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Governance and Governmentality in Projects
Governance and Governmentality in Projects
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International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378 – 392
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman
Received 15 August 2016; received in revised form 21 December 2016; accepted 12 January 2017
Available online 27 January 2017
Abstract
This study investigates the role of governance and governmentality in project and organizational success. Results from 121 responses to a
worldwide survey provided for profiling of different governance and governmentality approaches at different levels of success, and quantitative
investigation of the relationships between them. Results support the model of governmentality being positively related with both project level and
organizational level success. Governance as structural context variable moderates this relationship. Moderation takes place at the project level
through the governance mechanisms (trust and control) influencing the strength of the relationship, and at the organizational level through
governance complexity, measured as the number of governance institutions involved in projects, influencing the form of the relationship.
Contingency theory serves as a theoretical lens to interpret and discuss the findings, as well as theoretical and managerial implications.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.007
0263-7863/00/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 379
making (Dean, 2010). In projects, this is expressed in (Krasner, 2001). In the realm of projects it refers to the right
governors emphasizing outcome control, with clearly defined, for autonomy of standalone projects, and mutual recognition
but when needed flexible governance structures, typical for of projects within the organization, as well as mutual control,
customer delivery projects (Dinsmore and Rocha, 2012). Both for example through resource sharing (Müller et al., 2016b).
authoritarian and liberal approaches operate through interac- This applies similarly to program and portfolio governance.
tion of governors (e.g. steering committees) with individuals Sovereignty overlaps partly with the concept of project
(e.g. project managers), thus are direct person-to-person ap- autonomy (e.g. Gemünden et al., 2005). However, including
proaches to governmentality. mutual recognition and external control makes it wider in
Neoliberal governmentality differs from that by influencing the scope.
societal context of individuals in order to steer their behaviors Governance mechanisms – addresses the use of control and
(Lemke, 2001). By addressing people's collective interests and trust as mechanisms to execute governance. Influential work,
their willingness to consent, it indirectly steers people by setting the like the Cadbury report (1992) or textbooks, (e.g. Larcker and
criteria for their decision-making through their societal context. Tayan, 2011) emphasize the importance of formal control
Through people's collective interest and their voluntary obeying to mechanisms to reduce the risk of hazards (Williamson, 1991).
these contextual frameworks, their behavior is shaped, but not Others emphasize the importance of trust and relationships to
necessarily determined (Clegg et al., 2002). It is typical for projects govern organizations (Davis et al., 1997; Poppo and Zenger,
that foster self-control within rudimentary governance structures, 2002). The relationship between trust and control is complex
such as community-governed open source development projects and non-linear (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). The OECD
(Franck and Jungwirth, 2003). Neoliberal governmentality works (2004) definition of governance implies an irreducibility of
indirectly between governor and governed. governance mechanisms to neither trust nor control alone.
Governmentality precept – this reflects the preference that Following this, we assume that both control and trust are
governors have toward the way a project should be managed. present at any stages of a project, but one of them dominates as
Precepts are: a governance mechanism, as shown in Poppo and Zenger's
(2002) model of control and trust as the endpoints of a
• Organizational values: governors prioritize organizational continuum, where governance prioritizes one of the two
values in their governmentality and subordinate processes or alternatives.
results to it. Examples include project owners prioritizing the Institutions – refers to the number of governance institutions
accomplishment of core organizational values - like continu- like steering groups, project management offices (PMOs),
ous learning, individual wellbeing, or individual's engage- quality committees, program and portfolio management.
ment - over short term profit objectives or process compliance. Each of them fulfills its particular role in governance.
• Process: governors prioritize process compliance, such as However, every additional governance institution increases
following the project management methodology. This is the complexity in overall governance due to the difficulties
typical for projects in high-risk industries, such as for airline in reconciling and coordinating the different governance
pilots or firefighters. approaches of these institutions, hence poses a further
• Project wellbeing: governors prioritize the project in terms of agency problem to the project, because of the need to agree
its viability, success of its deliverables, and the importance of and maintain performance in line with the terms of reference
the deliverables for the organization or its stakeholders. Process under which each of those institutions engages (Dixit, 2009).
compliance and organizational values are subordinated to short This becomes evident in organizations that establish many
and long-term project results. PMOs (Aubry et al., 2012) or are in industries that are
strongly controlled, such as the pharmaceutical or healthcare
Any precept can appear in any governance approach, thus they industry with their various governance bodies. The number
are independent of governance approaches. However, one of them of governance institutions for a project is used to assess the
typically dominates the other two in the governors understanding complexity of governance.
of how the project manager is supposed to execute tasks.
