The Presidency

JAMES MANOR

the
emarkably. litele actention
to
have devoted
Political analysts rather 'our)
owes something to their (or
presidencý in India, This attention. But
institutions too little
habit.of giying formål political of institutions, more has
been
evenfwe focus only on'analyses federal
role of state governors within Lndia's
wtitten both about the porential alterrmative
an executive presidency as'a
system, ánd about institution itself.
-

the' present institution, than about that

to strudies of che presidency.
This writer has written three:previous
had the feeling.that he was examininga
Byt on each occasion, hë at least an institution
that
mparatively marginál insticution-pr In
achieves great political importance only very occasionally.
when no
such as India's, that happens
Yestminster-style systems house of a
the dominant lower
ycommands a majority in in the
This occurred önly rwice
artiar country's Parliament. the 1969
years of the Republic of India's existence-ater
.' Theseudes re J. Manor, Seeking Greater Power1979' and Constitutional
Crisis of. in D. A. Low
Change: Ind's Psideat and the Constirutional
Crises: Conmonwealth Episodes,
(ed) Constt1onaHeads and Politicalin D.
. Mnor, 'Ladia' Butler and D. A. Low (eds)
1945-1985; PP. 128
Sovereignsand Surrogse: ntitional Heads of State in the Commontuealth,
and the President' inJ. Manor
pp. 144-70; and J. Manoyhe PAime Minister Minister in lndia,
(edt): Nehru to the. Ninetie:{Thhagging Offce of Prime
PP: 115-37
In Ladia we have seen one extepefon to.this generalizaion, in June 1975,
ot
when President Ahmed agreed, hsti, to ign a declarätion of a state

