Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Finnish Russian War
Finnish Russian War
Pasi Tuunainen
PhD, Docent of History, University of Eastern Finland
Abstract: This article uses the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940 as a case study
to introduce several approaches that can be employed when studying Arctic warfare in
winter. The study of Arctic warfare is a highly context-related field: the Finnish-Russian
border area had a character of its own. Combat here essentially was sub-Arctic forest
fighting. Unpreparedness for such peculiarities and special conditions, in particular for
the harsh sub-zero weather, ice, deep snow and shortened days of winter, complicated
military action and even led to military failures. Many historical antecedents show that
those armies that have adapted and correctly realised the implications of the effects
of adverse weather on terrain and of the northern environment on soldiers, materiel,
organisation and operations could prevail. Unlike in many places, the hostilities normally
have not ended in the Far North of Europe as the winter set in. Winters were utilised
for offensive combat operations provided that the attacking force had secured its over-
snow mobility and logistical support. The Finnish case demonstrates that the terrain
and weather not only dictated the operational capabilities in northern forests but also
that better preparation in the utilisation of the possibilities offered by military geography
explained the eventual outcome of military operations. Arctic warfare is an important
research area with wider significance. Surprisingly, the literature on the topic is scant.
Keywords: Arctic warfare, the Winter War (1939–1940), northern operations, winter
tactics, forest fighting, military geography, terrain analysis
Introduction did not realize this fact until after the war
was in progress. The German troops which
“The features peculiar to the theater of were sent to Finland during World War II
operations in the Far North of Europe were not prepared for the special difficulties
have given the recent wars in the Finnish they encountered in combat in that trackless
area a character all their own. Terrain and wilderness, in the endless virgin forests, and
climate always have a decisive influence on during the long Arctic night. Only after
warfare. The tactical rules which had been paying dearly for their experiences did they
worked out on the basis of experiences become adjusted to the requirements of
in central European theaters of war and that theater” (Erfurth 1951, 19).
which are adapted to normal conditions General Erfurth was a German liaison
were applicable only to a limited extent in officer in the Finnish High Command
the cases of Karelia and Lapland. In many during the Continuation War (1941–1944),
respects warfare in the Arctic follows rules and his text confirms that the Wehrmacht
of its own. The German High Command soldiers stationed in Finland ignored military
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supply lines. The Finns could only contain The proper ability to conduct winter
the bridgehead by the end of the Winter operations depended on technical tests and
War with difficulty. experiments. The results of the Finnish
developmental activities were published
in Talvisotakäsikirja – T.S.K.K. (Winter
Logistics, shelter, clothing, Warfare Handbook) in 1928. The Finnish
weaponry and equipment Army, the Border Guards and the Civil
Guard Defence Corps had systematically
Logistical preparation and support were improved their capability to orienteer and
then the key military considerations in bivouac in a trackless wilderness. They had
winter operations. These could require an manufactured heated tents and portable box
up to 50% increase in supplies compared stoves, allowing the troops to operate in a
to summer operations. Diet and nutrition wintery forest for a sustained period of time.
requirements grew. Exposure to extreme In the Winter War the Finns, having secured
cold could cause accidental hypothermia, their own well-being, employed scorched
and soldiers could even freeze to death. earth tactics in the border areas thus leaving
Sometimes winter soldiers also risked the Red Army with no shelter. Their ability
dehydration, snow blindness and sunburn. to keep warm, wear dry and clean clothing
These dangers posed additional challenges and eat hot meals contributed to their
to logistical support units and field medical ability to maintain combat effectiveness all
care. year around. Finnish Army personnel were
The training program is worth studying provided with proper clothing and special
because it reveals the actual preparedness footwear to prevent frostbite. Garments
to conduct winter operations. It is were practical: they protected the soldiers
surprising that the Red Army that invaded against climatic factors by dressing in
Finnish territory in 1939 was not equally insulating and ventilated loose layers and
well prepared. Some of its units were used traditional tried and tested items, such
in summer uniforms. In contrast, the as Laplander’s beak boots. This way they
Finns had accepted the geographical could balance heat production, loss and
conditions as a basis for the war plans and moisture, protecting the skin and the body.