These above listed dimensions for governmentality are used
These governance dimensions are also used in the present
in this study.
study.
2.2. Governance
2.3. Projectification
Müller et al. (2016b) followed Biesenthal and Wilden (2014)
and used corporate and country level governance concepts that In line with the underlying model we use the level of
reach through to the project level. Following Dean (2010) they projectification as a control variable during the analysis.
used: Projectification is the extent to which an organization uses
projects and their management as an underlying principle
Sovereignty – which refers to supreme power or authority. It is to conduct their work. Midler (1995) and Lundin et al. (2015)
one of the most basic principles in governance and addresses describe it as an organizational transition process from process
the rights for autonomy, mutual recognition and control to project orientation. Literature on the measurement of
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 381
projectification is rare and we adopt the dimensions described project governance through project methodologies, for project
in the methodology section. success.
The literature indicates a gap in the knowledge about the Quantitative studies are more nuanced. Project governance
context contingency of the dimensions for governmentality, (i.e. project methodologies) accounts for 22% of project
governance and projectification. This study will address this success, and the shareholder versus stakeholder orientation
gap. of the organization (i.e. a governance of projects dimension)
explains about 6% of project success (Joslin and Müller,
2.4. The relationship between governmentality and success 2016b). Other quantitative studies focused on the phenomenon
in particular project types, like enterprise resource planning
Governmentality is a relatively new concept in project (ERP) projects. Here Badewi and Shehab (2016) showed that
management and very little research investigates its impact on institutional routines and benefits management support project
project success. Clegg et al. (2002) brought governmentality into success, thus effectively shifting large proportions of the
the realm of projects by describing the particular approach used at responsibility for project results away from project manage-
the Sydney Olympics as a successful project. Recently Simard and ment and into the governance structure. Wang and Chen (2006)
Aubry (2016) found qualitatively traces of a relationship between showed how the balance of four governance elements (explicit
governmentality and success, but did not specify it further. A contracts, implicit contracts, reputation, and trust) mediates the
global quantitative study by Müller et al. (2016a) showed a relationship between project hazards and project success. Many
significant correlation between governmentality as an enabler for corporate level studies perceive governance as contextual
project governance and a) the acceptance of governance structures structures and therefore define it as a moderator variable (e.g.
by project managers, and b) organizational success. The present Narayanan and Narasimhan, 2014). These studies frequently
study differs from that by not measuring governmentality as a show a moderating effect of governance on the relationship
timely antecedent for the development of governance structures. between different measures of organizational performance and,
Instead, we concentrate on the governmentality during project for example, flexibility and human capital (Narayanan and
execution, thus we measure authoritarian, neoliberal and precept, Narasimhan, 2014), environmental performance (Kock and
which differs from the measures in the Müller, Shao and Pemsel Santaló, 2005), or market turbulence (Pan et al., 2015). We
study. However, we adapt the notion of a direct relationship and address research question 2 by hypothesizing a similar moder-
hypothesize: ating role of governance between the governance of projects
dimensions and project success, using the earlier identified
Hypothesis H1. There is a positive relationship between
dimensions of sovereignty, governance mechanism, and number
governmentality and project success.
of governance institutions:
The link between organizational success and governmentality
Hypothesis H3. Governance of projects moderates the relation-
in the public sector was shown, for example, by Renou (2015)
ship between governmentality and project success.
who emphasized the importance of governmentality for
successful water utilities in France, and Collier (2007) who
Little research is done on the relationship between governance
identified governmentality, sovereignty and discipline as the
of projects and organizational success. The traditional view is that
three critical success factors for performance in the police. project success leads to organizational success (Kaplan and
This was complemented through studies in the private sector
Norton, 1995). Empirical studies for that include those by Pollack
with organizations like IBM and consulting firms showing
and Adler (2015) who found that profitability of small to medium
the importance of governmentality for global supply chains
enterprises is significantly driven by projects and their results.
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). We transcend these results from
Based on that we hypothesize that the moderating effect
studies in functional/permanent organizations, to the realm of
hypothesized in H3 for each project, will be accumulated at the
projects.
organizational level for the totality of projects.
