Why Britain was right to go to war

in 1914
Following on from Niall Ferguson's argument that Britain should not have entered the First
World War, we asked six expert historians for their views on the decision. They all came to a
similar conclusion

Margaret MacMillan: “Even if Britain had stayed out of the

war in August 1914, it would have been difficult for it to stay on
the sidelines”
We can never know for certain what would have happened if Britain had stayed out
of the First World War, but we can guess. If Germany’s war plans against France
had succeeded – and, without the British Expeditionary Force, they might well
have – Paris would have been surrounded again.

Although the French might well have surrendered, this is a big question mark: we
should not make the mistake of assuming that the France of 1914 was the same as
the France of 1940. The country then was far more united, with better forces and
leadership than it had in the Second World War. France might well have fought on,
and it would have become increasingly difficult for Britain to stay on the sidelines.

Think, as British statesmen did at the time, about what a German victory might
have meant. German demands would have been drastic: France would lose part of
its northern coast, and Belgium and Luxembourg would have been gobbled up.

A Europe dominated by such a Germany would have been an unhappy place: it

would have been disastrous for Britain economically and in every other way. So,
yes, I think Britain was probably right to enter the war.

Peter Hart: “The challenges that Britain faced could only have
been answered with war”
British foreign policy had long been worked out based on the necessity of
maintaining the status quo on mainland Europe by acting to contain the expansion
of any wayward power appearing to be threatening domination. Traditionally, this
had involved creating coalitions while contributing only a small army on the
continent. Meanwhile, as an aggressive imperial power, Britain had used its naval
strength to harvest new colonies, protect maritime trade and concentrate troops at
key locations.

Since its defeat of France in 1871, Germany had threatened domination of Europe
while also challenging the supremacy of the Royal Navy through a provocative
naval race. During the July Crisis of 1914, Britain was not central to events and
initially favoured a negotiated settlement. Yet the invasion of Belgium, the
possibility of outright defeat for France and the threat to the Channel ports were
challenges that, given the sensibilities of the age, could only be answered by war.

Britain was perfectly well equipped for the traditional maritime role that had
served it well. Unfortunately, the war would demand an enormous British military
commitment on the western front, for which the army was ill-prepared. This
tragedy is one that we cannot seem to forgive or forget.

Peter Hart is the author of The Great War: 1914–1918 (Profile, 2013)

Nigel Jones: “The German invasion of Belgium persuaded the

British government that war was necessary”
Britain’s government was divided in August 1914, with a clutch of ministers
threatening to resign in protest at the war and bring down the government.
However the event that changed their minds, and swung not only the cabinet but
the vast majority of the country behind the war, was Germany’s brutal, unprovoked
and unnecessary invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality both she and Britain had
guaranteed.

In spirit, if not in scale, this was a bestial action similar to that of the Nazis 20
years later. Some 6,000 Belgian civilians were murdered in cold blood, and the
prospect that such a barbarous militarist power could dominate Europe and
threaten Britain’s vital sea links concentrated British minds wonderfully.

Hindsight is a great thing, and the war’s horrendous casualty toll tends to make
pacifists of us all. But there are worse things than battles: as the French resistance
writer Jean Dutourd put it in the Second World War: “War is less costly than
slavery.”

Nigel Jones is the author of Peace and War: Britain in 1914 (Head of Zeus,
2014), reviewed in our March 2014 issue
Gary Sheffield: “It is now difficult to capture the sense of
moral outrage at Germany’s actions”
When Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914, British entry into the war
became inevitable. The sense of moral outrage at Germany’s flagrant flouting of an
international treaty to which the country was a signatory is difficult to capture in
this more cynical age, but it was real enough.

Even more importantly, a fundamental tenet of British security had, for centuries,
been to keep the Low Countries out of the hands of a hostile power. In this respect,
Britain went to war against Germany in 1914 for the same basic reason that it had
fought against expansionist Revolutionary France in 1793.

For centuries British leaders had been concerned with the maintenance of the
balance of power. For Britain to stand by while its fellow democracy, France, was
defeated and an authoritarian, aggressive Germany gained hegemony in Europe
would have been a strategic catastrophe. While Britain was protected by the
battleships of the Royal Navy and thus all but invulnerable to invasion, German
domination of the European continent would have been as much a threat as
Napoleon’s had been a century before.

If Britain had stayed out in 1914 it is all too likely it would have found itself at war
with Germany in the not-too-distant future, except – having betrayed its friends in
their moment of deepest need – without allies.

As was well understood at the time, the world faced worse things than war in
August 1914.

David Reynolds: “To understand Britain’s decision, we must

look at its historical ties with Europe”
In the circumstances that Britain faced in August 1914, I think that going to war
was an understandable decision. The Germans had invaded Belgium and were
threatening France, and historically Britain has never felt comfortable with a
hostile power occupying the ports just across the English Channel. So although
there was no immediate threat to British territory, it seems to me that, in terms of
Britain’s historical tradition, this choice made sense.

It was a difficult decision for the Liberal cabinet, particularly David Lloyd George,
who was a radical but had anti-war roots. Deeply sceptical at the end of July, he
became convinced by the invasion of Belgium and, in September, gave a big
speech in which he called the Prussians the “roadhogs of Europe”, bulldozing their
way over – as he put it – five foot five nations who had to stand up against the
storming Prussian Junker.

His evolution over those few weeks is a very striking indication of the way in
which British opinion developed.

David Reynolds is the author of The Long Shadow (Simon & Schuster, 2013)

Heather Jones: “The cabinet delayed involving Britain in the

war for as long as it possibly could”
The decisions made by the British cabinet in the first days of August 1914 had
truly devastating consequences. Yet the reality was that, by the time the British
cabinet agonised over the decision
to go to war, they had little choice.

The cabinet’s decisions on 2 August were based on the facts as they knew them.
They expected a short war. They also initially expected that Britain would only
provide naval and financial support to France rather than sending in a land army.
Britain’s army was tiny compared to its French, German and Russian counterparts
– few could have imagined how it would expand, the length of the war, or the scale
of British casualties.

By 2 August, most of the major decisions that caused the war had already been
taken in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and elsewhere. The British
government had, in fact, delayed getting involved for as long as possible: the
foreign secretary, Edward Grey, had proposed a conference to find a peaceful
solution to the crisis only to be rebuffed.

The cabinet had even privately discussed turning a blind eye and not entering the
war if Germany only breached a small corner of Belgium, but it rapidly became
clear that its army was intent on invading the whole country with a view to
ruthlessly occupying it.

Could Britain have stayed out of the war? The reality was that even those states
that remained neutral at the outset – such as Italy or the US – ultimately found
themselves forced to take sides and enter the conflict. Based on what they knew in
those early August days, the British cabinet believed entering the war was the right
decision.
Questions

 Paraphrase the arguments in your own words?

 Provide counterargument for each?
 Write a short essay to discuss the arguments of both sides of the debate?
What is your standpoint and why?