1

RUNNING HEAD: WOMEN DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

WOMEN ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL

PERFORMANCE: A META-ANALYSIS

Kris Byron
Georgia State University
J. Mack Robinson College of Business
Department of Managerial Sciences
Atlanta, GA 30302-4014 USA
+1-404-413-7531 phone
+1-404-413-7571 fax
kbyron@gsu.edu

Corinne Post (corresponding author)

Lehigh University
College of Business and Economics
621 Taylor Street
Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
+1-610.758-5882 phone
+1-610-758-6941 fax
cgp208@lehigh.edu

Acknowledgments: Both authors contributed equally to this article. We are indebted to Amy
Hillman—as well as the associate editor Ruth Aguilera and three anonymous reviewers on this
paper--for advice and feedback on earlier versions of this work. We also appreciate the
comments received from presentations at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Academy of
Management.
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ABSTRACT

Manuscript Type: Review

Research Question: Whether and how women directors influence firms’ engagement in socially
responsible business practices and social reputation among diverse stakeholders is unclear due to
conflicting empirical evidence, the lack of a coherent theory linking these variables, and
inattention to the national contexts in which these relationships occurs.

Research Findings: Results from our meta-analysis of 87 independent samples suggest that,
while generally positive, the female board representation–social performance relationship is even
more positive in national contexts when boards may be more motivated to draw on the resources
that women directors bring to a board (i.e., among firms operating in countries with stronger
shareholder protections) and in contexts where intra-board power distribution may be more
balanced (i.e., in countries with higher gender parity).

Theoretical Implications: Future studies should more attentively examine how firms’
institutional contexts enhance or mitigate the relationship between women’s representation on
boards and corporate social performance. Our findings also highlight the need for a
comprehensive understanding of the social performance-related knowledge, perspectives, and
values that men and women bring to boards.

Practitioner/ Policy Implications: Our results suggest that, to enhance any benefits of diversity
for corporate social performance, efforts be directed at holding boards more accountable toward
diverse stakeholders and improving the status of women in society and in the workforce.

KEYWORDS: Corporate Governance; Board of Directors; Corporate Social Responsibility;

Diversity; Women
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Social issues, such as climate change, natural resource challenges, social inclusion, and

gender parity, are among the most pressing global challenges facing 21st century economic actors

(World Economic Forum, 2014). Corporate governance may considerably influence firms’

impact on such social issues, for example, when boards of directors weigh in on decisions

directly or indirectly affecting corporate social performance (Maon, Lindgreen & Swaen, 2009).

In addition to addressing social issues, corporate social performance is increasingly

perceived as a competitive advantage for firms (McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006; Porter &

Kramer, 2006). Corporate social performance is positively associated with organizational

commitment (Brammer, Millington & Rayton, 2007), employee satisfaction (Bauman & Skitka,

2012), cost and risk reduction, perceived legitimacy, and stakeholder satisfaction (Carroll, 1999)

-- all of which likely indirectly contribute to the bottom line. This may explain why meta-

analytic evidence finds that corporate social performance contributes to firms’ financial

performance (Lu, Chau, Wang & Pan, 2014; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Wood, 2010).

Not surprisingly then, boards of directors -- and corporate governance scholars -- have

increasingly directed their attention to finding ways to increase corporate social performance

(Kakabadse, 2007; Rahim, 2012). One oft-recommended solution is to increase the number of

women on boards (Catalyst, 2011; Credit Suisse, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2013) – based on the

idea that the experience and values of female directors may positively impact corporate social

responsibility and reputation (Adams, Haan, Terjesen & Ees, 2015; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh,

2009). Yet, the results from empirical studies examining a possible link between board gender

diversity and corporate social performance are mixed: some studies have found a positive

relationship (e.g., Post, Rahman & Rubow, 2011; Skaggs, Stainback & Duncan, 2012); others

have found a negative or null relationship (e.g., Rao, Tilt & Lester, 2012; Rodriguez-Dominguez,
 4

Gallego-Alvarez & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009).

One of the reasons that findings across studies may vary is that studies tend to focus on

firms from a single country. And, as the institution-based view suggests (Aguilera & Jackson,

2003; Aguilera, Williams, Conley & Rupp, 2006; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009), country-

level institutions may influence the extent to which female directors can and do influence

corporate social performance. In line with Adams and her colleagues (2015), who note that

diversity is not equally important in all contexts, we argue that country-level institutions may

influence the strength of the relationship between diversity (e.g., women on boards) and firm

outcomes (e.g., corporate social performance). A multi-country analysis, such as the present

meta-analysis, allows us to ascertain the true variability in the relationship between factors that

may be influenced by the same country-level conditions (Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009).

The purpose of the present study is to explain and reconcile mixed results from mostly

single-country firm samples through meta-analysis – a method that allows us to statistically

aggregate results from existing research. We draw on Post & Byron’s (2015) theoretical

framework, which suggests that the relationship between female representation on boards and

firm outcomes is contingent on the extent to which boards are motivated and able to make full

use of all directors’ knowledge, experiences, and values. Briefly, results from our meta-analysis

of 87 independent samples from over 20 countries suggest that the female board representation–

social performance relationship is generally positive, and even more positive in conditions when

boards may be more motivated to draw on the resources that women directors bring to a board

(i.e., among firms operating in countries with stronger shareholder protections) and in conditions

where intra-board power distribution may be more balanced (i.e., in countries with higher gender

parity). The mean effect size relating female board representation and social performance is
 5

approximately five-fold larger than the one associating women on boards with firm financial

performance, presumably because boards have more control over firms’ social performance than

over firms’ financial performance.

Our study offers four novel extensions to theory and research on board composition.

First, drawing on and complementing Post and Byron (2015)’s meta-analysis of female board

representation and firm financial performance, we theorize on the influence of female board

representation on corporate social performance, a firm-level outcome over which directors have

more direct control and that aligns more closely with the qualities women may bring to boards.

