12

Water Allocation Conflict

Management: Case Study
of Bitit, Morocco
Rachid Abdellaoui

T
he Bitit irrigation perimeter is a small-scale irrigation system built
in Morocco at the start of the twentieth century by farmers
and managed by them. † The system lies at the foot of the Atlas
Mountains at an average altitude of 600 meters above sea level, midway
between the cities of Fes and Meknes. As farmers have put land and
water to productive use, there naturally have been conflictual situations.
An interesting dimension has been the emergence of markets for water
rights as a means to bring transparency to bargaining for water. Water
rights have mitigated conflicts over water for two constituencies:

N Among Bitit irrigation water users

N Between these irrigators and the water utility, RADEM, which
supplies water to Meknes.

The Irrigation System and Its Evolution

State of Water Resources

The Bitit irrigation perimeter is fed by three perennial springs (table

12.1).
In the early 1980s, Morocco experienced a series of severe drought
years. The government created 3 boreholes in the Bitit area to extract
approximately 120 liters of water per second (l/s) to serve potable wa-
ter needs. As a result, the perennial springs have witnessed lowered
discharges.

†
Adapted by the editors from a background paper prepared for the “MNA Devel-
opment Report on Water: Water Conflicts and Their Management Mechanisms in
Morocco,” CEDARE Cairo, 2005.

213
214 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

Table 12.1 Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit (l/s)

Spring name Estimated discharge during summer , 1974–79 (l/s) Estimated discharge during summer, 2005 (l/s)
Sidi Tahar 1850 1450
Si L’Mir 120 0
Sbâa 600 400
Total 2570 1850

Appropriation of Land and Water

At the start of the last century, land and water were exploited col-
lectively by the Bitit area’s population, mainly as rangeland. The
resources were plentiful, and each household had more land than it
could exploit. Excess water discharges from the springs fed into the
adjoining marshlands, causing malaria to become a common health
problem in the Bitit community.
However, by the 1920s, through both natural population growth
and the growth of commercialization, pressures on land and water
resources began to increase. The French colonial administration had
two goals. On the political side, it intended to keep the peasants from
joining the nationalists, who had become very active in both Fes and
Meknes. On the economic side, the French meant to encourage market
linkages for these rural communities.
In the mid-1910s, the French had promulgated laws to place water
resources in the public domain unless they had been regulated by spe-
cific pre-existing water rights. Regarding Bitit, these laws established
equal sharing of water between upstream (politically active Ait Oual-
lal) and downstream (less politically active Ait Ayach) communities.
Later, group and individual water rights were recognized and recorded.
Both land and water then became private property that could be sold
to both nationals and French private settlers.
However, the nearby city of Meknes had growing demand for
water and the local farmers resisted attempts to expropriate their
rights. In 1949 a special decree fixed the share of the Public Domain
of Bitit waters at 60 percent of availability, leaving only 40 percent of
the water to the farmers. There was strong opposition from the latter.
As compensation, the French offered to construct the main canal of
Bitit, to reduce infiltration rates in the existing earthen canals (thus
“justifying” the 60 percent reduction in water rights), and to improve
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 215

public health by reducing malarial mosquitoes. The canal was con-

structed by 1954, after which 400 l/s were diverted for the potable
water needs of Meknes.
By the 1970s, Morocco was an independent country, but govern-
ment decisions continued to respond to urban needs. Meknes needed
more water, and water available in the public domain was estimated
to be 1800 l/s (in peak irrigation season). However, there was still a
need to avoid social unrest in the countryside. To justify the diversion
of just an additional 400 l/s, the government undertook a rehabilitation
project by which many more kilometers of earthen irrigation canals
(seguias) were lined to reduce water infiltration losses, and thus com-
pensate beneficiaries for the additional water diversion. By August
2005, although the municipal water demand had drastically increased,
the overall water sharing had not changed. Meknes continues to divert
800 l/s, leaving the rest of the water resources with the farmers for
three reasons, one political and two technical:

1. On the political side, farmers’ opposition to further diversion of

water to which they considered they had water rights
2. On the technical side, (a) the Office National de l’Eau Potable’s
(ONEP) using better drilling technology to enhance Meknes’ water
supply with approximately 1200 l/s, and (b) higher treatment costs
for the spring waters during the rainy season when they had high
quantities of suspended matter.