tactics, so equipment and training had been One of the basic principles of keeping
developed and purchased accordingly. All warm in winter clothing was avoidance of
Finnish conscripts, regardless of their role, overheating. Equipment had to be kept to a
underwent the winter training program minimum. Axes, billhooks and bucksaws of
designed to make everyone capable winter ideal sizes and light weight were constructed
fighters. The effectiveness of training is, to for military usage (Partanen, Pohjonen &
a large extent, an organizational and cultural Tuunainen 2007, 85–93).
matter. Therefore, it could be studied The Finnish Ar my did not favour
from a comparative viewpoint. The armies technological determinism. Instead it had
can, for example, be viewed as learning chosen not to overly rely on the mechanized
organizations. approach, and weapons were relatively
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low-tech, designed to offer reliability in Russians had also begun to deploy ski units.
adverse conditions. The battles in the When suppressing the Karelian uprising in
northern forests proved the usefulness of the beginning of the 1920s the Red Army
the Finnish made 9 mm Suomi submachine used ski troops. It is striking that in the
gun, ideal for combat at close range. Light Winter War very few Soviet soldiers could
mortars were also handy. The equipment ski. In the 1930s practically all the Finns
was winterized. Weapons needed proper could ski, and army personnel were trained
maintenance in the cold. The Soviets used to operate on and off skis.
petroleum lubricants that often jammed The Finns favoured economical cross-
their weapons. The Finns went for a country (Nordic) skiing but the skiing
mixture of alcohol and glycerine or none speed was to be kept low in cold weather to
at all. To avoid freezing, the weapons had avoid undue perspiration in order to keep
to be kept outside the warm shelter. Many the men fit for battle. The skis were fitted
technical devices had not been designed to with bindings without heel straps, allowing
operate in freezing temperatures. Special for quick dismounting (30 centimetres of
measures were taken because radio batteries snow was the limit for effective movement
froze easily. Radiators had to be filled with by a foot soldier). The Finnish skiers hauled
antifreeze, and vehicle engines needed to ahkios, the boat-hull deep snow toboggans
be started and kept running frequently to or sleds. Ahkios were utilized to evacuate
ensure their functioning in cold weather. the wounded, to transport munitions and
The men wore white camouflage suits and equipment, and as a firing platform for
equipment was painted white. machine guns. With pack horses the Finnish
Army duplicated the methods of farmers
and loggers. The horse-drawn sleighs
Movement on snow transported heavy arms and even artillery
pieces on sleighs. This provided them with
A researcher of Arctic warfare should place manoeuvrability in a trackless terrain. The
emphasis on movement. Mobility was the Winter War demonstrated that mechanized
main tactical principle of winter operations and armoured units tied to narrow unpaved
in the Arctic for the Finns. This is logical gravel roads became a burden to the Red
as the wide and empty spaces of the Army. Vehicular traffic was not possible
Arctic regions permit almost unrestricted along slippery icy roads in winter without
manoeuvre and movement for those troops clearing the roads first (even several times
that possess over-snow mobility. a day after blizzards).
There is a long tradition of military skiing
in the Nordic countries and Russia. In an
attempt to indoctrinate them, all Finnish
conscripts of the interwar period were told
about the peasant ski troops enveloping a
much large Russian foe in March 1555 at
Joutselkä. By the Great Northern War the
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in order to hurt the Soviet troops suffering counterfactual approach could turn out to
from the effects of cold. The Finns counted be merely speculative reasoning.
that combat fatigue due to cold associated A student of Arctic warfare can benefit
with hunger and sleep deprivation as a from organizational theory. Knowledge
result of continuous harassment would transfer has proved a useful concept in
slacken Red Army discipline and could lead investigating the activities and influence of
to apathy. Controlled by fear, however, very a group of some 20 ex-Finnish officers who
few besieged Soviet soldiers surrendered joined the US Army in 1947 as enlisted men.
