The D i s c o v e r y o f P a r t i c i p a t o r y

R e s e a r c h As A N e w Scientific
Paradigm: Personal and
Intellectual Accounts

PETER PARK

The article presents considerations for the placing of participatory research in

the practice of sociology. The changing conditions in contemporary society
have compelled social scientists to rethink the way social theory has been
conceptualized and has been practiced in relation to social change. Modernist
social theory, of which sociology is a prime example, has been imbued with
the biases of the Enlightenment that privilege the essentialized male rational
actor set above the ordinary people. As a consequence it has produced nar-
ratives and practices that are not in the interest of the people, especially
those who have been dominated and oppressed. In order to live up to the
potential of sociology as a vehicle for the improvement of social conditions,
it must include the interest and the wisdom of the people in its researching
and theorizing activities. It is argued that participatory research provides an
opportunity to follow this course in sociology. Participatory research, it is
contended, will lead to a paradigm shift in the social sciences because it is
based on an expanded conception of knowledge and because it changes the
relationship between the researcher and the researched and between theory
and practice. Arguments are drawn from the history of science, critical theory,
and postmodernist and feminist critiques.

Introduction

P a r t i c i p a t o r y r e s e a r c h as an identifiable and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s intellectual activity

in t h e social s c i e n c e s is n o w a b o u t t w e n t y y e a r s old. Its e m e r g e n c e a n d devel-
o p m e n t r o u g h l y c o i n c i d e in time w i t h t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n that I w e n t
t h r o u g h as a sociologist. I t h i n k o f t h e s e parallel a n d at t i m e s i n t e r t w i n i n g e v e n t s
as b e i n g r o o t e d in the same social c h a n g e s that s t a r t e d h a p p e n i n g in t h e sixties.

Peter Park is currently on the faculty of the Fielding Institute. Address for correspondence:
Peter Park, 1313 Richards Alley, Wilmington, DE 19806.

Park 29
I was profoundly moved by the questions being asked about the social sciences,
as were many others, in the climate of revolutionary fervor affecting all spheres
of life at that time. The story of h o w I came to participatory research in address-
ing some of these questions, I think, gives witness to the energy and vision that
motivate participatory research. For this reason, I have chosen to talk about h o w
the m o v e m e n t for participatory research came about from a personal point of
view, intermingling my understanding of the history of participatory research
with an account of the journey that has brought me to my present position as
a founding m e m b e r of an organization devoted to the practice and p r o m o t i o n of
participatory research. 1

Defining Participatory Research

Participatory research is a way of creating knowledge that involves learning

from investigation and applying w h a t is learned to collective problems t h r o u g h
social action. A critical difference b e t w e e n traditional social research and par-
ticipatory research is that in the latter the people on w h o s e behalf the investi-
gation-action cycle is carried out get directly involved in the process, from prob-
lem formulation, to inquiry, to action. In reality, it is more than research, under-
stood in the conventional sense, since it has as its constituent elements theoriz-
ing and action in addition to investigation. As far as the investigative aspect is
concerned, it utilizes all m a n n e r of methods, some well k n o w n , such as ques-
tionnaires and quantitative analysis, and others less k n o w n or understood, such
as dialogue and theater. In this sense, participatory research is decidedly not a
n e w kind of method. However, it is a n e w way of doing social science, poten-
tially a harbinger for a paradigm shift.
W h e n e v e r a group of people put their heads together to puzzle out a problem
that concerns them collectively and join hands to come up with ways of dealing
with it, we have the rudiments of participatory research. Viewed this way,
participatory research is not new, since humans have practiced it since the
beginning of their communal existence. What is n e w is to think of this very
h u m a n activity in terms of knowledge creation and to call it research. By doing
so we expand the domain of intellectual knowledge, turn upside d o w n the
relationship b e t w e e n theory and practice, and restore the place of ordinary
people as the creators of knowledge.
From my point of view, the best k n o w n and most elaborate example of par-
ticipatory research in this country comes from Appalachia. After the major flood
that devastated the region in 1977, local residents with the help of c o m m u n i t y
organizers, community educators, and academic researchers collected themselves
into a research team to investigate the conditions that p r o d u c e d the e n d e m i c
poverty in the region with the intent of bringing about changes t h r o u g h com-
munity actions. In the process citizens learned research skills and actively par-
ticipated in civic politics to bring about changes in local tax codes that had been
impoverishing the regional e c o n o m y in favor of the absentee landowners, mostly
coal mining companies (Gaventa and Horton 1981). 2 This project captures for

