Anomalous Monism

pdf version of the entry
Anomalous Monism
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/anomalous-monism/ Anomalous Monism
from the Fall 2019 Edition of the First published Tue Nov 8, 2005; substantive revision Fri Sep 6, 2019
Stanford Encyclopedia Anomalous Monism is a theory about the scientific status of psychology,
the physical status of mental events, and the relation between these issues
of Philosophy developed by Donald Davidson. It claims that psychology cannot be a
science like basic physics, in that it cannot in principle yield exceptionless
laws for predicting or explaining human thoughts and actions (mental
anomalism). It also holds that thoughts and actions must be physical
(monism, or token-identity). Thus, according to Anomalous Monism,
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson psychology cannot be reduced to physics, but must nonetheless share a
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor physical ontology.
Editorial Board
https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html While neither of these claims, on its own, is novel, their relation,
Library of Congress Catalog Data
according to Anomalous Monism, is. It is precisely because there can be
ISSN: 1095-5054 no such strict laws governing mental events that those events must be
identical to physical events. Previous identity theories of mind had held
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem-
that claims concerning the identity of particular mental and physical
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized events (tokens) depended upon the discovery of lawlike relations between
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the mental and physical properties (types). Empirical evidence for
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, psychophysical laws was thus held to be required for particular token-
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . identity claims. Token-identity claims thus depended upon type-identity.
Davidson’s position is dramatically different—it requires no empirical
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
evidence and depends on there being no lawlike relations between mental
Copyright c 2019 by the publisher
The Metaphysics Research Lab and physical properties. It in effect justifies the token-identity of mental
Center for the Study of Language and Information and physical events through arguing for the impossibility of type-identities
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
between mental and physical properties. (For discussion of philosophical
Anomalous Monism
Copyright c 2019 by the author positions related to Anomalous Monism, see the supplement on Related
Steven Yalowitz Views.)
All rights reserved.
Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/
1
Anomalous Monism Steven Yalowitz
The appeal of Anomalous Monism is due to these enigmatic features, a 6.2 Interest-Relativity and the Dual Explananda Strategy
fairly straightforward argumentative structure, and its attempt to bring 6.3 The Causal Constitution of Reasons
together an intuitively acceptable metaphysics (monism) with a 7. Conclusion
sophisticated understanding of the relation between psychological and Bibliography
physical explanatory schemes (anomalism). Its explicit assumptions are Academic Tools
each intended, on their own, to be acceptable to positions opposing Other Internet Resources
monism, but, when taken together, to show that monism is in fact required. Related Entries
1. The Argument for Anomalous Monism This entry also includes the following supplementary documents that are
2. Premise I: The Interaction Principle linked into the text:
2.1 Mental and Physical Events
2.2 Mental Causation Related Views
2.3 Psychological Anomalism 1. Spinoza’s Parallelism
3. Premise II: The Cause-Law Principle 2. Functionalism
3.1 Strict Laws 3. Bare Materialism
3.2 Justifying the Cause-Law Principle 4. Other Positions
3.3 Objections to the Cause-Law Principle Related Issues
4. Premise III: The Anomalism Principle 1. Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism
4.1 The Holism/Indeterminacy Arguments 2. Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism
4.2 The Rationality Arguments 3. Anomalous Monism and Freedom
4.2.1 Normative vs. Descriptive Principles (Kim) 3.1 Anomalous Monism and Kant’s Theory of Freedom
4.2.2 Uncodifiability and Strong Rationality as An Ideal 3.2 Anomalous Monism and Contemporary Compatibilism
(McDowell) Casual Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Monism
4.2.3 The Context/Complexity Argument (McDowell and Mental Properties and Causal Relevance
Child) Homonomic and Heteronomic Generalizations
4.3 The Causal Definition Argument Explanatory Ephiphenomenalism
5. Monism Kim’s Reductio Strategy for Establishing Mental Anomalism
5.1 Token Identity Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical
5.2 Objections to Token Identity Token-Identity and Minimal Materialism
5.3 Is Supervenience Consistent with Mental Anomalism?
6. The Epiphenomenalism Objections
6.1 Mental Properties and Explanatory Relevance
1. The Argument for Anomalous Monism
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 3

The basic structure of the argument for Anomalous Monism is as follows. holds that mental properties are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws of
We start with the plausible assumption that some mental events, such as any kind; we shall call it the anomalism principle:
believing that it is raining, are caused by certain physical events, in this
case the rain. Similarly, it is assumed that some physical events, such as The Anomalism Principle: There are no strict laws on the basis of
one’s arm rising, are caused by certain mental events, such as deciding to which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or
scratch one’s head. Davidson calls this the Principle of Causal Interaction; explained by other events
we shall call it the interaction principle:
Davidson offered loose ruminations concerning rationality and
The Interaction Principle: Some mental events causally interact rationalizing explanations, which purportedly constitute the very nature of
with some physical events mental properties, in support of the anomalism principle (4.2). All of this
will be discussed in detail below.
Davidson presents this assumption as obvious and not in need of
justification, but we shall see that motivations for it can be found in parts With the interaction principle, the cause-law principle, and the anomalism
of his writings (2.2). To this interaction principle is added the requirement principle now in place, we can see that there is a tension in need of
that all singular causal interactions are covered by strict laws—laws with resolution. From the interaction and cause-law principles it follows that
fully articulated antecedents which guarantee some fully articulated there must be strict laws covering the interaction between mental and
consequence (for caveats and details, see 3.1). Davidson calls this the physical events. But the anomalism principle entails that there are no strict
Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality; we shall call it the psychophysical laws. How can all three principles be held simultaneously?
cause-law principle:
To resolve the tension, Davidson noted that while the cause-law principle
The Cause-Law Principle: Events related as cause and effect are requires that there be strict covering laws, it doesn’t specify the
covered by strict laws vocabulary in which those laws must be formulated. If particular physical
event p1 causes particular mental event m1, and there must be some strict
This cause-law principle was also initially assumed without argument by law covering this interaction, but there is no strict law of the form
Davidson, though we shall see below (3.2) how he later came to try to ‘P1 → M1’, then there must be some other law, ‘?1 → ?2’, which covers
justify it. Now, the assumptions so far seem to point directly to the the causal relation between p1 and m1. That is, m1 and p1 must instantiate
existence of strict psychophysical laws—if some particular mental event properties suitable for inclusion in strict laws; but since we know that M1
m1 is caused by some particular physical event p1, then, given the cause- is not a property of this kind, m1 must instantiate some other property.
law principle, it seems to follow that there must be a strict law of the form Davidson’s ingenious deduction at this point was that this property must
‘P1 → M1’. That is, whenever events of kind P1 occur, events of kind M1 be physical, since only the physical sciences hold out the promise of a
must follow. However, Davidson then claims that there can be no such closed system of strict laws (Davidson 1970, 223–24; on the notion of a
laws. He calls this the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, and it closed system, see 5.1 and the supplement on Causal Closure of the

Physical in the Argument for Monism). Therefore, every causally Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical: if two events share
interacting mental event must be token-identical to some physical event— all of their physical properties, they will share all of their mental
hence, monism (5.1): properties
Monism: Every causally interacting mental event is token-identical In what follows (2–5), each step of this argument will be analyzed and
to some physical event discussed separately, but always with an eye to the overall argument. In 6,
a central objection to Anomalous Monism—that it appears unable to
In arguing in this way, Davidson relies upon a key distinction between account for the causal/explanatory power of mental events and properties
explanation and causation. While explanation is, intuitively, an intensional —will be explained and discussed. (For discussion of the relationship
notion—one sensitive to how events are described—causation is between Anomalous Monism and two other pillars of Davidson’s
extensional, obtaining between pairs of events independently of how they philosophy—his rejection of conceptual relativism and commitment to
are described. For example, a bridge’s collapse is explained by the semantic externalism—see the supplement on Related Issues.)
explosion of a bomb. That explosion, let us suppose, was the most
newsworthy event of the day. While the most newsworthy event of the day 2. Premise I: The Interaction Principle
caused the bridge’s collapse, ‘the most newsworthy event of the day’ does
not explain that collapse. Telling someone that it was the most The interaction principle states that some mental events causally interact
newsworthy event of the day that explained the bridge’s collapse wouldn’t with some physical events. In this section we will look briefly at a number
provide an explanation—it wouldn’t make the bridge’s collapse of issues related to this principle: how mental and physical events are
intelligible to the audience—though it would pick out its actual cause. demarcated, the nature of events themselves, the scope of the interaction
How the cause is described is relevant to whether an explanation occurs. principle, the relationship between mental events and causation, and the
Causes and effects can be accurately picked out using a variety of use of the interaction principle in establishing one component of mental
expressions, many of which are not explanatory. As we shall see, the anomalism—psychological anomalism, according to which there can be
distinction between causation and explanation is crucial to Anomalous no strict, purely psychological laws. Psychological anomalism is to be
Monism (6.1–6.3). distinguished from psychophysical anomalism, which holds that there can
be no strict psychophysical laws. This latter thesis will be explored in
Finally, to alleviate certain concerns about the adequacy of the form of
detail in our discussion of the anomalism principle (4).
physicalism he was endorsing, Davidson endorsed a dependency relation
of supervenience of the mental on the physical, and claimed that it was 2.1 Mental and Physical Events
consistent with Anomalous Monism (5.1, 5.3) (Davidson 1970, 214; 1993;
1995a, 266): Davidson restricts the class of mental events with which Anomalous
Monism is concerned to that of the propositional attitudes—states and
events with psychological verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘desires’, ‘intends’ and

others that subtend ‘that-’ clauses, which relate subjects to propositional This is at best a promissory note about some future language of
contents such as ‘it is raining outside’. Anomalous Monism thus does not ‘physics’—the ‘true’ physics—and it incorporates a requirement of the
address the status of mental events such as pains, tickles and the like causal closure of the physical domain that creates problems for certain
—‘conscious’ or sentient mental events. It is concerned exclusively with aspects of Anomalous Monism (see the supplement on Causal Closure of
sapient mental events—thoughts with propositional content that appear to the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism). It is probably best
lack any distinctive ‘feel’. to take a ‘physical’ description simply to be one that occurs in the
language of a future science that is similar to what we call ‘physics’ today
Though traditional and intuitive, this way of dividing up the domain of the but with none of its inadequacies. One important component of such
mental isn’t without controversy. Generally, Davidson expresses some descriptions is their capacity to figure in strict laws of nature (see 3.1).
skepticism about the possibility of formulating a clear and general While this is non-negotiable for physical terms, it is an open question for
definition of the class of mental phenomena (Davidson 1970, 211). And he mental terms, and Davidson will be arguing (4) for a negative answer.
is suspicious about the idea of mental states given to, but uninterpreted by,
concepts (Davidson 1974a), which is how philosophers have often thought When Davidson first argued for Anomalous Monism he subscribed to a
of conscious phenomena. But for current purposes the class of causal criterion of event-individuation, according to which two events
propositional attitudes will suffice as a criterion for the mental. One key (event-descriptions) are identical (co-refer) if they share all the same
reason for so limiting the reach of Anomalous Monism, as we shall see causes and effects (Davidson 1969). He much later came to reject that
(4.2), is that it is the rational status of the relevant mental events that criterion in favor of one according to which events are identical if and
Davidson usually cites as responsible for mental anomalism. Conscious only if they occupy the same spatiotemporal region (Davidson 1985b).
events have traditionally been thought to occur in non-rational animals, a The difference between these views will not, however, be reflected in our
position with which Davidson shows some sympathy (Davidson 1985a). discussion. It does not appear to affect either the derivation or the essential
Such events thus appear to fall outside of the domain of the rational, and nature of Anomalous Monism. For our purposes, Davidson’s central
thus outside of the purview of Davidson’s argument. claims are that what makes an event mental (or physical) is that it has a
mental (or physical) description, and the extensionalist thesis that events
Davidson is even less helpful about offering a criterion for the ‘physical’ are concrete entities that can be described in many different ways (‘the
(Davidson 1970, 211). One half-hearted attempt comes in the statement flipping of the light switch’, ‘the illuminating of the room’ and ‘the
that alerting of the burglar that someone is home’ can all pick out the same one
event in different terms). (For controversies concerning extensionalism,
[p]hysical theory promises to provide a comprehensive closed
see 5.2 and the supplement on Related Issues (Anomalous Monism and
system guaranteed to yield a standardized, unique description of
Scheme-Content Dualism).)
every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law.
(Davidson 1970, 224) The interaction principle states that at least some mental events cause and
are caused by physical events (Davidson 1970, 208). This leaves open the

possibility of mental events that do not causally interact with physical causally/explanatorily impotent—and that Anomalous Monism is
events. However, given Davidson’s early views about event-individuation therefore unacceptable as an account of the place of the mental in the
(the causal criterion) it is unclear that this possibility can be realized. His physical world. However, since Anomalous Monism is based upon the
later views on event-individuation appear to leave this possibility open, interaction principle, Davidson can claim in response that if Anomalous
but his general claims about the causal individuation of mental contents Monism is true, then mental events are already known to have a kind of
and attitudes (see 4.3 and 6.3 below) also stand in some tension with this causal efficacy. As we shall see, this point is not by itself sufficient to ward
possibility. In any case, Davidson goes on to say that he in fact believes off all epiphenomenalist concerns about Anomalous Monism. But it does
that all mental events causally interact with physical events (Davidson serve to remind us of the full framework within which challenges to
1970, 208), but he restricts his argument only to those that actually do. Anomalous Monism must be assessed, and in particular brings out the
Given the pressures just noted in favor of the inclusive reading of the reliance of that framework on specific assumptions about causality (see
interaction principle, we shall assume it in what follows. Sections 4.3, 6, and Yalowitz 1998a).
The interaction claim itself should be understood as follows: some events What needs to be noted at this point is that Davidson argued early on for
that have a mental description or instantiate a mental property cause and the claim that mental events have causal efficacy, through noting a
are caused by events that have a physical description or instantiate a problem for non-causal accounts of action explanation (Davidson 1963).
physical property. Formulating the interaction principle in this way both Mental events and states explain action by making it intelligible—rational
clears the way for an extensional reading of the causal relation (events are —in light of the agent’s beliefs and purposes. The challenge that Davidson
causally related no matter how they are described), and also leaves open raised for non-causal theories of action explanation was to account for the
the possibility, which Davidson will subsequently argue for, that mental fact that, for any action performed, there may well be a large number of
events in particular must have some non-mental description/instantiate mental events and states true of the agent, and capable of rationalizing the
some non-mental property. At this stage that possibility is left as an open action, but that don’t thereby explain that action. The agent acted because
question, but it is important to notice that for it to be an open question we of some specific beliefs and purposes, but other beliefs and purposes of his
need to at least allow for a distinction between events and the ways in could just as easily rationalize that action, and thus be cited in its
which they are picked out in language. explanation. Was the agent moving his hand as he did because he wanted
to swat the fly, relieve a cramp, or wave in greeting? He may well have
2.2 Mental Causation wanted to achieve all three of these aims, but still only in fact performed
the action because of one of these reasons. How do we understand
Though this will be focused on separately below (6), it is also important to
‘because’ so as to rule out the pretenders? Davidson’s claim was that it is
recognize that we are beginning with the assumption that mental events
only if we understand ‘because’ as ‘was caused by’ that we can justifiably
cause and are caused by physical events. Many critics of Anomalous
pick out the genuine explanans—thereby imputing causal potency to
Monism have claimed that it is difficult to see how the position avoids
mental events.
epiphenomenalism—the view that mental events are

What exactly does this argument show? It is intended to tell against non- of cashing out what it means to be caused in the right way (Davidson
causal theories of action, which deny that reasons explain actions by 1973b, 78–9), for reasons relating to mental anomalism (Davidson 1973b,
causing them. There have been sophisticated attempts, on the behalf of 80; see 4 for explicit discussion). The key point for now is that because
non-causal theories of action explanation, to respond to this challenge Davidson rejects the possibility of analyzing action in terms of behavior
(von Wright 1971; Wilson 1985; Ginet 1995; for a good overview, see caused in a particular way by reasons, the point made by the ‘because’
Stoutland 1976; and see related discussion in 6.3.) However, assuming the argument cannot be used to establish that mental events cause physical
argument is successful, while it does establish mental efficacy of a kind, it events. It does not follow from the fact that reasons must cause actions in
does not by itself establish the interaction principle. Establishing that order to explain them that reasons must cause behavior or (the interaction
reasons explain actions by causing them, and that therefore reasons principle) that reasons do cause behavior. It does not entail that actions are
causally interact with actions, does not establish that reasons causally physical behavior.
interact with physical events. Dualists who reject the identity of mental
and physical events will surely object. This point is important when one considers the wider framework to which
the interaction principle contributes. Since Davidson is attempting to
A key point to grasp in many of the issues raised by Anomalous Monism derive monism from it and other principles that are themselves neutral
is that there is an important distinction between action and behavior. about the metaphysics of mind, he cannot assume that action is (identical
According to Davidson, action is intentionally described behavior—the with) behavior on pain of circularity. Once monism has been established,
moving of a hand through space in a certain way may, but need not, be an Davidson will be in a position to deploy the ‘because’ point in order to
action of waving or swatting or any action at all. It may simply be mere argue for the claim that mental events are causally efficacious with respect
bodily behavior—as happens as the result of a muscle twitch or a strong to physical events. How this relates to the wave of epiphenomenalist
gust of wind. The behavior must be caused by an agent’s beliefs and criticism about Anomalous Monism will be explored in detail below (6,
desires in order to be action. However, while this is necessary for action, it and see the supplement on Mental Properties and Causal Relevance). To
is not, according to Davidson, sufficient. The behavior must be caused in summarize, the interaction principle is an unargued assumption in the
the right way by the beliefs and desires. Davidson notes the possibility of Davidsonian framework, one that does not assume monism, and the
cases where an agent’s beliefs and desires cause behavior which is not ‘because’ argument, while important for ruling out non-causal theories of
rationalized by those states, and thus not action. A mountain climber might action, does not itself establish the interaction principle.
become so unnerved by his desire to rid himself of an annoying second
climber sharing his rope and belief that jiggling the rope is a means for 2.3 Psychological Anomalism
doing so that he unintentionally jiggles the rope, leading to the loss of the
Davidson uses the interaction principle to establish directly one part of
second climber. This is not an action—it is mere behavior that happens to
mental anomalism—psychological anomalism, which denies the
him, no different than if caused by a muscle twitch or gust of wind. It is
possibility of strict, purely psychological laws of the form
caused in the wrong way—a “deviant causal chain”—by the belief and
‘M1 & M2 → M3’ (Davidson 1970, 224; 1974b, 243). For if physical
desire, and so is not an action. Davidson is skeptical about the possibility

events causally impact on mental events, then the mental domain is to guarantee that the condition or event-types specified in the consequent
‘open’, and any laws in which mental predicates figure will have to take occur—the latter must occur if the former in fact obtain. But
this into account (for related discussion, see the supplement on Causal indeterministic or probabilistic versions of strict laws are possible as well
Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism). More (Davidson 1970, 219). The point that distinguishes strict laws is not so
generally, physical conditions will always play some role in any plausible much the guaranteeing of the effect by satisfaction of the antecedent as the
psychological generalizations, because physical intervention (e.g., injury) inclusion, in the antecedent, of all conditions and events that can be stated
is always a possibility and can prevent the occurrence of the consequent that could possibly prevent the occurrence of the effect. A strict
‘M3’. Thus, the only potentially true and strict laws in which indeterministic law would be one that specified everything required in
psychological predicates can figure are variants of the psychophysical order for some effect to occur. If the effect does not occur when those
form ‘P1 & M1 & M2 → M3’. Psychophysical anomalism, the other conditions obtain, there is nothing else that could be cited in explanation
component of mental anomalism and the one that denies the possibility of of this failure (other than the brute fact of an indeterministic universe). For
such strict laws, is thus the view that Davidson focuses on establishing. reasons of simplicity, we will assume determinism in this discussion,
though what is said about strict laws could be carried over without
3. Premise II: The Cause-Law Principle remainder to strict indeterministic laws.
The cause-law principle states that events related as cause and effect are The cause-law principle is aimed, in the first instance, at laws of
covered by strict laws. In the earliest formulations of Anomalous Monism, succession, which cover singular causal relationships between events at
Davidson assumed but did not argue for this principle. His later argument distinct times. However, as will become clearer below, mental anomalism
in support of it will be considered below (3.2), along with objections to the also takes in bridge laws that would correlate simultaneous instantiations
principle (3.3). But we need to consider the nature of the requirement of mental and physical predicates as well—such as ‘P1 → M1’,
contained in this claim, and how it relates to the framework out of which ‘M1 → P1’, or ‘P1 ↔ M1’. Indeed, mental anomalism rejects the
Anomalous Monism is deduced. possibility of any strict law in which mental predicates figure (where those
predicates figure essentially, and are not redundant)—including (as we
3.1 Strict Laws have seen (2.3)) laws formulated with purely mental predicates
(‘(M1 & M2) → M3’), as well as laws with mental predicates in either the
The nature of the strict laws required by the cause-law principle is as
antecedent or consequent, such as ‘(M1 & M2) → P1’ and
follows. For any causal relationship between particular events e1 and e2,
‘(P1 & P2) → M1’ and mixed variants of these (see 4).
there must be a law of the form ‘(C1 & D1) → D2’, where ‘C1’ states a set
of standing conditions, and ‘D1’ is a description of e1 that is sufficient, The denial of strict laws of these forms is consistent with allowing hedged
given C1, for the occurrence of an event of the kind ‘D2’, which is a versions of them which are qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. ‘All
description of e2. Traditionally, a strict law has been thought of as one things being equal’ or ‘under normal conditions’, such psychological and
where the condition and event-types specified in the antecedent are such as psychophysical generalizations can, according to Davidson, be justifiably

asserted (Davidson 1993, 9). As will be discussed below (4), denying the the match. Ducasse intended this definition to rebut Hume’s claim that
strict version of these generalizations amounts to denying that the singular causal relations between particular events must be analyzed in
qualifying clause ‘ceteris paribus’ can be fully explicated. That is, ‘ceteris terms of regularities between types of events (and thus laws). Indeed,
paribus, ((M1 & M2) → P1)’ cannot be transformed into something like Ducasse claimed that Hume was wrong to deny that we have the ability to
‘(P2 & P3 & M1 & M2 & M3) → P1’ (for a related discussion of this perceive singular causal relations—this denial being the basis for Hume’s
particular issue, see the debate between Schiffer 1991 and Fodor 1991). subsequent regularity account (see 3.3). For, according to Ducasse, we can
perceive that some event is the only change in the immediate environment
(Davidson organizes his discussion of this transformation process, and of some subsequent event just prior to that event’s occurrence. (We can, of
Anomalous Monism more generally, around a distinction between course, be wrong in thinking that this is what we have in fact perceived.
‘homonomic’ and ‘heteronomic’ generalizations (Davidson 1970, 219). But as Ducasse points out, the same problem plagues Hume’s own account
That distinction is extremely problematic for the purposes of establishing —we can be wrong that what we have perceived are instances of types
Anomalous Monism, and is set aside here in favor of the related (but by no which bear a regular relation to each other. But this does not lead Hume to
means identical) distinction between strict and ceteris paribus hold that since we can’t infallibly perceive that some succession is an
generalizations. For discussion of the former distinction, see the instance of a regularity, we cannot form the concept of causality in terms
supplement on Homonomic and Heteronomic Generalizations.) of regularity. The same thus applies to Ducasse’s own account.)
3.2 Justifying the Cause-Law Principle Davidson notes the heavy dependence, in Ducasse’s account, on the notion
of a ‘change’. And he asks whether we really have a purchase on this
Davidson argues for the cause-law principle—that singular causal
concept absent appeal to laws. There are two aspects of this concern. First,
relations require strict covering laws—on the basis of a conceptual
the notion of ‘change’ is short for ‘change of predicate’—a change occurs
interconnection between the concepts of physical object, event and law. As
when a predicate true of some object (or not true of that object) ceases to
he says, “our concept of a physical object is the concept of an object
be true (or comes to be true) of that object. And this leads directly to
whose changes are governed by laws” (Davidson 1995a, 274). The
questions about how predicates are individuated and their relationship to
interconnections are established partly in response to C.J. Ducasse’s
laws (see below). Second, and at a more general level, the notion of
attempt, in reaction to Hume’s regularity theory of causation, to define
‘change’ has itself changed over time—for instance, Newtonian mechanics
singular causal relations without appeal to covering laws (Ducasse 1926).
defines a change differently than Aristotelian physics, so that continuous
Simply put, Ducasse defined some particular event c as the cause of some motion counts as a change, and thus requires an explanation, according to
effect e if and only if c was the only change occurring in the immediate the latter but not the former. Thus, the very notion of ‘change’ is theory
environment of e just prior to e. The striking of the match is the cause of dependent, and therefore (Davidson holds) presupposes the notion of
the flaming match just insofar as the striking is the only change occurring ‘law’, in the sense that something counts as a change, and thus as having a
in the immediate vicinity of the flaming match just prior to the flaming of cause, only against a background of theoretical principles.