Second, we examine how country characteristics moderate the female board representation--firm

social performance relationship. While we have learned a great deal about how country

characteristics and institutions shape female board representation (de Cabo, Gimeno & Nieto,

2012; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Seierstad & Opsahl, 2011; Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz,

2014; Terjesen & Singh, 2008), this study examines the moderating influence of country-level

factors on the relationship between women on boards and social performance. As a third, more

general contribution, while this study considers a different firm-level outcome than Post & Byron

(2015), it nevertheless affords the opportunity to test the theoretical premise of their theoretical

model with a substantially different sample of studies that includes countries not represented in

Post & Byron (2015). Finally, by statistically aggregating 87 samples from 84 studies conducted

in over 20 countries, we detect robust effects between female board representation and firms’

social performance that may offer practical and theoretical implications. Only a systematic

comparison of these studies can account for difference in their study designs and methods, and,

more generally, in the national context in which they were conducted (Adams, Haan, Terjesen &

Ees, 2015). Given the increasing interest in both board diversity and corporate social
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performance, this study offers multiple suggestions for new avenues of research.

The rest of this article is organized into five sections. In the next two sections, we

develop the theoretical arguments leading up to our hypotheses for main and moderating effects.

In the two subsequent sections, we detail our method and the meta-analytical results. In the final

section, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.

WOMEN ON BOARDS: COGNITIVE FRAMES FOR FIRM SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

Conforming with existing literature, we define corporate social performance broadly as

encompassing principles, processes, and outcomes that relate to an organization’s societal

relationships (Wood, 1991: 693). Drawing on Orlitzky et al.’s (2003) categorization, we consider

firms to exhibit social performance when they engage in socially responsible business practices

(e.g., environmental responsibility, philanthropy) (referred to here as corporate social

responsibility) and when they generate a positive reputation among stakeholders (e.g., listed on a

reputation-based “most ethical” lists) (referred to as social reputation).

A variety of theories have been evoked to explain why and how women on corporate

boards and various firm-level outcomes are associated. Like Post and Byron (2015), we draw on

upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) to frame this meta-analysis.

Upper echelons theory (UET) posits that directors’ cognitive frames – due to their prior

knowledge, experiences, and values -- inform strategic decision-making and, ultimately,

corporate strategy. UET provides an ideal organizing framework for this meta-analysis because it

suggests that the cognitive frame composition of a board is determined, in part, by how many

women are on it, based on evidence suggesting that women and men tend to bring different

knowledge, experiences, and values to the boardroom. Therefore, one may expect the decisions

of boards around corporate social responsibility to vary as a function of boards’ gender

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composition. In addition, upper echelons theorists have long called for increased consideration of

factors that may moderate the influence of upper echelons (and their cognitive frames) on firm

outcomes (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) and our study responds to that call.

Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Social Performance

While Post and Byron (2015) argued for and found meta-analytical evidence for a

positive relationship between female board representation and some aspects of firm financial

performance, they also suggested that female board representation is likely to be more directly

associated with other strategic decisions and outcomes that boards can influence more easily and

readily than firm financial outcomes. This study builds on that suggestion and focuses on

corporate social performance in relationship to female board representation. We expect that a

greater representation of women on boards is likely to be associated with greater consideration of

social responsibility in board deliberations because research suggests that there are consistent

gender differences in knowledge, experience, and values related to social performance.

First, female directors tend to have values that are more aligned with corporate social

performance. Developmental psychologists have suggested that, individual differences

notwithstanding, gender socialization promotes gender differences in moral reasoning

(Chodorow, 1974), with women, as compared to men, feeling a higher responsibility to use care

reasoning (i.e., feeling responsible for others’ well-being and for avoiding harm) (Gilligan,

1982). Meta-analyses support these contentions as they find small but consistent evidence of sex

differences in moral orientation (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000) and ethical attitudes (Borkowski &

Ugras, 1998). Further, compared to men, women tend to be more concerned about social

performance issues (Backhaus, Stone & Heiner, 2002). More recently, in a survey of directors’

values, Adams and Funk (2012) found women directors to be systematically more benevolent
 8

and inclusive than their men counterparts.

Second, female directors bring experiences and knowledge to the board, that, when

voiced and contemplated, may help boards consider the implications of strategic decisions for a

wider range of corporate stakeholders. Research shows that women directors are less likely to

have a business background, are more interested in philanthropic and community service

activities, and are more likely to be community influencers than men directors (Hillman,

Cannella & Harris, 2002; Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe, 2008) and thus may “provide non-

business perspectives on issues, problems, and ideas as well as expertise about and influence

with powerful groups in the community” (Hillman, Cannella & Harris, 2002: 749). Women

directors are also more likely to hold advanced degrees (Hillman, Cannella & Harris, 2002;

Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe, 2008) and, research suggests individuals with advanced degrees

tend to be more concerned with corporate social responsibility issues (Elm, Kennedy & Lawton,

2001; Rest & Narvaez, 1994), presumably because their education encourages them to develop

broader perspectives and think of issues from multiple viewpoints.

Due to the empirical evidence regarding women’s and, particularly, women directors’

knowledge, experience, and values as they relate to social responsibility and because directors’

cognitive frames inform strategic decision-making, we propose that women’s representation on

boards will be positively associated with the boards’ consideration of social performance issues.

As shown in Figure 1, we hypothesize that women’s board representation is positively related to

CSP due to the underlying theoretical link (depicted in the dashed oval) between board cognitive

frame diversity and greater consideration of firm social performance issues.

Hypothesis 1: Women’s representation on firms’ boards is positively related to corporate

social performance.
------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
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------------------------
COUNTRY-LEVEL MODERATORS OF THE WOMEN’S BOARD REPRESENTATION

-- CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP

It is unlikely that the representation of women on boards will uniformly enhance

corporate social performance across all contexts – thus we investigate two theoretically-derived

country-level moderators of the women’s board representation-corporate social performance

relationship. Specifically, UET proposes two conceptual moderators relevant to the present

study: (1) board behavioral integration, the extent to which board members engage in “mutual

and collective interaction” (Hambrick, 2007: 336), and (2) intra-board power distribution, the

extent to which the relative power of directors on a board is balanced (Finkelstein & Mooney,

2003; Hambrick, 2007). Although a growing body of work supports the validity of these

conceptual moderators in other domains (e.g., Boone & Hendriks, 2009; Carpenter, 2002; Ling

& Kellermanns, 2010; Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin & Dino, 2005), they have not been considered in

studies relating women’s board representation and firms’ social performance. We contend that

both of these conceptual moderators may explain the conditions in which women’s

representation on boards is more or less likely to influence corporate social performance and

may, therefore, help explain why extant empirical results have been mixed.