424
 106Public InszitHtions in India
The Presideency 107
splic.in the Congres y, and in mid-1979. In both cases, presi governments. And in early 1999, he asked a sitting prime minister
dents became hugely apoptant players. During the latter episode, to provehis majority in the Lok Sabha when that was in doubt
terocious controversy arqse, orreasons explained below, But since a request which triggered the fall of the government and a fresh
parliamentary majorities exiskd anall other times in those years, election.
Indian presidents almost entireavoided public Part of the explanation for such actions by presidents lies in the
although as we shall see, Presidéntiingh (who controversy changedcircumstances since 1989. The adveng of hung parliaments
1982 to 1987)courted
held office from
and it,
a
few^ethruoions took place behind has undermined somewhat the power of prime ministers: and
the scenes. Cabinets that hold ofice without
majority support. And even when
"Since 1989, however, major changes hay occured that have a
government has a
majority, its grip on
power often seems rather
increased the importance of the presidency-ànd both/the need for precarious-because
of
remainto in office, it
must rely on a diversity
and the risks of presidential interventions., The pårliamentary elec parties. The prospects of any government being re-elected also
tions of 1989, 1991, 1996, and 1998 all
produced-üngPariaments usually appear dubious-because since 1939, voters have persis-
that is, single party had a majority of seats in the ok Sabha,
no tently suppoited a. plethora of smaller (atea regional or casfe:
. ' Lndia's lower house). In 1999, a coalitión led by the Bharatiya Janata based) parties, and their continued backing for any party leading
Party (BJP) obtaineda majoriry. But for reasons discussed below a ruling coalition iS open to serious question.
All of these things have inspired the aolders of 3ome
there are good reasons to expect hung Parliaments to becomeche (though,
mportantly, not all) extra-parliamentary otices in Lndia to seek,.
norm once again at furure elections-at least over, the medium
term with some success, to assert themselves in ways that were largely
unthinkable before 1989. In this chapter, ve need to consider
The president has become more importang since 1989 because
is the in the game of he
whether this trend--and the wider dispersal of power away from
he referee government.formation, and the prime minister and the-Cabinet, and Parliament-has had much
decides whether to granta primeminister's request for a dissolution
Ampact.n the presidercy as an instirution and on the behaviour of
of Parliament. In this era of hung parliaments, the former task has
ndiidual presidents. It will become clear. that it has indeed done
become more complex and.difficult, and the lattet.is aporential
problem: This makes it much more likely that the pkesidency will so hst hat other things were also at work. We shall see that
be engulfed in heated disputes which may occur.even if pre_idents presideñts actions are often
influenced more by their personal
seek to avoid controversy-as they. usually do. progivitieshan by this dispersal of power.
It is also far more possible now för a president with an appetite: We mussdconsider whether greater assertiveness by presi
dents is advisa ris chapter argues that-beyond striet limits-
for greater power than his. office has traditionaly possessed to it is hot, becausehe changes which have
pursue that goal..President Venkataraman may have attempted occurred. since 1989
present presidents wTaqurious.paradox. Those changes provide
precisely that during the process of-government formation in 1989. them with many more bppoitunities to assert themselves, but they
A president may alsa seek greater influence in "normal' timesas
when no,dissolution-has also make it more crucial tha aver that presidents avoid contro-
wel-when a-government is in place and verey and the appearance of arisanship-things which nearly
been requested. India's current President,, K. R. Narayanan; has"
always come with greater asserien
doneso. He had at
times disagreed (or appeared to disagree) with
.
This chapter also argues that-ce post-1989 changes will
inevitably require their
presidents to intevengsnore often-people in
Emergency at the request of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. We.still. do not India,must adjust attinudes. to wha consuiores appropriate
have a.satisfatory.analysis of that incident, and ijt will probably remain behaviour by presidents. They must begin todelop.arsomewhat
impossible to write one unless the Ahmed family.opens the president's diaries higher tolerance for presidential activissp duipg he process of
'which are reliably reported to exist. government formation-a tolerance of th kiad epnged to heads
All Indian presidénts have, thus far, been men.
 108 Public irstitutions in India
of state in politücal systems where parliamentary majorities are
seldom achieved, such as some of the systems in contunental Eu
rope.' If such an adjustment is not made, Indian presidents will
often be.unjustly accused of partisanship. To say this is to reiterate
ahd
not to deemphasize the commènt above aböus the nneed for
presidents to seek to. avoid the appearance of. partisanship.
This chapter is divided into four parts, Part I brnefly discusses
occasions when presidents åcted assertively in the period before
1989, Part I examines changes since then-the
reasons for and the
implicatiors of the emergence of hung parliaments, and the ten-.
dency ot some
extra-parliamentary institutións to become more
assertive. Part analyses the records of. India's three presidents
since 1989, with special reterence to
presidential assertiveness. Part
TV concludes by assessing the
capacity of the oftice ot the pYesident
to cope with the new ctallenges that have arisen.
. Presidertiai Assertiveness before 1989
Since this chapter deals mainly with
events since 1989, this discus:
sion of the period before that
year-when governments almost
aways had solid mnajorities in the Lok Sabha-can be rather brief.
More detailed discussions of thát era can be found élsewhere
.The limitations on the powers of presidents when goyetnnents
with soid parliamentary majorities wre in.place were
estäblísHed
during the term of office-(1950-62) of the first person to holdthat
office, Rajendra Prasad. He disagreed with Prime Minister Jawaharlál
Nehii on many questions ánd|twice sought privately toresist
decisions
threats
by the Nehri goverh.ment, On both ocasions, it required
o resignation from
the Prime Minister to.persúade Prasad
', to back down. But he did so, and this firmly established in.präctice
what the Constirution made clear on
can
paper-that while presidents
advise and warn governments and ask them "to recónsider
intended actions, they cannót déky the will ofa governmernt with
a inajority in the Lok Sabha.
Rajeidra Prasad made occasional public statéments which
arfoünted to veiled criticisms of the governmént,(as some of his
For an introduction to somé of these, see V. Bdgdanor, "Európean
Constiutional Monarchs' in.Butler and Low (eds).Sovereigns and Surrogates,
PP. 274-97.
SEeinparicular, Manor, 'India';and Manor, "The Prime Minister and...'
The Prsidency 1c9
successors have also
done). But these were largely tolerated, except
on one occasion-when he said, in effect, that a president need not
conform to the lirie laid down by the government. This vas,
understandably, sharply rebuffed. All of this left Prasad feeling
Powerless." As a civil servant who had served as his secretary put
it, THereas no substance there... under the high dorme of the
presidencial palace there was nothing ou: hollowness'
Most of the other six presidents who served berween 1952 and
1987 were far more restrained than Rajendra Prasad had been. One
of them, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed has, vith some
justice, been
criticized for being too restrained when presented arour:
on 25/26 June
1975 by Indira Gardhi and one min
request for the declaration of Emergency. He mig:
toreconsider, which would have prevented:
tacing a ait. accompli at 6 a.m. the rext mornin3
had been sélected for his pliabiliy, behaved as
expected ac
z2v
way.
Howeyer, Two later
presicenis in :nis per:OC Soug: C:te ic:c
ully' to assert' themselves. The first, N. Saniva Redd h o hec
oftice berween 1977 and 1932), enjoyed some success,
a.tnough iess
than he hoped for. On 15 July 1979, four days afte losing his
majority in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Morarji Desai of the
Janata Party offered his resignation to President Redcy vithout
requesting a dissoluion. Reddy then invited the Leader of the
Opposition, Y. B. Chavan, who headed the no-indira
Congress
party to seek to torm a government. When he failed to secure
adequate support, the President turned to Charan Singh, who led
a small .breàkaway group from the old Janata Party.
He initially appeared likely to obtain
a majority thanks to
support from. Indirà Gandhi's Congress pary, but when this sup-
port was abruptly withdrawn, Charan Singh resigned and tormally
requested the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha and call an
election.Since he had never obtained a vote of confidence, he had
little justification for making such request. His purpose in doing
a
so was to prevent an invitaion to the main body of the Janata
Party, which was now led by Jagjivan Ram, leader from thee
a
(ex-untouchäble) Secheduled Castes who appeared likely to receive
For more detail see Manor, 'The Prime
P. Chopra, 'After Charisma' ch. Minister and...'PP. 119-21.
9, p. 15.
110 Public Institutions in India
The Presidency 111
majority backing. President Reddy apparently
Ram the preferred to deny
premiership and acceded, very controversially, corruption' over the Bofors arms purchasing scandal-something
to Charan that would have triggered a full scale constitutional
Singh's request. Many observers crisis and,
vien-that Reddy. expected a fresh believed-rightly in this writer's probably, a general election. He lso claimed that Rajiv Gandhi
Parliament in which he could exercise election to produce a hung jnstructed an adviser to draw
up documents to impeach him.} In
more inflaence the event, neither man followed through with
Constitution intends. (See the diseussion of this danger inthan
the these drastic actions,
Part M and the matter ended in 1987 vhen Zail
below.) In the event, the election which of office. But he came
Singh completed his term
ensued yielded.a, solid
majoriry for Lndira Gandhi's Congress, sq that close to a spectacular act of presidential
Reddy may have harboured were thwarted. Butwhatever ambitions
he was plainly far
assertiveness.
The incidents
more assertive
than any of his predecessors had been. involving presidents Prasad, Reddy, and Zail Singh
were exceptions the
predominant trend in the pre-1989
to
those years, presidents.tended in the man to restrain period.
The other example of
presidentil assertiveness in the pre-1989 In
them-.
erioc occurred when prime
a minister had a solid-indeed, a four- selves-as was only natural, ziven the prevalence of decisive election
ths-majority in the Lok Sabha.
Rajiv.Gandhi had obtàined this results and Lok Sabha majorities. Since 1989, however, things haye
a iandslide
election victory at. the end of 1984, soon after. the changed and presidents have had to operate in very diferent
assassinauon ot his mother and cir
predecessor in oftice, Indira Gandhi. cumstances. Let us now consider the
e President
at the time, Giani Zail Singh, had been implhcations ot these changes.
nat post
by Indira
hand picked
Gandhi in 1982-in part þecause. he appeared
to do her
bidding.' I Rajiv Gandhi had hándled him sensi- II. Changes Since 1989: The Dispersal of Power ard
veiy, the President would probably have proved Assertivemess in Extra-Parlamertary Institutions
ble. But the Prime Minister, who entirely ame
came trom a anglicized highly As we saw in
the introduction to this
background, iound Zal Singh's rough and
ready ways in 1989 witnessed four chapter, the decade beginning
distastefi.
Rajiv Gandhi thereore set about ignoring him. He failed to parliamentary elections, none of which
his constitutional meet
obligation 'to.furnish such information...as the produced a Lok Sabha in vhich one party or alliance
President may call for'.1° majority support. There is more to say abour all of that,enjoyed
us first note that but let
This caused Zail Singh intense irritation, and in 1987, he made presidential elections do not occur
with parliamentary elections. simultaneously
his feelings plain-by threatening to withhold.assent from a piece Presidents areselected
of legislation, and then to
five-year tetms
views. During the very
by voicing his exasperation in press inter
public controversy that followed, it became
complex formula giving varying weights toindirectly,
votes by
by way of a