This second point does not appear to deliver the result Davidson is after— one appropriate for use in science—and this notion inevitably brings in the
establishing that each causal interaction must be covered by a particular notion of law. Changes are described by predicates suitable for inclusion
strict law. The claim that something is a change, and thus has a cause, only within laws. But how does this relate to the cause-law principle? Once
if certain theoretical assumptions are in place is consistent with the claim again, it is unclear why Davidson would think that it is the notion of a
that those assumptions (for instance, that uniform rectilinear motion does strict law in particular that this line of argument motivates.
not count as a change) cannot play the explanatory role for specific causal
interactions that strict laws are supposed to play. They are simply of too A related line of argument that Davidson offers (see 4.3) appears to
general a nature—they don’t enable predictions or explanations of any suggest that dispositional predicates—those defined in terms of the effects
particular events. And in any case, there appears to be nothing in they tend to bring about—are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws
Davidson’s considerations here that forces the requirement that the (generalizations in which they figure are always qualified by a ceteris
covering laws be strict as opposed to irreducibly ceteris paribus. (As we paribus clause), but there must be strict laws at the bottom, so to speak, of
have already seen (3.1), Davidson himself has insisted upon the legitimacy the dispositional vocabulary. Davidson’s discussion of this issue refers
and ubiquity of such laws in scientific explanation.) back to an older debate about the status of dispositional terms—
specifically, whether they are ‘place-holders’ for predicates that are non-
Returning to the first point about predicate-individuation, Davidson claims dispositional (‘intrinsic’ or ‘manifest’) (see Goodman 1983, 41ff).
that “it is just the predicates which are projectible, the predicates that enter Whatever one’s view about that issue, it again does not appear that
into valid inductions, that determine what counts as a change” (Davidson Davidson has provided adequate argument for establishing that strict laws
1995a, 272). We know from Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ (as opposed to ceteris paribus laws) are required for our dispositional
(Goodman 1983) that we can invent predicates, such as ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ vocabulary to operate as it does. So Davidson does not appear to have
(where an object is grue if it is green and examined before 2020 or provided the cause-law principle with a plausible rationale (for skepticism
otherwise blue, and an object is bleen if it is blue and examined before about the principle, see Anscombe 1971, Cartwright 1983, McDowell
2020 or otherwise green) so that a green object goes from being grue to 1985, Hornsby 1985 and 1993, and 3.3 below). This is not to say that it is
bleen over the course of time without having changed in any intuitive false, or even that it is implausible to assume it in his argument for
sense. It will continue to be green, though it will also be true that it ceases Anomalous Monism. Many find the principle highly intuitive, and it is
to be grue and comes to be bleen. Contrary to much discussion of worthwhile to explore its relation to the other central claims in Davidson’s
Goodman’s riddle, Davidson holds that such unusual predicates can be framework.
projectible, and figure in laws, but only when appropriately paired with
other such predicates ( “All emeralds are grue” is not lawlike, but “All 3.3 Objections to the Cause-Law Principle
emerires are grue” is (where “emerire” is true of emeralds examined
The cause-law principle has come in for a lot of criticism since it received
before 2020 or otherwise sapphires ). What is crucial for Davidson is that
its canonical formulation in Hume’s regularity theory of causation, and it
to understand the notion of change, which is so closely tied to the notion
is worth briefly reviewing some of the central objections relevant to
of causation, one must understand the notion of a projectible predicate—

Davidson’s own discussions. This will make clear how important it is, for know why we should believe in such things. Science seems to have done
an argument such as Davidson’s for Anomalous Monism, that some well for itself without any apparent use of them.
justification for the thesis ultimately be provided.
Another objection to the cause-law principle comes from the state of
An initial objection is that Hume’s analysis of singular causal statements contemporary physics. According to quantum mechanics, it is not simply
(‘a caused b’ is true if and only if ‘whenever an A occurs, it is followed by difficult or impossible for us to state such laws for quantum phenomena.
an occurrence of a B’), which articulates his own version of the cause-law Rather, quantum theory appears to entail that determinism fails to obtain at
principle, is not an accurate rendering of the way in which we typically the level of microparticles. What the theory and the behavior of such
use the term ‘cause’. We are confident in judgments such as ‘Harry’s particles tells us is that causation, at least at the level of micro phenomena,
smoking caused his lung cancer’ while knowing that in fact not all is indeterministic. And this indeterminism is claimed to be inconsistent
smokers are stricken by lung cancer. This point is entirely general—we with the requirement of strict laws. This objection to the cause-law
make singular causal judgments all the time without believing in (indeed, principle, then, is that philosophy should never dictate to science on
while knowing the falsity of) the associated universal generalization (see empirical matters. Observation of the world tells us that strict laws are
Anscombe 1971). However, Davidson’s extensionalism about causality impossible in this domain even while causation is present, in direct
provides a straightforward response to this concern. His view is that while contradiction of the cause-law principle.
we may not believe in the associated universal generalization, that is
consistent with there being some universal generalization, stated in a Now, we have already seen Davidson’s own response to this sort of
different vocabulary than the singular causal statement, which ‘covers’ objection (3.1). As traditionally construed, strict laws are supposed to
that statement. (It is worth noting that Davidson rejects Hume’s analysis of guarantee the consequent condition on the basis of the antecedent
singular causal statements in terms of universal generalizations—he holds condition. But they do not need to provide such a guarantee. What strict
that the requirement of such a covering generalization is necessary but not laws require is that the antecedent include all conditions and events that
sufficient for the truth of such a statement (Davidson 1967).) could possibly prevent the occurrence of the consequent. If the consequent
does not occur when all these conditions have been accounted for, there is
While this response does appear to meet the objection, it raises the nothing else to be cited in explanation of the non-occurrence other than the
following concern, which is behind a related objection to the cause-law sheer brute fact of an indeterministic universe. So indeterministic
principle: no one in fact seems to know any true predictive ‘strict’ laws (in causation is entirely consistent with the cause-law principle (Davidson
the literal sense of that term). Now, while it is certainly consistent with 1970, 219). The determinist/indeterminist and strict/nonstrict law
this point that there are or even must be such laws, it becomes more distinctions do not map neatly onto each other. An indeterministic law can
pressing to know why we should think this if we cannot even offer any be universal, exceptionless and true. This point does not appear to be
examples. It is well and good for Davidson to point to the possibility of recognized by central proponents of the indeterministic objection to strict
strict covering laws that transcend our current knowledge, but we need to laws (see Cartwright 1983).

A final objection to the cause-law principle which is more internal to the proponents of mental anomalism highlight some feature of mental
wider framework of Anomalous Monism has been put forth in McDowell properties that is claimed to (1) sharply individuate them from physical
1985. McDowell sees a tension between Davidson’s allegiance to the properties and (2) create a conceptual tension with physical properties that
cause-law principle and his rejection of ‘the dualism of scheme and precludes the possibility of strict lawful relations between these properties.
content’ (Davidson 1974a). Briefly, the dualism Davidson opposes is the According to the objections, however, the highlighted feature of mental
idea that, for instance, a perceptual judgment is the rational upshot of an properties either does not serve to distinguish it from physical properties
interaction between a concept and an nonconceptualized experiential or does not actually stand in any conceptual tension with physical
element—the sensory input. Given Davidson’s systematic rejection of this properties that rules out lawlike relations. We will consider each
idea, McDowell believes he ought to disavow the cause-law principle. interpretation, and its problems, in turn. In a later section (5.3) we will
McDowell doesn’t think the principle is required for a minimal version of look at another objection related to the anomalism principle—that it is
materialism (see the supplement on Related Views (Bare Materialism), inconsistent with Davidson’s invocation of the doctrine that mental
and without the need to justify materialism McDowell sees the principle as properties stand in a relation of supervenience to physical properties. For
lacking any motivation in Davidson’s framework. For discussion of this discussion of the relation between the anomalism principle and Davidson’s
issue and others related to scheme-content dualism and Anomalous views about scheme-content dualism and semantic externalism, see the
Monism, see the supplement on Related Issues (Anomalous Monism and supplement on Related Issues.
Scheme-Content Dualism).
Mental anomalism, as initially formulated by Davidson, holds that there
4. Premise III: The Anomalism Principle can be no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted
and explained (Davidson 1970, 208). It is thus restricted to ruling out strict
The anomalism principle states that there are no strict laws on the basis of laws of succession with mental predicates occurring in the consequent—
which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or explained by laws such as ‘P1 → M1’, ‘(M1 & P1) → M2’, or ‘M1 → M2’. It thus denies
other events. In this section we look at different interpretations of the that the occurrence of particular mental events such as coming to believe
argument for this principle. Davidson’s own formulations, while or intend something, or intentionally acting in some way, can be explained
suggestive, are notoriously vague and often appeal to very different sorts by appeal to strict covering laws. But as becomes clear, Davidson’s
of considerations, including aspects of language and interpretation, considered position rejects the possibility of any strict laws in which
questions about psychological explanation, and the nature of causality and mental predicates figure—and this includes, in particular, bridge laws of
dispositions. We shall be looking at specific interpretations as well as the the form ‘P1 ↔ M1’, which form the basis of type-identity theories of
problems they face in providing a compelling rationale for both the mind, as well as any strict laws with mental antecedents. We have already
anomalism principle and Anomalous Monism. seen how strict purely psychological laws are ruled out by the interaction
principle (2.3). And, at a more general level, it rules out purported
While differing in important ways, the various formulations of the solutions to the problem of deviant causal chains noted in 2.2, which
argument, as well as the objections to them, exhibit a discernible pattern: would spell out, in terms of some required physical and also, perhaps,

mental conditions, how behavior must be caused by reasons (“caused in to recognize this simple distinction. The distinction allowed Davidson to
the right way”) in order to be action. (That some physical conditions are merge two key ideas in his theory of action—that reasons explain by
necessary in such an analysis is guaranteed, as we have seen (2.3), by the causing, and that they explain by rationalizing (Davidson 1963, 13–17).
open nature of the mental and subsequent psychological anomalism.) Any As we shall see below, however, Davidson appears to accept a basic
such adequate analysis of action would entail particular psychophysical distinction at the heart of the Logical Connection Argument—that the
laws of the form ‘(M1 & M2 & M3 & P1) → P2’. For such an analysis rationalizing relationship bears a certain key property (quasi-logical status)
would state that whatever behavior (P2) which in fact is caused in the right that is at odds with the relationship between physically described, causally
way (M3 & P1) by reasons (M1 & M2) would be the action that is related events.
rationalized by those reasons. This provides a schema for generating strict
psychophysical laws: by plugging in particular reasons and the causal 4.1 The Holism/Indeterminacy Arguments
conditions P1 and M3 proffered by the analysis, we get a strict predictive
Davidson’s explicit considerations in favor of mental anomalism appeal to
psychophysical law simply by noting what effect is produced by these
factors about the interpretation of action (linguistic as well as non-
causes. (In the course of an extended discussion of the problem of deviant
linguistic) and the ascription of mental states and events to persons.
causal chains, Bishop 1989, 125–75, fails to see this connection between it
Several distinguishable features are noted—holism with respect to
and mental anomalism—see 164.) With strict purely psychological laws
particular ascriptions, indeterminacy with respect to systematic
thus already ruled out, the focus now is on strict psychophysical laws.
interpretative frameworks, and the responsiveness of mental ascription to
It is useful to view Davidson’s attack against psychophysical laws in light an ideal of rationality. According to holism, particular mental states can be
of an argument, in vogue in the 1950s and 1960s, against the claim that cited in explanation of behavior only in the context of other mental states,
reasons are causes of the actions they explain. This argument was referred which in turn depend upon others. Davidson claims that this dependency
to as the “Logical Connection Argument” (see Stoutland 1970). According and holistic interrelatedness is “without limit” (Davidson 1970, 217). This
to this argument, reasons cannot be held to explain actions by causing echoes a related point he makes about the impossibility of definitional
them because (1) causes and effects must be logically distinct from each reduction of mental states in purely behavioristic terms, because of the
other (one of Hume’s requirements on causality) but (2) reasons and the ineliminable need for mental caveats (e.g., that the person understands, or
actions they explain bear a quasi-logical connection to each other, by notices or cares….) qualifying any attempt to state non-mental conditions
virtue of the rationalizing relation between them. That relationship is for mental states.
quasi-logical because not just any reason can explain any action—only
Davidson presents these claims about definitional reduction as facts which
those reasons which actually rationalize (make intelligible) an action can
“provide at best hints of why we should not expect nomological
explain it. Davidson’s own influential response to this argument was to
connections between the mental the physical” (Davidson 1970, 217). If
distinguish between causal relations, which obtain between events no
definitional reduction of this kind were in fact impossible, it would rule
matter how they are described, and logical relations, which obtain between
out the possibility of a subclass of strict psychophysical laws—those
particular descriptions of events. The Logical Connection Argument fails

relating mental states with non-intentionally described behavior—but the exceptionlessly predicted or explained, just as mental anomalism
basis for this impossibility would not have been explained. In fact, maintains.
however, without knowing what that basis is supposed to be, we have no
reason to accept Davidson’s claim that definitional reduction is indeed There are two problems with this, however. First, this would do nothing to
impossible. What prevents us from articulating all the required caveats? rule out certain psychophysical laws, such as those of the form
Without a rationale in hand, nothing prevents a reductionist from simply ‘M1 → P1’. And so it couldn’t ground the completely general thesis of
offering us detailed definitions and challenging us to come up with mental anomalism. But more importantly, Davidson himself holds that the
counterexamples. Something both principled and convincing is clearly least controversial versions of indeterminacy, having to do with diverging
needed. Davidson’s concerns about definitional reduction are ‘hints’ reference schemes, amount to mere notational variance—as he puts it,
concerning nomological reduction only in the sense that they draw out our meaning is what is invariant between empirically adequate translation
intuitions about something standing in the way of formulating such laws. schemes (Davidson 1977, 225; 1999a, 81). And given that such schemes
What that obstacle is needs clear formulation. are generated through a purely mechanical permutation function
(Davidson 1979, 229–30) it is a relatively simple technical trick to take
At times, Davidson appeared to flirt with the idea that the missing link was these different schemes into account when formulating psychophysical
provided by the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, developed by laws. The laws, for instance, could be formulated with disjunctive
W.V Quine (1960) and endorsed by Davidson (1970, 222; 1979). This predicates (‘P1 → (M1 ∨ M2 ∨ M3’). Or, if such predicates are considered
thesis claims that there are empirically adequate but non-equivalent problematic, the laws could be of the form ‘P1 → M*’, where ‘M*’ picks
complete frameworks for assigning linguistic meanings and mental states out the invariant element between the empirically equivalent theories. So
to a person on the basis of his behavior, and that there is no fact of the it is not at all clear that indeterminacy in and of itself is capable of
matter that determines that one but not other such frameworks is correct. supporting an across-the-board rejection of strict psychological or
In particular, there are no physical facts, inside a person’s body or head or psychophysical laws. And Davidson ultimately acknowledges this, in
outside in the external world, that could settle whether a person’s words stating that anomalism would hold even if indeterminacy didn’t (Davidson
refer to some determinate range of objects rather than some other range, or 1970, 222).
whether one rather than another systematically interdependent set of
mental states, with distinct distributions of truth values, is true of that 4.2 The Rationality Arguments
person (see Davidson 1979). If the indeterminacy thesis is true, then on the
What is responsible for the possibility of indeterminacy, however, is the
face of it there would be some rationale for rejecting the possibility of
role of the principle of charity in formulating a theory of another person’s
psychophysical laws. For if all physical facts are consistent with different
behavior (Davidson 1970, 222–23). And this principle is closely aligned
psychological/semantic assignments, then it seems that knowing all the
for Davidson with mental anomalism. According to this principle, we must
physical facts could not tell us whether some mental states were true of
“try for a theory that finds him consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover
some person, or some meaning true of her words—neither could be
of the good (all by our own lights, it goes without saying)” (Davidson

1970, 222). In the process of coming to understand another, by ascribing deviations from psychological assignments that might be required by the
mental states and events to him and meanings to his words, we must, stronger interpretation. On this view, the interpreter puts himself into the
Davidson claims, stand ready to adjust previous assignments of meanings shoes of the interpreted, acknowledging evidential and cognitive
and mental states and events based upon new evidence about the person limitations that might prevent her from achieving maximal rationality
and how it relates to the overall project of finding him and his behavior (Grandy 1973). As we will see in this section, how one interprets the
intelligible. There are two key points here that for Davidson suggest notion of rationality as constitutive directly affects how the argument for
mental anomalism. First, we never have all possible evidence—we must mental anomalism is interpreted to work.
maintain an openness to better interpretations of previous behavior as new
evidence becomes available. Interpretation is always ongoing. And While Davidson never offers any substantive account of what the proper
second, ‘better’ interpretations are those made in light of the constitutive source of evidence is for the physical, he often invokes the notion of
ideal of rationality. Consequently, Davidson claims, rationality as constraining mental ascription, and it is clear that whatever
constrains physical ascription is supposed to pull in a different and
there cannot be tight connections between the realms [of the potentially conflicting direction. One suggestive way of getting at
mental and the physical] if each is to retain allegiance to its proper Davidson’s idea here is through the traditional distinction between
source of evidence. (Davidson 1970, 222) ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ concepts. When we look to uncover
generalizations in the physically described world, what we find to follow
Rationality is claimed by Davidson to be constitutive of the mental in the from a certain set of physical conditions is a brute fact; our world is
sense that something only counts as being a mind—and thus an constituted in certain ways (in its governing laws) that we could imagine
appropriate object of psychological attributions—if it meets up to certain to be different. We may come to an empirical investigation with certain
rational standards. This constitutive idea is open to weaker and stronger theoretical commitments that inevitably lead us to read the data in some
interpretations. The weaker interpretation sees only very basic logical, ways rather than others; and there may indeed, as Davidson himself
semantic or conceptual constraints on understanding others—and thus suggests, be constitutive a priori principles that govern very basic physical
what is constitutive of minds—which allows for significant variation as concepts such as ‘object’ and ‘event’ (Davidson 1970, 220; 1974b, 239;
one moves further out from these to more substantive principles of 1973a, 254; see 3.2 above). However, the constraints are far looser and
practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning, and even more when allow for a wide variation in terms of empirical content—of what physical
extending out further to desires and values. The stronger interpretation events and states can follow from others. This is contrasted with mental
appears to be suggested in the quote from Davidson immediately above. In ascription, where the normative notion of rationality rules out the
requiring consistency, true beliefs and appropriate desires, it appears to possibility of certain mental states following from others. This line of
require maximizing agreement between interpreter and interpreted, and thinking is suggestive, but it is in need of considerable tightening.
thus a maximal conception of what is constitutive of minds. The weaker
interpretation instead requires merely minimizing inexplicable error on the 4.2.1 Normative vs. Descriptive Principles (Kim)
part of the creature being interpreted, thus allowing for significant

Jaegwon Kim’s account of Davidson’s position (Kim 1985) attempts to do that enable these troublemaking derivations, they—and thus strict
just this. Kim argues that if there were strict lawlike relations between psychophysical laws—are to be rejected. This is how Kim makes sense of
mental and physical predicates, the ‘brute factness’ and contingency of the Davidson’s suggestive claim that mental anomalism is grounded in the fact
physical would ‘infect’ the mental. For instance, rationality considerations that mental and physical explanation owe their allegiance to different
will typically lead us to attribute a belief that q to a person if we attribute a sources of evidence. (For related discussion, see the supplement on
belief that p and also attribute a belief that p entails q. According to Kim’s Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.)
account, beliefs involving very basic logical, semantic or conceptual
relations like this hold of necessity—we cannot make sense of possible Kim’s argument rests upon two central assumptions. First, it assumes that
worlds where beliefs of the first two kinds are attributed but not the third. no distinction between strict and ceteris paribus laws need play any role in
reconstructions of Davidson’s argument. It is, purportedly, not the scope of
Now, this may appear to be too strong a claim, in light of Davidson’s a psychological law which accounts for an asymmetry with physical laws,
rejection of strict, purely psychological laws—mental anomalism rejects but rather the point of each type of law (Kim 1985, 381). Second, it
the possibility of any strict laws in which mental predicates figure, but assumes that there is a firm distinction between descriptive laws and
Kim here appears to be deploying laws of the form ‘M1 & M2 → M3’. relations, on the one hand, and normative laws and relations, on the other,
Kim would reply that Davidson is only interested in rejecting strict that can bear the weight of mental anomalism (Kim 1985, 383) The first
descriptive (i.e., explanatory, predictive) laws, not strict normative laws assumption is clearly mistaken; as already noted, Davidson heavily
(see below). emphasizes the focus on strict laws in his own discussions of Anomalous
Monism, and explicitly allows for the possibility of hedged laws
If physical predicates stood in strict lawful relations to mental predicates, incorporating mental predicates. Kim’s reductio strategy, then, would fail
this contingency would ‘infect’ the mental in the following sense. Suppose to uniquely identify the culprit responsible for producing the trouble as the
that there were strict bridge laws correlating the instantiation of mental bridge laws rather than the rational principle, all of which are strict. And
and physical properties, ‘P1 ↔ M1’ and ‘P2 ↔ M2’. Then, Kim argues, while Davidson does emphasize the normative status of mental predicates,
rational principles of the form ‘M1 → M2’ would enable the logical he also recognizes, as we have already noted (3.2 and 4.2), a normative
derivation of physical laws like ‘P1 → P2’. Indeed, the reverse would be component to the physical realm, in constitutive a priori principles. There
true as well; starting with the physical law ‘P1 → P2’, and assuming the does not appear to be a significant distinction between descriptive and
psychophysical bridge laws, one could derive the rational principle normative principles in Davidson’s framework that can bear the burden of
‘M1 → M2’. However, the metaphysical status of the rational principle and mental anomalism, as required on Kim’s interpretation. (For further
the physical law are importantly different—rational principles are discussion of Kim’s interpretative strategy, see the supplement on Kim’s
necessary, true in all possible worlds, while physical laws, being Reductio Strategy for Establishing Mental Anomalism.)
contingent, are not. In particular, with the bridge laws in place, a
contingent physical law could explain (through derivation) the rational 4.2.2 Uncodifiability and Strong Rationality as An Ideal (McDowell)
principle, undermining its status as necessary. Since it is the bridge laws

John McDowell also focuses on the normative nature of rationality, but with rationality. Clearly this claim is much more plausible with the
emphasizes a very strong conception of rationality as an ideal constitutive stronger conception of rationality that McDowell is urging than the weaker
of the mental, taking in more than merely the familiar deductive relations conception limited to mere deductive relations. McDowell goes on to
—logical, semantic or conceptual—deployed in Kim’s reading (McDowell argue that because of this feature, we must be open to the possible
1985, 391–4). McDowell appears to be guided by some of Davidson’s reinterpretation of a person’s behavior and psychological states in light of
broader formulations and discussions of the principle of charity (4.2), our changing conception of rationality, and how it changes cannot be
which extend to more general principles governing action and belief anticipated in advance so that rationality could be captured in a permanent
formation, highlighted in Davidson’s discussions of irrationality (see set of principles from which strict laws could be fashioned. For this
Davidson 1982). For example, the principle of continence requires one to reason, rationality is uncodifiable. According to McDowell, this is what
act on the basis of all available considerations, and the principle of total underlies mental anomalism.
evidence requires one to believe the hypothesis supported by all of one’s
evidence. And the broad formulations entail that our conception of One might understand the reasoning here in the following way: because it
rationality includes conceptions of the Good, and so the formation of is built into our conception of rationality that our own particular grasp of
rationally appropriate desires, thus extending beyond constraints on belief rationality may be mistaken on any given occasion and is also inherently
and action. According to McDowell, those inclined to think that mere limited, no statement of psychological or psychophysical generalizations
deductive relations can be captured in physical terms (see Loar 1981) will could exhaust, and therefore explain, our conception of rationality. If the
find mental anomalism much more difficult to deny when taking into concept of rationality does not simply consist in one’s conception, at any
account this stronger conception of rationality. given time, of rationality, then it cannot be captured in terms of the actual
goings on in one’s brain (the same point applies if we substitute
This stronger conception of rationality puts McDowell in a position to “everyone’s” for “one’s”). Therefore, strict lawlike relations between the
exploit a crucial gap between rational norms and actual explanations of mental and the physical are impossible. This contrasts interestingly with
behavior: Kim’s strategy: on McDowell’s reading, it is partly because no detailed
statement of a rational principle could be claimed to be necessarily true
Finding an action or propositional attitude intelligible, after initial that there can be no psychophysical laws.
difficulty, may not only involve managing to articulate for oneself
some hitherto merely implicit aspect of one’s conception of A number of questions arise in considering McDowell’s argument. It
rationality, but actually involve becoming convinced that one’s appears to be heavily influenced by Davidson’s remarks about the ongoing
conception of rationality needed correcting, so as to make room for nature of interpretation (Davidson 1970, 223; see 4.2). However, Davidson
this novel way of being intelligible. (McDowell 1985, 392) appeals to the fact that new evidence—in the form of behavior and
environmental context—is always coming in that can force us to revise
Just as our beliefs about empirical matters can be mistaken in any given existing interpretations of an agent. There is no mention of shifting
case, and we can make genuine discoveries about empirical reality, just so standards, or unarticulated or inarticulable conceptions of rationality.

