Tutors: Professor Brian McCook, Andrew Lock and John Greenacre

Department: History
Module: The Global Cold War: From Berlin to Beijing
Assessment 2: Document Commentary
Title: ‘Two Thousand Words’ by Ludvík Vaculík
Student Number: S231054
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‘Two Thousand Words’ by Ludvík Vaculík

‘Two Thousand Words’ is a key Czechoslovakian document by writer and dissident Ludvík Vaculík
published on the 27th of June 1968, one day after the preliminary censorship was abolished, in four
Czechoslovakian magazines including “Literární noviny”. The essay's title, ‘Two Thousand Words,’
refers to the length limit imposed by the newspaper on all articles, and Vaculík masterfully uses this
constraint to his advantage. In just a few short pages, he manages to convey a powerful message.
His words struck a chord with the people of his country, and "Two Thousand Words" became an
instant classic of political history, inspiring countless activists and intellectuals around the world. It
was written some months after the work of reformists under Alexander Dubček to enact the Prague
Spring reforms, a period of 8 months between January and August 1968, aimed at providing
economic decentralisation and democratisation. The manifesto’s main purpose was to convince the
people of Czechoslovakia of the importance of this political reform and to present the issues of the
Soviet socialist ideology. Vaculík would argue this should go beyond central government and extend
to local levels. Vaculík desired this because he had become disillusioned with the communist party,
fearing that the party itself and socialism as a whole was under threat of collapsing from the
corruption of authoritarianism. For Vaculík, there has been an economic and moral decay as the
proletariat were making no decisions for themselves, being a far cry from the ideological position of
socialism. For Vaculík, the only way forward for Czechoslovakia was to achieve Democratic Socialism.

Key to understanding the document is Ludvík Vaculík’s position on the matter. After Dubček started
his programme of Socialism with a human face in April, Vaculík grew concerned about its effects.
Being one of the more progressive members of the reformists, Vaculík believed that it was only
doing the bare minimum for Czechoslovakian citizens. Therefore, to ensure that the reforms came
from the bottom up as much as from the top down, Vaculík drafted his manifesto to ensure that the
whole country was united in his passion for the most necessary of social reforms. Unsurprisingly, the
document was not well received by Dubček and the other moderate reformists, despite gaining over
70 signatures. According to Jaromír Navrátil, “They were especially dismayed by the exhortation to
resort to independent initiative and action at the local level, which they regarded as a threat to their
own measured approach.”1 This was significant for them as they wanted to keep an appearance of
working from within the socialist system to achieve democratic change.

Using memories of days gone, Vaculík hopes to draw contrasts between what the country was, is
and could be if the people make urgent notice of their support of reform. Vaculík starts his piece
referencing that most of Czechoslovakia welcomed socialism with open arms, owing to the best
parliamentary result for a communist party when in 1946 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
and Slovakia attained 38% of the vote. However, Vaculík mentions how “it fell into the hands of the
wrong people”2 as the government was being led by Antonín Novotný, a loyal Stalinist whose
policies were characterised by censorship, repression and suppression of dissent. Furthermore, focus
on a command economy meant industry favoured heavy rather than consumer goods, leading to
serious shortages and low living standards. For Oldrich Tuma, “the sense that the country was falling
1
J. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, A national Security Archive Documents Reader, (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1998), p.170.
2
Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968), p.170.
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behind concerned not only the economy, but also technology, culture, and civilization in general.” 3
Consequently, the reforms would act to revitalise their country. For Vaculík, this is a call to the
people that they can achieve greatness within socialism, but it has been corrupted by lazy
authoritarianism and needs replacement and reform. Vaculík expresses his desire now that “we have
been experiencing a regenerative process of democratization”4 the country can be transformed. Its
strong national spirit which had been endangered by the communist government as people
“accordingly lost interest in public affairs, worrying only about themselves and about money” 5 can
be remedied if the people take the initiative. However, the success of these aims was largely
dependent on whether Czechoslovakia would have the opportunity to make changes, which at the
time was uncertain. The Soviets, ever since the start of the Prague Spring were watching the
situation of anti-Soviet publication worryingly unfold.