Table 12.2 summarizes this evolution of water allocations.

Irrigation Canal Network and Water Shares

The main canal, constructed in 1953, starts at the spring of Sidi Tahar.
The canal feeds five large main seguias and several smaller ones before
discharging downstream in Ait Ayach lands. All main seguias were lined
in the 1980s. The subsequent rehabilitation of the irrigation network
necessitated two developments:

1. Construction of proper diversion and discharge partitioning struc-

tures
2. Fixation of the seguia on which individual water rights could be
exercised led to the computation of the design discharge of the
seguias.
216 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

Table 12.2 Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco, 1920s–2005

Total Water right Discharge
Groups of No. of discharge discharge actually
Period shareholders shares (%) (l/s) diverted (l/s) Important event/comments
Béni M’tir (Ait Start of appropriation (by peasants) of waters
Early 48 2,420 2,420
Ouallal) and land previously collective
1920’s Chorfa et Intensive pressure on land and water by French
8 403 403
Regraga settlers
Caid 3.5 176 176
Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000
Laws of 1919 and 1924 related to water and
Around Ait Ouallal 24 1,210 1,210
definition of water domain
1925 Ait Ayache 24 1,210 1,210 Ait Aiyache—downstream users of Béni M’tir
Chorfa et
8 403 403 Individual appropriation of land and water
Regraga
Caid 3.5 176 176
Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000
Ait Ouallal 24 484 1,210
Ait Ayache being downstream, they are
1949 Ait Ayache 24 484 1,210
probably not diverting all their right
Chorfa et
8 161 403
Regraga
Caid 3.5 71 176
Total 59.5 40 1,200 3,000
Vizirial decree of November 23, 1994 (Official
Public domain 60 1,800 0
Bulletin of 30 December 1949)
Construction of main canal to compensate for
Ait Ouallal 24 484 1,049
1953–54 the water appropriated by the public domain
Ait Ayache 24 484 1,049
Chorfa et
8 161 350
Regraga
Caid 3.5 71 153
Total 59.5 40 1,200 2,600
Public domain 60 1,800 400 Water is effectively diverted to Meknes
Rehabilitation of irrigation system consisting
Ait Ouallal 24 415 714 essentially of lining main seguias to
compensate for additional 400 l/s diversion
1983–88 With creation of modern discharge partitioning
Ait Ayache 24 415 714
structures
Chorfa et
8 138 238 Small reduction of spring discharge
Regraga
Caid 3.5 60 104
Total 59.5 40 1,028 1,770
Diversion to Meknes of an additional discharge
Public domain 60 1,542 800
of 400 l/s
Ait Ouallal 24 298 424 Large reduction of discharge of various springs
2005
Ait Ayache 24 298 424
Chorfa et 3 tube wells with total discharge of 120 l/s are
8 99 141
Regraga created.
Caid 3.5 44 62
Total 59.5 40 740 1,050
Public domain 60 1,110 800
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 217

Actual measurements con-

Figure 12.1 Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names
ducted after the rehabilitation
project showed that water losses
in irrigation canals effectively
dropped from approximately
1.21 l/s/100 meters to 0.9 l/s/100
meters of the seguia. The farm-
S. ichniouine S. Mouloua
ers immediately recognized the canal
benefits of lining the seguias, S. ghellafa main
particularly as the overall net- S. boufadma
work was very long. They also S. Kherichfa
recognized the importance of
concrete diversion structures
that prevent water theft. S. Tahar S. bâa
Figure 12.1 is an approximate Si L’Mir
drawing of the irrigation network N
with seguia names.
Source: Author.
Table 12.3 gives the break- Note: Scale = 1: 70,000.
down of shareholders’ water
rights by group of shareholders
and by main seguia. The shares indicated in table 12.3 assume continuous
water discharge of a water modulus.1 The modulus varies depending
on the spring discharge and thus the season.
Field measurements conducted in 1987 indicated a variation of the
water modulus ranging from 25 l/s to 35 l/s with an average of 30 l/s
depending on the seguia and the precision of the flow-partitioning
device on the main canal. Presently, farmers estimate that the water
modulus is only approximately 20 l/s, which correlates perfectly with
the reduction in spring discharge since then. In 1987 the total available
discharge to peasants was approximately 1770 l/s, which, divided by
59.5 shares, equaled a water modulus of 29.75 l/s. In 2005 the figures
were 1050 l/s and 17.65 l/s, respectively (table 12.2). For example,
Seguia Boufadma carries 9 water modulus (which summed to ap-
proximately 270 l/s in 1987, but now sums to only 160 l/s in peak-use
periods) (table 12.3).

