepened, they no longer need rational
reasons for trusting each other. Ultimately, it is not rational evidence alone
which begets trust”.17
This basic effort to distinguish between trust and confidence is useful
in that it provides a means of anchoring the two concepts that are other-
wise woven together in a complex and often confusing web of social inter-
action. It also allows us to begin to situate the concepts within the
verification context. In any inspection scenario, confidence is derived from
the evidence gathered by inspectors over the course of a mutually agreed
inspection. As in the everyday example discussed above, the possibility of
error, miscalculation or deception can never be completely ruled out, but
the risks here are offset to some extent by the competency, experience and
equipment of the experts that make up the inspection party. Within the
scope of the information that inspectors are allowed to gather, the level of
confidence instilled in those conducting the inspection should, in theory
at least, be directly related to the technical strength of the evidence
acquired and the extent to which it stands up to scientific scrutiny. The
problem is that only a limited amount of evidence can be made available
to inspectors. The ability to derive confidence from the inspection process
is limited by that uncertain space where evidence is lacking. And it is here
that trust, broadly understood in terms of perceptions and intentions, has
the potential to exert a shaping influence on the overall outcome. In short,
trust is the intangible variable that can take inspectors beyond the techni-
cal, evidence based process and contribute to judgements that reflect more
than the accumulated evidence reveals.
When we consider the human factor in the practice of verification, then,
it is trust that is of most concern. More specifically, it is the nature and
extent of the influence exerted by trust on the evidence-based judgements
from which confidence is derived. Against this background, the chapter
now explores trust in more detail with a view to developing a conceptual
framework within which our empirical research can be considered. What
are the key components of trust? How do they relate to each other? Our
objective here is to provide a conceptually robust means of shedding addi-
tional light on the nature and drivers of verification outcomes.
Thinking About Trust: Multidisciplinary Approaches

Before setting out the specifics of our trust framework, it is worth briefly
considering some of the dominant perspectives that have shaped thinking
in this subject area in recent years, for the concept of trust has been the
focus of a considerable body of literature that spans multiple disciplines.
Principal among these is the psychological tradition, where there have
been two main approaches to thinking about trust.
The first revolves around a “dispositional (person-centred) view” that
focuses wholly on the individual. As Kramer points out, “ample evidence
exists from both laboratory experiments and field-based research that indi-
viduals differ considerably in their general predisposition to trust other
people. Research suggests further that the predisposition to trust or dis-
trust others tends to be correlated with other dispositional orientations,
including people’s beliefs about human nature”.18 This approach found
early expression in Julian Rotter’s work as a “generalised expectancy” held
by an individual that, “the word, promise, verbal or written statement of
another individual or group can be relied upon”.19 Trust in this context
attributes sole agency to the individual and entails “general beliefs and
attitudes about the degree to which other people are likely to be reliable,
cooperative, or helpful”.20 More specifically, Rotter viewed trust through
the lens of social learning theory and argued that individual socialisation
led to a situation whereby, “choice behaviour in specific situations depends
upon the expectancy that a given behaviour will lead to a particular out-
come or reinforcement in that situation and the preference value of that
reinforcement for the individual in that situation”.21 Rotter sought to
ground his theoretical understanding of trust in an “Interpersonal Trust
Scale”, an “additive scale in which a high score would show trust for a
great variety of social objects”.22
Rotter’s approach was criticised for a number of reasons, including the
apparent mismatch between his definition of trust and certain constituent
elements of his scale, and the intellectual limitations of his focus on the
individual. Yet this dispositional approach strongly influenced subsequent
research.23 In this regard, Dominic Aitken notes that, “Much of the litera-
ture on trust argues that it is, at least in part, dependent upon an individ-
ual’s ‘disposition to trust’ […] This has also been referred to as one’s
capacity or propensity to trust […] or social or generalised trust”.24
The second approach is a dyadic (interpersonal) one, according to
which “trust is a psychological state or orientation of an actor (the truster)
toward a specific partner (the trustee) with whom the actor is in some way
interdependent (that is, the truster needs the trustee’s cooperation to
attain valued outcomes or resources)”.25 Notable early advocates of this
approach were John Holmes and John Rempel, who drew on the ideas of
interdependence theory to inform their study of trust in close relation-
ships such as marriage.26 This interpersonal approach was also adopted in
broader social psychological studies that operationalised trust as “cooper-
ating behaviour in settings such as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ or conflict
situations […], or discover trust as a taken-for-granted condition for stable
interaction”.27 The work of Morton Deutsch on conflict resolution in par-
ticular set the scene for much of the research in this area.28 Crucially, this
perspective holds that responsibility for the relationship is shared and the
construction of trust depends on the interaction between parties.
While much of the debate around trust has taken place within psychology
broadly defined, other disciplines have also sought to situate trust within their
conceptual boundaries. The work of Roderick Kramer, for example, explores
the role played by trust in “intra-organisational cooperation, coordination,
and control”, while Roger Mayer, James Davis and David Schoorman have
sought to develop an integrative “model of dyadic trust in an organizational
context”.29 These efforts to probe the concept of trust in an organisational
behaviour context are informative, not least since they seek to learn from
trust-related theoretical developments across multiple disciplines. Sociologists
have also sought to take ownership of the concept. Lewis and Weigert, for
example, build on the work of Durkheim, Simmel and Parsons in arguing
that, “trust is an essential form of human sociation and its underlying reality
is irreducibly sociological”.30 According to this perspective, “trust is concep-
tualized as a reciprocal orientation and interpretive assumption that is shared,
has the social relationship itself as the object, and is symbolized through
intentional action”.31 The approach here attaches considerable significance to
the social system and associated norms within which interaction between par-
ties takes place. Context, in other words, assumes a dominant role. This aligns
with Hardin’s view that trust should be conceptualized as a “three-part rela-
tion involving properties of a truster, attributes of a trustee, and a specific
context or domain over which trust is conferred”.32
The understanding of trust that underpins our study is a multidisci-

plinary one drawing on all of the disciplines mentioned above. We are
highly cognizant, for example, of the role played by macro-factors such as
the political relationship between the states involved, the cultural similari-
ties and differences between parties, and so on. These macro-factors do
not necessarily pre-determine the course of the relationship, but they cer-
tainly frame the verification scenario and play an important role in shaping
the nature and significance of the initial engagement. At the same time, we
are also heavily influenced by approaches grounded in psychology, in par-
ticular the dyadic, interactional dimension that is so prominent in more
recent psychological research. Indeed, our interest in the micro-factors
that influence perceptions and contribute to the development of trust dur-
ing the practice of verification – that is to say through the interactions
between host and inspectors over the course of an inspection – leads us to
focus more closely on this aspect of trust. In short, while we adhere to the
more holistic and integrated understanding of trust propounded by
Luhmann – “Trust occurs within a framework of interaction which is
influenced by both personality and social system” – we have chosen to
focus on the interactional dimension with a view to gauging how and to
what extent the interactions between parties influences the supposedly
objective, evidence-based approach to the inspections working in situ.33
As will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5, we facilitated this more
focused conceptual approach by controlling for macro-factors in the sce-
nario that was the source of our empirical data.
Trust and the Practice of Verification:

Towards a Conceptual Framework
Against the conceptual background outlined above, our understanding of
trust is shaped by three interlinked and overlapping categories of action:
vulnerability and risk; the expectation of favourable behaviour; and signal-
ling and influence credibility. These elements have been studied individu-
ally and in various combinations in the literature on trust, but we believe
that it is only when taken together that their full explanatory value is
realised. Our framework is neither exhaustive nor completely original.
Rather, its value derives from our effort to harness the explanatory value
of the considerable body of literature that exists on trust, and by extension
confidence, for the purpose of structuring thinking around the role and
influence of trust in verification at the operational level.
Vulnerability and Risk

While academics have different views on the precise definition and charac-
teristics of trust, there is widespread agreement on the importance of vul-
nerability in the trust equation. This view is deeply rooted in the literature
on trust. As early as the 1950s, Deutsch hinted at the significance of vulner-
ability in his definition: “An individual may be said to have trust in the
occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads
to behaviour which he perceives to have greater negative motivational con-
sequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational
consequences if it is confirmed”.34 Another seminal study, in 1986, took a
similar view: “Where one depends on another’s good will, one is necessarily
vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity
to harm one when one trusts […] Trust then, on this first approximation,
is accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or
lack of good will) toward one”.35 Indeed, this general perspective forms a
consistent theme in subsequent studies across a range of disciplines, a point
made clear by Rousseau et al in their 1998 cross-disciplinary work on trust:
“a willingness to be vulnerable [is a] critical component of all definitions of
trust reflected in the articles [under study]”.36 Simply put, without an ele-
ment of vulnerability, there is no need for trust.
If vulnerability and uncertainty are core elements of trust as a social
construct, so too is risk. Trust requires invested parties to take calculated
risks, to wilfully accept limited vulnerability in certain domains or catego-
ries of action in exchange for the prospect of positive outcomes. Inevitably,
this leaves open the prospect of deception, lack of fulfilment and disap-
pointment. The possibility of deception when stakes are high, in particu-
lar, can never be discounted and “actors seeking to build trust must be
willing to accept their vulnerability to betrayal if their positive expectations
about the motives and intentions of others prove misplaced”.37 Crucially,
this process is facilitated by the knowledge that the vulnerability at the
heart of the relationship is mutual. The balance of power may be tilted in
favour of one or other parties to the relationship, yet the position of all
involved incorporates an element of vulnerability.38 This interdependence
is an important aspect of trust that is often overlooked.39
It is important to note, however, that while trust inevitably incorporates a
measure of risk, it cannot be reduced to risk-taking behaviour. Deutsch
makes a useful distinction in this regard: “Risk-taking behaviour, wherein an
individual gambles on the occurrence of an event which he perceives to have
a low probability of occurrence, is distinguished from trusting behaviour by
the perceived lower probability of the occurrence of the event and also by the
difference in the anticipated ratio of positive to negative emotional conse-
quence”.40 In this context, “risk-taking and trusting behaviour are […] really
different sides of the same coin”, a distinction that makes all the difference in
terms of the ability to develop trust within relationships.41 While the notion
of risk-taking as understood by Deutsch would likely be incomprehensible to
those involved in sensitive relationships where the stakes are high, the idea of
trust as a process of small, incremental and cautious steps towards bridging a
gap in evidence, based on mutual vulnerability and a relatively low probabil-
ity of negative outcomes, is perhaps more palatable.
This discussion is particularly apt in the verification context where the
inevitable limits of evidence mean that vulnerability and risk are unavoid-
able. In the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, there is also
ample opportunity and possible incentives for deception. This situation is
compounded by the fact that relationships in this sphere may be adver-
sarial, even if a verification process has been freely and mutually agreed by
involved parties. Trust takes a relationship beyond the limits of confidence
and helps to fill the space where evidence is lacking or ambiguous. Yet the
potential negative consequences of trusting behaviour are significant.
From the verification of Iran’s nuclear rollback to the possibility of nuclear
disarmament on the part of a nuclear weapon state, the success or failure
of verification efforts can potentially have a powerful impact on national
interests and strategic stability more broadly.
The gravity of the issue does not change the nature of the requirements
for trust, it simply augments their significance and means that acceptable
levels of vulnerability and risk must be carefully weighed in verification
considerations. What, then, brings people to the point at which they are
prepared to take risks and make themselves vulnerable in a relationship,
particularly one that is so technically-oriented as those found in the verifi-
cation context? In terms of our own research into the verification of
nuclear warhead dismantlement at the level of the facility, we contend that
there are a number of important questions that must be kept in mind:
• What is the nature of the vulnerability and risk to which the trustor
is exposed?
• To what extent can the risk posed to the trustor be quantified?
• What are the implications of deception, disappointment or loss, both
in the short- and longer-term?
• How and to what extent can the vulnerability of both parties be off-
set or mitigated?
The Expectation of Favourable Behaviour

Inextricably linked to the idea of vulnerability and risk is the expectation
of favourable behaviour. The significance of positive expectations in the
development of trust has already been alluded to earlier in the chapter, but
the importance of this element cannot be overstated. Barber notes that,
“expectations are the meanings actors attribute to themselves and others
as they make choices about which actions and reactions are rationally
effective and emotionally and morally appropriate”, and this goes to the
heart of the matter.42 At stake here is the perception of intentions and
associated actions that, ultimately, will persuade an actor that cooperative
engagement and a degree of trust represent a desirable course of action.
As mentioned above, much of this relates to probability. Simply put, par-
ties to the relationship must balance the weight of available evidence
against the probability of fulfilment or disappointment. This is a rational
and calculated approach to the management of uncertainty, and consti-
tutes an important element in the trust equation. Indeed, for Das and
Teng, “trust cannot be understood without reference to probabilities”
and, ultimately, relates to the “assessment of probability that the person
will perform as expected”.43 Clearly, this expectation is not arbitrary but is
rather linked to the trusted party’s “current and previous implicit and
explicit claims”.44 These claims, usually informed to a certain degree by
prior experience, assume integrity and technical competence.
The significance attached to prior experience is noteworthy as this rep-
resents the point of overlap with confidence, defined earlier as an evidence-
based judgment. It stands to reason that a history of context-specific,
positive interactions and experiences will have a cumulative effect and pro-
vide a strong base for favourable expectations as the relationship progresses.
Conversely, a relationship marked by negative experiences will likely have a
diminishing effect on the expectations of involved parties going forward.
In the verification context, for example, a track record of warhead dis-
mantlement in a cooperative relationship, comprehensively verified by an
independent party (as is the case in the dismantlement scenario at the core
of our empirical research) will, notwithstanding some important contex-
tual change, undoubtedly frame expectations regarding future behaviour
in this area. In short, this is about the extent to which previous forms of
engagement between relevant parties contribute to, or indeed inhibit the
development of, a form of ‘trust capital’. Prior experience serves to colour
the lens through which the potential for a positive and mutually rewarding
relationship is viewed.
With regard to integrity, Hon and Grunig describe this as “the belief
that a person or organization is fair and just”.45 In other words, there is an
assumption that the party to be trusted will act reasonably, responsibly and
with sincerity. In the verification context, integrity might be considered as
the perception on the part of the inspectors that the host party is guided
by the principle that warhead dismantlement has been politically man-
dated and must therefore be implemented.
While the importance of integrity is well established as a determinant of
trust in the academic literature, it is counter-balanced by the prospect of
deception.46 Recognising the tension between these positions, Mayer,
Davis and Schoorman seek to adjust for the possibility of “profit seeking”
in their approach: “the relationship between integrity and trust involves
the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that
the trustor finds acceptable”.47 This idea of acceptability is significant since
it “precludes the argument that a party who is committed solely to the
principle of profit seeking at all costs would be judged high in integrity
(unless this principle is acceptable to the trustor)”.48 It also provides a use-
ful link to the related issue of suspicion and the role of this psychological
state as both an impediment to trust and a restraining factor in the risk
assessment process (discussed earlier) that plays such an important role in
determining appropriate levels of vulnerability.
The possibility of deception undoubtedly features in the cognitive pro-
cess through which one individual or group bestows trust on another.
Crucially, however, it is the accompanying level of suspicion that has most
bearing on the relationship. Sophisticated deception in uncertain circum-
stances can fool the most perceptive minds, yet Steven Fein argues con-
vincingly that suspicion triggers “sophisticated attributional analyses” that
are “characterized by active, careful consideration of the potential motives
and causes that may influence people’s behaviours”.49 In other words, his
research evokes an image of “social perceivers as ‘intuitive scientists’
attempting to draw reasonable inferences about others’ trustworthiness
from available social data”.50 In this context, the behavioural signals pro-
jected by both parties play an important role in the development of trust.
This issue is discussed in more detail in the following section.
Finally, implicit in the expectation of favourable behaviour that is central
to the development of trust, is the presumption of technical competence. In
his work on the subject, Barber notes that, “in a society like ours, where
there is such an accumulation of knowledge and technical expertise, expec-
tations of trust in this sense are very common”.51 This is particularly true of
the verification context, where activities are primarily viewed through a

technical lens and satisfactory outcomes on both sides require a high level of
scientific knowledge and an in-depth understanding of the unique chal-
lenges posed by verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. Crucially,
technical competence is closely related to professionalism – the idea that
parties involved in the verification process are aware of and committed to
fulfilling their designated roles and responsibilities. Signalling is important
here, for while any ‘trust capital’ looks to past developments, credibility
around issues of technical competency, integrity and professionalism are
forged in the present through the actions and behaviours of inspectors and
hosts working together ‘on the ground’. Expectations are inherently subjec-
tive and, as such, may not fully reflect the reality of a situation; they may be
influenced or distorted inadvertently or intentionally. Yet these subjective
constructions undoubtedly shape perceptions of trust among individuals
and groups. Some key questions in this regard include the following:
• What is the context framing the current interaction? Have prior

interactions between the parties resulted in positive outcomes?
• What might be judged the reasonable limits of favourable behaviour
on the part of the trusted party?
• Does the other party demonstrate technical competency?
• How do the actions of the other party reflect on their perceived
integrity?
• To what extent does the other party appear committed to achieving
the agreed objectives? Are roles and responsibilities carried out in an
efficient and effective manner?
Signals, Frames and Trust-Building