30 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

me some of the key ingredients of participatory research that I will highlight
later on in this article.
Other examples in the same vein from outside the United States include:
people's struggles for protection against deforestation in India (Society for Par-
ticipatory Research in Asia 1982); securing rights for farmer-settlers in the south-
ern Philippines (Callaway 1980); developing equitable agricultural marketing
structures in Colombia (Sanz de Santamaria 1987); and reforming agricultural
practices in Nicaragua (de Montis 1985).

A Personal Journey

Participatory research comes out of the intellectual impasse that many social
scientists, including myself, have faced personally in the postcolonial, postindustrial
era. In the fifties, w h e n the Cold War was accelerating, we saw the global
ascendancy of American sociology cast in the positivist mold. And in the late
sixties and the early seventies, many of us social scientists w h o had been at-
tracted to the field by its promise of providing the vehicle for humanizing so-
ciety came face to face with the reality that professionalized sociology and re-
lated fields were not only irrelevant to any liberatory social change agenda but
w e r e actually antithetical to it. Social theories that underlay the social change
thinking at the time w e r e replete with w e s t e r n biases that rationalized the
imperialism of the First World in the name of modernization and development
and p r o m o t e d the managed, if not engineered, society at h o m e in keeping w i t h
the tenets of social sciences (Huizer and Manheim 1980; Beals 1968; Herzog
1971; Kelman 1968).
In research supportive of this program, so-called scientific m e t h o d s in fashion
prescribed the treatment of the people being studied as objects, as in the physi-
cal sciences. Minorities and the poor bore the brunt of this treatment, since
their relative lack of p o w e r exposed them disproportionately to being "studied
to death" by social researchers. Not only w e r e they subjected to the indignities
of being probed as under a microscope, like carriers of social diseases, w h i c h
they were p r e s u m e d to be (Lander 1973; Sanchez 1971; Tong 1977; Park 1979),
but to make things worse, they received no tangible benefits from social science
research. The promise of positivistic social science was only imperfectly fulfilled
then, as now, and it looked as t h o u g h the triumph of scientific social science
w o u l d be attained, if at all, only at the cost of demanding more sacrifices in
h u m a n dignity across the board, especially for those at the lower end of the
p o w e r spectrum. I, for one, came to this conclusion by critically examining
sociological practices from the point of view of an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g positivist
(Park 1969).
This was the turning point in my development as a sociologist. The realization
that hewing to the rigors of a science modeled after the physical sciences en-
tailed abrogating h u m a n values was unsettling to me deep at a subconscious
level, as I reflect on it now, especially at a time w h e n h u m a n spirits were
bursting out in liberation m o v e m e n t s of all kinds that were raging worldwide,