Hypothesis H2. There is a positive relationship between
Hypothesis H4. Governance of projects moderates the rela-
governmentality and organizational success.
tionship between governmentality and organizational success
2.5. The relationship between governance and success
2.6. Contingency theory as theoretical perspective
Corporate governance studies on the relationship between
good governance and performance or success show mixed results. Contingency theory claims that organizational performance
The OECD describes it as exceedingly difficult to establish results from fitting characteristics of the organization to contin-
empirical evidence of such a relation (Clarke, 2007). gencies that reflect the situation of the organization (Donaldson,
Related studies at the project level are somewhat clearer. 2001). This makes it an appropriate lens for this study. The
Qualitative studies, support the notion of this relationship, governmentality approach chosen is hereby seen as a character-
whereby Bekker and Steyn's (2008) Delphi study with an expert istic and the governance structure as a contingency variable.
group supports the importance of governance of projects for Early version of contingency theory proposed that context shapes
success, and Joslin and Müller's (2016a) study the importance of organizational characteristics, (Donaldson, 1985). More recent
382 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392
versions emphasize reflexivity through interaction between context is granted a wider scope of tolerated behavior, including risk
and organizational characteristics, which allows readjustment of taking behavior and rugged individuals (McGrath et al., 1992). It
organizational characteristics to changes in context, for the benefit assumes that the project manager is responsible for the project in
of organizational performance (Donaldson, 2001). In studying its entirety as a business and free to decide on behalf of the project
organizational phenomena from the latter perspective, researchers as long as it stays within the limitations set by the governing
“implicitly treat organizations as loosely coupled aggregates whose bodies. In summary, we assess the project manager's represen-
separate components may be adjusted or fine-tuned incrementally tativeness of the project in relation to its context, including the
once weak constraints have been overcome” (Meyer, Tsui, & related internal control and external autonomy granted to this role
Hinings, 1993, p1177). The interaction between these components by the governance system, as a proxy to measure sovereignty.
(in this study: governmentality, governance and success) is These dimensions were measured on a five point Likert scale
typically investigated using moderator models and related analysis from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
techniques (Drazin and van de Ven, 1985), such as hierarchical Governance mechanisms were measured using an existing five
regression analysis. dimensional construct from Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014), which
uses five point semantic differential scales (a form of Likert
3. Methodology scales). Lower levels are indicative of a preference for control, and
higher levels of a preference for trust as a governance mechanism.
Our research design followed the design process suggested by We measured institutions in project governance from low
Saunders et al. (2007). We chose critical realism as underlying (0 or 1 institutions, such as a steering group), medium (2 or 3
philosophy, which assumes the existence of a mind-independent institutions) and high (more than 3 institutions). Projectification
reality, in which the empirically observable part of a phenomenon is a broad concept. We operationalized the dimensions from
is investigated for its causal events and the mechanisms that Müller et al. (2016b), which were based on Midler (1995), on five
underlie the emergence of these events (Bhaskar, 2016). Hence, point Likert scale from very low to very high.
we assume that similar empirical phenomena can be caused by Success was measured separately for project level and
different underlying events and mechanisms, which allows organizational level. To balance the hard (objective) and soft
identification of trends, but not automatically generalization of (subjective) measurement dimensions we used the construct
results. developed by Blomquist and Müller (2006) for their governance
A deductive approach was chosen, testing hypotheses with data studies, using 5 point Likert scales from Not at All to Very much. It
collected through a worldwide, web-based questionnaire. This assesses on the project level achievement of the triple constraints,
was distributed in a snowball sampling approach to professional business objectives and customer satisfaction. At the organiza-
organizations for project managers (such as Project Management tional level, it assesses the accomplishment of last year's annual
Institute, International Project Management Association) and to plan, customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction.
the researchers existing networks with practitioners known from Demographics included questions on the respondent's country,
earlier studies. experience, sector, employees in organization, and budget of the
project. Respondents were asked to answer the question in respect
3.1. Measurement constructs of their last finished project.
The survey yielded 125 responses, of which four were empty
The Appendix A lists the assessed constructs, the measures, submission, leading to 121 usable responses. Table 1 shows the
and the related questionnaire items. demographics. ANOVA tests showed no differences in answers
Governmentality was operationalized along the findings from between project managers and other roles. Therefore, all answers
the underlying study. Authoritarian to liberal approaches were were used for analysis.
measured through two sets of questions, which were combined in
the subsequent factor analysis. Precepts was measured through 3.2. Validity and reliability
three questions on the relative importance of values, process and
projects. All these constructs were measured on five point Likert Validity of the data was ensured by using constructs that were
scales from strongly disagree to strongly agree. either used and tested before, or developed from the most often
Following Müller et al. (2016b) sovereignty was operational- cited publications in the subject area. A pilot test with 10
ized as the totality of the role that the project manager is granted respondents from academia and industry was done to test
by the governance system. We distinguished between project face-validity. Minor misspellings were corrected after the pilot,
manager roles of employee, manager or entrepreneur. As which allowed using the pilot data in the final sample.
employee the governance system expects the project manager to Quantitative tests for validity included item-to-item and item-to-
fulfill tasks in a merely prescribed manner (e.g. process total correlations. Reliability was tested using Cronbach Alpha
compliance), like in some public investment projects (Klakegg tests (Cronbach, 1951).
and Haavaldsen, 2011). As manager the system grants some Data for both independent and dependent variables were
level of decision-making authority to the project manager, in collected from the same informants, thus we took precautions to
expectation of a merely risk averse behavior (Amihud and Lev, avoid the risk of Common Methods Bias (CMB). These followed
1981). This implies professional and predictable decisions Podsakoff and Organ (1986) and included reminders on
making heuristics (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). An entrepreneur anonymity of the data, that there are no right or wrong answers,
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 383
Table 1 4. Analysis
Sample demographics and their categories.