The third element of the trust framework relates to the manner and extent
to which intentions are conveyed and interpreted. It stands to reason that
in an uncertain environment such as the verification one, where evidence
is lacking and the expectation of positive outcomes may result in disap-
pointment, parties to the relationship are constantly seeking to identify
behavioural and other cues that will provide insights into the intentions of
other actors. On this point Bacharach and Gambetta argue that in virtually
all situations of this type that occur naturally, “the truster sees or otherwise
observes the trustee before deciding. She [sic] therefore can, and should,
use these observations as evidence that the trustee has, or lacks, trustworthy-
making qualities”.52 Thus to understand the nature and significance of
trust, and how it influences judgements in the verification context, we

must give thought to the relational interactions between involved parties –
in this case, the host team and the inspection team.
In their work on the subject, Six et al frame trust as a process of projecting
and interpreting relational signals. This approach draws on the Relational
Signalling Theory developed by Siegwart Lindenberg in the 1990s and holds
that trusters seek to identify at least two indicative characteristics in the
behaviour of trustees. First, “they check if the behaviour shows the compe-
tence to perform according to expectations”.53 Nooteboom describes this as
the ability dimension of trustworthiness and this relates to the earlier discus-
sion regarding technical competence as an influence on the expectation of
favourable behaviour.54 Second, “trusters look for signs in the behaviour of
trustees indicating whether the trustee is interested in maintaining the rela-
tionship in the future (the intentional dimension of trustworthiness)”.55 This
aspect, in particular, fits with the widely held belief that “mutual trust will
increase incrementally via carefully considered, repeated positive interactions
and that an unexpected breach will result in an abrupt loss of trust”.56
Together, these dimensions suggest a fluid, dynamic process that sees
parties constantly engaged in a process of interpretation and evaluation on
the one hand, and projection on the other. Crucially, the trajectory here
might be predicted to an extent, but it cannot be predetermined. This
dyadic process of signalling can lead to unexpected outcomes because there
are considerable challenges to be negotiated in this space. For example,
Bacharach and Gambetta allude to the ever-present possibility of deception
in their work: If deception could reap benefits, “there is a motive for an
opportunistic trustee to ‘mimic’ – to emit signs of trustworthy-making
qualities when he lacks them”.57 This further complicates the situation for
the truster since “she must judge whether apparent signs of trustworthiness
are themselves to be trusted”.58 Clearly, this can have a significant impact on
the development of trust; the need to constantly question and evaluate dia-
logue, actions and behaviour has the potential to distort the interpretative
process through a circular process of doubt-filled reasoning. Beyond the
issue of deception, there are more banal issues that must also be kept in
mind: “It is an inevitable fact from social life that one’s behaviour is not
always perceived or experienced by others as intended, and sometimes one
is simply not able to act according to his or her intentions”.59 These chal-
lenges, in turn, present difficulty for those seeking to understand the inter-
actions that make up the trust dimension of a relationship.
Another issue relevant to the discussion here is the manner in which
meaning and priority are attached to particular signals and behavioural
cues. In this regard, the notion of framing provides a useful conceptual

anchor. Framing is a well-established concept in the social sciences and
owes much to the ground-breaking work of Erving Goffman in the 1970s
and David Snow and colleagues in the 1980s.60 Goffman describes frames
as “schemata of interpretation” that allow users to “locate, perceive, iden-
tify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined
in its terms”.61 Simply put, frames help us make sense of the world and
derive meaning from social interactions. In the context of trust, Lindenberg
argues that framing provides for a conceptual approach that “links insights
from cognitive psychology to a theory of rational action”.62 More specifi-
cally, the value and relevance of Lindenberg’s work lies in its focus on the
interactional element of relationships involving trust and makes a distinc-
tion between the “foreground” and the “background” with regard to the
interpretative process: “what is in the foreground (i.e. in the “the frame”)
is analyzed and attended to in more detail than what is in the background
and, even more important, it is analyzed in terms of what is in the fore-
ground. Therefore, it has a much higher impact on the choice of action”.63
This perspective finds resonance in the literature. For example, Entman
describes framing in similar terms as a process of “selection and salience”:
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in a communicating text [or other medium], in such a way as
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.64
This focused approach to thinking about framing is particularly relevant
to our study, which seeks to identify and consider factors beyond the evi-
dentiary chain that have an influence on the interpretative process of
inspectors. Lindenberg’s approach does not dismiss the influence of
broader, background factors such as politics, norms and culture that form
the backdrop to human relationships. It simply highlights the importance
of the here and now, where a single incident or event can have a definitive
shaping influence on perception and the evolving nature of the relation-
ship. Context may set the initial path in a relationship involving trust, but
it does not by any means predetermine the route.
These issues of signalling, interpretation and framing prompt a number
of questions in the verification context:
• How do parties to the relationship seek to communicate and project

their intentions? How are these interpreted by the other side?
• Are there particular actions, attitudes or statements that prove deci-
sive in the evolution of trust in the relationship?
• What is the nature of these pivotal moments and can they be clearly
identified (i.e. Are they explicit or do they take a more subtle form?)
• How do information flows (speed of delivery, style of delivery,
responsiveness, etc) impact on the perceptions of either party?
• How are challenging situations resolved and what does the manner
of their resolution reveal about the relationship?
Conceptualising Trust and the Practice

of Verification
See Table 4.1. For more details
Table 4.1 Conceptualising trust and the practice of verification

Vulnerability and risk Expectation of favourable Signals, frames and
behaviour trust-building
What is the nature of the What is the context framing How do parties to the
vulnerability and risk to the current interaction? relationship seek to
which the trustor is Have prior interactions communicate and project their
exposed? between the parties resulted intentions? How are these
in positive outcomes? interpreted by the other side?
To what extent can the What might be judged the Are there particular actions,
risk posed to the trustor reasonable limits of attitudes or statements that
be quantified? favourable behaviour on the prove decisive in the evolution
part of the trusted party? of trust in the relationship?
What are the implications Does the other party What is the nature of these
of deception, demonstrate technical pivotal moments and can they
disappointment or loss, competency? be clearly identified (i.e. Are
both in the short- and they explicit or do they take a
longer-term? more subtle form?)
How and to what extent How do the actions of the How do information flows
can the vulnerability of other party reflect on their (speed of delivery, style of
both parties be offset or perceived integrity? delivery, responsiveness, etc)
mitigated? impact on the perceptions of
either party?
To what extent does the How are challenging
other party appear situations resolved and what
committed to achieving the does the manner of their
agreed objectives? resolution reveal about the
relationship?
Are roles and responsibilities
carried out in an efficient
and effective manner?
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the need for a robust conceptual approach to
understanding the nature and impact of the human element to disarmament
verification. This process is most often considered in terms of the associated
technical challenges, yet it is our contention that the perceptions, assump-
tions, values and biases held by key actors involved in the implementation of
verification procedures and protocols at ground level have the potential to
influence verification outcomes. In particular, we argue that the verification
process is marked by a constant tension between confidence, viewed as an
evidence-based judgement on the part of informed actors, and trust, thought
of as the perception of intentions in a situation where evidence is lacking. Of
these, trust is of most interest to us since it relates to the uncertain space
beyond evidentiary limits, where perceptions and subjective judgement have
the potential to assume disproportionate weight and influence.
Our discussion of trust underpins the conceptual framework that is at
the heart of the chapter. With this framework, we have sought to identify
the key components of trust and combine them into a robust conceptual
lens. Chapter 6, through this lens, will view and interpret the empirical
data. Ultimately, this trust-based conceptual approach will allow us to
explore the interactional dimension of verification practice in detail, with
a view to gauging how and to what extent the interactions between parties
influences the supposedly objective, evidence-based approach to the
inspections working in situ.
Notes
1. Canadian Government, “Verification in All Aspects: A Comprehensive
Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UN
General Assembly Resolution 40/152(0),” April 1986, 15.
2. Wyn Q. Bowen and Andreas Persbo, “How Might States, or the
International Community, Go about Implementing the Dismantlement of
Nuclear Weapons Systems in an Accurate Way Which Would Engender
International Confidence?” (International Commission on Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Disarmament, February 2009), 1–18, https://studylib.
net/doc/8046435/paper---international-commission-on-nuclear-non.
3. Stephen J. Gould, “Deconstructing the ‘Science Wars’ by Reconstructing
an Old Mold,” Science 287, no. 5451 (2000): 253.
4. Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science
and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4.
5. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public

Life.
6. Edward J. Rykiel, “Scientific Objectivity, Value Systems and Policymaking,”
BioScience 51, no. 6 (2001): 435.
7. Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1983), 1.
8. “Confidence – Definition,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed August
29, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/confidence;
“Trust – Definition of Trust,” Oxford Dictionaries | English, accessed
August 29, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/trust.
9. W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167–98.
10. Ibid., 7.
11. Carol A. Heimer, “Solving the Problem of Trust,” in Trust in Society, by
Karen S. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 43.
12. Luhmann, cited in Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust, 8.
13. Niklas Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and
Alternatives,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relati (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 97.
14. Ibid., 98.
15. David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, “Trust as Social Reality,” Social Forces
63, no. 4 (1985): 976.
16. Morton Deutsch, “Trust and Suspicion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2,
no. 4 (1958): 265.
17. David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, “Social Atomism, Holism, and
Trust,” The Sociological Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1985): 464.
18. Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging
Perspectives, Enduring Questions,” Annual Review of Psychology 50
(1999): 575.
19. Julian B. Rotter, “A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal
Trust,” Journal of Personality 35, no. 4 (1967): 651, 653.
20. Jeffry A. Simpson, “Psychological Foundations of Trust,” Current
Directions in Psychological Science 16, no. 5 (2007): 264.
21. Rotter, “A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust,” 653.
22. Ibid.
23. See, for example, Ki-Taek Chun and John B. Campbell, “Dimensionality
of the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale,” Psychological Reports 35, no. 3
(1974): 1059–70.
24. Dominic Aitken, “Trust and Participation in Urban Regeneration,” People,
Place and Policy 6, no. 3 (2012): 135.
25. Ibid.
26. John K. Rempel, Holmes, J. G., and Mark P. Zanna, “Trust in Close
Relationships,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (1985):
95–112.
27. Lewis and Weigert, “Social Atomism, Holism, and Trust,” 456.
28. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1973).
29. See Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives,
Enduring Questions,” 570; Roger C. Mayer, James. H Davis, and F. D.
Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organisational Trust,” Academy of
Management Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 729.
30. Lewis and Weigert, “Social Atomism, Holism, and Trust,” 456.
31. Ibid.
32. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives,
Enduring Questions,” 574.
33. Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (New York: Wiley, 1979), 6.
34. Deutsch, “Trust and Suspicion,” 266.
35. Anette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 235.
36. Denise M. Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline
View of Trust,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (1998):
393–404.
37. Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World: More Trust May Be
Better,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 437.
38. On the importance of mutual vulnerability in the development of trust see
Baier, “Trust and Antitrust.”
39. J. Mark Weber, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan, “Normal Acts
of Irrational Trust: Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development
Process,” Research in Organisational Behaviour 26 (2005): 76.
40. Deutsch, “Trust and Suspicion,” 266.
41. Ibid.
42. Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust, 9.
43. T. K. Das and Bing-Sheng Teng, “The Risk-Based View of Trust: A
Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Business and Psychology 19, no. 1
(2004): 98.
44. Ibid., 716.
45. Linda C. Hon and James E. Grunig, Guidelines for Measuring Relationships
in Public Relations (Gainesville: Institute for Public Relations, 1999), 3.
46. Studies highlighting the importance of integrity include Jethro
K. Liebermann, The Litigious Society (New York: Basic Books, 1981); John
K. Butler and Stephen Cantrell, “A Behavioural Decision Theory Approach
to Modeling Dyadic Trust in Superiors and Subordinates,” Psychological
Reports 55, no. 1 (1984): 19–28; Sim B. Sitkin and Nancy L. Roth,
“Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic ‘Remedies’ for Trust/
Distrust,” Organisational Science 4, no. 3 (1993): 367–92; Amos
S. Engelbrecht, Gardielle Heine, and Bright Mahembe, “The Influence of
Integrity and Ethical Leadership on Trust in the Leader,” Management
Dynamics 24, no. 1 (2015): 2–10.
47. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organisational

Trust,” 719.
48. Ibid. This draws on the work of Lynne McFall in her article; Lynne McFall,
“Integrity,” Ethics 98, no. 1 (1987): 5–20.
Enduring Questions”; Steven Fein, “Effects of Suspicion in Attributional
Thinking and the Correspondence Bias,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 70, no. 6 (1996): 1167.
Enduring Questions,” 587.
51. Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust, 14.
52. Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, “Trust in Signs,” in Trust in
Society, Volume 2, ed. Karen S. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2001), 148.
53. Frederique Six, Bart Nooteboom, and Adriaan Hoogendoorn, “Actions
That Build Interpersonal Trust: A Relational Signalling Perspective,”
Review of Social Economy 68, no. 3 (2010): 288.
54. Bart Nooteboom, Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and
Figures (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002).
55. Six, Nooteboom, and Hoogendoorn, “Actions That Build Interpersonal
Trust: A Relational Signalling Perspective,” 288.
56. Weber, Malhotra, and Murnighan, “Normal Acts of Irrational Trust:
Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development Process,” 76.
57. Bacharach and Gambetta, “Trust in Signs,” 148.
58. Ibid.
59. Miriam J. A. Tazelaar, Paul A. M. Van Lange, and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk,
“How to Cope with ‘Noise’ in Social Dilemmas: The Benefits of
Communication,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87, no. 6
(2004): 845.
60. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of
Experience (Boston, MA: Northeastern Press, 1974); David A. Snow et al.,
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81.
61. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, 21.
62. Siegwert Lindenberg, “It Takes Both Trust and Lack of Mistrust: The Workings
of Cooperation and Relational Signaling in Contractual Relationships,”
Journal of Management and Governance 4, no. 1–2 (2000): 17.
63. Ibid.
64. Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–8.
CHAPTER 5
Simulating Disarmament Verification:

Design and Methods
The preceding chapters have had three principal objectives. First, to delve
into the history of verification in the nuclear arena with a view to provid-
ing the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the various chal-
lenges that have been encountered by researchers in this space, particularly
with regard to nuclear warhead dismantlement. In this complex area of
enquiry, some of these challenges have been overcome, while others, such
as the impossibility of 100 per cent certainty in verification outcomes, have
endured. Second, to highlight what we regard as a significant gap in veri-
fication research, namely the role and influence of human factors in what
is usually considered to be an objective, technical process. In our view, this
techno-centric view is reductive and limiting, and fails to adequately
account for the complexities and nuances of verification as practice. This
leads directly to our third objective: to adopt a multidisciplinary approach
to thinking about human factors relevant to the verification context, such
as trust and confidence, and develop a robust conceptual framework
within which these factors can be considered. These objectives achieved,
the remainder of the book is devoted to exploring the research findings
drawn from a two-year project designed to isolate for study, in so far is
possible, the human factors of verification.
Against this background, this chapter sets out the research approach
underpinning the study. It begins by outlining the rationale for adopting
a simulation-based approach, and considering the strengths and weak-
nesses of this particular method. Simulations allow for the construction of

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_5
carefully controlled research environments that can closely replicate real

life. At the same time, these are artificial contexts that bring their own
unique challenges. The chapter then sets out the relevant particulars of the
simulation designed and run for this project at an operational nuclear facil-
ity in Norway. As part of this discussion, we describe the approach to data
collection that underpinned our research methodology, as well as outlin-
ing the simulation design and implementation, from participant recruit-
ment to implementation. It is worth noting from the outset that the
design and conduct of the simulations drew heavily on the studies of
nuclear warhead dismantlement and nuclear verification discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3. Drawing insights from past research and practice in this
area proved invaluable in the development of a fictional scenario that was
grounded in realism.
Why Simulate?
Before discussing the benefits of a simulation-based approach to our
research, it is first necessary to define simulations and describe briefly what
they entail. For while this methodology has a long and diverse history that
spans a range of disciplinary boundaries, from security studies to aeronau-
tics, the term is a contested one whose meaning can vary according to
context. In the area of ‘wargaming’ or ‘conflict simulation’, for example,
the term ‘simulation’ is often used interchangeably with ‘game’. On the
surface, this might appear to be a relatively minor distinction, yet Philip
Sabin notes that it is a source of angst for some scholars who “prefer to
draw a sharp distinction between the two concepts, and to confine the
term ‘simulation’ to detailed self-contained systems that faithfully mimic
real processes without the need for human intervention”.1 This school of
thought sees ‘games’ as something entirely different, activities that are
“much more unpredictable and heuristic”.2 Yet this view is contested by
others who embrace the capriciousness and uncertainty that feature in
games as valuable qualities with much to add to the process. Consider the
following statement by Thomas Schelling:
Games…have one quality that separates them qualitatively from straightfor-

ward analysis and permits them to generate insights that could not be
acquired through analysis, reflection, and discussion. That quality can be
illustrated by the impossibility theorem: one thing a person cannot do, no
matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a
list of the things that would never occur to him.3
SIMULATING DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION: DESIGN AND METHODS 101
For Schelling, there is immense value in uncertainty, since it can set the
ground for unanticipated discoveries and lead researchers or analysts in
unexpected and fruitful intellectual directions. Our understanding – and
the one that shaped our methodological approach – is more in line with
Sabin’s “hybrid concept” that bridges these two poles. Ultimately, our
approach here is guided by our fundamental objective of exploring human
decisions and the drivers behind them.4 And to this end, simulations hold
enormous potential.
Broadly speaking, simulations seek to create an “approximation for a
real-world situation” and allow involved parties to recreate some of the
challenges and complexities of real life in an artificial, controlled environ-
ment. Simulations have traditionally played an important role as a training
tool – Robert Axelrod gives the example of flight simulators used in the
training of pilots in noting that “many of the earliest and most successful
simulation systems were designed to train people by providing a reason-
ably accurate and dynamic interactive representation of a given environ-
ment”.5 Yet training is not the only use of simulations and in their work,
Starkey and Blake highlight the “shared research and public scholarship in
professional journals” that this approach also facilitates.6
From a research perspective, simulations can be used to understand
behaviour within complex systems. By creating a controlled and replica-
ble environment, the different factors at play can be unpacked and iso-
lated for observation and examination, creating new and rich data sets for
analysis.7 There are also many different forms of simulation, ranging from
“complex mathematical models to free-form verbal interchange”.8 And
as Starkey and Blake note, simulations can be very effective “as experi-
mental tools to allow researchers to develop and test theories of decision-
making and other processes”.9 Much like real life settings, simulations
force participants to take decisions in challenging situations where actions
are limited by certain constraints, such as incomplete information or time
pressures.
In our view, these various qualities make simulations an excellent means
of exploring the complex operational dynamics of nuclear warhead disar-
mament verification. Furthermore, a simulation-based approach is argu-
ably the most logical one in an area where the phenomenon exists only in
theory. In any case, simulating the verification of nuclear warhead dis-
mantlement provided us with a means of probing an intricate process
incorporating multiple parties with evolving dynamic strategies and rela-
tionships, and bound by overlapping legal, technical and political frame-
works. More specifically, a simulation-based approach allowed us to

configure a scenario that isolated, in so far as is possible, human factors
and particularly the interplay between trust and confidence for study.
In addition to the points raised above, our choice of approach was
influenced by important practical consideration, namely the readiness of
the Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) in Norway to provide access –
for several days at a time and on multiple occasions – to a working nuclear
facility in which to run the simulations. Basing the simulation at an opera-
tional nuclear facility presented a unique opportunity to develop a highly
realistic scenario for the participants (the players) to engage with.
Colleagues from IFE and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
in the UK also provided expert advice on the development of the back-
story to the scenario, how it might evolve and the nature of inspector-host
relations during inspections, all of which added further to the sense of
realism.
All this said, it is important to acknowledge that simulations are not
without problems and this approach has its detractors. In this regard,
Rubel identifies some key issues in the context of war gaming. For him
simulations are, in the end, only “simplified representations of a potential
future” situation and so must be recognised as such. He also alludes to
what he describes as “the common wisdom” that simulations “are not
experiments, as they cannot prove anything”.10 Rubel highlights the “sub-
jective nature of game-produced knowledge” and that this can be particu-
larly problematic when game-generated information may be
“bureaucratically or politically threatening to players or sponsors”. In this
respect he states, “It is all too easy either to ignore or put a favorable spin
on game events or results that do not fit comfortably into existing doc-
trines or accepted theories”. The key to simulation design, implementa-
tion and analysis, then, is “objective, disinterested sponsorship” and
analysis.11 Rubel further argues that, “it is entirely possible for games to
produce valid-looking garbage. It is not easy to distinguish error from
insight”. This can be avoided “only if game design, execution, and analysis
are conducted with discipline and rigor” and if diligence is applied.12
These criticisms of over-simplification and subjectivity are valid ones
that cannot be ignored. During the development of the disarmament veri-
fication simulation, emphasis was thus placed on creating a research envi-
ronment that sought to replicate real-world conditions in manner that was
as rigorous and as objective as possible. A crucial element of this approach
was a strong measure of self-awareness and critical reflection, questioning
each stage of the design and implementation with a view to offsetting any
potential assumptions or biases on the part of the research team. Ultimately,
while recognising that simulations cannot necessarily “prove anything”, it
is our contention that a robust, realistic, tightly-controlled and compre-
hensive simulation at a working nuclear facility would nevertheless offer
valuable insights into the nature and influence of issues such as trust and
confidence on the practice of verification. It is also worth noting that while
the project was co-funded by the UK and Norwegian governments, the
project retained complete intellectual independence in terms of the analy-
sis stemming from the data collected across the multiple iterations of the
simulation.
Developing a Verification Scenario