(Tynkkynen 1996; Tuunainen 2006, 107– At first, they were assigned as cross-country
108; Tuunainen 2013, 121–147). ski instructors but at the same time they also
The Finnish mottis bear a resemblance developed winter equipment based on the
to a German tactical innovation, the Finnish models and lectured about winter
storm troop tactics of the Great War. In tactics. These former Finnish officers
determining what factors explain the speed disseminated their know-how by serving
of this adoption process, my research has in various military schools, planning winter
been informed by Everett M. Rogers’s book exercises and acting as umpires in them.
Diffusion of Innovations, whose theory has They revised the US Army and US Marine
proved a useful interpretive framework to Corps cold weather and Arctic manuals.
regard the Finns as adopters of German The Finns tried, in vain, to argue that Arctic
military innovation. I was able to identify operations are separate from mountain
the various channels through which ideas operations, and that troops should receive
were transmitted since 1915 and finally special training for these. Their leader,
tested in motti battles in early 1940. As the Colonel Alpo K. Marttinen, remarked to
Finns considered manpower as their most The New York Herald Tribune in late 1951
important resource in costly frontal attacks, on the possibilities of training US soldiers
they found the storm troop tactics “cost- as “acceptable Arctic fighters” in eight
effective” (Tuunainen 2008). weeks. He said: “If the weather dropped
Finnish tactics were, indeed, a European from twenty to forty degrees below, the
military art. Although strongly influenced only problem a (Finnish) commander had
by Swedes and Germans, the Finnish was whether to change the ski wax” (The
officers applied general principles to the New York Herald Tribune, December
Finnish conditions. Yet was this unique to 1951). Finnish winter war expertise was
Finland? A Swedish volunteer brigade was incorporated into US-British-Canadian
in charge of a quiet front in Lapland in early cold weather doctrines. The US manuals
1940. It is, however, not certain that the were re-written only after 60 years but they
Swedish Army that was practically equally still retain much of the Finnish content
well prepared and accustomed to a similar (Tuunainen 2012, 205–280).
terrain and weather could have fought with The Finns could not use similar tactics
similar effectiveness in the Winter War as everywhere. The areas of operation were
the Finnish Army did. It is impossible to different in terms of military geography.
say for sure in hindsight, and this kind of The Finns had accurately predicted that
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the Karelian Isthmus, between the Gulf were responsible for preventing casualties
of Finland and Lake Ladoga, would be the to frostbite. This was not always necessary
location of the main Soviet thrust, because since Finland was an agrarian nation in
it was closest to Leningrad and the terrain the 1930s. Most of the civilian soldiers of
was suitable for tanks. The nature of the its reservist army were physically fit for
war there would be trench warfare and frontline duty, and life at the fronts was not
attrition. In all sectors the Finns enjoyed all that different from forest work, a very
the advantages of the interior lines of common source of additional income for
operations and the space to manoeuvre. the farmers in the wintertime. The soldiers
were familiar with the terrain and weather
conditions, and could protect themselves
Peculiarities of command against the cold. Winter often increased
and control in winter march times but the leaders were ordered to
make sure that no troops were left exposed
T h e l i m i t a t i o n s p o s e d by m i l i t a r y to the effects of cold weather, in particular
geographical factors – the weather, the the wind-chill factor, for extended periods
terrain and the daylight-darkness cycle – of time. This was not always possible, and
influenced the decisions of Finnish military the Finns also occasionally suffered non-
commanders. It is vital to examine how battle casualties.
commanders and staff took the effects of A psychohistorical approach could be
environment into consideration in their useful here as forest fighting has a significant
planning and decision-making processes. psychological dimension (Clayton 2012, xv).