We argue that macro-environmental factors (i.e., charactersitics of a particular national

context) may create conditions that influence board behavioral integration and intra-board

power distribution. UET theory conceives of board behavioral integration and intra-board power

distribtion as board-level micro-processes and theorizes on various factors that influence them,

including the firm’s environment (e.g., industry structure, market growth) (e.g., Simsek, Veiga,

Lubatkin & Dino, 2005). Drawing on conceptual work linking board characteristics and firm

outcomes through micro-level broad processes (Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni & Viganò, 2011), we
 10

argue here that country-level factors also influence micro-processes on boards.

To be clear, we are not arguing that macro-environmental factors are proxies for board

behavioral integration and intra-board power distribution but rather (as Figure 1 illustrates) that

there are macro-environmental conditions that influence board behavioral integration and intra-

board power distribution. Our approach reflects the institution-based view that country-level

institutions shape the relationship between firm governance characteristics and firm outcomes

(van Essen, Heugens, Otten & van Oosterhout, 2012) in ways that can only be elucidated with

cross-country studies (Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009). In this respect, a multi-country meta-

analysis is an especially advantageous study design as it enables us to explore macro-

environmental factors by drawing on studies conducted in a large variety of national contexts.

Shareholder Protection Strength Increases Board Behavioral Integration

Groups that are more motivated to accurately understand and address issues they face

tend to consider more information, elaborate more on new or unique information, and,

ultimately, make better decisions (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe & Euwema, 2006; Scholten, Van

Knippenberg, Nijstad & De Dreu, 2007). Similarly, we expect boards to engage in behavioral

integration when members are motivated to do so. As a country-level factor, shareholder

protections are likely to increase board behavioral integration –motivating boards to engage,

consider, and integrate multiple views regarding social responsibility into their decisions.

We expect that, in countries with stronger shareholder protections (such as when

directors may be held personally liable for not upholding their fiduciary responsibility), boards

will be more motivated to engage in behavioral integration, that is, to seriously consider the

varied knowledge and perspectives of all directors (for example, around social responsibility

issues). Stronger shareholder protections are likely to motivate boards to seek, consider, and
 11

integrate divergent knowledge, information, and values held by board members (Post & Byron,

2015). As shown in Figure 1, among studies of firms in countries with stronger shareholder

protections, women’s board representation is likely to be more positively related to corporate

social performance because shareholder protections motivate boards to consider and integrate

divergent views that advocate for socially responsible behavior in their decision-making process.

Hypothesis 2: The relationship between women’s representation on boards and corporate

social performance is moderated by shareholder protection strength. Specifically, the
relationship is more positive among studies conducted in countries with stronger
shareholder protections.

Gender Parity Increases Intra-Board Power Distribution

The greater relative power some directors have on a board gives their voices more weight

and may bias the decisions and actions of the entire board (Finkelstein, 1992). Powerful board

members tend to dominate board deliberation and make it more difficult for other voices to be

heard (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). However, when the relative power of directors is more

balanced, it is more likely that all voices on a board will contribute to the decision-making

process – thus allowing the characteristics of the board as a whole to have a stronger influence

on strategic actions and performance (Hambrick, 2007). The power distribution between men

and women directors is likely to be biased towards men, because, in general, men tend to be

more powerful than women. Relative to men, women hold fewer top management and executive

positions, accumulate less executive experience, are perceived to be less influential, and are less

likely to have resources to invest in equity ownership (e.g., Burgess & Fallon, 2003; Ragins &

Sundstrom, 1989; Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999; Rudman & Glick, 2012;

Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe, 2008; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 2011). However, intra-board

power distribution is not only a function of objective differences in male and female directors’

human capital and equity ownership. Institutional and social contexts also frame power dynamics
 12

between men and women (Ridgeway, 2009). In societies with greater gender gaps in terms of

education, wages, health, and political influence, men tend to exploit the higher status this

confers on them, for example by exercising more say in decision-making (Glick & Fiske, 1999).

We hypothesize that the relationship between women’s representation on boards and

corporate social performance is more positive among studies conducted in countries where

gender parity is higher, because, in those contexts, women directors are more likely to possess

the structural, prestige, expert, and ownership power that will provide them with voice in the

boardroom (Dalton & Dalton, 2010; Harrigan, 1981; Wright, Baxter & Birkelund, 1995). In

addition, in societies in which women and men are more similar in terms of educational, work,

health, and political opportunity and outcomes, gender dynamics in communication and

decision-making processes in small group contexts (e.g., boardrooms) are likely to improve

(Ridgeway, 2009). Like formal institutions, informal institutions, such as ideologies, influence

the behaviors and cognitions of social actors both inside and outside a firm (Aguilera & Jackson,

2003). By influencing actors and their relationships in national contexts, gender parity can

therefore be conceived of as an informal institution that may moderate the relationship between

female board representation and CSP. In countries with greater gender parity, intra-board gender

power distribution will be more balanced, giving women and their social responsibility values,

knowledge, and experience more voice in strategic decision-making. As shown in Figure 1, we

expect that the relationship between women’s representation on boards and corporate social

performance is more positive among studies conducted where gender parity is greater because

gender parity is likely to increase intra-board power distribution.

Hypothesis 3: The relationship between women’s representation on board and corporate

social performance is moderated by gender parity. Specifically, the relationship is more
positive among studies conducted in countries with higher gender parity.
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METHOD

Criteria for Inclusion

This analysis focuses on studies that examined the relationship between women’s

representation on boards of directors and firms’ corporate social performance (CSP). To be

included, studies were published or, if unpublished, completed by July 2015, in the English

language. They included a standardized effect size, included data that could be used to calculate

an effect size appropriate for a meta-analysis, or provided an appropriate effect size upon request

for the relationship between women’s board representation and one or more measures of CSP

(Bergh, Aguinis, Heavey, Ketchen, et al., in press). We excluded studies that combined gender

with other aspects of diversity such as race in their board diversity measure (e.g., Kabongo,

Chang & Li, 2013; Wang & Coffey, 1992), considered non-profit firms (e.g., Mori, Golesorkhi,

Randøy & Hermes, 2015), or were not firm-level (e.g., Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994).