Once the decision to adopt a simulation-based approach to the research
was agreed, the next step was to develop the fictional scenario with which
participants would engage. As discussed in Chapter 3 the real-life verifica-
tion of the dismantlement of a series of nuclear warheads would be a com-
plex and resource intensive process, likely involving multiple facilities and
phased activities occurring over a period of months, if not years.
Consequently, it was not possible to simulate this extended timeline in its
entirety. Neither, however, was it necessary. The research team decided
early on in the design process that it would be preferable to focus the
simulation around a single inspection visit at a hypothetical dismantlement
facility, triggered by a break in the chain of custody in a pre-existing veri-
fication regime. The idea was that the inspecting party would be tasked
with ascertaining the cause of the break, verifying that diversion had not
occurred and restoring the chain of custody. The disruption and ambigu-
ity at the core of this scenario was intended to put strain on the verification
regime. At the same time, it was also designed to simplify the simulation
environment, reducing the scope of the verification process and limiting
the number of influencing variables in this regard. This, in turn, allowed
emphasis to be directed towards the human factors at play.
A Fictional Verification Scenario

Framing the verification simulation was a detailed narrative that sought
both to cultivate a sense of realism and provide an acceptable level of back-
ground information to participants, thus allowing them to focus on the
break in the chain of custody that was the centre-piece of the simulation.
This narrative involved two fictional, nuclear-armed states, Westermark
and Registan, who had entered into a cooperative process of phased bilat-
eral reductions of nuclear weapons numbers. Following a period of nego-
tiation, a treaty was agreed whereby Westermark and Registan both
committed to dismantling 30 nuclear warheads – a militarily significant
number – in a verifiable way. In the scenario, the bilateral treaty was situ-
ated within the broader framework of the NPT and was presented by both
sides as an important step toward fulfilling their Article VI obligations.
The Treaty framing the scenario also noted the national security concerns
of the states concerned.
Under the terms of the fictional treaty a phased process was employed
whereby warheads were split into 5 batches of 6 warheads and dismantled
sequentially. At the point of the scenario, two batches of warheads had
been successfully dismantled as per the terms of the state-level agreement.
Dismantlement operations took place in declared facilities in each country,
with these facilities all housing a variety of nuclear weapons operations.
This aspect of dismantlement was particularly important as it was intended
to reflect the likely challenge of maintaining daily operations in a nuclear
weapons facility while accommodating an inspection team and the associ-
ated disruption.
The treaty stipulated that all fissile material derived from the dismantle-
ment process would ultimately be put into long-term monitored storage.
Under the verification regime, warheads earmarked for dismantlement
were tracked from military deployment through disassembly through to
the final storage of fissile material components. The regime covered mul-
tiple locations, facilities and processes in both of the treaty states. Although
the simulation itself was narrowly focused on a single incident involving a
break in the chain of custody, this background information was provided
to all participants.
In order to minimize the disruptive influence of contextual factors and
focus the attention of participants on operational issues, issues such as the
nature of the political and diplomatic relationship between the two states
were pre-determined by the control team and remained constant. The
relationship was portrayed as a positive one with a growing track record of
cooperation on key political and diplomatic issues, such as disarmament.
Beyond this background briefing, these higher level contextual issues were
excluded from the scenario so as to minimize their influence.
A Robust Verification Protocol

Alongside the state-level treaty discussed above, the research team devel-
oped a detailed verification protocol that outlined the different practical
steps and measures agreed as part of the dismantlement process. This pro-
tocol drew heavily on tools and procedures used in past nuclear verifica-
tion activities and specific studies into the warhead dismantlement process.
It comprised three main elements. First, there was the provision for on-
site visits to facilities where warheads were being dismantled or stored.
On-site inspections are widely recognised as a lynchpin of successful veri-
fication regimes in the nuclear arena and were deemed particularly v aluable
in this context, given the relative ease with which warheads or their con-
stituent parts could be diverted.
The second component was the application of containment and surveil-
lance measures on-site to ensure maintenance of the ‘chain of custody’
around the warheads and related components.13 As these moved between
dismantlement stages, they were stored in special opaque containers,
designed to shield their classified features. Customised tags were used to
uniquely identify the containers as they passed through the dismantlement
process, which are also subjected to surveillance including the use of
closed-circuit television (CCTVs).
The third component was the provision for voluntary confidence build-
ing measures, beyond what was explicitly encoded into the verification
protocol. Under the terms of this provision, either party was permitted to
propose, or to accept, measures that would further facilitate the verifica-
tion process. This element was included to reflect the broader cooperative
framework within which the phased disarmament processes was negoti-
ated. From a research perspective, it also created room for manoeuvre for
the participants and opened up additional potential pathways of progres-
sion for relationships developing within the simulation.
As discussed in previous chapters the presence of foreign inspectors at
sensitive nuclear facilities in close proximity to classified items (warheads
and their constituent components) and related processes, inevitably poses
risks for the host, most notably with regard to the potential the divulgence
(or capture) of classified nuclear weapons related information. In order to
mitigate this risk, the verification protocol contained clear guidelines for
the conduct of inspections that recognised the ever-present tension
between the competing goals of transparency and the protection of sensi-
tive information. For example, a formal process was created for requesting
on-site access, under which the hosting party reserved the right to manage
or deny access to sites, facilities or other places under their jurisdiction in
order to protect national security interests or to prevent disclosure of sen-
sitive or classified information unrelated to the purpose of the visit.
Inspectors could also request access to any documentation they deem
relevant, but information was only released at the discretion of the host on
a case-by-case basis. Inspectors were escorted at all times on site and
expected to abide by escorting rules, including keeping any requests to
within the scope of the Treaty and discharging their mandate with the
least possible inconvenience to the host facility. In dismantlement related
areas, inspectors were required to abide by strict safety and security mea-
sures, including wearing special overalls and only using equipment
screened and approved by the host. Monitoring equipment, in particular,
was only permitted to be operated by representatives of the host facility
under the direction of inspectors, rather than the other way around. These
were just some of the measures designed to ensure a robust verification
protocol that adequately provided for the concerns and priorities of all
parties while at the same time facilitating progress of the verification
process
The Verification Tool Box

Chapter 3 discussed some of the challenges associated with the deploy-
ment and use of sensing and measurement tools in a dismantlement facil-
ity, and these issues played an important shaping role in the design of the
verification protocol. It is of the utmost importance that the tools available
to an inspection team in a dismantlement facility be designed in such a way
as to enable the collection of relevant data in support of the verification
process, while minimising the risk of divulging sensitive information. In
this simulation, the only technical measurement allowed on the fictional
warheads or their components was through an ‘information barrier’ sys-
tem, referred to as an ‘Attribute Monitor’ during the simulation.14 For the
purposes of the scenario, this device was represented as jointly designed
and agreed by both state parties for application to the warheads and con-
tainers containing ‘treaty accountable items’ (TAIs). The premise was
straightforward, the device would take a particular measurement and com-
pare this to previously agreed attributes. In the case of a match, it would
emit an alarm and display a red light within 30 seconds of exposure.
Failure to emit a signal after this time was considered a negative reading.
The device had a range of 0.5m but it was acknowledged that shielding
could decrease its detection range. The device was also influenced by back-
ground conditions. If background interference was too high, the detector
would emit three short bursts of sound, and display a red light. Auto-
calibration was performed using an internal reference source, when the
detector was first switched on.
It was made clear to participants from the outset that the monitor
would not provide for 100 per cent certainty, a situation deliberately cho-
sen during the research design to reflect the current state of development
in information barrier technology. Information barrier devices cannot cur-
rently establish the presence of treaty accountable items beyond doubt, as
other items could also potentially have sufficiently similar attributes to
trigger a positive reading. The device can therefore only conclusively
exclude the presence of items rather than unambiguously confirm their
presence. This aspect was incorporated into the simulation.
As mentioned above, the application of all monitoring equipment in
the facility was performed by the hosts under the instruction of the inspec-
tion team. This procedure also applied to the Attribute Monitor. This
aspect of the verification regime was designed to minimize direct inspector
contact with the warheads or their components. The Attribute Monitor
could also be used to collect readings in areas where warheads or their
components could potentially be hidden, thereby aiding the process of
assessing possible diversion routes. Other verification tools available to the
inspection team included internal and external CCTV, tamper indicating
seals, camera tags and satellite observation using national technical means
(NTM). Portal perimeter monitoring was employed to detect and deter
the potential removal of sensitive materials and components from the dis-
mantlement site.
The Verification Mission: Investigating an Interruption in Treaty

Monitoring Procedures
As mentioned above, the specific verification mission chosen for this exer-
cises involved a break in the chain of custody around the nuclear warheads
and their components. The incident in question occurred during the dis-
mantlement of the third batch of warheads at a Westermark nuclear weap-
ons facility. More specifically, the breach took place while the TAIs were in
temporary storage and was triggered by a fire which disrupted the internal
CCTV, causing the two cameras used to monitor the TAIs to stop func-
tioning. Moreover, while attempting to escape the fire, a panicked facility

employee passed through the room containing the TAIs as he made his
way out of the building. This action broke the seals placed by inspectors
on two doors in the storage room containing the TAIs.
The above developments resulted in a break in the chain of custody
since, according to mutually agreed procedures, once the TAIs entered
the storage room, all entry and exit points to the room should have been
sealed and continuously monitored by CCTV. Needless to say, unauthor-
ised access to the storage room was not permitted under any circum-
stances. The loss of the CCTV feed in the storage room containing the
TAIs, combined with the breaking of seals, constituted a significant breach
in agreed measures for surveillance and containment, and immediately
opened up a potential diversion pathway for the TAIs.
Before entering temporary storage, the progress of the TAIs from
deployment sites had been monitored with no issues regarding the integ-
rity of the chain of custody. It was known beforehand that conditions in
the storage room were not ideally suited for the security of the TAIs as the
room was located on a potential fire exit route. This was deemed to be an
acceptable arrangement because the facility was not specifically designed
for warhead dismantlement verification. It was also believed that the com-
bination of seals and CCTV would provide adequate assurance regarding
the integrity of the TAIs.
Information about the incident was relayed by national representatives
of Westermark to their counterparts in Registan as per their obligations
under the state level treaty. However, the report on the incident was filed
late, with the short delay attributed to confusion about the extent of the
incident and the conclusions of an internal investigation into the causes
and consequences of the fire. In communicating details of the incident,
the government of Westermark expressed its willingness to immediately
receive an on-site inspection team to assess the situation and re-establish
the chain of custody around the warheads. This was accepted by the gov-
ernment of Registan who dispatched a team of inspectors with three main
objectives. First, the inspection team was required to account for material
at the facility under treaty control before the breach in monitoring proce-
dures. Second, the inspection team was mandated to re-establish the chain
of custody. Third, the inspection team was instructed to report back to
their national authorities on the measures taken to resolve the situation.
The inspectors were also asked to provide recommendations on how
future monitoring efforts could be enhanced.
Given the unusual nature of the event, the inspection team had to
negotiate with the host party over the nature and extent of access they
would be allowed to have at the facility, as well as considering the type of
information they would need to complete their mission. For its part,
authorities in Westermark had to assess all requests for information from
the inspection team, against both the desire to re-establish the chain of
custody and the need to protect sensitive information regarding their facil-
ities, activities, equipment and warheads.
Recruitment, Preparation and Engagement

of Participants
For each iteration of the verification simulation, between 7 and 9 partici-

pants were recruited, all of whom were postgraduate students with varying
degrees and combinations of knowledge regarding nuclear arms control
and verification. The number of participants selected per simulation was
considered optimal as it was large enough to comprehensively engage with
the range of tasks demanded by the verification protocol, yet small enough
to ensure rigorous and extensive data collection from individual partici-
pants as well as collectively. Recruitment criteria revolved around three
principal factors: career stage – all participants were university based post-
graduate students; disciplinary background – participants were recruited
from policy-related and technical fields, including nuclear engineering and
security studies, and demonstrated a particular interest in arms control and
verification issues; and academic credentials – all participants were edu-
cated to postgraduate level and possessed strong academic credentials. In
total, the exercise was run eight times with students drawn from academic
institutions in the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, Germany,
South Africa and Egypt. The cultural diversity of participants served to
enrich the study with a diverse range of perspectives.
To ensure a common point of intellectual departure at the start of the
simulation, all participants underwent a short preparatory programme of
study in the leadup to the simulation. This familiarisation programme com-
prised a short, focussed reading list of key scholarly works exploring some of
the challenges associated with nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.
These readings were complemented and reinforced by a series of bespoke
lectures in the days prior to the start of the simulation. These lectures, pro-
vided by subject matter experts, were interactive and addressed four main
areas: the dynamics and evolution of various arms control agreements, with
a particular focus on verification; developments and progress in the area of

nuclear warhead dismantlement verification; operational insights from past
weapons inspections, including a case study of the Iraqi experience; and the
nature of an investigative approach.
The final element of the preparatory programme involved a substantial
simulation briefing. At this final stage, participants were presented with
details of the scenario and its background, relevant supporting documen-
tation such as the treaty text, the facility inspection agreement, site plans
and satellite imagery, including supporting documentation. The nature
and objectives of the mission were set out and the practicalities of inspec-
tion methods (seals, attribute monitors and so on) explained. At this stage,
participants were allowed to digest all information before a final clarifica-
tion session where any questions, doubts or concerns were addressed by
the control team.
Recognising the complexity of the area and the fact that certain partici-
pants were less familiar with the nuances of verification as practice, the
simulation design process also made provision for an expert mentor who
would be available to assist the inspection team during the simulation. The
mentor’s role was envisioned as a reactive one with the mentor instructed
to provide guidance on technical issues in response to direct requests from
the inspectors. The only other permissible intervention on the part of the
mentor was for game control reasons if the inspection team was moving in
a fundamentally non-credible direction. In practice, proactive interven-
tions were seldom needed, but the mentor’s expertise was regularly called
upon to provide general insights on technical details.
Playing the ‘Game’

Each simulation adopted the same structure, content and format and ran
for three days. The control team overseeing implementation was respon-
sible for ensuring replicability over the course of the research project.
During the simulation, control team interventions beyond the detailed
scripted guidelines and parameters set out in the scenario plan were kept
to a minimum. All simulations followed a strict separation of ‘in-play’ and
‘out-of-play’ activities to avoid confusion and preserve the integrity of the
simulation over the three days of engagement. Any ‘out of play’ activity
was clearly delineated as such. The ultimate objective here was to allow
inspectors as much freedom as possible in a realistic environment, all the
while remaining within the parameters of the simulation.
Every effort was made to add to the realism of the endeavour, from the
simulation setting – a nuclear facility operated by IFE near Oslo in Norway,
to the health, safety, security and escorting regulations that mimicked
what would be expected in a nuclear weapons facility, to the shrouding of
equipment deemed sensitive in the context of the simulation. And while
simple substitutes were used for the attribute monitor, tags and seals, care
was taken to replicate the concept and methods of operation of these
tools. It should be noted that the entire process here benefited enormously
from the support and input of an advisory panel comprising experts from
IFE, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), and the UK
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).
Each simulation began in the same way: with formal introductions and
briefings at the inspection team’s base for the three days, a dedicated
building situated just outside the security limits of the Westermark nuclear
facility. Inspectors were briefed on the specifics of the incident that trig-
gered the inspection, how it unfolded and the efforts that were taken to
investigate and resolve it. Westermark facility staff also used this opportu-
nity to brief the inspectors on the security, health and safety, and escorting
rules that would be implemented while on site.
In opening discussions regarding inspector access to the facility, repre-
sentatives of the Westermark facility proposed that inspectors simply visit
the storage room at issue where the TAIs were being stored. From the
Westermark perspective, the process at that point would be straightfor-
ward: the Registani team would inspect the contents of the room, examine
the CCTV system and footage, reapply broken seals to points of entry, and
depart the facility. It is worth noting here that the host party adopted a
co-operative, albeit conservative, approach to the verification mission
throughout the simulation. As expected, this opening gambit inevitably
fell short of the needs and expectations of the inspection team and was
rejected. This served as a useful point of departure and the inspectors were
immediately forced to engage with the complex issue of access and what
this might mean in terms of information, evidence and the potential for
diversion of TAIs. The simulation planned for negotiations from this point
onwards and in all iterations, inspection teams followed this path (although
at varying speeds and to different extents).
As the simulation progressed, the controlled host party demonstrated a
willingness to provide new evidence and concessions to support the
advancement of the verification effort, sometimes volunteering these prior
before any request was lodged by the inspectors. For example, the hosts
provided inspectors with increased access to the facility, including to areas

beyond those agreed under the Treaty, as well as offering to install addi-
tional CCTV cameras in the interest of re-establishing the chain of cus-
tody. Westermark facility representatives also agreed to arrange an interview
for the inspectors with the facility worker breached the seals on points of
entry to the storage room where the TAIs were stored.
At the same time, the control team were careful to place strict limits on
the Westermark team’s flexibility. For example, inspectors were not able to
access certain parts of the facility on account of sensitive activities that the
host party insisted were unrelated to the verification inspection. Other
areas were out of bounds for reasons pertaining to national security. In
some cases, the host team provided ancillary evidence (e.g. environmental
records) to show that some areas were not suitable to store warheads or
some of their key components, and hence not possible routes for diver-
sion. Yet inspectors were forced to take this evidence at face value since
physical access was denied. Furthermore, for those areas deemed inacces-
sible for national security reasons, no information regarding their contents
was provided. In short, the simulation design ensured that physical access
to much of the facility was not permitted, resulting in clear verification
gaps and a number of potential routes for diversion of the TAIs. This, in
turn, contributed to a climate of uncertainty that framed the decision-
making process of the research participants.
Approaching Data Collection

