Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI Governments (2002-18)

Author(s): Muhammad Quraish and Fakhr-ul-Islam

Source: Policy Perspectives , Vol. 15, No. 3 (2018), pp. 197-208
Published by: Pluto Journals

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.15.3.0197

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An
Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)
Muhammad Quraish, Fakhr-ul-Islam

Abstract

This paper endeavors to assess the effectiveness of the government of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa (KP) interventions vis-à-vis reducing and preventing terrorism
through peacemaking initiatives during 2006-2016. The article attempts to
answer the question of what did and did not work for counter terrorism and
peacemaking in the province. An overview of the conciliatory and repressive
actions that targeted the militants in KP in the last one and half decade are
outlined. The stipulated analysis period i.e. 2002-18 witnessed the birth of
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the evolution of National Action Plan (NAP),
National Internal Security Policy (NISP) and FATA merger with KP. In the study,
the actions of three different KP provincial governments i.e. Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA), Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led
governments, have been analyzed on the Dugan and Chenoweth Scale (DCS).
The DCS measures the Government Actions in Terror Environment (GATE) using
the seven-point conciliation-repression scale. The research analysis avows to
promote a social change through peace making and ensuring the rule of law
principles while implementing the counter insurgency strategy simultaneously, it
also offers an array of recommendations to the KP government to ensure peace
by applying a peace making and building driven counter insurgency protocols.

Post 9/11 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Following the fall of the Afghan Taliban government in 2001, Taliban

retreated across the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Counter
insurgency operations started in the tribal areas and later on during
2002-2006, a gradual trickledown effect of terrorism reached Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan. In 2006, the growing militancy
culminated and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) came into existence as
a militant insurgent organization. On the political front, Muttahida Majlis–
e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of six religious political parties, was in power
in KP from 2002 to 2007. In 2002 general elections, MMA managed to
galvanize public sentiments, catching on the fall of Taliban government
in Kabul and foreign invasion of Afghanistan. The election did not simply
bring MMA to power but created an enabling climate for the Islamisation
of the socio-political system. During the MMA government (2002-2007),


Muhammad Quraish, PhD Scholar at Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar.
Fakhr-ul-Islam, PhD, Professor and Director at Pakistan Study Centre, University of
Peshawar.
[197]

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) too re-surfaced in

Swat in 2006 after its long oblivion since 2001. In July 2007, the security
environment sharply deteriorated after the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque)
operation in Islamabad. Simultaneously, Mullah Fazal Ullah (MFU)
emerged as TTP Swat commander.1 The MMA regime initiated peace talks
with MFU and struck a verbal agreement with TNSM/TTP to ease tension
over the use of an illegal FM radio station.2 According to the agreement,
the TNSM agreed to end its forceful drive against music and TV etc. and
in return the KP government promised to release TNSM activists. On the
genesis of TTP, MMA government seemed more tolerant and were
considered on the same page with MMA to the extent of ultimate
objective of supremacy of Shariah, at least. They preferred not to be
seen as obstructing those advocating and struggling for the same cause. 3
In the meantime, MMA tried to introduce Hisba law on the themes of
Islamic jurisprudence and accountability. The controversial part of the
proposed Law was the establishment of the office of Muhtasib (a qualified
religious scholar from Islamic education system) serving as an
ombudsman to whom the people could convey their grievances about the
presence of un-Islamic behaviours in the society.4 Hisba Bill was passed
twice by the KP Assembly and each time was referred to the Supreme
Court, where it was struck down on grounds of being “vague, overbroad,
unreasonable, based on excessive delegation of jurisdiction, denying the
right of access to justice to the citizens and attempting to set up a parallel
judicial system”.5 MMA was caught in intra-alliance rift during the later
years of their tenure in office and were presumed to have been unable
to make a positive impact.