Park 31
f r o m the feminist m o v e m e n t to liberation t h e o l o g y to socialist revolutions. I
t h e n r e m e m b e r e d w h y I had w a n t e d to be a sociologist to begin with. My earlier
interest had b e e n participation in the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Korean society after the
devastation b r o u g h t d o w n on the c o u n t r y by Japanese colonialism in w h i c h I
was b o r n and raised. I was, h o w e v e r , to lose this yout hful aspiration gradually
as I p r o g r e s s e d in the American educational system, first as an u n d e r g r a d u a t e in
the liberal arts tradition and t h e n as a graduate student pursuing an academic
d e g r e e in sociology that subtly a dvoc a t e d the status quo in the name of scientific
value-neutrality. While b e c o m i n g a professional sociologist, I had fallen into a
state o f political, moral, and spiritual amnesia. As I w o k e up from this forgetful-
ness, I began to search for a n e w paradigm of sociology that w o u l d be true to
t h e original imp et us of sociology to address the promises and p r o b l e m s o f t he
m o d e r n age and that w o u l d at the same time r e s p e c t the needs, intelligence, and
dignity o f the p e o p l e w h o m it is s u p p o s e d to benefit. Participatory r e s e a r c h
s e e m e d to hold the promise of satisfying these r e q u i r e m e n t s w h e n I first en-
c o u n t e r e d it.
My c o m i n g to participatory r e s ear c h was gradual and in a sense accidental. I
first started to break out of the d e t a c h m e n t mold of sociology by getting in-
volved with Asian-American c o m m u n i t i e s t h r o u g h federally s p o n s o r e d r e s e a r c h
in th e late seventies. In o n e project, I was i nt erest ed in learning about the n e w l y
arriving Korean immigrants in w e s t e r n Massachusetts and e n d e d up helping
t h e m organize a c o m m u n i t y among themselves (Park 1978). The p r o j e c t b e g a n
w i th the trappings o f survey research, including a formal i n t e r v i e w schedule,
a m o n g o t h e r things. As the p r o j e c t got u n d e r way, it quickly b e c a m e obvious to
me that the n e e d of the participants in the study, w h o w e r e geographically
d i s p er s ed in rural N e w England, to get to k n o w and to relate to one a n o t h e r was
o v e r w h e l m i n g . And I was in a position to help t h e m in this regard as an estab-
lished resident of the area with university c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h privileged access to
all the immigrants t h r o u g h the r e s e a r c h apparatus. It w o u l d have b e e n uncon-
scionable for me and my assistant, also a Korean American, to k e e p the social
and psychological distance that is dictated by the canons of social science research.
This w o u l d have violated the Korean cultural norms dictating affiliative b e h a v i o r
a m o n g p e o p l e from koyang, h o m e , not to speak of h u m a n d e c e n c y . I was n o t
only a "fellow c o u n t r y m a n " to them, but also s o m e o n e w h o was in a pivotal
position to help t he m in the process of settling in a n e w and strange environment,
w h i c h I was eager to do.
By this t i m e - - t h e late s e v e n t i e s - - I had already reestablished in m y mind t he
priorities that should exist b e t w e e n h u m a n values and the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l de-
mands of sociology, and I was h a p p y to serve as a vehicle for bringing the
immigrant families t o g e t h e r into a n e t w o r k by means of the research process.
T h e survey, in w h i c h Korean immigrants participated as active shapers of their
reality, yielded rich information and served as a useful i n s t r u m e n t for enabling
t h e m to get acquai nt ed with one another. It eventually led to the form at i on of
a Ko r ean immigrant organization in t he region. This was the kind of result I
began to anticipate as the p r o j e c t progressed, and in that sense it was a success.

32 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

This was my first participatory research project, although I did not have the
name for it then.
I was to discover that what I was doing was called participatory research in
the process of carrying out another project about the same time, involving Pacific
Asian American mental health workers (Park 1985). The purpose of this project
was to investigate the reality of therapeutic practices involving Pacific Asian
American clients, in order to make those practices culturally and ethnically more
sensitive and relevant. To this end, psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers,
counselors, educators, and c o m m u n i t y organizers of the Pacific Island and Asian
American background came together from different parts of the country in a
series of workshops. They presented and discussed the problems they encoun-
tered and the practices they found useful, and then formulated recommenda-
tions to be followed in their practices.
The participants in the workshops made self-conscious attempts to bring out
the suppressed ethnic voices in their professional e n c o u n t e r s with enthusiasm,
with the knowledge that the workshops were most likely the first such occa-
sions ever for Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans dealing with mental health
issues. The point about this event is not so m u c h that it was so uniquely differ-
ent from other conference-type gatherings of professionals and academics, be-
cause it was not. It is rather that by putting the w o r k s h o p s in the c o n t e x t of
participatory research, I began to see that knowledge that serves h u m a n needs
can be created by means other than those described in social science m e t h o d s
textbooks. I was beginning to e x p a n d my horizons on m e t h o d o l o g y propelled by
practical needs with moral and political implications.