Search Strategy and Search Results

First, we searched two databases, ABI Inform Global and JSTOR, using the search terms,

gender, female, women, diversity, heterogeneity, or composition combined with board, directors,

or governance, and reviewed 3,308 retrieved citations. Second, we reviewed the reference lists of

numerous review articles of either board composition or corporate social performance (e.g.,

Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 1998; Deutsch, 2005; Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013; Rao &

Tilt, in press; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). Third, we searched the tables of contents of

Academy of Management Journal, Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance: An

International Review, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Management, Journal of

Management Studies, and Strategic Management Journal for the years that the respective journal

was published between January 1989 and July 2015. Fourth, we manually searched the reference
 14

lists of studies meeting the inclusion criteria. Lastly, we took additional steps to locate

unpublished studies and to, more generally, help to overcome the tendency for statistically

significant results to be overrepresented among published studies: We sent emails to 12

prominent authors in this field and to four listservs for divisions of the Academy of Management

(i.e., GDO, BPS, SIM, and OB), and searched the SSRN website through July 2015.

Eighty-four studies met the criteria for inclusion in this meta-analysis; these studies are

listed in the appendix and include 71 journal articles, 4 working papers, 4 conference papers, 4

theses or dissertations, and 1 technical report. Because two studies had multiple independent

samples, the 84 studies include 87 independent samples. In total, these studies have a combined

sample size consisting of 26,710 firms (although some of these firms may be represented

multiple times such as when studies rely on populations such as the Fortune 500). As shown in

Table 1, the meta-analysis includes studies of firms from more than 20 different countries.

------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------
Coding of Variables

Before each author coded studies independently, we confirmed with a sample of 25

percent of the studies we both coded that we had satisfactory interrater agreement or reliability

(i.e., kappa (κ) or intraclass correlation (r1) exceeding 0.85). We resolved any disagreements in

our coding through discussion until we reached consensus. While coding, we established and

applied a number of decision rules to be both conservative and consistent. For example, we

recorded the lowest number when a study gave a range for the sample size and recorded the

number of firms rather than the number of firm years when studies included multiple firm years.

Primary Study Variables

Women’s Representation on Boards. Studies in our sample measured women’s board

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representation in several ways. Most notably, women’s board representation was measured with

proportional measures such as the percent of women on the board or diversity measures (e.g., the

Blau index) and with non-proportional measures such as the number of women on the board or

the presence of x number of women. Many studies included multiple measures of women’s board

representation (such as number and percent), and we entered each of the associated effect sizes.

(Although not shown, we found that whether female board representation was measured

proportionally or not was not a significant moderator.) In addition, one study presented effect

sizes for both executive and non-executive directors (Bond, Harrigan & Slaughter, 2014), both of

which were entered, and one study presented an effect size for non-executive directors only

(Khan, 2010). Lastly, for countries with dual board systems, women’s board representation refers

to the supervisory board (e.g., Wieland & Flavel, 2014).

Corporate Social Performance. The studies in this meta-analysis used different

measures of corporate social performance. Corresponding to Orlitzky et al.’s (2003) “social

audits, CSP processes, and observable outcomes” measurement category, corporate social

responsibility includes both general and more specific results-based measures: (1) CSR ratings,

usually based on social audits or disclosures (e.g., KLD ratings); (2) workforce diversity

including measures such as the percent of employees, managers, or top managers who were

women; (3) environmental responsibility including ratings or disclosures of CSR that were

focused on environmental responsibility and environmentally responsible firm behavior (e.g.,

reduction of harmful emissions); (4) philanthropy including measures of charitable giving, and

(5) codes of ethics including the existence or extensiveness of a firm’s code of ethics. (Although

not shown, we found that the type of CSR measure was not a significant moderator.)

Corresponding to Orlitzky et al.’s (2003) “reputation ratings” category, social reputation

 16

includes both broad (e.g., on a most admired companies list or firm reputation ratings) and more

specific (e.g., on a most ethical companies list) reputational measures of social performance.

Moderators

Table 1 details the values for each country-level moderator. As shown, we were unable to

code 10 studies with multi-country firm samples.

Shareholder Protection Strength. We coded studies in terms of shareholder protection

strength for the country where the firms in the study were located because countries vary in the

extent to which they afford, have codified, and enforce shareholder protections (La Porta, López

de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). We used The World Bank’s (World Bank, 2013) strength

of investor protection index, which is comprised of three dimensions of investor protections: (1)

transparency of related-party transactions, (2) liability for director self-dealing, and (3) ease of

shareholder suits for director misconduct. For the studies in our meta-analysis, the range is 5

(i.e., China, Germany, Kenya, and Spain) to 8.7 (i.e., Canada and Malaysia) such that higher

scores indicate greater shareholder protections. The methodology of this index is based on

Djankov et al.’s (2008) methodology but, unlike other similar indices that include only a sub-set

of countries (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, López de Silanes,

Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Spamann, 2010), the World Bank’s index includes all countries.

Gender Parity. Because countries vary in how much they offer women equal access to

resources and opportunities (Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi, 2012), we coded studies in terms of the

gender parity score of the country where the firms are located. We used The World Economic

Forum’s Global Gender Gap score (Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi, 2012), which concerns gender

equality in terms of economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and

political empowerment. In theory, the score ranges from 0 (no equality) to 1 (equality), however,
 17

the actual range among all countries is .5054 (i.e., Yemen) to .8640 (i.e., Iceland). For the studies

in our meta-analysis, the range is .6015 (i.e., Turkey) to .8451 (i.e., Finland).

