THE 2OTH CONGRESS OP THE COMMUNIST PARTY OP THE SOVIET UNION Nato Document

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5th April., 1956 '
PUBLIC DISCLOSED C-M(56)40
THE 2OTH CONGRESS OP THE COMMUNIST PARTY

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE
OP THE SOVIET UNION
Note hy the United States Delegation
The attached report on the 20th Congress of the

Communist. Party of the Soviet Union is submitted for the
information of the Council. The report is based on
information available through 5th March, 1956.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract (iii)
I. The Results of the Congress . . ... . . . . 1

A. The Setting . .. . . . . . ... , . . .. ., 1
B. The Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Foreign Affairs . 4
A. Foreign Policy Approved . 4
B. Achievements of Soviet Foreign Policy . 5
C. Doctrinal Adjustment to Changed
Conditions 7.
D. Outline for the Future ......... 1®
III. Stalin - The Shrunken Symbol ........ 12
A. The Indictment of Stalin . . . . . .. . . 12
B. Gains and Losses . 15
IV. The Party Leadership . 18
A. General Trends »... . 18

B. The Presidium . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. The Secretariat . . . 20
D. The Central Committee -20
E. Khrushchev's Influence Gains . , . . . .. 22'
F. Variations Aiiiong the Leaders 23
V. The Party Machinery 26
A. The Party Membership . . . . . . . . . . 26
B. The Party Elite . ., 28
C. The Party in Action 29
VI. The Government . . . . . 32
A. Management of the Economy 32
B. Political Issues . . . . . , . . . . . . 33
TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd.)
Page
VII. The Economy • 35

A. Nature of Economic Growth . . . . . . . . 35
B. Changes Affecting Lahor Productivity . . . 37
C.. Development of the East . . ; 40

D. Agricultural Production ' 40
VIII. Social Structure. 44
/
A. Boarding Schools 44
B. Lifting Low-Income Earners' Wages . . . . 45
C. Literature and the Arts 46
Abstract
The first public criticism of Stalin hy his

successors stands out as the highlight and main innovation
of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (February IU to 25). Otherwise, the conclave
served largely as an authoritative occasion for the Soviet
rulers to confirm and formalize their current policies.
Criticism of Stalin. In the nearly three years

since his death, Stalin's stature has been progressively

reduced. The new regime shrank the symbol of Stalin largely
by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it entirely
on Lenin. The Congress has now marked a further distinctive
step as the rulers took to open attack. Their criticism
centered chiefly on the ill-effects of one-man rule, with
its glorification of an all-wise leader. Beyond this, how-
ever, while they neither completely buried Stalin nor brought
into question his basic state policies, they ranged critically
over many fields, including economic development, ideology,
law .and foreign affairs.
The Soviet rulers are rewriting history and

rehabilitating some of Stalin's victims; how much further
they will go remains to be seen. Clearly to find clay feet
on the infallible demi-god whose rule for three decades encom-
passed all facets of Soviet life will have widespread effects -
but effects whose manifestations will depend upon a whole
complex of related factors.
Collective Rule. The attack on one-man rule

served to underscore the virtue claimed for collective .leader-
ship which, formally enshrined as a guiding principle, has
thus become an obstacle to concentration of overwhelming •
power in the hands of one individual. That the present ruling
group is stabie appears from the absence of changes among full
members of the Party Presidium. New and younger blood has
been brought to the top circle by the candidate members,
expanded to six.
Inclusion in the latter group of Marshal Zhukov,

the first professional military chief to reach Presidium
level, appears to represent both recognition of him personally
and appreciation of the military ingredient in policy-
making rather than an Indication that the aimed forces are
growing to be a distinct political force.
Khrushchev received no special build-up at the
Congress, but his leadership within the ruling group was
strengthened by the number of new Presidium candidate members
and new members of the Central Committee who have had past
links with him.
Foreign .Affairs. In foreign affairs the Soviet
rulers claimed major successes for their current policy and
announced they would pursue it with greater vigor. They set
forth as the underlying basis of their policy the thesis that
peaceful coexistence is i(the only alternative" to nuclear
war, and they indicated that the USSR will energetically
champion coexistence as an activist program aimed at under-
mining Western defense efforts. They called for the develop-
ment of friendly relations throughout the world, and
especially with the underdeveloped countries. Although this
policy was to apply also to the major Western powers, it was
not meant to imply concessions on major East-West issues.
Their goal was evidently to remove apprehensions of a Soviet
threat and instead to imhue the USSR with an air of respect-
ability,. normalcy, and tolerance.
To further this impression, the Soviet rulers

readjusted their ideological stance: they stressed the

preventability rather than the inevitability of war and, with-
out renouncing violence, they sanctioned for foreign Communists
a "non-violent" acquisition of power by parliamentary means.
They sought both to assure non-Communists that the USSR is not
wedded to violence and to reassure ComiTiunists that a period of
coexistence would not undercut their struggle for the promised
ultimate victory of Communism nor jeopardize the prospect of
winning it.
Any improvement in state-to-state relations between
Communists and non-Communists would involve no ideological
reconciliation. The speakers confidently predicted the
inevitable world triumph of Communism on.the grounds that
Soviet military power would protect the Soviet base; that
continuing Soviet economic successes ,would inspire others to
take the Communist path; and that a majority of mankind,
although representing different views, was already joining
together in "one mighty stream" that would wash out the under-
pinnings of historically-doomed capitalism.
Domestic Innovations. Traditional emphasis on

enforced industrialization and on the maintenance of high
level armaments continued at the Congress. It approved the
Sixth Five-Year Plan, announced in January, adding a provision
for shortening the work-week to i+O-i+l .hours before i960. A
breakdown of investment figures for 1956-60 showed a marked
similarity, with some deviation in favor of agriculture, to
the pattern implemented in 1951-55.
The leaders showed some concern over living
standards and promised to bring up the level of the lowest-
paid workers and pensioners while retaining the present policy
of a sharply differenoiated income structure. Another inno-
vation was the proposal to establish fee-charging boarding
schools. Although justified in part as a way of meeting the
problem of children who lack adequate parental supervision,
these schools will probably be select elite-training
institutions.
The importance of these developments on the internal
scene was less than the.implications of the attack on Stalin,
which opens the way to a re-evaluation of all sectors of
Soviet life. In this sense the Congress could turn out to be,
in Mikcyan's words, !,the most important Congress" in Soviet
Communist Party history since Lenin's time.
THE TWENTIETH .. CONG-EESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
I. THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS
A. The Setting
In the three years and four months since the

Nineteenth Party Congress many changes occurred on the Soviet
scene. The most important, of course, was the death of Stalin,

ending a 29-year rule and paving the way for a new phase in
Soviet history.
Collective leadership in top Party organs became

enshrined as a leading principle; at the same time, Khrushchev
succeeded in moving to the forefront of the ruling group; the
purge of Beriya brought the police under firmer Party control;
the armed forces received a greater share of prestige and
recognition; in,economic policies, agriculture became the
target for sustained special attention, but a new stress on
consumers' goods was short-lived as the regime reaffirmed the
priority of heavy industry; in other facets of Soviet life,
some relaxations of restrictions occurred.
The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion; the

appearance of new long-range bombers and supersonic fighters;
the development of guided missiles; the modernization and
re-equipment of ground forces; the continued emphasis on new
naval construction - all testified to further improvement in
Soviet military power.
In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union moved toward

new international relationships. These were most dramatically
expressed on the East-West level at the Geneva meetings of
the Big Four, where a calmer and friendlier atmosphere
surrounded negotiations which, however,- settled no major
issues, Moscow sought to give vitality to the image of the
USSR as a peace-loving power by making diplomatic gestures
and by removing some barriers to communication with the non-
Communist world. The wars in Korea and Indochina were ended,
an Austrian treaty signed, relations with West Germany estab-
lished. The USSR revamped its approach to Yugoslavia and to
a number of non-Cornniunist countries stretching from the Arctic
to the Indian Ocean. Confident of its economic capabilities,
the USSR employed new means - arms, credits, machines and
technicians - to woo underdeveloped non-Communist countries.
Against this background of developments, more than

1,400 delegates to the Twentieth Congress, as well as dele-
gates from 55 foreign Communist parties, assembled in the
Great-Hall of the Kremlin from February 14 to 25 to listen
to scores of speeches endorsing the policies of the new
regime. The agenda was routine: a report of the Central
Committee, by Khrushchev as First Secretary; a report on
the Sixth Five-Year Plan, by Bulganin as Premier; and reports
and actions on sundry Party administrative matters, including
the "elections1' of new central organs.
B. The Results ;
The principal effect of the Congress was to call ;
into question many aspects; of Stalin's rule over the Soviet
Union. Criticism centered on methods of rule hut also
involved policies ; caustic references were made to one-man
decision making, leader-worship, overcentralization, mistakes
in economic policies, ossified conduct of foreign relations,
distortions of ideology, propaganda, and Soviet history, ;
unhealthy developments in Soviet law, and arbitrariness in,
law enforcement.
How far the present leadership intended to proceed
in repudiating- the Stalinist past was not clear although they
erected a few markers to indicate what they considered good
and had in Soviet development and signified that much would
remain sacrosanct.
A second result of the conference was to put the
official stamp of approval on the leaders' rationalization;,
of their rule as well as on their recent policies. The.
emphasis on collectivity in leadership plus the criticism of
one-man rule may have been designed to make it more difficult
for Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader to set himself
apart from the other oligarchs. Khrushchev's position was ^
improved, however, by the leadership changes instituted in
connection with the Congress. Khrushchev-linked officials '
were prominent in the members added to the Central Committee;
and the new Central Committee promptly expanded the Party
Presidium at the candidate-level (the full-members were
untouched) by adding members with Khrushchev ties. In
addition, it enlarged the Khrushchev-directed Party Secretariat
and geared that body and the Presidium even'more closely to-
gether through overlapping of membership.
In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers

claimed their policy, especially during the past 12 months,
had scored important successes and proclaimed that it would
be pursued even more vigorously. Their basic premise was ;
defined: peaceful coexistence was the only alternative to :
"the most destructive war in history." -
Their basic.course was accordingly set: to develop
friendly relations with most countries, including the major
Western powers, but not at the cost of concessions; to make
special efforts in underdeveloped areas and among foreign
socialist groups.
Their immediate aim was made clear: to undermine

Western defense efforts and to.extend further Soviet influence.
Their ultimate goal was expressed with even greater
optimism than in the past: "the ideas of Communism will
triumph without war."
As reasons for their confidence, the Soviet rulers
cited"growing Soviet military power as a deterrent to Western
aggression;- depicted increasing Soviet economic strength as
a magnetic symbol of the success of Communism; arbitrarily
enveloped into a "zone of peace" neutral countries together
with the Sino-Soviet bio« as proof that a majority of mankind
was marching together toward peace and socialism.
Mindful of the contradiction between coexistence :

and continuing Communist-capitalist conflict, yet unwilling-
to discard either, the Soviet rulers sought to appear both :
respectable and revolutionary by adjusting their ideological
garb. The doctrine of the inevitability of war was modified
to stress the preventability of war; .the doctrine of the
necessity of the violent overthrow of capitalism was shaded
to sanction a :,non-violent" parliamentary seizure of gower.