After 2008 general elections, the Awami National Party (ANP)

took over the government from the MMA. The province was then passing
through the storm of militancy and insurgency. ANP is considered a
secular ethnic Pashtun political party. Nonetheless, it initiated
negotiations with the TTP and opted for peace-making through use of
force. This was a resuscitation of political strategy akin to that used by
the ANP leader Bacha Khan during British Raj. ANP’s government actions
in terror environment (GATE) can be summed up in five various phases.
The first phase comprises of the series of peace talks with TNSM and TTP.

1
S.M. Zaidi. “The Taliban Organization in Pakistan.” The RUSI Journal 154 (5) 2009:
40-47.
2
Muhammad Waseem, Maryam Mufti, Religion, Politics and Governance in Pakistan.
Birmingham, 2009: University of Birmingham.
3
Sultane Rome. “Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat” in Pakistaniaat: A Journal of
Pakistan Studies, 2011: University of Karachi 3 (1):53-79.
4
Fakhrul Islam. Mutabadil Adalati Nizam Aur Swat Operation (Urdu). 2011: University
of Peshawar: Institute of Regional Studies.
5
Joshua T White. “Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier”, Religion & Security Monograph Series, Vol. 1. 2008,
Arlington: Center on Faith & International Affairs.
[198]

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)

This phase commenced in May 2008, immediately after ANP came to

power. The peace-making phase lasted till January 2009. In the second
phase, the ANP government came up with Nizam-e-‘Adal Regulation
(NAR) as a counter terrorism instrument and to accommodate the TTP
demand for enforcement of Shariah in Malakand region. NAR was signed
by the President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari in April 2009. The third phase
started when peace did not return to Swat or Malakand region even after
the NAR promulgation and TTP expanded itself to neighboring areas and
gaining more social space. The forth phase commenced when the ANP
regime finally asked for army support to clear the area. Meanwhile, on
the political front in the fifth phase, ANP patronized local peace
committees (LPCs) to encourage the local population to fight the
insurgents at the grassroots level. In this phase, the ANP leadership and
workers were targeted and as claimed by ANP, 700 of its workers were
killed.6 In this phase, the government also worked on rehabilitation of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and rebuilding of the damages done
to the government installations in wake of terrorism. In the last phase,
though the KP government’s counter insurgency strategy (COIN) was put
in place in 2012 but the general elections were not far away and the ANP
was in the exit mode. The strategy was hardly implemented during their
tenure.

In May 2013 general elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)

came into power in KP. It formed coalition government with Jamaat-e-
Islami and Qaumi Watan Party. PTI insisted that the war on terror was
not Pakistan’s own war, but the United States’ war and that Pakistan
should not fight a proxy war. GATE as related to the PTI government in
its first year in office, was dominated by the narrative of restoring peace
in the Malakand region following the COIN operations. PTI had always
demanded withdrawal of military from the area. But even when the PTI
government moved to withdrawing army from Malakand, it was scuttled
by the Peshawar High Court (PHC) in September 2013. The PHC
expounded that there were law and order issues and military needed to
stay longer in Malakand region.7 The second quarter of 2013 resonated
with the PTI’s demonstration against the US drone air strikes in Pakistan.
The PTI came out on the roads and blocked the NATO supply lines at
Peshawar.8 Two months after this blockade, a terrorist attack on Dera

6
Khadim Hussain. Political Cost the ANP Paid in its Fight Against Extremists.
Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies
7
Shuaib ur Rehman. “PHC stops KP govt from pulling out Army from Malakand
Division,” Business Recorder, https://www.brecorder.com/2013/09/17/136376/phc-
stops-kp-govt-from-pulling-out-army-from-malakand-division/
8
“PTI blocks Nato supplies at five points in KP,” The News,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/634468-pti-blocks-nato-supplies-at-five-
points-in-kp
[199]