What is important therefore is to understand the soviet reaction and its motives. Under the
Khruschev Doctrine, the Soviet Union had the framework to intervene in the affairs of other socialist
countries against anything it deemed ‘counter-revolutionary’ threats. At the time of Vaculík's
publication, pro-Brezhnev conservatives from the Communist Party were losing their posts at their
14th party conference. Concerned with the developments, Vaculík's manifesto would act as their
reason for potentially involving themselves. For Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Peter
Ruggenthaler, the Czechoslovakian mass media “ was ultimately one of the most important factors
in triggering the decision for military intervention”6. As a result, the Soviet Politburo would for the
first time characterise both the manifesto and the Prague-Spring as counter-revolutionary, being a
threat to the authority of the Czechoslovakian government (and by ideological extension, World
Socialism). This led to the invasion of Soviet forces in August 1968 which would overwhelm
Czechoslovakia and purge the reformists from government, bringing an end to the Prague Spring and
entering the country into a period of restored soviet authority, called ‘Normalization’. As Milan
Sevec argues, Brezhnev wanted to make “it clear to the Czechoslovak reformers that it was Soviet
power politics, not ideology, that they must understand’7.

However, the period of ‘normalization’ would still mark the “most oppressive and rigid regime of any
Soviet Bloc country, which relied heavily on terror and all but eliminated civil rights” 8. Yet with the
Prague Spring, according to Zdenek Mlynar, unlike Poland and Hungary, “It was no explosion of mass
discontent, it was no revolt of the governed against those who governed them, with whom the
people could no longer find a common language and who surrender only to the force of a potential
3
O. Tuma, ‘Reforms in the Communist Party: The Prague Spring and Apprehension about a Soviet Invasion’, in
G. Bischof, S. Karner and P. Ruggenthalers (ed.), The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Pennsylvania: Lexington Books, 2009), P.67.
4
Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, p.171.
5
Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, p.171.
6
G. Bischof, S. Karner, P. Ruggenthaler, ‘Introduction’, in G. Bischof, S. Karner and P. Ruggenthalers (ed.), The
Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Pennsylvania: Lexington Books, 2009),
P.19.
7
M. Sevec, ‘The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later’, Foreign Affairs, 66, no.5, 1988, p.986.
8
A. J. Stoneman, ‘Socialism With a Human Face: The Leadership and Legacy of the Prague Spring’, The History
Teacher, 49, no.1, 2015, p.104.
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uprising.”9 For the Soviets, Czechoslovakia posed a deeper issue than just counter-revolution,
otherwise soviet intervention would not have been necessary. Thus, after the invasion, the Brezhnev
Doctrine was officially introduced, allowing the Soviet Union to intervene once more in any socialist
country that seemed to be under threat of capitalist restoration or invasion. There was clearly
increasing worry over the position of Eastern-Bloc countries and international Communism,
especially in the case of Czechoslovakia, where Vaculík's document is one of many that for the
Politburo is ” affecting the very preservation of peace and security in Europe”.10

While not the result Vaculík, or anyone wanted in the reformists, it did serve to prove further the
authoritarian government the Soviet Union had created and which is described in his manifesto.
They were able to attain “eight months of freedom”, which “revealed to the citizens of
Czechoslovakia not only that autonomy was universally desired, but also that it was attainable.” 11
One way or another, it was enough for many to continue a long struggle. Vaculík and 200 others
would go on to contribute to Charter 77 in 1977 to further the issue of human rights and find
“sympathy, as it was designed to do, among certain West European communist parties which had
already proclaimed human rights as an integral part of the socialism they espoused.”12 The
democratic path for Czechoslovakia would continue despite the attempts of Brezhnev’s doctrine to
suppress it. Its fortitude would inspire many, such as dissident movements in Hungary and Poland to
resist and fight for their freedom. The final Czechoslovakian President Václav Havel would go on to
create a semi-autobiographical play centred around a political dissident titled ‘Largo Desolato’ in
1984. Havel wrote this as soon as he got out of prison and is a great example of the resistance to
Soviet authority and the persistence of individuals to recreate Czechoslovakian culture. Without the
influence and spark of national debate from Vaculík's manifesto, the efforts of Havel would be
grossly undermined.