These adjustments were meant to reassure non-Communists of
the seriousness of Soviet ideas on coexistence and to make
clear to Communists that coexistence meant neither relaxation
nor reformism. Coexistence, it was stressed, was a state-to-
state concept which involved no reconciliation with "bourgeois
ideas.
Within the USSR the preferential role of heavy

industry and the maintenance of a high level of armaments
would therefore continue to exact sacrifices from the popu-
lation, since the threat of war was said still to exist.
Outside the USSR, Soviet efforts to improve relations with
foreign governments was. not to. be interpreted by local Commu-
nists as undercutting their efforts to come to power, for a
period of coexistence would still provide revolutionary
potentialities.
In the field of internal policy the Congress opened

up a whole series of questions about future trends by the
attack on certain aspects of Stalin's rule. The implications
of this attack for internal policy orientation appear far more
significant than the few domestic policy developments revealed
at the Congress, On the economic side the Congress discussion
centered on the new Five-Year Plan. This plan continued past
priorities; investment plans for 1956-60 show a similarity to
the pattern implemented in 1951-55» with some deviation in
favor of SP;riculture. Of special interest' were new policies
in the labor field: the work-week gradually to be cut to
UO-Ul hours, incomes of low-paid workers and pensioners to
be increased.
II. F O R E I G N AFFAIRS
In the field of foreign affairs, the Congress

affirmed the correctness of the regime's foreign policy,
giving special approval to developments during the past year.
Indicating an effort to adjust Soviet policy to the advent
of'nuclear weapons, the Congress emphasized the theme of
"peaceful coexistence" as the only alternative to the "most
destructive war in history," The Soviet version of coexist-
ence, the main speakers made clear, would he actively pursued

to avoid the threat of nuclear war, to undermine the rationale
for the Western alliances, and to spread Communist influence
The tactical revisions of Leninist doctrine on the

inevitability of war and on revolution by violence were
S'teilored to fit this program, which stresses the "respect-
ability" aspects ,of coexistence to non-Communists while
assuring Comniunists of the inevitability of the downfall of
capitalism and the victory of Communism.
A.' Foreign Policy Approved
Setting the tone for references to foreign affairs,

Khrushchev affirmed that: "loyal to the Leninist principles
of a peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet Union has worked
vigorously to ease international tension.and strengthen peace
and has scored large successes."
Other speakers supported these claims and praised

the role of the Central Committee in formulating foreign
policy. In the words of M.ikoyan, the USSR had "introduced a
new, fresh trend, pursuing a policy of high principles, active
and elastic, maintained on a calm level and without abuse,
proceeding from the firm injunctions of Lenin on the peaceful
coexistence of countries with different social regimes and
with its chief purpr.se of eliminating the threat of war and
of insuring world peace." The Soviet Union, M.ikoyan went on,
had discarded "ossified forms" of diplomacy, was willing to
admit mistakes of the past, and conducted its policy on the
basis of a "realistic correlation of forces, with a proper
appreciation of the differences and nuances of the policy of
individual countries at certain periods."
In the only instance of self-criticism by a Presidium

member at the Congress, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov
acknowledged that he and his. Ministry "not infrequently still
remain prisoners of habits and patterns formed in the past
before World War II and which now hinder the deployment of
new, wider, and more active forms of struggle against war."
He declared that this deficiency had been "pointed out in
time" by the Central Committee which along with the Presidium
"probably never in the past has ... been engaged so actively;
with questions of foreign policy." Molotov praised the
measures taken by the leadership, particularly in the past
year, and saw'bright prospects in "the Leninist combination
of adherence to principle and elasticity in the pursuance of
the foreign policy line."
In an atmosphere of confidence, a succession of
speakers claimed a series of Soviet diplomatic -victories and
saw in the marked emphasis on peaceful coexistence increasing
Soviet strength which was making itself felt in all areas of
the world.
B. Achievements of Soviet Foreign Policy

End of Isolation. The Congress established as the
"main feature of our epoch" the "emergence of socialism from
within the hounds of a single country and its transformation

into a world system." Significantly Khrushchev mentioned
"capitalist encirclement" only perfunctorily in his speech, •
While Molotov and Mikoyan stated flatly that this encirclement
had now come to an end.
Heretofore, Soviet theoreticians had pointed mainly

to the existence of the "socialist camp" as proof that the
Soviet Union had broken out of its prewar isolation. However,
several speakers . gave this break-through a much wider signifi-
cance. Mikoyan, in particular, stressed that "not a single
major international question can be solved by the will of the
Yvestern powers alone without regard for the views of the
Soviet Union, China, and all the countries of socialism." He
also exclaimed that Communism "strides with a firm and
relentless step, not only through Europe but throughout the
entire world. It asserts itself with a full voice and for
all to hear. "
Zone of Peace. Khrushchev and other speakers

exhibited satisfaction with the prospects for enhancing
Soviet influence and prestige in Asia and Africa, particularly
among underdeveloped countries in South Asia and the;Near_ ;
East... Continuing the tactics used during the South Asian
tour, Khrushchev sought to emphasize the community of interests
between the USSR and these areas and declared.that there now
existed a "zone of peace"- including the Sino-Soviet bloc and
"peace-loving" states, both socialist and non-socialist, in
Europe and Asia embracing the "majority of the" population of
our planet,. "
The basic characteristic of this zone was claimed

to be refusal to be involved in military blocs. Two types
of non-Communist countries apparently are included in this
group: those more outspoken in their views such as India,
Burns, Afghanistan, and many Arab states, as well as
declaredly neutral states such as Finland, Austria, and Sweden.
The Congress gave this "zone of peace" concept a

broader ideological coloration by linking it above all with
the "disintegration of the imperialist colonial system."
Opposition to Western-sponsored blocs was therefore seen as
part of a larger process wherein the underdeveloped countries
in" particular were breaking loose from the West and contri-
buting to the downfall of world capitalism. Khrushchev's
report also foresaw an economic factor in this connection -
predicting that the industrialization of formerly backward
areas will sharpen the struggle for' markets and exacerbate
economic difficulties in the capitalist world.
The impact of Soviet policy in the Near East and
South Asia seems to have added yet another dimension to
Soviet views on uncommitted and underdeveloped countries.
Several speakers purported to see in recent developments in
this area not merely a coincidence Ofi attitudes toward blocs;
and colonialism hut an active sympathy in these countries for
the Soviet Union. Speaking about the Khrushchev-Bulganin
visit to India, Kaganovich declared that "had Lenin been able
to see how the peoples of India welcomed the emissaries of
the Socialist. Soviet state" he would have felt that his
dreams were being fulfilled about the ultimate victory of

socialism being ensured by the "liberation" of Russia, China,
and India. x
Attractive Power of Communism. The concept applied

by Kaganovich to India was given broader connotations by other
speakers. According to Mikoyan, "the influence of Communism
has V - O w n immeasurably in all of present-day life of human
society. Looking at the struggle against imperialism and
colonialism, against war and against the threat of war, and
looking at the struggle for peace between peoples and for their
freedom and independence, one can boldly assert that already
this overwhelming majority of"mankind is struggling together
with us on this front."
Party theoretician Shepilov described the process

as "the confluence into one mighty stream of the popular
struggle for many Socialist end non-Socialist currents and
streams, which are washing loose and undermining from various
sides the worn-out capitalist structure."
Other Sources of Optimism. Along with factors
which stern from recent Soviet foreign policies, the Congress
listed three, others as causes for Soviet optimism.
/
(1) Military Strength. Soviet armed power was strongly

stressed as a basic source of Soviet satisfaction.
Marshal Zhukov emphasized the "superiority" of
Soviet and satellite armies over the capitalist
powers. Both he and Mikoyan emphasized the
deterrent effect of Soviet possession of nuclear
weapons and the existence of "means to carry these
bombs to any point of the earth by aircraft or
rockets." Zhukov outlined in some detail the
modernization of Soviet armed forces and made an
unprecedented reference to progress in Soviet
anti-aircraft defense. Zhukov and Mikoyan,
singling out the US as the main opponent, also
repeated previous warnings that in case of war
both American bases abroad and the US ibself would
be attacked..
(2) Economic Strength. One of the main sources

cited at the Congress for Corriiaunist attractive
power was the strengthening of the Soviet economy.
Speaker after speaker cited Soviet ability to^
overtake "in the shortest time" the most advanced .
capitalist countries in production per capita.
Some, possibly carried away,by. their words,
challenged the US to compete with the USSR "both
with respect to the economic betterment of their
own peoples and for the advancement of other
peoples. Attempting to underscore Soviet
economic capabilities, Khrushchev claimed that
the USSR had granted the bloc 21 billion rubles
worth of credits ($5.25 billion at official
rates) - a figure far exceeding Western estimates.
(3) Disintegration of Capitalism. Along with the

positive factors, the Congress reaffirmed Soviet

belief in the disintegration of capitalism from
within. As in all previous major Soviet conclaves
the Congress repeated Communist doctrine that
history was marching inexorably toward the replace-
ment of capitalism by Communism, •
At the same time, there were new notes of.realism
in Soviet analysis of the capitalist world as
several leaders sought to reconcile this long-
range prediction with obvious economic progress
in the Western world. Significantly this was
the only point in which Stalin was attacked by name
as Mikoyan charged that the dead dictator had been,
wrong in writing in 1952 that production in the
main capitalist countries was bound to shrink as
time went on. Khrushchev in his opening report
seemed somewhat more realistic than Soviet spokes-
men had been in the past in explaining the cause of
capitalist economic progress while Mikoyan strongly
urged more intensive study of this phenomenon. •
These bows to reality did not, however, change the

"basic Soviet position that the. bases Of--Vvestern.prosperity
are temporary and artificial, Khrushchev, for example, saw .
"underlying crisis symptoms" on the increase especially in
the US and concluded that "capitalism is steadily moving
toward new economic and social upheavals."
C. Doctrinal Adjustment to Chanp;ed Conditions ^

The Congress proclaimed that the changing situation
brought about by Soviet- foreign policy successes and enhanced
military, economic, and ideological strength had made both
possible and necessary innovations in Communist doctrine on
war and revolution. These innovations appeared to have been
made with two audiences inTnind: non-Communists whom Moscow
was seeking to convince of. its peaceableness and Communists
whom it was shewing the revolutionary opportunities as well
as the limitations of the current emphasis on coexistence.
(l) Inevitability of War. Modifying Lenin'-s thesis

that war is inevitable as long as capitalism exists, Khrushche
declared that although imperialism still breeds the economic
causes of war, bloc strength and political conditions have
so changed since Lenin's day that "war is not fatalistically:
inevitable."
Thus, the Congress sought to reconcile the contra-

diction of the doctrine of inevitable conflict with Soviet
professions of a peaceful foreign policy. The modification
attempted to show that Communism is increasingly confident of
its ability to triumph without war and to lend more credence
to Soviet assertions that it was competing with the West in
the realm of ideas, not arms, Khrushchev accused "bourgeois
ideologists" of confusing "ideological struggle with questions
of relations between states in order to make the Cominunists
of the Soviet Union look like advocates of aggression."
According to Mikoyan, the new doctrine also rebuts, the argu-
ment that for.the Soviet Union coexistence is merely a•
temporary phase until such s time as it is "prepared and can

attack and assert Communism by force of arms,"
For the Communist faithful, the variation of the
doctrine appeared designed to meet questions about the conse-
quences of war in a nuclear age which had proved troublesome
to Cormnunist theoreticians in the past. If, as previously
held, war was destined to be the final result of the struggle
between Corrimunism and capitalism, then it became questionable
whether it was worth while to continue the struggle given
the nature of nuclear weapons.
The repudiation by Molotov in February 1955 of

Malenkov/s March 1954 statement that nuclear war would spell
"the destruction of world civilization" marked one Soviet
attempt to face this problem. Significantly, at the Congress
several speakers, including Malenkov, repeated the Molotov
version that war would mean the end only of capitalism.
The current doctrinal revision represents another
approa ch to the same problem. Since increasing Communist
strength mokes, 'war no longer inevitable, the reasoning proceeds
•Communists can and should carry on the class struggle with
the assurance that the sharpening conflict need not bring war.
In any case, the faithful are reassured,.that, if war between
the two systems does break out, capitalism would perish and
Communism would emerge triumphant.
At the same time, the Congress did not rule out the
possibility of war. Considerable emphasis was put on showing
that some imperialist circles were still bent on starting a
war against the Soviet bloc, and Mikoyan repeated - though
without discussion or attribution - Stalin's 1952 dictum that
wars between capitalist countries were still possible. Nowhere
did the Congress go "so far as the Soviet-Indian communique of
last December which declared that all the powers at the Geneva
summit meeting had acknowledged the impossibility of nuclear
war. The Congress therefore felt constrained to confirm the
orthodox position that capitalism remains an enemy of peace
and to justify the need within the Soviet block of continued
vigilance, high military expenditures, heavy industry
priority, and curtailed civilian consumption,
(2) Doctrine of Violence. Khrushchev's second

theoretical revision was that the new favorable correlation
of forces in the world meant that a violent change-over from
cap!ta Iism to socialism was no longer obligatory and that
Communists could take over some countries by parliamentary
means.
"It is not true," Khrushchev asserted, "that we
regard violence and civil war as the only means of remaking
society." In some countries, he declared, the working class
is in a position "to capture a stable majority in parliament"
and transform this body into a "genuine instrument of the
people's will."
When taken in conjunction with the approbation

given to Yugoslavia as a country building socialism, this
acceptance of the possibility of a non-violent way to establish
conditions for socialism appears part of a multi-faceted drive

which Moscow has been conducting to attract support for Soviet
policies among Socialist movements, particularly in Western
Europe. As the cement for a Communist-Socialist rapprochement,
Khrushchev argued that if the workers unite "there will be no
war."
What form this unity might take was not indicated,

but it was clear that Khrushchev's proposal did not intend,
to place collaboration with Western Socialists on a liberal
democratic basis. However, local Communist Parties in several
countries have already made bids to other leftist groups for
a united front, and the USSR has also made direct approaches
for collaboration to a number of Western European Socialist
Parties. Nothing was said at the Congress .about the Cominform,
and it is possible that Moscow may yet propose some new type
of international Socialist organization.
Khrushchev's formulation on the possibility of

peaceful transition to socialism, however, was carefully
C i Ualiiied and did not amount to a Communist renunciation of
the use of violence. In countries where "capitalism is still
strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its
disposal," Khrushchev envisaged the seizure of power by a
"sharp class, revolutionary struggle."
The Congress made a determined effort to refute in
advance the conclusion that because it was suggesting the
feasibility of non-violent assumption of power, the Kremlin
was endorsing varieties of socialism basically different from
those obtaining in the Soviet bloc.
For one thing, the Congress strongly asserted that
the Communist objective of total power was unchanged.
According to Khrushchev, "whatever the form of transition to
socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the
political leadership of the-working class headed by its van-
guard. Without this there can be no transition to socialism."
Secondly, the Congress made clear that peaceful

revolution was possible only when the opposition does not
resist s Conxaunist takeover, Mikoyan was particularly
enlightening on this point as he cited the coup in Czecho-
slovakia as a prime example of a revolution "carried out by
peaceful means" and attributed to Lenin the general principle
that "in a small bourgeois country, with the presence of
socialist countries in the neighborhood, the transition to
socialism can take place by peaceful means." Kaganovich was
most blunt on the question when he said that the new revision
illustrated Lenin's advice :!that one must learn to make all,
new or old, forms into tools for a full and final, decisive
and irrevocable vic'tory for Communism.'
Thirdly, the Congress was quite explicit in

rejecting "reformist1'' Socialists abroad as "in essence ...
advocates of capitalists" and stressing that once Communists
achieved power, they sought a "revolutionary transformation
of society," a transformation, it may be noted, which means
the end of parliamentary regimes. Underlining this point,
Mikoyan also added the thought in his speech that in the case
of current Socialist governments, presumably like those in
Scandinavia, "no socialism is built."
Outline for the Future