Neither aerial reconnaissance nor maps The Ukrainians participating in the Winter
revealed the hidden features and real War even feared the snowy forests of the
trafficability of the terrain in winter. Winter North. The environment was not the only
conditions also led to serious frictions, or, demoralizing factor for them. The Finnish
in Clausewitzian terminology, “the fog of ski troops employing hit-and-run tactics
war”. The key was how to cope with it added to these sentiments and the Soviet
(Lowry 2012; Tuunainen 2011b, 40). soldiers came to call them The White Death
Cold weather puts additional mental (Russ. Belaya Smert; Tuunainen 2011a,
strain on individual soldiers. Close 240–241). The Finns had a long history of
attention should be paid to factors such living in harmony with nature. They did not
as the command culture and mentality. view the forests as a hostile environment
In the study of wartime sociological and but rather as a source of protection. This
psychological phenomena one needs is in striking contrast to German idea of
to incorporate human factors, such as forests as a military nuisance (Tuunainen
motivation and morale. Mental stamina 2008, 48).
and fortitude should be evaluated as the A typical conceptual framework in
quality of individual soldiers is critical to military history has been the “Great Man”
fighting in the cold. The buddy system was approach. This focus on generalship does
in place in the Finnish Army but the leaders not apply to the Finnish case. The Winter
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War was largely fought at the infantry to reconstruct and interpret the actual
company level. Large battle formations events as seen through the eyes of a
could not operate in forests because the military commander and the geographical
terrain separated them, and they were easily limitations and opportunities he faced when
in disarray. This made the coordinated action appraising the situation and making his
of larger units difficult. To study small-unit decisions at the time. OCOKA refers to
action one can draw upon a theoretical base the elements of a battle plan and involves
and methodology from social sciences, and deliberation of trafficability effects. The
apply, for example, various small group acronym stands for: O = observation and
theories and theories of group solidarity fields of fire, C = cover and concealment,
to assist in explaining motivation. The O = obstacles, K = key terrain, and A
endurance and sustainability of the Finnish = avenues of approach or withdrawal
soldiers in the Winter War may also be (Vicksburg National Military Park: Cultural
explained by the strong social cohesion of Landscape Report 2009, 243–245).
the homogenous Finnish culture. Field of fire refers to an area that has a
The Finnish Army command was also direct line of sight that a weapon may cover
subject to external influences. The most or lay effective fire from a given position
important command principle was the within its range. It is related to observation.
German system of decentralized command The land which cannot be observed or fired
(Auftragstaktik). With these mission- upon is dead space or ground. Observation
type orders small unit leaders (and even and fields of fire are affected by contour
soldiers) were delegated powers to exhibit and vegetation. While the treeless Arctic
their initiative and independent action. is open terrain, in subarctic boreal forests
The use of common sense and flexibility visibility is extremely limited, particularly
were encouraged, as were “bottom-up” in old growth spruce forests. Even though
improvisations, making way for the history the long spells of darkness restrict visibility
from below approach. The Finnish military and observation capabilities, moonlight
leaders made use of German tactical over a snowy terrain produces a contrary
concepts and ideas but applied them to the effect. The accuracy of fire is affected
local forest conditions (Tuunainen 2010, by foliage. The branches cause bullets
66–67). to ricochet. The use of hand grenades
Terrain analysis is the process of analysing became complicated making engagements
a geographical area to determine the effect close-quarter. The artillery shells usually
and hindrance of natural and manmade detonated in tree trunks when the shell
features on military operations. The burst was directed downwards. In the
OCOKA system of Western armies is a Finnish-Russian border areas there were
good analytical tool that can be developed many tree-covered hills. The higher ground
into a descriptive theory. With an awareness attracted fire but enabled good observation,
of the dangers of anachronism, OCOKA although it was impossible to see into the
terrain analysis can be applied to a specific forests between the hills.
historical case as it allows the researcher
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Boreal forests could provide excellent Key terrain is an area the control of
concealment and thus protection from which gives one side a significant advantage
enemy observation and surveillance. Cover over the other. Normally it could be a
is protection against enemy fire, both direct high ground, a river crossing or a bridge,
and from shelling. Camouflage (in winter mountain pass or road junction. In
white) can hide men and equipment, help Arctic regions road networks (lines of
to prevent the detection of hidden units communication or “life lines”) and villages
and thus minimize casualties. In forests and urban areas are few, and thus the most
attackers could achieve surprise, which important terrain features such as the lack
often guaranteed their success. This was of adequate shelter in winter may lead
helped by the long periods of darkness to non-combat casualties and reduce the
typical for the northern winter. impact of firepower. These added logistical
Snow and ice are natural obstacles requirements dictated the key terrain. A
that might prevent, restrict, divert, or dense wood or river network could also
delay military movement. There are also be designated a key terrain if it anchored
manmade terrain features, existing or the flank of a battle line. Ice roads to
reinforcing, that determine the degree to facilitate off-road movement could also be
which a certain terrain is restricted. Swamps constructed along lakes and rivers when the
(or other wet surfaces), woods, and rivers ice was thick enough.