Fequency Percent Category We tested the data for missing values, eligibility for the
Country analysis techniques, used factor analysis to validate the constructs
The Netherlands 34 28.1 outlined above, and hierarchical regression analysis (HRA) to test
Other countries 20 16.5 the moderator model. The results of the HRA were interpreted
Sweden 15 12.4
following Sharma et al. (1981). The interpretation of significance
USA 11 9.1
Canada 8 6.6 values followed Aguinis et al. (2010) with 0.10 being “marginally
Australia/NZ 7 5.8 significant”, 0.05 “significant”, and 0.01 “highly significant”.
China 5 4.1 Missing values were not of concern (below the 15% mark) and
Germany 5 4.1 skewness and kurtosis ± 2 indicated normality (Hair et al., 2010).
Norway/Finland 5 4.1
Scales sizes were harmonized by using categories for measures
Global workers 4 3.3
Middle/South America 3 2.5 of number of employees, budget size and years of experience
Total 117 96.7 (Table 1). Dummy variables were created for each industry
Missing 4 3.3 category, for use as control variables in subsequent regressions.
Sample total 121 100.0 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the constructs. ANOVA
Experience tests by demographic variables showed no significant differences
Up to 5 years 14 11.6 1 by demographics.
6 to 10 years 20 16.5 2
11 to 20 years 48 39.7 3 4.1. Factor analysis
More than 20 years 35 28.9 4
Total 118 97.5
Missing 4 3.2 Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation resulted
Sample total 121 100.0 in eight factors (KMO 0.749, p = 0.000) and explained 68% of
the variance. Six factors had acceptable reliability (i.e. Cronbach
Project budget
Up to M€ 0.5 31 25.6 1 Alpha ≥ 0.6), and were used to replace the original questionnaire
M€ 0.5–5.0 37 30.6 2 items in further analyses. Item-to-total and item-to-item correla-
M€ 5–50 28 23.1 3 tions generally met or exceeded the respective validity threshold
More than M€ 50 12 9.9 4 of 0.5 and 0.3. The question on “Steering Committee acts
Total 108 89.3
authoritarian” compromised the thresholds slightly. However,
Missing 13 10.7
Sample total 121 100.0 deleting the question would have compromised reliability. We
prioritized reliability over the minor deviation from threshold and
Industry/Sector found it important from a logical perspective to keep the item in
IT/Telecom 31 25.6 1
Engineering 16 13.2 2
the analysis. The factor loadings and Cronbach measures are
Other 22 18.2 3 shown in Table 3, the related question items are shown in the
Oil and gas 13 10.7 4 Appendix A.
Finance 8 6.6 5 The questionnaire items for project success and organiza-
Utility 8 6.6 6 tional success all loaded highly on their respective factor (KMO
Consulting 7 5.8 7
Healthcare 7 5.8 8
0.757, p = 0.000), thus confirmed the construct. Success was
Total 112 92.6 measured as the mean of the related question items.
Missing 9 7.4 The factor solution mirrors the theoretically derived
Sample total 121 100.0 concepts from the underlying study. Minor deviations were
Employees in org. expected when moving from qualitatively developed scales to
Up to 50 10 8.3 1 quantitative measures of dimensions. One difference found was
51–250 5 4.1 2 in the questions on liberal governmentality. Of the three
251–1000 16 13.2 3 questions, one loaded on the factor for authoritarian, one on the
1000–10,000 44 36.4 4
factor for neoliberalism, and the third did not load sufficiently
10,001–50,000 15 12.4 5
50,001–100,000 5 4.1 6 high on any factor. As the factors are orthogonal, it indicates
More than 100,000 20 16.5 7 a clear distinction between direct governmentality of people
Total 115 95.0 (i.e. the authoritarian factor) and indirect governmentality
Missing 6 5.0 through neoliberal approaches to set the context for people's
Sample total 121 100.0
self-governance. It indicates a dominance of the difference
between direct (i.e. authoritarian) and indirect (i.e. neoliberal)
that answers should be related to the last finished project. Related governmentality quantitatively over other differences, such as
post-hoc tests included the Harman test, which showed 12 liberal and authoritarian governmentality. This is an important
factors, with the first one accounting for 21% of the variance, finding, which does not compromise the concept of the underlying
followed by 13%, 7%, 6%, 5% and smaller. No single factor tool, but refines it in terms of the importance of direct versus
dominated the test, thus no indication of CMB. indirect governmentality.