Historical Roots of Participatory Research

In the early seventies, y o u n g social scientists of the First World working as

development specialists in Africa became frustrated with the social science methods
they were using in c o n n e c t i o n with their aid efforts. They found the research
techniques developed in the West to be too rigid for useful application in the
African setting. The local assistants they were working with were a lot more
effective in eliciting n e e d e d information from the people by using their o w n
m e t h o d s rooted in the local culture, one important feature of w h i c h is commu-
nal sharing of knowledge. More fundamentally, they also began to see that the
use of the social science research methods, w h i c h privileges the experts w h o
control the p r o d u c t i o n and distribution of knowledge, w e n t hand in hand with
the imposition of a d e v e l o p m e n t model that was tied to the w e s t e r n domination
of the n e w l y emerging African nations. Based on these insights, d e v e l o p m e n t
workers began to rely more and more on local knowledge for the technical
solution of the problems facing the people, w h o were encouraged to participate
w i t h their experience, wisdom, and skills. As far as I can determine, Marja-Liisa
Swantz of Finland, t h e n working in Tanzania, was the first to use the term
"participatory research" to refer to this approach to action-oriented research in
the African setting (Hall 1991).

Park 33
 Th er e was also an upsurge of similar practices addressing p r o b l e m s of social
c h an g e in parts of Asia and Latin America, w h i c h w e r e likewise e x p e r i e n c i n g
pains o f struggle for liberation from foreign a n d / o r dictatorial domination. Paulo
Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire 1970) c a p t u r e d this liberatory spirit
w i t h its t r e n c h a n t critique of w hat he called domesticating e d u c a t i o n and its
a d v o c a c y for putting the learner at the c e n t e r of the t eacher-st udent relation-
ship. At the same time, it tied e duc a t i on to an agenda of social change in w h i c h
learning was to be c o u p l e d with the investigation of social conditions, on the
o n e hand, and their transformation, on the other. In his p o w e r f u l formulation,
t h e r e could be no reading of the w o r d w i t h o u t reading of the world. Freire's
interest in this w o r k and many of his o t h e r writings has b e e n to r e s t r u c t u r e
e d u c a t i o n so that it w o u l d serve as the vehicle for helping p e o p l e o v e r c o m e the
political and social domination that p r o d u c e s p o v e r t y and disenfranchisement.
Because of its political message, Pedagogy has served as the manifesto for
liberation m o v e m e n t s in many Third World countries and for political and eco-
n o m i c minorities in the United States and o t h e r d e v e l o p e d countries. But it also
describes in sufficient detail h o w p e o p l e m ove from p r o b l e m formulation to
social action t h r o u g h investigative steps based on Freire's o w n e x p e r i e n c e in
adult literacy w o r k in Brazil. Consequently, Pedagogy has set a theoretical and
practical model for participatory research and related approaches to social change
in w h i c h learning t h r o u g h investigation o c c u p i e s the central role. Freire in fact
made a definitive linkage b e t w e e n his p h i l o s o p h y of e d u c a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t o r y
research, w i t h o u t explicitly using this terminology, in a talk he gave to frus-
trated social scientists working as d e v e l o p m e n t specialists in Africa (Freire 1982).
For me personally, the discovery of Freire's w o r k began to o p e n up a perspec-
tive from w h i c h to view r e s ear c h in terms of living k n o w l e d g e that p e o p l e gain
in their struggles to free themselves from political and social domination, and to
make research part of collective action for social change. The reformulation of
social r es ear ch that Freire h e l p e d me to make was p o w e r f u l in c o n c e p t u a l terms.
More importantly, the language of love and hope, of c o m m u n i t y and critique,
that infuses his writing spoke to me of a w o rl d that is made and rem ade not just
by technical k n o w l e d g e but also t h r o u g h w hat our w h o l e beings, our hearts and
spirits, tell us. This is the subtextual message that p e o p l e resonate with w h e n
t h e y read or listen to him. T h r o u g h this e n c o u n t e r with Freire, I broke out of
the positivist mold that had kept me captive in the p s e u d o l a b o r a t o r y of social
science, cloaked in value neutrality, d e t a c h e d from p e o p l e , and intent on con-
trol. I saw a glimmer of h o p e for a humanistic sociology.