clear that the Prime both houses of Parliament, and of members of

Minister (in cooperátion with the very partisan
Speaker of the Lok Sabha)
nicate with the President.
Zail Singh later stated thatj out'of
actions were contemplated on
dent considered dismissing thè
This is discussed in much
Power...
For in account of the
'India', p. 163.
1
Constitution of India, Article
dies in office (which has state legislarures. f president
a
happened
election is held soon thereafter. Buttwic,
had virrually ceased rto visit or in 1969 and 1977), a fresh
commu
have served their full terms, since all presidents since 1977
this has meant that presidential elec-
the public eye, gravely serious tions have occurred in the second and seveath.
both sides of this dispute. The Presi-
decades. Table 3.1, a timeline, provides readers years of recent
government
for
'irresponsibility and of the staggered with
timings of presidential and parliamentàry overview
an
sincè, 1989. elections
greater detail in Manor, "Secking Greater
"See in
curious logie that led to this connection, M.
Limaye, Times
of India, 20 March 1987, On
his.selection, see Manor, a dubious attempt by presiding officers in
bar discussions the rwo
Houses of Parliament. to
of this matter, see A. G. Noorani, Indian
78.
tKtional Dimension, chs 8 and 9, Affairs: The Conisti

w*v*IT"""riv1* ***
 The Presidency 113
112 Public Instirations in lndia
We should also note that in the hung parliaments berween 1989
TABLE 3.1 than
India and 1999, some governments were much closer to majorities
Presidential and parliamentary elections in
others. This had a pôtént impact böth on their. capacitysurvival
to govern

Presidential elections.(name of winner) Parliamentary elections
1932 Jaivaharlal Nehru
1952(Prisad) 1957 Jawaharlal Nehn
authoritatively and on their prospects withof long-term in
s o m e presidents.)
:office. (It also affected their relations
Narasimha Rao's Congress party won large minorirythe
a ot the seats

1957 (Prasad) 1962 Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha.at.che 1991 election, and (unlike in previous
1962 (Radhakrishnan). like its total tally of
1967 (Husain) 1967 Indira Gandhi election. in 1989) 'no.other party had anything
difficult decisions-espe
seats. This enabled.it to make numerous
i969 (Gin) 1971 Indira Gandhi cially in che field of economic liberalization. It also meant that it
ofseeing out its fu!! tive-year term
had a reasonably good chance
1974 (Ahmec) 1977 Moraiji Desai/Charan Singh (aot least because the opposition to it
was divided berween paries
1977 Reddy) 1980 Indira Gandhi that stood to its left and to its right).
ater the par!ia
By contrast, the three parties that took power
1982 (Zail Singh) and 1998 were less (usually far less)
1984 Rajiv Gandhi mentary elections of 1989, 1996,
Ct sects
1987 (Venkataranan) securely placed. In 1989, the party with the larges: minoriy
1989 V.P. Singh the Congress) preterred not to torm a goverament, so jar:.ara (e
1991 Narasimha Rao* thanks to the support trom
next largest partyY) assumed power
Prime
1992 (Sharma) outside by the BJP and the Left. n mid-1990, however,
1996 Deve Gowda/Gujral Minister V.P.. Singh soúght to appeal to Índia's cisadvantaged the
section of voters by announcing hisrecommended implement
1997 (Narayanan) intention to
1998 A: B. Vajpayee reservations in
Mandal Commission repor which,
.1999 A. B. Vajpayee*
employment.and education for such groups. This caused the BJP
govermment fell. Ic was replaced
2002 (Kalam)
2004 Manmohan Singh to withdraw support and Singh's
by another government with an extremely. precarious hold
on