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

Ismail Khan Jail in KP took place and it posed the first challenging episode
for the PTI government to respond.9 On legislative side, the PTI regime
made important amendments and new anti and counter terrorism laws
were introduced, including the Explosive Substance Act, Restriction of
Rented Buildings Act, Restriction of Hotel Businesses Act, Security of
Sensitive, Vulnerable Establishments Act and Police Act. The last quarter
of 2014 witnessed the most horrific terrorist attack on the Army Public
School (APS) Peshawar in which around 150 school children and adults
were brutally killed. In early 2015, the next GATE stage was set for
responding to the APS incident and its aftermath. At this juncture, the
Federal Government came to the forefront and formulated first ever
counter terrorism strategy called National Action Plan (NAP). For the NAP
implementation, the army led COIN operations Zarb-e-Azb and Radd ul
Fasad.10 During the PTI tenure, the Federal Government also enacted
new anti-terrorism legislation namely Protection of Pakistan Act in 2014.
The Act granted security forces additional powers like arresting the
suspects and searching houses without search warrants. These powers
were given to deal with extra ordinary situation initiatives. These federal
actions helped provincial government of PTI in their efforts to bring law
and order to the people. Rehabilitation of the IDPs from North Waziristan
Agency (NWA) and repatriation of Afghan refugees to their homeland
continued during these years. In a controversial move, the PTI
government allocated PKR 300 million for Dar-Ul-Uloom Haqqania (a
large religious seminary known to have produced many of the senior
members of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan) at Nowshera with a
view to mainstream it. PTI government also started suggesting the
merger of federally administered tribal areas (FATA) with Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and abolition of their distinct status with respect to
governance and application of national laws. PTI believed that merger
would bring a sense of inclusion and development to these areas, which
would bring a stop to terrorism, insurgency and violence.11

This study

With the quick recap of the events in context, this study aims at filling
the research gap in literature. As a matter of fact, no research specifically
studies the government actions in a terror environment (GATE),
especially the provincial governments actions. In the context of Khyber

9
“230 prisoners escape in TTP's DI Khan jail attack,” The Express Tribune,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/583919/230-prisoners-escape-in-ttps-di-khan-jail-
attack/ lasted modified January 8,2019
10
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was focused on North Waziristan Agency and was meant to
clear the area from terrorists. Following this, operation Radd-ul-Fasad was launched
throughout the country to flush them out of any hiding places elsewhere.
11
The News, “PTI urges Gov’t to merge FATA with KP” May 18, 2018,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/318328-pti-urges-govt-to-merge-fata-with-kp
[200]

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)

Pakhtunkhwa, the government departments generated performance

briefs and power point presentations showing the government
achievements vis-a-vis counter terrorism. KP police, Counter Terrorism
Department (CTD) and Home Department showcased a year by year
synopsis of the terrorist actions, number of casualties and their
comparative statistics. But these write ups and policy notes lack the huge
and important part of government actions that are directed towards
peace making, accommodation, and negotiations whether through
legislations, policies or directives. Similarly, the reports developed by the
counter terrorism institutions like KP Government COIN strategy called
‘Checkmating Terrorism’ (2013), Federal Government National Action
Plan (2015) or National Internal Security Policy (2014-18) etc. are also
conspicuously missing the in-depth analysis of provincial government’s
actions vis-à-vis peace making and peace negotiations. Through a
comparative analysis of the government actions in terror environment
(GATE) of three different political parties in KP, the study analyzes the
complex social relationship between the governments and their
constituencies and the effects on the rule of law architecture during GATE
in the province. It might offer help in institutional capacity building for
data analysis and formulating evidence-based policy on governance,
peace negotiations, rule of law and counter terrorism.