Despite the political aims of Vaculík's manifesto being annihilated for the meantime; his ideas of
democratic freedom would remain fundamental to criticism against the Soviet socialist ideology and
gaining eventual democratisation. In Vaculík's manifesto, he mentions that:

“The everyday quality of our future democracy depends on what happens in the
factories, and on what happens to the factories. Despite all our discussions, it is the
economic managers who have us in their grasp.” 13

Vaculík is making it clear that the command economies of socialist countries enforced by the Soviet
Union provide little for the Workers. Critical to understanding the significance of this issue is the

9
Z. Mlynář, ‘The Lessons of the Prague Spring’, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 10, no.2, 1988, p.35.
10
Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, p.188.
11
Stoneman, ‘Socialism with a Human Face’ p.109.
12
H. G. Skilling, ‘Socialism and Human Rights: Charter 77 and the Prague Spring’, Canadian Slavonic Papers, 20,
no.2, 1978, p.158.
13
Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, pp.172-173.
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moment when Gorbachev visited worker factories in Czechoslovakia in 1969 as part of an official
soviet delegation, finding that:

“workers turned away from us, this was a shock to me. From that time on I began to
think more and more about what was going on in our country, and I came to an
unconsoling conclusion: there was something wrong in our country.” 14

While it cannot be proven that Vaculík's manifesto directly influenced Gorbachev's decisions or
convinced workers to dissent against the Soviets, it did make issues with Soviet Stalin-style Socialist
ideology following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia much clearer. Gorbachev would go on to
argue “The time was ripe for change in our own country, and they were using this [The Prague Spring
and ‘threats’ to international socialism] as a way of putting off such changes”15. Regardless of its
contradictions due to the Soviets actions, some of Gorbachev’s policy of Perestroika in the 1980s can
be felt in Gorbachev’s assessment. Perestroika would promote independent actions and introduced
economic market reforms to reduce the effects of command economies. Therefore, it is clear to
argue that Vaculík's manifesto had a lasting effect on the future state of not just Czechoslovakia, but
of Eastern Socialism, even if the reasons were less than desirable.

In conclusion, ‘Two Thousand Words’ was a critical piece for not only the history of Czechoslovakia,
but also for launching dissent in other Communist Eastern Bloc countries such as Hungary and
Poland. It exposed the gap between the Communist Party's stated goals and their actual practices,
and helped to galvanize public support for reform. Not only that, but the Soviet reaction of complete
suppression led to individuals such as Gorbachev questioning the decisions and foreign policy of the
Soviet Union and World Communism. Its calls for greater political freedom became the foundation
for the new democratic government that emerged after the Velvet Revolution. Vaculík's manifesto
remains an important document in the history of the Czech Republic. It serves as a reminder of the
power of the written word to inspire debate, and of the importance of free speech and political
freedom in any democracy. Ultimately, it is a powerful call to action to fight for the importance of
Democracy and human rights, which continues to inspire people to this day.

14
M. Gorbachev and Z. Mlynář, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the
Crossroads of Socialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p.35.
15
Gorbachev and Mlynář, Conversations with Gorbachev, p.35.
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Bibliography

A. J. Stoneman, ‘Socialism With a Human Face: The Leadership and Legacy of the Prague Spring’, The
History Teacher, 49, no.1, 2015, pp.103-125.

G. Bischof, S. Karner, P. Ruggenthaler, ‘Introduction’, in G. Bischof, S. Karner and P. Ruggenthalers

(ed.), The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Pennsylvania:
Lexington Books, 2009), pp.10-40.

H. G. Skilling, ‘Socialism and Human Rights: Charter 77 and the Prague Spring’, Canadian Slavonic
Papers, 20, no.2, 1978, pp.157-175.

J. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968, A national Security Archive Documents Reader, (Budapest:
Central European University Press, 1998).

M. Gorbachev and Z. Mlynář, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and
the Crossroads of Socialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

M. Sevec, ‘The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later’, Foreign Affairs, 66, no.5, 1988, pp.981-1001.

O. Tuma, ‘Reforms in the Communist Party: The Prague Spring and Apprehension about a Soviet
Invasion’, in G. Bischof, S. Karner and P. Ruggenthalers (ed.), The Prague Spring and the Warsaw
Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Pennsylvania: Lexington Books, 2009), pp.64-75.

Z. Mlynář, ‘The Lessons of the Prague Spring’, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 10, no.2, 1988, pp.34-
40.