Indeed, the implication is that a stable standard, when taking into account reasoning doesn’t tell us what exactly it is about such principles that
new evidence, can lead to revised interpretations of prior behavior. So makes them resistant to reduction, since, as we’ve just seen, that reasoning
McDowell appears to be going beyond Davidson’s own views about the has failed to distinguish them from empirical concepts in the physical
concept of rationality. Indeed, the idea that one is not able to fully sciences. And second, as noted in 4.2, Davidson holds that there are
articulate a concept in the way suggested by McDowell—that it is in effect constitutive a priori principles underlying the physical sciences which
ineffable –does not clearly sit comfortably with Davidson’s views about play a similar role there that rationality plays in psychological explanation.
conceptual relativism and rejection of the idea of untranslatable languages So we are still in need of an explanation of why psychology and physics
(see further the supplement on Related Issues (Anomalous Monism and cannot stand in strict lawlike relations. Now, we did note there that such
Scheme-Content Dualism). physical constitutive principles are far more lenient than rationality,
allowing for a greater variety of empirical content—of what can follow
Further, and more importantly, McDowell’s distinctive uncodifiability from what. This indeed accounts for an important asymmetry between
claim, which rests on this view of rationality, looks to be too general to mental and physical explanation. And McDowell heavily emphasizes this
underwrite a specific thesis like mental anomalism. This becomes apparent point in his discussion: that it is not merely a brute fact that rationality
when one asks why the very same features that he is insisting are true of marks the limits of intelligibility, while physical explanations do bottom
our conception of rationality aren’t also true of the key concepts that figure out in brute facts (McDowell 1985, 394). However, this point appears to
in explanations of the physical world. Surely our concepts of physical be entirely separable from the distinctive feature of McDowell’s reading of
reality outstrip any particular conception we have at any given time, and the argument for mental anomalism—it has nothing especially to do with
the possibility of mistaken application is built into them. And scientists are the idea of rationality as uncodifiable in McDowell’s specific sense. In
in the same position as interpreters in terms of the possibility of new fact, it is the key point behind Kim’s strategy, and it appears to have no
evidence and its bearing on how previous evidence was understood. So far essential connection to McDowell’s stronger views about rationality. One
this looks to be nothing more than a combination of a completely general can think of rationality as constitutive, as normative and as asymmetrical
point about concepts together with the familiar problem of induction, to the physical in the way just noted—as Kim does—without buying into
which plagues all empirical enquiry. McDowell’s assertion that “someone McDowell’s distinctive picture of it. So it looks like the salvageable part
who aims at explanations of the ideal-involving kind must be alive to the of McDowell’s actual argument for mental anomalism ultimately reduces
thought that there is sure to be a gap between actual current conception to Kim’s. Uncodifiability appears to be a red herring.
and ideal structure in his own case as well as others” (McDowell 1985,
392) doesn’t appear to uniquely pick out any particular explanatory Therefore, despite McDowell’s extremely subtle and interesting views
framework. It therefore cannot tell us anything distinctive about the about the nature of the ideal of rationality, in the end those views do not
metaphysical status of psychology. appear to provide a secure foundation for mental anomalism. It is only
what is shared in common with Kim’s strategy—the modal asymmetry
If, however, the emphasis here falls on constitutive principles in particular between rational and physical explanation—that bears directly on mental
—as surely it must—then two other problems arise. First, McDowell’s

anomalism. And that leaves McDowell’s reading facing the sorts of a match is struck it will produce a flame, the resulting strict law would be
concerns raised in 4.2.1. quite complex, and in a way not obviously different from any putative
strict laws in which mental predicates figure, with contextual features
4.2.3 The Context/Complexity Argument (McDowell and Child) included. And if there are indeed no fixed ends or values in the realm of
choice and a decision, this can be accommodated in the same way—the
As we have seen above, Kim thinks that mental anomalism is susceptible contextual ends or values could themselves be included in the putative
of a kind of proof. This seems to be something stronger than Davidson strict laws. This would complicate and expand the set of such laws, but as
himself claims (Davidson 1970, 215). In light of Davidson’s modesty already noted this is not something that would set mental generalizations
about provability, and lack of explicit argumentation, some commentators apart from physical ones. (For further discussion of rationality and the
(Child 1992; see also McDowell 1979) have suggested that mere reflection argument for Anomalous Monism see Yalowitz 1997 and Latham 1999.)
on the kinds of generalizations that we draw upon in coming to understand
each other supports (but cannot prove) mental anomalism. Such 4.3 The Causal Definition Argument
generalizations are rules of thumb that hold only for the most part, and
require, for their application to a given case, detailed contextual We have been looking at different ways of making sense of and justifying
supplementation that cannot, by its nature, be included in anything like a Davidson’s claim that mental anomalism stems from the constitutive role
universal generalization. The suggestion is that the sheer amount of of rationality in mental ascription. In Davidson’s writings, however,
contextual detail that would need to be accounted for in any statement another line of argument often surfaces which focuses less on the rational
with even a hope of being true is inappropriate for inclusion in strict nature of mental events and more on their causal nature. As we have
lawful statements. A related strategy is to point to a lack of fixed, already seen, in his earliest work on action Davidson argued that reasons
predetermined ends that all humans (or even any particular human over explain actions by causing them, and he later came to emphasize that what
the course of her life) aim for in situations of choice, or values to makes mental states and events what they are is determined in part by their
maximize when deciding what to believe (such as simplicity, scope, and causes and effects. Particular psychological explanations are causal (they
consistency in the case of theory choice) (Child 1992). The thought here is invoke causes—Davidson 1963), and are formulated in terms of causally
that if there are no such fixed ends or values, then no psychological defined concepts (for propositional attitudes, see Davidson 1987b, 41; for
generalization could be complete—since in particular contexts such ends mental contents, see Davidson 1987a, 44). In later work he frequently
or values play a crucial explanatory role in determining what to do or notes the anomic nature of causal concepts and causal explanations, and
believe. how mental properties and reasons explanations are anomic because of
this—“reason-explanations…are in some sense low-grade; they explain
It would seem, however, that reflection on the level of detail required for less than the best explanations in the hard sciences because of their heavy
strict laws in the physical sciences fails to provide for an interesting dependence on causal propensities” (Davidson 1987b, 42; see also
asymmetry here. If one considers the number of factors that would have to Davidson 1991, 162). If mental concepts are causally defined, and strict
be taken in to account in order to state conditions that guarantee that when laws do not employ causally defined concepts, then mental anomalism

appears to follow straight away, without need of any detour through issues causally defined concepts, rationality should be thought to underwrite
concerning the rationality of mental concepts. mental anomalism. And it becomes imperative to know why that general
thesis is plausible (for discussion, see Yalowitz 1998a).
Extending this reasoning, Davidson writes that
With regard to the first issue, there is some evidence that Davidson is
[m]ental concepts…appeal to causality because they are designed, confusing two distinct questions: why mental concepts cannot stand in
like the concept of causality itself, to single out from the totality of lawlike relation to physical concepts, and why mental concepts cannot be
circumstances which conspire to cause a given event just those eliminated in favor of physical concepts in the explanation of human
factors that satisfy some particular explanatory interest. (Davidson behavior. Given the general thesis about casually defined properties, we
1991, 163) have an understanding of why mental concepts are anomic. But this leaves
open the question whether we ought to continue to traffic in anomic
This appears to ground the causal definition of anomic properties (whether
concepts generally, and mental concepts in particular. Why not eliminate
mental or otherwise) in the fact that they answer to particular explanatory
them in favor of the nomic physical concepts? Here, the rationality of
interests. This is contrasted with the case of ‘ultimate physical’ properties:
mental concepts may be thought to provide an answer. If we wish to
“Explanation in terms of the ultimate physics, though it answers to various
understand why an agent performed the action that she did, as opposed to
interests, is not interest relative” (Davidson 1987b, 45). This seems to
having a full sufficient causal explanation of why her body moved as it
collapse the distinction between psychology and all the other special
did, we are interested in a selective explanation—that part of the total
sciences with respect to the question of anomalism. All of the latter
sufficient condition that satisfies the particular explanatory interests behind
answer to particular explanatory interests, and are thus selective with
reasons-explanations (Davidson 1991, 163). Those interests highlight the
respect to the total sufficient condition for an effect-type (see Davidson
normative nature of reason and action—their responsiveness to the
1987b, 45); the causal definition, and thus anomalism, of their
principle of charity and ideal of rationality. Rationality, on this line of
vocabularies is owed to this interest-relativity and selectivity. ‘Ultimate
thinking, does not account for mental anomalism; but it does speak to the
physics’, on the other hand, “treats everything without exception as a
question of mental realism (see further 6.2). (For further discussion of the
cause of an event if it lies within physical reach (falls within the light cone
anomic nature of causally defined concepts and its bearing on Anomalous
leading to the effect)” (Davidson 1987b, 45).
Monism, see Yalowitz 1998a. For more on the relation between rational
Davidson repeats these sorts of claims about the anomic nature of causally explanation and mental realism, see the supplement on Explanatory
defined properties in a number of places in later writings, but at no point Epiphenomenalism. For discussion of issues closely related to the casual
does he clearly bring them into contact with his early remarks concerning definition argument, see 6.3 and the supplement on Related Issues (Mental
the constitutive role of rationality in psychological ascription. And he Anomalism and Semantic Externalism).
never provides argument in support of this general thesis concerning
causality. It is natural to wonder why, given this general thesis about 5. Monism

So far we have looked at Davidson’s three premises in support of since they fail to share a crucial property in common without which
Anomalous Monism—the interaction, cause-law and anomalism identity is unintelligible. While Anomalous Monism is not officially
principles. In this section, we examine the conclusion that Davidson draws concerned with the ontological status of substances, it thus appears to have
on the basis of these principles—the token-identity theory of mental consequences that are inconsistent with Descartes’ substance dualism—
events, according to which every causally interacting mental event is though it doesn’t by itself establish substance monism, it does rule out the
token-identical to some physical event. We will look at the derivation and Cartesian thought that mental and physical events fail to be identical, and
nature of this theory, some questions about its adequacy, as well as the so conflicts with one of the bases for Cartesian substance dualism.
additional thesis that mental properties supervene on physical properties.
As we shall see, both the token-identity and supervenience claims turn out 5.1 Token Identity
to be controversial, in their motivation as well as in their consistency with
The structure of Davidson’s derivation of the token-identity of causally
mental anomalism. One key point to keep in mind at this point is that
interacting mental events with physical events appears to be
monism is supposed to be derived from the principles and other
straightforward: causally interacting mental events (the interaction
assumptions that, taken individually, could be acceptable to positions
principle) must instantiate some strict law property (the cause-law
opposing monism.
principle) but mental properties are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws
To begin with, it is worth pointing out that Davidson is concerned only (the anomalism principle). So mental events must instantiate some other
with the ontological status of events, and not substances. Descartes, for property, which is suitable for such inclusion. Given Davidson’s
instance, argued for the claim that mind and body are distinct entities. invocation of the causal closure of the physical domain, according to
While Descartes’ position has implications for accounts of mental events, which every physical event has a physical explanation, he moves rather
the issues concerning event and substance identity are distinct (see Latham quickly to the conclusion that this other property must be physical, since
2001). Davidson clearly takes himself to be establishing something that is closure entails that physical properties have a privileged status, which
inconsistent with Cartesian dualism, however, and it is useful briefly to suggests that they hold out the promise of strict laws. (Davidson also has a
look at how Anomalous Monism bears upon substance dualism. tendency simply to identify as ‘physical’ those properties that figure in
strict laws (Davidson 1970, 224; 1995a, 266), but this would of course beg
According to Descartes, mind and body are distinct substances in part the question of mental anomalism.) Consequently, causally interacting
because they do not share essential properties in common. In particular, mental events must be token-identical with physical events, ruling out
minds do not occupy a spatial location, while bodies necessarily do. Since Cartesian as well as other forms of dualism.
mental events thus constitute changes occurring in a nonspatially-located
entity, they also do not occupy a spatial region. Bodily events, on the other There are serious problems with the assumption of causal closure of the
hand, do occupy spatial locations by virtue of being changes in material physical in Davidson’s framework (for discussion, see the supplement on
substances, which themselves are spatially located. On Descartes’ view, Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism).
then, particular mental and physical events cannot be token-identical, It is difficult, however, to see how Davidson can move from the claim that

mental events must instantiate non-mental, strict law properties to the An important point to recognize in Davidson’s version of token-identity is
claim that these properties must be physical without assuming closure. that he is not simply deriving the conclusion that mental events bear some
Why assume that only ‘physical’ properties are nomic? This raises property that we would intuitively acknowledge as ‘physical’ (such as
interesting issues about the nomic status of other special sciences—the spatial location). As pointed out in 2.1, the relevant ‘physical’ properties
relevant ones here being biology and chemistry—but there do not appear would more likely have to resemble the sorts of properties currently
to be explicit, conclusive resources in Davidson’s own thinking for invoked in physics, our most mature science and the one closest to issuing
addressing this. Yalowitz 1998a has, however, provided an interpretation in strict laws. This point has generated numerous objections to Davidson’s
of Anomalous Monism stressing Davidson’s views on causality and the token-identity theory, but it also has been overlooked by some objectors
nomic status of dispositions (see 4.3) in which causal closure is derived (see below). Davidson’s central claim is that what makes a mental event
from the cause-law principle, token-identity and the anomalism of causally identical to a physical event is that the mental event has a physical
defined properties. On this interpretation, the strict law properties that description. In Davidson’s original formulation, monism entailed that
mental events must instantiate turn out to be physical because only every mental event can be uniquely singled out using only physical
physical properties are non-causally individuated—all special science concepts (1970, 215). It is this position that became the target of some
properties are causally individuated, and all such properties are anomic. Davidson’s critics (5.2). However, Davidson eventually came to explicitly
deny that his monism commits him to the possibility of providing
Davidson’s token-identity theory is dramatically different than previous descriptions of mental events or actions in physical terms suitable for strict
identity theories of mind, in both it’s a priori status as well as its stance laws (Davidson 1999d, 639; 1999b, 653–4). He noted that strict laws will
towards the role of laws in justifying monism. Previous theories had say something to the effect that “whenever there is a certain distribution of
argued that claims concerning the identity of particular mental and forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time t, it will be followed by
physical events depended upon the discovery of lawlike relations between a certain distribution of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time
mental and physical properties. These theories thus held that empirical tʹ” (Davidson 1999d, 639). And he claimed that both the antecedents and
evidence supporting such laws was required for particular identity claims. consequents of such laws, when covering particular mental events and
According to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely because there actions, will cover much larger regions of space than merely the agent or
can be no such strict laws that causally interacting mental events must be her action. Why? Because while singular causal statements are singular,
identical to some physical event. The token-identity thesis thus requires no and therefore select from a complete set of causal factors those that are
empirical evidence and depends on there being no lawlike relations. It in salient or in line with our particular explanatory interests, strict laws don’t
effect justifies the token-identity of mental and physical events through themselves select—“that’s what makes them strict” (Davidson 1999d, 640;
arguing for the impossibility of type-identities between mental and see Yalowitz 1998a for an extended discussion of this issue and its bearing
physical properties or kinds (Davidson 1970, 209, 212–13; see Johnston on the argument for both mental anomalism as well as monism). Davidson
1985). soft-pedals how this view bears on the uniqueness claim in the official
statement of Anomalous Monism, parsing away that claim in favor of the

blander idea that “some physical description applies to each mental event” physical property. The supervenience relation is usually understood to
(Davidson 1999b, 654). As subtle as it seems, this appears to be a issue in generalizations of the following kind: ‘P1 → M1’, ‘P2 → M1’, etc.
fundamental shift in Davidson’s thinking about monism, though it goes (where antecedent and consequent occur at the same time). This allows for
unexplored in his later work and has failed to attract the attention of his the empirical possibility that a number of different physical state kinds
critics. underlie the same mental state kind (for more on this, see the supplement
on Related Issues (Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism)).
In any case, Anomalous Monism thus does not inherit the problem of how However, it also appears to suggest the existence of lawlike relations
to justify specific identifications between mental and physical events, between physical and mental properties, and so to be in tension with
because the claim that there is a physical description for each mental event mental anomalism. This issue will be explored in 5.3.
is established purely a priori. And the physical descriptions are not
(indeed, cannot be) specifiable in precise and uniquely identifying spatial 5.2 Objections to Token Identity
and temporal terms. As we are about to see (5.2), each of these points is
overlooked by many of Davidson’s critics. That the latter is overlooked is The token-identity thesis has been the subject of a number of interesting
understandable, given its late appearance. However, the former point has criticisms. Many of them, however, are difficult to bring fully into contact
always been fundamental, and critics’ failure to appreciate it is curious. with Davidson’s own particular version of the thesis, primarily because
Davidson’s version is derived a priori from the other premises in his
Davidson additionally claims that the relation between the mental and framework. So, for instance, it has been argued that mental events do not
physical properties is not merely haphazard or coincidental. A relationship bear the burden of the spatiotemporal precision of physical events that
of supervenience obtains between the two (Davidson 1970, 214; 1973a, they would need to if the former were genuinely identical to the latter
253; 1993; 1995a, 266). (Davidson never argues for supervenience. For (Hornsby 1981; Leder 1985). For example, it would seem arbitrary to
discussion, see the supplement on Supervenience and the Explanatory identify the deduction of some conclusion from a chain of reasoning with
Primacy of the Physical.) A working statement of this relationship is that if some particular neural event or set of neural events occurring at a specific
two events fail to share a mental property, they will fail to share at least time and place in the brain—especially given the micro-precision of the
one physical property (Davidson 1995a, 266)—or, equivalently, if two neural framework. Compare attempting to provide physical description for
events share all of their physical properties, they will share all of their the action of paying back a debt—how does one determine the spatial and
mental properties. It is meant to articulate a kind of dependency of the temporal parameters with the precision demanded by the language of
mental on the physical, and correlatively a kind of explanatory primacy to physics? Distinguishing between “the” physical event, as opposed to its
the physical, but without claiming any kind of reductive relation between causes and its effects, can seem daunting if not outright nonsensical (Leder
the mental and the physical. The working statement’s truth depends, it 1985; see also di Pinedo 2006). Further, it has been argued that the only
seems, on the thought that the distribution of physical properties somehow possible empirical evidence for specific token-identity claims could be
explains the distribution of mental properties—failure to share a mental type-identities between either those or other mental and physical
property depends upon/is explained by failure to share at least one

properties, because evidence needs to be drawn from variant cases in order business of assigning fine-grained spatiotemporal parameters to mental
to sort out merely coincident from identical events (Leder 1985). events, it does not seem obvious that we couldn’t come to accept such
assignments on the basis of theoretical considerations without thereby
Such criticisms become difficult to evaluate given Davidson’s a priori committing ourselves to the existence of type-identities. However,
procedure for establishing the token-identity thesis. He can respond that Davidson’s official position, early and late, has always been that we do not
we already know, a priori, that any particular mental event must need to be capable of making such assignments in order to assert token-
instantiate some physical property if it causally interacts with any mental identity—there must simply be such true assignments, and this is
or physical event, given the cause-law and anomalism principles. something we know on the basis of a purely a priori argument. (Davidson
Questions about how this physical property, whatever it is, relates to 1999b; for further discussion of this issue, see the supplement on Related
properties currently invoked in neuroscience come later and are Views (Bare Materialism); for a different criticism of token-identity, see
necessarily secondary to this monistic conclusion. And there is no the supplement on Related Views (Other Positions). For a criticism based
guarantee (indeed, it is quite unlikely) that neuroscientific properties upon Davidson’s own treatment of causal explanation, see Horgan and Tye
currently in vogue are candidates for strict-law properties. As we have just 1985. For discussion of the criticism that Davidson’s monism is too weak
seen (5.1), Davidson eventually came to explicitly associate the physical to warrant the label ‘materialism’, see the supplement on Token-Identity
properties that cover mental events with broad descriptions covering large and Minimal Materialism).
space-time regions. Further, it would confuse epistemology with
metaphysics to insist that, because we can only establish which physical 5.3 Is Supervenience Consistent with Mental Anomalism?
property some mental token event instantiates by leaning on some type-
correlations between other mental and physical properties, token-identity We have seen that Davidson supplements his monism with a claim of
claims presuppose type-identity. How we discover the particular physical supervenience. There are many different conceptions of the supervenience
properties is one thing; whether there can be psychophysical laws is quite relation (see Kim 1993b), and Davidson ultimately came to identify his
another, and not settled by the method of discovery. version with what is called “weak” supervenience, in contrast to “strong”
and “global” supervenience. Briefly, the basic differences between these
We also need to keep in mind that Davidson embraces the possibility of positions are as follows. Weak supervenience links specific mental and
substantive mental-physical correlations (ceteris paribus psychophysical physical properties within but not across possible worlds, while strong
laws), which directly address these epistemological issues. More supervenience links those properties across worlds. Global supervenience
generally, Davidson’s token-identity claim is that the predicates that come links the class of mental properties as a whole with the class of physical
to form the vocabulary of the as-yet unknown strict-law science will be properties as a whole within but not across worlds, but does not constrain
capable of being used to describe mental events. While we cannot judge relations between specific pairs of mental and physical properties. Weak
this claim by appealing to features of current neuroscience, it also seems supervenience comes down to the view that mental properties depend
that it should be possible to adjudicate conceivability concerns. And, upon those physical properties they are correlated with within a particular
putting aside Davidson’s later views, while we are not currently in the possible world, but those very same physical properties may, in another

possible world, correlate with very different (or even no) mental between mental and physical properties arises (see the supplement on
properties. Weak supervenience is thus stronger than global Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical). (The caveat
supervenience, in that it posits correlations between particular pairs of about the relation between Davidson’s later views about physical
mental and physical properties, but weaker than strong supervenience in descriptions and supervenience noted at the end of 5.1. should be kept in
that it recognizes the possibility that these correlations can fail to obtain in mind here.)
other possible worlds. (It should be noted that Davidson never brought his
views on supervenience into contact with his later views, noted above, Why does supervenience appear to generate strict laws? When Davidson
about the broad nature of the physical properties that mental events must first stated the supervenience claim, he articulated it in the following
instantiate according to Anomalous Monism. It is not at all clear whether terms: “there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but
or how these views can be combined. In the following discussion of differing in some mental respects” (Davidson 1970, 214)). This
supervenience, this complication will be ignored, and it will be assumed formulation appears to entail strict psychophysical laws of the form
that the physical properties in question are not of this broad nature, since ‘P1 → M1’. Davidson later came to focus on the inversion of this
this is how Davidson’s own discussions of supervenience seem to proceed, formulation: “if two events fail to share a mental property, they will fail to
and certainly what his critics presuppose.) share at least one physical property” (Davidson 1995a, 266). The
advantage of this reformulation is that it brings out the fact that the
The puzzling aspect of Davidson’s doctrine of supervenience arises requisite physical differences need not be the same in each case of mental
independently of fine points of the disagreement between the competing difference (see Davidson 1973a, 253–4). As Davidson says,
conceptions of supervenience sketched above. Whether the dependency is
between particular mental and physical properties, or sets of the two, and although supervenience entails that any change in a mental
whether or not the dependency holds only within or also across possible property p of a particular event e will be accompanied by a change
worlds, it appears that it entails that there will exist strict laws on the basis in the physical properties of e, it does not entail that a change in p
of which mental events can be predicted and explained that were supposed in other events will be accompanied by an identical change in the
to be ruled out by the anomalism principle. Davidson sometimes claims physical properties of those other events. Only the latter entailment
(Davidson 1995a, 266) that supervenience is actually entailed by would conflict with [Anomalous Monism]. (Davidson 1993, 7)
Anomalous Monism, in which case it would appear to follow that
There seem to be two problems here, however. First, the inverted
Anomalous Monism itself is an inconsistent theory—entailing both that
reformulation actually entails the original thesis—that if two events share
there cannot be any strict psychophysical laws (the anomalism principle)
all physical properties they will share all mental properties—and so once
and that there must be such laws (supervenience). But generally his
again generates strict psychophysical laws. Second, even if the
position appears to be that Anomalous Monism is simply consistent with
accompanied physical changes can be different, that simply generates
supervenience (Davidson 1993, 7). If supervenience and Anomalous
more strict psychophysical laws—‘ P1 → M1’, ‘P2 → M1’, and so on. So
Monism are indeed inconsistent, and the former is rejected, the question of
the plausibility of a materialist position with no discernible relation