To test the working research hypotheses, the structured game plan for
the simulation provided for a tightly controlled environment within
which the various factors influencing participants’ decision-making could
be identified and examined. Needless to say, this required a rigorous data
collection architecture, capable of capturing the detail and nuances of
these influencing factors that were often expressed through fast-moving
interactions between various members of the host and inspection teams.
Clearly, the semi-structured nature of the simulation was designed to
provide inspectors with as much room for manoeuvre as possible. Yet
this resulted in a fluid and dynamic environment where meaning was
actively constructed in myriad ways. Consequently, a qualitative, mixed
methods research approach was deemed most appropriate. Data was col-
lected by a team of researchers employing the five main techniques out-
lined below.
Participant Observation
Participant observation is “an intense social interaction between research-
ers and participants in the milieu of the latter, during which time data, in
the form of field notes, are unobtrusively and systematically collected”.15
Participant observation is particularly well suited to a study of trust, and
human factors more broadly, in the context of a verification simulation
because it allows for detached, first-hand observation of the reactions of
participants as they engage with the scenario and respond to develop-
ments that occur throughout the exercise. The researcher can thus gain a
comprehensive insight into the social and psychological dynamics at play
in the exercise. There were two main objectives to participant observation
in the context of our simulation. First, to observe participants’ behaviour
in order to gain direct insights into how levels of trust were influenced or
shaped, if at all, in response to specific events forming part of the scenario
(e.g. when information was provided prior to being requested, when there
was a delay in information provision, etc.). Second, to identify and record
key points in the simulation where behavioural change on the part of the
monitoring team was prompted by interaction with the facility host. At all
times during the simulation, at least one member of the research team,
and usually two members, were engaged in participant observation. Data
points of particular interest were further explored in the context of inter-
views and focus groups, discussed below.
Situation Reports (SitReps)

As part of the simulation scenario, inspectors were required to send
Situation Reports (SitReps) to their government twice daily. These SitReps
served as a collective journal of sorts for the inspection team, document-
ing perceptions, concerns and assessments (as well as how these were
reached). The process of completing these documents, which were pre-
prepared by the simulation design team and contained specific questions
regarding assessments of compliance and the decision-making process
within the inspection team, also helped inspectors to structure their collec-
tive thoughts as they sought to make sense of the scenario and its chal-
lenges. This, in turn, proved valuable when the inspection team began
their final deliberations regarding the verification judgement.
From a research perspective, SitReps provided an excellent means of
regularly gathering data from the research subjects. The nature of the
SitRep document encouraged a reflective approach, and provided loose

structure to what was, in effect, an attempt on the part of the research
team to tap into the participants’ stream of consciousness as the simulation
evolved. They also served as a useful means of gauging progress from a
practical, simulation control perspective. The information provided in the
SitRep also served as a valuable means of game control, and was used to
inform any decisions regarding communication to the inspection team
from their national authorities.
When completing the SitReps for transmission to their national author-
ities, inspectors were required to several key pieces of information. First,
SitReps demanded a summary of the inspection team’s current position in
terms of what had been achieved. This was an opportunity for participants
to describe in their own words how they perceived the verification mission
to be progressing. This could then be compared to the simulation design
plan and any mismatches explored by the control team. This information
also provided insights into the perceptions of inspectors regarding particu-
lar developments and their impact. The inspection team was also asked to
outline what remained to be achieved in line with mission objectives, and
explain how these objectives would be pursued (e.g. information requests;
access requests, etc.).
Second, a confidence judgment (at that point in time) regarding the
integrity of the monitored items. For the purposes of data collection, five
‘confidence descriptors’ were assigned a percentage value range so that the
research team could chart any rise or fall in confidence and match these to
specific developments or events occurring within the scenario. The ‘confi-
dence descriptors’ and their value ranges were straightforward: Very high:
90–100 per cent; High: 70–90 per cent; Moderate: 50–70 per cent; Low:
30–50 per cent; Very low 0–30 per cent. As well as providing this numeri-
cal indicator, the inspection team was also required to explain and justify
its confidence judgement at that point in time.
Semi-structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews constituted the third strand of data collection
while the simulations were running. A semi-structured interview is “a ver-
bal interchange where one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit infor-
mation from another person by asking questions. Although the interviewer
prepares a list of pre-determined questions, semi-structured interviews
unfold in a conversational manner offering participants the chance to
explore issues they feel are important”.16 The value of these interviews lies
in the fact that they “offer a means of exploring the ways in which social
actors interpret the world, and their place within it. These interpretations
are often extremely complex and nuanced, and would be difficult to access
through other means”.17 Semi-structured interviews thus allowed the
research team to go beyond the information provided in SitReps and
through participant observation, and gain a more detailed and nuanced
understanding of participants’ perceptions and the factors influencing
their decision-making process.
The research team decided to conduct interviews at opportune
moments while the simulation was running in order to further probe
issues and developments identified as significant through participant
observation and the on-going review of SitReps. The interview process
was discreet and took place away from the simulation area so as not to
disrupt the flow of the game. The interview guide was also carefully
designed to avoid any questions that might be interpreted as loaded with
particular meaning and thereby inadvertently influencing the perceptions
of the interviewee and, beyond that, the broader simulation. During inter-
views, participants were encouraged to speak frankly both about their per-
ceptions of developments and decisions taken, both by individuals and by
the group as a whole. These semi-structured interviews provided the
research team with a wealth of data and insights, and a valuable means of
probing the nuances of particular issues arising as the simulation evolved.
Research Questionnaires
Upon completion of the simulation, participants were asked to complete
a research questionnaire. The questionnaire was a focused survey instru-
ment designed to capture the attitudes and opinions of each member of
the inspection team. Each participant was asked to answer a set of stan-
dardized questions regarding their perceptions of the scenario and devel-
opments therein. The questionnaire also sought to capture information
relating to the decision-making process, of both individuals and the group.
Some of the questions involved the respondents having to provide specific
information on their level of confidence at different times during the exer-
cise. Other questions were more open-ended and required greater
reflection.
Conducting the questionnaire immediately after the simulation while
participants were still fully immersed in the details of the scenario meant
that meant that the insights captured were fresh and comprehensive. The
timing of the questionnaire also provided the research team with time to
digest the key points raised. These were then integrated into the focus
group, conducted the following day, and explored further. It is worth not-
ing that questionnaires were completed anonymously and participants
were encouraged to give their personal account, even if this was different
from the collective view of their team.
Focus Groups
A focus group was involving research participants was conducted after the
simulation had been concluded and post-simulation questionnaires com-
pleted. Focus groups are ‘groups of individuals selected and assembled by
researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the
topic that is the subject of the research’.18 The aim here was to build upon
the data gathered using participant observation, the SitReps and the ques-
tionnaires by engaging the participants in a group discussion around the
question of confidence and how this increased and decreased during the
monitoring visit. It is worth noting that the research team introduced the
term ‘confidence’ to the discussion and explained the link to evidence that
this term implies. Any discussion of trust, and there was a considerable
amount, was initiated by the research subjects themselves. In any case, the
focus group provided an opportunity for the research team to drill down
on specific issues arising during the scenario. Questions were informed by
data collected through participant observation, interviews and the
questionnaires.
The benefit of the focus group approach lies in the fact that the shared
experience of the group allows for a collaborative approach which, in turn,
produces more information and data for the researcher. Instead of the
researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, “people
are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anec-
dotes and commenting on each others’ experiences and points of view”.19
In the context of the verification exercise the focus group approach pro-
vided a valuable means of gauging participants’ responses to different fac-
tors, both as individuals and as a group.
Summary of Data Sources

See Table 5.1 for more details
Table 5.1 Summary of data sources

Data sources Relationship to Value/main insights
play
Situation reports Generated in Team/group assessment

play Formal report to government
Confidence estimate and rationale
Summary of activities
Twice a day
Questionnaires Out of play Individual assessments
Confidence estimates and rationale
Addresses some of the research hypotheses
Focus groups Out of play Team as well as individual assessments
In depth discussions of confidence estimates
Probe dynamics within team in addition to
hypothetical (what if) scenarios
Participant In play Insights into individual attitudes and team
observation discussions
Independent assessment of interaction between
hosts and inspectors
Semi-structured Out of play In-depth probing of Individual assessments of
interviews confidence
Conclusion
This chapter provided background information on the design and implemen-
tation of the series of simulations that formed the cornerstone of the research.
The simulation design represented the key element of the preparatory work
underpinning the research, and unsurprisingly, required a considerable invest-
ment of time and resources. In this regard, the research team benefited greatly
from the support and expertise of colleagues at the IFE, the NRPA, and the
UK AWE. Work here also drew heavily on the considerable body of research
devoted to simulations and war-gaming. Our simulation does not make a
theoretical contribution to this literature, but it does reflect some of its most
celebrated insights. Ultimately, the detail provided in this chapter reflects the
importance that we attached to the construction of a simulation that would
immerse participants in a realistic and challenging environment, while at the
same time providing a vehicle for the research team to explore the complex
dynamics that surround the role and influence of human factors in dismantle-
ment verification. Simply put, the simulation-based approach offers a flexible
means of recreating real-life challenges and problems in an artificial environ-
ment that can, for the most part, be controlled and focused for study.
The chapter also set out the particulars of our methodological approach.
This is important since the success of our research relied on a robust data
collection architecture that was well-equipped to capture the full range of
participants’ attitudes, opinions and perceptions, and help explain how
these fed into the decision-making process. It is for this reason that we
adopted a comprehensive mixed methods approach that was qualitative in
nature. The research design prioritised depth and quality of data, and the
combination of methods chosen provided us with an extraordinarily rich
body of empirical data that served as a solid base for the subsequent
analysis.
What then, did the findings reveal? How did our hypotheses hold up
against the body of data collected? How useful was our conceptual frame-
work in helping to explain the role and influence of trust in the verification
process. These are some of the fundamental questions that will be
addressed in the following chapter.
Notes
1. Philip Sabin, Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation
Games (London: Continuum International, 2012), 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Thomas Schelling quoted in Shawn Burns, ed., The Wargamers’ Handbook
(Newport: Defense Automated Printing Office, 2013), 4, http://www.
professionalwargaming.co.uk/WarGamersHandbook.pdf.
4. For a detailed account of the simulation-based approach see Peter Perla,
The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis,
MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1990).
5. Robert Axelrod, “Advancing the Art of Simulation in the Social Sciences.
Obtaining, Analyzing and Sharing Results of Computer Models,”
Complexity 3, no. 2 (1997): 16.
6. Brigid A. Starkey and Elizabeth L. Blake, “Simulation in International
Relations Education,” Simulating and Gaming 32, no. 4 (December
2001): 537–38.
7. Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G. Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist
(Open University Press, 2005), 18–26.
8. Martin Shubik, “On the Scope of Gaming,” Journal of Management
Science 18, no. 5 (1972): 20.
9. Starkey and Blake, “Simulation in International Relations Education,”
537–38.
10. Robert C. Rubel, “The Epistemology of War Gaming,” Naval War College
Review 59, no. 2 (2006): 113–14.
11. Ibid., 125.

12. Ibid., 126–27.
13. ‘Chain of custody’ can be defined as ‘the process of establishing the
authenticity or provenance of items, tracking their movements between
facilities and confirming that they have not been altered in any way’. See
NTI, “Chain of Custody, Tags, Seals & Tamper-Indicating Enclosures,”
Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 16, 2015, http://www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/tags-seals/.
14. An ‘information barrier’ can be defined as “a measurement system that con-
tains classified information to prevent the release (either intentional or inad-
vertent) of the classified information while still allowing an inspecting party
to reach independent conclusions as to the contents of a storage container”.
See Richard B. Williams et al., “Advances in Information Barrier Design”
(Institute of Nuclear Material Management 46th Annual Meeting, Phoenix,
July 10, 2005), 1, https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/LA-UR-05-4149_
Advances_in_Information_Barrier_Design.pdf?_=1438110422.
15. R. Bogden, Participant Observation in Organisational Settings (New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1972), 3.
16. R. Longhurst, “Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups,” in Key
Methods in Geography, by N. Clifford, S. French, and G. Valentine (London:
Sage, 2010), 103.
17. S. Lawlor, “Narrative in Social Research,” in Qualitative Research in
Action, by T. May (London: Sage, 2002), 243.
18. Focus groups are ‘groups of individuals selected and assembled by research-
ers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is
the subject of the research’. R.A. Powell, H.M Single, and K.R. Lloyd,
“Focus Groups in Mental Health Research: Enhancing the Validity of User
and Provider Questionnaires,” International Journal of Social Psychology
42, no. 3 (1996): 193–206.
19. J. Kitzinger, “Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups,” British
Medical Journal 311, no. 7000 (1995): 299.
CHAPTER 6
Trust and Verification: Empirical Insights
Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated that the development and conduct of
simulations is a well-established and valuable means of exploring the
nuances, possibilities and limits of contentious and potentially dangerous
issues and scenarios in a controlled environment. In the nuclear disarma-
ment and arms control arena, this approach was adopted at a relatively
early stage as part of research conducted by the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in the 1960s.1 The proposed Field Tests to
explore verification inspection procedures were initially opposed by the
Atomic Energy Commission, but the simulation-based approach was ulti-
mately perceived to hold value and approved with a budget of some
900,000 USD.2
More recently, the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) adopted a simulation-
based approach as part of a collaborative effort to give new momentum to
thinking on disarmament verification. Studies have described how, from
2008 to 2010, the UKNI conducted a series of exercises “designed to
elucidate the technical and procedural issues surrounding managed access
of inspectors into highly sensitive facilities”.3 The procedural focus of the
UKNI simulations was clear and the exercises provided a unique opportu-
nity to probe the nature and limits of a mutually acceptable inspection
process. Yet the review process that accompanied the simulations also
revealed another, unanticipated dimension to the engagement between

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_6
the inspection team and the host team. Simply put, in a context where 100
per cent certainty was not possible and the potential for diversion or
deception remained present throughout, “‘Inspecting parties’ often
reported ‘a high level of confidence’ in achieving certain objectives”.4
More than this, the level of confidence was at times higher than might
have been expected, given the constraints placed by the host team on facil-
ity access and information.
This prompted a range of questions regarding the development of
‘confidence’ and the role of human factors in the verification process. Why
was confidence higher than expected at certain points? What were the
drivers at stake here? Clearly, there were human factors shaping the pro-
cess, but what was the nature and extent of this influence? Ultimately, it is
these questions that drove our empirical research. Chapter 4 explored the
human factor in detail, noting in particular the tension between confi-
dence and trust, and revealing the significance of these fluid concepts in
the verification context. More than this, it demonstrated that from an
analytical perspective, our attention should focus primarily on the influ-
ence of trust, defined as perceptions regarding intentions, on the evidence-
based judgements from which confidence is derived. For trust represents
the dynamic and uncertain space beyond pure evidence, where the nature
of the relationship and its performance can subtly impact upon verification
outcomes.
To this end, the chapter set out a conceptual framework within which
the role of trust in the human interactions that make up much of the prac-
tice of verification can be understood. Chapter 5 went on to provide the
details of a controlled verification simulation, carefully designed to isolate,
in so far as is possible, issues of trust and confidence for study. This exer-
cise allowed the research team to gain an in-depth insight into the dynamics
of trust in practice, and understand the various elements – from informa-
tion flows to behavioural cues – that contributed to the development or
erosion of trust.
This chapter sets out the findings of the research. The analysis applies
the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4 to a significant body of
qualitative data gathered from approximately 50 research subjects over the
course of 6 simulations conducted over a two-year period. This provides
robust empirical grounding for our argument that the human factors
involved in the verification process, often ignored in a debate framed in
technical terms, must be given due consideration. Beyond this, however,
the chapter paints a nuanced picture of the interactional dimension that is
TRUST AND VERIFICATION: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS 123
integral to the inspections that form part of a rigorous verification process.

The findings indicate that in these circumstances where technical certain-
ties are in limited supply, trust and perceptions regarding intentions can
play a subtle but important role in shaping verification outcomes.
Vulnerability, Risk and the Nature of the Game