The Potential for a Paradigm Shift

I believe that participatory r e s ear c h provides a potential for a paradigm shift

in sociology and I base this assertation on t hree different considerations. I have
made these arguments elsewhere, t h o u g h not exhaustively (Park 1988, 1992;
Park, Brydon-Miller, Hall, and Jackson 1993), and here I have r o o m only for a
s u mmar y o f the relevant points.

34 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

 The first is lessons that w e can derive from the history of science. Modern
science began by leaving the c o c o o n of medieval scholarship that was c o n t r o l l e d
by the s c h o o l m e n w i t h their canons of learning. This break was b r o u g h t about
by a n e w brand of scholars, like Galileo, w h o w e r e i m b u e d w i t h the ethos of
exploration, fueled by the exigencies of n a s c e n t capitalism. T he capitalist revo-
lution significantly advanced the participation of one s e g m e n t of society, the
bourgeoisie, in the c o n t r o l of the social structure and in the e n j o y m e n t o f the
benefits deriving f r om it. Galileo and others fashioned their sci ence by making
use of the participation of this class of p e o p l e , artisans and craftsmen in particu-
lar, and learning from their crafts and skills.
Needless to say the privilege and benefits of participating in society and sci-
e n c e did n o t e x t e n d in equal m eas ur e to the segments of the p o p u l a t i o n that the
bourgeoisie e n d e d up dominating. F u r t h e r m o r e , this science excel l ed in provid-
ing technical k n o w - h o w for ext r a c t i ng w eal t h from nat ure for the benefit of the
capitalist class and the bourgeoisie, but was blind to o t h e r forms of k n o w l e d g e
that make h u m a n life possible, since t hey w e r e d e e m e d not particularly useful
for the capitalist political-economic agenda. T he ruling class could not foresee
and did not c o n c e r n itself with the h o r r e n d o u s social and e n v i r o n m e n t a l conse-
q u e n c e s o f its u n f e t t e r e d application, c o n s e q u e n c e s that w e have b e g u n to see
only recently, some four h u n d r e d years later.
T h e r e are two different lessons to be learned from this history. One is that if
w e are to e x t e n d the social and material benefits of the capitalist revol ut i on to
the rest of humanity, w h i c h justice dictates, w e have to ensure the participation
of the p e o p l e - - a l l p e o p l e this t i m e - - i n the creation of the requisite know l edge,
as well as in the political-economic arena. And the o t h e r is that this k n o w l e d g e
c a n n o t be just technical but must include o t h e r forms of consciousness.
The s e c o n d cons i de r at i on girding my a rgum ent for a paradigm shift in the
social sciences relates to this question of different forms of k n o w l e d g e . U nder
the sway of positivism, sociology has privileged the form of k n o w l e d g e that is
obtainable by following the m e t h o d s of the physical sciences, w h i c h are mistak-
enly t h o u g h t to be "objective," i.e., true reflections of reality and not tainted by
subjective values. By so doing it has banished o t h e r forms of k n o w l e d g e that are
essential to h u m a n e x i s t e n c e b e y o n d the bo undari es of science. In going b e y o n d
the kind of k n o w l e d g e nar r ow l y defined by positivism as science, I have f o u n d
it i mmen s ely useful to b o r r o w from critical theory, especially as r e f o r m u l a t e d by
J u r g en Habermas. In their critique of instrumental rationality, of w h i c h positiv-
ism is a philosophical offspring, critical theorists have argued persuasively, at
least for me, that h u m a n rationality consists of m o r e than s u p p o s e d l y value-
neutral calculations of ends and means. On this account, rationality must also
include the ability and the practice of critically examining the ends themselves
from a position of c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n emancipation. H u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g
deriving from and leading to the c o n n e c t e d n e s s involved in everyday interpre-
tation and interaction is equally a part of rationality that makes social life pos-
sible. Habermas has argued from a t h e o r y of h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n that this
e x p a n d e d view of h u m a n rationality is g r o u n d e d in an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of basic