As enunciated by Khrushchev, the "Leninist
principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems" will remain the avowed general line of
Soviet foreign policy.
(1) The World as a YifhoIe. As in the past year, the
totality of Soviet moves will probably be directed toward
enhancing the international image of the Soviet Union as a
peace-loving power. The only general prescription offered
was the suggestion that it would be desirable if all countries
subscribed to the Chou-En-Iai-Nehru "five principles."
(2) The Uncomraitted Countries. The Congress reaffirmed

that the "zone of peace" countries, particularly the under-
developed ones, would be the object of special efforts to
increase Soviet influence.
' (3) The Western Powers. Improvement of Soviet relations

with the Big Three Western powers was still accorded high
priority. Almost all the Presidium members expressed regret
that President Eisenhower rejected Premier Bulganin's bid for
a US-USSR peace pact and saw the rejection as evidence of
pressure on the President by unnamed "advocates of settling
outstanding questions by means of war,"
Unfriendly references to the West Were spliced into

Congress speeches. US policies in particular were often
sharply attacked. The US was still named as the number one
villain in opposition to relaxation of tension, the source of
pressure against other countries both allied and not allied.
Khrushchev, for example, warned France of an "emerging"
Washington-Bonn axis which would make France a third-rate
power. As for the West in general, point five of his list of
Soviet foreign policy tasks stressed the need for vigilance
against the.", "intrigues" and "subversive activities of the
enemies of peace."
On the main unsolved East-West issues, the
Congress indicated no substantial changes in current Soviet
positions. Khrushchev revived references to renunciation of
the Paris Pacts as a prerequisite for a solution to the G-erman
problem. On disarmament, he suggested the feasibility of
"partial steps" including an agreement on a thermonuclear test
ban, but gave no inkling of a change on the basic question of
inspection. On Asia, Khrushchev mentioned but did not
discuss Chou En-lai's regional security plan. He said
nothing about Taiwan although Molotov and Zhukov both
strongly supported Chinese Communist claims to the island.
Another interesting detail in Molotov's speech was that he
mentioned both Korea and Taiwan, but not Indochina, as
sources of, war danger in the Far East,
(k) Other committed Countries. The Congress called

for "a vigorous policy of furthering relations" with'the
former enemy countries (West Germany, Italy, Japan) as well
as members of the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan).
Encouragement was given to further Communist efforts, parti-

cularly in Western Europe, to become part of "popular front"
governments. Moscow has already tacitly approved such bids
in France and Greece, and the drive should receive further
impetus from the actions at the Congress.
(5) International Trade. Using standard Communist
terminology, Mikoyan inveighed against trade restrictions,
singling out the US as- a special target, and asserted his firm
belief that "stable, peaceful coexistence is unthinkable
without trade."- He denied that the existence of two world
markets precluded trade "between all countries" and foresaw
mutually .profitable trade. Moreover, he took the position,
unique in recent Soviet pronouncements, that there was a need
for a universal division of labor based on the principle that
"it is not equally profitable to turn out all. forms of produc-
tion in all countries." The Mikoyan proposition is probably
an attempt at justifying the Soviet Union's recent interest
in increasing international trade, but it is doubtful that it
represents a basic modification of the long-held views on the
advantages of economic autarchy. Nevertheless, this was an
indication that the Soviet Union would push its trade drive,
(6) Cultural and other Exchanges. Several Congress

speakers, including Khrushchev, asserted that the USSR would
continue to expand•"contacts and cooperation in the sphere of
culture and science.1' Seeking to shift the blame for the
"Iron Çurtain", Mikoyan derided the Vifestern "myth" regarding
"our alleged fear of what might result from contact between
the Soviet people and foreigners."
However, coexistence, it was emphasized, did not
mean reconciliation with bourgeois ideas. . Mikoyan claimed
that "progressive•ideals exist and can only exist among the
working class - the leading force of present-day society -
only in the Communist Party, the bearer of its ideology."
. "It goes without saying," said Shepilov, "that we are not
offering capitalism any compromise on ideological questions.
The capitalist and socialist outlooks cannot be reconciled."
", (7) Bloc Coordination and Unity. Whatever its moves

to the outside world, Moscow made clear that next to building
-up the Soviet Union itself, it gave utmost priority to
strengthening' its relations with Communist China and its East
European satellites. The concept, of a monolithic, increasingly
coordinated bloc - the socialist system - was given offical
sanction at the Congress. Soviet spokesmen reaffirmed Sino-
Soviet solidarity and gave no hint of dissension in their
relations.
III. STALIN - THE SHRUNKEN SYMBOL
The "biggest surprise at the Congress was the

unprecedented treatment of Stalin: not only was he denied
even perfunctory praise - his name was mentioned less than
a half-dozen times in 11 days of speeches - hut for the first
time his "rule was publicly subjected to an onslaught of
criticism by some of his successors.
Beginning shortly after his death, Stalin as a symbol
began undergoing a shrinking process at the hands of the new
regime. Privately Soviet rulers on at least two occasions had
criticized to foreigners certain of Stalin's foreign policies.

Stalin remained, however, a positive symbol. Last December,
on the occasion of his birthday anniversary, all major Soviet
publications treated him as if he were securely cast in a
supporting yet featured role as "continuer" of Lenin's
policies. In January he received favorable treatment at
various republic Party congresses and was given his accustomed
place in the quadrumvirate of "Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.
The first hint that he might be subjected to critical

treatment appeared on the eve of the Party Congress when the
Pravda editorial on the meeting ignored hira completely and-
named Lenin as the exclusive Soviet authority on all facets
of Communism. At the opening session of the Congress he
was further downgraded when the delegates were asked to
rise in memory of comrades who had died since the last
Congress and his name was simply grouped with that of the
Czech Communist leader (Gottwald) and the Japanese Communist
leader (Tokuda). After that he became the unnamed but
unmistakable target for actual attacks, beginning in a
limited manner with Khrushchev's opening report and reaching
the strongest expression in Mikoyan's speech.
A. The Indictment of Stalin
To discredit Stalin, two techniques were used at
the Congress: (l) outright- repudiation or condemnation, by
clear implication, of some phase of his activity or some
policy pursued under his regime; (2) total ignoring of his
association with any of the Soviet policies that were praised.
Only once - Mikoyan's speech - was Stalin critically

mentioned by name, yet it was clear that he was constantly in
xhe minds of the principal speakers as they criticized past
practices and approved new ones.
The attack on Stalin centered mainly about the issue
of one-man rule versus collective leadership. . The approval ..
expressed for the measures which restored collective leader-
ship in the preceding three years in all echelons of the
Party organization, including the' highest, was obviously
meant to discredit Stalin's personal dictatorship.
Suslov charged that the "Lenin norms of Party Life1^,
including the practice of collective rule, had been "frequent-
ly" violated prior to the 1952 Party Congress. Mikoyan
asserted that collective "leadership had been lacking in.top
Party organs for an interval of "about 20 years," which he
said had had an "extremely negative influence" on the Party's
work. Khrushchev described the "restoration and strengthening
... of ihe principles of collective leadership" as of "primary
importance," pointing out that the role of the Central
Committee as a collective leader had risen in the "past few
years" and- that the Party Presidium was now a "regularly
operating body." Malenkov claimed that the "cult of person-
ality" - hero worship and one-man rule - had "led to
peremptoriness of individual decisions, arbitrariness, a nd,
during a certain period, inflicted great harm on the work of
directing the Party and country."
The scope and nature of the specific shortcomings

which were attributed directly or by implication to Stalin
were suggested in a remark of Khrushchev. He said that in
the period since the last Party Congress "the Party courage-
ously exposed shortcomings in various spheres of economic,
state, and Party activities, broke obsolete ideas, resolutely
sweeping aside everything that had outlived its time and was
acting as a brake on our forward movement." The areas encom-
passed by these faults included domestic economic and admini-
strative practices, foreign relations, ideology, law, and
justice. Among the charges leveled against Stalin's rule
were these :
(1) Inflexibility in foreign policy. The new regime's
foreign policy', especially as pursued during the past year,
was lauded and was said to have been carried out with
"maximum flexibility." Mikoyan claimed that since the 1952
Party Congress "certain ossified" techniques had been aban-
doned. He pointed up the errors committed in the conduct of
•Soviet diplomacy under. Stalin, saying that in some instances
the new regime had frankly admitted where the Soviet Union
had been at faùlt in aggravating international tensions.
Molotov acknowledged that his foreign ministry had been
corrected by the Central Committee since the last Congress
for underestimating the possibilities which had appeared in
the postwar period to develop new "forms of struggle against
war,"
(2) Stalin's role as theoretician questioned. Citing

Stalin and his last extended theoretical pronouncementf
"Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," MIkoyan
described as "hardly correct" or "helpful" the statement in
the work that production in the US^ the UK, and Prance would
decline following the postwar emergence of two world markets.
Mikoyan also urged Soviet economists "to make a deep study
and critical review ... from the point of view of Marxism-
Leninism" of "certain other postulates" in the "Economic
Problems." Some reflection upon Stalin as a theorist was
apparent also in Suslov's condemnation of those who had
believed that only "individual personalities" could develop
Marxist theory while all other "mortals" had only to study
and to popularize what these single personalities created,
(3) Fabrication and distortion of history,, Mikoyan,

Khrushchev, and others criticized the continued use of the
1938 Short Course of the History of the CPSU as the principal
source for instruction in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Part of
the criticism concerned the fact that the text omitted the
' last two decades. In addition, Mikoyan, following Khrushchev's
lead, threw suspicion on the accuracy of the text, long attri-
buted to Stalin, when he said that if Soviet historians con-
sulted archives and.historical documents and not only the
daily press, they "could illuminate better from the position
of Leninism many facts and events described in-jthe Short
' Course." Mikoyan also charged that some Party histories
falsified facts and that "some persons were arbitrarily
exalted in them, others go no mention at all." He said this
particularly in reference to histories of Party organizations
in the Caucasus.
(4) Stalin's legal practices impinged. Both

Khrushchev and Voroshilov referred to the increased power
given to the prosecutors by the new regime to eliminate all
violations of law and arbitrary actions by the police.
Mikoyan, moreover, cast doubt on the entire Stalinist legal
system with his remark that whereas "Soviet jurisprudence ...
in Lenin's lifetime and in the course of a few years after
his death developed ... in accordance with the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism, ... one cannot say the same for the later
. period." Mikoyan also appeared to question the implementation
of justice under Stalin when he referred as "comrades" to two
officials who disappeared in 1938 and apparently had been
'classified as "enemies of the people." Ironically, one of
•the two, Kossior, was Khrushchev's predecessor as Ukrainian
Party boss. This raised the question of. the extent to which
the purges of the-1930rs would be repudiated* ^The
Congress speakers and the press continued to describe
"Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and bourgeois nationalists" as
"inveterate enemies of the people."
(5) Ma.ior agricultural shortcomings. Party .Secretary

Belyayev claimed that "major mistakes and shortcomings in
agriculture ... which were tolerated .until 1953" had been_
uncovered by the new leaders. Mikoyan 'said that the lag in
agriculture and the "disproportion" which had arisen between
its .growth and that of industry had become "most^dangerous"
and were the present rulers' main "preoccupation" in the
economy.
(6) Administrative overcentraligation. Bulganin and
other speakers criticized the extreme centralization of
planning and administration practiced previously and under-
scored the new policy of transferring to the lower echelons
additional responsibilities. Mikoyan mentioned that the
union republics had been given "management of matters which
are within their competence but which previously had been
incorrectly concentrated in the center,"
(7) Stifling effects of security. Both Bulganin and
Mikoyan criticized the exaggerated security practices
inherited from Stalin-. Bulganin referred to the obstacles .
which the "unwarranted", classification of materials as
"secret" placed in the way of a scientific progress. Mikoyan
mentioned that Soviet economists were hampered in their work
because the government's Main Statistical Administration
refused to release statistical information, apparently for
security reasons. He asserted, moreover, that under the new
leadership the "isolation of Soviet public and governmental
organizations from the outside world had been liquidated."
Mikoyan alluded to "the great anxiety about the
fate of our Party and revolution" which Lenin had expressed
before he died. This may have been an allusion to the
"political testament" which Lenin wrote in January 1923.
In it Lenin expressed fears over the enormous power Stalin had
concentrated in his hands and which Lenin felt Stalin did not
know how to use "with sufficient caution," References were
made to the testament in the Soviet press as late as 1927 but
thereafter were suppressed. Conceivably the present leaders
may republish it to help justify and to further their deflation
of Stalin's stature.
Lastly there was a suggestion that the new regime

might retract the title of "continuer" of Lenin's work which
it had given Stalin, In an obvious reference to the oath
that Stalin gave several days after the death of Lenin to
follow in his footsteps, Mikoyan said that the present
leaders "not only swear by Lenin's name but ... put into
practice Lenin's ideas. " (1)
B. • Gains and Losses