Calculating the Effect Size

We computed the correlation for each study from correlations, t values, means, and

standard deviations, or events for different conditions (e.g., firms with no women on the board

and firms with at least one woman on the board on a “most ethical” firms list). Because some

studies included more than one measure of women’s board representation (e.g., number,

percent), more than one measure of CSP, or multiple time periods, we entered 209 effect sizes in

total. However, because the formulae used in this meta-analysis require that the studies used are

statistically independent, we used a shifting unit of analysis approach to avoid violating the

assumption of independence while also allowing for the retention of as much data as possible

from each study (Cooper, 1998). We combined effect sizes within a sample to the extent possible

for each analysis. For example, we combined all measures or time periods from the same study

to avoid losing information or violating the assumption of independence. However, if the effect

sizes within a sample differed in terms of a category or moderator, then they were kept separate

and entered into each sub-group analysis in later analyses. To further avoid violating the

assumption of independence, we included the results from the dataset only once when multiple

studies reported on the same dataset. To identify possible duplicate datasets, we used the

technique outlined by Wood (2008) and also scrutinized the data for duplicate datasets by

examining the studies by the source (e.g., database, list, or stock exchange) of the data.

Analysis Strategy

In evaluating the main effects in this meta-analysis, we calculated random-effects

analyses using meta-analysis macros for SPSS (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2005). In this
 18

method, each effect size is weighted by its inverse within-study variance and the between-studies

variance (τ2). We chose random-effects models because (1) our analyses suggest that the studies

included in our analysis are not homogenous and a random-effects model is appropriate to this

situation; and (2) we wanted to make inferences that extend beyond the studies included in the

analysis, and a random-effects model allows for generalization to a wider population of studies

(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2005). We calculated the mean effect size across studies, its 95

percent confidence interval, and a Qw, a within-group homogeneity statistic that has an

approximate chi-square distribution with k - 1 degrees of freedom. A statistically significant Qw

indicates that the effect sizes underlying the analysis have significant variability; a Qw that is not

statistically significant indicates that the variability of the underlying effect sizes is sufficiently

explained by sampling error variance. To test our moderator hypotheses, we fitted simultaneous

weighted least squares, random-effects regression models with method of moments estimation.

More specifically, we regressed the effect size on three variables regarding potential

methodological artifacts (i.e., whether the study lagged the CSR measure or not, whether the

study was published or not, and the year that women’s board representation was measured in the

study), and two hypothesized moderators (i.e., the country’s shareholder protection strength and

gender parity) weighted by the inverse variance associated with each effect size. In particular, we

note that the addition of the variable, year, may help address the fact that our two country-level

moderators represent country’s shareholder protections and gender parity at a single point in time

because we were unable to find measures of these variables for each of the years of the studies in

this meta-analysis. Although not shown, we should note that the study conclusions regarding our

hypotheses remain the same with and without the potential methodological moderators. We

inspected whether z, the unstandardized regression coefficient divided by the corrected standard
 19

error, exceeded the critical value (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2005).

RESULTS

Hypothesis 1 predicted that women’s representation on firms’ boards is positively related

to corporate social performance. Because CSR and social reputation reflect distinct measurement

categories (Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003), we analyzed the two dimensions of social

performance separately. As shown in Table 2, we found that the average effect sizes were

positive. Specifically, women’s board representation is positively related to CSR (r = +0.15;

95%CI: +0.12, +0.18) and to social reputation (r = +0.15; 95%CI: +0.09, +0.21). Before

proceeding, however, we conducted a robustness check by removing the studies or effect sizes

from studies that may have included women’s board representation in their measure of CSR.

Specifically, the diversity dimension of KLD ratings includes women’s board representation

among other several other measures of diversity. Five studies may have included this dimension,

although none measured CSR with only this dimension. As shown in Table 2, the result is

similarly positive with largely overlapping confidence intervals (r = +0.14; 95%CI: +0.11,

+0.17). In sum, these results support Hypothesis 1.

------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
------------------------
Although we predicted several moderators of these relationships, the mean effect size for

social reputation has a heterogeneity statistic indicating that moderators are unlikely to be

present (Qw(8)= 15.02, n.s.). In contrast, the associated heterogeneity statistic for CSR suggests

that there is significant unaccounted for variation in the studies that underlie the mean effect size,

suggesting that a search for moderators is warranted (Qw(82)= 348.95, p < .001).

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the relationship between women’s board representation and

corporate social performance will be more positive among studies conducted in countries with
 20

stronger shareholder protections. As shown in Table 3 and supporting Hypothesis 2, we found

that the women’s board representation-CSR relationship is more positive in countries with

greater shareholder protections, b = 0.05, SEb = 0.01, p < 0.001. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the

relationship between women’s board representation and corporate social performance would be

more positive among studies conducted in countries with greater gender parity. Supporting

Hypothesis 3, we found that the women’s board representation-CSR relationship is more positive

in countries with greater gender parity, b = 1.37, SEb = 0.48, p < 0.01. (As shown in Table 3, we

should note that, in supplemental analyses without the measures that included board diversity as

a dimension or without US studies (the country most represented among the studies in this meta-

analysis), our findings remain substantively the same—except the coefficient for shareholder

protections is not statistically significant in the model with US studies removed.)

------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------
To examine how country’s shareholder protections and gender parity moderate the

women’s board representation-CSR relationship, we calculated the predicted values (i.e., effect

sizes) for selected countries. As examples, in countries low in both shareholder protections and

gender parity (e.g., Kenya and China), the predicted value of the relationship between women’s

board representation and CSR is near zero (rs = .00 for Kenya and .01 for China). In contrast, for

countries high in both shareholder protections and gender parity (e.g., United States and

Canada), the predicted value of the relationship between women’s board representation and CSR

is positive and larger (rs = .21 for US and .23 for Canada).

Lastly, we should also point out how analyses address the concern that these results are

due to reverse causality, that is, that firms with higher CSR may be more attractive to women

directors and be more likely solicit women to join the board. Following the model of Orlitzky,
 21

Schmidt, and Rynes (2003), we explored whether study design moderated the relationship

between women’s board representation and CSR, by examining the coefficient associated with

this variable in the regression models. As shown in Table 3, across the three models, study

design in terms of including a time lag or not is not significant. Thus, although we cannot rule

out the possibility that reverse causality may account, in part, for our findings, our results do not

provide support for the idea that firms with higher CSR attract and select more women directors.