The paper examines terrorism and counter terrorism on seven-

point scale of Dugan and Chenoweth Scale (2015).12 It discusses the
practice of GATE in KP in the backdrop of GATE-O-METER13 fashioned
after the Obometer14 or Trump-O-Meter15 in the US and the recently
launched Khan Meter16 in Pakistan where the political promises and
government performance is tabulated and measured on daily basis. The
researcher has designed a GATE-O-METER where the KP government
actions in terror environment (GATE) are to be measured on daily basis.
For GATE-O-METER the data is retrieved from the South Asian Terrorism

12
Professor Dr Laura Dugan at University of Maryland and Professor Dr Erica
Chenoweth at University of Denver developed a seven-point conciliatory-repression
scale to gauge the effectiveness of Government Actions in Terror Environment (GATE).
This scale is commonly known as Dugan and Chenoweth Scale or DCS. For this
research study, the DCS scale was selected as GATE is growing as a new sub discipline
in counter terrorism and conflict studies and its original exponents i.e. Professor Dugan
and Professor Chenoweth have already tested the scale, in a different way, in peace
making and counter terrorism efforts in Israel.
13
“Pakistani Web Developer Launches Unique 'Khan Meter' to Monitor PTI's 100-Day
Agenda,” The News. retried from https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/349663-
pakistani-web-developer-launches-unique-khan-meter-to-monitor-ptis-100-days-
agenda.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
[201]

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

Portal (SATP)17 database and then it is triangulated against the Daily

Situation Reports (DSRs) of the Provincial Crisis Management Center
(PCMC), Strategic Analysis Wing (SAW) of Home and Tribal Affairs
Department and Research Office of Central Police Office Peshawar.18

The study also conducted Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) to fill

the gap in the literature. The KIIs was a sample representation of seven
administrative divisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Twenty-five individuals
were selected via simple random sampling mechanism from the key
stakeholders including government functionaries, police officers, civilian
counter terrorism officials, peacemakers, opinion leaders, lawyers,
students, teachers, judges, former de-radicalized militants, ulema and
political leaders. The administered questionnaire was based on the seven
points of Dugan and Chenoweth Scale (DSC). The research also
conducted three Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) on each of the three
governments (MMA, ANP and PTI) under review. The FGDs included equal
numbers of members from each political party who had remained on
treasury and opposition benches during 2002-18. The FGDs served as an
important tool and brought together important stakeholders under one
roof. The FGDs also helped in the triangulation of findings attained during
the literature review, the GATE-O-METER and the KIIs exercises. Talking
points for FGDs too were designed on the basis of seven points DCS scale.
The DCS is a combination of reconciliation-regression continuum on the
basis of which three political governments of MMA, ANP and PTI are
measured. On the effectiveness of GATE framework, it is widely accepted
that even the militants are rational and self-interested human beings who
always pursue to reduce the personal cost while increasing the personal
gains. This suggests that repressive counterterrorism could lead to
unexpected backlash.19 The seven points of DCS are:

1. Accommodation

• Appeasing or surrendering to adversary

• Making full concessions according to opponent’s demands

2. Conciliatory Action

• Making material concessions

• Taking action that signals intention to cooperate or negotiate
with opponent

17
SATP, South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/
18
Home Department KP, http://www.hdkp.gov.pk/uploads/Final_Version.pdf
19
L Dugan and E Chenoweth, “Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising
the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel” in American Sociological
Review, 77(4) 597-624 (2012)
[202]

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)

3. Conciliatory Statement or Intentions

• Expressing intention to cooperate or showing support

• Verbal expression short of physical action

4. Neutral or Ambiguous

• No clear moves toward or away from resolution of conflict

• Includes all attempts to ask for help from a third party to
resolve the conflict
• Requires more context to determine whether it is conciliatory or
repressive

5. Verbal Conflict

• Express intent to engage in conflict or threaten

• Decline to cease ongoing conflict; maintain the status quo
during conflict
• Short of physical action

6. Physical Conflict

• Physical or violent action aimed at coercing opponent

• No apparent intention to kill

7. Extreme Deadly Repression

• Physical action exhibiting intent to kill

• Torture or severe violence which could easily kill someone.20

Analysis

The three political regimes that governed KP during the period in review
came up with different legislative and non-legislative responses to
counter terrorism. MMA believed that ensuring good governance and
accountability by pious and honest leadership would create a conducive
atmosphere that would reduce social and political space for the militancy
and insurgency. On the legislative ground, the MMA government offered
its most eulogized Hisba Bill as a panacea for ensuring good governance
and ensuing rule of law. However, the MMA proposed Hisba Bill was
turned down by the Federal Government and then by the Supreme Court