In their treatment of Stalin, the present rulers
indicated a desire to define the limits of the attack. Not
all of what Stalin had done or had stood for was to be
criticized, for this would bring Into question nearly 30 years
of Soviet history and would implicate on various scores certain
members of the current leadership. To offer some guidance of
where criticism was to be directed and where it might be
withheld, Mikoyan in effect offered a chronological dividing
line of about the early thirties. Mikoyan spoke of the 20
years in which Leninist norms of leadership had been neglected,
presumably 1933-53. Ke pictured legal developments as having
had s good start in the 'twenties and having gone awry in the
'thirties. The division may have been determined to coincide
with one or more of the following: (l) the dividing line in
Stalin-worship between its early and late forms; (2) the
dividing line in treatment of dissident leaders between the
intra-Party measures and the police measures culminating in
the purge trials of 1935-38; (3) the dividing line in
"rewriting of history," with, a serious effort from the mid-
thirties on to make art and history present a uniformly-
tailored picture of Soviet development.
Undoubtedly the decision to criticize Stalin caused
much soul-searching among the current leaders. They doubt-
less weighed the effects on Communist Parties at home and
abroad, including the Chinese Communist Party under the
individual direction of Mac Tse-tung. To attack the symbol
would bring both gains and losses, but the net result
^ ^ The "return to Leninism" so heavily emphasized by the

current Soviet leadership reflected a type of distortion
for which they crticized Stalin. For example, they
especially stressed the "Leninist principle of coexist-
ence" when in fact Lenin had virtually nothing to say
about this concept.
apparently has considered to he favorable. The Congress
offered an opportune occasion since it is formally the
Party's most authoritative body and its approval, however
automatic, could be portrayed as carrying the greatest
sanction.
In going over from minimization to disparagement

of Stalin, the Soviet rulers were doubtless influenced by
certain potential gains:
(1) At home, disparagement of Stalin would have appeal

for large groups in the Soviet population, especially the
intelligentsia who had suffered under Stalin's restrictions
and repressions.
(2) Abroad, the tarnishing-of the Stalinist symbol

would make more attractive the idea that the present Soviet
leaders were indeed moving along a new path and would parti-
cularly appeal to non-Communist leftist circles.
(3) In general, the shrinking of the Stalin symbol
gave his successors greater freedom of action. 'With the myth
of Stalin's infallibility destroyed, the new regime could
alter previous policies and practices without concern for
possible critics who based their opposition on quotations
from Stalin.
(U) Indeed, the emphasis on the "return to Leninu

served to offset the comparative lack of stature of the
current rulers and make them appear even more orthodox than
Stalin. As a result-, they could affirm the legitimacy and
authority of their rule.
( 5 ) The attack on one-man rule offered the regime a
new opportunity to seek more positive support from the rank-
and-file. One-man rule was said to have caused the lower
ranks to feel their role was simply to obey; with all
direction coming from the top, they were depicted as lacking
any feeling of participation or sense of responsibility.
With one-man rule doctrinally outlawed, the Party has improved
its position in appealing for more initiative and acceptance
of responsibility at the lower levels.
At the same time, the debunking of Stalin posed

certain problems.
(1) One of the strengths of the Communist cause ever
since Marx has been the appearance of historical/inevitability
and infallibility which surrounded the movement. The Commu-
nists1 successes in acquiring and extending their sway were
ascribed largely to the Larxist-Leninist -orientation of the
leaders and the movement. The sudden allegation that the
movement had been misled for 20 years, that personal factors -
Stalin's- one-man rule - distorted- the course of Soviet
history makes it more difficult to maintain the aura of
infallibility around the cause.
(2) The renunciation of an undefined portion of

Stalinism presents certain dangers to the Communists,
Mikoyan and the other leaders singled out various facets of
Stalin-tinged development for censure "but nowhere indicated
what re.aained in good standing. Jet it was obvious that
many of the policies and events associated with Stalin, both
before and after the early thirties, could not be challenged.
This failure to define clearly the aspects of Stalinism
which are being rejected probably has its attractive features
for Soviet Iesdersj allowing them to gain a sympathetic
reaction by raising hopes that more is being repudiated than
actually is; but as a negative consequence it is likely to
cause some confusion end uncertainties in the ranks of the
movement as well as in the population at large.
.(3) The attack on Stalin is likely to cause difficulty

for s group identified as closely as the present leadership
with him. They are all on record with words of"praise for
Stalin's genius, sometimes involving the same work which they
1
criticized at the Twentieth Congress.
In addition to weighing gains and losses, some of

the current Soviet rulers may have found it in their own
interest to play up the concept of collective leadership in
an effort to build at least a psychological obstacle to any
future attempt of one man to acquire the personal power
possessed by Stalin.
IV, THE PARTY LEADERSHIP
A. General Trends
At the Congress and the Central Committee meeting
that followed, these were the main developments with regard
to the Party leadership:
(1) The principle of collective leadership was explicit

Iy endorsed hy the major Presidium members as a guide to

Party officials at all levels,
(2) The new Presidium reflected stability of the
present leadership, with the 11 full members remaining
unchanged,
(3)- The inclusion of Marshal Zhukov among the six

candidate nembers of the Presidium highlighted the influx of
new blood into the leading group, which, except for the short
lived radical reorganization in 1952, now has its largest
membership since the 1925-27 period.
(4) Khrushchev's role at the Congress, as veil as the-

personnel shifts announced there, indicated a further enhance
ment of his personal influence in the hierarchy,
(5) The new Central Committee reflected sizeable
personnel changes, with newcomers filling nearly half of
the total full and candidate positions.
(6) The Presidium members in their speeches evidenced
some variations of approach to the common topics discussed,
but there was no firm evidence of any differences among them.
Several lower ranking speakers cast doubt on the oft-
repeated assertion that the Central Committee was the
collective leader of the Party.
B. The Presidium
The new Presidium, the top policy-making body of
the regime, was set up at the Central Committee meeting
following the Congress. With the exception of Beriya, it
remained composed of the same individuals who had formed the
group at Stalin's death, together with the two new members
(Kirichenko and Suslov) added in July 1955. All of the 11,
except for Kirichenko, had sat in top Party bodies under
Stalin. The retention of Malenkov and Molotov, who had been
publicly criticized in 1955» appeared designed in part to
emphasize the stability of the leading group as a collective
organization.
In the words of Khrushchev, the Presidiiom "has

become a regularly acting collective body" handling the
principal problems facing the country. He claimed that
relations among the top leaders were based neither on mutual
advantage nor personal antagonism, and where any leading-
official had been found mistaken, measures were taken by the
Central Committee to correct him. Mikoyan characterized the
Presidium as consisting of "comrades who have become a team
during many years of revolutionary struggle."
PULL MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM
Age Age
Bulganin 60 Molotov 65
Kaganovich 62 Pervukhin 52
Khrushchev 61 Saburov 56
Ki richenko 48 Suslov 53
Malenkov 54 Voroshilov 75
Mikoyan 60
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Zhukov 59 Shepilov 50
Brezhnev 9 Furtseva 46
Mukhitdinov 39 Shvernik 67
The major development with regard to the Presidium
was its expansion through an increase in the number of candi-
date members from two to six. Of the six named, five were
new: Marshal Zhukov, Kazakh First Secretary Brezhnev,
Uzbek First Secretary Mukhitdinov, Central Committee Secretary
Shepilov, Moscow City First Secretary Furtseva. Of the two
candidate members prior to the Congress, only N.M. Shvernik,
head of the Party Control Commission, was renamed; P.K.
Ponomarenko, currently Ambassador to Poland, was dropped.
The new set of candidate members marks several

innovations,
(1) Hierarchical listing. Instead of being listed
alphabetically, as was the case for all other leading Party
organs, the candidate members were apparently listed in
hierarchical order, with Zhukov first. This is the first
departure from alphabetical listings of Party organs since •
such listings were introduced in mid-1954. It may indicate
that Zhukov will be the first to be elevated to full member-
ship in the Presidium.
(2) Inclusion of the military. The selection of

Marshal Zhukov marks the first time that a professional
military figure has been included in the top Party organs and,
as a result, the professional military now have a consultative
voice at the highest decision-making level. Zhukov's elevation,
however, appears to be a recognition of his own personal
stature and popularity in the eyes of the public rather than
a sign that the armed forces have acquired independent politi-
cal power. If the armed forces had acquired an increased
political role, it is likely that there would have been an
increase over 1952 of military figures included in the new
Central Conimittee rather than a decrease. There are 18 in
the new Central Committee as compared with 26 elected to that
body in 1952.
(3) Central Asian representation. The inclusion of the
Kazakh and Uzbek Party First Secretaries, Brezhnev and
Mukhitdinov, marks the first time that officials representing'
the Central Asian regions have heen included in the top
leadership and signifies recognition of the growing political
and economic importance of the Central Asian republics. The
addition of Mukhitdincv, who is apparently an Usbek by birth,
marks the first time that a Central Asian has been admitted
to the ruling group.
(1+) Woman candidate. The naming of Moscow City
Secretary Furtseva as a candidate member marks the first time
that a woman has entered the leading group. Previously the
highest post in the Soviet regime held by a woman was that of
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars

(1939-43) and Deputy Chairman of the Party Control Commission,
both occupied by R.S. Zemlyachka.
(5) Younger blood. The addition of 39-year old

Mukhitdinov and 46-year old Furtseva calls attention to the
increase at the highest level of younger Party figures. This
injection of junior leaders began last July, when the first
post-Stalin additions to the Presidium and Sécretariat were
made. The average age of the full members of the Presidium
is nearly 59 years.
C. The Secretariat
The Secretariat, under Khrushchev as First Secretary,
was increased from six to eight members with the addition of
•Brezhnev and Furtseva. It had been doubled in s ize at the
July 1955 meeting of the Central Committee, when Aristov,
Belyayev, and Shepilov were added.
MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT
Age Age
Khrushchev 6l Shepilov 50
Suslov 53 Aristov 52
Brezhnev ? Belyayev ?
Furtseva . 46 Pospelov 58
The Secretariat, which manages the far-flung
apparatus of Party functionaries, as a result of changes in
July 1955 and February 1956 is once again strongly represented
in the top policy body, the Presidium. Five of the eight
secretaries are also on the Presidium, as against only one -
Khrushchev - for most of the first two years after Stalin's
death.
D. Central Committee
1, Role of the Committee. The Congress witnessed a
special effort to emphasize that the Central Committee had
been restored as a properly functioning forum and instrument
of collective leadership in the past three years. Credit for
most of the measures adopted since the last Congress was
attributed to the Committee. Khrushchev claimed that in
this period the guidance supplied the country by the Central
Committee had reached "its height" and said that it was
"obvious .... how much the rule of the Central Committee, as
a collective leader of our Party, has risen in the past few
years."
Lower ranking speakers, however, cast doubt on the
role of the Central Committee as the collective leader of
the Party. S.D. Ignatev, First Secretary of the Bashkir
Obkomf indicated that it was through the medium of the
Presidium that the '''Leninist principle of collective leader-
ship, violated in the past, was restored and persistently
effected both in the Central Committee and also in all organi-
zations of the Party." Even more explicit was Z.I. Muratov,
First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom, who gave a graphic picture
of the father-and-son relationship between the Presidium and
the Central Committee:
"Plenums of the Central Committee were for us

a school for study, a training school, and a
tempering school. At plenums and meetings the
Central Committee, its First Secretary, Comrade
Khrushchev, and other members of the Presidium
of the Central Committee corrected /us7 when
individual ones of us, members of the Central
f Committee, committed errors, corrected in a
fatherly way, corrected /us/ regardless of post
occupied or of record, taught and reared us in
the spirit of adherence to principle and in the
spirit of unlimited faith in the principles of
Leninism, and demanded a profound knowledge of
affairs and concreteness in leadership."
2. Membership Changes. The membership of the Central

Committee underwent considerable change at the Congress. The
total number of members and candidate was increased from 236
to'255 (153 full and 122 candidate members). Newcomers were
admitted to approximately 44 percent of the positions (40 full
members and 71 candidates). Although this increase falls short
of the change between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Congresses
(separated by an interval of 13 years and the war) and that
between the Seventeenth and Eighteenth (1934-39? the years of
the purges), it is more than the one-third turnover effected
by Stalin between 1924 and 1928.
The composition of the full Central Committee, as
indicated by the table belowj shows a slightly increased
proportion of governmental civil servants and a decline in
the representation of the police and armed forces, as compared
to 1952.
1952 1956
Party 103 117