DISCUSSION

This study, which draws on Post and Byron’s (2015) framework, contributes to the

literature on board composition by examining whether and how women’s representation on

boards is associated with corporate social performance (Adams, Haan, Terjesen & Ees, 2015;

Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). Our findings shed light on why the empirical evidence from

previous studies shows mixed results regarding this relationship. Results from our meta-analysis

of 87 independent samples representing a range of over 20 countries find that firms with more

women board directors engage in more corporate social responsibility and enjoy more favorable

social reputations. The mean effect size for the relationship between women on boards and CSP

is five to six times larger than the mean effect size for the relationship between women on boards

and firm financial performance (Post & Byron, 2015), perhaps because boards have more control

over firms’ social performance. Although we found that this relationship is generally positive,

we found several factors that explained significant variation in this relationship. By capitalizing

on the fact that studies have been conducted with firms from a diverse set of countries, we find

support for our argument that firms’ national context helps to determine the extent to which

women’s representation on boards contributes to firms’ corporate social responsibility.

Implications for Theory

 22

The findings of this meta-analysis have several theoretical implications. First, and

broadly speaking, our finding that female representation on boards is positively associated with

corporate social performance highlights the importance of considering the role of social context.

More specifically, complementing Post and Byron’s (2015) illustration of the moderating

influence of shareholder protections and gender parity on the relationship between women on

boards and firm financial performance, our study shows that shareholder protections and gender

parity also moderate the relationship between female board representation and firms’ social

performance. Our study’s contribution is unique in examining contextual influences on the

relationship between women board representation and social performance across such a wide

array of countries. Second, and relatedly, in contrast to previous theoretical articulations of upper

echelons theory, we considered whether macro-environmental factors (rather than board- or

industry-level factors) could strengthen the relationship between board characteristics and social

performance. More specifically, we relied on two conceptual moderators in upper echelons

theory, board behavioral integration and intra-board power distribution, to theorize that the legal

and socio-cultural contexts in which firms exist may explain the extent to which boards can

influence corporate social performance. Findings from this meta-analysis buttress our argument

that boards may tend to be more motivated to elicit, discuss, and deliberate the varied knowledge

and perspectives of all directors in legal contexts that require directors to be especially diligent in

board deliberation and decision-making (i.e., in countries with stronger shareholder protections).

Our findings also provide support for our contention that the socio-cultural context in which

firms exist (i.e., in countries where women have more equal access to educational, employment

and other opportunities) may help to distribute power and influence in boardroom decision-

making, and that this intra-board power distribution strengthens the link between board gender
 23

composition and firm outcomes such as CSR. Finally, these findings are also consistent with the

institution-based view in strategy, which argues that institutions, both formal (i.e., shareholder

protections) and informal (i.e., gender parity), are likely to moderate the relationship between

firm-level inputs and outcomes (e.g., van Essen, Heugens, Otten & van Oosterhout, 2012).

Limitations, and Directions for Future Research

Our findings cannot refute an alternate explanation for the positive relationship between

women on boards and social performance, that is, that firms with higher social performance are

more likely to nominate and attract women to their boards. More socially responsible firms may

be more likely to have boards whose social networks include a larger number of potential women

directors, as potential women directors are more likely to come from non-executive and non-

business backgrounds than are male directors (Hillman, Cannella & Harris, 2002; Singh,

Terjesen & Vinnicombe, 2008). Additionally, more socially responsible firms may be better able

to attract women directors because social performance may serve as a competitive advantage in

the war for talent (Bhattacharya, Sen & Korschun, 2008; Turban & Greening, 1997).

Unfortunately, the existing study cannot fully test this possibility because a meta-analysis of non-

experimental studies cannot establish causality. We recommend that future research employ

research designs that may investigate this possibility. For example, director-level studies

examining what factors influence directors’ decisions to accept nominations and firm-level

studies that incorporate a time lag for directors may help to discern whether more socially

responsible firms are more likely to nominate women directors and whether nominated women

are more likely to join socially responsible firms. We should also note that these two

explanations may be complementary: women directors may increase corporate social

performance and corporate social performance may increase women’s board presence.
 24

As would be any meta-analysts, we were constrained in terms of the moderators we were

able to examine due to incomplete or missing data in the primary studies. For example, we would

have liked to examine whether cross-cultural differences in the role of institutional investors may

differentially motivate directors to engage in board deliberation (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). An

additional limitation that presented itself with the studies in our sample is that many countries are

represented by just one study. In some cases, that study includes the population of publicly

traded firms in the country under consideration. Still, taken together with the absence of studies

of countries in South America, this suggests a wealth of opportunities for future research.

We also considered the question of whether and how the presence of “hard law” quotas

and “soft law” non-binding quotas might influence the relationship of interest in our study. In

reality, these laws vary widely from country to country (e.g., in actual quota, sanctions, time

between passage and compliance date). Furthermore, experts on board gender quotas have

eloquently argued that gender parity is a key predictor of hard/soft quota laws (Terjesen,

Aguilera & Lorenz, 2014). Therefore, we decided not to control for hard/soft laws, to avoid

introducing multi-collinearity in our analyses. Finally, as García‐Castro and his colleagues have

suggested, it is conceivable that any influence of female board representation on social

performance is enhanced when this governance practice is “bundled” with other corporate

governance practices (2013). Regrettably, because existing studies rarely considered multiple

governance practices as they evaluated the relationship between women on boards and corporate

social performance, this is not a question our meta-analysis could address.

Overall, the findings from our analysis indicate it is high time for corporate governance

scholars to enhance the simple argument that increasing the number of women on boards will

automatically improve CSP (or any other firm outcome). A wealth of studies in the diversity
 25

literature have shown that increasing diversity in groups (such as boards of directors) may be

necessary, but is often insufficient, to ensure favorable group (or firm) outcomes (e.g., van Dijk,

van Engen & van Knippenberg, 2012). In our paper, we draw on behavioral perspectives (Huse,

Hoskisson, Zattoni & Viganò, 2011) and argue that board behavioral integration (Hambrick,

2007) and intra-board power distribution (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Hambrick, 2007)

moderate the extent to which female board representation may influence CSP. Huse and his

colleagues (2011) suggest additional avenues for representing behavioral perspectives in board

research, such as research designs that rely on process-oriented data to complement and inform

the traditional input-outcome models and we encourage further research in those areas.

Relatedly, we endorse the call for multi-level research designs that would greatly enhance our

understanding of how individuals, groups and institutions interact to explain corporate social

performance (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007; Aguinis & Glavas, 2012).