1
The bulk elastic properties of a material determine how much it will compress
under a given amount of external pressure. The ratio of the change in pressure to
the fractional volume compression is called the bulk modulus of the material. http://
hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/permot3.html
218 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

Table 12.3 Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia

Group of No. of
shareholders shares Guellafa Boufadma Kherichfa Moulouya Tichniouine Roz Batbatia Taoujdate Tighza Total
Ait Moussa 8 4 3 1 8
Hammi + Ait
Akka
Ait Rbaa 4 2 2 4
Ait Ali 4 4 4
Boubker
Ait Brahim 4 1 2 1 4
Ait Ammar 4 2 2 4
Chorfa et 8 4 1 2 1 8
Regraga
Caid 3.5 1.5 2 3.5
Total shares 35.5 9.5 9 3 4 5 1 2 1 1 35.5
(water
modulus)

The irrigation turn duration originally was computed for each

shareholder to receive the total water discharge of the seguia during
a full day. For example, the households of Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait
Akka villages originally numbered 52. Thus, their irrigation rotation
on Boufadma followed a 52-day cycle, and each household received
a 4 water modulus, totaling a discharge of 120 l/s every 52 days. As
the water rights process fragmented due to population growth and
demand grew because of crop intensification (as with the introduc-
tion of summer vegetable crops), the irrigation frequency had to be
increased. Consequently, over time, the water turn duration was
reduced (table 12.4).
To avoid having 6.5 days of irrigation turn and facilitate water
distribution by making the rotation weekly, in 1990 rights were recom-
puted proportionally. Presently, farmers’ water rights are expressed in

Table 12.4 Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait
Hakka), 1940s–1990s

Period Length of irrigation turn (days)

Until late 1940s 52
Until late 1960s 26
Until late 1980s 13
Since early 1990s 7
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 219

hours: In 2005 a farmer who owned 1 hour of water actually possessed

3600 seconds * 20 liters/second, that is, 72 m3 every irrigation turn (=
rotation) of 7 days.

Cropping Pattern

In the early 1980s, the total useful area of the Bitit irrigation system
was estimated at 5000 hectares (ha). Of these, approximately 2000 ha
were irrigable (900 ha during the summer + 1100 ha during winter).
Since then, following many stone-clearing operations, the arable land
has greatly increased.
The preferred winter crops are cereals (primarily wheat planted
in November and harvested in June), which receive supplemental ir-
rigation if necessary. Ninety percent of summer crops are vegetables
and tobacco. Orchards (mainly apples) have been abandoned due to
low water availability.
Tobacco acreage has decreased, and tobacco is kept only as an
alternative crop to reduce farmers’ risk. Potato acreage also has de-
creased. Some farmers switched from summer production of potatoes
(planting in March, harvesting in August) to seed production of F1 and
F2 generations (planting by mid-August, harvesting in January at the
latest).2 Onions are a popular crop. They are planted in March and
harvested by mid-August, followed by seed potatoes. These crops
appear to be the best combination that matches seasonal demand for
water with existing market conditions.

Irrigation System Management

Traditional organization to manage conflicting interests

Bitit’s irrigation system is managed by traditional organizations at the
main seguia level. Before the start of each cropping season, after Friday
prayers (which time was chosen to ensure maximum attendance), the
shareholders of the seguia gather in a general assembly to take deci-
sions to reduce potential conflicts among members:

a. Shareholders elect a certain number of waqqaf (type of ditch rider)

members. This task has the highest priority.