9 RajendrsPrasad became India's first president at the crestion of the Repüblië of

India.
power, led 5y Chandra Shekhar, which lasted, only a few months.
thar office, which he won,
on26 January 1950. But the first conventiona election to The 1991 election duly followed. form
occurred in 1952.
In 1996, the, largest single party (the BJP) was invitedtotoobtain
a government but- lasted only 13 days because it kailed
The star next to the prime minister's name in Table3,1 indicates
that his. party or aliianice had a reliable majority-on its own majority support in the Lok Sabha. A minority govèrnment was
then formed by H. D. Deve Gowda of the Janata Dal-that was
in the Lok Sabhá. This has happened only rwice since 1989. First,
Rao obtained:a dependent on the Congress party which did not join it. After just
the Congress government.of P. V.. Narasimha under a year, Congress refused to continue backing him, where
majoriry (in fact though not in name) 1993
in by bribing members upon another.Janata Dal leader (.K. Gujral) became prime min
of Patliameht, from the small Jharkand Mukti .Morcha a, sub, ister-with continued dependence on theCongress. His government
regional party) to oppose a noconlfidente vote against it, That lasted less than a year, and thus another parliamentary election
ssured the Narasimha.Rao goveroment of a"majority thrbughouti
occurred in 1998.
the rest öf. its five-yeár term, which ended in 1996. Second, the
That election brought in a government led by the BJP, which
National Democratic Alliance overnment led by Atal the
Bihari
depended for its very tenuous majority on an alliance with a large.
Vajpayee öbtained a rmajority (id harne, and in.fact) at. pårlia
mentary. electionof 1999 and at this writing, it tetains.it. number of smaller,máinly regional parties: It was led by Atal Bihari
 The Presidency 115
114 Public Institutions in India
India has had three presidents since 1989: R. Venkataraman (until
Vajpayee whose power was precarious-mainly becauseof
hold on
1992), Shankar Dayal Sharma more (1992-97), and K. R. Narayanan
his coalition partners. His.govern assertive? The answers vary.
very public squabbling among (since 1997). Did they. become
ment lasted into early 1999, bur, then collapsed when. Congress' The available evidence yields a 'maybe fór, Venkataraman, a
machinations with one coalition parthner.deprived it of å majority-
no' for Sharma, anda 'yes' for Naryanan. This takes some explain
episodein which (as we shall see) presidential intervention played
an
:Ing.
a part. After several monthsin which Vajpayee headed a.
caretáker In his memoirs, PresidentVenkataraman takes pains to show
election of 1999 gave his newly constiuted
behaved with great restraint, It is clear that to address
on many
gOvernment, the general that he
and expanded alliance the first clear majority in decade.:
a
between occasions, hè was indeed restrained. But he largely failsIt has been
The point of all of this is that-except for the period
the one episode which, has generared grest controversy.
1991 (or m o r e accurately, 1993) and 1996-no governmnt in
the Lok Sabha. This dleged that in 1989-either before the|parliamentary election pro-
ten years after 1989 was securely placed in produced an inconclusive
senior posts in instiutions that stood cess had been completed, or-just afterft minister at
inspired people occupying ministries t o begin result-he made efforts to get himself elected as primeto have been
beyond the direct superv1s1on of goverhment is
the head oB a government of national uicy. This said
to a degree that had.been'unthinkabl before
asserting themselves
1959 when parliamentary majorities were the rule. inspired both by his own ambitions anp by the widespread anxiety stable
advent of hurng parlia that no leader or party in that Lok Sabha could, provide and
itis, however, worth asking whether|the government. These allegations are mdstly expressed verbally
mens-and the dispersal ot power away. trom prime ministers, in They ome trom a number ot people
Hew have appeared print."
their cabinets and parliaments which followed from it-fully ex who beld prominent posts in various politica parues.at
that time.
available
plan this increased assertiveness. The evidence already This writer has stated previously that there
is insufficient evidence
clearly indicates that it did not-other things the
mattered too.
available to substantiate these charges.' The only significant source
recognize that.not all of instirutions.which that has lately emerged is
It is important to
control.of. central government ministries of fresh evidence on this episode
were beyond the, direct
and the Election Commmission enkataraman's memoirs and, not surprisingly, there is nothing in
became more asserive. The judiciary them to lend credence to the allegations." Byt a recent discussion
this period, and so did state govern analysts in Delhi.indicated thar
plainly asserted themselves inBut some other such' institstions
did o f this matter with leading. political
in the federal system. refuse to die down. Thase analysts have heard stories
ments
some of these variations are explained by the alegations
not do so. It appears that
these Certain of the then president's manouevres from too many politicians to
within in_tituuons.
the personalities of key figures (whose disbelieve them. So we must leave the' matter open by saying that
activist judges, certain chief ministers in state governments ay be Venkataraman made such an attempt.
ruling partiesin'New*
number included botlf allies and opponents ofCommissionerT:N. The case of, President Shankar Dayal Sharma is mare straight
Delhi), and the'irrepressible Chief Election torward: Press reports and ocher evidence an his presidency, includ.
Seshan were plainly more inclined to act'forçefully
than were senior ng interviews with.people who' had frequent ençoyunters.withThe his
restraint.
tigures in some other institutions. tat, consistently indicate char he behaved with great
orly suggestion tharhe mighthave soughr to assert himself cane
III. Have Presidents become imore Assertive sirce 1989? tom a knowledgeable Indian analyst who said that he accasionally
Let now rurn, in this context,
us the actions of, India's presidents
to But see M. Limaye,Declire ofa Polirical System, p. 119. I do not regard
since 1989. We must consider two questions. First, did:those presi- Madhu Limaye as an unimpeachable source.
dents become more assertive? Second, insofar as they
did, was their DJ. Manor; "The Prime Minister and..., p. 135..
the advent of hung
assertiveness'more adequately explained by () See chapters 21 and 22 of R. Venkataraman, My Preridential Years.

parliaments or () personal proclivities?