We found that most research examining women on boards and social performance used

results-based measures of CSR (rather than reputational measures). Given the important role of

social reputation as a signal to investors (e.g., Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2011), consumers

(e.g., Marin & Ruiz, 2007) or potential employees (e.g., Jones, Willness & Madey, 2014), there

is a need for studies to further examine how, and in what contexts, women on boards may affect

firms’ social reputation. In future studies, scholars may also want to evaluate the potential role of

women on boards of directors as it relates to emerging trends in corporate social responsibility

such as CSR communication strategies and effectiveness (e.g., Lattemann, Fetscherin, Alon, Li,

et al., 2009), human rights (e.g., Welford, 2002), and inequality issues (e.g., Hahn, 2009; Mori,

Golesorkhi, Randøy & Hermes, 2015). Given the established correlation between corporate

social performance and firm financial performance (e.g., Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003), we
 26

also see an opportunity for future primary studies research to explore the causal linkages between

female board representation, corporate social performance, and firm financial performance

something that was not feasible to explore in a meta-analysis with the studies in our sample.

Implications for Practice

Our findings have practical implications for policymakers, companies, and boards. First,

given the pressing social issues facing the world today (World Economic Forum, 2014), our

finding that firms with women on their boards tend to be more socially responsible provides a

compelling rationale for continuing to work at improving the representation of women in

governance. Our finding that women’s representation on boards and social performance are

positively associated may tempt policy makers to endorse board representation quotas. However,

our results do not provide support for (or against) such measures, which if taken in isolation may

even be detrimental. (And, as others have argued, the business case should probably not be the

only rationale in the consideration of quotas (Seierstad, 2015)). At the same time, our results do

suggest that efforts be directed at improving the status of women in society and in the workforce,

for example, enabling women to reach the highest levels within their organization and holding

boards more accountable toward shareholders and, ultimately toward all stakeholders. More

specifically, such gender parity initiatives and shareholder protections may improve boardroom

decision-making, particularly by enabling divergent knowledge, information, and perspectives to

be heard and integrated in strategic deliberations. Second, although our results point to

institutional factors (such as regulations and laws providing shareholder protections) that may

motivate boards to engage in more deliberate and inclusive decision-making, it seems likely that

internal factors to the firm may operate similarly. As such, our findings suggest that firms may

wish to employ strategic communications and activities as a way of increasing the relative power
 27

of women in their roles as employees, managers, and board members and of increasing board

members’ felt accountability towards their shareholders. Lastly, our findings provide support

regarding the importance of fully engaging all board members. Although our results also suggest

that diversity on boards may prompt board members to think more broadly about firm

performance and consider a wider range of stakeholders, board diversity does not appear to

uniformly do so. Thus, it seems prudent to suggest here that boards should emphasize inclusive

and deep deliberations of firm decisions perhaps through board development activities.

Conclusion

This study has helped to elucidate the question of whether and how women directors

influence firms’ engagement in socially responsible business practices and reputation among

diverse stakeholders. Our results, based on a meta-analysis of 87 independent samples, suggest

that the female board representation–social performance relationship is generally positive and

that this relationship is even more positive in national contexts characterized by higher

stakeholder protections and gender parity. We hope that future research continues to explore

boundary conditions of the relationship between board diversity and firm outcomes such as

social performance. But perhaps, more importantly, we hope that this study spurs research that

helps both to establish what is unique about the cognitive frames (e.g., values, knowledge, and

experience) women and men seem to bring to boards and how female representation on boards

contributes to improving board decision-making processes and, ultimately, social performance.

 28

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 34

TABLE 1

Number of Studies, Shareholder Protection Strength, and Gender Parity Scores by Country

Shareholder
Protection Gender
Country k Strength Parity Score
Australia 3 5.7 .7294
Bangladesh 1 6.7 .6684
Canada 3 8.7 .7381
China 1 5 .6853
Finland 1 5.7 .8451
France 2 6.8 .6984
Germany 1 5 .7629
India 1 7.3 .6442
Indonesia 1 6 .6591
Italy 1 6 .6729
Kenya 1 5 .6768
Malaysia 2 8.7 .6539
Multiple countries 10 --- ---
Nigeria 3 5.7 .6315
South Africa 1 8 .7496
Spain 4 5 .7266
Sri Lanka 1 6 .7122
Sweden 2 6.3 .8159
Turkey 1 6.9 .6015
United Kingdom 7 8 .7433
United States 40 8.3 .7373

Note: k is the number of independent effect sizes; Multiple countries refers to studies that

sampled firms from more than one country and did not report results by country.
 35

TABLE 2

Mean Women’s Board Representation-Social Performance Effect Sizes

Effect

Corporate Social Performance k size 95% CI τ2 Qw(df)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 83 +0.15 +0.12,+0.18 0.012 348.95(82)***

CSR with no KLD diversity measures 80 +0.14 +0.11,+0.17 0.008 247.37(79)***

Social reputation 9 +0.15 +0.09,+0.21 0.003 15.02(8)

Note: For each analysis, k is the number of independent effect sizes included in each analysis.

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

 36

TABLE 3
Weighted Least Squares Regression Models for Moderators of the Women’s Board Representation and CSR Relationship for Single
Country Studies
All CSR measures Board diversity U.S. studies removed
measures removed
b SEb z b SEb z b SEb z

Constant -11.02 -1.05 2.74

Methodological artifacts
Time lagged study design -0.01 0.04 -0.18 0.04 0.03 1.47 0.10 0.07 1.44
Published study 0.07 0.04 1.83 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.79
Year 0.01 0.00 1.43 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.21
Theoretical moderators
Shareholder protection strength 0.05 0.01 3.46*** 0.03 0.01 2.81** 0.03 0.02 1.61
Gender parity 1.37 0.48 2.86** 1.33 0.36 3.72*** 1.15 0.45 2.53*

Note: All CSR measures model includes all effect sizes representing firms from a single country (of 20 different countries) combined
at the study-level by year and study design, R2 = .43; for the sub-analysis with board diversity measures removed, R2 = .51; for the
sub-analysis with US studies removed, R2 = .49.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
 37