384 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. error Statistic Std. error
Experience 117 1.000 4.000 2.889 0.972 − 0.576 0.224 − 0.595 0.444
Company size 115 1.000 7.000 4.252 1.711 0.026 0.226 − 0.406 0.447
Project budget 108 1.000 4.000 2.194 0.981 0.325 0.233 − 0.923 0.461
Projectification 109 − 2.272 2.103 0.000 1.000 − 0.202 0.231 − 0.679 0.459
IT_Telecom 118 0.000 1.000 0.263 0.442 1.092 0.223 − 0.821 0.442
Engineering 121 0.000 1.000 0.132 0.340 2.199 0.220 2.882 0.437
Other 121 0.000 1.000 0.182 0.387 1.671 0.220 0.804 0.437
Oil_Gas 121 0.000 1.000 0.107 0.311 2.567 0.220 4.668 0.437
Finance 121 0.000 1.000 0.066 0.250 3.536 0.220 10.681 0.437
Utility 121 0.000 1.000 0.066 0.250 3.536 0.220 10.681 0.437
Consulting 121 0.000 1.000 0.058 0.234 3.835 0.220 12.924 0.437
Healthcare 121 0.000 1.000 0.058 0.234 3.835 0.220 12.924 0.437
Authoritarian gvty 109 − 2.824 2.302 0.000 1.000 − 0.043 0.231 − 0.258 0.459
Neoliberal gvty 109 − 2.490 2.321 0.000 1.000 − 0.214 0.231 − 0.256 0.459
Gvty precept 109 − 2.743 2.746 0.000 1.000 0.236 0.231 − 0.191 0.459
Sovereignty 109 − 2.846 1.758 0.000 1.000 − 0.630 0.231 − 0.090 0.459
Gov mechanism 109 − 2.448 2.801 0.000 1.000 − 0.175 0.231 − 0.334 0.459
# of institutions 98 1.000 6.000 2.735 1.248 0.715 0.244 0.348 0.483
Project success 115 1.667 5.000 4.214 0.834 − 0.972 0.226 0.198 0.447
Organizational success 114 1.000 5.000 3.662 0.965 − 0.657 0.226 − 0.120 0.449
Valid N (listwise) 73
A few questionnaire items did not clearly load on one individual reflects earlier findings, like those by Miller and Hobbs (2005) or
factor. However, all expected constructs were clearly represented Klakegg and Haavaldsen (2011). In respect of research question
through the factor analysis. RQ2 it shows the correlation of project success and the level of
The correlations are shown in Table 4. It indicates significant authoritarian and neoliberal governmentality, as well as the
correlations, such as the increase of authoritarian and decrease of relationship between organizational success and authoritarian
neoliberal governmentality with increasing company size, which governmentality. This is further elaborated in later sections. Even
Table 3
Rotated factor and reliability analysis.