Park 35
h u m a n interests that include mastery, emancipation, and communication. Corre-
sponding to these three basic conditions of h u m a n life are three forms of knowl-
edge, paraphrasing Habermas, w h i c h I will call here, respectively, instrumental,
critical, and relational (subsuming both interpretive and interactive) (Habermas
1971, 1984, 1987).
Equally important has been the feminist critique of the social sciences that
follow the positivist paradigm. There are of course differences among feminist
scholars in their understanding of h o w w o m e n ' s being and history affect their
social and political situation and influence their ways of knowing; and these
scholars espouse different political and intellectual agendas for the liberation of
w o m e n . But underlying these differences is the persistent voice that speaks for
the importance of bringing out w o m e n ' s way of knowing, w h i c h has b e e n ex-
cluded from the domain of rationality and the social sciences (Harding 1986;
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberg, and Tarule 1986; Jagger 1989). This includes, among
other things, knowledge imbedded in gossiping, caring, connecting, and loving,
w h i c h I w o u l d like to subsume here under relational knowledge.
I emphatically do not want to imply that this kind of knowledge is the exclu-
sive p r o p e r t y of w o m e n by reason of biology or ontology or that w o m e n alone
should continue to be the repository of this sensibility. This would be a prescrip-
tion for the continued exclusion of w o m e n from the world of male privilege and
their subjugation in the name of preserving the "virtues" of the "gentler sex" for
the good of humankind. My point is rather that relational knowledge belongs to
all humanity, both w o m e n and men, and it should be reinstated in the realm of
rationality and be pursued, together with instrumental and critical knowledge,
as a form of legitimate knowledge.
A look at the current practice of participatory research reveals that it is usu-
ally directed at solving specific problems and h e n c e the knowledge it generates
is explicitly instrumental in character. But the problems participatory research
deals with have social origins and implications that require collective participa-
tion of the affected community. For this reason, participatory research is likely
to begin with an often implicit critique of the status quo, leading to critical
knowledge anticipating social changes, t h o u g h it may not be clearly articulated.
Similarly, the success of participatory research depends on the existence of a
functioning collectivity, and its execution in turn tends to generate relational
knowledge that strengthens social ties. That is to say, there are critical and
relational dimensions to participatory research that cannot be ignored. It is true
that written reports on participatory research projects typically do not dwell on
these aspects of knowledge generation as main concerns, concentrating instead
on the problems tackled, the m e t h o d s used, and the results obtained. This is
because the participatory researchers w h o write up the reports usually have ties
to academia and find it more congenial, comfortable, and strategic to continue
to think and to justify their activity in terms of the conventional academic cri-
teria tinged with the positivist valorization of instrumental knowledge. But the
promise of participatory research as a n e w way of doing the science of social
relations lies in breaking this bondage to a failed epistemology and asserting its