Government 79 98
Police 9 3
Military (holding command posts) 26 18
Others and unidentified 19 19
'it is notable that at least 12 of the 119 state members (civil

servants, army, police) are former Party officials who have
switched to governmental or diplomatic work since the 1952
Congress.
A comparison of the percentage of top Party, posts
whose incumbents are on the Central Committee with the
percentage of top governmental posts represented, shows the
ratio favoring the Party. In addition to roughly 19 Party
and Komsomol officials at the center included on the Central
Committee, all-the union republic Party first secretaries
(15) and a large majority (at least 58) of the first
secretaries of RSFSR krais and oblasts are members (All
except four of the remaining RSFSR first secretaries are on
the Central Auditing Commission.) Although the Chairman of
the USSR Council of Ministers and his 13 First Deputies and;
Deputies are all on the Central Committee, only 37 of the . •
other 57 heads of ministries and agencies enjoying ministerial
status are members. The number of diplomatic and other
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs included on

the body has ri.sen from 7 to 12.
A number of old members were dropped from the

Central Committee ; many of these changes were predictable,
in the light of Stalin's death, Beriya's ouster, and
developments since Malenkov's demotion. The more notable of
these included N.N. Shataliri, former Central Committee.
Secretary ; S.N. Kruglov, former MVD head; A.N. Poskrebyshev,
head of Stalin's Special Secretariat; Yu. A. Zhdanov, son
of A.A. Zhdanov and Party official in Rostov Oblast ; G-, M.
Popov, former Central Committee Secretary and Moscow Party .
boss; N,G-. Kuznetsov, former Commander in Chief of the Navy;
V.M. AndrianoV, former Leningrad Party boss; and M.D.A,
Bagirov, former top Party and governmental leader in
Azerbaidzhan. (The speech of I.D. Mustafayev, Azerbaidzhan'
First Secretary, left little doubt that Bagirov has either :
been executed or is in prison.)
Former candidate member of the Presidium and
Ukrainian First Secretary L.G. Melnikov, who now is Minister
for Construction of Coal Industry Enterprises, was demoted-,
from a full to a candidate member of the Central Committee.
Ponomarerikoj although dropped from the Presidium, remains a
member of the Central Committee. An anomaly was the fact
that of all the Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of
Ministers only P.P. Lobanov, who presumably was responsible
for general supervision of•agriculture, failed to make full
member of the Central Committee, while Minister of Agriculture
Matskevich and Minister of State Farms Benediktov did.
E. Khrushchev's Influence Gains

Khrushchev's personal influence appears to have
been further enhanced as a result of both personnel and
organizational changes: at least three and possibly four
of the new Presidium candidates seem to owe their rise to him
more than to any other Presidium member. Khrushchev appears
to have been instrumental first for Mukhitdinov's reappoint-
ment as Chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers in December
195U and second for his choice as Uzbek Party First Secretary
in December 1955. Furtseva rose to a leading position in .
the Moscow City Party organization when Khrushchev was Party
boss of the Moscow area. Shepilov, who served during World
War II in the Ukraine, rising to the rank of Major-General,,
had a somewhat chequered postwar career as an Ideologist in
the Central Corriinittee's Propaganda and Agitation Section until
he began to rise rapidly after the 1952 Party Congress,
presumably having caught Khrushchev's eye. The case of
Brezhnev is less conclusive, but he also. appears to have
benefited from ties to Khrushchev.
Zhukov, on the other hand, although promoted to
full membership in the Central Committee in July 1953 and to -
Minister of Defense in February 1955» probably owes, his rise
to several of the top leaders rather than to Khrushchev alone.
A further notable increase of Khrushchev's influence

.is evident in the implementation of one of his recommendations,
namely, the formation of a bureau under the Central Committee
for RSFSR affairs. The membership of this body, announced
after the Congress, included Khrushchev as chairman, Belyayev
as his deputy, and eight other members, virtually all of whom
can be identified as Khrushchev followers. From this position

Khrushchev directs the largest bloc of Party members and
organs, those of the RSFSR. The large turnover in Central
Committee membership paved the way for the introduction of a
large number of members and candidates who can be identified as
probable Khrushchev followers. Roughly 60 full and candidate
members have been associated with Khrushchev either in the .
Ukraine or elsewhere. On the other hand, the failure of a
number of persons believed to have been Malenkov proteges to
be re-elected to the new Committee suggests a noteworthy
drop in his influence.
Khrushchev played a leading role in the Congress

proceedings. As First Secretary he delivered the report of
the Central Committee, which provided the focus for most of
the subsequent discussion. In at least four cases and
possibly more he interrupted lesser speakers and interjected
a comment. He was frequently referred to by other speakers
but was not made the object of flattery. Throughout his own
speech he carefully noted that it had been the Central
Committee which had adopted the new measures since the last
Party Congress, He avoided identifying himself specifically
with any"of the Central Committee's resolutions - in agri-
culture and construction - which had been taken following his
recommendations. He was careful to note that it was the
Central Committee and Council of Ministers that had made
provisions for such obviously popular proposals as the
reduction of working hours and the increase in pay and
pensions of the lower brackets.
F. Variations among the Leaders

There was sufficient variationîn the treatment of
common topics by the various leaders to give -the appearance
of individuality within the top group..
Whether these variations reflect differences in
substance or simply in approach is difficult to determine,
since the evidence is insufficient to establish any firm
lines of demarcation.
1. Stalinism and Policy Questions. . 'The primary

difference among the leaders lay in their treatment of
Stalinism and the Stalin era. Mikoyan, Suslov, and Khrushchev
were most vigorous, in that order, in denouncing practices of
the period before Stalin's death, A. more moderate group
included Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and
Shvernik, all of whom referred to the "abnormalities," the
great harm done "during a certain period," or the "restoration"
of Lenin's norms in Party leadership and organisation hut
not to the same extent as the first three.
Following these were Kirichenko, Voroshilov, and
Belyayev, who lauded the principle, of collective leadership
hut did not refer to its "restoration" or any specific time
period when it was ignored. Belyayev, however, was fairly
specific in his comment on Soviet agriculture when he referred
to the "major mistakes and shortcomings in agriculture which
were tolerated until 1953." I
The final three of the top group - Aristov, Shepilov

and Sahur-ov - cast virtually no reflections on the Stalin ;
period and, with the exception of Aristov, did not mention •
the principle of collective leadership. Aristov discussed It
only in connection with the July 1953 plenum of the Central.
Committee, thereby seemingly connecting the restoration of
the principle more with Beriya's elimination than with Stalin'
death.
Mikoyan was the most outspoken on the subject of
the former leadership, the cult of personality, and the
principle of collective leadership. He also emphasized and
developed some of Khrushchev's more significant points on
foreign policy. Khrushchev, however, was apparently limited
in his treatment of these points"because of the wide scope -
of his report. Bulganin in turn concentrated on the new
Five-Year Plan.
Molotov gave indications of continued differences'

between his approach and the lines of foreign policy laid out
by the "collective leadership." He was the only Presidium :
speaker to indulge in self-criticism at the Congress, and
acknowledged that the Presidium and Central Committee had
been taking an increased part in guiding foreign policy.
Molotov was also the only Presidium .member who did
not characterize the new doctrinal revisions as creative
additions to Marxism. He discussed the substance of the
revision on. inevitability of war but said nothing about the
question of non-violent seizure of power. Differences between
Molotov's treatment of Jfu£LasjL£u&i-a-and those of other speakers
reinforce speculation that he has been at least reluctant
toward the rapprochement with Tito. Whereas the others told
of the importance of this development for "peace and socialism
Molotov saw its significance for "peace and international
security" - a difference which might imply misgivings on his.
part about the ideological implications of Soviet relations
with-Tito.-
In contrast to most of the other speakers,

Kaganovich seemed to have some reservations about measures ;
taken or contemplated by the current regime. On the question
of leadership, although admitting that the Central Committee
found the correct "Marxist-Leninist" reply, Kaganovich stated
that the struggle against the cult of the individual "is no-
easy question." In referring to the "difficult" state of
agriculture, Kaganovich said "measures for correcting the
matter of agriculture were elaborated and carried out to a
certain extent,"
In Kaganovich's own field, moreover, it appears that
he was hesitating on the question of revision of wage policy.
Bulganin asked for more speed in wage and labor norms revision,
while Kaganovich said much time and careful study was
necessary. Mikoyan's comments on wage policy, moreover,
expounded a more egalitarian doctrine than Kaganovich or any
of the other speakers would admit.
2, Positions of Molotov and Malenkov. Further, douhts

about Molotov's position were raised when Khrushchev
criticized specifically the formulation on building socialism

which Molotov recanted last October. Although not mentioning
Molotov by name, and not quoting him verbatim, Khrushchev
unmistakably was referring to him. Khrushchev said that the
Central Committee has to correct,"those workers who intro-
duced discord and confusion into some clear.problems solved
by the Party a long time ago.11 He attacked as mistaken the
statement to the effect that "so far only the foundations of
socialism have been built in our country."
Khrushchev also attacked a position with which
Malenkov had been popularly identified by disparaging some
"wise people" who had proposed to alter the priority relation-
ship of heavy and light industry development. For his part
Malenkov reaffirmed that the "line directed toward priority
in the development of heavy industry, was, and still remains,
the general line of our Party," but he did not openly admit
any errors of his leadership period. He referred, however,
to "the exposing of grave errors and great improvement of
leadership in agriculture," which was one of the factors
publicly stated to be underlying his demotion in early 1955.
In addition, Malenkov's current bailiwick, the Ministry of
Electric Power Stations, was criticized by Saburov for
uneconomic use of resources.
V. THE PARTY MACHINERY
The interval since the Nineteenth Party Congress

witnessed Doth quantitative and qualitative changes in the
Party machinery,. The changes are significant not only as
indicators of the nature of the ruling elite in the Soviet
dictatorship hut also as reflectors of the internal policies
of the regime.
A. The Party Membership

Trends in the Party's membership showed these
developments:
(1) The Party continued to expand. Por the first time
in its history total membership exceeded the seven million
mark. The gain of 4.8 percent since the 1952 Congress roughly
approximated the estimated rate of population growth since
that time. The number of candidate members, however, declined
by more than half. The acceptance as full members of candi-
dates who had passed satisfactorily the probationary period
indicates a response to Central Committee demands made by
Malenkov at the Nineteenth Congress.
(2) Geographically the Party's growth was uneven.

Administrative changes were one cause; the addition of the
Crimean Oblast to the Ukraine cut into RSPSR Party membership
and added to Ukrainian. Greater economic .activity in some
areas was another cause. These factors probably do not
present the full answer.. The 11 republics for which compara-
tive figures are available show a combined Party merabership
growth of 11,8 percent. The Estonian, Latvian, Karelo-
Pinnish, and Turkmen Parties, for which no figures were
given, are relatively small in size. Clearly, therefore,
Party growth in the RSPSR has been below the national average.
(3) Party membership in the- rural areas appears to have
increased, but still lags in direct agricultural operations.
No urban-rural breakdown of Party members was presented to
the Congress, but Khrushchev did note that over three million
members live in rural areas, although less than half of them
work on collective farms, machine tractor stations, and state
farms. While.the total figure undoubtedly represents an
appreciable increase over 1952, in view of the emphasis on
agriculture since then, there still are more than 7?000
collective farms without primary Party organizations. That
so large a segment of rural Party members is not engaged
directly in agricultural work is a matter of obvious concern
to the Party leadership.
TOTAi PARTY MEMBERSHIP
Percent of
1952 I956 increase
Total Party Membership 6,882,145 7,215,505 . 4,8

Including:
Pull members 6,013,259 6,795,896 13.0
Candidate members 868,886 419,609 -51.7
Komsomol Members , 16,000,000 18,500,000 15.6
Republic Party Membership

Armenia 64,255 69,263 7.8
Azerbaidzhan 111,697 119,774 7.2
Belorussia 127,987 145,069 13.3
Estonia 31,000 No figure
Georgia 173,298 . 185,224 6.9
Kazaghstan 231,610 257,055 11.0
Kirghiziya 46,267 48,232 4.2
Karelo-Pinland - No figure
Latvia 42,03 No figure
Lithuania 36,693 38,087 3.8
Moldavia - 37,466 39,499 5.4
Tadzhikistan 38,096 40,465 7.3
Turkmenistan - No figure
Uzbekistan 142,355 160-,285 ' 12.6
Ukraine 777,832 895,400 15,1
KK
i787,556 1,998,753 11.8
Percent of members with:
Higher education g 11.1