Component
Gov mechanisms Projectification Sovereignty Neoliberal gvty Authoritarian gvty Precept Not valid Not valid
Cronbach Alpha .824 .837 .718 .619 .813 .642 N/A N/A
Q20 .759
Q18 .719
Q19 .716
Q21 .700
Q22 .697
Q27 .894
Q26 .853
Q24 .825
Q25 .641
Q17 .724
Q16 .683
Q13 .649
Q15 .612
Q9 .715
Q8 .591
Q3 -.546
Q7 .502
Q1 .856
Q2 .686
Q10 .727
Q12 .570
Q4 .539
Q11 .865
Q5 .756
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 385
.531 ⁎⁎
mechanisms institutions success
Project though it is not within the scope of the present study, Table 4
shows that project level success and organizational success are
significantly correlated. Assuming a causality from project level to
−.027
−.001
organizational level success, it indicates that 28% of organiza-
# of
−.292 ⁎⁎
4.2. Hierarchical regression analyses
−.050
.053
Sovereignty Gov
Two separate path models were tested. The first model tested
the correlation of the independent variables governmentality with
.000
.035
.157
.147
dependent variable project success and its moderation through
governance (Table 5, left side). The second model tested the same
precept
−.036
Finance Utility Consulting Healthcare Authoritarian Neoliberal Gvty
.000
.000
.000
.156
independent and moderator variables in relation to organizational
success (Table 5, right side). The factors for authoritarian,
.275 ⁎⁎
−.077 neoliberal, and precept were entered as the dimensions for the
.000
.000
.000
.162
gvty
−.172
−.022
.052
.021
.091
.153
−.088
.078
.097
.096
.044
.065
.105
−.051
−.031
−.154
.098
.093
.089
.039
−.165
−.081
−.029
−.177
.046
−.013
−.055
−.146
−.065
Oil &
.071
.048
.030
.050
−.047
−.080
Experience Company Project Projectification IT_Telecom Engineering Other
.079
.082
.040
.047
.007
−.065
−.055
−.020
−.003
−.016
−.046
−.183
which is tested in iv
.107
.091
.134
.173
.108
.180
.514 ⁎⁎
.215 ⁎
−.176
−.089
.073
.082
.153
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.019
−.069
−.049
−.040
−.090
−.002
−.034
−.148
−.165
.013
.016
.159
.025
.032
.002
.003
.100
−.216 ⁎
.308 ⁎⁎
−.058
−.096
−.040
−.061
−.059
−.006
.153
.060
.058
.028
.090
.190
.128
.006
.036
−.131
−.009
−.039
−.039
−.008
−.072
−.127
−.063
−.029
.033
.012
.103
.037
.058
.013
.106
Gov mechanisms
Neoliberal gvty
Project success
Projectification
Project budget
Company size
Gvty precept
IT_Telecom
Engineering
Sovereignty
Finance
regression.
386 R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392
Table 5
Hierarchical regression models.
Variables entered Dependent variable: Project success Dependent variable: Organizational success
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Robustness Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Robustness
test test
Control variables
Experience (years in managing projects) 0.100 0.111 0.105 0.091 0.073 − 0.067 − 0.080 − 0.095 − 0.102 − 0.077
Size of company (in employees) − 0.026 − 0.053 − 0.047 − 0.090 − 0.072 − 0.045 − 0.058 − 0.074 − 0.033 − 0.096
Size of project (budget) − 0.129 − 0.141 − 0.145 () − 0.148 − 0.138 − 0.120 − 0.134 () − 0.134 () − 0.139 () − 0.150
Projectification 0.236 ⁎ 0.257 ⁎⁎ 0.251 ⁎⁎ 0.247 ⁎ 0.238 ⁎ 0.506 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.519 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.519 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.541 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.493 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
Industry dummy variables:
IT-Telecom 0.325 0.190 0.161 0.120 0.243 0.174 0.110 0.081 0.079 0.112
Engineering & construction 0.149 0.113 0.102 0.104 0.144 − 0.035 − 0.037 − 0.064 − 0.079 − 0.027
Other industries 0.310 0.224 0.190 0.116 0.223 0.195 0.159 0.116 0.090 0.158
Oil & gas 0.111 0.045 0.026 0.007 0.065 0.091 0.047 0.003 ⁎ 0.013 0.014
Finance 0.166 0.194 0.181 0.156 0.207 − 0.019 0.002 − 0.040 − 0.020 − 0.008
Utility 0.224 0.213 () 0.197 () 0.182 0.219 () − 0.027 − 0.024 − 0.037 − 0.024 − 0.025
Consulting 0.168 0.122 0.094 0.079 0.125 0.116 0.087 0.061 0.047 0.079
Healthcare 0.082 0.049 0.039 0.035 0.085 0.132 0.105 0.070 0.051 0.065
Independent variables
Governmentality:
Authoritarian governmentality 0.353 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.354 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.367 (),⁎ 0.359 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.287 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.291 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.419 ⁎ 0.342 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
Neoliberal governmentality 0.239 ⁎⁎ 0.243 ⁎⁎ 0.390 () 0.259 ⁎⁎ 0.138 () 0.130 () 0.489 ⁎ 0.171
Governmentality precept 0.166 ⁎ 0.166 ⁎ − 0.006 0.150 − 0.046 − 0.048 − 0.168 − 0.085
Moderator variables
Governance:
Sovereignty 0.132 0.178 ⁎ 0.165 () 0.134() 0.171 ⁎ 0.122
Governance mechanisms 0.048 0.014 0.070 − 0.078 − 0.085 − 0.061
Number of governance institutions 0.006 0.023 0.030 − 0.011 − 0.004 − 0.001
Interaction terms
Authoritarian × Sovereignty − 0.086 0.018
Authoritarian × Mechanisms 0.121 − 0.028
Authoritarian × Institutions 0.027 − 0.093
Neoliberal × Sovereignty − 0.083 0.019
Neoliberal × Mechanisms − 0.059 − 0.025
Neoliberal × Institutions − 0.221 − 0.393 ⁎
Precept × Sovereignty 0.018 0.043
Precept × Mechanisms − 0.063 − 0.101
Precept × Institutions 0.203 0.092
F for regression 1.200 3.166 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 2.795 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 2.112 ⁎⁎⁎ 2.560 ⁎⁎⁎ 4.343 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 5.138 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 4.539 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 3.355 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 ⁎⁎⁎⁎
F for change 1.200 9.849 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 0.959 0.830 4.545 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 4.343 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 5.936 ⁎⁎⁎⁎ 1.314 0.992 0.005 ⁎⁎⁎
R-square 0.118 0.311 0.330 0.380 0.326 0.423 0.445 0.493
Adj. R-square 0.020 0.213 0.212 0.200 0.226 0.251 0.341 0.347 0.346 0.368
N = 121.