it is hard to see why Davidson thinks that the second formulation is accepts the requirement that any satisfactory account of the relation
consistent with the anomalism principle. between mental and physical properties must permit appeal to local
correlations and dependencies between specific mental and physical
Some defenders of Davidson (Child 1992, 224; see also Davidson 1973, properties (Davidson 1993, 9). But he blocks any entailment from this
258) have responded to the apparent tension between supervenience and requirement to strict psychophysical laws, suggesting that such
mental anomalism by emphasizing that the degree of detail that would ‘correlations’ and ‘dependencies’ are of a ceteris paribus form.
have to go into the formulation of such laws would make them useless for
prediction, since it is unlikely that the relevant initial conditions will Such a ceteris paribus conception of supervenience has not been discussed
repeat. But as we have seen (4.2.3), this seems to be true of any candidate in the extensive literature on the topic (its possibility is recognized and
for a strict law—it must take into account all possible interfering endorsed by Kim 1995, 136; however, see Kim 1993, 24–25) and it is
conditions, and doing so becomes quite unwieldy for generating unclear whether it can deliver a suitably strong notion of dependency to
predictions. And in any case, such laws would still provide strict satisfy materialist intuitions. But it does seem to be an attractive way of
explanations of mental events, contrary to Davidson’s own formulation of reconciling supervenience with mental anomalism so that Anomalous
mental anomalism. So the problem that supervenience ‘laws’ seem to pose Monism remains a consistent theory.
for the anomalism principle remains.
6. The Epiphenomenalism Objections
Other defenders of Davidson (see Macdonalds 1986) have responded to
this problem by arguing that the existence of strict supervenience laws is It has been widely held that Anomalous Monism cannot avoid
compatible with mental anomalism so long as we are not actually able to epiphenomenalism—the view that mental events lack causal/explanatory
state any such laws and thus be in a position to use them to predict and powers. At a first approximation, the concern derives from a tension
explain actual mental events—which is certainly the case currently and between mental anomalism and the apparently privileged status assigned
likely for the foreseeable future. This suggestion exploits a literal reading to physical properties in Davidson’s framework—in particular, that all
of Davidson’s official statement of the anomalism principle, which denies events are physical, and all physical events have a strict explanation in
the possibility of strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be terms of other physical events. It then becomes an important question what
explained or predicted. But in doing so, it makes Anomalous Monism into sort of causal/explanatory role mental properties can play when all events
a much weaker position, dependent on the cognitive limitations of human already have a physical explanation.
beings. It in effect becomes a contingent epistemological position rather
than the necessary metaphysical doctrine it purports to be. Some welcome this result, holding that mental events explain actions in a
sui generis way not accountable for in the terms of typical scientific
Davidson in one place offers a very different suggestion in response to the explanations (see von Wright 1971; Stoutland 1976; Wilson 1985; Ginet
problem. He claims that the supervenient relations between mental and 1995; Campbell 1998 and 2005 and related discussion in the supplement
physical predicates that he envisages are of a ceteris paribus nature. He on Explanatory Epiphenomenalism). Many, however, see this charge as

devastating to the prospects of Anomalous Monism’s attempt to occupy a metaphysical relation between particular events independently of how they
position between reductionist materialism and dualism. Without a are described—and explanation—which relates events only as they are
distinctive causal role for mental events to play in the explanation of described in particular ways. But as we will now see, this doesn’t end the
action, many think that they would lack the sort of robust reality needed to concerns about epiphenomenalism.
compete with reductionism and dualism. On this way of thinking, only
causal powers can justify mental realism. So if Anomalous Monism 6.1 Mental Properties and Explanatory Relevance
cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, it appears to open the door to
Critics of this extensionalist line of defense insisted that related questions
eliminativist materialism, which holds that mental vocabulary and
remained about Anomalous Monism even taking into account the
explanations are vacuous and ought to be thrown out and replaced by
distinction between causation and explanation. In particular, they
neuroscience (assuming, which seems extremely doubtful, that
questioned whether mental properties could play any genuine explanatory
neuroscience can itself supply strict laws—if not, then this line of thought
role—whether they had explanatory relevance—given the priority
would lead to throwing out all but ‘physical’ strict law properties and
assigned to physical properties in Davidson’s framework. Why think that
explanations).
mental properties explain anything given that the events which instantiate
As noted, the epiphenomenalist worry arises from two points that are them always also instantiate physical properties that figure in causal laws?
absolutely basic to Anomalous Monism—first, that mental events are at One thought here is that genuine explanations require laws, and mental
the same time physical events, and, second, that while mental predicates anomalism, in ruling out psychological and psychophysical laws, cannot
cannot figure into strict causal laws, physical predicates must. Early critics account for any explanatory role for mental properties vis a vis physical or
moved quickly from these points to the epiphenomenalist conclusion that mental events.
mental properties are causally irrelevant, because there are always strict
In response, Davidson notes that while Anomalous Monism rejects the
law properties—physical properties—to causally explain the occurrence of
possibility of strict laws in which mental predicates can figure, it allows
an event. (For detailed discussion of this line of argument, see the
for ceteris paribus psychological and psychophysical laws (Davidson
supplement on Mental Properties and Causal Relevance.) Among many
1993, 9–12). His point appears to be that if backing by law is sufficient for
other problems with this line of argument, however, there is the one
explanatory relevance, then mental properties are explanatorily relevant.
immediately capitalized on by Davidson: that within the extensionalist
(Davidson and his critics often slide between the issues of causal and
metaphysical framework in which Anomalous Monism is developed (2.1
explanatory relevance, but the latter issue is clearly what is at stake given
above), properties don’t cause anything, and so can be neither causally
Davidson’s views about causal efficacy and properties.) Second, Davidson
relevant nor irrelevant. According the Davidson, only events are causal
appeals to the supervenience of mental properties on physical properties in
relata. He expresses general skepticism about epiphenomenalist objections
order to ground the explanatory role of mental properties. Davidson says
to Anomalous Monism that depend on the idea that events cause ‘by
that
virtue’ of the properties they instantiate (Davidson 1993, 6, 13). This is
closely connected to his sharp distinction between causation—a

properties are causally efficacious if they make a difference to One problem with Davidson’s response here is its reversal of the
what individual events cause, and supervenience ensures that dependency relationship between mental and physical properties typically
mental properties do make a difference to what mental events claimed in supervenience relationships. A central rationale for positing
cause. (Davidson 1993, 15) supervenience is to mark a kind of explanatory primacy to the subvenient
properties (see the supplement on Supervenience and the Explanatory
The first point does not get developed by Davidson in any systematic way, Primacy of the Physical). And this is reflected in the first part of
though it has been explored by others interested in defending nonreductive Davidson’s formulation above—surely a difference in psychological
monism from epiphenomenalist concerns. Some have focused on properties entails (requires) a difference in physical properties because the
exploiting ceteris paribus covering laws for psychophysical casual difference in physical properties is needed in order to explain the
relations, claiming that this allows mental properties to be sufficient for difference in psychological properties. So the sense in which
their effects, thus providing the needed type of explanatory role psychological properties ‘matter’ to physical properties is that changing
(McLaughlin 1989; Fodor 1989, 1991). Others have attempted to sidestep the former amounts to a change in the latter because a change in the latter
the issue of covering laws entirely by appealing directly to the truth of explains a change in the former. This does not appear to be helpful in
psychological and psychophysical counterfactuals in grounding the establishing the explanatory relevance of mental properties. Another
explanatory role of mental properties (LePore and Loewer 1987, 1989; problem, discussed above (5.3), is that it is difficult to see how a
Horgan 1989). Davidson himself instead focused on supervenience supervenience relation of sufficient power to make mental properties
(although as we are about to see, the possibility of ceteris paribus laws explanatory of an event’s physical properties in the way Davidson seems
enters into his account). to suggest does not issue in strict laws. So it is unclear how supervenience
is consistent with the anomalism principle, and thus how it can help block
Supervenience implies that
epiphenomenalist concerns, although we did previously note one
if two events differ in their psychological properties, they differ in potentially worthwhile but unexplored possibility—a ceteris paribus
their physical properties (which we assume to be casually supervenience relation—which Davidson endorses.
efficacious). If supervenience holds, psychological properties make
a difference to the causal relations of an event, for they matter to
6.2 Interest-Relativity and the Dual Explananda Strategy
the physical properties, and the physical properties matter to causal
Kim has explored a related but different route from Anomalous Monism to
relations. (Davidson 1993, 14)
mental epiphenomenalism—the problem of explanatory exclusion (Kim
The point here is not simply that mental properties inherit or piggyback on 1989, 44). A causal explanation of an event cites a sufficient condition for
the causal powers of the physical properties on which they supervene. that event’s occurrence. This seems to exclude the possibility of other
Rather, Davidson appears to be claiming that mental properties influence independent causes or explanations of that event. So if, as Anomalous
the causal powers of their subvenient physical properties. Monism entails, physics can provide a sufficient explanation of any
particular event, there appears to be no room for an independent and

irreducible mental explanation of an event (Davidson 1993, 15). It is interacting) mental event there are two distinct explananda in need of
because the cause instantiated some particular physical property that the explanation: an event of a certain physical type and an event of a certain
effect (which happens to instantiate a mental property) came about. Any mental type. Mental properties are accorded an ineliminable and (given
mental properties that the cause instantiates seem superfluous in Anomalous Monism) irreducible explanatory role by virtue of their
explaining why the effect occurred—unless those properties are identical singular capacity to make intelligible the occurrence of other mental
or related in some strict lawlike way to the physical properties, something properties through the sui generis relation of rationalization. This reflects
ruled out by the anomalism principle. the point made at the end of 4.3 by the causal definition interpretation of
the argument for mental anomalism: that rationality underlies, not mental
Davidson responds by arguing that citing only the physical properties of anomalism, but rather mental realism. (For related discussion of the dual
the cause to provide a sufficient explanation of an action does not address explananda approach, see Macdonalds 1995 and Gibbons 2006.)
the particular interests that psychological explanations of actions serve—
providing the reasons of the agent in light of which she performed the It should be noted, however, that it is not the case that only mental
action that she did. Serving these explanatory interests compensates for properties can explain and be explained by the occurrence of mental
the fact that such explanations cannot be sharpened into strict laws or properties. That would lead to an “outlet” problem, with mental properties
folded neatly into physical laws (Davidson 1991, 163). We only being explanatorily insulated from physical properties—something
understand why the agent waved her hand—why the effect is of the inconsistent with the way in which we ordinarily think of mental-physical
mental kind ‘waving one’s hand’ (as opposed to merely ‘one’s hand going interaction. A blow to the head can, for instance, explain the occurrence of
up and down’)—by citing mental properties of the causing event, such as a thought. And a thought can explain the movement of an object, as when
her wanting to greet her friend. The citation of physical properties of the my decision to quench my thirst leads to the movement of a glass of water
causing event and the associated mere bodily movement will not bring to my lips. However, the blow cannot rationalize the thought, and the
about such understanding, assuming mental anomalism, because of the decision cannot rationalize the movement of the glass (though it can
lack of any reductive relationship between either the physical properties of rationalize the action of moving the glass). Davidson’s dual explananda
the cause and the agent’s reasons or the physical properties of the effect strategy provides no account of such phenomena (for discussion of the
and the agent’s action. outlet problem, see Gibbons 2006). Nonetheless, so long as there are
occurrences of mental properties in need of the distinctive kind of
Here we see the interest-relativity of explanation and its bearing on explanation provided by rationalization, mental properties occupy an
explanatory relevance (see the supplement on Mental Properties and ineliminable explanatory role. And given Anomalous Monism, that role is
Causal Relevance) playing an important role for Davidson. Mental irreducible. It is worth noting that this dual explananda strategy is
properties must be cited if we want a rational explanation of mental consistent with Davidson’s commitment to the causal closure of the
effects. Davidson’s response to epiphenomenalist concerns can thus be physical domain (Crane 1995 seems to miss this point)—every physical
described as a kind of ‘dual explananda’ theory of the explanatory role of event can have a physical explanation, even if the mental component of
mental properties. According to this theory, for every (causally some physical events can be rationally explained only through appeal to

mental components of the causing event. Therefore, however causal properties are causally impotent appears to have difficulty getting any
closure ultimately enters into Anomalous Monism (see the supplement on traction. And since these claims are prior to the argument for monism,
Causal Closure of the Physical and Anomalous Monism), it does not they are neutral about whatever else reasons must be in order to be causes.
appear to create any further problems for Anomalous Monism’s ability to So reasons must be recognized as causes prior to any discovery that they
account for the ineliminable, irreducible explanatory role of mental are also physical events. This appears to secure the causal potency of
properties. reasons in a way entirely independent of the claim of token-identity.
Within Davidson’s framework, reasons can only play the rationalizing and
The interest-relativity of causal explanation is thus crucial in Davidson’s explanatory role that they do by virtue of their causal nature.
grounding of the ineliminable explanatory role of mental properties within
the framework of Anomalous Monism. If, as Anomalous Monism Many of Anomalous Monism’s epiphenomenalist critics do not address
contends, mental event-types such as actions are not reducible to physical- this rich causal background. As we have seen, the background is not
event types, then the only way to explain actions (as opposed to mere sufficient by itself to silence all epiphenomenalist concerns. But it does
bodily movements) so as to make them intelligible is by appeal to the significantly affect how those concerns can be formulated and addressed.
mental properties of the cause—reasons. (For discussion of whether, in Anomalous Monism is clearly deeply committed, at a number of levels, to
light of this, reason explanations can still be maintained to be causal the causal explanatory relevance of the mental, and so charity suggests
explanations within the framework of Anomalous Monism, see the that we try to understood it in a way such that these commitments are
supplement on Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.) respected. The dual explananda strategy discussed above (6.2) provides
one promising framework for doing this, while at the same time displaying
6.3 The Causal Constitution of Reasons sensitivity to the sorts of concerns driving the epiphenomenalist
objections.
A final point to consider in evaluating the epiphenomenalist objections to
Anomalous Monism is the way in which causality enters into the
7. Conclusion
constitution of reasons and reasons-explanations according to Davidson.
Before we have established the anomalism principle, or go on to derive Despite the initial appearance of simplicity in its assumptions, structure
monism, we already know that reasons explain actions by causing them and argumentation, we have turned up several important problems and
(the ‘because’ problem discussed in 2.2). And, as we have seen (4.3), we lacunae that stand in the way of any overall final assessment of the
know that propositional attitudes and mental contents are individuated, plausibility of Anomalous Monism. While the central objections it has
and thus defined, partially in terms of what they are caused by and cause faced have derived from epiphenomenalist concerns, the force of these
(for attitudes, see Davidson 1987b, 41; for contents, see Davidson 1987a, objections is not clear. Arguably, the most serious difficulties for
444, and extended discussion in the supplement on Related Issues (Mental Anomalous Monism are not with its adequacy but with its justification. We
Anomalism and Semantic Externalism)). But if something cannot even be still stand in need of a clear argument for how rationality leads to the
recognized as a reason unless it is a cause, then the charge that mental anomalism principle; there are the substantial problems surrounding the

status of the causal closure of the physical and its bearing on monism; and –––, 2003, Mental Causation and the Philosophy of Mind, New York:
the cause-law principle’s strictness requirement is still in need of a Broadview Press.
compelling rationale. Even with these problems, Anomalous Monism –––, 2005, “Explanatory Epiphenomenalism”, Philosophical Quarterly,
continues to provide an extremely useful framework for exploring 55(220): 437–451.
fundamental issues and problems in the philosophy of mind, and has Cartwright, N., 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Oxford
earned a central place on the rather short list of important positions on the University Press.
relation between mental and physical events and properties. Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bibliography Child, W., 1992, “Anomalism, Uncodifiability and Psychophysical
Relations”, The Philosophical Review, 102(2): 215–245.
Allison, H., 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Yale Crane, T., 1995, “The Mental Causation Debate”, Proceedings of the
University Press. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, LXIX: 211–236.
–––, 1990, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Cussins, A., 1992, “The Limitations of Pluralism”, in Charles, D. and
Press. Lennon, K. (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford:
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971, Causality and Determination. Cambridge: Clarendon Press.
Cambridge University Press. Davidson, D., 1963, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, in Davidson 1980.
Antony, M., 2003, “Davidson’s Argument for Monism”, Synthese, 135: 1– –––, 1967, “Causal Relations”, in Davidson 1980.
12. –––, 1969, “The Individuation of Events”, in Davidson 1980.
Bishop, J., 1989, Natural Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University –––, 1970, “Mental Events”, in Davidson 1980.
Press. –––, 1971, “Agency”, in Davidson 1980.
Block, N., 1980, “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Block, N., Readings in –––, 1973a, “The Material Mind”, in Davidson 1980.
the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard –––, 1973b, “Freedom to Act”, in Davidson 1980.
University Press. –––, 1974a, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, in Davidson
Boghossian, P., 1989, “Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical 1984.
Topics, 17: 5–26. –––, 1974b, “Psychology as Philosophy”, in Davidson 1980.
Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in –––, 1974c, “Reply to Solomon”, in Davidson 1980.
Philosophy, 4: 73–121. –––, 1977, “Reality without Reference”, in Davidson 1984.
–––, 1993, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice”, in Heil and –––, 1979, “The Inscrutability of Reference”, in Davidson 1984.
Mele 1993. –––, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Campbell, N., 1998, “Anomalous Monism and the Charge of –––, 1982, “Paradoxes of Rationality”, in Philosophical Essays on Freud,
Epiphenomenalism”, Dialectica, 52(1): 23–39. R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Ducasse, C.J., 1926, “On the Nature and Observability of the Causal
–––, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Relation”, Journal of Philosophy, 23: 57–68.
Press. Fischer, J., 1986, “Van Inwagen on Free Will”, The Philosophical
–––, 1985a, “Rational Animals”, in LePore and McLaughlin. Quarterly, 36(143): 252–260.
–––, 1985b, “Reply to Quine on Events”, in LePore and McLaughlin. –––, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell.
–––, 1987a, “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Proceedings and Addresses of Fodor, J., 1974, “Special sciences and the disunity of science as a working
the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–58. hypothesis”, Synthese, 28: 77–115.
–––, 1987b, “Problems in the Explanation of Action” in Metaphysics and –––, 1989, “Making Mind Matter More”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 59–80.
Morality, P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman (eds.), Oxford: Basil –––, 1991, “You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything
Blackwell. Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations”,
–––, 1989, “The Conditions of Thought” in J.Brandl and W. Gombocz Mind, 100: 19–34.
(eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson, Grazer Philosophischen Frankfurt, H., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, in
Studien, 36: 193–200. Frankfurt 1998
–––, 1990, “The Structure and Content of Truth”, The Journal of –––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, in
Philosophy, 87(6): 279–328. Frankfurt 1998.
–––, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, in A.J. Ayer: Memorial –––, 1975, “Three Concepts of Free Action”, in Frankfurt 1998
Essays, A.P Griffiths (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press. –––, 1998, The Importance of What We Care About, New York:
–––, 1993, “Thinking Causes”, in Heil and Mele. Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1995a, “Laws and Cause”, Dialectica, 49: 2–4: 263–279. –––, 2003, “Some Thoughts Concerning PAP”, in Widerker, D. and
–––, 1995b, “Could there be a Science of Rationality?”, International McKenna, M. (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3: 1–16. Possibilities, Burlington: Ashgate.
–––, 1999a, “Reply to Quine”, in Hahn 1999. Gibbons, J., 2006, “Mental Causation without Downward Causation”,
–––, 1999b, “Reply to Bruce Vermazen”, in Hahn 1999. Philosophical Review, 115(1): 79–103.
–––, 1999c, “Spinoza’s Causal Theory of the Affects”, in Desire and Ginet, C., 1995, “Reasons Explanations of Action”, in Agents, Causes and
Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, Y. Yovel (ed.), New York: Little Events, T. O’Connor (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Room Press. Goodman, N., 1983, Fact, Forecast and Fiction, Cambridge, MA:
–––, 1999d, “Reply to Jennifer Hornsby”, in Hahn 1999. Harvard University Press.
Della Rocca, M., 1991, “Causation and Spinoza’s Claim of Identity”, Grandy, R., 1973, “Reference, Meaning and Belief”, Journal of
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 8: 265–276. Philosophy, 70(14): 439–52.
de Pinedo, M., 2006, “Anomalous Monism: Oscillating between Hahn, L.E. (ed.), 1999, The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Chicago:
Dogmas”, Synthese, 148: 79–97. Open Court Press.

Hancock, N., 2001, “Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure”, Journal –––, 1993a, “Can Supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save Anomalous
of Philosophical Research, XXVI: 175–85. Monism?”, in Heil and Mele 1993.
Heil, J. and Mele, A.(eds.), 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon –––, 1993b, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Press.
Honderich, T., 1982, “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis, –––, 1995, “Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation”,
42: 59–64. in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology,
Horgan, T., 1989, “Mental Quasation”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 47– Oxford: Blackwell Press.
76. Latham, N., 1999, “Kim and Davidson on Psychophysical Laws”,
Horgan, T. and M. Tye, 1985, “Against the Token Identity Theory”, in Synthese, 118: 121–143.
LePore and McLaughlin 1985. –––, 2001, “Substance Physicalism”, in Loewer and Gillett (eds.),
Hornsby, J., 1981, “Which Physical Events are Mental Events?”, Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 73–92. Press.
–––, 1985, “Physicalism, Events, and Part-Whole Relations”, in LePore –––, 2003, “What is Token-Physicalism?”, Pacific Philosophical
and McLaughlin 1985. Quarterly, 84: 270–290.
–––, 1993, “Agency and Causal Explanation”, in Heil and Mele 1993. –––, 2011, “Are Fundamental Laws Necessary or Contingent?”, in
Hudson, H., 1994, Kant’s Compatibilism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and
–––, 2002, “Kant’s Third Antinomy and Anomalous Monism”, in Science, J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and M. Slater (eds.), Cambridge,
Pasternack, L. (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics MA: MIT.
of Morals in Focus, London: Routledge. Leder, D., 1985, “Troubles with Token Identity”, Philosophical Studies,
Hume, D., 1748 [1993], An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 47: 79–94.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. LePore, E., and Loewer, B., 1987, “Mind Matters”, Journal of Philosophy,
Jarrett, C., 1991, “Spinoza’s Denial of Mind-Body Interaction and the 84: 630–642.
Explanation of Human Action”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, –––, 1989, “More on Making Mind Matter”, Philosophical Topics, 17:
29(4): 465–485. 175–191.
Johnson, M., 1985, “Why Having a Mind Matters”, in LePore and LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B, (eds.), 1985, Actions and Events:
McLaughlin 1985. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York:
Kim, J., 1985, “Psychophysical Laws”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. Blackwell.
–––, 1989, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism”, Proceedings and Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 63: 31–47. Philosophy, 63(2): 17–25.
–––, 1992, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, –––, 1981, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”, Theoria, 47: 113–121.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 (1): 1–26. Loar, B., 1981, Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press. Stoutland, F., 1970, “The Logical Connection Argument”, American

Macdonald, C. and G., 1986, “Mental Causes and Explanation of Action”, Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph No. 4, 117–29.
Philosophical Quarterly, 36(143): 145–158. –––, 1976, “The Causation of Behavior”, in Essays on Wittgenstein in
–––, 1995, “How to be Psychologically Relevant”, in C. Macdonald and Honor of G.H. von Wright, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28(1–3):
G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on 286–325.
Psychological Explanation (Vol. 1), Oxford: Blackwell: 60–77. van Inwagen, P., 1984, An Essay on Free Will, New York: Oxford
McDowell, J., 1979, “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist 62: 331–350. University Press.
–––, 1985, “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism”, in LePore and von Wright, G.H., 1971, Explanation and Understanding, Cornell: Cornell
McLaughlin 1985. University Press.
McLaughlin, B., 1985, “Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Watson, G., 1975, “Free Action”, in Watson 2004.
Mental”, in Lepore and McLaughlin: 331–68. –––, 1999, “Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism”, in Watson
–––, 1989, “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal 2004.
Priority of the Physical”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 109–135. –––, 2004, Agency and Answerability, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Meerbote, R., 1984, “Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Widerker, D., 1995, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the
Actions”, in W. Harper and R. Meerbote (eds.), Kant on Causality, Principle of Alternate Possibilities”, Philosophical Review, 104(2):
Freedom, and Objectivity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 247–261.
Press. Wilson, G., 1985, “Davidson on Intentional Action”, in LePore and
Mumford, S., 2009, “Laws and Dispositions”, in The Routledge McLaughlin 1985.
Companion to Metaphysics, R. le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal Yalowitz, S., 1997, “Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous
and R. Cameron (eds.), London: Routledge, 471–9. Monism”, Philosophical Studies, 87(3): 235–58.
Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it like to be a bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83: –––, 1998a, “Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism”,
435–456. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28(2): 183–226.
Pereboom, D., 1995, “Determinism al Dente”, Noûs, 29(1): 21–45. –––, 1998b, “Semantic Determinants and Psychology as a Science”,
Quine, W.V., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Erkenntnis, 49: 57–91.
Schiffer, S., 1991, “Ceteris Paribus Laws”, Mind, 100: 1–17.
Shea, N., 2003, “Does Externalism entail the Anomalism of the Mental?”, Academic Tools
The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211): 201–213.
Solomon, R., 1974, “Comment on Davidson” in Brown, Stuart (ed.), How to cite this entry.
Philosophy of Psychology, London: MacMillan. Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP
Society.
Spinoza, B., 1985 [1677], Ethics, in The Collected Writings of Spinoza
Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
(Vol. I), E. Curley (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Project (InPhO).

Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links dualist ontological positions. (Certainly the anomalism principle is not
to its database. empirical. While the cause-law principle has been claimed to be an
empirical, and false, assumption (Cartwright 1983—see 3.3), we have
Other Internet Resources seen (3.2) that Davidson himself views it as a priori. The interaction
principle does not appear to be based upon empirical assumptions.) This a
Mind and Anomalous Monism, in the Internet Encyclopedia of
priori status sets Anomalous Monism apart from other forms of
Philosophy.
nonreductive monism that have been developed since Anomalous Monism
Anomalous Monism, in the Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
was formulated. However, Anomalous Monism’s clearest philosophical
ancestor, Spinoza (1985 [1677]), shared this a priori perspective, and
Related Entries Davidson explicitly acknowledges Spinoza’s anticipation of Anomalous
Monism (Davidson 1999c). We begin with him.
action | Davidson, Donald | dualism | epiphenomenalism | events |
functionalism | laws of nature | mental causation | mental content: causal
theories of | mental content: externalism about | mind/brain identity theory 1. Spinoza’s Parallelism
| monism | multiple realizability | physicalism | psychologism | Quine,
Willard Van Orman | relativism | scientific explanation | Spinoza, Baruch | Spinoza held that the world was composed of only one kind of substance
supervenience or stuff (monism) which exhibits distinct realms of physical and mental
properties. On the standard reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics, these two
Related Views realms are causally insulated from each other—while mental events can
cause and result from other mental events, and physical events can cause
There are a number of philosophers and traditions that share the two key and result from other physical events, there are no causal relations
features of Anomalous Monism: its rejection of any reductive relationship between mental and physical events. There are thus no strict
between mental and physical events and properties, and its assertion of psychophysical laws. But there are both strict physical and strict
monism. In this section, we look briefly at one classic precursor to psychological laws. The causal insulation of the two realms, and the
Anomalous Monism as well as several more recently developed positions existence of strict psychological laws, appear to distinguish Spinoza’s
that share these features. The comparisons help to shed further light on position from that of Anomalous Monism.
Anomalous Monism.
Davidson, however, disputes this traditional reading of Spinoza’s
At the most general level, one distinctive component of Anomalous metaphysics , emphasizing two key points. First, while Spinoza does
Monism is its a priori status. It is deduced logically from what are indeed deny that there can be explanatory relations between the mental
plausibly claimed to be a relatively bland set of assumptions themselves and the physical, his notion of explanation is quite demanding.
not clearly empirical in nature, and each, individually, acceptable to ‘Explanation’ means ‘adequate explanation’, which in turn requires a

demonstration of logical entailment between explanans and explanandum. described in physical terms. This does not preclude holding that the
Davidson happily concedes that no such relation exists between mental ringing of the bell may cause us to be aware of the ringing. Davidson goes
and physical properties and events. But he denies that one need impose on to reject Spinoza’s infamous doctrine of parallelism, the view that the
such a strong requirement on causation and causal explanation. In any temporal order of physical events corresponds to the order and connection
case, it is consistent with Spinoza’s position that mental events cause and of ideas. Since the physical domain is governed by strict laws, this would
are caused by physical events so long as one does not equate ‘cause’ with entail the possibility (indeed, necessity) of strict, purely psychological
‘logically entails’. laws. Just as events described physically would have a fully adequate
explanation in terms of strict physical laws and initial conditions, so too
Second, and related to this, Davidson insists that while explanation is, would events described mentally need to have a fully adequate explanation
intuitively, an intensional notion—one sensitive to how events are in terms of strict mental laws and initial (mental) conditions. Davidson
described—causation is extensional, obtaining between pairs of events rejects this picture (as indeed Anomalous Monism must) because too
independently of how they are described. As we have seen (1, 6–6.2), this many causes and effects of mental events are not themselves events with
distinction between causation and explanation is central to Anomalous mental descriptions—the mental domain is thus ‘open’ in a way that the
Monism. Some interpreters of Spinoza, explicitly considering the question physical domain is not (2.3). Every physical event has a fully adequate
of his relation to Anomalous Monism, have denied that Spinoza would or (strict) physical explanation, but no mental event can have a fully adequate
should accept such an extensional account of causation (see Della Rocca (strict) mental explanation.
1991 and Jarrett 1991). Davidson replies that one needs to distinguish an
opaque and a transparent concept of ‘cause’ (where the former involves In these ways, then, Davidson finds points of significant contact between
sentences which do not allow the substitution salva veritate of co-referring Anomalous Monism and Spinoza’s position, and attempts to soften or
expressions, and latter does allow such substitutions). Davidson accepts correct those points of apparent divergence. Davidson’s view appears to be
that Spinoza himself probably had in mind the opaque concept, in keeping that if Spinoza had available to him the intensional-extensional distinction
with historical tradition, but that nothing stands in the way of his accepting as well as a concept of causation that was not identical to logical
a needed transparent concept as well. Davidson sees this as the only way entailment, his position would essentially be that of Anomalous Monism.
to get Spinoza out of being saddled with the logical absurdity that would
result from holding that, for instance, the physical event of a bell ringing 2. Functionalism
cannot cause a mental awareness of the ringing even though that mental
Functionalist accounts of mental phenomena (for a good overview, see
awareness is identical (as Spinoza’s monism requires) with a physical
Block 1980) were the most prominent of the nonreductionist monist
event in the brain caused by the ringing.
positions developed at around the same time as Anomalous Monism.
According to Davidson, what Spinoza is really committed to is denying According to functionalism, an adequate analysis of the meaning and
the possibility of a fully adequate (complete) explanation of the individuation of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and
occurrence of the awareness by appeal to the laws of nature and the cause other psychological states is in terms of the explanatory/causal role that

they play in the etiology of behavior. Beliefs differ from desires, for instance, intending to stay dry would be (partially) defined not in terms of
instance, in the role that each plays in mediating the relations between perceiving that it is raining and subsequently opening an umbrella, but
perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs and other intervening psychological instead in terms of something like sensory stimulations and mere bodily
states. To believe something is just to be in a state that exhibits such a movements. Indeed, many functionalists claim to provide an analysis of
distinctive causal pattern. It is not relevant what realizes such a functional mental properties in other, non-mental terms. Brian Loar (Loar 1981, 20–
state, however, just so long as it is the sort of realizing media that can 25) sees his functionalist account as a direct refutation of Anomalous
support such a pattern. Monism, purporting to account for the rational nature of mental states and
events within a reductionist framework (see 4.2.3). But whether or not all
Associated with functionalism was the doctrine of multiple realizability: functionalists view their accounts in these terms, it nonetheless appears
mental properties can, in practice as well as principle, be realized by a that the nonreductionism of functionalism is of a vertical but not
variety of media which do not share anything in common physically other horizontal nature, so to speak. Mental properties cannot be reduced to their
than a capacity to support the distinctive pattern (Fodor 1974). Other realizing physical properties (because of multiple realizability), but there
species, with different internal wiring, can realize mental properties, and in will be strict lawlike generalizations (the distinctive patterns) that purport
principle so could extraterrestrial beings. Mental properties therefore to define mental properties in non-mental terms—causal relations to non-
cannot be reduced to physical properties because of this heterogeneous mentally characterized inputs, outputs and other functional states.
nature of the realizing physical media. However (at least according to
most proponents of functionalism—see Lewis 1966), some physical media Another point on which functionalism diverges from Anomalous Monism
must play the realizing role—hence, monism. is in its attempt to account not only for the propositional attitudes—belief,
desire, intention, etc.—but also for sentient states and events like pains
Functionalism therefore differs from Anomalous Monism in appealing to and tickles—conscious phenomena that there is something it is like to
multiple realizability rather than rationality as the ground for irreducibility. experience (Nagel 1974). These wider aspirations have, however, proven
There are other important differences as well. For one thing, it is unclear to be especially problematic for functionalism. A standard objection has
what exactly grounds the monism of functionalism—in Anomalous been that while the propositional attitudes may be given a plausible
Monism, the monism is derived in an a priori fashion from Davidson’s analysis in terms of casual patterns, the felt quality of sentient states and
three principles, but it often seems to be simply an assumption within the events cannot be analyzed in purely causal terms without losing touch
functionalist framework (Fodor 1974, but again, see Lewis 1966). Indeed, with what is distinctive about such phenomena (Nagel 1974; Chalmers
some functionalists explicitly observe that their account is consistent with 1996; see Section 4 below).
dualism (see Block 1980). Another key difference is that traditional
functionalism has built into it a kind of reductionism, though not of the Many of the same questions that arose in our examination of Anomalous
type-type variety. This comes out in the fact that the inputs and outputs Monism—in particular, concerning supervenience and mental causation—
between which the functional states are supposed to play their mediating arise also in discussions of functionalism. Indeed, these questions arise for
role are typically required to be characterized in non-intentional terms. For any property dualist monism—any theory on which mental and physical

properties are thought of as distinct and irreducible but instantiated by the sees this requirement as an overreaction to the threat of Cartesian dualism.
same set of states, events or substances. For instance, Kim 1992 argues He puts the point as follows:
that multiple realization actually entails a form of type-reduction, given
the key physicalist assumption—the causal inheritance principle—that the …since it is not events but substances that are composed of stuff,
causal powers/explanatory relevance of higher order properties is identical one can refuse to accept that all the events there are can be
to and exhausted by those of all of their lower-order realizing properties. described in ‘physical’ terms, without thereby committing oneself
On this view, mental properties have no causal powers/explanatory value to a non-‘physical’ stuff or compromising the thesis that persons
over and above those of their realizing physical properties. Kim’s are composed of nothing but matter. (McDowell 1985, 397)
formulation of the principle, however, is completely insensitive to the
This view is essentially shared by Hornsby and Leder, each of whom
points about effect-types and interest-relativity of explanation discussed in
questions both the intelligibility of attaching precise spatiotemporal
6.2 and the supplement on Mental Properties and Causal Relevance). A
parameters to mental events, and the purported necessity of doing so, in
more nuanced formulation of the principle also amenable to physicalists
order to maintain a materialist position. McDowell and Hornsby
would respect those points by selecting, from the full set of realizing
subsequently come to question the cause-law principle, which, when
causal powers, those that actually play an explanatory role relative to
appended to the interaction and anomalism principles (both of which are
particular effect-types. Such a formulation of the principle would not
accepted by McDowell and Hornsby) leads to the token-identity thesis
clearly lead to the reductionist conclusion pressed by Kim, yet would
they question. Each sees the cause-law principle as unmotivated and, as
retain a physicalist ontology and also respect the insights of the dual
we have seen, McDowell claims it to be inconsistent with another of
explananda approach.
Davidson’s basic commitments—his rejection of scheme-content dualism
3. Bare Materialism (see 3.3 and the supplement on Related Issues (Anomalous Monism and
Scheme-Content Dualism)).
Another version of nonreductive monism, put forward in different ways by
We have already seen that Davidson later came to weaken his early claim
Hornsby (1981, 1985, 1993), Leder (1985) and McDowell (1985), rejects
regarding uniquely identifying strict law descriptions for mental events. So
the token-identity of Anomalous Monism and replaces it with a blander,
the rationale for bare materialism, as an alternative to Anomalous
bare materialist doctrine of substance monism. As we have already seen
Monism, seems less compelling. With respect to bare materialism taken on
(5.2), this is motivated, in the first instance, by the concern that it is simply
its own, it is also unclear what its rationale is for asserting materialism,
too demanding to require that every mental event bear a uniquely
even one of this minimalist variety, which focuses on substances (the
identifying description in the language of physics—the fine-grained
person or perhaps the body) rather than events undergone by substances.
spatiotemporal specificity of the language of physics appears ill-suited to
One virtue of Anomalous Monism is that it provides a justification for its
mental events. Davidson’s early view, recall, was that there must be such a
form of materialism. It is also not clear how mental events, when thought
fine-grained physical description for every causally interacting mental
of as not describable in the language of physics, can be held to interact
event, though he made no attempt to provide examples. McDowell (1985)

with events describable in physical language. Here concerns with a lineage of propositional attitudes are determined. Some externalist views like
going back to the earliest critics of Descartes, such as Pierre Gassendi and Davidson’s hold that mental contents are determined in part by physical
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, again rear their heads: if physical but not environmental factors. Others emphasize social factors, such as the role
mental events (which supposedly interact) have precise spatiotemporal that experts play in constituting norms of usage for concepts to which
locations, how can events of such different kinds causally interact, and laypeople defer. Some proponents of this view conclude that the attitudes
where is the locus of interaction? These questions are just as pressing for in which these contents figure cannot be held to be token-identical to
proponents of minimal materialism who reject token-identities of mental underlying physical states of those agents, even though all states and
and physical events. events may indeed be physical in some other sense (Burge 1979, 1993).
Davidson (1987a) has forcefully argued, against this view, that the token-
As discussed in 5.2, the spatiotemporal objection to Anomalous Monism is identity theory of mind is consistent with semantic externalism. (For
difficult to evaluate, depending as it does on our own current intuitions related discussion, see the supplement on Related Issues (Mental
about the intelligibility of recognizing precise spatiotemporal dimensions Anomalism and Semantic Externalism).)
for mental events and states. There is also Davidson’s later rejection of the
requirement that such descriptions be uniquely identifying to take into Related Issues
account. Davidson’s point, early and late, however, is that based upon a
priori argument we know that there must be some such description, even Davidson’s philosophy is extraordinarily systematic and innovative, and
if we may never actually be in a position to make the relevant Anomalous Monism is only one of his fundamental contributions to the
identifications. philosophical landscape. In this supplement, we look at issues that have
arisen in considering how Anomalous Monism relates to two of the other
4. Other Positions pillars of his work: the rejection of conceptual relativism and its
underlying dualism between conceptual scheme and uninterpreted
Various other nonreductive monist positions have been developed that are
empirical content, which Davidson refers to as the “third dogma of
motivated by concerns very different than those of Anomalous Monism.
empiricism”, and the semantic externalist thesis that the determinants of
These positions raise issues that go beyond what can be addressed here,
linguistic meaning and mental content lie in the external world rather than
but some are worth noting. As observed above, one motivation derives
on the surfaces of, or even further within, persons’ bodies. There are
from concerns with sentient phenomena—whether, given distinctive
interesting questions about the relationship between each of these
properties attaching to conscious states and events, they can be explained
doctrines and Anomalous Monism.
in terms of underlying physical states and events. Proponents of these
views deny that such an explanation is possible, and subsequently assert 1. Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism
various forms of property dualism together with a substance monism (see
Chalmers 1996). And another nonreductive monist position has been Davidson (1974a) argued against a traditional distinction underlying
motivated by appeal to a semantic thesis concerning how mental contents modern and much contemporary philosophy between concepts or

conceptual schemes and empirical content—intuitions or uninterpreted supposedly enters into Hume’s argument with the idea that the concept of
sensory events. The argument turns largely on the connection between necessary connection stands distinct from the content of the experience of
those ideas and the notion of an untranslatable language. Davidson argued singular events (McDowell 1985, 398). As we have already seen (3.2–3),
that this notion must be rejected, and that doing so largely eliminated the however, Davidson’s argument in support of the cause-law principle does
threat of conceptual relativism, providing a sort of guarantee that our most not appeal to any such claim, and so while it may well be true that this
fundamental beliefs are by and large true. The details of the argument will principle bears some relation to the third dogma, how it does isn’t
not concern us here. However, a number of critics have claimed that apparent in Davidson’s actual thinking. The mere fact that Davidson is
Davidson’s rejection of conceptual relativism and its underlying dualism arguing in favor of the cause-law principle does not itself entail a
between conceptual scheme and empirical content is inconsistent with one commitment to the Humean view of the content of the experience of
or another premise in his argument for anomalous monism. McDowell singular events that invites the worry. As McDowell himself notes,
suggested that the cause-law principle was in tension with it. Manuel di Davidson is not offering a reduction or analysis of singular causal
Pinedo has more recently argued that both the cause-law principle as well statements in terms of the principle, but is merely stating a necessary
as Davidson’s related extensionalism about events—and therefore his condition for such statements. It is not at all obvious that insisting on such
token-identity theory of mind—are inconsistent with it. And Solomon a condition forces a position either way on scheme-content dualism.
early on suggested that mental anomalism conflicts with it (Solomon
1974). In this section we look briefly at these issues. De Pinedo (2006) offers one way to clarify the supposed relation between
the cause-law principle and the third dogma, by focusing on Davidson’s
McDowell suggested that Davidson’s commitment to the cause-law metaphysics of events. In particular, de Pinedo emphasizes that
principle was in tension with Davidson’s rejection of scheme-content Davidson’s argument for monism depends upon the extensionalist view
dualism—the so-called “third dogma” of empiricism (McDowell 1985; that the same event can be described in different vocabularies. As we saw
Davidson 1974a)—and in effect constituted a fourth dogma of empiricism. in 1, Davidson had pointed out that Hume’s covering law requirement is
McDowell does not think the cause-law principle is needed for a minimal not committed to the idea that the vocabulary in which the singular events
version of materialism, and claims that without the need to justify are picked out must be the vocabulary in which the covering law is
materialism there is no rationale for it in Davidson’s framework. formulated, and from this together with the extensionalist assumption
moved to the monistic conclusion that anomic mental events have physical
One way of parsing McDowell’s idea is that the only plausible rationale descriptions that instantiate strict laws. De Pinedo argues that this
for the requirement of strict covering laws for singular causal relations is extensionalism is in direct conflict with Davidson’s rejection of the third
based on the Humean claims, first, that we can’t perceive singular causal dogma, because it entails that the events variously described are
relations, and, second, that therefore the only way to distinguish between “noumenal” (di Pinedo 2006, 86–90, using Kant’s term for things in
events that are causally related and those that stand in a relation of mere themselves, independent of conceptualization), and that positing them
temporal succession is to bring in the concept of regular succession, with depends upon a “schemeless method” for individuating events (de Pinedo
its close ties to the notion of a strict covering law. Scheme-content dualism 2006, 87)—one that “allows us to say that the same event is both the one

described by the nomological vocabulary of physics and by the normative which entities get related to which other entities cannot be
vocabulary of psychology”. And he claims that Davidson’s criterion for postulated independently of the conceptual framework needed to
event-individuation—that two events are identical if and only if they share make sense of such relations. But, famously, that framework
all causes and effects—is precisely an attempt to provide such a method excludes laws connecting mental and physical predicates. (di
(de Pinedo 2006, 83–84). Since the ideas of “noumenal” events and Pinedo 2006, 83)
“schemeless” individuation methods seem so intimately caught up with
the third dogma, di Pinedo claims that their source—extensionalism—and This presumably is behind de Pinedo’s related point that Davidson’s
bounty—token-identity—must both be rejected. distinction between causal relations and causal explanations is also in
conflict with his rejection of the third dogma because of its basis in the
Extensionalist criteria (whether it is Davidson’s earlier causal or later extensionalist view of events (di Pinedo 2006, 83).
spatiotemporal version) are supposed to be a “schemeless” method
because they apply indiscriminately to all events, no matter how they are Three points need to be addressed in response to di Pinedo. First,
described. Davidson needs such an indiscriminate criterion in order to extensionalism by itself does not entail that there are possible correct
derive monism, but according to de Pinedo is not entitled to it precisely descriptions of events that are radically different from the familiar
because of the basis for mental anomalism—that the constitutive criteria descriptions of our current scheme or some conservative extension of it. It
for the mental and the physical are distinct. de Pinedo asks: is only if such descriptions—ones that are not translatable—are possible
that the conclusion might follow that the events are “noumenal”. And,
From where does Davidson get his token-identities then? What most importantly, there is nothing in the extensionalist picture itself that
area of our picture of reality can simultaneously capture entails this, and Davidson’s own argument that tells against their
nomological and anomalous features of the same event? …the possibility. This shows that Davidson’s extensionalism and rejection of the
identities…do not fit any of our conceptual devices. Davidson is third dogma are fully consistent with each other.
defenseless against the accusation that that such identities are
noumenal. (de Pinedo 2006, 89) Second, de Pinedo appears to think that for something to be an
explanatory framework it must issue in strict laws. If this were true, then
De Pinedo’s objection seems to be that any particular claim that this the most basic sorts of event-identity claims—for instance, between the
mental event is token-identical to that physical event cannot be made from most newsworthy event of the day and the bridge’s collapse—would have
the perspective of either the mental or the physical explanatory schemes, to be rejected because belonging to distinct frameworks. Furthermore, an
and there is no other explanatory scheme from which to make such a explanatory scientific framework relating specific physical and mental
claim. So it can only be made from a schemeless perspective—which properties does exist (see the supplement on Explanatory
makes it noumenal and thus in conflict with Davidson’s rejection of the Epiphenomenalism). The fact that it can’t issue in exceptionless laws
third dogma. As de Pinedo says, relating the two does not mean it is illusory—Davidson himself is clear on
this in allowing for ceteris paribus relations between the mental and

physical schemes. And while there may be philosophical and empirical Davidson’s point is that the incommensurability posited by mental
problems concerning how to justify particular claims of token-identities, anomalism holds between subparts of one full-blown language, not
we have seen that they don’t affect Davidson’s considered view of monism between two such languages. Psychological concepts are essential to
(5.2). understanding language because of the ineliminable role they play in
communication and interpretation. One key point Davidson is making
Third, as we have seen, Davidson’s monism is not in any case based in here, which is relevant to the previous discussion of de Pinedo, is that our
particular identifications of mental and physical events, but rather in an a conceptual scheme already contains ceteris paribus laws relating the
priori argument. So de Pinedo’s questions above must be understood to be mental and the physical that we rely upon in understanding each other.
concerned with the perspective from which such a priori philosophical Scientific investigation into the relation between mental and physical
claims generally are made, because they typically are made about events is a refinement of an already existing framework—limited,
explanatory frameworks and not within them—for instance, the question according to mental anomalism, but nonetheless explanatory and fruitful.
of how the mental and physical frameworks relate to each other, and the
question whether we can make sense of alternative conceptual schemes. 2. Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism
These sorts of questions arise from within our general conceptual scheme,
when we look at its various commitments and explore their consistency. Semantic externalism holds that the meanings of linguistic expressions
One of philosophy’s central tasks has always been to probe the and/or the contents of mental states and events are constituted, at least in
foundations and relations between explanatory frameworks. part, by objects and events in the external world. In this section we look at
Davidson’s commitment to this doctrine and its relationship to mental
Davidson made a related point to a related concern expressed early on by anomalism. In some ways, formulating the issues in terms of mental
Robert Solomon, who asked how Davidson’s rejection of conceptual content and thoughts makes the philosophical stakes clearer: according to
relativism could be squared with his assertion of mental anomalism and its semantic externalism, without an external world, there would be no mental
claim that the mental and physical schemes are incommensurable content to thoughts. And mental anomalism is in the first instance
(Solomon 1974, 66). Solomon assumed that Davidson’s rejection of formulated in mental rather than linguistic terms. However, the issues
conceptual relativism entailed that all explanatory schemes must be carry over without significant remainder for Davidson. For ease of
commensurable—inter-translatable—and thus mutually reducible. exposition, our discussion will, depending on context, be alternately
Davidson replied by pointing out that his rejection of conceptual framed in terms both of meaning, utterances or expressions and in terms of
relativism and incommensurability concerns an entire language— content and thoughts. As we have seen (4.3), the causal definition
argument interprets mental anomalism as flowing from Davidson’s
nothing… can be left out that is needed to make sense of the
independent commitments concerning the casual nature of mental
rest….Psychological concepts…cannot be reduced…to others. But
concepts. Semantic externalism is essentially a thesis about the casual
they are essential to our understanding of the rest. (Davidson
constitution of mental content by external objects and events. So it
1974c, 243–44)

provides additional support for the causal definition argument’s approach block Davidson’s argument from semantic externalism to mental
to mental anomalism. anomalism.
Davidson argues that mental contents are determined by their external, However, there are externalist thought experiments intended to show that
environmental causes—“water” refers to H2O because H2O is the two individuals could be in globally physically indiscernible
systematic cause of tokenings of “water” during its period of acquisition circumstances and yet still be mentally distinct—either with different
by an agent. Another agent could mean, and therefore think, something thoughts, or with one thinking thoughts and the other having no thoughts
different by “water”—the substance XYZ instead—because of differences at all. Davidson develops the latter sort of case (1987a, 443–44), in which
in the environment and history of acquisition of their concept. Davidson a creature is imagined emerging ex nihilo, with no causal history at all, yet
claims that this entails psychophysical anomalism. He argues that two physically identical to another individual. In this case, Davidson claims
agents could be in identical internal physical conditions while thinking that the new creature would simply lack all thought content because of
different thoughts expressed by “water”, and thus realizing different lack of any history of acquisition. In the former sort of case (see
mental properties, because their respective histories of causal interaction Boghossian 1989), an agent from one world is transported to the other
and acquisition of the relevant concepts are different. If this is the case, world, retaining her original thought contents because of the history of
then semantic externalism rules out the possibility of strict laws of the acquisition condition, and therefore constituting a counterexample to that
form ‘P1 → M1’ (Davidson 1987a, 1995b). new world’s laws. Both cases would effectively prevent the maneuver of
folding environmental differences into the relevant laws so as to block the
A natural response to this argument is that if the environments of the two counterexamples, because the global physical indiscernibility of the
agents are different, and this is responsible for their semantic divergence, imagined worlds (essentially amounting to the two creatures inhabiting the
then that environmental difference simply needs to be folded into the same world) provides nothing on which to pin the semantic divergence. If
relevant laws, which are of course massively underdescribed anyway such cases are convincing, then no strict psychophysical laws with mental
(clearly more than P1 by itself is needed to guarantee any effect, and thus consequents would be possible, because of the possibility of such
M1). Thus, in the H2O world, ‘P1 & P2 → M1’ would hold, while in the counterexamples to any laws relating physical antecedents to mental
XYZ world, ‘P1 & P3 → M2’ would hold, with ‘P1’ and ‘P2’ in each law consequents. (For discussion of these issues, see Shea 2003.)
representing the semantically relevant environmental differences of the
two worlds. This maneuver would effectively block counterexamples of Many questions arise concerning these thought experiments, primarily
the kind suggested by Davidson’s argument by preventing the same regarding the nature of or need for a history of acquisition condition and
antecedents of laws—which only as a set guarantee the consequent—from its bearing across worlds. But many other aspects of these cases are
being met by two individuals with different histories of acquisition, and controversial, not the least of which is the basic externalist doctrine that
thus different concepts. This response would thereby do away with any the contents of thoughts and meanings of expressions derive essentially
exceptions to the laws based on semantic externalism. It would thereby from distal environmental causes, as opposed to sensory surface
stimulations or even internal brain processing. But we have at least seen