20
L Dugan and C Erica, “The Government Actions in Terror Environments Datasets,”
The Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies, Santa Barbara: University of
California (2015)
[203]

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

of Pakistan on the grounds that it was against the constitution and

created a parallel administrative and judicial system in the country.21 On
the peace-making, MMA opted for the appeasement path and was able
to come up with peace deal with TNSM and TTP in Swat. To MMA
leadership, the root causes of terrorism in KP was the trickle down of
terrorism from Afghanistan or the consequential ramifications of the
actions of allied forces therein, the US drone attacks in FATA and the Red
Mosque Islamabad operation that snowballed the problem of insurgency.
ANP inherited the province in bad shape and it was in state of full-scale
insurgency. TTP had been formed in 2006 and had already showed
presence in almost all districts of KP. The ANP initial legislative response
was the enactment of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (NAR) 2009 which was the
byproduct of the peace negotiations with TNSM and TTP in Swat.
However, the NAR 2009 could not quell the insurgency in Malakand.
Subsequently, ANP asked for deployment of Army in aid of civil power
and the COIN operation Rah-e-Rast started in Malakand region. However,
the extreme repressive action from the ANP regime came when it
announced head money for the TTP leadership.22 Meanwhile, the ANP
government also tried the establishment of Local Peace Committees
(LPCs) but these proved successful only in some places like Dir and
Buner. The ANP regime also concentrated on the capacity building of the
KP police to make it a frontline anti-terrorism force.23 As a matter of fact,
owing to the ANP strong response to the TTP, the ANP leadership,
workers and supporters remained as the prime target, approximately
700, of TTP atrocities during and after their tenure.24

PTI came big on the legislative side of counter terrorism efforts

and passed various Acts that proved effective in reducing social and
political space for the terrorists like Hotels Restriction (Security) Act,
Surrender of Illicit Arms Act, Restriction of Rented Buildings (Security)
Act, Tenancy (amendment) Act, Right to Public Service Act, Right to
Information Act, Protection and Enforcement of Human Rights Act, Civil
Mobile Courts Act, Sensitive and Vulnerable Establishments and Places
(Security) Act, Whistleblower Protection and Vigilance Commission Act,
and Police Act. This government regime found an enabling environment
as the Federal Government too played a proactive role and came up with
various actions including formation of a federal peace committee for
dialogue with TTP, devising a consensus National Action Plan, Spelling-

21
“SC Blocks Hasba Bill,” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/223645
22
“Wanted Swat Taliban list reissued with corrections,” The News
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/180916-wanted-swat-taliban-list-
reissued-with-corrections
23
“Aman Lashkars: Hung out to dry,” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1090953
last modified January 8,2019
24
Khadim Hussain, Political Cost the ANP Paid in Its Fight Against Extremists,
Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2013)
[204]

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)

out the National Internal Security Policy and bringing about the 21st
constitutional amendment to establish military courts for two years, end
of moratorium on capital punishment and passage of Protection of
Pakistan Act.

In a nutshell, the first government to respond to the challenge

had tried to avoid confrontation but took measures to manage the
emerging phenomenon through peaceful measures. The two following
governments built upon the experiences their predecessors and they had
undertaken, and in a hindsight seem to have exhibited different
approaches to terrorism and counter terrorism. On the Provincial
Assembly floor, the discussion on peace-making, peace-building or COIN
has been very little. From the analysis of the three Provincial Assemblies’
business, it transpires that the dominate themes related to GATE or rule
of law for the legislators were limited to release of Dr. Afia Siddiqui from
US captivity, US drone strikes in Pakistani territory, repatriation of
Afghan refugees, blocking NATO supply lines, relocation of Frontier
Constabulary (FC) paramilitary platoons to KP and condemning the
terrorist attacks everywhere in the world.