36 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

efficacy in terms of all forms of knowledge, those that have been devalued by
the social sciences as well as the one h o n o r e d by positivism. The potential for
generating critical and relational forms of knowledge is i m m a n e n t in the actual
practice of participatory research and should be emphasized as m u c h as instru-
mental knowledge.
My third and last argument for thinking of participatory research as the thin
edge of a paradigm shift in the social sciences has to do with the apparent
exhaustion of universalistic theorizing derived from w e s t e r n rationalism. The
social science theories f o u n d e d around the turn of the century, w h i c h guided
intellectual projects for dealing with the problems occasioned by the advent of
the m o d e r n age, have come u n d e r attack for their failures. The challenges to
classical sociological theories and their offshoots come from both postmodernist
theories and feminist consciousness and practice (Foucault 1970, 1980; Derrida
1976; Lyotard 1986; Poster 1988; Jameson 1984; Best and Kellner 1991; Fraser
1989; Flax 1990; Lather 1991). As a c o n s e q u e n c e of these attacks, the conven-
tional edifice of social theory is n o w beginning to look like a precarious frame-
w o r k for addressing the pains that emanate from the current sociocultural sys-
tem that engulfs the entire world with ever-changing machinations. This rupture
in the conceptualization of modernist social theory and practice opens up an
o p p o r t u n i t y to rethink and redefine the way social science can insert itself in
the process of improving the h u m a n condition.
The charges of failure brought against established social theory can be consid-
ered at two interrelated levels for convenience. One set of charges stems from
theory's inability to account for the social and cultural conditions prevailing
today and to provide an adequate agenda for bringing social changes that it
prophesies and supports. The fizzling out of the sixties' revolutionary fervor,
especially after the missed o p p o r t u n i t y of 1968 in Paris, dramatically demon-
strated the inadequacy of the theoretical enterprise as a kind of blueprint for
action. One of the reasons for this shortfall is that by then the world had changed
b e y o n d the easy reach of nineteenth-century conceptualizations tied to the te-
nets of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment promised progress t h r o u g h the
realization of the universal man acting rationally. Under the auspices of late
capitalism, however, metropolitanization moved around and brought t o g e t h e r
people from different parts of the world, while homogenizing the material sur-
face of their lives through intensified and internationalized consumerism. This
m o v e m e n t of people and goods was both physical (because people and things
literally moved around) and symbolic (in that the increasing mass media capabili-
ties create w h a t is often optimistically referred to as the global village). At the
same time, the changing political e c o n o m y of the center in the world system has
altered the relationships among people situated in different traditional catego-
ries, notably along the lines of sex and race. The resulting juxtaposition of actors
of different racial, ethnic, sexual, social, and cultural background heightens the
differences among them in history, consciousness, interest, and politics, chal-
lenging the central position that w e s t e r n man has occupied. This p h e n o m e n o n
is associated with the fragmentation of subjectivity (multiple identity). It is also