how Davidson conceives of the relation between mental anomalism and most basic condition of adequacy for a semantic theory will not have been
semantic externalism, and how it illustrates the causal definition met.
argument’s key claim that it is due to the causal nature of mental states
that strict psychophysical laws are impossible. According to Yalowitz, Quine and Davidson diverge in how to deal with
this problem of error. Quine, committed to providing a scientific
A different connection between semantic externalism and mental framework for semantics, holds on to the requirement that semantics issue
anomalism in Davidson’s thinking has been explored by Yalowitz in strict semantic-determining laws, and responds to the problem of error
(1998a,b), who lays out the framework of an extended debate between by holding that mistaken utterances of an individual can be identified only
Davidson and Quine over the nature of language and thought and the relative to a norm established by the usage of other speakers of the same
scientific status of psychology. According to Yalowitz’s reading, they language. Individuals considered in isolation, then, cannot be assigned
share three key assumptions in that debate. First, that the scientific status meanings. Individuals must share a language with others, relative to which
of an explanatory framework depends upon its potential for delivering their usage can gauged for correctness, in order for the utterances to mean
strict laws (this is largely definitional). Second, that the most promising something—to have conditions of correctness. Further, according to
approach to semantics is a causal theory, which in broad stroke holds that Quine, in order for semantic laws to be strict the conditions of correctness
the objects or events that cause an utterance to be tokened by an agent must be located proximally rather than distally, in the sensory stimulations
determine the meaning of that utterance. And third, that there is a puzzle on the bodily surfaces of individuals’ bodies rather than in the external
about whether strict causal laws are consistent with a coherent semantic environment of objects and events shared by them. As Davidson observes,
theory. The puzzle is that any adequate semantic theory must be able to the further out one goes in the causal chain extending beyond a person’s
make sense of the notion of mistaken usage of an expression or tokening skin, the greater chance there is that the chain can be interfered with, with
of a mental content, because meanings/contents are individuated by their the result that the appropriate behavior is not triggered (Davidson 1992,
conditions of correct usage—what makes “water” mean or apply to what it 262). The proximal cause thus
does is determined by conditions under which “water” is correctly
tokened. A first pass at a strict semantic-determining law might say has the best claim to be called the stimulus, since the more distant
something like the following: ‘for all x’s, if x causes y to be tokened, then an event is causally the more chance there is that the causal chain
y means x’. And in holding that whatever causes a y to be tokened will be broken. (Davidson 1989, 197)
determines the meaning of y, no room would be made for cases of error—
Here Yalowitz identifies a fourth key assumption shared by Quine and
cases where some z causes y to be tokened, but y nonetheless counts as
Davidson: that degree of distance between cause and effect bears directly
mistakenly applied to z. The point is that all sorts of things stand in causal
on the possibility of strict lawful relations (on which see further below).
relations to tokenings. There is a considerable problem of determining
Quine therefore deals with (1) the problem of accounting for the
which of these myriad causes constitutes the conditions of correctness,
possibility of error (2) within a scientific semantic framework by requiring
rather than occasions of mistaken usage. Without such a distinction, the
both that individuals share languages with others (which responds to (1)),

and that meaning is determined by proximal as opposed to distal causes concepts. And mental anomalism is claimed to be necessary for
(which responds to (2)). accounting for error and thus meaning and content.
According to Yalowitz’s reading, Davidson’s general approach to Yalowitz’s reading of how semantic externalism and mental anomalism
semantics and to the possibility of a scientific psychology is formulated are related is largely historical and reconstructive. While it makes clear
largely in response to these positions of Quine’s. The key divergence contact with some of Davidson’s statements concerning these issues, and
comes in Davidson’s rejection of Quine’s solution to the problem of highlights the significant and longstanding philosophical (and, indeed,
accounting for error and thus conditions of correctness. For Davidson, this personal) relationship between Davidson and Quine going back to
specific sort of communal solution to the problem of error leads to an Davidson’s graduate study at Harvard, there is much that it doesn’t
objectionable sort of relativism which is inadequate for a genuinely account for, and many points of detail that require fleshing out. Further, as
objective notion of error (Davidson 1984, xix; 1990, 309). The possibility Yalowitz himself notes, it commits Davidson to a rather unconvincing
of error cannot be due merely to the relationship between different argument for both mental anomalism and semantic externalism. It is
individuals’ overlapping linguistic dispositions. Otherwise, the notion of clearly false that degree of distance between cause and effect is tied to the
truth will be reduced to mere agreement. It thus must be reflected directly distinction between strict and ceteris paribus laws. The greater possibility
in semantic-determining laws governing individuals’ usage. The issue, of interference by itself doesn’t force an anomalous relation between cause
then, is how to do this. Davidson goes on to reject Quine’s location of the and effect. It simply requires a broadening of the conditions in the
conditions of correctness that determine meaning proximally, on antecedent of the law, leaving wide open the question of whether this
individuals’ bodily surfaces, in response to this problem. Instead, he broadening can be completed—fully articulated—to the point of providing
insists that conditions of correctness must be located in the shared external a strict law. If that is not possible, and such laws are essentially ceteris
environment of individuals. We have seen that this increase in distance, paribus, this has nothing especially to do with the possibility of
according to Davidson, allows for greater possibility of interference in the interference by itself. Therefore, the connection between the possibility of
chain between cause (condition of correctness) and effect (utterance). This error, mental anomalism and semantic externalism is not as
interference thus allows for a more slack relation between conditions of straightforward as Yalowitz’s reading suggests. However, Yalowitz’s
correctness and utterances that in turn allows Davidson to make sense of framing of the debate between Davidson and Quine on these issues and its
the notion of error without appealing to a shared language community. bearing on Davidson’s views concerning semantic externalism and mental
Since, then, strict semantic laws cannot account for error, and are tied to anomalism does have the virtue of providing for a kind of bridge between
proximal conditions of correctness, Davidson insists on distal conditions the two very different readings of the argument for mental anomalism
of correctness and the subsequent anomic—ceteris paribus—semantic (4.2–4.3). While it locates concerns about the causal definition of mental
laws expressing them, which have the slackness necessary for accounting concepts as fundamental to that argument, its focus on the normative
for the possibility of error. Semantic externalism is thus motivated in large notion of error—mistaken usage—is intimately related to concerns about
part by the key condition of adequacy for semantic theory—accounting for rationality. For Davidson, to be rational requires applying concepts, and
the possibility of error and thus conditions of correctness for meanings and concepts require conditions of correctness. Assuming a causal approach to

determining such conditions, the line of argument Yalowitz reconstructs monism, and the more general claim that anomalous monism is a
holds that both mental anomalism and semantic externalism are needed in necessary condition for human freedom. As we shall see, both claims are
order to make sense of concepts and therefore rationality. While perhaps more complex and problematic than Davidson’s brief remarks recognize.
not as tightly related as this reconstruction portrays, these several theses
are clearly absolutely central to Davidson’s philosophy of mind generally, To begin, consider the basic picture of action offered to us by anomalous
and therefore Anomalous Monism. monism. Monism entails that strict physical laws determine that one’s arm
will go up on a particular occasion, and this bodily movement can, in
3. Anomalous Monism and Freedom principle, be exceptionlessly predicted. However, mental anomalism
entails that whether that rising of the arm is token-identical to a raising of
In this section we explore the relationship between anomalous monism one’s arm – an intentional action – is not something that can be predicted
and the nature and possibility of human freedom. Initially, the connection exceptionlessly. Complete knowledge of physical law cannot decide
seems to be clear. Human freedom intuitively seems to be threatened by whether the rising of an arm is an arm-raising. Two immediate points
the existence of strict predictive psychological and psychophysical laws, come up here. First, one sort of freedom made room for by anomalous
since if our actions can be exceptionlessly predicted ahead of time it seems monism appears to be freedom with respect to whether one’s arm going up
that we lack choice or control over them. And since mental anomalism is an instance of one’s intentionally raising one’s arm. One’s arm is
denies the existence of such laws, it should thus be considered (and determined to go up; this leaves it as an open question whether this event
Davidson claims it to be) a necessary condition of human freedom. can be described as an intentional action. By itself, this is not an
However, this intuitive connection is complicated by the monism intuitively adequate conception of what freedom consists in. While
component of anomalous monism, since monism, as understood by interpretative considerations of rationality and Davidson’s basic theory of
Davidson, entails that every event – including human actions – is covered action address this gap to some extent, they don’t provide a theory of what
by a strict physical law. It is also complicated by the existence of freedom consists in. Davidson nowhere provides this further theory.
conceptions of compatibilism about freedom and determinism that Second, this is not a picture where alternative possible actions or choices
explicitly allow for the possibility of strict psychological and in any clear sense play a role – the alternative isn’t an action or choice at
psychophysical laws. The intuitive connection between anomalous all, it’s a non-intentional bodily movement. As we will see below,
monism and human freedom therefore needs some sorting out. The Davidson in fact rejects the intuitive requirement that freedom entails the
literature on freedom and determinism has gotten extremely complex since ability to do or choose otherwise. And we will see that this point stands in
Davidson’s remarks on them and their relation to anomalous monism, so some tension with Davidson’s claim that mental anomalism is necessary
the following can be no more than a brief and selective overview, in order for freedom.
to better place Davidson’s position within both historical and
contemporary discussions (see also Related Views: Spinoza’s Parallelism). 3.1 Anomalous Monism and Kant’s Theory of Freedom
We will focus on two key issues: the connection to Kant’s theory of
freedom, which Davidson claims bears a close relation to anomalous

Davidson opens and closes his definitive statement of anomalous monism that they explain. Kant’s key notion of “spontaneity”, which is generally
(Davidson 1970) with remarks concerning Kant’s views on human thought to be the foundation for both his view of freedom and subsequent
freedom. He starts by expressing sympathy with claims of Kant’s incompatibilism, is understood in terms of a belief-desire model of
concerning the need to eradicate any appearance of contradiction between deliberation on which agents choose freely when they have epistemic
the ideas of human freedom and natural necessity, noting that the same autonomy – they are able to stand back from their beliefs and desires,
need exists if “anomaly” is substituted for freedom, and that for Kant decide which are rationally defensible, and act in accordance with this
freedom entails anomaly (as we shall see below, this last point is more decision. On Meerbote’s and Hudson’s views, such spontaneity is
complicated than Davidson seems to recognize). He likens these to his compatible with determinism (see further below).
own attempt to make consistent the interaction, cause-law, and anomalism
principles. And he ends by first emphasizing the point that psychological Meerbote and Hudson read Kant’s transcendental idealism, and in
explanation operates in a very different conceptual framework than particular Kant’s key distinction between the phenomenal and the
physical explanation, and that mental anomalism is a necessary condition noumenal (things as they appear to us and things as they are in
for viewing actions as free. But he then quotes approvingly of Kant’s themselves), according to the “two-descriptions” view, which has been
claim that not only can these different conceptual frameworks co-exist, articulated and defended most recently and thoroughly by Henry Allison
they must also be thought “as necessarily united in the same subject” (Allison, 1983). And they (unlike Allison – see below) relate that
(Davidson 1970, 225). And he likens this latter thought to the monism he distinction closely to the distinction between physical and mental
has used to resolve the apparent tension between those principles. descriptions of singular events. On the two-descriptions view, we can
Davidson goes no further in relating his views to Kant’s, but some Kant consider the objects and events of human experience in two distinct ways:
commentators have followed up on these remarks with extended as they appear to us and as they are in themselves. Things as they appear
treatments of the relation between the two views. must conform to the conditions that are necessary for us to experience and
represent them. In particular, they must appear within space and time, and
Anomalous monism has been claimed, by Ralf Meerbote (Meerbote 1984) must conform to the causal principle that every event has a cause and is
and Hud Hudson (Hudson 1994, 2002), to be an appropriate framework determined to occur, which is established in the Second Analogy (Allison
for articulating Kant’s account of freedom. In claiming this, Meerbote and 1990, 2–4). Things in themselves can be thought of independently of the
Hudson understand Kant to be a compatibilist about freedom and conditions under which we must experience them, though they cannot be
determinism, rather than the incompatibilist he has usually been labeled. known because of the limitations imposed by our cognitive apparatus.
According to both, Kant’s notion of the “causality of reason” and how it This two-descriptions view contrasts with the two-worlds interpretation of
fits into his deterministic account of the natural world is best understood Kant’s distinction, according to which appearances and things in
along the following lines. Reasons are token identical to physical (brain) themselves constitute two ontologically distinct sets of entities (Allison
states, and the causality of reason is to be understood as the casual 1990, 4). Here we set aside the two-world view, since none of the
interaction of reasons under their physical descriptions. Under their mental participants in the debate about the relation between Kant’s theory of
descriptions, reasons only bear a rationalizing relationship to the actions freedom and anomalous monism hold it.

On both Meerbote’s and Hudson’s view of Kant (Meerbote 1984,155; to solve the “because” problem: we can’t pick out the actual reasons that
Hudson 2002, 247), description types used in describing things as they explain an action (as opposed to reasons that the agent has available and
appear to us are law-like and thus deterministic, while descriptions types that could rationalize the action but that don’t actually play a role in
used for things in themselves are not. explaining it) unless we see the explanatory reason as causing the action
(so that causality is essential to articulating a distinction between active
The general picture they share can be summarized as follows: action and dormant reasons). This, together with the key point that singular
explanations are compatible with the determinism of the physical realm causal relations between psychologically described events don’t entail
because such explanations are not causal but instead are rationalizations. law-like psychological relations, allowed Davidson to unify the two
Since they aren’t causal, they aren’t law-like – this is the Kantian analogue competing theories of action – the hermeneutical and the causal theories.
to mental anomalism. However, because psychological descriptions pick Hudson (Hudson 2002, 261) shows some awareness of this issue, in
out physical events – monism – we can make sense of a “causality of expressing sympathy with the interaction principle, which plays a key role
reason” in terms of the causal powers of psychological events under their in Davidson’s argument for monism. But he fails to recognize that this
physical descriptions. The resulting Kantian compatibilism about freedom principle is independent of and prior to Davidson’s monism, since it
and determinism is established by denying that mental events can be figures in an argument for it. For Hudson, the interaction principle can
deterministically predicted or explained in the language of psychology only be made sense of by assuming monism and then claiming that mental
(mental anomalism) but maintaining that mental events are part of nature events cause physical events by virtue of being identical with the physical
and are determined and determining (i.e. have causal powers in events that play the truly causal role. For Davidson, this gets things
accordance with the strictures of the Second Analogy) under their physical backwards: the interaction principle is assumed, and it is then shown that
descriptions as events in the brain. There are many interesting issues that it, together with the anomalism and cause-law principles, entails monism.
arise in considering the details of this interpretation which we cannot
investigate here. In considering the relationship between this interpretation It therefore is not plausible to present Kant’s theory of freedom, as
of Kant’s theory of freedom and anomalous monism, we will focus on the understood by Meerbote and Hudson, as a precursor to anomalous
general picture, and in particular the role that causality plays in it. monism. Henry Allison has also disputed the interpretative claims of
Meerbote and Hudson concerning Kant’s theory itself. Though we can’t
What is notable about this picture is the claim that causality plays no role settle that interpretative dispute here, it is worth noting two key points
in psychological explanation itself, and its centrality in connecting Kant’s involved in it. First, Allison strongly emphasizes a distinction that Kant
theory with anomalous monism. We are being presented with a picture draws between empirical and intelligible character. What is important in
almost identical to one that Davidson criticized from his earliest writings, this distinction is that reason has both an empirical, phenomenal character
according to which psychological explanations are non-causal and as well as an intelligible, noumenal character. The empirical character of
therefore anomalous rationalizations, while physical explanations are reason seems to get lost in Meerbote’s and Hudson’s accounts – reason
causal and therefore law-like. As we have seen in 2.2, Davidson insists on explanations are pushed purely into the noumenal realm. Second, and
the need for causal descriptions within psychological explanations in order related to the first point, Allison sees the notion of the causality of the will

as absolutely central to Kant’s conception of freedom, and therefore finds Hudson both emphasize Kant’s denial of empirical psychological and
the compatibilist picture presented by Meerbote and Hudson, on which psychophysical laws in trying to connect his views with anomalous
there is no psychological causation per se but only by virtue of identity monism. And in one sense that is the right direction to go in aligning Kant
with physical events, unable to account for Kant’s picture. One way of with Davidson, since the thesis of mental anomalism is concerned with
thinking about this point relates to our previous criticism of Meerbote’s empirical reality. However, as noted earlier, Meerbote and Hudson can’t
and Hudson’s removal of the concept of causality from psychological make full sense of Davidson’s position on this since they push
explanations. On both Allison’s interpretation of Kant and the psychological explanation entirely into the noumenal realm. Meerbote in
interpretation of Davidson offered here, there must be causation within the fact claims that, for Kant, psychological events are not locatable in space
psychological realm itself in order to account for all of our commitments or time except in so far as the physical token events that they are identical
about the mental. to are – the categories of causality, space, and time are not applicable to
the noumenal realm, and therefore to psychological events (Meerbote
However, this doesn’t mean that there is a convergence between Allison’s 1984, 157; see also Hudson 2002, 247). It is worth noting, on this latter
own view of Kant and anomalous monism. For one thing, the causation issue, that Davidson famously has rejected the very idea of a noumenal
internal to the psychological takes place at the empirical level for realm (Davidson 1974a), making Meerbote’s and Hudson’s alignment
Davidson, while it crucially must take place at the noumenal level project even more implausible.
according to Allison in order to account for freedom. Allison holds that
the spontaneity in deliberation required for genuine freedom – involving We began this discussion by noting Davidson’s own invocation of Kant on
the capacity to stand back from one’s reasons and evaluate them for the thesis of mental anomalism, its status as a precondition for freedom,
justification – is not possible empirically but only noumenally. And as and monism. On the two-descriptions view of transcendental idealism, it
Allison emphasizes in his reading, Kant actually allows for empirical, initially can seem plausible to see in Davidson’s monism and mental
strict psychological laws. Here Allison points to potentially conflicting anomalism a model for making sense of Kant’s picture: described
claims that Kant makes: first, Kant appears to insist on psychological or physically, a person is subject to strict physical laws, and his behavior can
psychophysical determinism – the view that all human actions are be deterministically predicted; described mentally, a person’s thought and
determined and predictable by the person’s empirical character (the actions are not subject to strict psychological or psychophysical laws and
causality of reason, and thus of beliefs, desires, and other psychological thus can be seen as free. However, as we have seen, this initial appearance
states) together with other contributing casual factors (Allison 1990, 31). of isomorphism masks over difficult issues, in particular about the role of
Yet Kant appears to deny that there can be empirical psychological or psychological causation in Davidson’s and Kant’s pictures and the place of
psychophysical laws (Allison 1990, 31–34, 43). It isn’t easy to see how psychology more generally in the empirical world for each. And, as we are
these two claims can be made consistent, though Allison tries to do so about to see, there are other questions about the connection between
within Kant’s framework. In any case, Davidson’s position is that mental anomalism and freedom that further complicate initial appearances
psychological and psychophysical determinism are both ruled out at the concerning the relation between them.
empirical level by mental anomalism. As we’ve seen, Meerbote and

3.2 Anomalous Monism and Contemporary Compatibilism to the fore the second issue distinguished above: whether and how the
ability to do or choose otherwise is consistent with determinism.
Within contemporary discussions of compatibilism there are several
competing positions concerning the relationship between mental Compatibilists starting with Hume and more recently Frankfurt have
anomalism and freedom. As noted earlier, there is the very strong argued that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for the sort of
intuition, which Davidson claims to share, that anomalism is necessary for freedom that we care about, which tracks moral responsibility (Hume
freedom. Now, typically this intuition is based on the thought that if one’s 1748 [1993], section VIII; Frankfurt 1969). Frankfurt discusses cases
action or choice is exceptionlessly predictable, then one lacks control over where agents lack the ability to do otherwise than A because a coercive
it: it will occur no matter what, and is thus inconsistent with the idea that force will kick in if the agent chooses or begins to choose to do otherwise
one could have done or chosen otherwise. There are two distinct claims than A, guaranteeing that the agent A’s. He argues that our intuitions show
involved here. The first is that the ability to do or choose otherwise is that such an agent nonetheless can be held morally responsible for her
necessary for freedom. The second is that strict laws are inconsistent with actual action of A’ing. These intuitions derive from the fact that the agent
the ability to do or choose otherwise. However, there are compatibilist performed the action because she wanted to and so wasn’t in fact coerced
positions that highlight the denial of one or the other of these claims. As in any relevant sense. Davidson shares these intuitions, and notes that they
discussed below, Davidson himself rejects the first claim for reasons flow directly from his account of rationalizing explanations, which
deeply connected to his views on action explanation, agreeing with Harry highlight actions as intentional – as described from the agent’s point of
Frankfurt’s well-known views (Davison 1973b, 75; Frankfurt 1969). This view in terms of his reasons (Davidson 1973b, 75). He notes that in the
would seem to make the second issue irrelevant in a discussion of kinds of cases Frankfurt imagines, there is overdetermination of a certain
anomalous monism, since it depends on a notion that Davidson rejects. kind (a certain result A is causally guaranteed), but this overdetermination
And Davidson has taken no position on the debate, generated by Lewis masks over an important, freedom-relevant distinction between
1981, van Inwagen 1984, Fischer 1986 and others concerning whether intentionally and non-intentionally described actions. If the coercive force
determinism is inconsistent with the ability to do or choose otherwise. were to in fact kick in, the resulting action wouldn’t be intentional. It is
However, as we will see, Davidson’s embrace of Frankfurt’s view actually intentional only under the description of doing it because one wants to. It
calls into question Davidson’s claim that mental anomalism is required for is this intentionality that ascriptions of responsibility, and thus freedom,
freedom. Though there has been no clear recognition of this point in the are tracking (here Davidson anticipates the discussion in Fischer 1994,
literature on either anomalous monism or freedom, we will see that it cuts chapter 7).
to the very heart of the most central issue in the metaphysics of freedom.
Incompatibilists have responded to this line of argument against the
As argued below, in order to make sense of the intuition that the status of
requirement of alternative possibilities for responsibility-relevant freedom.
strict psychological and psychophysical laws is relevant to freedom, one
They claim that the case that Frankfurt imagines isn’t a counterexample to
must hold that the ability to do or choose otherwise is necessary for
a properly formulated version of the alternative possibility requirement
freedom. This doesn’t decide the compatibilism question, but it does push
that drives incompatibilist intuitions: an agent freely A’s if they could have

chosen, or begun to choose, not to A (Widerker 1995; Fischer 1994, himself has gone so far as to argue that a creature that was designed and
chapter 7). The point is that the basic incompatibilist intuition about created to have wants would be freely acting on them to the extent that he
determinism is that it rules out the possibility of alternative possible was designed to wholeheartedly endorse them (Frankfurt 1998, section
actions. In the Frankfurt example, there is the actual action and then a III). On this view, the history of a creature’s mental properties is irrelevant
counterfactual result that is not an intentional action because it’s coerced. to assignments of freedom; what matters is the agent’s mental structure at
Many philosophers now believe, and Frankfurt 2003 appears to have the time of action. Watson 2004, section III heavily emphasizes this point,
conceded, that there is no clear counterexample to this formulation of the arguing that a defensible compatibilism ultimately depends on rejecting
incompatibilist intuition. However, Frankfurt insists that a distinction any freedom-relevant distinction between purposeful determination
underlying his example, between causation and explanation, is sufficient (deriving from other agents) and merely natural determination. Otherwise,
to show that the incompatibilist requirement of alternative possibilities is a door is left open that inevitably leads to incompatibilism, because only a
nonetheless mistaken. There is a key conceptual difference between concern about control could drive such a distinction, and determinism is
making an action unavoidable (which causal determinism appears to ultimately incompatible with control. And control is precisely what is at
guarantee) and bringing it about that an action is performed. Ascriptions of issue in requiring alternative possible actions of choices for freedom. The
responsibility-relevant freedom track the latter – they track how an agent important point here is that the existence of strict psychological or
was led to perform the action they performed, and this concerns whether psychophysical laws, on Frankfurt’s and Watson’s views, is not only
the action was or was not intentional. This is a point that goes back to entirely consistent with freedom; a defensible compatibilism actually
Hume’s classic presentation of compatibilism and rejection of the need for depends on holding this. And this point is closely tied to rejecting the
alternative possible actions: it is not whether, but instead how an action is requirement of alternative possibilities for freedom. On their view,
determined that is relevant to responsibility-relevant freedom. If the action Davidson’s position ultimately is incoherent.
is determined by the agent’s wants (or, as with later compatibilist views,
endorsed wants (Frankfurt 1971), or wants consistent with his values Given Davidson’s rejection of the requirement of alternative possibilities,
(Watson 1975), then the agent acts intentionally, and thus with where do things stand with his claim that mental anomalism is required for
responsibility-relevant freedom. Davidson would certainly agree with this freedom? It is clear that mental anomalism is required, on Davidson’s
general point, subject to the difficulties, discussed in 2.2 and 4, concerning view, for intentional actions, because these are structured by rationalizing
spelling out being caused in the right way. explanations and rationality is, as we’ve seen, integral to the argument for
mental anomalism. But there is no necessary connection between
To the objection that one’s wanting to A may itself be determined in intentional action and free action, except perhaps derivatively in that free
coercive fashion, compatibilists in this tradition have developed, in action is action. It thus appears that mental anomalism has nothing directly
different ways, the core thought that what matters to freedom is the agent’s to do with the status of actions as free. This is the cost of rejecting the
relationship to his wants. If the agent endorses those wants, or they are requirement for alternative possibilities for freedom. Insofar, then, as one
consistent with his values, then the fact that the wants might be takes seriously the intuition that the status of strict psychological and
determined is simply irrelevant to freedom considerations. Frankfurt psychophysical laws is relevant to the issue of freedom – as Davidson