The question arises as to why the peace-making efforts did not

work? The reply is not short. In fact, violence flared up after every peace
deal. On every such instance, there were allegations of violation from the
other side. It also transpired that political leadership was not adept in
peace negotiation skills. TTP was interested in gaining more space for
itself through peace deals and demanded further concessions on reaching
a peace deal. More significantly, FATA was the epicenter of terrorism and
headquarter of TTP but the area was not governed by the KP provincial
government. It was under the Federal Government and governed under
a colonial era legislation of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The TTP
decision makers and core leadership were from FATA not from Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and the various KP governments did not engage the TTP
FATA core leadership in the peace process.

In 2009, the Federal Government launched its 3D COIN Model

(Dialogue, Deterrence and Development)25 but it lacked a consistent
operational plan. As a result, the ‘deterrence’ part was a bit larger. In
classic COIN sense the four phases of COIN are the “clearing the area,
holding the area, rebuilding the area and transferring the area to civilian
control.”26 But it remained a disjointed effort in KP context. After

25
“3D strategy to defeat militants: Zardari,” The Nation. https://nation.com.pk/23-
May-2009/3d-strategy-to-defeat-militants-zardari
26
David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, London, England: Oxford University Press
(2013)
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

“clearing the area” by the military through operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat

and operation Zarb-e-Azb in Waziristan, the “holding” part was not
played very well by the civilian law enforcement agencies and civil
administration and resultantly, the TTP staged a comeback in many
places. The “rebuilding” part was confined to the IDPs rehabilitation. And
lastly, the “transferring” part would still take some time to be fully
implemented; truly, in some areas of KP, armed forces are still operating
in aid of civil powers. However, situation saw improvement after the
National Action Plan and National Security Policy were devised in 2015.
These reconciled most disjointed parts and synergized the efforts of
provincial and federal governments. The KP government supported Rule
of Law Roadmap (2018) is viewed as a ray of hope at the end of the
tunnel.

Recommendations

The government response to terrorism has gradually developed through

various phases and stages. The approach has fundamentally been of
avoidance of use of force but the scale of violence gradually raised the
level of response as well, and the nation has been able to serve major
blow to terrorism during recent years. In 2018, PTI too control of the
Federal Government as well. Based on the experiences through the years
of terrorism, following recommendations may be made in the current
circumstances:

1. The Local Peace Committees (LPCs) should be re-constituted as

effective peace making and peace building institutions at grass
roots level. The international best practices should be utilized in
strengthening of the LPCs. (Neighboring and community policing)

2. To restore fabric of the society, truth and reconciliation commission

may be constituted at national level to initiate policy of
reconciliation, to from a national narrative on counter extremism
and to admit the follies while upholding rule of law under extreme
conditions.

3. The KP Provincial Assembly Standing Committee on Home and

Tribal Affairs role may be enhanced through amendment in the KP
government Rules of Business to enable it to discuss and frame
legislative and non-legislative responses for peace-making and
dialogue process with insurgents.

4. The KP Provincial Cabinet may also be involved in the peace-

making process along with the Apex Committee or other specially
designated Peace Committees.

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 Peace-making Efforts in KP: An Analysis of MMA, ANP and PTI
Governments (2002-18)

5. The provincial political leadership across the board may be trained

in peace-making process and peace dialogue while at the same
time ensuring the rule of law in extreme conditions.

6. The victims of terrorism and the families of the missing persons

may be adequately compensated so that no further social and
political space could be gained for the emergence of new
movements like the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM).

7. After the FATA-KP merger, all out efforts should be made to put in
place effective and efficient rule of law institutions in the erstwhile
tribal areas and to avert any chances of de-railing the reforms
process by any vested interest or pressure groups.

8. The De-Radicalization initiatives need to be streamlined and the

democratic institutions should also be involved in the process as
enunciated in the National Internal Security Policy and National
Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines.

9. The National Action Plan and National Internal Security Policy may
be updated, and new targets may be identified.

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 15 Issue 3

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