It will come as no surprise that those who participated in the research
project approached the simulation with a good measure of caution. The
particular context of nuclear disarmament verification, where 100 per cent
certainty is never possible poses a unique set of challenges for those
involved in the process and the research participants were keenly aware of
the limits imposed by this situation. From the point at which they first
engaged with the simulation, the inspectors began to grapple with the
nature and extent of their vulnerability, and the risk that the evidentiary
constraints posed to their ability to conduct the inspection in a robust and
effective manner: “The thing that occurred to me first, and that stayed
with me throughout the inspection, was the fact that we could never know
for certain…that there was always the possibility we would be fooled by
the host”.5
In line with this view, participants were generally wary of the host
team’s intentions going into the verification process, some particularly so:
“The safest way for me personally, that I thought that I could approach it,
was just to be as sceptical as possible … worst case scenario is the safest
conclusion, you work from there”.6 This was to be expected; anything less
would have suggested a dangerous naivety on the part of the inspection
team. Yet this general trend does not account for the complexity of the
situation. Rather than a straightforward and uniform position of suspicion
that only varied in response to tangible evidence encountered, the per-
spective that emerged from participant observation and interviews sug-
gested a more nuanced approach.
From the outset, participants proved sensitive to a whole range of indica-
tors associated with the scenario, from the behavioural cues of the host team
to the most minute changes in mutually agreed plans. Reflecting on this
situation after the event, a number of participants described the situation in
terms of “finding their feet” or, later, “feeling their way forward” with
regard to the host team and their intentions: “At the beginning I felt scepti-
cal and I thought that there was a good chance that the evidence would give
us a clue that something was wrong. But this was not a straightforward
thing. From the minute we met the host team, I was trying to understand
them…we all were. It’s natural, isn’t it? You form opinions about people
and how they act and I was trying to understand the situation”.7
The approach of participants here resounds with the longstanding
efforts of social psychologists to understand the nature and influence of
the various factors that shape our perceptions of others, both as individuals
and in groups. As early as 1946, Solomon Asch noted “the remarkable
capacity we possess to understand something of the character of another
person, to form a conception of him as a human being” and sought to
determine “in what manner are these impressions established? Are there
lawful principles regulating their formation?”.8 This work laid the ground
for a significant body of research that has continued to gain momentum.9
Recent research by Fiske, Cuddy and Glick, for example, set out an
empirically based model identifying “warmth” and “competence” as uni-
versal dimensions of social cognition.10
This research in social psychology has primarily considered these issues
in the normal circumstances of everyday life. In the verification context,
however, the situation is further complicated by the artificial and heavily
controlled environment of the inspection, as well as the uncertainty that
surrounds the limits of the process and what may be permitted by the host
team. Clearly, the simulation set certain parameters with regard to TAIs
and the constraints posed by national security concerns, among other
things. Yet the research participants were generally aware that the pre-
agreed inspection protocol could not plan for every conceivable develop-
ment. There was inevitably room for discretion on the part of the host
team in terms of the lengths they went to satisfy the requirements and
requests of the inspectors. As one participant noted: “Part of the problem
is also that you don’t know if [the host team members] are being as coop-
erative as they can or not…you haven’t got a sense for the most part”.11
This meant that the inspection team was constantly probing the limits of
what was permissible within the broader parameters of the mutually agreed
protocol. Observation of group discussions confirmed this exploratory
and more flexible approach to ‘sounding out’ the host team.
This subtle process of cognitive engagement with the host team and the
broader environment within which the inspection was situated com-
menced before any substantive evidence pertaining to the inspection was
received. It is important to note that this was the first indication of the
influence of human factors and it formed an important element of the
broader evaluative approach of the research participants. Crucially, the
interpretative process here helped shape perceptions of risk, at times

unconsciously, and framed more tangible issues of access, and the nature
and volume of documentary and other evidence provided by the host.
Quantifying Risk
It became evident to the research team early on that the nature of the
vulnerability posed by the inspection process – namely that the possibility
of material being diverted could never be fully eliminated – was clearly
understood by participants, and this understanding remained constant
throughout the simulation. In discussions observed by the research team,
the implications of their vulnerability weighed heavily on inspectors. Much
was felt to be at stake in the inspection process, not least because in the
context of the simulation, the outcome would ultimately contribute to
shaping political engagement between the two states involved.
At the same time, however, a number of participants noted the fact that
this was not a one-sided process and that the host team was also vulnerable
to an inspection report that returned a judgement of low confidence or no
compliance: “We would lose out if it turned out they diverted material,
but I think we need to remember that they face consequences if we don’t
think they are complying with the Treaty. They don’t hold all the cards
here”.12 The mutual vulnerability at the core of the relationship was thus
recognised as an issue of significance, framing the inspection from an early
stage. This point resounds with the idea of interdependence highlighted in
the trust framework set out in Chapter 4.
While the nature of the vulnerability was a clearly understood and ever-
present factor underpinning the engagement of inspectors with the simu-
lation, their perception of risk exposure was not at all static. In terms of
the tangible factors influencing perceptions on this front, two stand out:
access and information. As one participant put it: “The main issue that
influenced my confidence in host facility was accessibility to…information
and locations (all rooms in the facility)”.13 In terms of access, the ability to
view and take measurements in various parts of the facility was central to
the inspectors’ efforts to build a robust evidence base. The desire to
ground progress in evidence was palpable throughout: “We always were a
bit suspicious that the host team could fake information. So it was impor-
tant to gain knowledge on our own [through access]”.14
Yet here as well, the relationship with levels of confidence was not
straightforward. Certainly, increased access was likely to have a positive
impact on confidence levels: “Since we were able to inspect so many parts

of the facility, my confidence level raised”.15 Equally, a lack of access placed
significant limits on the ability of inspectors to dramatically increase their
confidence that no TAIs were diverted: “Our confidence could not be 100
per cent because we could not access room G”.16 Beyond this basic inter-
play, however, there were a number of other variables influencing percep-
tions that added a layer of complexity to the confidence-access dynamic.
These included the perceived willingness of the host to provide access in
the first place, the speed with which access was granted, and the conditions
placed on access (nature and extent of measurements permitted, etc.).
These issues were raised implicitly and explicitly in both the group discus-
sions observed by the research team and the Situation Reports completed
at regular intervals by participants:
When they were allowing more inspections of rooms or movement of con-

tainers, this showed they really tried to resolve the incident.17
They immediately offered us on-site inspection, which surprised me in a
positive manner.18
It was not only the willingness that surprised us but the willingness to
allow us the amount of access that we hadn’t anticipated.19
It is worth noting here that research participants across all simulations

fully expected to have only limited access to the facility. This meant that
when actual levels of access exceeded the threshold of expectation that
gradually emerged from discussions within the inspection team, even
slightly, this had an important impact on perceptions of risk exposure.
This relates, among other things, to the point on discretion raised above.
Participant observation of group discussions revealed that the idea of the
host team stretching in any way the limits of what was permissible were
very positively received and had a disproportionate effect on perceptions
regarding risk. Essentially, participants felt that this offset in some small
way the vulnerability that pervaded the experience of the inspectors. The
same was true when the level of access provided fell short of this
threshold.
Alongside access, the amount of documentary evidence – broadly
defined to include reports, logs, CCTV footage, imagery, etc. – made
available to inspectors was the most dominant factor influencing percep-
tions of risk. At the most basic level, documentary submissions constituted
another form of tangible evidence that complemented the access afforded
to inspectors. Again, the research participants were aware of certain fun-

damental constraints on the relationship between documentary evidence
and levels of confidence. As one participant noted regarding CCTV, for
example: “The CCTV surveillance are [sic] omitted for the three days in
question, and thus leaves a level of uncertainty without the means to
resolve it”.20 Despite these constraints, however, documentary evidence
generally had a positive cumulative effect on confidence levels in that it
provided another source that could potentially shed light on new elements
of the inspection or corroborate existing ones. This was highlighted
repeatedly by participants:
Confidence increased when documentation was provided.21

Written information increased the level of confidence more than a verbal
account…a written statement usually included more details.22
Official documents for example gave a big amount of trust compared to
just words of the hosts.23
This point should also be considered in the broader context of source

diversity and its significance. This was certainly the view of research par-
ticipants who consistently stressed the importance of gathering meaning-
ful information from a range of sources in these challenging circumstances:
“one piece of evidence is almost never enough so you need multiple
sources to be sure”.24 This is not to suggest homogeneity of opinion with
regard to the provision of information by the host. Indeed, opinions
sometimes varied significantly according to the form of the information
and the speed of its delivery – points that will be discussed in relation to
signalling later on. Furthermore, for some of the inspectors the provision
of documentary evidence was not always well received: “Untranslated
documents or undetailed reports made us feel as they were trying to delay
our investigation or conceal information”.25
In general terms, the research revealed that there was a keen under-
standing of the nature of the vulnerability and the implications of
deception on the part of the host team. This added a level of gravity to
the exercise and this was reflected in the intra-group dynamics of the
inspection teams where there were inevitably voices of dissent and
points of strong disagreement. Much of this related to perceptions of
risk. On the one hand, certain participants felt that the information and
access provided were enough to offset, to the extent possible, the expo-
sure to risk:
I cannot prove 100 per cent that things, that warheads were not diverted
and material was not diverted. But at the same time all the story was falling
in place in a way that was…there were holes in the story, but […] they give
us more information than we expected, definitely. And when we were there
we could analyse everything. So, if we missed something, it was our fault.26
This perspective was particularly interesting as it reflected a strong mea-

sure of introspection and suggested that the burden of responsibility did
not rest with the host alone. Rather, responsibility for a successful inspec-
tion was shared between host and inspectors, each group having a vital
role to play in this delicate and complex process. Again, this interpretation
of the process aligns with the notion of interdependence that is a core ele-
ment of the trust framework outlined in Chapter 4. On the other hand,
certain participants felt permanently constrained in their ability to gain
confidence in the host due to the evidentiary gaps that could not be
bridged by any amount of effort:
You’re operating in a context where the percentage of confidence can’t rise

beyond a certain point due to the level of ambiguity that comes with iso-
lated technical reports and the fact that we couldn’t see everywhere.27
For the most part, differences were resolved through a process of data
fusion – “Our confidence judgment is a group average based on both
qualitative and quantitative measures” – and majority agreement. Yet the
often intense group discussions bore witness to the participants’ desire to
be as rigorous as possible in their approach, given the significance of what
was at stake.
While access and documentary evidence constituted the dominant fac-
tors influencing perceptions regarding vulnerability and risk, they were
certainly not the only ones. Other influencing factors included the manner
in which information was provided, the attitude of the host team, and the
perceived levels of competency and professionalism. Yet these are issues
that relate more to the intangible facet of the relationship between the
inspectors and the party being inspected. For this reason, we have chosen
to discuss them in the following sections pertaining to expectations of
positive behaviour and signalling. In this sense, the application of our con-
ceptual framework takes us progressively away from the more tangible and
fixed evidentiary factors influencing and towards more intangible ones
that are perhaps more fluid and open to interpretation, relating as they do
to the subjective subtleties of human behaviour.
Positive Expectations in the Verification Context

The first section noted the caution, and often scepticism, with which
research participants approached the simulation. As mentioned, this was
grounded in a keen understanding of mutual vulnerabilities, and recogni-
tion of the risks posed to the inspectors by certain insurmountable chal-
lenges of the verification process. At the same time, we also highlighted
the fact that the approach was nuanced by the inspectors’ cognitive
engagement with the host team and the broader exercise environment.
This engagement began before the inspection team encountered any sub-
stantial evidence and was summed up by the idea of the inspectors ‘feeling
their way forward’ and taking stock of unfamiliar terrain.
In the uncertain context of verification, the significance of vulnerability
and risk in the interpretative process is easily understood. What, then, of
the second element of our conceptual framework? Did participants bring
positive expectations to bear on the verification process? To what extent
was the caution with which participants approached the inspection offset
by the track record of positive interactions between the host state and the
inspecting state?
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the inspection process at the core of our
scenario formed part of a broader disarmament agreement whereby two
fictional states committed to dismantling 30 nuclear warheads in 5 sepa-
rate batches, each comprising 6 warheads. Dismantlement operations were
mandated to take place in declared and operational facilities forming part
of the nuclear complex of the disarming country. At the point of the simu-
lation, two batches of warheads had been successfully dismantled as per
the terms of the bilateral, state-level agreement, and pre-exercise briefings
framed interactions to date in terms of a positive and transparent (to the
extent possible) relationship.
Certainly, the effect of these past successes helped shape the thinking of
several participants. The initial positive verification outcomes were seen as
politically significant and a mark of commitment to the broader disarma-
ment effort. For these participants, the value of these engagements was
cumulative and translated as a form of ‘trust capital’ that factored into
their interpretative approach. As one participant noted: “There have
already been successful inspections and I think we need to remember that.
Our inspection is just one stage in a broader process. We definitely can’t
just forget it”.28 This perspective was significant in that it meant that advo-
cates brought a positive outlook to bear on the exercise, seeking to find
proof in support of a positive outcome as opposed to a negative one, even

if they retained the desire to be critical and rigorous. This came across
clearly in focus groups: “My logic was I am looking for evidence to sup-
port things being okay and that’s where the burden of proof lies, not try-
ing to prove…looking for things that aren’t okay”.29 This was also evident
in some of the early Situation Reports, before any real ground had been
covered by the inspection team: “It is important to note that, short of a
major incident causing mistrust, we may be able to re-establish confidence
in the integrity of the monitored items”.30
Yet here again, the situation was by no means straightforward. While
the outlook of certain participants was positively informed by the trust
capital resulting from an emerging record of successful inspections, this
experience was not shared by all those involved in the exercise. Indeed, for
many others, previous successes were viewed as having little or no bearing
on the inspection at hand. This group was far less optimistic going into the
inspection: “We thought they were doing something wrong…we
approached the situation where they were out to trick us and do some-
thing wrong and it was our job to try and catch them”.31
It is worth noting that a good measure of the suspicion here stemmed
from the irregular context of the inspection. The process was triggered by
an abnormality in the disarmament process and while the state-level treaty
provided for events such as this, these participants were acutely aware that
mission deviated from the normal progression of the disarmament sched-
ule. Instead, of building on the work of colleagues before them and
oversee the dismantlement of the third batch of weapons, their objective
was to re-establish the chain of custody in unexpected circumstances. This
was the primary factor influencing the outlook of these participants: “The
seals being broken, the camera being off for two days, not notifying us
instantly…it seemed to me like it was a perfect crime so to speak, that they
could get away with it and we were trying to stop them”.32
Beyond this, observation of group discussions revealed that the issue of
expectations was also influenced by the fact that participants had not been
involved in verifying the dismantlement of the first two batches of weap-
ons. This break in continuity of personnel had important implications:
while some participants felt a connection with the outcomes secured by
their predecessors, many others felt dissociated from these prior engage-
ments and viewed the inspection at hand in entirely separate terms. Thus,
while the earlier positive outcomes may have established goodwill and
provided for positive expectations at the broader, organisational level, this
influence was only marginally felt at the level of the individuals involved in
the simulation. In short, the macro-context had an influence on the micro-
context of the inspection, but the lack of continuity in terms of personnel
meant that this influence was far less significant than it might otherwise
have been. Clearly, this was an issue linked to the design of the simulation,
yet it provides a valuable insight into the significance of relational continu-
ity at the individual level in efforts to build trust in challenging
circumstances.
It is important to note that none of the perspectives discussed above
were fixed and immutable. In line with the earlier point regarding the
cognitive engagement of inspectors, the research team observed consider-
able changes in the perspectives of participants, primarily in response to
relevant and timely evidence provided by the host team, but also based on
evolving perceptions of issues such as integrity and technical competency
on the part of the host team.
Integrity and Technical Competency

The literature on trust attaches considerable importance to the notion of
integrity and the assumption that parties to the relationship will act
responsibly and with sincerity. Clearly, this implies that neither party will
engage in deception and thus the idea has powerful resonance in the
verification context where the potential for deception is considerable. As
already mentioned, the possibility of deception weighed heavily on the
minds of participants throughout the simulation. With no means of prov-
ing compliance beyond question, the potential for TAIs to be diverted
remained an underlying constant that was woven into perceptions of vul-
nerability and risk. At the same time, perceived integrity on the part of the
host team appeared to assuage fears on this front and gradually nourish the
positive expectations alluded to above. The importance of integrity came
across clearly in the research:
I was trying to work out if the host team was genuine or not…were they
really just trying to get this sorted and move on? So I was paying a lot of
attention to how they were trying to help us in our work.33
The significance of discretion has already been addressed in terms of the

inspectors’ cognitive engagement with the inspection process and their
efforts to probe the limits of the possible on-site access, but here too this
theme exerted considerable influence. For participants, any willingness to

co-operate by stretching the measures agreed as part of the treaty protocol
fed into perceptions that the host team was indeed committed to legiti-
mately resolving the chain of custody issue. This was noted by participants
in interviews: “I was suspicious at first…in fact I was suspicious all the way
through, but their efforts to accommodate our requests seemed to suggest
that they were committed to the task”.34
Focus groups also revealed that despite inevitable frustrations arising
from the restrictions and constraints placed on inspectors by the host
team, most participants felt that the hosts acted within reason. This was
important as it meant that constraints related to access or information did
not fatally undermine their sense of the host team’s integrity. Indeed,
there appeared to be a conscious effort to understand particular actions
from the host team’s perspective: “If I was hosting a foreign delegation at
my classified facility I would probably have treated them the same way”.35
Ultimately, the fact that the host demonstrated “willingness to move out-
side treaty limits and even advise on how to proceed did increase the level
of trust”.36 It should be noted, however, that the significance of discretion
and host behaviour on this front was never taken at face value by partici-
pants. Rather, it was weighed against the constant possibility of deception
and took its place in the broader interplay between themes of vulnerability
and risk, and the evolving expectation of positive behaviour.
Closely linked to this theme of integrity is the idea of technical compe-
tence. From a social psychology perspective, the “competence dimension
reflects traits that are related to perceived ability, including intelligence,
skill, creativity and efficacy”.37
More particularly, competence may be regarded as an attribute that
“directly and unconditionally affects the possessor’s chance of achieving
personal goals”.38 In other words, this attribute feeds into the idea of integ-
rity and helps project the image of an actor who is not only committed to
achieving a particular task or objective, but also well-equipped to do so. This
notion of competence is particularly relevant to the verification context,
since nuclear warhead dismantlement is clearly a highly technical area requir-
ing specific and detailed expertise. Certainly, our research data revealed that
perceptions regarding competence factored into the broader inspection pro-
cess. A considerable number of participants seemed to be influenced by the
belief that the host team had a comprehensive technical understanding of
the challenges facing both sides and, crucially, how they might be mitigated
or overcome. This point came across clearly in interviews:
The fact that the host team are highly-qualified experts is important. They
know what we need to complete the task, but they also know that we can’t
have all the evidence we need…They know where they have to draw the
line. But that doesn’t have to be a bad thing. They can help us come up with
solutions to problems. They understand what the issues are.39
With more willingness to move outside treaty limits and even advise on
how to proceed did increase the level of trust.40
On the one hand, technical competence gave legitimacy to the host team
in their role as custodians of the dismantlement process. On the other, it
equipped them to work alongside the inspection team and share the bur-
den of responsibility for resolving the break in the chain of custody. Once
again, this is linked to the idea of discretion and the extent to which the
host team were able and willing to apply their expert understanding, not
to mention their knowledge of the facility, in service of the verification
process. In more general terms, this situation speaks to the interdepen-
dence that we argue is a central element of trust with both parties invest-
ing in a joint, collaborative effort to achieve a particular set of objectives.
Finally, when considering participants’ views on integrity and technical
competence, it is worth noting that much of the discourse here was regu-
larly framed in terms of the ‘professionalism’ of the host team:
It went from ‘they’re trying to hide something’ to ‘they’re just being profes-
sional and going about their business’.41
If I had to describe [the host team] in one word…it would be
professional.42
In other words, the collection of actions and broader approach of the host
team created a general impression of a technically-proficient and commit-
ted workforce, acting in a manner that suggested they were keen to resolve
the anomaly in the chain of custody and return to regular duties. The
phrasing here is significant as it resounds with a considerable body of soci-
ological literature addressing professionalism, its importance as an influ-
encer of behaviour, and its relationship with issues such as competence and
trust. For example, Fournier places emphasis on this behavioural dimen-
sion to professionalism in her research: “Being a professional is not merely
about absorbing a body of scientific knowledge but is also about conduct-
ing and constituting oneself in an appropriate manner, a point long recog-
nised by symbolic interactionist studies of socialisation”.43
Ultimately, in terms of the expectations of inspectors engaging with the

exercise, the research revealed a complex and fluid process whereby themes
of vulnerability and risk evolved in tandem with varying degrees of positive
expectation regarding the process and its outcomes. The tension between
these themes never dissipated, instead emphasis shifted between their
respective poles in response to a constantly developing combination of
evidence and perceptual indicators. On the one hand, participants’ per-
ceptions of vulnerability and risk, and their expectations regarding the
prospect of success, were anchored in evidence, or rather the very clear
gaps in tangible evidence that framed the entire process: lack of access to
particular parts of the facility, lack of CCTV footage at particular points,
inability to rule out all possible paths of diversion of the TAIs, and so
forth. This was in a context where a failed inspection would have impor-
tant consequences reaching far beyond the immediate scenario.
On the other hand, these views were offset to a certain degree by alto-
gether more intangible issues such as perceptions regarding integrity,
commitment and professionalism. For some, the accumulated value of
successful past inspections played a role. This dimension incorporated a
good measure of inference and brought the influence of behavioural cues
and attitudes to bear on the situation. This was significant as it hinted at
the subtle but powerful role played by human factors in the verification
process. The extent of this influence, however, only becomes clear by
looking more closely at the third element of our trust framework: signal-
ling and the manner in which intentions are conveyed and interpreted.
Trust, Signalling and Interpretation