clearly does, and Frankfurt does not – one must accept some version of the rejected by Frankfurt, and thus one must take a stand on how or whether
principle of alternative possibilities: free action depends on the existence that principle is compatible with the cause-law principle, which is the
of alternative possible actions or choices. It is then necessary to confront expression of determinism within anomalous monism. There are a number
the issue of how and whether strict physical laws are incompatible with of options for articulating a compatibilist conception of the ability to do or
such alternative possibilities. choose otherwise, including acting or choosing otherwise in relevantly
similar circumstances, or in a world with slightly different laws or pasts
Another way to put this criticism of Davidson’s attempt to maintain the (Lewis 1981, Fischer 1986.) The point here is simply that one owes some
relevance of mental anomalism to freedom while rejecting the requirement such account if one holds that mental anomalism is relevant to freedom.
of alternative possibilities is to ask the following question: why should one One can, alternatively, go Frankfurt’s full route and reject both the
care if one’s actions or choices are or are not exceptionlessly predictable relevance of determinism to freedom and the need for alternative
by strict laws if one holds that alternative possibilities aren’t required for possibilities.
freedom? There is no clear answer to this question, and it certainly isn’t
self-evident that it should matter. The fact that one’s action or choice is Finally, let us return to the basic picture of action offered to us by
inevitable is threatening to one’s sense of freedom only if one thinks that anomalous monism. As already noted, on Davidson’s view, strict physical
one thereby cannot do or choose otherwise. Interestingly, this same point laws determine that one’s arm will go up on a particular occasion, and this
can be made about the Derk Pereboom’s striking claim that the bodily movement can, in principle, be exceptionlessly predicted. However,
“fundamental incompatibilist intuition” which makes determinism mental anomalism entails that whether that rising of the arm is token-
threatening to freedom in its morally relevant sense isn’t the forward- identical to a raising of one’s arm – an intentional action – is not
looking claim that determinism (i.e. the existence of strict laws) rules out something that can be predicted exceptionlessly. Complete knowledge of
alternative possibilities, but rather the backward-looking claim that physical law cannot decide whether the rising of an arm is an arm-raising,
determinism entails that one’s actions trace back to causal factors in the and a free one at that. Whatever the factors are that go into deciding this,
distant past beyond one’s control (Pereboom 1995, 257). Pereboom, like Davidson is clear that they don’t require the ability to do or choose
Davidson, aims to support Frankfurt’s rejection of the need for alternative otherwise. The sort of freedom made room for by anomalous monism, by
possible actions or choices for freedom while nonetheless maintaining the itself, appears to be freedom with respect to whether one’s arm going up is
relevance of the existence of deterministic laws for our sense of freedom. an instance of one’s intentionally raising one’s arm. At the very least, this
And Pereboom provides no answer to the question of why one should care is not an intuitive or adequate conception of what freedom consists in.
about the fact that one’s actions trace back to causal factors in the distant Finally, there needs to be some explanation provided of why it is that what
past beyond one’s control, why this would seem to threaten our sense of we intend to do so often coincides with the occurrence of appropriate
freedom. He appears to take its significance as self-evident. But it is not. bodily movement that is determined by physical law and so going to
The conclusion to be drawn is that if one takes mental anomalism (and, happen anyway. (See Pereboom 1995, section III for related discussion.)
more generally, the status of determinism) to be relevant to freedom, than Without some such explanation, free action can only appear to be an
one must accept some version of the principle of alternative possibilities inexplicable miracle. This is a manifestation of the miraculous coincidence

problem discussed in Supervenience and the Explanatory Primary of the physical explanation’. For simplicity, we will work with the deterministic
Physical. version stated above.) With this assumption in place, Davidson’s
subsequent denial of strict laws incorporating mental predicates amounts
Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for to denying that there can be more than one fully adequate and complete
Monism (i.e., strict) explanation of any physical event. Only physical explanations
can constitute such explanations of physical phenomena. This assumption,
Davidson’s argument for monism is supposed to be based upon however, is quite problematic given Davidson’s wider aims of establishing
assumptions—the interaction, cause-law and anomalism principles—each monism. (This has been pointed out in different ways by McLaughlin
of which, on its own, is consistent with some version of dualism. 1985, Yalowitz 1998a, Hancock 2001, Antony 2003.)
Otherwise, the question of monism or dualism will have been begged at
the outset. And the respective version of dualism must be one the ruling This can be seen by considering the following dilemma: assuming the
out of which would be a substantive philosophical achievement. interaction principle, to hold that all causally explainable events have a
Otherwise, the interest of Anomalous Monism will have been physical causal explanation entails either that those mental events which
compromised. As we shall now see, these two constraints appear to be cause physical events are also physical—token-identity—or else that these
violated by Davidson’s rather innocuous-appearing invocation of a thesis physical effects are overdetermined by both physical and mental events.
of the causal closure of the physical: Only these two mutually exclusive options would square the interaction
principle with causal closure (Antony (2003, 5), arguing in a similar vein,
Causal Closure of the Physical: every physical event has a fails to notice the second option). Davidson cannot directly embrace the
physical explanation first horn of this dilemma, since this would eliminate the need for
independent argument, appealing to mental anomalism, to establish the
In this section we look at this thesis and its bearing both on the argument token-identity of those mental events with physical events. He must, then,
for monism and, more broadly, the structure of Anomalous Monism. acknowledge the ‘overdetermining’ dualism of the second horn as an open
question. However, this is the only position available that neither begs the
Davidson assumes a version of this thesis when he writes “It is a feature of
question about monism nor conflicts with the assumptions of closure and
physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect
the interaction principle. It is therefore the only position that the
it with other changes and conditions physically described.” (Davidson
subsequent argument for monism, appealing to mental anomalism (and
1970, 222). Davidson is claiming that it is part of the very nature of the
assuming causal closure), would actually rule out. There would thus be no
physical realm that every physical event has a purely physical explanation
argument against other forms of dualism (such as Descartes’ classic
—this is constitutive of the physical domain, a synthetic a priori principle
formulation) which denied causal closure of the physical domain.
(Davidson 1970, 221). (Given Davidson’s openness to the possibility of
strict indeterministic laws (4.1), a more refined formulation of the closure Now, perhaps such dualistic conceptions of mind and nature have lost
principle would read ‘every physical event that has an explanation has a some credibility in the present philosophical and scientific climates

(however, are they really any less credible than ‘overdetermining’ dualism, interaction principles is compatible with there not being a physical cause
which on this view would be Davidson’s central opponent?). However, it for every causally explainable physical event.
would be both self-defeating and wasteful to give up a general argument
for monism that would ground their rejection by simply assuming closure, Furthermore, even if the interaction, cause-law and anomalism principles
which then rules them out by stipulation. It is also very difficult to believe are all true, that still does not entail physical causal closure. There are
that Davidson’s only opponent is ‘overdetermining’ dualism. It is far more events other than mental ones that are picked out in a non-physical
ambitious and interesting to limit oneself to premises that many forms of vocabulary (e.g., biological events) and that cause physical events. Mental
dualism might share (such as the cause-law, interaction and anomalism anomalism and monism do not entail anything about biology’s nomic or
principles) and then show that they inexorably lead to monism without ontological status, and so it is consistent with Anomalous Monism that not
reliance on the more controversial assumption of closure. That is true of all physical events have physical causes (Crane 1995 fails to see this
Davidson’s argument for monism shorn of any commitment to causal point). Therefore, neither the interaction nor the cause-law principles
closure: someone who espouses dualism along with the cause-law, (even together with the anomalism principle) entails causal closure. If
interaction, and anomalism principles but eschews causal closure is causal closure is to figure in the arguments for anomalism or monism, it
nevertheless shown by that argument that dualism is inconsistent with her can do so only as a primitive assumption relative to these other premises.
other commitments.
We now need to ask about the motivation for assuming causal closure.
It would seem, then, that causal closure should not simply be assumed in What work does it do that might be worth the price of letting go of the
Davidson’s setup. Is it entailed by anything necessary to that setup—the more general argument against dualism? Now, the clearest appearance of
interaction, cause-law or anomalism principles? Davidson’s talk of the the causal closure thesis comes when Davidson is offering the official
‘open’ nature of the mental domain (2.3)—the fact, expressed in the argument for the anomalism principle (Davidson 1970, 222). Rationality is
interaction principle, that some mental events have physical causes—may there cited as the constitutive feature of the mental, while closure is cited
have led him to think that the ‘closed’ nature of the physical domain as the constitutive feature of the physical. And it is then claimed that these
followed directly, especially given the cause-law principle. But this is disparate commitments ground the anomalism principle (see 4.2). Clearly
false. Notice first that to hold, as Davidson does, that the mental is an the structure of this sort of argument requires some characterization of the
‘open’ system—that mental events causally interact with physical events essence of the physical, in contrast to the mental, and Davidson’s strong
—does not by itself entail that the physical is ‘closed’ in the sense that commitment to causal closure may have led to its invocation here, due to a
every causally explainable physical event has a physical cause. More lack of alternatives. (He nonetheless insists that it does not provide a
importantly, even with the cause-law principle in place, the openness of criterion of the physical (Davidson 1970, 211)). But in any case, since an
the mental does not entail that the physical domain (or any other domain, assumption of closure conflicts with the aims of establishing monism, and
for that matter) is closed. Closure also depends partly upon whether otherwise would appear question begging, it is probably best left as a
mental anomalism is true. The latter’s falsity—the existence of strict conclusion to be derived rather than as playing any supporting role in
psychophysical laws of succession—together with the cause-law and establishing Anomalous Monism.

Without the assumption, however, the question arises as to how to As noted in §6, the epiphenomenalist worry arises from two points that are
demarcate the mental and physical vocabularies. Without such a absolutely basic to Anomalous Monism—first, that mental events are at
demarcation in hand, it can appear difficult to state what exactly is at issue the same time physical events, and, second, that while mental predicates
when it is asked whether there can be strict psychophysical laws in cannot figure into strict causal laws, physical predicates must. Early
particular. How can we recognize such a purported law without knowing criticisms moved very quickly from these points to the claim that mental
what makes something a physical (or mental) predicate? As noted above properties were causally irrelevant relative to physical properties. Though
(2.1), Davidson despairs of the possibility of an intuitively adequate it eventually became clear that this particular concern can get no traction
definition of the mental. However, he allows, for his purposes of within Davidson’s framework, it is instructive to follow out the line of
establishing monism, a criterion in terms of intentionality—having a argument. An early critic of Anomalous Monism, Ted Honderich
propositional content. And this criterion of the mental then allows us to (Honderich 1982—for related literature, see Campbell 2003), articulates
pick out the ‘physical’ by exclusion, without need of a positive criterion the worry by arguing, first, that not all properties of an event are casually
like causal closure (Davidson 1970, 211). So the vocabulary-individuation relevant to its effect. For instance, the color of a piece of fruit has no effect
problem does not appear significant enough, even by Davidson’s own on its measurement—when the fruit is placed on a scale, the subsequent
lights, to motivate the assumption of physical causal closure. movement of the weight indicator is not influenced by the fruit’s color.
According to Honderich, the color is therefore a causally irrelevant
The assumption of causal closure thus conflicts with many of Davidson’s property of the event (of placing the green fruit on the scale), while the
aims and procedures in arguing for Anomalous Monism. And, as we have weight of the fruit is a causally relevant property. Honderich then asks:
seen, the assumption is not required in order to establish mental what accounts for this distinction between causally relevant and irrelevant
anomalism (4). However, we have also seen that causal closure does properties? And he claims that only properties that figure in strict laws—
appear to play a role in Davidson’s actual derivation of token-identity—it physical properties—are candidates for casual relevance. There is no strict
allows him to identify the further property that causally interacting mental lawlike relation between being green and the resulting measurement,
events must instantiate as ‘physical’ (5.1). On some readings of the while, according to Honderich, there is such a relation between the weight
anomalism principle, however, this role can be eliminated (see 4.3, and of the fruit and that measurement.
Yalowitz 1998a). Thus, although there is ample reason for setting the
causal closure thesis aside from the general framework within which the Honderich thinks that this simple point generalizes and shows that, within
argument for Anomalous Monism takes place, its ultimate status is the framework of Anomalous Monism, mental properties are not causally
unclear. (For discussion of how causal closure may itself be deduced from relevant because they are not lawlike. His argument can be understood as
Davidson’s framework once Anomalous Monism is in place, see Yalowitz follows: since Anomalous Monism insists that mental events have
1998a, 225.) physical properties that can be related, by strict law, to the effects of those
events, and also insists that such events’ mental properties cannot be so
Mental Properties and Causal Relevance related, it is only ‘by virtue’ of its physical (i.e., strict lawlike) properties
that a mental event causes what it does. Its mental properties, and thus its

being the particular kind of mental event that it is, play no role in its causal physical properties are casually relevant. What enables (i.e., is necessary
powers. Thus, Honderich suggests that the cause-law principle must be for) causation is thus held to be responsible for causation (for a similar
articulated slightly differently—as the Principle of the Nomological argument, see Kim 1993a, 22). But this is disputable. Not all necessary
Character of Causally Relevant Properties. This nomological property conditions of some phenomenon are explanatory conditions—conditions
principle rules out the causal relevance of anomic mental properties. ‘responsible for’ that phenomenon. For example, a person can talk only if
she was born—having been born is thus a necessary condition of her
Honderich’s argument is instructive for a more general consideration of talking. However, her ability to talk is not explained by her having been
the wave of epiphenomenalist criticisms lobbed at Anomalous Monism. born. It is not ‘by virtue’ of being born that she can talk, though the former
First, Honderich’s distinction between causally relevant and irrelevant is a necessary condition of the latter. Davidson himself expresses
properties is completely insensitive to the question of what is being skepticism about the intelligibility of his critics’ use of the ‘by virtue’
explained or caused, which effect is under consideration (Macdonalds locution in discussing Anomalous Monism (Davidson 1993, 6, 13) (see
1995 and Gibbons 2006 usefully discuss the importance of typing effects further §6.1).
in addressing the epiphenomenalist objections). Consider the fruit
example. While the color of the fruit has no causal relevance to its The point that causal explanation is interest-relative, and must be sensitive
measurement, that is not the only effect of the event of putting the fruit on to what one wishes to explain, is not novel. But it is a point that often gets
the scale. The color catches the eye of a customer, bleeds onto the scale lost in epiphenomenalist criticisms of Anomalous Monism. However, it is
and changes its color, and causes a host of other effects that are not salient also a point that invites important questions about the relations and
when considering only the effect of the measurement. Salience is differences between causation and explanation. As we have seen,
dependent on explanatory interests, and if we shift those interests, what Davidson insists on a firm distinction between causation, which is a
was an irrelevant property with respect to one effect may be a relevant metaphysical relation between particular events independently of how they
property with respect to another (see §6.2). are described, and explanation, which concerns events only as they are
described in particular ways. Thus, he is inclined to dismiss the
Second, Honderich arrives at the view that an event’s physical properties epiphenomenalist concerns about Anomalous Monism, and the locution of
are the only causally relevant ones through reflecting on Anomalous ‘causally relevant and irrelevant properties’ as based upon a confusion and
Monism’s insistence on the cause-law principle in light of the anomalism certainly a different metaphysical framework than that assumed by
principle. If mental events must instantiate physical properties—strict-law Anomalous Monism. Events themselves—rather than any particular aspect
properties—and all causal relations must be covered by strict causal laws, or property of them—cause other events. Our descriptions of these events
then an event’s having such properties is a necessary condition for (what we speak of as their aspects or properties) explain why effects
standing in causal relations. Davidson can agree with all of this. However, described in certain ways occur. Mental descriptions explain actions by
Honderich concludes from this that it is only ‘by virtue’ of its physical rationalizing them—making them intelligible in light of the agent’s beliefs
properties that an event stands in causal relations. This ‘by virtue’ claim and purposes. The mental event that explains an action by rationalizing it
then allows Honderich to move directly to the conclusion that only is a cause of that action—otherwise, as discussed above (§2.2), there

would be no way of answering the question concerning which of the many discussion of the color of the fruit). The Macdonalds’ insistence that they
mental events that rationalize some action are the ones that actually are turns on the point that only instances of properties cause anything. But
explain its occurrence (see further the supplement on Explanatory instances are neither relevant nor irrelevant. At best, they either have or
Epiphenomenalism). That mental event is also a physical event (as is the lack causal efficacy– they are or are not responsible for bringing about
action it explains), according to Anomalous Monism, because it stands in some effect or other. The Macdonalds have perhaps established that
causal relations (the interaction principle), and thus (given the cause-law because physical events are paradigm examples of causally efficacious
and anomalism principles) must instantiate physical (strict-law) properties. events, then since, according the Anomalous Monism, mental events are
But properties themselves don’t cause anything, only instances of physical events, mental events inherit any causal efficacy had by physical
properties—and these are the events that bear or instantiate them. events. But that is quite different than establishing that mental properties
are explanatorily relevant—that an event’s being a mental kind of event
Is this point really responsive to Honderich’s concern? It is instructive to matters to the occurrence of any effects in the world. (The Macdonalds
observe how some proponents of Anomalous Monism (Macdonalds1986) (1995) later acknowledge this and develop an account of explanatory
have attempted to defend Davidson from epiphenomenalist concerns by relevance; for discussion, see the supplement on Explanatory
exploiting the point in the following way. Honderich has insisted that the Epiphenomenalism.)
only causally relevant properties of events are strict-law properties. But
properties don’t cause anything; only their instances do. And particular, Homonomic and Heteronomic Generalizations
causally interacting mental events are instances of strict-law properties,
according to the monistic component of Anomalous Monism. (Recalling Davidson organizes his discussion of Anomalous Monism around what he
the discussion of the ‘because’ argument in §2.2, since reasons causally portrays as an exhaustive distinction between ‘homonomic’ and
explain actions, and due to mental anomalism, actions must be physical, ‘heteronomic’ generalizations (Davidson 1970, 219). As we shall see in
the claim that mental events cause physical events is justified.) So this section, it is extremely problematic for the wider purposes of
Honderich’s nomological property principle must itself be amended to the establishing Anomalous Monism. Ultimately it is best to set it aside and
Principle of the Nomological Character of Causally Relevant Instances of instead focus simply on the related (but by no means identical) distinction
Properties. Mental properties are causally relevant, according to this between strict and ceteris paribus laws.
principle, because their instantiations are also instances of nomic
properties, and nomic properties are paradigm examples of causally With regard to the distinction, Davidson writes:
relevant properties.
[o]n the one hand, there are generalizations whose positive
However, it can reasonably be wondered how this line of thinking is instances give us reason to believe the generalization itself could
responsive to the point that appears to be underlying Honderich’s be improved upon by adding further provisos and conditions stated
nomological property principle. After all, the issue under consideration in the same general vocabulary as the original generalization. Such
has been whether mental properties are relevant to explanation (recall the a generalization points to the form and vocabulary of the finished

law: we may say that it is a homonomic generalization. On the homonomic/heteronomic distinction is made “within the category of the
other hand, there are generalizations which when instantiated may rude rule of thumb” (Davidson 1970, 219; emphasis added). Since
give us reason to believe there is a precise law at work, but one homonomic ceteris paribus generalizations are thus possible, the
that can be stated only by shifting to a different vocabulary. We distinctions between homonomic/heteronomic generalizations, on the one
may call such generalizations heteronomic. (Davidson 1970, 219) hand, and strict/ ceteris paribus laws, on the other, are not the same; not
all ceteris paribus generalizations are heteronomic. (Most commentators
Davidson’s claim is that generalizations in which mental properties figure have failed to see this point; for examples, see Fodor 1989, McLaughlin
can only be heteronomic, not homonomic, and that therefore there can be 1985, and Hancock 2001. For extended discussion, see Yalowitz 1998a.)
no strict psychological or psychophysical laws. In the passage above,
Davidson maintains that the finished (i.e., strict) laws towards which both The central question now concerns the status of heterogeneously
homonomic and heteronomic generalizations (both of which are ceteris formulated strict laws. It would seem that Davidson’s attack on the
paribus—see further below) point must be stated in a homogeneous possibility of strict psychophysical laws is an attack on the possibility of
vocabulary. (This reading of the passage is supported by Davidson’s (one form of) strict laws formulated in a heterogeneous vocabulary. But
subsequent remark (Davidson 1970, 222) explaining the heteronomic we have already observed that Davidson’s own formulation of the
character of psychophysical generalizations by appeal to various reasons homonomic/heteronomic distinction as exhaustive makes it difficult to see
for mental anomalism. This remark would not make sense if heteronomic how the possibility of heterogeneously formulated strict laws could even
statements could be made strict while incorporating both vocabularies.) It be at issue, since they appear to be ruled out by definition. But there are a
is important to see that this is equivalent to ruling out, by sheer definition, number of reasons against proceeding in this way. If we assumed the
the possibility of heterogeneously formulated strict laws. This is extremely exhaustive nature of the homonomic/heteronomic distinction, then the
problematic, however, because it amounts to defining away the possibility interaction principle would guarantee the heteronomicity of
of strict psychophysical laws—strict laws formulated in heterogeneous generalizations that include psychological predicates, and thus mental
vocabulary. And that appears to beg one of the central questions that anomalism. As a result, no independent argument for mental anomalism
Davidson is investigating. would be required; this holds for monism as well.
To see this, notice first that, according to Davidson’s actual formulation, After all, as we have already seen, the interaction principle tells us that
neither homonomic nor heteronomic generalizations are strict. Each of mental events causally interact with physical events, and this means that
these generalizations is a ceteris paribus generalization at the time when homonomicity is already ruled out—something other than just
its status is under consideration, and each points in the direction of a psychological vocabulary is needed in explicating psychological
different sort of strict law relative to the original vocabulary in which it is generalizations of the form ‘ceteris paribus, M1 & M2 → M3’. With
formulated. The sort of strict law pointed to depends upon whether a heteronomicity the only remaining option, we could then directly draw the
change in vocabulary is required in articulating the conditions gestured at conclusion that the only strict laws that can cover mental event-tokens
in the ceteris paribus clause. Davidson is quite clear on this: the must be stated in an entirely different vocabulary. This is equivalent to

mental anomalism. Furthermore, monism follows as well, since causally Explanatory Epiphenomenalism
interacting mental events must be covered by some strict law (the cause-
law principle), and the only candidate laws remaining contain no mental Recognition of an irreducible explanatory role for reasons, and mental
vocabulary—therefore, mental events must instantiate whatever properties properties generally, as expressed in the dual explananda strategy, does
are capable of formulating such laws. Now, as we have seen (2.3), it is not by itself fully do away with epiphenomenalist concerns. In light of
quite uncontroversial that there can be no strict, purely psychological laws, mental anomalism, why think that reason explanations are causal
and the interaction principle expresses this. However, Davidson’s explanations, rather than a sui generis form of noncausal explanation? The
homonomic/ heteronomic framework would allow us to draw directly need for a causal relation between mental events cited in reason
from this uncontroversial point the far more controversial and interesting explanations (see discussion of the ‘because’ problem in 2.2) doesn’t settle
doctrines of psychophysical anomalism and monism, with no required this issue once we have distinguished between causal relations and
route through the anomalism principle. That is too quick, and anyway explanations (see section 6). Neil Campbell (1998 and 2005) argues for an
inconsistent with Davidson’s own explicit attempt at independent interpretation of Anomalous Monism on which while mental events stand
arguments for this principle. Indeed, on this way of thinking one cannot in causal relations with each other, reason explanations are not causal
even formulate the question about the possibility of strict psychophysical explanations. He calls this ‘explanatory epiphenomenalism’. Causal
laws. The only available formulation that is coherent and somewhat explanations explain because they fit singular causal occurrences into true
relevant is: ‘are generalizations in which psychological predicates figure causal generalizations (2005, 442–43). However, reason explanations,
homonomic or heteronomic?’ But this does not succeed in raising a according to Campbell, are more plausibly thought of as functioning along
question about strict psychophysical laws. It asks only whether there can different lines: reasons explain actions by revealing the agent’s rationality
be strict, purely psychological laws, or (barring that) concludes that there in so acting in light of those reasons (2005, 445). The point of this
are no strict generalizations in which psychological predicates can figure explanatory epiphenomenalism is not to criticize reason explanations as
at all. Clearly something has gone wrong, and the purported illusory—as wrongly claiming to explain—but rather to point up
exhaustiveness of the homonomic/heteronomic distinction is the culprit. limitations of the domain of causal explanation. On this view, not all
genuine explanations are casual—reason explanations are sui generis and
What this suggests is that an argument is needed to rule out the possibility capture a distinctive pattern in nature that would otherwise be missed. This
of heterogeneously formulated strict laws, otherwise the question of the is an interesting twist on the noncausal theories of actions (2.2),
possibility of strict psychophysical laws has simply been begged. And this acknowledging both Davidson’s criticism of them (the ‘because’ problem)
means that we cannot assume the exhaustiveness of the homonomic/ in insisting on causal efficacy (reasons cause (extensional) actions) yet
heteronomic distinction at the start. In the main text, then, we set aside also acknowledging their disavowal of causal explanation as a model for
Davidson’s use of this distinction in our discussion of Anomalous reason explanation and refusal to accept that only causal explanations
Monism, and instead simply focus on the distinction between strict and capture real patterns in nature. It also explicitly connects the distinctive
ceteris paribus laws, which is at the very core of Davidson’s discussion. feature of reason explanation—rationality—to the reality of reasons and