Main Table standard coefficients beta.
()
p ≤ 0.1.
(),*
= 0.055.
⁎ p ≤ 0.05.
⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.005.
⁎⁎⁎⁎ p ≤ 0.001.
4.3. Moderation model for project success dimensions of governmentality and project success. This
supports Hypothesis H1. The relative weight of each dimension
Table 5, left side, shows the results for project success. Step 1 (i.e. the standardized Beta coefficient) indicates authoritarian
shows the results after entering the control variables, step 2 after governmentality as strongest correlated with project success,
adding the independent variables, step three after adding the followed by neoliberal governmentality and precept.
moderator variables, and step 4 after adding the interaction terms The insignificant results for moderators (step 3) and
of independent and moderator variables. The model is significant interaction terms (step 4) indicate possible homologizer variables.
with an Adjusted R-square of 21% (p = 0.000). Step 2 shows a The results of the homologizer test are shown in Table 6. Only
significant main effect, which is the correlation between all three the R-square values of the subgroups for different levels of
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 387
Projects with high levels of success show clear governmentality moderates governmentality's impact on success. This moderation
approaches, with both approaches, the direct (authoritative) and the differs by level of success.
indirect (neoliberal) being highly expressed. The precept is in
average the project. The governance of successful projects sets
medium levels of sovereignty for projects, together with high 5.1. Moderator effects
levels of trust as the related governance mechanism. The average
number of governance institutions does not vary by project Authoritarian governmentality's relationship with project
success. It is typically the steering committee, the owner/customer success is moderated by the governance mechanism, where
of the project, and a PMO. Successful projects are found most higher trust strengthens the relationship between authoritarian
often in the context of highly projectified organizations. governmentality and project success. The profiles in Fig. 1
Fig. 2 shows the average profile of organizations with low, confirm this by showing highest levels of both trust as
medium and high levels of success with their project-based part governance mechanism and authoritarian governmentality in
of the organization. Similar to Fig. 1, it shows that organizations the most successful projects. Dyer and Chu (2003) study
with low to medium levels of success apply more ambiguous supports this in the context of general management and Müller
approaches to governmentality, indicted through low to medium et al. (2013) in project management. Both studies showed that
levels of clarity in authoritarian and neoliberal governmentality. increasing trust associates with decreasing control efforts and
Governance approaches vary considerably in these organizations improved task/project efficiency. Contingency theory suggests
and are in part contradictory, for example by giving projects high that a “fit” between context and organizational characteristics
levels of sovereignty and then employing control as a governance leads to higher performance. For this study, it translates into
mechanism. As before, these organizations show low to medium trust and authoritarian (direct and clear) governmentality
levels of projectification. influencing each other to find their “fit” in form of an
Highly successful organizations tend to apply governance equilibrium in relation to the success of the project. Earlier
and governmentality approaches found on the right side of the studies support that by showing that successful projects are
profiling tool. Clarity in governmentality is achieved with both characterized by clearness in interaction between project
authoritarian and neoliberal approaches used in parallel, and a sponsor and manager (Turner and Müller, 2004), which
precept of organizational values. The governance approaches of associates with higher levels of authoritarian governmentality,
these organizations include high levels of sovereignty, paired with and as well as trustful project environments fostering mutual
a balance between trust and control as governance mechanism and respect and openness in interaction between governance
two or three governance institutions. These organizations tend to institutions and projects (Müller et al., 2013).
be highly projectized. Neoliberal governmentality's relationship with organizational
success is moderated by the number of governance institutions,
5. Discussion where the latter influences the form of the relationship. This effect
is shown in Fig. 3. In the context of few governance institutions (0
This study is the first to model the relationship between to 2) neoliberal governmentality and organizational success are in
governance, governmentality, and success at project and organi- a positive linear relationship. In case of three or more institutions
zational level. Results show all governmentality dimensions being (labeled high), organizations start at a higher level of success, but
correlated with project success, and authoritarian and neoliberal the increase of organizational success along with increases in
governmentality with organizational success. Governance is the neoliberal governmentality is marginal. This is further discussed
structural context, within which governmentality is executed and under theoretical implications.