The conceptual discussion in Chapter 4 emphasised the importance of
signals in determining the course that a relationship involving trust will
take. The process of communication here is bi-directional; parties to the
relationship convey, interpret and respond to signals in an ongoing,
dynamic process of informational and emotional exchange. Clearly, each
party has its own objectives in this process. In the verification context, the
host team seeks to reassure the inspectors of its willingness to comply with
treaty-mandated obligations, and convince them of its commitment to
the disarmament enterprise more broadly. On the other side the inspec-
tion team seeks to understand the true nature of the host team’s inten-
tions, and if the stated desire to comply with disarmament obligations is
reflected, not only in the tangible evidence available, but in all aspects of
the host team’s behaviour and attitude. Beyond this, the relationship
unfolds as a complex web of interactions within which, each side is sensi-
tive to the most minute details that might serve as indicators of behaviour
or intentions.
In our verification simulation, we focused our analytical lens on the
perspective and interpretations of the inspectors. To this end, as described
in Chapter 5, we sought to control one side of the relationship between
host and inspectors. The mandate for the host team was carefully designed
to be cooperative, responsive, and at times proactive with regard to deal-
ing with the requests and concerns of the inspection team. In the event of
a conflict or unexpected query, the host team would adopt a conciliatory
approach, seeking to address the problem in an efficient and timely man-
ner. This outlook aligned with the backstory supporting the scenario and
the successful outcomes of prior verification inspections. This host team
position remained constant across all six exercises and allowed the research
team to identify a number of factors that were interpreted as important
signals by the inspectors. It is worth noting at this point that participants
across all six exercises regarded the actions of the host as deliberate and
carried out with full awareness of the likely consequences.
The Impact of Information Flows

At the centre of this signalling process was the theme of information.
Inevitably, the nature and extent of the information made available to
participants by the host team was a core factor influencing levels of confi-
dence and trust. Beyond facility access, documentary and other informa-
tion was the only means of gaining empirical insights into developments
around the break in the chain of custody driving the inspection process.
But the information flow between host and inspectors was by no means
straightforward and interviews, questionnaires, Situation Reports and par-
ticipant observation revealed that exchanges on this front incorporated an
important interpretative process of signalling defined by at least three cat-
egories of action: type of information; speed of delivery; and manner of
delivery.
With regard to the type of information provided by the host, it became
clear early on that participants attached considerable significance to docu-
mented information, and particularly the facility floor plans. At the most
basic level, participants felt that “a written statement usually included more
details”44 – although it should be noted that quantity was not prized above
quality: “ultimately, it was more important how detailed and accurate the
information was”.45 Beyond this, the more formal, codified structure of this
information appeared to leave a strong impression on participants:
No written reports meant less trust.46

Confidence increased when documentation was provided.47
Written reports make me feel more confident about the given informa-
tion instead of an oral report.48
While primacy was given to written information and this did appear to exert
a meaningful influence on the perceptions of inspectors, it did not come
without problems. The potential for documents to be doctored or fabri-
cated by the host team was raised in group discussions several times – this
point links to the themes of vulnerability and risk mentioned earlier and had
a moderating effect on the more positive views expressed among partici-
pants. Furthermore, the fact that several documents were heavily redacted
and some were provided in the local language – Norwegian rather than
English – was viewed in negative terms by certain participants. Redacted
documents were generally seen as holding relatively little value – “redacted
documents and the level of redaction raised suspicion”49 – while some
viewed original language documents as a deliberate attempt to dissimulate –
“Documents presented in Norwegian lowered our confidence. Seemed they
tried to hide information in plain sight”.50 It should be noted, however, that
the concerns regarding original language material were minimal, particu-
larly given the significance attached to the speed at which information was
provided by the host (discussed in detail below). Translation would have
delayed the flow of information and brought new challenges, such as mis-
translation. In any case, this broader process of evaluating information and
evidence links to the earlier discussion of risk and vulnerability, and high-
lights the cautious, probing approach that framed the engagement of the
inspectors across all aspects of the exercise.
Beyond the body of written information provided by the host team, the
decision by the host team to allow inspectors to interview a member of
staff involved in the incident that disrupted the chain of custody proved
significant. Across all cohorts of research participants, there was general
agreement that this interview – unplanned and not strictly required under
the terms of the verification protocol – served as an indicator of the posi-
tive intentions of the host team: “the interview with the technician deep-
ened [trust] for me”.51 The influence here is all the more interesting due
to the fact that the interview revealed no new information, the interviewee
simply confirmed or reiterated information already known to the inspec-
tors. Moreover, research participants were fully aware of this situation:
The interview with the worker increased the confidence even though no
new information was revealed. So first-hand information gave me more
confidence.52
The interview was helpful even if it had no new information in it.53
The significance of the interview, then, lies in the fact that this measure
was not provided for in the verification protocol and the host team was
under no obligation to facilitate the interview. Essentially, the host team
exercised a measure of discretion and sanctioned the interview as a means
of demonstrating good will and conveying its desire to reach a positive
verification outcome. Clearly, the host team had relatively little at stake
here given that the interview did not provide any new information to the
inspectors and all interview questions were screened in advance.
Observation of internal discussions among inspectors revealed that this
point was well understood, yet it was felt that the interview was a positive
signal on the part of the host team. Furthermore, inspectors raised the
possibility that the interviewee might say something to contradict the offi-
cial narrative under questioning. On the whole, then, the interview was
viewed with cautious optimism and generally interpreted as an indication
that the host team was committed to restoring the verification chain of
custody.
If the type of information provided to the inspection team was signifi-
cant, so too was the speed with which this information was provided.
Indeed, speed of information provision proved to be a dominant theme
across all cohorts of research participants. For example, the vast majority
of questionnaires made reference to the speed of requested information
delivery and indicated that this had a direct influence on their perceptions
regarding the host team’s intentions. In general, quicker responses were
interpreted as positive signals, while slower responses seemed to raise
doubts and suspicions. Examples include:
The willingness to provide a response in a reasonable time helped increase

my level of confidence.54
Undoubtedly a fast response helps increase the level of trust in any
negotiations.55
Taking longer to respond rightly or wrongly seemed to increase our sus-

picions therefore decrease our confidence.56
The bigger the delay between the request of information and their
response the more mistrust grew.57
Written responses on the questionnaires provided an array of explanations

for why the speed with which information was provided was deemed
important. Of these, two issues appeared most frequently. First, partici-
pants felt that a speedy response made it more likely that the information
being provided was authentic and reflected the reality of the situation. In
other words, it was felt that a speedy response reduced the possibility of
deception as the host team would have less time to tamper with
documentation:
The faster the response the more I assumed it was spontaneous and there-
fore unfiltered.58
The faster the response the lower the chance of falsifying it.59
Speed of information gives the impression that the host is not trying to
hide something from us.60
It does not take time to hand in a document, but it does to forge or
fabricate one.61
Second, the majority of participants felt that timely provision of informa-

tion by the host demonstrated commitment and signalled an honest desire
to engage comprehensively with the verification process. This links to the
earlier discussion of positive expectations and, in particular, the issue of
integrity. Simply put, speed of information delivery was widely viewed as
an indicator of integrity and commitment: “Generally speaking, the faster
an answer was provided the higher the level of trust, since it emphasised
the willingness to cooperate”.62
Directly related to the issue of how quickly requested information was
provided is the question of whether the inspection team had to request
specific information, or whether the host volunteered information without
being asked for it. Questionnaires captured responses to this issue across
multiple cohorts and the weight of the comments highlight the impor-
tance of the inspected party volunteering information to the inspectors:
My confidence decreased due to the fact that information was only released
when specifically asked for.63
My main problem was that we were not provided with information,
mostly only if asked for it specifically.64
Freely provided information and access was more well received and
increased confidence in the host facility… Any outstanding question or
delay in information/access or misinformation decreased confidence.65
Providing information on a voluntary basis helped to increase trust.66
Again, much of the influence here derived from the perception that volun-
teering information suggested a level of commitment to resolving the
break in the chain of custody. In terms of signalling, however, the inspec-
tors were generally surprised by this proactive effort on the part of the
hosts. Crucially, this meant that even if the information did not significantly
advance the investigative process, the commitment that it represented had
a shaping effect on the perspective of inspectors:
Some information was provided in response to our request, but surprisingly,

some information was also given voluntarily by the host even before we
asked.67
Freely given material increased our confidence in the hosts, though it
might not have been useful material.68
All this said, it is important to note research participants were wary of

attaching too much value to speed of information provision: “It is impor-
tant not to over-rely on the speed alone as a factor influencing the level”.69
Furthermore, the speed with which the host team provided information
was not always viewed in positive terms. Each cohort also contained more
sceptical participants who sought to temper the positive view of timely or
bulk information provision:
We need to be careful…just because they give us information quickly doesn’t

mean that it is accurate or genuine.70
I just see [provision of data in bulk] as throwing a lot of information out
there in one sense in order to confuse and derail us from the main
question.71
Broadly speaking, however, the consensus was that information was pro-
vided in a timely and proactive manner served to increase trust. This pro-
cess was not without challenges – some pieces of information took longer
than others, some required negotiation and internal approval. For a small
number of participants, these delays were viewed with suspicion as “it
looked like they were not trying to resolve the issue”.72 For the most part,
however, research participants viewed any slight delays as acceptable: “The
fact that some things took a bit longer, everything came in at a reasonable
period of time but it didn’t seem coordinated. It seemed much more true
to life”.73
The third factor influencing perceptions around the flow of information
was the manner in which the information was provided. In line with the
cognitive engagement discussed earlier in the chapter, research participants
were constantly on the lookout for behavioural cues and other signs that
might shed light on the host team’s intentions. With regard to the flow of
information, the responsiveness of the host team, their perceived levels of
openness, and even their demeanour as they responded to requests were all
elements that factored into the interpretative equation of the inspectors.
It has already been noted that participants attached considerable signifi-
cance to the timely delivery of information. Equally important, however,
was the attitude and perceived degree of effort exerted on the part of the
host team: “The more responsive and cooperative they are the more con-
fidence we become”.74 For several participants, interactions with the host
team created the impression that they were genuinely seeking to provide
as much information as possible within the limits imposed by national
security and obligations under the NPT:
It seemed to me that they were trying to provide us with the answers we

needed, as much as they could. Yes, there were things that they couldn’t tell
us but it made me think that they were serious about this. That they wanted
to solve the problem.75
In this context, the research participants accepted that the verification pro-
cess would inevitably face challenges and obstacles. What was important
here was the approach adopted by the host team and the efforts it made to
overcome these issues:
Any problem I could have had with the speed of [information provision],
the form it took, was somewhat mitigated by the fact that I could under-
stand perhaps why there was a reluctance there to share it.76
What was important for me was how the host team responded to prob-
lems. Were they really trying to find a solution or were they happy to leave
these obstacles in our way?77
For the most part, research participants felt that the host team was indeed
attempting to provide all necessary information and respond to requests as
best they could. Certainly, there were dissenting views – a minority of
participants were struck by an “unwillingness to provide information that

logically should have been alright to discuss” – but participant observation
of group discussions revealed that these views were usually grounded in a
lack of understanding with regard to informational constraints.78 On the
whole, inspectors were of the opinion that “The host country has been
very open minded and forthcoming with information’ coinciding with an
increase in confidence levels”.79
Intergroup Relations and Trusting Behaviour

The above discussion of information flows and the significance attached to
issues such as speed and manner of information provision provides some
interesting insights into the thinking of research participants as they
sought to shed light on the incident and re-establish the chain of custody
around the TAIs. Indeed, from an analytical perspective, the theme of
information arguably serves as the most useful means of drawing together
the views and opinions of research participants, and determining their
influence on broader issues of trust and confidence. Consideration of the
dynamics underpinning the flow of information allows us to understand
the process by which the research participants evaluated and accumulated
the evidence that would ultimately shape their levels of confidence and
trust. Beyond this theme, however, it is important to consider the role of
intergroup relations more generally and how these helped shape the per-
ceptions of inspectors.
Across all cohorts, the data revealed that a cooperative and open atti-
tude on the part of the host team contributed to the development of trust
between the parties. Indeed several participants noted that “attitude and
willingness to cooperate” were among the most important factors influ-
encing their perspective of the host team and their intentions.80 This issue
of positive attitude and engagement on the part of the host draws together
a number of earlier themes, such as discretion and the extent to which the
host team appeared willing to go beyond the pre-agreed limits of the
inspection in order to advance the objectives of the host team. Positive
attitude on the part of the host team is also closely related to the question
of integrity and the broader issue of positive expectations, a core element
of our trust framework.
The correlation between positive attitude and increased trust is not
surprising, even if it occurs in a high stakes environment marked by vul-
nerability and the potential for deception. More interesting is the process
by which inspectors came to appreciate the positive attitude of the host.

The academic literature is contested on this issue. The work of authors
such as Blau, Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, and Zand suggests that trust
“develops gradually over time”, yet this incremental perspective has been
challenged by empirical studies where early trust levels were unexpectedly
high at the outset of a relationship.81 Our data supports the former view of
trust development and revealed the process to be an incremental one,
influenced both by milestone events and a series of smaller, more discreet
behavioural cues. As mentioned at the start of the chapter, the cognitive
engagement of inspectors with the host team and the broader environ-
ment within which the inspection was situated commenced before any real
evidence was gathered, and this process continued throughout the inspec-
tion. In this context, and at the most granular level, several participants
spoke of a feeling of empathy that developed as the inspection
progressed:
There was an extremely personal level between teams – with the host team,
meaning that at points we could feel the bond between people who are
thrown into this working situation together. You are in the same boat and
you know you have to do your job. You have to be suspicious of the other
side but at the same time you know you must work together to get stuff
done. That means that there was kind of an empathy, there was a kind of a
mutual understanding, we’ve got hurdles to jump but it’s fine, there was
kind of an empathy in that regard.82
This sense of empathy, described by others as a “gut feeling”, emerged

from the emotionally intense, shared experience of the inspection process.
Built on the personal relationships that developed between various actors
in each group, it represented the cumulative effect of the sometimes sig-
nificant, but more often banal encounters that made up the week-long
inspection. Consider the following quotation:
During the simulation we developed a relationship with the lead person on

the other team. He sometimes laughed with us when we were trying to talk
to the other teams and even this small interaction actually made a slight dif-
ference. I could relate to this person when I saw him smile and laugh.
This perspective was shared by the majority of research participants and

came across clearly in group discussions observed by the research team.
On the one hand, this point demonstrates the subtle influence of personal
relationships. On the other, it resonates with Lindenberg’s work on fram-

ing, discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In particular, it illustrates the distinc-
tion between what Lindenberg terms the ‘foreground’ versus the
‘background’ of an individual’s interpretative schema.83 Lindenberg argues
that the details concentrated in the foreground are attended to in more
detail and direct the cognitive engagement of the individual; an argument
that appears to hold true here. While the inspectors never lost sight of the
objectives of their task, other momentary encounters inevitably broke into
the interpretative ‘foreground’ as the week progressed.
It is important to note that individual agency was not diminished in this
process. Participants appeared largely cognisant of the potential for per-
sonal relationships and the associated emotions to influence their judge-
ment. To this end, some sought to make a distinction between the
professional and personal dimensions to the engagement:
There are two levels which I experienced. One is extremely personal, one is
extremely professional. So on the personal level, it was all trust. So I trusted
some more than the others. It was not even about what they gave me,
because I knew that was a professional thing. But you know, it was about the
little things and the bond you try to build.84
The participant recognises, in their own way, the constant tension between
the professional objectives of the inspection and the myriad other, more
personal influences that arose from sustained interaction with another
group of individuals in an emotionally challenging environment. Yet even
with this awareness, participants acknowledged the challenge of actualis-
ing and maintaining this distinction throughout the exercise: “I tried to
keep the personal element of the whole thing separate, but it’s not easy to
do this. I’m not sure it’s even possible”.85
In addition to those banal everyday interactions that encouraged empa-
thy and contributed to the development of trust were a number of larger
‘milestone’ events, whose impact was sharper and more dramatic. One
example here relates to the issue of access. Clearly, the ease and extent of
access granted by the host team was central to inspectors’ efforts to gather
evidence and determine whether the chain of custody could be re-
established around the TAIs. During the simulation, inspection teams all
requested an initial site visit – this was planned for by the control team –
and this visit was conducted over the course of several hours, usually on
day two of the exercise. The visit served both a familiarisation role and a
data collection function, but the time limit inevitably left the inspectors
keen for further on-site inspection time.
As part of the simulation, the host team pre-empted a second request
by offering another site visit to inspection teams. This proactive approach
was viewed by the majority of participants as a significant milestone in the
relationship with the host and in the inspection process more broadly:
The second site visit kind of took me off guard… I think that we were prob-
ably expecting to ask for it with a reasonable degree of assertiveness. The
fact that it was offered, in the way that it was offered, did make me feel like
these people were just trying to get us to leave so that they can get on with
what they’re doing.
The second site visit was a turning point for me. They offered it and they
offered us more access than we expected to get. It was a clear sign of their
cooperation.
Milestone events such as this served as a force multiplier and boosted an

incremental development of trust on the part of the inspectors. They also
served as clear anchor points for the internal group deliberations of
inspectors. These milestone moments dominated the collective memory
of the group as the week progressed, and while the significance of smaller
events faded as time passed, these were frequently referenced in discus-
sions relating to authenticity, veracity and the potential for deception. On
the whole, the combination of everyday banalities and milestone events
that made up the intergroup relations played an important role in shaping
the attitude and thinking of inspectors with regard to the intentions of the
host team.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the subtle but powerful role played by
human factors, and particularly the notion of trust, in the verification pro-
cess. Analysis of our data revealed that the simple truisms that are often
raised in discussions of trust – trust develops gradually over time, trust
develops through positive behaviour on both sides in contexts of mutual
vulnerability, etc. – are far more complex than commonly believed. Our
research found that at the outset of the simulation, research participants
became engaged in a complex set of cognitive processes that saw them
constantly seeking to identify, assess and make sense of a range of behav-
ioural and other cues emanating from the host team. Everything from the
attitude of the host team, to the manner and speed with which informa-
tion was provided represented a potential indicator of intentions and was
incorporated into the interpretative schema of the research participants.
This intellectually demanding cognitive process overlaid the more
objective and scientific, evidence-based approach that all research partici-
pants aspired to. Crucially, the overlapping nature of these interpretative
strands meant that, despite an awareness of the potential influence of
human factors, participants were always susceptible to moving beyond the
strict limits of evidence in their efforts to understand and make sense of
the verification scenario and the nature of the host team’s intentions. This
should not be interpreted as naïve, superficial or irresponsible on the part
of inspectors. Rather it should be viewed as the consequence of a genuine
attempt to adopt a holistic approach to verification, one that incorporated
all available information, whatever its form.
Ultimately, this approach that brought aspirations to scientific objectiv-
ity together with the inevitable subjectivity of the human condition framed
the process by which inspectors brought what they believed to be the only
obtainable truth of the situation, blurry and uncertain at the outset, more
clearly into focus. From a research perspective, it provided us with exten-
sive empirical evidence to support the argument that trust does indeed
exert a shaping influence on verification outcomes and it would be reduc-
tive, and even dangerous to think of verification in terms of a solely techni-
cal and evidence-based process.
Notes
1. Betty Goetz Lall, “Government Sponsored Research for Disarmament,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21, no. 2 (1965): 44.
2. See: Atomic Energy Commission, “Project Cloud Gap and CG-34,
Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. Note by the Secretary.”
3. “The United Kingdom - Norway Initiative: Further Research into Managed
Access of Inspectors During Warhead Dismantlement Verification.”
4. United Kingdom Norway Initiative, “New Verification Exercises: A
Collaboration with King’s College, London,” May 28, 2014, http://ukni.
info/mdocs-posts/uknipreparatorycommitteetothenptreviewconferen-
ce2014studentexercises/.
5. Individual interview (Participant 7), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
6. Individual interview (Participant 6), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
7. Individual Interviews (Participants 2, 4 & 5), Kjeller, Norway, August
2014.
8. Solomon Asch, “Forming Impressions of Personality,” Journal of Abnormal