116 Public Institutions in India
tried to influence events in a non-intrusive way-probably by way
of 'advice to prime minister which is routine
thus appears to have acted in the tradition of
practice Sharma
his more cautious
predecessors befqre 1989. He did so even though the government
that held power quring his last year in oftice
was very precariously
placed, so that he might have exerted çonsiderable leverage. So in
an era of hung
pkrliaments, it is plainly not inevitablè that presi.
dents will become more assertive. But they may become so, if they
are personally indlined that way-as the case of Sharma's successor
vividly lustrates.
President K. R. Narayanan has held office since 1997. When he
took up his pöst, he announced that he intended to bè á 'working
President-a comment which suggested that he would be more
proactive than many of his predecessors. His record sinee then has
conirmed that initial impression. As we shall see, some observers
believe that he has gone beyond the constitutional limitations of
his office. We need to consider his actions in some detail.
The first clear sign that he intendd to assert himself.came in 1998.
He was asked by the Janata government headed by I. K. Gujral
whose hold on power was rather tenuous) to endorsé the impos
tion of President's Rule in the stàte of Uttar Pradesh. He sent the
proposal.back to the Cabinet with a request that they reconsider it,
and they then chose not to pursue the matter: Narayáñan won.many
plaudits for this action, since thére.wás widespread disenchantment
in India with ihe excessive use of President's Rule for partisan
purposes. He was hully within his constinutional rights in asking the
government to reconsiderits decision. But hethen said publicly that
Tam not a rubber staimp". This statement.was, if narrowly.inter-
pfeted, an accurate descriptíon of his office. But it raised guestions
abouthis willingness to accept ädvice from goverhientswhich
the Constitution plainly requires him to do.
After the 1998 election brought in a coalition governmentled
by the BJP-again without a firm grasp on powerPresident
Nriyanan provoked gteater contraversy on several ocasions. The
first occurrd in August of 1998: Presidents traditionally give an "
'
Interview, New Delhi, s Octóber 2000.
15
Düring that 1998 episode, the test of this would bave come had the
Cabinet.sedt the request for President's Rule backro him a second time. But
théy declined to do so.
The Presiderncy 117
address to the nation on 14 August, the eve of Independence Day.
By convention, a president sends the text of his speech to the
government for verting-and there have been occasions (notably in
che time of President Zail Singh) when suchchose
tes were chen altered
not to make such
On ministers' advicç. Ln 1993, Narayanan
anaddress, but to substicute an interview with a leading journalist.
The content of the.interview could not be veted by ministers in
ãdvance. During the interview, the president auorly made clear
nis discomíort with the Hindu nationalist ideology of the ruling
BJP. An eminent journalist, Kuldip Nayar (who is no supporer of
: the BJP) óbserv d that-even though the govermment ielt too weak
co raise objections-Narayanan had been 'instiuionall;y vrong' to
take chis.action,"
The next day, at a meeting in the Central Hal! oi Parliament to
mark the end ot thè SUth year ot india's indepesdent exiSter.ce, tne
president gavé an address that had not been vettad in acvarce by
the government. Early in th speech, he noted th led
government had.been in power tor iive"months. Thern iate:, he
criticized people holding public office who saw it 'as ar opporu
nity to strike gold'. The reference can of course be read to reie:
to. poluticians of all parties, but coming atter the menuon ot che
existing. government in New Delhi, it was seen by some to be
direeted at thát particular governmeat. This provoked the same
journalist to say that Narayanan had engaged in 'violation(s) of
precedent..twice, in two days'. He added that in earlier publi
statements, the:President 'has challenged the eaire direction of the
new economic policy"' to which most major parties were largely
sympathetic,.
Inearly 1999, when one of the larger parties in the BJP's nuling
coálition exited from it, the -government appeared to have lost its
majority. At,that.point, President Narayanan stepped in and re
quested Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to establish-through
à vote in che Lok Sabha-that he still had majority support.
The President was within his rights in making this request-the
Indian Constitution lays down next to no detailed guidelines for
presidents in such siruations. But three, objections might be raised
nonetheless. First, Indian and Commonwealth precedents-for the
Herald, 27 August 1998.
"I Deccan
Tbid.
 The Presidency.119
118 Public Institutions in lndia
believed that since this was not
alformal addréss such ás he gives
most part-strongly suggest that
inaction circumstances is
in such at the opening of a session of Parliament, he need not submit it for
the convention. (Note however, () that Lidia's Constirution explic
itly states that the president is not bound by precedents or conven vetting. He was probably right, since there' are no clear rules
available for such occasions. But predictably, the
tions from other.countries, and (i1) presidents have ignored Indian speech triggered
trong, positive reactions from the opposition parties. The Con-
precedents established by their own predecessors often enough to gress party hailed the President's 'vise words' as 'a lamp unto our
make them, in practice, less than binding." Indeed, the evidence eet and light unto our path'. A Communist Pary of India Marxist
suggests that the.office of the president does not even.keep record
a
of such precedents. 3) Second, the President,might have expected
leader stated that he had adopted the "correct position'" The.
of
following month, after the ruling B]P'spjournal had accused.the
the opposition parties in Parliament to table an early vote no President of being'partial' and.of.having 'descended into politics
confidence-which provided a inaction: Third,
further reason for
Congress party spokesman protested at what he regarded as a
BP sympathizers could and did argue that the Prime Minister. vituperative act of calumny' intended to "besmirch' the President's
was enutled to continue in office untl a
vote of no-contidence reputátion,
succeeded. Unt! hat happened, in their view, the: President re The point here is that any president who is as assertive as
mained bound by advice.trom the. government vhich obviously Narayanan should expecr such exaggerationand he is, plainly,
would not have asked him to'act as. he did,:
This is to say that canny enough to understand this. Presidents should also be aWare.
Narayanan vas pushing his powers t o the'limit.
o f one other thing which compounds this probiem-when so-called
There is another dimension to all of this that cannot
be ignored. constitutional experts' provide instant commentaries to Indian
and the two Vajpayee newspapers on episodes involving the presidency, their views are
The diierences berween President Narayanan usually intended to serve the interests of one or another party) Are
governnents (betore and after the
1999 genera election-since as
w e shall aee, diferences
did not end in 1998) have been greatly these inevitable exaggerations and poliical controversies good ei
them,2slightly or ther for his office or for the polity? President Narayanan has
exaggerated. Many newspapers have overplayed
have gone about this very obviously concluded that with this, but numerous
he can live
extrayagantly, and opposition parties
obseryers-including many who are not trie believers of the Hindu
2ggressively. berween the President righ-have misgivings."
Clear differences emerged in January 2000 decisiontoreview One futher incident needs to be noted. In March 2000, Presi
and the Prime Minister over the government's
the Constitution--differences which were
set: out by. Narayanan dent Clinton of the US visited India. At a state banquer in.
at the cèlebration of' the
fiftieth Clinton'shonour, President Narayanan departed from the text of
in another un-vetted speech
Constitution. Press reports indicated
that he speech prepared by Ministry of External Affairs-which,
the
annivér_ary of the
again, he is apparently tree to do: Atter several positive references
of
See for example, the discussion' precedents
with regard to the disso to the US, he said that (as one newspaper paraphrased him)
obalisation was fast reducing the world to á global village but
'
eleçtion day, in Manor, 'The Prime Minister
Jution of Lok Sabha's prior to the Cold War
ne that did not need a "headman"', He¢ alludd to
and.pp. 1334
request during the election campaign of entality that' still infuences, American policy, and emphasized
See President Venkataramán's optíons-whiçh appears.to imply that
1989 that a note be preapred on possible
continuing releyance of the Non-Alignd Movement, although
in Venkataraman, My.
no record of precedents
(Indian or foreign). existed,
be stressed that many other Common.
Presidential Years; pp,314-15.It should
"
lack Hindu, 28 January 2000.
(including' the British monachy) also apparently
wealth heads of state. are often, and in part Hindu, 18 February 2000.
records of prccedents-though such matters S e for example, the editorials in the Times.ofIndia and Hindu, both on
such lists or in
understandably, shrouded secrecy. a0 editorial in the
Hindustan January 2000.
See the criticism of other publications in
Times, 24 March 2000.
.!
 **