mental properties generally (see 4.3). Campbell is influenced in this line of point, reason explanations might be different than other causal
thinking by McDowell’s reading of mental anomalism (4.2.2), though he explanations in their subject matter without this preventing them from
goes beyond McDowell in denying that reason explanations are causal. being causal. After all, there are other causal explanations that are also
backed only by ceteris paribus generalizations, and a point analogous to
Campbell acknowledges that reasons which explain actions are backed by the one Campbell emphasizes—that their constitutive feature explains why
generalizations (ceteris paribus ones), but claims that this fact “takes a such generalizations hold rather than vice-versa—has also been made
back seat” to the normative dimension of rationalizing explanation, concerning biological explanations in particular and functional
because generalizations record mere tendencies while rational explanations generally (Macdonalds 1995; for related discussion, see
explanations observe what agents should do—the fact that the below).
generalizations hold is explicable by rationality, something that is not true
of other forms of explanation (2005, 445). (Though Campbell doesn’t If rational explanations could be satisfying despite failing to be instances
argue this explicitly, in this vein one might also point to the fact that the of generalizations, then there might be an asymmetry sufficiently strong to
truth of the generalizations does not—indeed, cannot—explain the fact block the assimilation of reasons explanations to causal explanations. But
that the relations covered are rational. This is a key point in Kim’s Campbell does not argue for this, either in itself or as an interpretation of
reconstruction of the argument for mental anomalism—see 4.2.1.) The Davidson, and it has no clear independent plausibility—the failure of a
epistemic satisfaction that reason explanations provide is achieved reason explanation to generalize would in fact prevent it from being a
differently than that of causal explanations—not by being an instance of a satisfying explanation (see also 4.2.3). Reason explanations are satisfying
generalization, but rather by being a realization of rationality. both because they show that an action is a realization of rationality and
also because such explanations are instances of generalizations. Both
By itself, this point does not appear to rule out the idea that reasons conditions are necessary for reasons explanations, and cannot be pulled
explanations are causal explanations. Indeed, it seems to be a non sequitur. apart. None of this appears to be inconsistent with reasons explanations
First, in other cases where explanations covered by generalizations are not being causal explanations, and seems merely to individuate reason
thereby casual explanations—for instance, logic—the obstacle has to do explanations from those that are made relative to different explanatory
with not meeting basic conditions for casual explanations, such as interests.
temporal succession. But such conditions are met in reason explanations.
Second, as we have seen (4.2.1), Davidson emphasizes that a normative However, Campbell provides an additional and conceptually distinct point
component also underlies the physical realm in constitutive a priori in favor of an asymmetry between the two that would block assimilating
principles. On Campbell’s reasoning, this would prevent physical reason explanations to causal explanations. Even though, for example,
explanations from being casual, which is clearly wrong. We see once again hurricanes and catastrophes don’t stand in strict lawlike relations, the
a problematic consequence of interpretations of the argument for mental explanation of the latter by the former is causal because we have at least a
anomalism (Kim’s and now Campbell’s) that highlight a strong distinction rough understanding of how hurricanes function in terms of underlying
between normative and descriptive principles. Third, and related to this mechanisms—the physical properties co-instantiated by meteorological

events. But the point of mental anomalism is to deny that there can be any mental anomalism. And the Macdonalds, who accept mental anomalism,
such understanding in the case of reasons. Therefore, “without a means of indeed hold that the patterns in both cases—rational and biological—must
connecting reason explanations to their underlying causal processes in an be “reliably produced” by co-instanced nomological properties. However,
intelligible fashion there is nothing to account for their explanatory force and crucially, such reliability does not depend upon or entail exceptionless
if such explanations are taken to be a species of casual explanations” relations (see further below).
(Campbell 1998, 29). Campbell’s point seems to be that without an
explanatory relationship between reason explanations and the physical Campbell’s explanatory epiphenomenalism is in effect calling into
causal explanations underlying them, not only is there no justification for question the Macdonalds’ underlying assumption that patterns genuinely
holding reason explanations to be causal; moreover, the problem of causal occurring “in nature”—and thus real—must bear an explanatory relation
explanatory competition and exclusion pressed by Kim (6.2) rears its head. to nomological properties. On Campbell’s view, that assumption is
Campbell’s explanatory epiphenomenalism is thus a form of the dual unwarranted, particularly given the already established causal efficacy of
explananda solution to Kim’s problem, but one that further eschews mental events. Reason explanations can pick out genuine patterns “in
explanatory competition between reason and physical explanations by nature” without being either causal explanations or explainable in terms of
distinguishing not only their distinct explanans and explananda but also underlying nomological properties. The relevance of this for the current
the form of explanation (causal or not) that relates them. discussion is whether the Macdonalds’ “reliable production” requirement
is consistent with Anomalous Monism, which Campbell in effect denies.
The Macdonalds (1995) hold, as Campbell does, that (1) mental events are We have already seen (5.3) that the Macdonalds endorse a supervenience
causally efficacious by virtue of being identical with physical events, and relationship between mental and physical properties, and claim that their
that (2) despite the anomalous nature of reason explanations, they capture conception of supervenience is consistent with both the strict nature of
distinctive patterns that account for their explanatory usefulness. But the supervenience laws and also mental anomalism because we can’t currently
Macdonalds don’t see this as incompatible with reason explanations being state such laws and so are not in a position to predict or explain mental
causal. They cite biological events and explanations as meeting (1) and (2) events on their basis. As we have also seen, this is consistent with—
—the pattern consisting in appearance of design resulting from natural indeed, seems ultimately to require—a strict explanatory/predictive
selection—but emphasize that these are nonetheless causal explanations. It relationship between physical and mental properties, making mental
thus appears that the difference between their attitudes is due to the second anomalism into a merely epistemic and not metaphysical thesis.
point raised by Campbell—whether there exists an account of how such
explanations explain. For the Macdonalds, there is an underlying account If one rejects this particular attempt to square supervenience with mental
of design and natural selection in terms of underlying “physico-chemical anomalism, then the quagmire of 5.3 arises—how to articulate a
changes”. That suggests that for the Macdonalds there needs to be an conception that provides for dependency without exceptionless prediction
account of reason explanations in terms of the nomological properties that or explanation. Interestingly, the Macdonalds’ later requirement of
mental events instance in order for reasons explanations to be causal “reliable” (as opposed to exceptionless) relations is suggestive of a ceteris
explanations—precisely what Campbell claims is ruled out by Davidson’s paribus conception of supervenience, which we earlier saw as an

unexplored and potentially fruitful direction to take in trying to square nonetheless makes it intelligible why a hurricane is occurring or how it is
Anomalous Monism with an explanatory priority of the physical through behaving within its own particular explanatory framework.
the supervenience relation. (Campbell valiantly but implausibly tries to fit
Davidson’s appeals to supervenience into Campbell’s explanatory The debate about asymmetries between reason and other explanations
epiphenomenalist framework by claiming that while reason explanations does not end here, and though we cannot explore it any further, it is worth
depend upon physical causal explanations, this is a semantic and not a briefly noting one direction in which it inevitably goes that is close to the
metaphysical thesis (Campbell 1998, 37–38), and so presumably does not heart of Anomalous Monism. A plausible question to ask at this point is
entail an explanatory relationship between the mental and the physical of why the generalizations—whether strict or ceteris paribus—hold at the
the kind pressed by the Macdonalds. Much of what we have seen most basic level between physical properties, between mental properties,
Davidson saying about supervenience is inconsistent with this and between the two. In other words, why are the fundamental laws of our
interpretation.) world as they are? Now, an initial answer to this question might be that it
is in the nature of the properties related that the laws are what they are.
Since Campbell allows that reason explanations make actions intelligible However, this answer masks an important asymmetry between the
without falling under exceptionless generalizations (mental anomalism), different kinds of generalizations, emphasized by both Kim and McDowell
he can’t object that physical properties cannot make reasons intelligible (4.2.1–4.2.2) and reflected in Campbell’s discussion. In the case of both
simply because of an anomalous relation between them. It might be purely physical and psychophysical generalizations, we can conceive of
responded that physical properties cannot make reasons intelligible the possibility of different relations holding. (Though this point is
because “making intelligible” means making rationally intelligible, and powerfully intuitive, it is no simple task to make precise. For relevant
this is not something that physical properties are in the business of discussion, see Chalmers 1996, Mumford 2009 and Latham 2011). This is
providing (as emphasized by the dual explananda approach). While this is the case whether the generalizations are strict or ceteris paribus. In the
true, it is both question-begging and misses the point. Explanations always case of psychophysical generalizations in particular, there is no convincing
make phenomena intelligible within the terms of the particular answer forthcoming to the question of why these mental properties
explanatory framework. This is the point of the idea that explanation is supervene on these rather than other physical properties. However, to the
interest-relative. Within the framework of understanding the relationship question “Why are these actions explained by these reasons?”, there is a
between physical and mental properties, ceteris paribus relations can deeper level of explanation available. And the answer isn’t simply
make it intelligible why some mental event is occurring—because some “Because of a rational relation between the two”. Rather, it is because that
physical event is occurring, and there is a ceteris paribus relationship rational relation has no conceivable alternative. It is not intelligible to us
between them—even while not providing an exceptionless explanation for that those reasons might explain very different kinds of actions. As we
its occurrence. Rational intelligibility is not the only kind of intelligibility. have seen, it isn’t at all obvious that this asymmetry entails that reason
As Campbell himself notes, the sort of explanation that physical properties explanations are not causal explanations, as Campbell insists. But there is
can provide for hurricanes is neither exceptionless nor rational, but it no question that this asymmetry is important to our understanding of
Anomalous Monism and the nature and status of reason explanations.

Kim’s Reductio Strategy for Establishing Mental not the strict law ‘P1 → P2’, due to the obvious invalidity of deriving a
stronger modality (strict law) from a weaker one (ceteris paribus). How
Anomalism
would these adjustments affect the reductio strategy of showing that
As we have seen in 4.2.1, one key problem with Kim’s reductio strategy presumptively contingent relations between physical states would be
for interpreting the argument for mental anomalism is that it fails to explained by necessary rational relations and vice-versa given (2) and (3)?
register Davidson’s distinction between strict and ceteris paribus laws. Yalowitz (1997, 238–40) claims that the reductio would then fail, arguing
Can Kim’s very straightforward and elegant interpretative approach be in one direction that any troubling sense of constraint of the physical by
saved by making requisite adjustments? It might not affect Kim’s basic the rational due to (2) and (3) would be lost because of the nonstrict nature
point to formulate the rational principle deployed in his argument in of (4*) and subsequent allowance of exceptions to ‘P1 → P2’. Yalowitz’s
ceteris paribus rather than strict form, while maintaining its necessary idea seems to be that since not all cases of P1 result in the occurrence of a
status: all things being equal, if an individual is attributed one belief he P2, there is no necessary relation between the types P1 and P2. And this
should be attributed another. This allows for exceptions under unusual seems to suggest that the constitutive essence of the physical has not been
circumstances, but insists that attributions of such exceptions must be well infected by that of the mental. The existence of exceptions by itself seems
motivated and also not generally the case. But there would nonetheless be to secure the contingent status of relations between P1 and P2. As a result,
a contrast with the merely contingent status of any physical regularities. the objection to bridge laws (2) and (3)—the point of Kim’s argument—
Suppose that there is a necessarily true descriptive psychological would then be removed.
generalization
An analogous point could be made if explaining (1*) by (4*); here,
(1*) ‘ceteris paribus, M1 → M2’. Yalowitz’s criticism would presumably be that the troubling notion that
certain mental possibilities which should be ruled out by the necessity of
The most that can be derived from it together with strict bridge laws (1*) would not be ruled out, given (2) and (3), would be lost because of
the now nonstrict nature of (1*) and subsequent allowance of the
(2) ‘P1 ↔ M1’
possibility of alternatives to M2 when an M1 occurs. Here, Yalowitz’s idea
and would seem to be that since the nonstrict nature of (1*) already allows
exceptions, it could not be an objection to (2) and (3) that they allow the
(3) ‘P2 ↔ M2’ (assumed for the purposes of reductio) constitutive essence of the physical—contingency—to jeopardize the
necessary nature of mental generalizations. This is because the nonstrict
would be the contingently true nature of (1*) already allows for cases where an M2 is not produced by an
M1, and thus the relation between M1 and M2 is contingent.
(4*) ‘ceteris paribus, P1 → P2’,
However, there is room for debate here. Since we are trying to make room
for the notion of necessary ceteris paribus generalizations like (1*) (see

also 5.3 and 6.1), we need to be careful not to collapse the distinctions while establishing that there are possible worlds (including the actual
between strict and necessary generalizations and also between ceteris world) in which M1’s don’t cause M2’s, is, once again, orthogonal to the
paribus and contingent generalizations. Yalowitz’s argument appears to be question of whether there are possible worlds in which ‘ceteris paribus
doing precisely this in holding that the existence of exceptions—the mark M1 → M2’ is false. And since (4*) is only contingently true, there are
of a ceteris paribus generalization—entails a merely contingent relation indeed such worlds. Since certain possibilities about the relations between
between cases successfully covered (non-exceptions) by that M1 and M2 are being ruled in by (4*) together with (2) and (3), it once
generalization. This can be seen clearly by considering the following. The again appears that Kim’s central point survives the adjusted argument and
existence of exceptions does show that there is no necessary relation continues to hold. The necessity of (1*) should block the possibility of the
between P1 and P2—there are possible worlds (including the actual world) realization of its denial—a world in which ‘ceteris paribus, M1 → M2’ is
in which the latter does follow from the former. But this is orthogonal to false. This impossibility, required by the constitutive essence of the
the key question of whether there are possible worlds in which P1’s don’t mental, is ruled out by (4*), constituting a reductio of (2) and (3). Thus,
cause P2’s ceteris paribus. And if the generalization is supposed to be Yalowitz’s objection to the adjusted Kim strategy for establishing
necessary, as we are proposing in assuming (1*) and deriving (4*) from it, psychophysical anomalism appears to fail.
then this is not possible. Since certain possibilities about the relations
between P1 and P2 are being ruled out by (1*) together with (2) and (3), it Our adjustment of Kim’s argument, taking into account Davidson’s
appears that Kim’s central point survives the adjusted argument and rejection of strict psychological laws and lack of reliance on the notion of
continues to hold: bridge laws like (2) and (3) enable the transference of a normative psychological principle, thus looks promising as a
the constitutive essences of the mental and physical from one to the other, reconstruction of Davidson’s argument for psychophysical anomalism.
and so must be rejected. In this case, the contingency of (4*) should allow Yalowitz (1997, 240), however, mentions a few other problems with it that
for the possibility of the realization of its denial—not merely an exception are not easily dismissed or, for that matter, assessed. First, there is a
like P3, which Yalowitz’s argument highlights, but rather a world in which concern about how the deductive-nomological model of explanation
it is false that ‘ceteris paribus, P1 → P2’. But this possibility, required by handles explanatory relations between ceteris paribus generalizations—if
the constitutive essence of the physical (contingency), is ruled out by (2) one generalization, which has exceptions, cannot explain why or when
and (3) given the necessity of (1*). So it is only by denying (2) and (3)— another generalization has exceptions, then it is a good question to ask
psychophysical anomalism—that the constitutive essences of the mental how the former can be said to explain the fact that the latter holds when it
and the physical can be respected. does. (For related discussion, see Fodor 1974 and 1991, and Schiffer
1991.) Further, it is very unclear how the deductive-nomological model
This point is even clearer if one considers the reverse version of the can be applied to generalizations of different modalities (necessary and
adjusted Kim argument, with (4*), together with (2) and (3), explaining contingent). And there is a related question about the legitimacy of
(1*). Here the problem with (2) and (3) would be the following: according substitutions within the sorts of modal contexts Kim is working with. In
to the contingent status of (4*), there are possible worlds where ‘ceteris particular, are substitutions of physical for mental properties in
paribus, P1 → P2’ is false. The existence of exceptions allowed by (1*), metaphysically necessary generalizations like (1*) licensed by the

existence of metaphysically contingent bridge laws relating mental and aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties. It appears that
physical properties like (2) and (3)? If not, then the problematic Davidson has in mind this sort of picture of the relation between physical
derivations and explanations would not go through, and so neither would and mental properties when he maintains that physical properties
any transfer of constitutive essence from one domain to the other. These “determine” mental ones, and that the latter are “strongly dependent” on
structural questions about Kim’s argument (both the original and the the former (Davidson 1973a, 253). But it is difficult to see how this claim
adjusted versions) make a final assessment of his approach too complex to is motivated in Davidson’s framework. Davidson offers no argument in
settle here. favor of supervenience, and although he does think that it is required of
any acceptable theory of the relation between the mental and the physical
Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the (Davidson 1993, 9), he never explains this requirement.
Physical
One possible explanation that is close to Davidson’s concerns is the
As we have seen, Davidson never argues for either the supervenience of following. If an event involving a change in mental properties occurs (e.g.,
the mental on the physical or the explanatory primacy of the physical. a person comes to believe something), there must be some physical
Here we consider some reasons for these claims that are consistent with explanation of that event. Davidson’s causal extensionalism would lead
the spirit of Anomalous Monism. One reason for the primacy claim is that him to say that what is explained is the event of coming to believe, but
while every mental event is physical, not all physical events are mental. under a physical description. (And, as discussed in the supplement on
Another is that, with Anomalous Monism already established, the only Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism,
strict laws are strict physical laws. And given causal closure of the causal closure of the physical holds that all physical events have physical
physical (see the supplement on Causal Closure of the Physical in the explanations.) So the physical explanation is not of that change in mental
Argument for Monism), every event that occurs must then have a physical properties directly. But the physical explanation does concern a physical
explanation. These points motivate a kind of explanatory primacy to change that coincides with the change in mental properties. Without some
physical properties—they always explain the occurrence of physical sort of supervenience claim, this coincidence would be merely that—a
events, which is not true of mental properties. However, none of these brute fact that could just as well be otherwise. It would be perfectly
reasons motivates the sort of explanatory relation between physical and possible for that exact same physical change to be accompanied by a
mental properties expressed in the supervenience claim (indeed, Davidson completely different mental change or even no mental change at all. In
1970, 214 describes these features of the physical as ‘bland’ and not considering the mental change, absolutely no explanatory significance
indicative of any significant ontological bias towards the physical). could be accorded to the physical change. But since many mental changes
Typically, supervenience claims are driven by the thought that one can (i.e., actions) involve overt bodily movements for which physical
only affect the higher-order (in this case mental) properties of an event or explanations are possible, this would threaten to bifurcate completely the
object by affecting its lower-order (physical) properties. One creates a explanations of bodily movements and actions; the former would have
beautiful statue by altering the physical properties of the marble; therefore, nothing to do with the latter, which seems quite counterintuitive and also

surprising given Davidson’s claim that actions are bodily movements making token-identity too trivial a thesis to merit the label of even the
(Davidson 1971, 49). most minimal materialism (Antony 2003; Latham 2003). In particular, it is
argued that an event could receive a physical description even though it
Continuing this line of thinking, a related reason for the supervenience might, for all we know, include, as a part, the thinking of an immaterial
claim, not mentioned by Davidson, is that it can otherwise appear mind. Antony (2003) claims that such a ‘hybrid’ event must count as
completely miraculous that the ceteris paribus generalizations in ‘physical’, according to Davidson, because of the physical description, but
psychology and the strict physical laws can so often converge in their it would seem to be counterintuitive to accept this label given the presence
predictions and explanations of events (see Cussins 1992, sect. 3, for and behavior of the immaterial mind. Now, an initial and seemingly
discussion). If there are no explanatory relations between mental and plausible response to this is that if all physical events have physical
physical properties, how is it possible that the psychological generalization explanations, as Davidson clearly believes , then the thinking/existence of
that some individual will, given that he has certain reasons, open an this immaterial mind could have no causal consequences. We couldn’t,
umbrella on a certain occasion, predict an event that is also (under a then, ever know of it, or have any reason to think it obtained, and it is not
different description) predicted by the physical laws? Such convergences clear that its sheer conceivability (if it is conceivable — see below) should
occur countless times each day, but can appear to be only repeated count against Davidson’s monism.
miraculous coincidences unless there are explanatory relations between
the mental and physical domains. Supervenience is one way of filling this Antony acknowledges the inclination not to take this kind of dualism
explanatory void. seriously, but argues that such inclinations don’t constitute arguments, and
that if Davidson’s monism doesn’t rule it out it is an unacceptably weak
One final rationale for positing supervenience is that it can provide a conception of materialism. However, the impossibility of any evidence for
criterion for distinguishing between those properties of an event that can such a position appears to constitute a rather strong argument against it.
play a role in genuine explanations and those that cannot. Why, for Antony also acknowledges the inclination not to consider such hybrid
example, do many reject astrological explanations of human behavior as events as genuine events, but rather as clearly gerrymandered
genuinely explanatory? On this view, it would be because astrological constructions like one incorporating this morning’s rainfall with some
properties do not supervene on physical properties—there is no distant supernova. However, Antony rejects this too, claiming that unlike
dependency or explanatory relation between the two. (For related such gerrymandered events, his imagined hybrid events are “perfectly
discussion, see the supplement on Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.) unified”. This, however, seems clearly wrong. Consider what is intuitively
offputting about the obviously gerrymandered constructions—they
Token-Identity and Minimal Materialism incorporate events that are spatially unconnected. Can Antony claim
something different about his hybrids? Since their phenomenal
As we have seen, Davidson’s central claim is that what makes a mental
components are supposed to be mental, it seems that they can’t have
event identical to a physical event is that the mental event has a physical
spatial descriptions. But if so, they are indeed spatially unconnected to
description. It has been objected that this is an extremely weak condition,
their supposed physical companion events. It’s hard to see how this

Anomalous Monism
warrants counting hybrids as genuine events as opposed to gerrymandered

ones. (Note that this is especially (though not only) the case given
Davidson’s later endorsement of the spatiotemporal criterion for event-
individuation.) A connected worry relates precisely to what makes
Davidson’s restriction of his argument for monism to causally interacting
mental events reasonable. If an event or subevent has no causal
consequences, what grounds do we or could we have for believing in its
existence? Without such grounds, it sounds less unmotivated than Antony
suggests to not take such proposals seriously. Antony seems to anticipate
this concern (2003, 11), claiming that his hybrid events do casually
interact with physical events by virtue of their physical companions. But
by Antony’s own definition, the phenomenal component of the event is an
event that does not causally interact with physical events (2003, 9).
Hybrids enter into causal relations by virtue of the physical subevents
only. This provides further grounds for doubting that they are genuine
events that we could have evidence for. And this suggests that it is entirely
reasonable not to take their possibility seriously as an objection to the
strength of Davidson’s materialism.
Copyright © 2019 by the author

Steven Yalowitz
132 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Anomalous Monism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Anomalous Monism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

pdf version of the entry

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 3

4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 5

6 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 7

8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 9

10 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 11

12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 13

14 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 15

16 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 17

18 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 19

20 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 21

22 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 23

24 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 25

26 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 27

28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 29

30 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 31

32 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 33

34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 35

36 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 37

38 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 39

40 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 41

42 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 43

44 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 45

46 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 47

48 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 49

50 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 51

52 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 53

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 55

56 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 57

58 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 59

60 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 61

62 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 63

64 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 65

Press. Stoutland, F., 1970, “The Logical Connection Argument”, American

66 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 67

68 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 69

70 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 71

72 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 73

74 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 75

76 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 77

78 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 79

80 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 81

82 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 83

84 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 85

86 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 87

88 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 89

90 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 91

92 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 93

94 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 95

96 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 97

98 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 99

100 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 101

102 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 103

104 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 105

106 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 107

108 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 109

110 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 111

112 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 113

114 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 115

116 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 117

118 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 119

120 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 121

122 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2019 Edition 123