Incomplete higher education ) ± J - ° • 3.6
Secondary education 22.2
Incomplete secondary education 29.7
Number of women members 1,318,968 1,414,456 10.7
Percent of women members 19.2 19.6
x
No figure for the RSPSR was given and none can be
accurately deduced in view of the incomplete breakdown.
ÄÄ
This total does not include Estonia and Latvia, for
which comparative ^ data are not available.
(U) The educational level of the rank-and-file remains
low, although undoubtedly higher than the level for the
population as a whole. More than 60 percent of the members
have not completed secondary school, a fact which undoubtedly
causes difficulty in finding qualified Party leaders for
industry and agriculture.
(5) The proportion of women in the Party has advanced

slightly since 1952, although not enough to suggest any
change in policy. The proportion of women reflects their

actual status in society rather than propaganda claims of -
complete equality of the sexes. The relatively low position
of women in the ruling structure is also made clear by the
fact that female representation at the Party Congresses has
been appreciably smaller than their membership would justify.
On this score women Communists did register definite gains
at the Twentieth Congress.
(6) Komsomol membership gains of two and one-half

million have been registered since 1952, an increase of
roughly 15 percent. Unlike the Party, however, membership in
the junior organization is highly fluid, with eight million
youths joining the organization since the Nineteenth Congress.
This is' understandable in view of the requirement that members
normally lose their Komsomol status at age 26. Despite the
much larger membership of the junior organization, it too
has only three million members in rural areas. Vtfhether this
is the result of an aversion.to membership on the part of
rural youth or, more likely, organizational deficiencies in
the countryside, is not entirely clear.
B. The Party Elite
Published data on the lÔO-odd delegates to the
Congress, (including top and an intermediate leader) provide
some insight into the nature of the Party's elite.
( 1 ) Education is highly important t'o Party success.
Although roughly only 15 percent of all members have had some
higher education, almost two-thirds of the delegates dame
from this stratum.
(2) The Party elite is aging. Nearly 80 percent of the

delegates were over J4O, compared to 76 percent in 1952 and
18 percent in the post-purge 1939 Congress. Only 6 percent
of the delegates had joined the Partybefore 1921.
(3)" Party functionaries (persons involved in full-time
Party operations) clearly predominate among the elite,!
accounting for more than one-third of the delegates. However,
post-Stalin efforts to induce leading Party members to enter ,
directly into production have enjoyed some success.
PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES
1952 1956"
Voting delegates 1192 1355

Non-voting delegates 167 81
Age of voting delegates:

Up to 40 23.6% 20.3%
40 to 50 61.1% 55.7%
50 and above 15.3% 24.0%
Percent of voting delegates with:
Higher education 59.0% 56.2%
Incomplete higher education 7.0% 8.6%
Secondary education 18.7% 12.5%
Percent of voting delegates who are:
Party, officials 37.3
Government officials 13.1
Industrial and transport workers 7.8 18.5
Agricultural workers. 7.8 13.8
Women 12.3 14.2
C. The Party in Action

• The Congress gave special emphasis to the need for
improvement of Party operations in four areas: economic
activities,, the countryside, over-centralization of the Party
apparatus, and, a perennial topic, ideological work.
1. Economic Role of the Party. The most persistent
theme running through the speeches was the urgent need for
Party members to become more intimately acquainted v/ith
economic problems and thus to provide more efficient leader-
ship in production. Time after time the delegates were
exhorted to master technical aspects of industrial and
agricultural production. This was not intended to mean the
substitution of Party officials for economic managers, however
"Such a substitution," Khrushchev warned, "would lead to a
lack of personal responsibility, and irresponsibility in
general."
2. Weaknesses in the Countryside. Various speakers
clearly•showed concern over the situation in the countryside.
Weaknesses in raion organization received particular stress,
because- it is here that chief responsibility lies for.
control over agriculture. The 1954 decision to attach a
raion Party secretary to each machine tractor station (MTS)
received general approbation, although many of the listeners
obviously dissented from this view. Even Khrushchev, who may
have conceived the idea, acknowledged that thus far the
results have been unsatisfactory, although quickly adding
that "it is hardly expedient to carry out a new reconstruction
The difficulty, he insisted, is not in the system itself but
rather in the appointment of unqualified cadres. What is
needed, he said, is the appointment of capable people both
from agriculture and from. the cities who understand agri-
cultural techniques. As an inducement to more effective
leadership, Khrushchev proposed that these raion leaders be
paid in accordance with plan-fulfillment in their area of
concern.
3. -Party Reorganization. Excessive bureaucrati'sm in

the Party dêw many barbs, despite certain successes in
combatting" it. Suslov noted that a 25 percent reduction had
been made in the Central Cornrnittee apparatus and strongly

urged ^reductions at lower Party levels.
Efforts to streamline the Party and adapt its
structure to local conditions explain in large part the
organizational, changes instituted by the Congress. Most
important among them were the following:
(1) Abolition of political organs in transport. These

units were criticized sharply in the Central Committee reports,
and Suslov charged that political sections in civil establish-
ments merely "duplicate the work of territorial Party organs."
Under the circumstances, the Congress decided to liquidate
them, •
(2) Abolition of local representatives of the Party

Control Committee,. Under the 195 2 Party statute, this
committee, with the help of local representatives, served .
both as a prosecutor and an appellate body in cases involving
alleged violations of the Party rules by individual Party
members. These duties have not been officially changed, but
the loss of local representatives must perforce reduce the
capability of the Cominittee to enforce discipline on the
rank and file. Local Party organizations will probably now
have this responsibility, while the Control Committee will
perhaps function chiefly as an appellate body and as a court
of first instance only for more important Party officials.
(3) Increasing•the number of local Party secretaries

to accord with local needs. This merely provides a legal
basis for what has already been done.
(U) Increasing the time span between meetings of Party
committees at the yarious organizational levels below the
All-Union body. This change was probably motivated by a
desire to economize time and materials involved in holding
innumerable meetings and to increase administrative responsi-
bility of local Party officials.
(5) Establishment under the Central Committee of the

CPSU of a bureau for the RSFSR. This was perhaps the most
important organic change proposed to the Congress and was
instituted immediately afterwards. The announced aims of
this bureau are to achieve "a more concrete leadership of
the work of republic organizations such as oblast, krai t Party,
local government and. economic organs and a more efficient
solution of questions of economic and cultural building of
the RSFSR."
N,
The R S F S R does not have Party organs at the

republic level as do the other 15 republics; this work for
the RSFSR is carried out by the All-Union organization.
During 1954-55, however, two departments of the Central
Coniiiiittee for the RSFSR were formed, one concerned with
'agriculture and the other with Party organs. The heads of
these two departments are members of the new bureau, whose
chairman is Khrushchev.
The failure to establish standard-type republic

Party organs in the RSFSR in the past is probably explained

by the belief that in large measure they would either
compete with, or make superfluous, certain Ali-Union organs.
These factors presumably have been overridden by a manifest
need for coordinating economic developments through the
republic.
4. The Pragmatic Creed. As a creed for all Communists,

various speakers emphasized that Marxism-Leninism is '''a
fighting guide for practical activity, for the transformation
of the world, for the building of communism." Khrushchev set
the keynote at the outset in his expression of disdain for
abstract doctrine, for concepts not related to production
activity. itAn end must be put to pointless political
chatter,5' he said. "If a Communist is able to make loud
speeches on the significance of Marxism-Leninism but does
not help the people to put this great teaching into practice,
he is worthless."
Although of a highly pragmatic orientation, state-
ments on theory at the Congress in no way minimized the
importance of ideology in the Communist scheme of things.
On the contrary, Party members were repeatedly exhorted to
study the classics of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and to promote
the further development of revolutionary theory.
VI. THE GOVERNMENT
The perennial Communist problem of how to make a

highly centralized bureaucracy function efficiently drew the
attention of many speakers at the Congress. Much of their
comment indicated a preoccupation with problems of production
in a complex industrial economy and a realization of the
weaknesses inherent in the practice of concentrating all
direction at the top. The concentration of control serves
to smother the central apparatus in details and to stifle
initiative at the lower ranks. The problem for the Soviet

rulers, therefore, is how in a totalitarian system to stimulate
the lower echelons to carry a greater load of responsibilities
and exercise greater initiative.
A. Management of the Economy

Beca use the bulk of the Soviet state machine is
concerned with management of the economy, most of the comments
on government were devoted to state controls over this sector.
Primary'among the fields of concern were:
(1) Decentralization. This word has become almost a
cure-all for the ills suffered by the state apparatus. In
current parlance it means that decision-making power is
retained at the center but that decision implementation Is
a local responsibility. This is possible, according to
Khrushchev, because local specialists and technicians capable
of exercising individual initiative and utilizing local
resources are now available. Organically, decentralization
has been pursued and is to be continued largely through the
conversion of certain Ali-Union into union-republic ministries
and the subsequent transfer of appropriate enterprises to
republic jurisdiction.. The transfer has gone so far as to
raise the question, in Bulganin's mind, "about whether the
continued existence of certain union-republic ministries is
expedient in general." He apparently was referring to some
USSR ministries which were left with only coordinating
responsibilities. Bulganin mentioned "resistance from some
top executives /of USSR Ministries/ ... who want centralized
control," but no speaker suggested that their wishes be
acceded to.
(2) Inter-republic equality. In discussing economic

problems at the republic level, Khrushchev took cognizance of
complaints against unbalanced development among the various
republics. To ensure the establishment of "conditions equal
for all," he proposed the creation of a new inter-republic
body, constituting an economic commission of the Soviet of
Nationalities. The commission will draft proposals on such
matters as agricultural procurement and pricing> budgetary
appropriations to the republics, and problems attendant on
local economic growth. Although broadly conceived, the body
will resemble other Soviet representative institutions in
that it will have no genuine authority, its function being to
study and recommend. It apparently is intended largely as an
escape valve to relieve pressures arising out of regional
economic inequities.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
C-M(56)40
(3) Expanded control function. The "weakest point" in

the Soviet state organizational work, according to Khrushchev,
pertains to checking on the implementation of Party and
government directives. At fault is the fiscal auditor of
the Soviet state, the Ministry of State Controls which
reportedly has a vast staff compiling statistical data hut
negligent in the correction of local deficiencies. To remedy
this situation, Khrushchev suggested the reorganization of
the ministry so as to broaden its scope from the financial
auditing upon which it has concentrated in the past to a
broader type of administrative management:, it is to recommend
measures for improving and rationalizing state administrative
practices.
(4) Procurement reorganization. The Ministry of
Procurement felt Khrushchev's barbs for keeping on its
payroll "hundreds of thousands" of local representatives
who should be transferred to production. This was made
possible by the transfer in 1955 of procurement responsi-
bilities for collective farms to machine tractor stations, .
which, however, have not yet assumed full "operational
management" in this field. This they must now do, while the
ministry's job, in Khrushchev's opinion, "should be limited
to problems involving the development of the elevator and
flour midi and meal industry and to storing and receiving
grain and other produce." In connection with this enlarge-
ment of their responsibilities, the MTS are gradually to be
placed on a cost-accounting basis.
B. Political Issues
Spokesmen at the Congress devoted relatively little
attention to the Soviet Government as a political, as con-
trasted to an administrative, institution. They did,
however, manifest concern with the.state's punitive organs
as well as with Soviet "democratic" practices.
1* Police Under Law. The subject of socialist
legality commanded considerable attention, as Khrushchev
noted that during the previous three years "control has been
established over the organs of state security." Speakers
were as one in blaming Beriya and his henchmen for abuses
of the police power and agreeing with Khrushchev that "the
Central Committee has taken steps to restore justice,"
Supporting these contentions, Voroshilov disclosed that a
new criminal code and a criminal procedure code has been
drafted, with the declared intent to safeguard rights of
citizens. Furthermore, he stated that the prosecutor's
office has not only been restored "in its rights" but
actually strengthened. This may have been an allusion to
the abolition of the IvIVD's Special Conference, which, however,
was not mentioned during the Congress.
.Although various speakers discredited the security

police, delegates were also told that ubiquitous capitalist
spies and saboteurs are forcing the Soviet people to maintain
"revolutionary vigilance and strengthen state security organs.
Police abuses are the exception rather than the rule,
Khrushchev told his audience warning that it was "wrong and
very harmful" to distrust the security police. "We know that
the cadres of our Chekists, in the overwhelming majority,
-3k-
consist of honest workers devoted to our cause."
2. More "Democracy" Needed. Khrushchev reaffirmed

post-Stalin emphasis on more "democratism" and increased
respect for constitutional forms. As examples, he cited the
need for closer contact between Soviet deputies and the
electorate and the recalling of incompetent deputies hy their
electors. On the latter point, Voroshilov remarked that a
draft law to clarify recall procedure has been drafted for.
approval by the Supreme Soviet. Voroshilov's warning to
Supreme Soviet deputies to beware on this score reportedly
provoked laughter in the audiences.

VII. THE ECONOMY
Discussion of the draft directives for the Sixth

Five-Year Plan and of the major economic problems facing the
country constituted an important part of the Congres s
proceedings. The speakers generally reaffirmed the economic
policies publicized during the past year and embodied in the
plan directives: continued primacy of heavy industry, greater
emphasis on agricultural development, and gradual improvement
in the living standard. Particular attention was given to
problems of labor, technology, and inflation, as well as to

better regional distribution of productive forces.
The draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan

were adopted with only minor revisions. The most important
change was the introduction into the text of the published
plan of the transition to the I4.O-hour week and the increases
in lower bracket wage rates and pensions, changes first
announced publicly by Khrushchev in his report to the Congress.
The remaining revisions are of interest primarily as indi-
cators of emphasis in planned changes of technology.
A, Nature of Economic Growth . .