The Presideny 121

120 Pablic Institutions in india
for insuficiently responsive and inclusive. There is thus a need to find
that went unmentioned in the government's Nationäl Agenda
ways to open government up to previously excluded groups, to
Governance."
This speech offended the Americans and cáused intense anxiety ensure that diversity is respected,; and to seek greater synergy
from berween state and society.
in India'sExternalAffairs Ministry. It provoked rebukes even
earlier outspo This writer. should.come clean and say that he agrees with these
newspaper editors who have supported Narayanan's thiat he règafds this for acting more asser
motive
kenhess. The iasué was not whether he iwas fre to depärt krom": views, and thus
theMinistry's text, but the things that he said when .he did so tively, as dmirabl : It is
also worth strèssing,that presidents have
not just.the option but a responsibility to raise moral and consti
The Hirdustan Times argued thät °Elementary courtesy dictates
house, you tiçiónal concerns. But we shall see later in this discussion that even
thatwhen you are hösting' a man tor dinner in your remarks'. t when such motives and concerns inspire presidential assertiveness,.
do hor sternly lecrurè him.or make vaguely insulting
in the complex of. foreiggn it can still do unintended damage.
asked, 'should.be. bè flying solo.
area

relations26 The second thing which appears to lie behind the presicdent's
It is worth dwelling a little longer on the case of. Naryanan, : actions is closely linked. to the first He comes from a severely
disadvàntaged community, and teels-again understandably-that
because ofthe three presidents who haveserved since 1989-he has
iaeas that. he therefore.has á special responsibiliry to do ali that he can to
been the most påtently assertive. Let us consider the will
have inspired him to.act in this way (which
appear to
rell
us catalyse change that.may help such excluded groups.
He may also be inspired by a third idea, which is more vorrying.
the implications of this era of hung parliaments foor
nore about his actions This is the notion thát he has been elected bya wider constituency
the actions and then. the implications of
of presidents), "

the wider polity in an era of hung parlia- than. that which supports not the present ruling coalition, the
for the presïdency and National Democratic Alliance, but the BjP which leads it. The BJP
ments.
to be expluned
President Narayanan's assertiveness.appears of.which yielded so, manyo seats at the last election to its allies that both
the total nurmber of seats that it won and its share of the popular
mainly by wo or perhaps three ideas, each is pro-. for
of the national vorc were somewhat limited. It would not be entirely illogical
bably more impprant, than the changed character :Narayanan to conclude that-despite the fact that he was indirectly.
party system since 1989 that is the. main cause of hung pårlia
ments.
elected-the large number of MPs and state legislators who sup
First, like mady others in Delhi thése days, he appears to believe ported him constirute a broader political base than the BJP now
that the legitimacy, of goverament in India is in some doubt, póssesses. If that is in his mind, it might make him feel justified in
it.
and that new appróaches to development,are needed to restore acting more assertively.
of This is worying for reasons that were set forth, very percep
These questiöns about legitimay do not arise because changes tively-long before anyone imagined an era of hung parliaments
in the parry system and thé terndency toward hung paYliaments
of it.
those things are more symptoms of the problem, not cakses by Jagjivan Ram." In an interview with Pran Chopra in the late
The pröblem is that:government h¡s come, to be perceived as 1960s he expressed' the following concern.