APPENDIX
Studies Included in the Meta-analysis

Author(s) Year Publication

Amran, Lee, & Devi
Amran, Lee, & Selvaraj
Arena, Bozzolan, & Michelon
Bäckström & Karlsson
Barako & Brown
Bear, Rahman, & Post
Ben Barka & Dardour
Ben-Amar, Chang, & McIlkenny
Bernardi, Bosco, & Columb
Bernardi, Bosco, & Vassill
Bernardi & Threadgill
Bilimoria
Bond, Harrigan, & Slaughter
Boulouta
Bowrin
Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin
Bruna, Dang, & Vo
Chinta, Sussan, & Jin
Cho, Jung, Kwak, Lee, Yoo
Coffey & Fryxell
Cook & Glass
Deschênes, Rojas, Boubacar,
Prud'homme, Ouedraogo, Eweje, &
Eweje
Dickman
Dobbin & Jung
Doh, Hadani, & Howton
Escobar, Miras, & Guzmán
Everly & Schwarz
Fernandez & Burnett
Fodio & Oba
Fodio & Oba
Frias-Aceituno, García-Sánchez, &
Rodríguez-Domínguez
Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, &
García-Sánchez
Galbreath
Gallego-Alvarez, Garcia-Sanchez, &
Rodriguez-Dominguez
Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-
2014 Business Strategy and the Environment
2014 Business Strategy and the Environment
in press Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Management.
2015 Master’s Thesis Uppsala University
2008 Journal of Management & Governance
2010 Journal of Business Ethics
2015 Management Decision
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2009 Corporate Reputation Review
2006 Business and Society
2010 Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and
Organization Studies
2006 Journal of Managerial Issues
2014 Voluntary Sector Review
2013 Journal of Business Ethics
2011 Social Responsibility Journal
2009 British Journal of Management
2014 Corporate Social Responsibility and Human
Resource Management: A Diversity Perspective
2014 Journal of Strategic Innovation and Sustainability
in press Journal of Business Ethics.
1991 Journal of Business Ethics
in press Work and Occupations.
2015 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of
Business in Society
2004 Report, Milwaukee Women Inc.
2011 North Carolina Law Review
2014 6th Annual Alliance for Research on Corporate
Sustainability Conference
2012 International Journal of Environmental Research
2015 Human Resource Management
2014 Academy of Management Annual Meeting
2012 Research Journal of Finance and Accounting
2012 European Journal of Business and Management
2013 36th Annual Congress European Accounting
Association Conference
2013 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Management
2011 Journal of Management & Organization
2010 Spanish Accounting Review
2014 Management Decision
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Ballesteros, & Sepulveda

Giannarakis 2014 Social Responsibility Journal
Giannarakis, Konteos, & Sariannidis 2014 Management Decision
Glass, Cook, & Ingersoll in press Business Strategy and the Environment.
Gupta, Lam, Sami, & Zhou 2014 Working Paper, Social Science Research
Network
Hafsi & Turgut 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Haldar & Mishra 2015 Information Management and Business Review
Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee in press Journal of Business Ethics
Hassel, Kallunki, & Nilsson 2012 Working Paper
Hogan, Olson, & Sharma 2014 Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics
Ijas 2012 Master’s thesis, University of London
Jia & Zhang 2011 The International Journal of Human Resource
Management
Kabongo, Chang, & Li 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Khan 2010 International Journal of Law and Management
Kılıç, Kuzey, Uyar, Kakabadse, & 2015 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of
Fleur Business in Society
Kimball, Palmer, & Marquis 2012 Working paper, University of California, Davis.
Landry, Bernardi, & Bosco in press Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Management
Larkin, Bernardi, & Bosco 2012 International Journal of Banking and Finance
Liao, Luo, & Tang in press The British Accounting Review
Mallin & Michelon 2011 Accounting and Business Research
Mallin, Michelon, & Raggi 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Margaretha & Isnaini 2014 Jurnal Manajemen dan Kewirausahaan
Marquis & Lee 2013 Strategic Management Journal
McCann & Wheeler 2011 Journal of Law and Society
McQuillen 2011 Doctoral dissertation, Pace University, New York
Miller & Triana 2009 Journal of Management Studies
Mohamad, Abdullah, Mokhtar, & 2011 Working Paper, Social Science Research
Kamil Network
Moore & Robson 2002 Business Ethics: A European Review
Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
Oba & Fodio 2012 International Journal of Business and Social Science
Post, Rahman, & McQuillen 2015 Journal of Business Ethics
Post, Rahman, Rubow 2011 Business & Society
Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez 2010 Journal of Business Ethics
Rao, Tilt, & Lester 2012 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of
Business in Society
Rodriguez-Dominguez, Gallego- 2009 Journal of Business Ethics
Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez
Roitto 2013 Master’s thesis, University of Oulu, Finland
Said, Noorain, & Wan 2013 Social Responsibility Journal
Santiago-Castro 2014 Working paper, University of Puerto Rico
Setó-Pamies in press Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Management
Shamil, Shaikh, Ho, & Krishnan 2014 Asian Review of Accounting
Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles 1997 Journal of Managerial Issues
Stanwick & Stanwick 1998 American Business Review
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Strydom & Yong 2012 25th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference
Walls, Berrone, & Phan 2012 Strategic Management Journal
Webb 2004 Journal of Management and Governance
Wieland & Flavel in press Journal of Management and Governance
Williams 2003 Journal of Business Ethics
Zaichkowsky 2014 International Journal of Business Governance and
Ethics
Zhang 2012 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of
Business in Society
Zhang, Zhu, & Ding 2013 Journal of Business Ethics
 40

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Kris Byron is an associate professor of managerial sciences at the J. Mack Robinson College of
Business, Georgia State University, where she also received her Ph.D. Her primary research
interests are emotion, creativity, self-regulation, and gender. She presently serves on the
executive committee of the Research Methods Division of the Academy of Management and
serves as associate editor of the Academy of Management Review.

Corinne Post is associate professor of management and currently holds the Scott Hartz '68 Term
Professorship at the College of Business and Economics, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. She
has a Ph.D. from Rutgers University. Her research interests include mechanisms underlying
gender/racial/ethnic differences in careers and diversity as enabler or impediment to group and
organizational performance.