The general direction of Soviet growth planned for
I956-6O is similar to that of the past five years. While
investment is to increase somewhat more rapidly than over-all
output, and investment goods' will occupy a larger share in
total production of i960 than at present, the distribution
of investment is to follow closely the existing Soviet
pattern.
This trend is indicated by figures supplied by
Bulganin. Total investment is to increase by 67 percent, from
594 billion ,rubles (in 1955 values) over1 the past five years
to 990 under the new plan. A little larger proportion of
this total appears to be going into agriculture and light
industry than in the past five years, but heavy industry will
also receive . slightly more. The shares of housing and trans-
port and communication are virtually unchanged. With the
information given one cannot determine which sectors of the
economy are to fall behind the rate of increase in total
investment. (See Table below).
Consumer Outlook. Although heavy industry is to

be pushed as strenuously as before, Khrushchev's report con-
tained the most explicit statement since Malenkov's speech
to the Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1953.of an awareness
of continuing consumer shortages. He said: "The Soviet
people knowingly accepted a curtailment of their needs in
matters of food and clothing, in matters of housing and
living conditions, as well as in many other respects ..."
But he made no promise of a rapid improvement. "Many
important questions" connected with the rise of the workers'
material well-being have not yet been solved .,, The Communist
Party and the Soviet Government will have to do a great deal
to raise the living standard of the population ..." The
solution of the consumer problem was described in now well-
publicized terms as being: "based on the preferential growth
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE INVESTMENT IN M J O R
ECONOMIC SECTORS BASED ON BULGANIN t S
PRESENTATION
1951-55 I956-6O
(Actual) (Planned)
Billion Percent Billion Percent

rubles rubles
Total•investment 594 100.0 990 100.0

Industry ' over 353 59.4 over 600 60.6
Light
industry a/ (34) (5.8) (60) (6,1)
Heavy
• industry a/ (319) (53.6) (540) (54.5)
Selected heavy
industries b/ over 400 40.4
Agriculture c/ 63,6 10.7 over 120 12.1
Housing d/ 120 20.2 200 20.2
Transport and
communications e/ (60) (10.1) (102) -(10.3)
a/ Bulganin mentioned a 75 percent increase in funds for

light and food industry. The figures used here for 1951-55
were obtained by adding past investments in these industries
and deflating by the proportion of total industrial invest-
ment to BulganinrS implied figure for the same period.
b/ Power, chemicals, ferrous and non-ferrous metals,

oil, coal, building materials, and timber.
c/ 1951-55 values supplied by Belyayev, These figures
exclude collective farm investments which will amount to
100 billion rubles in 1956-60.
d/ A large fraction of these housing expenditures is

probably also included in the investment figures for
industries,
e/ Bulganin mentioned a 70 percent increase in funds
for transport and communications, A 1951-55 figure was
obtained by'adding data from these years, not entirely
comparable from one year to another, and applying the
deflation described in footnote a/ above.
of heavy industry, to achieve a steep rise in agricultural
production and a quicker development of the light and food
industries. if
These statements are an accurate summary of the

relevant'provisions of the Sixth Pive-Year Plan and of the
1556 plan as shown in the current budget. While heavy
industry output in the next five years will' continue to
grow faster than that of light industry, the absolute increase
in the latter will be considerably larger than in the past.
Food and raw materials for light industry are to be assured
by ambitious plans for agricultural output. Actual perform-

ance will probably fall short of planned targets for many
products, but with increased use of fertilizer'and machinery
and with the incentive of increased procurement and purchase
prices, the level of production in agriculture should show
more improvement than previously. In addition, more rapid
construction of housing is projected.
The 1956 budget gives agriculture a larger share,

and light industry a smaller share, of total investment than
does the plan for 1956-60 as a whole. Presumably light
industry investment will rise after agricultural output has
been built up.
There was also discussion of improvement in the
distribution of consumers' goods. Mikoyan spoke of reforms
in domestic trade practices and inferentially criticized
past price reduction policies for having created excessive
shortages. He promised the elimination of queues and
shortages early in the Sixth Five-Year Plan period, suggesting
that future price cuts would be more modest than in the past
and would be made only when warranted by available supplies.
At the same time Mikoyan said that "in a socialist society
demand must always outstrip supply" as a stimulus to
production, thus indicating official awareness that persistent
shortages and inflationary pressures will not be overcome.
Provision is apparently also to be made for easing

inflationary tendencies through chaneling a portion of the
population's growing income into private or locally determined
investment. Private, housing in urban areas is to be greatly
encouraged. Collective farms are expected to undertake, at
their own expense, construction of communal buildings, public,
service facilities, and inter-collective electric power
stations.
B.. Changes Affecting Labor 'Productivity

Success in attaining economic goals will depend
more than ever before upon improved productivity of labor.
Fewer persons will be entering the labor market in the next
•few years, and industry will not be able to drain manpower
from the countryside as freely as in the past if agricultural
targets are taken seriously. For this reason a special
interest is attached to proposed reforms in the field of
labor, and to the overt recognition of obsolescence as a
factor retarding growth in productivity.
1. "Work Week to "be Reduced. . A proposal announced "by
Khrushchev to introduce gradually in 1957-60 a 1+0 to 4-1 hour
work week was the single most striking economic development
at the Congress.1 The reduction in the work week from the
present 48 hours is to he accomplished without pay cuts,
either hy shortening the working day or hy reducing the
number of days worked.
The contemplated return to a seven-hour day, which

had heen abolished in 194-0, is remarkable in view of the
fact that the USSR faces a tightening labor supply during
the next five to six years. Soviet leaders evidently expect

to make up for the shorter work hours through the elimination
of losses of work time in industry, which now average at least
one hour per worker a day. A reduction in absenteeism and
loafing may cut down some-of these losses. Their complete
elimination will depend upon improvements in factors other
than labor, such as supply bottlenecks and machinery break-
downs, Even though some output increase per man-hour may
result from fuller labor utilization, it is doubtful that
these gains will compensate completely for the loss of
production hours.
Khrushchev indicated that the shortening of the

work week would be conditional on a continued increase in
labor productivity: "Only on the basis of the uninterrupted
growth of production and increase in labor productivity will
... the working day shrink ..." Thus, the Soviet leaders
undoubtedly plan to use the shorter hours as an incentive
to productivity, and will slow down the process, if it should
appear that the fulfillment of plan targets might be
jeopardized.
Khrushchev's speech contained indications, as did

the Sixth Five-Year Plan*draft, that the Soviet leaders hope
to increase still further the participation of women in the
labor force. They already account for over half of total
employment, Khrushchev tied in the planned expansion.of
consumer services, especially public catering, and the greater
production of household appliances, with an increased
availability of women for "useful public work." The expansion
of the network of creches and nursery schools and the estab-
lishment of boarding schools appear designed for the same
purpose.
2, Wage System to be Streamlined. Khrushchev as well

as several other speakers discussed the revision of the wage
system called for by the Central Committee plenum last July.
Generally the speakers made much of the proposed boost in
wages for low-paid workers. The simultaneous reaffirmation -
of "material interestedness" as the basic principle of the
wage structure appears intended to dispel any ideas that this
move constitutes a step in the direction of egalitarianism,
which has been emphatically rejected since 1931. In fact,
both Khrushchev and Bulganin listed "levelling" among the
shortcomings of the present wage system.
Mikoyan, on the other hand, came out for what
appeared to be a more egalitarian wage policy, declaring that
the wage increase for low-paid workers meant "the liquidation
of a certain disproportion in our economy." He stated
further that wage differentials, though not to he eliminated,
will he reduced, since at the present stage of economic
development there is no longer, as great a need to stimulate
a growth in the number of skilled workers as in the past.
Even though the other Soviet leaders were not explicit on
this point, a boost in low-paid workers' wages is in fact
likely to narrow somewhat the spread in earnings.
There was no indication what form the raise for

low-paid workers is to take. The general wage reform,

which is designed among other things to increase the share
of basic wages (in contrast to bonuses) in total earnings,
will undoubtedly involve a substantial increase in all basic
wage rates. In this process rates at the bottom of the
scale might be raised relatively more than those at the top.
The reduction of the high proportion of bonuses in total
earnings (now UO to 60 percent) in itself should improve the
low-paid workers' position in relation to the higher-paid,
since the former benefit to a much smaller extent from
supplementary payments,"
Another aspect of the general wage revision

emphasized by several speakers was a, closer gearing of the
remuneration of management and engineering personnel to the
performance of the individual enterprise.
There was little discussion at the Congress of the

overhauling of output norms, which had also been called for
at the July plenum* Bulganin, the only speaker who dealt
with this subject at length, condemned the practice of
keeping output quotas artificially low in order to guarantee
a certain wage level. He urged a rapid general introduction
of technically up-to-date norms,
3. Obsolescence Recognized. The tightening labor '

supply situation has forced the Soviet Government to give
overt recognition to the problem of obsolescence and to
undertake a broad program of modernization for all industry.
Such a program was implied in the Sixth Five-Year Plan as
well as in remarks made at the Congress.
" In the past, with a more ample supply of labor and
a smaller output of machinery, obsolete machinery was
apparently replaced mainly in the high-priority plants, so
that the calculations necessary to determine when replacement
should be made were only of concern in a limited sphere
of industry. At the Congress Bulganin and Suslov attacked
economists for denying the existence of obsolescence under
socialism, and thus retarding progress.
While it is true that many economists have evaded

discussion of obsolescence under socialism or have discussed
it only in terms acceptable to the Party, it appears that
Soviet economists and engineers have not been unaware of
the phenomenon or of its relation to industrial efficiency.
Thus-, the problem of obsolescence under Soviet conditions was
dealt with intelligently and at length by the well-known
Soviet economist, A.I. Notkin, in a book published by the
USSR Academy of Sciences in 1§U8. Notkin pointed out that
-1+0-
"as long as the possibilities for increasing the output

of machinery and equipment are relatively more limited
than the possibility of mobilizing additional labor resources,"
the greatest expansion of production could be achieved by
using the available supply of new machinery to equip new
plants (except for replacement of worn-out equipment in
established plants). However, "if in a given period there
is a shortage of labor, and obsolete equipment limits the
growth of productivity, then replacement of obsolete equip-
ment by more productive machinery becomes an absolute
necessity ..." Notkin also made it clear, that , a policy of

selective modernization of high-priority plants had been
practiced in the US1SR.
c !
. Development of the East
The existence of a large reservoir of untapped
resources in its Eastern areas is an important element
making possible rapid economic growth of the USSR. Develop-
ment of this frontier, which also has military significance,
•i's apparently to be pressed with vigor. .Khrushchev justified
this drive on the ground that well over half the Soviet
Union's reserves of coal, water power, timber, metals,
chernitals, and building materials are found in the East, and
cited examples of lower produc-tion costs in that area.
Other leaders mentioned recent discoveries of rich deposits
of.diamonds in the Yakut ASSR and of vanadium in Kazakhstan,
minerals of considerable strategic importance.
In the next 10 years Siberia is to become the

largest producing center for coal and electricity, and in
the next 10 to 15 years the third largest iron-and steel
center in the country. Machine building, non-ferrous
metallurgy, and chemical manufacturing will utilize this
power and steel output, and an "expedient all-round distri-
bution of industry" will reduce economic lop-sidedness of
the country and the volume of unnecessary transportation.
At the same time, the expansion of the food base

for the Eastern USSR is to continue, as indicated by
Khrushchev's reaffirmation of the new lands program. The
manpower needs of the population-deficit areas - Western
Siberia and Kazakhstan - are to be met in part by further
youth recruitment drives for work in both agriculture and
industry.
Growth of the East was also implied in statements
indicating the intention to prevent a further influx of
population to large cities (most of which are in the Vvestern
areas) since new industrial construction is not to take
place there.
D. • Agricultural Production
Khrushchev reviewed agricultural production during
the past five years, giving yearly indices for output of
major commodities but no absolute figures. In regard to grain
and industrial crops, he said that in the first three or four
years of the previous plan, there had been "hardly any
increase in production." He attributed the "considerable"
increase in 1955 to "implementation of a number of well-
known measures," and followed this statement by reaffirmation
of the correctness of the virgin lands and corn programs.
Bulganin supplemented the percentage increases

for individual commodities contained in the Sixth Five-Year
Plan directives by stating that by i960 gross agricultural
production is to rise by about 70 percent over the 1955
level.1» Neither the planned nor achieved rate of growth
during the preceding five-year period has been published.
Bulganin did indicate, however, that the planned rise for

the Sixth Five-Year Plan period is "considerably faster" than
had been achieved during 1951-55» when, according to a recent
official statement, the plan was not met.
KHRUSHCHEV CROP INDEX *