2
F1 and F2 refer to foundation seeds for potatoes of good quality.
220 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

b. After this vote, and with the expert assistance of the waqqaf,
shareholders establish the Jrida of the seguia. This is a full list of the
individual shareholders and their irrigation time durations, together
with the exact location of the fields that each shareholder would
like to irrigate in the forthcoming season.
c. Last, the shareholders agree on the water distribution sequence
during each irrigation turn.

The number of waqqafs will depend on the number of sharehold-

ers, the length of the seguia, and the degree to which irrigation land is
dispersed along the seguia. In 1987, 5 waqqafs were elected to manage
Seguia Boufadma (270 l/s at that time).
The waqqaf members are required to live in the village, have an
extensive knowledge of field locations and water rights, and fully un-
derstand the spatial and temporal water distribution logic of the seguia.
These persons therefore allocate their time to irrigation management
and also are available at any time day or night. An implication is that
waqqaf members tend to own little land and usually have either none
or very few water rights. In 1987 each irrigator in the villages paid each
waqqaf 300 DH/year for 24 hours of water rights, which corresponds
to 12.5 DH/year/hour of water right.
The first task of the waqqaf is to help to establish the Jrida during
the general assembly and to work on it later until it is complete and
exact. This process usually takes time as:

a. The number of shareholders is very large. Therefore, it is not feasible

to list all of them during one two-hour general assembly.
b. Many of the small shareholding farmers often are not at the assem-
bly, requiring the waqqaf to contact them later at their homes.
c. Some transactions on water rights are not resolved immediately. Ad-
ditional time is needed to make sure that no mistakes are made.

The Jrida is of paramount importance because it is the basic manage-

ment framework through which water allocation and distribution rules
are established. Although the process of establishing/operationalizing
the Jrida may seem to be and is challenging, the waqqaf usually is able
to complete the process before irrigation season begins.
The waqqaf uses local knowledge to simplify the Jrida. Irrigation
quarters of variable acreage and limits are defined, to which one ir-
rigation modulus ( fess, literally “a hand of water”) is allocated. Usually,
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 221

this process requires defining turns among the various field intakes.
Topography, water rights, cropping patterns, and conflict reduction
are the key criteria in determining the rules.
The Jrida system is very flexible. It fully incorporates irrigators’
concerns by ensuring that allocation rules for each quarter are trans-
parent for that irrigation season, including after crops are progressively
harvested. Once the Jrida is established and the first irrigation turn is
executed, the waqqaf’s responsibilities are reduced. The waqqaf has
made every farmer aware of who his predecessors and successors are
in the rotation process. Because the irrigation turn is exactly one week
in length, the rotation is perfectly fixed. Each field receives the water
on a given day at a given time for a given duration.
However, problems do arise during the irrigation process that require
waqqaf intervention. For example, while transplanting onions, farmers
need low discharges (half of the water modulus) and can irrigate only
during daylight hours. They often seek the waqqaf’s help with these
specifics. Besides the irrigation management responsibilities, the waqqaf
must manage conflicts among irrigators, particularly accusations of
water stealing by irrigators.

Modern WUAs continue to work according to traditional norms

In December 1990, Law 2/84 (published in May 1992) established the
rules by which water user associations (WUAs) (Associations des
Usagers des Eaux Agricoles, or AUEA) are to be created and man-
aged. The law also listed the benefits that WUAs could be expected
to receive from government policies aimed at irrigation system reha-
bilitation/improvement.
In 2005, there were 5 WUAs in Bitit (1 for each of the 5 main
seguias). All of them were created under the framework of Law 2/84.
Nevertheless, old practices of the traditional organizations continue to
dominate. While previously the waqqaf was earning 13 x 24 x 12.5 DH
= 3900 DH/year, it now earns 7 x 24 x 30 DH = 5040 DH/year. When
adjusted for inflation, the amount probably is very similar. Moreover,
if the rotations are more frequent, they also are shorter.