R. Müller et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 378–392 389
6. Conclusion
committees on success. Simple governance structures allow for of causality (or other form of interaction) between success
stronger influence through the level of neoliberal governmentality and governmentally/governance, and b) the moderation effects
by the steering committee. In cases of very high levels of neoliberal as they emerge in practice, thus, the situational context within
governmentality, simple structures (i.e. few governance institu- which the interaction between governance and governmentality
tions) are associated with higher success levels than complex takes place. Jointly these studies lead the way for future
structures. quantitative investigations that allow for generalization and
The results support the appropriateness of contingency theory to theory building.
explain the relationship between governance, governmentality and
successful. 6.4. Strengths and weaknesses
6.2. Managerial implications The study's strength lies in the use of proven constructs
and dimensions from studies in general and project manage-
The profiling tool serves practitioners in assessing their ment. The strong evidence found for the role of govern-
organization's particular profile of governance and govern- mentality further supports the validity of the findings. It is in
mentality and experiment with the dimensions and their scales line with the ongoing discussion about the importance of soft
to find their own “best practice”. Practitioners in management factors over hard factors in project management. Weaknesses
and governance roles will benefit from having the study's are in the relatively small sample size and the exploratory
results included in training and education programs to grow nature of the study, which extends in several new areas, thus
awareness of the importance of governmentality as a potential needs further studies to validate and support the present
success factor in projects. This includes the importance of findings.
establishing both direct and indirect governmentality simulta- The study's contribution to knowledge lies in modeling,
neously and in non-ambiguous ways. theorizing, and clarifying the relationship between governance,
governmentality and success for a better understanding of
6.3. Future research organizational practices and their consequences.
The study supports Clarke's (2007) notion that the relationship Conflict of interest
between governance and success is complex. Building on the
present results, qualitative studies can assess a) the direction The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.
Appendix A: Questionnaire
Concept Items
Governmentality In my project, the project governance institution…
Approach Gives clear directions. Q1
• Authoritarian Enforces their decisions. Q2
Is authoritative in style. Q3
• Liberal Emphasizes achievement of project objectives. Q4
Uses rational means to convince project managers. Q5
Flexibly adjusts organization structures to project needs. Q6
• Neoliberal Communicates values and fosters a culture that allows project manager/team to control themselves. Q7
Expects project manager and team to decide for themselves, based on the collective interest of the stakeholders in Q8
the project.
Rarely steers the project through directive orders. Q9
Precept Emphasizes achievement of organizational values, and to a lesser extent on project processes or time/cost/ Q10
• Organizational values quality results.
• Processes Emphasizes the need to follow the project process or methodology, and to a lesser extend organizational values or Q11
time/cost/quality results.
• Project well-being Emphasizes the viability and success of the project and the product/service it delivers, and to a lesser extend Q12
processes or time/cost/quality results.
Table 7 (continued)
Appendix A (continued)
Concept Items
Governance mechanisms The governance philosophy in my project favors…
• Balance between trust and control …a strong emphasis on always getting personnel to follow the formally laid down procedures … versus …a Q18
strong emphasis on getting things done even if it means disregarding formal procedures
…tight formal control of most operations by means of sophisticated control and information systems … versus Q19
…loose, informal control; heavy dependence on informal relationships and the norm of cooperation for getting
things done
…a strong emphasis on getting personnel to adhere closely to formal job descriptions … versus …a strong Q20
emphasis to let the requirements of the situation and the individual's personality define proper on-job behavior
… support institutions (like a PMO) emphasize tactical aspects, such as compliance with the organization's Q21
project management methodology … versus …support institutions (like a PMO) emphasize strategic aspects,
such as skills and knowledge development
…prioritization of methodology compliance over people's own experiences in doing their work … versus … Q22
prioritization of people's own experiences in doing their work over methodology compliance
Governance institutions Please list the institutions that are involved in the governance of your project. Q23
Projectification In my wider organization (such as the whole company)….
…the perceived importance of project management for achieving organizational objectives Q24
…in total, how well developed is the career system for project managers in terms of training and certification Q25
programs, career ladder, support for membership in professional organizations etc.
…to what extent is working-in-projects a business principle in your organization Q26
…to what extent prevails a project mindset and culture the organization Q27
What is the approximate percentage of revenue through projects Q28
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