A presideat who chooses to play polities caa,in fact make himself formidableis
a

attempt to play down power because the only restraint which Parlianent exercise upon him
can
Hindustan Time, 24 March 2000. A subsequent oa impeachment which requires three-fourths majority and a president who has
a
differences berween, the president and thë góvernmént thesé issues. (Hindä, '.".
27 March 2000) is unpersuasive.
26 24 March.2000. It should in fairness be stressed tbat President Narayanan Anxieies similar to those expresed by Jagjivan Ram appeared in the early
See.for example the 1950s in learned commentaries on India's Constinution, but it is unclear
has not always beed at odds with the BJP-led govemment,
in
reference to echoes between his and the Prine Minister's major speeches whether. Ram had read, them. It appears quite possible that be developed this
August 2000, in Hindu, 18 August 2000. insight independently.
 The Presidency 123
122 Public institutions in lIndia
There are good reasons to think that it may nor be possíble for ,
never fail obtain sufficient support
played his political game with skill can to
any party to construct such broad alliances prior to the next few
in Parliament to [th»wan this]."
general elections. In 1999, when it set about consuructing its huge
Ram was mistaken about one detail-impeachment requires a wo alliance of 24 parties, the BJP found its way almost entirely open-
thirds majoritý of the total members of both houses, of Parliament because the Congress party unwisely declined to seek a broad
force' was in
not just those present and voting. Buf
his basic point has always coalition, and because the old Centre-Left."third
been valid, and in an era of hung pariaments, it ácquires stillgreater serious disarray. But now that coalition-building has earned iIt at
force. If majority were ea_ily .obtainable in a Lok Sabha,
no
an least rwo and probably more years in' power, the BJP is very likely
to be çhallenged in the game of alliance-building at
kurure elec-
ambitious president might seek to assist, someone to become prime
minister on the understanding that the latter would then.permit
the tions-by one or both of the alternatives. That will probably ensure
the than the that smaller parties, which have consistencly garaered substantial
head of state greater intluence over. government
votes for a decade, will be-sufficiently divided berween rival alli-
Constiution intends. Such a president might even seize efèctive.
ances that no alliance gains majority. On present form, it would
control of the government by issuing orders without: taking the be not require the loss of many coalition partners to rival
alliances tor
acvice ofminister_. An Indian president's orders need do, not to

others, as.is the practice the BJP to lose its hope of a majoriry.
countersgned by the primè minister or
some other systems." This is not to suggest that"President To say this is not to predict that an era of bung parliaments will
does not. But Presi. continue indefinitely. Majorities in the Lok Sabha may well becomne
Narayanan intends any such thing-he clearly obtainable again-probably in one ot two ways. A wrenching event
cent Reddy appears to have attempted
to acquire great leverage over
So this is å concern- that akin to the assassination cf Lndira Gandhi in 1984 might o c c u r
a government in mid-1969
in just this way.
o r aliance a thumping victory. Or what the
deserves greater attention in India.. and give one
party
the. French cal! an 'issue of regime'-a dispute over fundamental prin-
Let us now turn to the implications, for the presidency and
Ciples of governance-may arise. We have seen examples of this
on
which President
polity more generally, of the kind'of assertiveness
need to recognize two occasions in India-and borth times heity parliamentary majori
Narayanan has: engaged; in. To grasp these,.we. ties resulted. In 1971, Lndira Gandhi proposed to abolish poverty,
that huture elections-t least over
the medium term--are.ikely to
or more of what-we have and persuaded voters that their chojce lay berveen reaction and
produce either more hung parliaments
,.

that is
may breák. up. This. likely reform. In 1977, the Janata' alliance (or perhaps Indira Gandhi's
today, coalition governments parliaments after Emergency regime) persuaded them that the choice lay berween
because the conditions which produced four hung
1989 still exist. Voting patterns at the 1999 general
election,which democracy and autocratic rule. It is conceivable that another 'issue
"of regime' might arise-even if none is visible at present.
alliance a parliamentary. majority, differed little
gave the BJP-led But in the absence of such things, hung pariaments appear likely
from those seen in the previous four elections. Huge numbers of to persist for some time. And even if one alliance manages.to scrape
citizens continued to support.small regional
caste-based parties.
or