Conflicts over Water

Conflicts over water among farmers

Water conflicts are very rare because both traditional and legal water
allocation and distribution rules are perfectly clear and well established
222 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

in writing. In addition, concrete discharge partitioning structures leave

very little space for arguments.
According to Ait Ouallal farmers, conflicts arise primarily when
irrigators resort to water theft. For example, at the start of an irrigation
season, water is relatively abundant, and farmers may overestimate
the acreage of summer crops that they may be able to irrigate satis-
factorily. Later, climatic conditions change, particularly when very hot
and dry easterly winds known as chergui raise temperatures for several
consecutive days during the peak growing months of July and August.
Under these circumstances, to save their crops, irrigators may resort
to water theft. The role of the waqqaf is to watch for such transgres-
sions and enforce penalties on these irrigators.
Tubewells play an important role in supplementary irrigation.
Through tube wells, irrigators can meet any unexpected demand
for irrigation water during the peak crop demand period without re-
sorting to water theft. The farmers usually buy tubewell water on a
volumetric basis.
A recent proposal by a mineral water bottling company to pur-
chase water rights (see further developments in this text) has caused
disagreement among farmers. They all want to sell their water to the
bottling company but cannot agree on how much water each one
would be allowed to sell.

Conflicts over water between farmers and the municipal water agency
of Meknes
The Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau de Meknes (RADEM)
is the municipal water management agency of Meknes. Ait Ouallal
farmers complain about the way that RADEM handles the diversion of
the 800 l/s directly from the Sidi Taher Spring. The spring is protected
by a concrete structure with a metallic door that has a single key kept
by 2 guards hired by RADEM. Farmers are forbidden from verifying
the discharge that is effectively diverted. The diversion takes place
literally behind closed doors, and no flow measuring device is installed
other than an imprecise concrete weir with a height that can easily
be modified.
Ait Ouallal farmers allege that RADEM is diverting more than its
share, particularly during the peak summer season. Ait Ouallal farmers
insist they will not accept further diversion of “their” water, whether
or not authorities consider it part of the public domain. The farmers
are adamant that RADEM should purchase water from them.
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 223

Effects of Water Markets on Women

In Morocco, women can inherit property rights. The fact that water is
a marketable good has been a factor in promoting the status of female
household heads, because women without access to enough labor for
irrigated farming can sell their water. Farmers sell the usage of water
for one irrigation season if they need money or if they do not have the
resources (labor and/or money) to grow irrigated crops themselves.
While property owners are attached to land and sell it only as a last
resort, there is much greater willingness to sell water rights, because
they are a renewable resource.

Water market in Bitit

In Bitit, water has been a freely marketable good since the early 1930s.
More importantly, water rights can be sold independently of land.
Farmers like to say that water is “single,” that is, it is not “married” to
the land it irrigates. Water is a free good that can travel to any field
provided it does not move to a main seguia other than that on which
the water right is registered. In other words, water rights are tied to
a given main seguia. This customary law does not pose a constraint
because there is much more land than water, and seguias are designed
to transport their full discharge over their total length. As discussed
below, water prices become a good mechanism to allocate resources
efficiently and minimize conflicts.

Water prices
The price of water can give a good idea of the efficiency of its use.

Annual rights
In 1987 the price of 24 hours of water right was 5000 dirhams (DH)/
year. In 2005 the price of 1 hour of water right skyrocketed to 1400
DH/year. Water is valuable only from mid-March to mid-October

Table 12.5 Price of Water, 1987 and 2005 (DH/m3)

Price of 1 hr Corresponding vol. Length of Total Price of

of water Actual water every irrigation Turn irrigation seasonal water
Year (DH) modulus (l/s) turn (m3) duration (days) season (days) volume (m3) (DH/m3)
1987 208 30 108 13 210 1745 0.12
2005 1400 20 72 7 210 2160 0.65
224 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

(7 months). The prices of a cubic meter (m3) of water in 1987 and 2005
have been computed in table 12.5.
The price of water over the past 18 years thus has been multiplied
by a factor of 5.4. The computations in table 12.5 assume that water
is plentiful during the winter season (mid-October to mid-March). If,
however, the rains have become less plentiful—as they have—and the
irrigation season longer, then the increase in the price of water is not
as great as shown in table 12.5.
The official average annual inflation rate in Morocco during the
last 18 years has been approximately 3 percent. Accordingly, prices
should have increased by a factor of approximately 1.7 during the
period 1987–2004/05. In comparison, from 1969–2005, the water
tariff in the Tadla large-scale irrigation system varied as shown in
table 12.6.