Social Psychology 9, no. 4 (1946): 259.
9. Other notable studies include Seymour Rosenberg, Carnot Nelson, and
P. S. Vivekananthan, “A Multidimensional Approach to the Structure of
Personality Impressions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9, no.
4 (1968): 283–94, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0026086; Mark Zanna
and David Hamilton, “Attribute Dimensions and Patterns of Trait
Inference,” Psychonomic Science 27, no. 6 (1972): 353–54; R. P. Abelson
et al., “Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person Perception,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 4 (1982): 619–30.
10. Susan T. Fiske, Amy Cuddy, and Peter Glick, “Universal Dimensions of
Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence,” Trends in Cognitive Science
11, no. 2 (2007): 77–83.
11. Focus Group A, Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
12. Individual Interview (Participant 3), Kjeller, Norway, August 2014.
13. Questionnaire (2013/Batch B), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
14. Questionnaire (2014/Batch B), Kjeller, Norway, June 2014.
15. Ibid.
16. Situation Report (2013/Batch B), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
18. Ibid.
20. Situation Report (2014/Batch A), Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
21. Questionnaire (2013/Batch B), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013
22. Questionnaire (2015/Batch C), Kjeller, Norway, July 2015.
25. Questionnaire (2013/Batch A), Kjeller, Norway, July 2013.
27. Ibid.
28. Participant 7, Kjeller, Norway, August 2014.
30. Situation Report 3, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
31. Focus Group A, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
32. Ibid.
33. Focus Group B, Kjeller, Norway, June 2014.
34. Participant 2, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
35. Focus Group B, Kjeller, Norway, June 2014.
36. Situation Report 3, Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
37. Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, “Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition:
Warmth and Competence,” 77.
38. Ibid.
39. Individual interview (Participant 5), Kjeller, Norway, August 2014.

40. Questionnaire 3, Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
41. Focus Group B, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
42. Ibid.
43. Valerie Fournier, “The Appeal to ‘Professionalism’ as a Disciplinary
Mechanism,” The Sociological Review 47, no. 2 (2001): 287.
44. Questionnaire 3, Kjeller, Norway, July 2015.
45. Questionnaire 3, Kjeller, Norway, June 2014.
47. Questionnaire 4, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
52. Questionnaire 5, Kjeller, Norway, June 2014. The use of the term ‘confi-
dence’ here rather than ‘trust’ reflects the fact that these terms were often
used interchangeably by participants.
70. Individual Interview (participant 5), Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
75. Individual Interview (participant 3), Kjeller, Norway, April 2014.
77. Individual interview (participant 5), Kjeller, Norway, January 2015.

79. Situation Report 3, Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
81. For studies arguing for the gradual development of trust, see P. M. Blau,
Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964); Rempel,
Holmes, J. G., and Zanna, “Trust in Close Relationships”; D. E. Zand,
“Trust and Managerial Problem Solving,” Administrative Science Quarterly
17 (1972): 229–39; Roderick M. Kramer, “The Sinister Attribution Error:
Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organisations,” Motivation
and Emotion 18 (1994): 199–230.
82. Focus Group A, Kjeller, Norway, January 2015.
83. Lindenberg, “It Takes Both Trust and Lack of Mistrust: The Workings of
Cooperation and Relational Signaling in Contractual Relationships,” 17.
84. Focus Group A, Kjeller, Norway, January 2015.
85. Individual interview (participant 4), Kjeller, Norway, November 2013.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion: Looking to the Future
Studying the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is a challeng-

ing task. This is an area of activity characterised by uncertainty, where 100
per cent ‘proof’ remains an unattainable aspiration. At root, the problem
lies in the enduring tension between the transparency needed for effective
verification and the secrecy demanded by national security requirements
and non-proliferation obligations. From a monitoring or inspection per-
spective, the space between these two poles is marked by a host of eviden-
tiary gaps, each one with the potential to fundamentally undermine the
verification process. Furthermore, the problem is magnified by the poten-
tial costs of failure or misjudgement. The illicit diversion of nuclear weap-
ons or their constituent parts would have far-reaching consequences and
likely pose a significant threat to international security.
To date, the majority of research relating to nuclear warhead dismantle-
ment verification has been devoted to the search for new technical solu-
tions. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, scientists have explored a range of
technical approaches over the last five decades, all with the goal of provid-
ing reliable and effective means of verifying the process of dismantlement
and countering the threat of diversion of warheads or any of their compo-
nents. From tamper proof seals to information barrier technology, efforts
here have been ambitious and innovative in equal measure. And beyond
the discrete pockets of technical advancement, the result of these endeav-
ours has been the emergence of a small but dedicated research community
that has witnessed some important breakthroughs in the search for tools
to support a robust future verification regime.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7_7
In this book, our focus has been on another, less researched side of
dismantlement verification: the nature and influence of the human factor.
Throughout the book, we have been at pains to highlight the mistaken
assumption that verification is a purely technical endeavour, an objective
and mechanical process where there is no room for subjectivity. Rather, we
have demonstrated that the human factor exerts a subtle but often power-
ful influence on the verification process and, potentially, its outcome. In
particular, our research demonstrates the need for trust to be considered
an integral part of the verification process. Trust is an unavoidable interac-
tional variable, that is to say, a moderating condition for a causal relation-
ship. It has the potential to influence confidence levels, often in spite of
the efforts of inspectors to base their judgments purely on evidence. The
implications of trust as an interactional variable are significant: ignoring
the influence of trust on confidence could potentially distort the interpre-
tation of verification outcomes
To reach these conclusions, we began by considering the nature of the
‘human factor’. Clearly, this broad and abstract concept can be interpreted
in a range of different ways, relating as it does to fluid and amorphous
issues such as perceptions, assumptions, attitudes and biases. With this in
mind, we sought to focus our attention on the two terms relevant to the
human factor that seem to dominate commentary and debate regarding
verification for arms control and disarmament: trust and confidence. In
our view, these terms – defined and analysed in Chapter 4 – encapsulate
the tension between evidence and perceptions that is at the heart of the
verification endeavour. Of particular interest was the concept of trust, the
essence of which seems to capture perfectly the grey area of verification,
this space where evidence is in short supply and inspectors may become
more susceptible to being influenced or directed by their perceptions of
the host party’s intentions.
Against this background, we sought to conceptualise trust and develop
a comprehensive framework that could be applied to the considerable
body of empirical data collected from those participating in our custom-
ised verification scenario. Following an extensive literature review, that
spanned disciplines ranging from management science to psychology, we
identified three ‘categories of action’ that together seem to encapsulate
the key factors of the trust equation: vulnerability and risk; the expectation
of positive behaviour; and signalling and framing. The remainder of the
book was devoted to applying this robust conceptual approach to the
research data. Our analysis here was driven by two key questions: To what
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 151
extent are perceptions shaped by interpersonal exchanges and informa-

tional flows, among other things, between inspectors and their hosts? Is
there evidence that these perceptions influence verification judgements
and outcomes? Cleary, the answers to these questions have important
implications for the design and implementation of any future nuclear war-
head dismantlement verification regime.
Ultimately, our research findings indicate that human factors, and par-
ticularly trust, play a subtle but powerful role in the verification process.
Analysis of our data revealed that the simple truisms that are often raised
in discussions of trust are far more complex than commonly believed. Our
research found that at the outset of the simulation, research participants
became engaged in a complex set of cognitive processes that saw them
constantly seeking to identify, assess and make sense of a range of behav-
ioural and other cues emanating from the host team. Everything from the
attitude of the host team, to the manner and speed with which informa-
tion was provided, represented a potential indicator of intentions and was
incorporated into the interpretative schema of the research participants.
The research provided us with extensive empirical evidence to support the
argument that trust does indeed exert a shaping influence on verification
judgements and it would be reductive, and even dangerous to think of
verification in terms of a solely technical and evidence-based process.
Future Avenues for Disarmament

Verification Research
In our view, this book breaks new ground in disarmament verification
research as the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the role and
influence of human factors on the operational dynamics of verification. Yet
it is important to recognise that this research represents the beginning of a
process, rather than the end. Our work sought to isolate, in so far as is pos-
sible, the human factor for study. More than this, we sought to understand
the nature of the interplay between trust and confidence, between evidence
and perceptions, that overlays the more objective science of verification.
While we focused on the nature and influence of trust in the verification
process, our work also has broader implications. For example, our analysis
of those factors that contribute to fostering trust in the relationship
between inspectors and hosts – a proactive approach on the part of the
host team, the speed of information delivery, the consistency of informa-
tion provided, etc. – highlight the potential for trust (and its influence) to
be managed. That is to say, parties to a verification regime, particularly the

host, can consciously adopt an approach that encourages the development
of trust and thus play an active role in creating the environment that is
favourable to higher levels of confidence. This in an environment where
the two fundamental conditions underpinning trust are met: risk (where
there is mutual vulnerability and a perceived probability of loss) and inter-
dependence (where the interests of one party cannot be achieved without
relying on another party).
Of course, the potential for trust to be managed also opens up the pos-
sibility of trust being manipulated. Our research to date has been framed
in terms of a cooperative relationship where both parties are genuinely
seeking to engage with the verification process, but it is clear that an
adversarial relationship would situate the dynamics around trust in an alto-
gether different environment. Future work in this area could build on our
simulation-based approach and begin to explore more complex scenarios,
including ones where the context is adversarial or where the host party
engages in deception. Could markers of deception be identified? How
would the behaviour of inspectors and/or hosts change (if at all) in this
radically different environment? Would past interactions in an adversarial
relationship weigh more heavily on the perceptions of inspectors than
those forming part of a cooperative one? A range of lessons could be
drawn from simulations designed to explore more challenging scenarios.
Our work also demonstrates the inherently multidisciplinary nature of
the subject area and need for this disciplinary diversity to be reflected in
research addressing topics of relevance here. Approaches to understanding
verification processes – particularly from the perspective of practice – that
are limited by disciplinary boundaries simply cannot hope to engage com-
prehensively with the range of influences and shaping factors of which this
endeavour is comprised. Intellectually, there is certainly space for a larger,
multi-institutional and cross-disciplinary effort to understand the human
factors that are inherent in verification processes and challenges. From an
operational perspective, progress demands this type of concerted effort.
With this book, then, we hope to expand the study of verification beyond
traditional scientific and technically focused approaches and encourage a
more holistic approach to this area of activity.
Clearly, future progress in disarmament verification research depends
on a political context that has a direct impact on the availability of the
resources necessary for rigorous and innovative research. At present, the
environment in this regard is marked by uncertainty. On the one hand,
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 153
there are a number of positive developments that provide cause for opti-
mism. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
(IPNDV), established in 2014 by the US Department of State in partner-
ship with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, is a good example. The IPNDV
brings together experts from nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-
nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to explore verification challenges. The
Initiative established three working groups – one addressing monitoring
and verification objectives, one exploring issues associated with on-site
inspections, and one devoted to technical challenges and solutions – have
met several times and together offer an important multilateral forum for
advancing verification, albeit with a strong technical focus. Elsewhere, the
seventy first session of the UN General Assembly saw the First Committee
adopt a resolution that asked the Secretary General to “to establish a
group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants on the basis of
equitable geographical distribution to consider the role of verification in
advancing nuclear disarmament”.1 This group is due to meet in Geneva in
2018 and 2019 for a total of three sessions of five days each. Furthermore,
during the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review
Conference, a new multi-year arms control initiative between two nuclear
weapons states (UK and US) and two Nordic states (Norway and Sweden)
was announced.2 The new initiative engages with simulations to build
capacity in nuclear weapons related verification, test monitoring technol-
ogy and develop a model verification protocol.
These examples, combined with the recent adoption of the nuclear
weapons ban treaty, offer hope for the future of disarmament verification.
On the other hand, however, other geopolitical developments provide
cause for concern. Take the IPNDV, for example. Driven in large part by
former US President Obama’s vision for a world free of nuclear weapons,
the initiative is vulnerable, to a certain extent at least, to policy shifts
effected by the current Trump administration. At present, the administra-
tion is conducting a wide-ranging review of nuclear policy and its commit-
ment to disarmament verification is not at all assured. Certainly, the
initiative benefits from the involvement and support of other partners, yet
US involvement holds considerable political significance as well as bring-
ing valuable technical expertise and cannot be underestimated. Beyond
this, international debates on the shape and pace of nuclear weapons
reductions will continue to frame thinking on the type of verification
needed. The 2010 New START Treaty established a good benchmark
through its rigorous verification regime, which continued to function
smoothly even when relations between the US and the Russian Federation
soured. But the prospects for a follow-on treaty, that would pave the way
to further verified reductions, are currently slim given the differences
between the two countries on missile defence and compliance with INF.
The politics framing nuclear disarmament aside, we believe that our
research makes a significant contribution to advancing the nuclear war-
head dismantlement verification. The empirical evidence and method-
ological approach set out in this book represent an important step towards
understanding an important influence on the process of verification that
has been largely ignored to date. As with most academic endeavours, our
work raises almost as many questions regarding the role and influence of
human factors as it answers. Yet, these are questions that must be addressed
in some shape or form, alongside technical considerations, if verification is
to advance as a holistic and comprehensive concept. To sideline the human
dimension of dismantlement verification would be to fundamentally
undermine the broader endeavour. We end this book, therefore, in the
hope that our research into the human factor in nuclear warhead disman-
tlement verification will set the path for further research, and feed into the
work of other scholars working in this area.
Notes
1. First Committee, “Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” Agenda Item 98,
Seventy-First Session of the General Assembly (United Nations General
Assembly), accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.
org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/resolutions/
L57.pdf.
2. Hassan Elbahtimy, “More Heat than Light: Reflections on the 2017 NPT
Prepcom,” The European Leadership Network, June 26, 2017, http://www.
europeanleadershipnetwork.org/more-heat-than-light-reflections-on-the-
2017-npt-prepcom_4881.html.
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message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834.
Trump, Donald J. 2016. Foreign Policy Speech – Video Recording. YouTube,
April 27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q_s6cXSv_8.
Trust – Definition of Trust. Oxford Dictionaries | English. Accessed 29 Aug 2017.
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/trust.
United Kingdom Norway Initiative. 2014. New Verification Exercises: A
Collaboration with King’s College, London. Presented at the UKNI Event
organised on the sidelines of the Third Session of the 2015 NPT Preparatory
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defence-bcf2.
What Lurks Beneath. The Economist, February 6, 2016. https://www.economist.
com/news/asia/21690107-nuclear-arms-race-sea-what-lurks-beneath.
Index1
NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS Arms Control and Disarmament

1967 Field Tests, 58, 60 Agency (ACDA), 8, 121
See also Field Tests Article II, 23
See also Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty
A Asch, 124, 146n8
ABM Treaty, see Anti-Ballistic Missile Atomic Detection System, 36
(ABM) Treaty Atomic Weapons Establishment
Accountable items, 106 (AWE), 11, 69, 71n10, 102, 111,
See also Treaty accountable items 117
Acton, J., 44, 47n35, 49n69, 49n70, Attribute Monitor, 106, 107, 110,
49n80, 73n48 111
Additional Protocol (AP), 29, 32 AWE, see Atomic Weapons
Afghanistan, 40 Establishment
Aitken, D., 83, 95n24 Axelrod, R., 101, 118n5
Anti-ballistic defences, 39
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
39, 42 B
AP, see Additional Protocol Bacharach, M., 90, 91, 97n52, 97n57
Arms control, 5, 8, 9, 11–13, 19, 22, Ban the bomb, 2, 34, 35
40, 41, 43, 52, 56, 59, 65, 70, Ban treaty, 2, 3, 153
72n35, 75, 78, 80, 109, 121, Barber, B., 79, 80, 88, 89, 95n7,
150, 153 95n12, 96n42, 97n51
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refers to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40988-7
170 INDEX
Biden, J., 20 CSA, see Comprehensive Safeguards

Bikini Atoll, 34 Agreement
Bing-Sheng Teng, 88, 96n43 CTBT, see Comprehensive Test Ban
Black Sea Experiments, 8, 52 Treaty
Blake, E. L., 101, 118n6, 118n9 CTBTO, 22, 38, 48n60
Blair, B. G., 1 Cuban Missile Crisis, 39
Bolton, J., 30 Cuddy, A., 124, 146n10, 146n37
Borey, 4 Cunningham, F. S., 6, 16n22, 16n23,
Bowen, W. Q., 76, 94n2 16n33
Brown, M., 1
Bulganin, N., 35
Bush, G. W., 42 D
Das, T. K., 88, 96n43
Davis, J. H., 84, 89, 96n29, 97n47
C Department of Defence (DOE), 8,
Canada, 22, 35 55
Canadian government, 76 Deutsch, M., 81, 84, 86, 95n16,
Categories of action, 85, 86, 135, 150 96n28, 96n34, 96n40
Chain-of-custody, 26, 55, 65 Dismantlement verification, 3, 9, 52,
China, 5–7, 9, 16n22, 16n23, 16n33, 53, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70,
26, 53 108, 109, 117, 149–151, 154
Beijing, 6 DOE, see Department of Defence
Civil nuclear industry, 58 ‘Dummy’ warheads, 57, 60
Cliff, D., 17n43, 17n45, 17n47, 53, Durkheim, E., 84
57, 70n6, 71n14, 72n31, 72n33,
72n44, 73n55, 73n59, 74n65
Closed-circuit television (CCTV), 107, E
108, 111, 112, 126, 134 Egypt, 30–32, 47n36, 47n41, 109
Cochran, T. B., 17n46, 25, 46n19 Eisenhower, D. D., 23, 35
Cold War, 8, 27, 37, 42, 52, 72n35 Elbahtimy, H., 17n43, 17n45, 17n47,
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 53, 57, 70n6, 71n14, 72n31,
(CSA), 28 72n33, 72n44, 73n55, 73n59,
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 74n65, 154n2
(CTBT), 37, 38, 48n60 El-Bharadei, M., 52
Conference on Disarmament, 37 ENEA, see European Nuclear Energy
Confidence, 10–12, 116, 122, 147n52 Agency
Containment, 26, 105, 108 EURATOM, see European Atomic
Control team, 104, 110, 112, 114, 143 Energy Community
Conventional Prompt Global Strike European Atomic Energy Community
(CPGS), 5 (EURATOM), 24, 45n12
CPGS, see Conventional Prompt European Nuclear Energy Agency
Global Strike (ENEA), 24
INDEX
171
F Hollande, F., 5, 16n26