(1950=100)
1951 1952.- 1953 1954 1955
Grain 97 113 101 105 129

Sunflower 97 123 1U6 106 207
Sugar beets HU 107 111 95 1U7
Raw cotton 105 - 106 108 118 1-09
Flax fiber 76 83 6U 85 IkS
1. Grain, Khrushchev claimed that last year's grain
crop was 29 percent above 1950 and 22 percent above 195U,
whereas the 1955 plan fulfillment report merely stated that
the crop was "considerably" higher than in 195U.
Khrushchev's figures seem either to exaggerate -

considerably the 1955 level of grain output or to contain
unwarranted downward revisions of 1950 and 195U production
figures. It is difficult to reconcile his figures for 1955
with the 1955 absolute level implied by the Sixth Five-Year
Plan regional targets. These point to a,1955 grain crop of
about 100 million tons at the most. It is reasonable to
assume that it was in Khrushchev's interest to present 1955,
the first year in which.both the virgin land program and the
corn program were in full operation, in a favorable light.
DRS estimates indicate that the increase in the past five
years is unlikely to have exceeded 10 percent, even if
silage corn, in terms of grain, is included. If the 1950
estimate is revised downward, the increase could be as large
as 15 percent, but this is still only half of Khrushchev's
figure.
' It is not known what pricing underlies the figure of 70

percent. On the basis of 1926-27 prices and of DRS
estimates of the output of major commodities, a planned
rate of almost 90 percent was computed, as compared with
50 percent or more calculated by the same method for
the Fifth Five-Year Plan goals and an estimated actual
output increase of less than 15 percent.
Khrushchev undoubtedly included silage corn in
his 1955 estime te. The same procedure was probably followed
in setting up the i960 goal; if this is the case, the pro-
portion of silage corn in the total grain crop would be much
larger than in 1955? the first year in which corn growing
was expanded significantly. In any event it is obvious from
the table below that Soviet data on current and future grain
production are not comparable with those previously claimed
for 195O.
2, Institutional Changes in Agriculture. The

Congress discussions threw some light on actual and planned

institutional changes. A picture emerged of Soviet agri-
culture being transformed into even larger production units
and of a resumption of plans for remodeling the collective
farm villages.
GRAIN CROP, OFFICIAL'AND ESTIMATED

Actual Plan Actual Plan
1950 1955 1955 i960
"Tin million, ton's)
Official a/ 124.5 b/ 174- 95-100 0/ 180,0

186 V
Estimated, barn e/ 90,0 100 d/
There was stress on the increased role of state

farms, which, Khrushchev pointed out, represent the highest
form of organization of socialist agriculture. His figures
reveal that, in addition to the 425 new state farms estab-
lished in the "new lands" during the past two years, an
additional 156 farms were set up, presumably in the old,
established regions.
There are indications that the process of amal-
gamation of collective farms may be speeded up. The speaker
from Stavropol Krai said that there are now only 264
collectives in the whole Krai; compared to 1,132 in Sept-
ember 1953. There were 6,399 at the beginning of 1950.
Figures on Party organizations on collective farms indicate,
however, that reductions of such a scope have not occurred
generally in the USSR. ,
a. According to Soviet statements, Soviet grain estimates

are supposed to have been on a barn basis since 1954 or
at least since 1955, No absolute figures on the actual
crop have been released since 1952.
b. Biological,
c. Calculated on the basis of official.percentage targets
for individual republics given in the plan. It was
assumed that they are consistent with the planned i960
over-all figure of 180 million tons for the USSR as a
whole. Khrushchev may, however, have used a higher
figure for the 1955 crop.
d. Includes silage corn in terms of grain.
e. DRS estimates.
The official attitude toward the private eponomy
(kitchen plots and privately-owned animals) is apparently
again undergoing a change. In contrast to statements in the
autumn of 1553, when a more lenient attitude toward the
private economy was manifested, there was no mention of
encouraging this sector of agriculture. However, even before
the Congress convened, the official attitude toward private
activities had become harsher than in 1953, and there is
now reason to believe that pressures against such activities
may be renewed. The most explicit evidence was in the speech
of the Chairman of Council of Ministers of Lithuania, who
said that the Sixth Pive-Year Plan calls for an increase in

that republic of 25 and 35 percent in the total number of
cattle and hogs, respectively; and for increases of 70 and
100 percent for collective farms. Since state farms are
also likely to increase rather than to decrease their herds,
the much smaller planned increase for all owners implied a
declined in privately-owned cattle and hog numbers.
Khrushchev resurrected some ideas on village

'improvements first mentioned in 1950 and formally presented -
by him in a speech in 1951. He did" not mention agrogorods,
however, nor did he suggest the moving of whole villages
into new rural settlements. He did speak of the desirability
of constructing '"well appointed, attractive" houses, the
building of communal buildings, such as kindergartens,
maternity homes, clubs, bath houses, etc. It is interesting
that while the amenities aspect was not discussed by the main
speakers, it was included in the Party resolution
VIII. SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The C oiigress attempted to strike' a balance between

policies leading toward intensified stratification of Soviet
society and the regime's proposed ultimate objective of a
classless society. Khrushchev proposed the establishment of
a new type of boarding school which will probably become-an
elite school for privileged children. Its establishment on
a fee basis to some extent counters the effect of the proposed
abolition of tuition fees in middle and higher schools.
Relief has been promised to two of the most economically

oppressed groups: the lowest paid workers and pensioners.
The latter particularly have suffered from the Stalinist
practice of giving inadequate care to most persons incapable
of. contributing to the national economy.
A. Boarding Schools
Khrushchev explicitly stated that the new boarding
schools, were to be modeled on such pre-revolutionary aristo-
cratic schools as those for the corps of pages, the cadet
corps and the institutes for daughters of the gentry. These
schools are to be constructed in surburban and rural areas
in order to achieve a pleasant setting, and their-teachers
are to be the "best available." Admission is to be at the
request of parents, who are to pay fees varying with their
incomes. Full state support is to be available to those poor
children admitted.
According to Khrushchev, the purpose of these

schools is to be not the rearing of an aristocratic caste,
but of the "builders of a new society, persons of great
heart and high ideals, who are selflessly serving the people,"
If, nevertheless, these schools become, as seems to be
intended, elite schools whose graduates acquire a preferred
status, the wealth and influence of high Soviet officials
seeking to enroll their children are likely to be decisive,
and the number of poorer children who enter them will be
small. This situation already exists in the more sought-
after higher' educational institutions, such as the Institute
for International Relations in Moscow,
The Sixth Five-Year Plan provides for the abolition

of tuition fees in the upper grades of middle schools and in
the higher educational institutions, and Khrushchev has
indicated that this provision will "be implemented at the
beginning of the next school year. The children of high
officials can thus be expected to encounter keener competition
in seeking entry into the more desirable schools and univer-
sities from some of the poorer students hitherto barred for
financial reasons. The new fee-basis boarding schools may
have been designed to enable such children to retain
relatively exclusive opportunities to acquire an education
and thereby to retain the same high status as their parents.
The problem of juvenile delinquency among the

children of the Soviet elite may also have been a factor in
setting up these' new schools. Khrushchev himself strongly
implied this hy opening the subject with a discussion of
the "had consequences" which follow from the lack of
adequate parental supervision. The unusual, open reference-
to the aristocratic schools may have heen prompted hy the
well-known fact that the graduates of such schools show a
cohesiveness, pride of caste, sense of identification with
the established order end a feeling for duty and honor which
have been conspicuously lacking among some Soviet elite
children,
É. Lifting Low-Income Earners' Yfages

Other proposals emerged from the Congress which
promised to reduce somewhat both the extent of social
stratification and some grievances of the lower classes.
The most significant of these was the pledge of a radical
overhaul of the pension system. At present old age pensions
are calculated, not on the basis of the actual salary of
the workers but on the basis of a maximum of 300 rubles per
month. The same is true of disability pensions, except
that the maximum is 600 rubles for workers in heavy industry,
who may also receive small supplements. As a result, the
aged and the infirm have been pressed to continue working
to make ends meet,
"v.
By contrast high officials may receive pensions
without limitation by decision of the government in each
case. Upon their death, their wives may receive a lump sum
payment and a generous pension, and their children may
receive an annuity to enable them to complete their educa-
tion, Senior officers of the armed forces and the police,
if they are not deemed eligible for a "personal pension" by
the regime, receive pensions based on their actual last
salary upon retirement, as well as many other privileges for
themselves and their children.
In his speech to the Congress, Khrushchev

excoriated the injustices of this system, mentioning that
many persons who are both able-bodied and young are receiving
unnecessarily high pensions and citing with approval the
apparently typical case of an army officer, who, though he
had lost his arm in the war and was receiving adequate
compensation, was continuing his career as a highly success-
ful collective farm chairman. vThese injustices are to be
remedied by a new comprehensive law on pensions soon to be
placed before the USSR Supreme Soviet. Because of the war,
the number of persons affected is probably considerable.
Another move which.may improve the living standard

of the bottom strata of Soviet society is the pledge to
raise the wages of-the lower paid workers. Since basic wage
norms have been virtually unrevised for 15 years and 1+0 to
60 percent of wages now consist of bonuses, the workers
who are likely to gain most are those who cannot easily earn
bonus payments. It should be noted that the wage structure
is to be revised in accordance with the principle of material
incentives and that both Khrushchev and Kaganovich attacked
elements of egalitarianism in the present wage structure.
G.. i Literature and the Arts - •
Literature and the arts received only cursory
attention at the Congress. Khrushchev's "brief remarks on
the subject in his main address were general in nature and
covered familiar ground. Soviet cultural workers were.
declared to be still lagging far behind Soviet reality, and
many writers were said- to be publishing dull and immature
works,
Soviet literature and art, Khrushchev declared,

must possess not only wealth of content but also artistic
force and skill. Writers and artists in their works must

steer a middle course between, on the one hand, "whitewashing
Soviet reality and, on the other hand, "slandering and
besmirching" Soviet achievements. At the same time,
Khrushchev cautioned, literature and art must serve the
interests of the Party, They must be imbued with the spirit
of struggle for Communism, inspiring and hardening people in?'
their Communist convictions.
The brief nature of Khrushchev's remarks were in
contrast to the considerably fuller attention to the subject
in Malenkov's main address at the Nineteenth Party Congress
in 1952. Malenkov castigated the low quality of many Soviet
artistic creations, and discoursed on "typicality," one of
the main aspects of "socialist realism." The Malenkov formu-
lation was denounced point-by-point in a late 1955 Kommunist
-editorial, which called for a more flexible and less rigid
application of the principle of partiinost (Party spirit) to
the arts. Khrushchev's failure to renew the attack -ir to
amplify the- editorial apparently indicates that Party
authorities have for the present nothing further to add to
the subject. Current Soviet doctrine, embodied in the
message of the Central Committee to the Writers' Congress, in
December 1954, holds that though literature and the other
arts are instruments of Party ideology, greater' freedom
should be allowed the .artist in choice of forms of expression
State—FD, Wash., D.C.

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EXEMPLAIRE 3 7 7

THE 2OTH CONGRESS OP THE COMMUNIST PARTY

OP THE SOVIET UNION

Note hy the United States Delegation

The attached report on the 20th Congress of the

I. The Results of the Congress . . ... . . . . 1

A. General Trends »... . 18

VII. The Economy • 35

C.. Development of the East . . ; 40

The first public criticism of Stalin hy his

Criticism of Stalin. In the nearly three years

since his death, Stalin's stature has been progressively

The Soviet rulers are rewriting history and

Collective Rule. The attack on one-man rule

Inclusion in the latter group of Marshal Zhukov,

To further this impression, the Soviet rulers

readjusted their ideological stance: they stressed the

Domestic Innovations. Traditional emphasis on

I. THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS

In the three years and four months since the

scene. The most important, of course, was the death of Stalin,

Collective leadership in top Party organs became

The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion; the

In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union moved toward

Against this background of developments, more than

In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers

Their immediate aim was made clear: to undermine

Mindful of the contradiction between coexistence :

to sanction a :,non-violent" parliamentary seizure of gower.

Within the USSR the preferential role of heavy

In the field of internal policy the Congress opened

In the field of foreign affairs, the Congress

ence, the main speakers made clear, would he actively pursued

The tactical revisions of Leninist doctrine on the

A.' Foreign Policy Approved

Setting the tone for references to foreign affairs,

Other speakers supported these claims and praised

In the only instance of self-criticism by a Presidium

B. Achievements of Soviet Foreign Policy

within the hounds of a single country and its transformation

Heretofore, Soviet theoreticians had pointed mainly

Zone of Peace. Khrushchev and other speakers

The basic characteristic of this zone was claimed

The Congress gave this "zone of peace" concept a

dreams were being fulfilled about the ultimate victory of

Attractive Power of Communism. The concept applied

Party theoretician Shepilov described the process

(1) Military Strength. Soviet armed power was strongly

(2) Economic Strength. One of the main sources

(3) Disintegration of Capitalism. Along with the

positive factors, the Congress reaffirmed Soviet

These bows to reality did not, however, change the

C. Doctrinal Adjustment to Chanp;ed Conditions ^

(l) Inevitability of War. Modifying Lenin'-s thesis

Thus, the Congress sought to reconcile the contra-

temporary phase until such s time as it is "prepared and can

The repudiation by Molotov in February 1955 of

(2) Doctrine of Violence. Khrushchev's second

When taken in conjunction with the approbation

conditions for socialism appears part of a multi-faceted drive

What form this unity might take was not indicated,

Khrushchev's formulation on the possibility of

Secondly, the Congress made clear that peaceful