Table 12.6 Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 (DH/m3)

Year 1969 1972 1980 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004
DH/m3 0.024 0.024 0.048 0.079 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.120 0.120 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.200 0.220

While the water prices in Tadla and Bitit were similar in 1987
(0.1 DH/m3 and 0.12 DH/m3, respectively), in 2004–05 they differed
substantially (0.22 DH/m3 and 0.65 DH/m3, respectively). The price
increase in Tadla from 1987 to 2004 was substantially below the increase
observed in Bitit. One could conclude that the free water market of
Bitit enabled taking into account the greater scarcity of water over
time and consequently its higher value.
Tubewell water also can be purchased from AUEA for 40 DH/h of
20 l/s. The corresponding price is thus 0.55 DH/m3, slightly less than
the surface water price.

Who sells/buys water?

Annual rights
Farmers think that the water right they own is never sufficient because
this resource, rather than the land, is the binding constraint on produc-
tion. Usually, those who possess 2–4 hours sell their water. Those who
possess more than 4 hours either sell their water or buy more water
to extend their farming operations. Thus, selling and buying water is
very common practice.
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 225

Permanent rights
Selling permanent water rights is still quite rare. Each year, only
50–60 hours of permanent water rights are sold, and usually by
those who own very small time shares—so small (usually 10–30
minutes) that it is not profitable to retain the right. Rarely does
anyone owning more than 3 hours sells his/her water right.
Few shareholders buy water rights. Their strategy is to look for
small shareholders and progressively concentrate water property by
hourly purchases. The advantages of concentrating water property
are reflected in prices; the smaller the share, the lower the price per
hour. Ten minutes can be purchased at less than 7000 DH/h (half the
normal price). Thirty minutes costs 10,000 DH/h.
In this way, one powerful farmer has accumulated 100 hours of water
rights. To ensure a reliable cash flow, he can profitably sell 50 hours for
70,000 DH/season. He himself can use the remaining 50 hours.

Net benefits from a cubic meter of irrigation water to grow onions

According to Ait Ouallal farmers, 1 ha of onions necessitates a water
right of 10 hours for at least 4 months (April–July). This purchase
amounts to 10 h * 3600 s/h * 20 l/s / 1000 l/m3 = 720 m3 every irrigation
turn of 7 days. Over 4 months (17 turns), the crop water requirement
is 12,340 m3. Apart from irrigated water, it costs on average of 30,000
DH/ha to produce onions. The average yield is 50 metric tons/ha.
The onion selling price is highly variable (table 12.7). Farmers
remember an exceptionally good year (1992) when onions sold for 5
DH/kg!
One bad selling year, the farmers had to feed onions to their cattle
because the price was too low. The milk ended up smelling of onions!
With the benefit of irrigation, farmers estimate that, on average, the
net benefit (receipts minus expenses) from onions is 30,000 DH/ha.
This net profit corresponds to a water productivity of 30,000/12,340
= 2.43 DH/m3 of water, and a profit of 2.34-0.65
Table 12.7 Onion Price, 2000–05
= 1.78 DH/m3 net of the price of water. Farmers
remark that 1.78 DH/m3 is higher than the lowest Year DH/kg
price that potable water is sold for in Meknes. 2005 2.5
If risk were not an issue, Bitit farmers should 2004 0.2
plant as many onions as possible because they look 2003 3.0
very profitable on average. However, in case of 2002 3.5
over-production, farmers risk losing profitability. 2001 1.5
In addition, the quantity of water used to produce 2000 1.5
226 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

onions is very high. Logically, farmers should switch to a more efficient,

on-farm water application type of irrigation, that is, from surface to drip
irrigation. Farmers recognize that, under drip irrigation, onion yields
double, while water consumption is almost halved. The water saved
could be either sold or used to increase the irrigated acreage.
These arguments are not convincing to farmers because they are
particularly afraid of onion over-production. They prefer to cope with
price variability by reducing risks and balancing their cropping pattern.
Farmers have developed specific strategies such as, “If March is dry,
the onion season will be good.”
It would be very interesting to further study this question. Never-
theless, the price of water at 0.65 DH/m3 appears affordable compared
to its productivity (2.43 DH/m3).