The difference in 1999 was' nor

that thé BjP gained more seats or through with a majority, it is unlikely to be very secure, So we
but that it constructed an alliance in should expect continuing uncerainty and instability at the national
popular votes.than before, included a these :level for some time yet. These things.will require.presidents to
very large number of
advance of the election that become more proactive and, if you like, assertive-even if they
do
smallerparties. not wish to do so-becaus there will be more occasions on which
P. Chopra, 'After the refereeing that only presidents can do becomes necessary
Ram, Par.I, p. 4, in
Chopra interview with.Jagjivanof the Office of Prime Minister in India', If that happens, it wil be more important than ever that the
Evolution
Charisma: A Study of the this.
ultimate referee (the president) is perceived to be non-partisan aince
*
I amgrateful to Pran Chopraforsharing
unpublished manuscript (1970-1). without that, the legitimacy of the outcomes of his réfereeing-that
material with me,
Ibid., ch. 9, p. 15.
124 Public Institations in india
The Presidenicy 125
is, national governments-will be open to question. This exceed.
ingly important. There are thus more compelling
is front at various times. It is a matter of public record that a small
reasons now than
before 1989 for presidents to do their utmost to avoid number of officers from the Indian Administrative Service, other
(8F misperceptions) that they are partisan. Such perceptions "services, and the armed forces have worked under various presi-
perceptions
anjustifiäBly-often enough evern before the onset of the era ofårose- dents. But conversations with some who have done so indicate that
parliaments 30 hung néarly, all of those people dealt with the running of Rashtrapati
iñ
sum: eveh though an era of hung parliaments creates gieater Bhavan and with state ceremonials. It appears that only a small
handful havé provided support to the president /n his political role
opporrunities-and often the necessity-for presidents to act asser and.that only one person is in a position to play a subs tantial role-
tively, it also generates sttong: new teasons 'for president not to do the secretary to the president. And as we shail see, even this has not
so, becausë asseriveness tends to generate suspicidns of partisanship always happened in practice.
evenwhen.there is no such intention. The secretary has a very difficult job
It is at the best of times. And
only far to add that in an era of hung parliaments, people in an era when
in India need hung parliaments have become he norm, that job
become more tolerant of legitimate presidential
to
1S-potentially at least-excruciating. Given all o: that, what do we
intervenuons-because the changed conditions will inevitably re *" know of.the people who have served secreraries? iere agun,
quire more of these. They.need to develop the kind of
to see that willingness
presidents seek to fostër sustainable governments intormatión is dificult to come by. Indeed, al oi the i7 vell
in intormed civil servants.(active and retired).who have spoken abobut
iragmented parliaments that exists in, for example, Iraly, But it is this to the
unrealisic to expect this change of view to present writer have asked (understancebl cr anory
the medium term,
presidents
happen'swiftly-so over
need to take great care to,ensure
ty, and have requested that their comnents be conre:"ad in sce
their interventions are that What vague terms. Nonetheless, even these commer.s pro71de s
indeed legitimate.. with one startling-and
IV The Shortfall-Some of the worrying-insight.
Senior. officials who worked in powerhul deparnents oi the
Support for the President Time-in Staf Government of India during the 1990s and who dealt with the office
of the president found the
Given the new burdens which qualiry of the people holding the post
presidents must bear, how wel of secretary to be rather variable,
They report that at least one and
equipped is the ofice of the president to deal with them? This is probably cwo of the three presidents who served in that period
a question siat
was never ásked, so far as I can tel, before 1989 by preterred to have secretaries who fell short of top quality. They
any analýst-including me. adopted that.approach.because they wished to shoulder the political
Over 400 people work on the president's staff, but burdens of this great office almost entirely by themiselves. Only one
them attend to the maintenance and management of nearly. all
of
of the three presídents in that period is
Rashtrapati
Bhavan (the presidenr's house)tending its vast gardenis, said.to have sought out a
the building ready for glittering state occasions keeping secretary who was fornidably equipped in his own nght to provide
heads of and visits by foreign substantial assistancé on .matters governmental and political.
stateetc. Only a tiny number of people These sources .further state that, in the
to the president in his'dealings with the government provide suPper days when less able
seçretaries were in place, senior officials in key ministries of the
of the day and
other groups-not east the
teract with him.
opposition parties-which seek to in Goyernment dk Lndia made íew, attempts to develop dialogues
of any substance with those secretaries. This was true even of
Such is the confidentiality (in the Prime: Ministes's Office. Those officials held back because
many ways, rightly) that surrounds
that side óf his activjties that it is
very diffiçult to obtain information they believed () that these secretaries were. not
ticated exchanges, and () that the presidents capable
of sophis
even on
exactly hop many people Have served presidents on that who had selected
See for example, chese secretaries
312-13.
Venkataraman, My Presidential Years, pp. 248-9.and preferred co handle serious political matters all by.
themselves. This meant that che only meaningful dialogues that
 126 Public Institutions in India
The Presidency 127
:
occurred: in those periods
between important ministries
involved ministers and presidentsandthem
oftice of the president the
References
selves. Only when a highly competent secretary held office did Bogdanor, V. (1991); 'European Constirutional Monarchs' in D. Butler
detailed discussions of
tal and strategic mattersimmensely imporant political, governmen. and D. A. Low (eds), Sovereigins and Surrogates, London: Macmillan,
took place berween seniòr officials PP. 274-97,
ministries and the in key Chopra, Pran (1970-1), 'Aker Charisma: A Srudy of the Evolution of the
This
secretary in question.
strongly suggests that during most of the 1990s, presidents Office of Prime Minister in India', unpublished manuscript.'
Deccan Herald (1998), 27
were less
fully informed on matters of state (and, necessarily, on August.
Hindu (2000), 'Cong () hails President's "wise words" 28 January.
politics than they should have been and than they may have
wished to be. It must be stressed that the 2000), 'A cautionary note, 29 January,
presidents who selected
less-than-formidable secretaries. were themselves decidedly able (2000),'Cong condeamns "attack" on President, 18 February.
(2000), 27 March.
men who were
quite capable
of
dealing,. on their own, with (2000), 18 August.
complex issues in a sophisticated .manner. But despite that, their Hindustan Times (2000), 'Editorial', 24 March.
approzches clearly left them deprived of the full flow of informa- Manor, James (1988), "Seeking Greater Power and Constirutiona Change:
tion ron key ministries that
occurred when an outstand1ng person India's,President and the Constitutional Crisis of 1979' in D. A. Low
servec aS secretay. We aiso know that
at timés, both of: those ed), Constitutional Heads and Political Crses: Commorvealth Ep
highiy skilled presidents were not in the best of health. There were sodes, 1945-85, London: Macmillan, pp. 126-41.
periods in which one of those presidents striggled visibly just (1991), "lndia', in D. Butler and D. A. Low (eds), Soureigns and
Surrogates: Constitutional eads of State in the Commonwea.th, Lon
to fulfl ninima ceremonial duties.
{And, if we consider: certain don: Macmillan, pp. 144-70.
earlier periods, we know that not every man who has
served as (1994), The Prime Ministerand the President' in J. Manor (ed.),
president has possessed the ability and sophistication to handle his Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office of Prime Minister in Irdis,
political duties with any adequacy-even .if he was served by a London: Hurst && Co., pp. 115-37.
formidable secretary.) Limaye, M. (1987), Times ofIndi4, 20 March.
All of this raises doubts about the capacity of the office of the (1992), Decline of a Palitical System, Allababad: Wheeler.
Noorani, A. G. (1990), Indian Afjairs: The Constitutional Dimersioz, Delhi:
president to.cope with the political burdens that are placed upon
Stosius Ine/Advent Books Division.
it. The only occasion that we know about when a president sought Tirpes of Indis (2000), Editorial, 29 January.
to expand his team of advisers on governance was when President (2000), "The President and foreign policy, Chennai, 27 March.
Rajendra Prasad asked Nehru to permit this in the early daysof Venkataraman, R. (1994), My Presidential Years, New Delhi: ndus.
the Republic. The proposal was understandably. rejected then,because
the Prime Minister was rightly concerned about Prasad's desire for
an expansion of presidential powers. But how.that the. burdens
of the presidency have clearly expanded because bf changes in th
national-level party system, an expansion of the .president's staf
of urgency, It is not
appears in a very diferent bght, as a marter this
sor a foreign observer such as this writer, suggest solutions:to
to
problem. Indian leádersare fully capable ráckling
of this mater. But
in recent
it is important to recognize that, .sometime
years,

genuine problem has existed.

Austin for this information.
31
I am gratehul to Granville