Fein, S., 89, 97n49 Holmes, J. G., 84, 95n26, 142,
Field Test 34, 8, 52 148n81
Field Tests, 61, 63, 121 Hon, L. C., 89, 96n45
See also Field Test 34 Host, 2, 10, 11, 13, 23, 54, 59, 64,
Fihn, B., 3, 15n14 68, 69, 81, 85, 89, 91, 102, 105,
Findlay, T., 30, 47n34, 47n38 109, 111–113, 122–129,
Fiske, S. T., 124, 146n10, 146n37 131–145, 149–152
Fissile material, 35, 51, 52, 55–57, 60, Human factor, 10–13, 54, 66, 70,
62, 63, 67, 104 76–78, 82, 99, 102, 103, 113,
Frame, 13, 25, 79, 85, 88, 91, 92, 153 117, 122, 124, 134, 144, 145,
France, 3–5, 15n12, 16n25, 26, 35 150–152, 154
Fravel, T., 6, 16n22, 16n23, 16n33 Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear
Weapons (HINW), 2
Humanitarian Pledge, 2
G Hussein, S., 27
Gallagher, N., 7, 17n41, 17n42 Hydrogen bomb, 34
Gambetta, D., 90, 91, 97n52, 97n57
Germany, 24, 26, 109
Glick, P., 124, 146n10, 146n37 I
Global Zero, 1, 2, 14n5 IAEA, see International Atomic Energy
Goffman, E., 92, 97n60, 97n61 Agency
Goldschmidt, P., 31, 46n22, 47n39 ICAN, 3
Gorbachev, M., 20, 40, 45n4 ICBM, see Intercontinental ballistic
Gorove, S., 24, 45n12 missiles
Gould, S. J., 78, 94n3 IDC, see International Data Center
Gravel gerties, 56 IFE, see Institute for Energy
Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), 37 Technology
Grunig, J. E., 89, 96n45 IMS, see International Monitoring
GSE, see Group of Scientific Experts System
Gulf War, 27 India, 6
INF, see Intermediate Nuclear Force
Information barrier, 9, 62–64, 66, 70,
H 106, 107, 119n14, 149
Hardin, R., 84 INS Arihant, 6
Heimer, C. A., 80, 95n11 Insiders, 58
Highly enriched uranium (HEU), 27, Institute for Energy Technology
44, 56, 62 (IFE), 102, 111, 117
HINW, see Humanitarian Impacts of Integrated Field Exercise, 38
Nuclear Weapons Integrated tamper indicating devices
Hiroshima, 22, 34 (ITID), 65
172 INDEX
Intercontinental ballistic missiles K

(ICBM), 4, 41 Kennedy, J. F., 24, 27, 45n15, 47n34
Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF), 20, Kerr, P. K., 33, 47n40, 47n42, 48n67
21, 40, 41, 59, 61, 154 Kissinger, H., 1
International Atomic Energy Agency Kramer, R. M., 83, 84, 95n18, 96n29,
(IAEA), 22–34, 44, 45n10, 96n32, 97n49, 97n50, 148n81
45n16, 46n20, 46n22, 46n28, Krass, A., 19
46n29, 46n30, 46n31, 47n33, Kristensen, H., 5, 15n20, 16n24,
47n34, 47n36, 47n38, 47n41, 16n31
47n44, 47n45, 51, 52, 57, 59,
62, 65, 71n9, 71n10, 73n50
Board of Governors, 30, 32, 33, L
47n33, 47n36, 47n41 LANL, see Los Alamos National
Secretariat, 29 Laboratory
International Data Center (IDC), 37 Lewis, D., 81, 84
International Monitoring System Lewis, J., 4, 15n15
(IMS), 37, 38, 65 Libya, 30, 46n32
International Partnership for Nuclear Lieber, K. A., 5, 16n22
Disarmament Verification Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 36
(IPNDV), 17n50, 153 Lindenberg, S., 91, 92, 97n62, 143,
Interpersonal Trust Scale, 83, 95n23 148n83
IPNDV, see International Partnership Lithium deuteride, 55
for Nuclear Disarmament Locations of notable speeches or
Verification meetings
Iran, 20, 30–34, 47n40, 47n42, 87 Geneva, 153
Tehran, 32–34, 47n40, 47n42 Paris, 5
Iraq, 26–30, 46n29, 77 Prague, 2
Baghdad, 27 Narayit, 2
Israel, 27 Oslo, 2
ITID, see Integrated tamper indicating Paris, 2, 14n5
devices Vienna, 2, 14n7, 45n16
Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), 65
J LTBT, see Limited Test Ban Treaty
Japan, 26, 47n46, 54 Lucky Dragon, 34, 47n46
JCPOA, see Joint Comprehensive Plan Luhmann, N., 80, 81, 85, 95n12,
of Action 95n13, 96n33
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), 32
Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), 32 M
Jordan, 38 Magnox reactor, 28
JPOA, see Joint Plan of Action Manichaean opposition, 78
INDEX
173
Marshall Islands, 34 147n40, 147n41, 147n44,

Mayer, R. C., 84, 89, 96n29, 97n47 147n45, 147n46, 147n47,
Michaels, J., 4, 15n17 147n48, 147n49, 147n50,
Minuteman, 1, 4 147n51, 147n52, 147n53,
MIRV, see Multiple Independently 147n54, 147n55, 147n56,
Targetable Re-entry Vehicles 147n57, 147n58, 147n59,
Moscow Treaty, 42 147n60, 147n61, 147n62,
Müller, H., 24 147n63, 147n64, 147n65,
Multiple Independently Targetable 147n66, 147n67, 147n68,
Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV), 41 147n69, 147n70, 147n71,
147n72, 147n73, 147n74,
147n75, 147n76, 147n77,
N 148n78, 148n79, 148n80,
Nagasaki, 22, 34 148n82, 148n84, 148n85, 153
National technical means (NTM), 29, Norwegian Radiation Protection
37, 107 Agency (NRPA), 11, 111, 117
NATO, 3 Article I and II of the Treaty on the
Navy, 4, 6 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Neutrons, 62 Weapons, 75
NNWS, see Non-nuclear weapon state Article VI, 104
Non-governmental organisation Article VI of the NPT, 51
(NGO), 53 NPT, see Nuclear Non-proliferation
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), Treaty
8, 25, 26, 53, 66, 67, 153 NPT Review Conference, 2, 9, 15n8,
Non-proliferation, 9, 12, 22, 24, 27, 53, 70n2, 153
58, 75, 78, 80, 149 NRPA, see Norwegian Radiation
Nooteboom, B., 91, 97n53, 97n54, Protection Agency
97n55 NTM, see National technical means
Norris, R., 5, 15n20, 16n24, 16n31 Nuclear disarmament, 1–3, 7, 9, 12,
North Korea, 6, 17n38, 26–30, 38 21, 22, 25, 51, 57, 87, 121, 123,
Pyongyang, 6, 28, 38 153, 154
Norway, 8, 13, 17n40, 53, 66, 67, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
73n63, 73n64, 74n67, 100, 102, (NPT), 2, 9, 12, 15n8, 21, 22,
111, 121, 145n3, 145n4, 145n5, 24, 26–28, 33, 46n30, 46n31,
145n6, 145n7, 146n11, 146n12, 47n33, 47n36, 47n41, 47n44,
146n13, 146n14, 146n16, 51, 53, 70n2, 71n11, 75, 104,
146n17, 146n19, 146n20, 140, 153, 154n2
146n21, 146n22, 146n23, Nuclear Posture Review, 4
146n24, 146n25, 146n26, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 119n13,
146n28, 146n29, 146n30, 153
146n31, 146n33, 146n34, Nuclear tipped missiles, 39
146n35, 146n36, 147n39, Nuclear triad, 4–6
174 INDEX
Nuclear warhead dismantlement, 3, 7, Perry, Bill, 1

9, 12, 21, 44, 52, 53, 57, 59, 61, Persbo, A., 17n43, 17n45, 17n47, 53,
63, 66–69, 75, 87, 90, 99–101, 57, 70n6, 71n14, 72n31, 72n33,
109, 132, 149, 151, 154 72n44, 73n55, 73n59, 74n65,
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 6, 8, 76, 94n2
25, 26, 53, 64, 66, 67, 153 Plutonium, 25, 27, 28, 31, 38, 62
Nunn, S., 1 PNE, see Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
NWS, see Nuclear Weapon States Treaty
Potter, W. C., 2
Press, D. G., 5, 15n12, 16n22, 17n39,
O 17n42, 46n23
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 56 Project Cloud Gap, 52, 70n3, 145n2
Obama, Barack, 2, 4, 42, 153
OECD, see Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development Q
OEWG, see Open-Ended Working Qadhafi, 30
Group Quint, M., 4, 15n15
On-site inspection, 37, 41, 59, 108,
126, 144
OPCW, see Organisation for the R
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Reagan, R., 20, 21, 45n4
Open-Ended Working Group Relational Signalling Theory, 91
(OEWG), 3 Rempel, J. K., 84, 95n26, 142,
Organisation for the Prohibition of 148n81
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 59 Romania, 30
Organization for Economic Rotter, J. B., 83, 95n19, 95n21, 95n23
Co-operation and Development Rousseau, D. M., 86, 96n36
(OCED), 24 Rubel, R. C., 102, 118n10
Osirak reactor, 27 Russia, 4, 5, 7, 12, 15n21, 22, 42, 44,
52, 53, 57, 62, 109
Moscow, 5, 7, 42
P Soviet Union, 12, 20, 28, 34–37,
P5+1, 20, 32 39, 40, 72n35
Paine, C. E., 25, 46n19 Rykiel, E. J., 78, 95n6
Pakistan, 6, 16n35, 17n36
Islamabad, 6
Pantex, 8 S
Parchin, 34 Sabin, P., 100, 101, 118n1
Parsons, 84 Safeguards, 12, 22–27, 29–31, 33, 34,
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 44, 46n31, 51, 52, 57, 59, 65
(PNE), 36 Safeguards Agreement, 32, 33, 46n30,
Perkovich, G., 44, 47n35, 49n69, 46n31, 47n33, 47n36, 47n41,
49n70, 49n80, 73n48 47n44
INDEX
175
Sagan, S., 3, 15n11, 15n13 Starkey, 101, 118n6, 118n9

SAGSI, see Standing Advisory Group START, see Strategic Arms Reduction
for Safeguards Implementation Treaty
SALT, see Strategic Arms Limitation START I, 8
Talks START II, 8, 40, 41
Savannah River National Laboratory, 56 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC, see Standing Consultative (SALT), 39, 41
Commission SALT I Interim Agreement, 39
Schelling, T., 100, 101, 118n3 SALT II, 40
Schemata of interpretation, 92 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Schoorman, D., 84, 89, 96n29, 97n47 (START), 8, 41, 42, 51, 52, 57,
Schultz, G., 1 59, 61, 70n1, 153
Science Wars, 78, 94n3 New START, 42
realists, 78 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
relativists, 78 (SORT), 42
Security Council, 31–33 Suez crisis, 24
Security dilemma, 19 Surveillance, 26
Significant quantity (SQ), 25
Simmel, G., 84
Simulation, 53, 99–107, 109–117, T
118n4, 121–125, 129, 131, 135, Tags, 26, 65, 68, 69, 105, 107, 111,
142–144, 151, 152 119n13
SitRep, see Situation Reports Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),
Situation Reports (SitRep), 113–115, 36, 39
126, 130, 135 Treaty, 3, 15n11, 19–21, 24, 33,
SLBM, 6, 41 36–38, 40–42, 45n4, 52, 59, 61,
Snow, D. A., 92, 97n60 67, 70, 104–108, 110, 130,
SORT, see Strategic Offensive 132–134, 154
Reductions Treaty Treaty accountable items (TAIs),
South Africa, 44, 109 106–108, 111, 112, 124, 126,
Pretoria, 44 131, 134, 141, 143
South Korea, 30, 32 Trident, 4, 5, 16n28
Seoul, 30 Tri-lateral Initiative, 52, 62, 64
Spectrometers, 60 Tritium, 56
SQ, see Significant quantity Trump, D. J., 4, 15n17, 153
SS-20, 40 Trust, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20, 44, 45n2,
SSBN, 4, 6, 16n28 78–92, 94, 95n8, 96n38, 99,
Standing Advisory Group for 102, 103, 113, 116, 118, 122,
Safeguards Implementation 123, 125, 127–139, 141,
(SAGSI), 25 143–145, 147n52, 148n81,
Standing Consultative Commission 150–152
(SCC), 39 TTBT, see Threshold Test Ban Treaty
176 INDEX
U US Arms Control and Disarmament

UKNI, see United Kingdom–Norway Agency, see Arms Control and
Initiative Disarmament Agency
Ukraine, 7 US B61 free-fall thermonuclear bomb,
United Kingdom (UK), 3–5, 15n12, 55
16n29, 22, 28, 34–36, 53, 70n2, US Department of Defense, 6, 8
109, 145n4 US Department of Energy, 52
United Kingdom Atomic Weapons See also Department of Defence
Establishment, see Atomic US Department of State, 30, 47n50,
Weapons Establishment 153
United Kingdom–Norway Initiative US-Russia bilateral disarmament
(UKNI), 8, 17n40, 53, 54, 66, efforts, 44
70, 73n64, 77, 121
United Nations (UN), 15n10, 15n12,
23, 30, 33, 48n54, 71n12, 154n1 V
United Nations Disarmament Valentino, B., 3, 15n11, 15n13
Commission, 35 Vanguard-class, 5, 16n28
United Nations General Assembly, 3, Verification regime, 7, 12, 13, 21, 31,
33, 153 37, 38, 41, 52, 53, 59, 61, 67,
United Nations Open-Ended Working 103, 104, 107, 149, 151–153
Group, see Open-Ended Working
Group
United Nations Security Council W
(UNSC), 30, 32 Wargaming, see Simulation
United Nations Special Commission Weapons stockpiles, 59
(UNSCOM), 77 Weigert, A. J., 81, 84, 95n15, 95n17,
United States (US), 2–4, 7, 9, 15n12, 96n27, 96n30
15n19, 17n44, 20, 22, 23, 28, Williams, R. B., 4, 15n17
30, 34–37, 39, 42, 45n9, 48n64, Wolfsthal, J., 4, 15n15
49n75, 52, 53, 55, 57, 62, 70n1, Woolf, A. F., 4
72n35, 109
Washington, 5, 9, 17n44, 23, 30,
42, 45n2, 45n15 X
UNSC, see United Nations Security X-rays, 60, 62
Council
UNSCOM, see UN Special
Commission Y
Uranium, 27, 30, 31, 38 Y-12, 8
highly enriched uranium (HEU),
25, 56 (see also Highly enriched
uranium) Z
low enriched uraninum (LEU), 56 Zero-knowledge protocol, 63

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TRUST IN NUCLEAR

ISBN 978-3-319-40987-0 ISBN 978-3-319-40988-7 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017961836

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

Cairo (Egypt). We are particularly grateful to Claudio Gariazzo, James

2 Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance

3 Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification:

4 The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence 75

5 Simulating Disarmament Verification: Design and Methods 99

6 Trust and Verification: Empirical Insights 121

7 Conclusion: Looking to the Future 149

Table 4.1 Conceptualising trust and the practice of verification 93

© The Author(s) 2018 1

Apocalypse”, the movement received endorsements from a host of high-­

2016 UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament. This,

The Enduring Appeal of Nuclear Weapons

non-governmental organizations and, more recently, from the new-look

Beyond the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament

community’ of technical experts whose shared commitment to a set of

among the most prominent of contemporary international efforts to

The Challenges of Verification

in the monitoring process, and ‘trust’, broadly defined as the expectation

While our findings are drawn from empirical research, it is important to

Structure and Content

ing of verification as strictly a data-driven activity, our research demon-

36. Jaganath Sankaran, “Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution

Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature,

In his seminal research on verification and trust in arms control, Allan

© The Author(s) 2018 19

While verification is inevitably overshadowed by the political and diplo-

Preventing Proliferation in the Nuclear Arena

once a system of “effective enforceable safeguards against its use for

At the same time, efforts were underway in Europe to develop a struc-

Developing a Safeguards Regime

In order to verify nuclear activities and ensure no diversion has taken

Verification Weaknesses: Iraq and North Korea

The Challenge of Assessing Compliance

definition of safeguards non-compliance, which complicates efforts to dis-

governors to ensure that it [South Korea] was not found in non-compli-

reporting oversights’? What happens if the ‘mistake’ is a one-time inci-

Verifying Iran’s Nuclear Activities: A Case Study

access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use

Verification and Nuclear Testing

that the consequences and implications of nuclear testing were much

Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban

Despite the relatively rapid progress in agreeing verification measures,

An International Verification System to Monitor

Onsite inspections could be triggered upon request from a state party,

Efforts to Reduce Nuclear Weapons Numbers

“narrow interpretations” of the treaty texts, it could be argued that their

Onsite Inspections at Nuclear Weapons Facilities

Further Reductions in Nuclear Weapons Numbers

missile defence. Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002

Conclusion: The Limits of Progress

This is supported by the existence of a wide range of tested tools and

33. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

© The Author(s) 2018 51

Despite the absence of any formal agreements regarding nuclear war-

verification regimes, although it is particularly strained in this context. The

The Practice of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

2 Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance

3 Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification:

4 The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence 75

5 Simulating Disarmament Verification: Design and Methods 99

6 Trust and Verification: Empirical Insights 121

7 Conclusion: Looking to the Future 149

Table 4.1 Conceptualising trust and the practice of verification 93

Apocalypse”, the movement received endorsements from a host of high-