Alternative Markets for Water

Municipal water
The municipal water market is one alternative. According to farmers, so
far the municipal water agency of Meknes (RADEM) does not appear
interested in buying water from them as long as its water needs (ap-
proximately 120,000 m3/day) are covered by the 800 l/s of spring water
plus the additional tubewell water it buys from the Office National de
l’Eau Potable (ONEP) at approximately 3 DH/m3. However, population
growth is expanding demand for municipal water. Moreover, supply
alternatives are becoming limited. Finally, aquifer levels fall every year
while pumping costs increase. Farmers think this ever-growing demand
may influence RADEM to enter into negotiations with them.
To date, the balance of power is with RADEM. Farmers accuse
RADEM of inefficient management, specifically, of having very low
water efficiency in its conveyance and distribution to urban consumers.
According to the farmers, a large water leak can be observed close to
the municipal water intake from Si Tahar spring. Farmers believe that
RADEM does not sell municipal water in Meknes at a high enough
price to create incentives for efficient use.
Farmers’ feelings are a mix, first, of apprehension of RADEM
trying to appropriate more water from the springs, and, second, of
hope that RADEM will buy water from them at a market price. If the
Vizirial decree of November 23, 1924 is invoked, their apprehension of
additional water diversion by RADEM is not unwarranted.
 Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study of Bitit, Morocco N 227

Mineral water
Recently, in 2004, a mineral water bottling company proposed to buy
water from Bitit farmers at 40 DH/m3. In the first stage, the factory
would treat 40 l/s, which will be doubled in a later stage. This deal is
seen as exceptionally good since a 1-hour water right corresponds to
a monthly revenue of approximately 7,000 DH. However, farmers
face two challenges.

1. Securing the authorization from the Sebou River Basin Agency to

finalize the deal. Securing this authorization is not straightforward.
Article 9 of the Law 10-95 of August 16, 1995 indicates that

“…irrigation water rights can be sold with, and for the benefit,
of the land it irrigates, or independently from the land but only
under the express condition that the buyer owns land to which
the water rights will be linked.”

Bitit farmers believe that their water rights are not linked to any
agricultural use of waters and that they are free to sell their water
to consumers willing to pay the acceptable price. From their point of
view, Law 10-95 is prohibiting maximization of water productivity
and should be revised or better interpreted.
2. Securing an agreement among farmers on how to work out a group
contract since every shareholder wants to sell his or her water right
to the company.

At present, farmers have almost stopped selling irrigation wa-

ter rights among themselves because they believe that much better
prices could be obtained from RADEM, or perhaps a mineral water
company

Conclusions

Three important lessons from the Bitit irrigation system are of relevance
to those who manage large-scale irrigation systems and to others who
are in charge of water resource management in Morocco and even
throughout the MNA Region:

1. A clear water allocation rule, internalized at the farmer level, is the

basis for any good water management practice. Transparency in as-
228 N WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPEC TIVES AND INNOVATIONS

signing water appropriation rights to farmers is the simplest water

allocation rule to reduce conflicts.
2. The free water market of Bitit has contributed to keep water rights
updated. Small water shares could be sold or hired, and consequently
put to their highest economic use. Similarly, a free water market
is the most effective way of keeping a clear water allocation rule
updated. This rule is the cement that links the water users and keep-
ing their association alive and active. What might have happened
over time if water rights were not a marketable good?
3. Free water market is certainly equally contributing to the search
for increasing productivity of water. A water price of 0.65 DH/m3
is a good indicator. It is as much as 3 times the tariff of water in
large-scale systems (Tadla, for instance). A net benefit of approxi-
mately 2.63 DH/m3 also is higher than the more modest values
encountered in large-scale systems. However, application efficiency
of water remains very low in Bitit. Why farmers are not improving
their water application efficiency is a question that remains to be
tackled. One would expect a rapid development of trickle systems,
especially because they are heavily subsidized by government.