that already exist on the battlefield are not An avenue of approach is a relatively
real obstacles in winter. Heavy snow cover unobstructed ground route that leads to
impedes movement but as the ground an objective or key terrain. These could be
and waters freeze in winter the battlefield lines of communication and supply such as
becomes larger. Certain terrain might be roads, rail lines, or rivers. A proper avenue
unfavourable. Yet hardly any terrain is of approach must allow rapid movement
totally impassable. Urban areas are existing all along its length. In the north avenues
cultural obstacles that slow down military of approach were mainly man-made roads
action. The enemy movement could be or trails. Skis aided movement but the
stopped, slowed down, or controlled emphasis was on trail breaking to ensure
(diverted) by placing reinforcing obstacles that the troops were not road-bound.
such as earthworks, barriers and abattis.
Permafrost might complicate digging in.
Yet if supported by mines, barbed wire A note on sources
and booby traps they require much effort
to clear. Flooding is another useful method Literature on the topic is scant. Thus
of creating obstacles, also in winter. For a historiog raphical approach is not
example, letting additional water onto worthwhile. The sources for the study
the ice of a lake was an effective factor in of Arctic warfare (or military action in
slowing down the advance of infantry units, the northern forests) are abundant yet
as keeping one’s feet dry and warm was scattered. Primary unpublished sources
essential to combat effectiveness. include official documents and personal
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files. Most of the relevant archival sources, on site. The seasons do matter: The best
such as training and operational planning time to visit the battlefields would be winter.
documents, orders, various after-action This way the researcher could avoid the
and other reports and correspondence impact of undergrowth on visibility. On
are deposited in the Finnish National the other hand, the landscapes of war, if
Archives (Kansallisarkisto). War diaries are still uninhabited, could look quite different
all available online. In Finland, the archival after 75 years. It would, therefore, be wise
system, some museums and historical to compare the actual wartime archival
societies hold oral history transcripts. The documents, photographs and maps with
papers of individual actors could prove current images and cartography. In this GIS
useful since individuals, not organizations, might also prove useful.
developed the art of war and winter
techniques. These persons might also have
published memoirs. Conclusion
The study of military art is close to the
history of ideas and intellectual history. Warfare in the north has been, as we have
Military instructional literature and the seen, geographic in nature. The Finnish
articles and debates published in military experience from World War II clearly
professional magazines are among the shows how distinct weather and terrain
relevant sources. significantly affected military operations.
The most important secondary published Therefore it is important to incorporate
sources are winter warfare manuals, some military geographical considerations
guidebooks, and regulations. Close reading into the study of Arctic warfare. A
of this instructional literature is revealing as geographical perspective can even act as an
it provides doctrinal guidance (on tactical overall research framework. Mountain and
doctrine and how to take the effects of winter warfare have often been considered
the environment into consideration) and is common fields of historical inquiry. This
produced to disseminate codified explicit does not, however, apply to the Finnish
knowledge. In Finland, however, manuals case. Winter combat practiced in Finland
were considered as a basis for application has essentially been sub-Arctic forest
rather than as set rules and methods. fighting. The illustrative examples discussed
Non-textual sources and remains might above suggest that the terrain and weather
prove useful. Visiting the battlefields could conditions of the far north of Europe and
give the researcher additional insights into the Finnish-Russian border area had, indeed
the conditions and what the troops could in a military sense, a character of their own.
or could not see and do in that specific kind Even though it is possible to draw limited
of terrain. The OCOKA terrain analysis parallels and make some generalizations
– indicating the connection between the based on the Winter War, it is fair to say
terrain and features of the battlefield that the study of Arctic warfare is a highly
landscape and the military tactics employed context-related field.
by army commanders – could be conducted
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