Park 37
responsible for the rise of n e w social movements centered on issues such as
ecology, peace, disability, AIDS, sexual orientation, etc. These micro-level activisms
cannot easily be reduced to classical analytical categories, such as class or ratio-
nalization. There are also n e w cultural p h e n o m e n a brought about by h e i g h t e n e d
consumerism together with the domination of mass media and the accelerating
invasion of technology in everyday life. These result in such observed symptoms
as the blurred distinction b e t w e e n reality and representation (the world as
Disneyland), the inability to locate oneself in a meaningful spacial c o n t e x t (the
L.A. syndrome), and the t e n d e n c y to disregard and disengage from both the past
and the future (presentism). Classical modernist theory fails to account for and
deal with these manifestations of the n e w culturally induced consciousness.
The second-level charges are related to these shortcomings. People w h o have
b e e n banished to the margins of society, as well as those w h o are not oppressed
but are still c o n c e r n e d with ~the agenda of social progress as detached observers,
namely intellectuals, are now challenging the vision of society provided by modernist
social theory. The critical reflections have turned to the root characteristics of
modernist social theory. The classical social theory of the n i n e t e e n t h century, of
w h i c h sociology provides the most notable prototype, was conceived in an at-
m o s p h e r e of optimism in the face of the mounting evidence that the m o d e r n age
ushered in by capitalism was producing n e w problems in society. The source of
this optimism was the Enlightenment faith in the ability of reason to p r o d u c e
progress for humanity, as with the physical sciences. And hope was that reason
w o u l d create true knowledge distinct from ideology by protecting itself from
vulgar c o m m o n sense and divorcing itself from metaphysical superstitions of the
previous era (Crook 1991).
The critique of social theory deriving from this philosophical optimism takes
two different paths, one radical and the other more reformist. The radical cri-
tique of modernist social theory, under the rubric of postmodernism, w o u l d
have none of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t m n o t the progress-minded social theory deriving
from it, not the premises on w h i c h it is based. Noting the impotence of social
t h e o r y in the face of the social and cultural upheavals that erupted since the
sixties, some postmodernists are suspicious of its oppressive potential, if not its
h i d d e n agenda (Foucault 1980). Others seriously doubt the ability of any theo-
retical account (or narrative, as they put it) to represent reality (Derrida 1976;
Lyotard 1986). Still others question the reality of reality, reducing the contem-
porary social and cultural scene to spectacles of simulations and simulacra
(Beaudrillard 1983). Nevertheless, they are all united in decrying the foundationalism
of the modernist social theory. They also complain of its essentialism, reduction-
ism, universalism, and sometimes dualism. But the c o m m o n charge, at least for
the present purpose, is that of foundationalism, w h i c h is the claim that the
Enlightenment's rational knowledge is f o u n d e d on a bedrock of prior, certain
knowledge that cannot be questioned, a claim that goes back to Descartes's
methodological meditations (Descartes 1968).
The reformist branch, on the other hand, holds on to the promise of reason
to p r o d u c e adequate theories to deal with the n e w problems and attempts to

38 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

modify nineteenth-century social theory to make it adequate to the task. For
example, Jameson, a Marxian cultural analyst, agrees with postmodernist critics
that we are n o w experiencing social and cultural organizations in c o n t e m p o r a r y
society that are fundamentally different from the previous era. But unlike other
postmodernist theorists he wants to situate these p h e n o m e n a in the developmental
stage characterized by the logic of late capitalism and to bring Marxist theory up
to date in order to understand them better (Jameson 1984).
More central to the concerns of this article, Habermas has embarked on cri-
tiquing and reforming modernist social theory. He subscribes to the emancipatory
agenda of traditional Marxism but revises Marx's original analytical framework in
light of the n e w developments in the capitalist political economy. One key
aspect of this revisionism has to do with an e x p a n d e d understanding of rational-
ity. In Habermas's view, Marx's historical materialism was compromised by his
limited understanding of rationality in w h i c h he saw only its instrumental dimen-
sion and ignored the historical/hermeneutic and critical dimensions. By broad-
ening the definition of rationality in this way, Habermas hopes to make room for
bringing into the realm of theoretical discourse issues of social relations in
everyday life and the deliberations of values, neither of w h i c h classical social
theories can adequately address within their theoretical frameworks (Habermas
1984, 1987).
The postmodernists have articulated the bewildering aspects of the contem-
porary social condition and pointed to the telling disarray in modernist social
theory. And they are right to question the faith in the certainty of rationalism on
w h i c h m o d e r n western civilization is f o u n d e d and to e x t e n d this skepticism to
all foundational thinking. But in insisting on the absolute relativism of different
standpoints as the standard of judgment and in asserting the certainty of their
uncertainty about representation and reality, extreme postmodernists themselves
fall into a kind of foundationalist position (Crook 1991). And w h e n they deny
the possibility of any social theory to p r o d u c e accounts of social situations that
could lead to positive changes, they can rightly be accused of a nihilism that
justifies the conservative social agenda (Habermas 1985). More importantly for
the present purpose, this extreme postmodernist position is an extension of
elitist modernist theory that privileges the narrative of the theorist behind the
backs of the ordinary people.
To the extent that Habermas invests his theoretical argument for emancipatory
projects in the e x p a n d e d rationality, he cannot easily escape being accused of
Enlightenment foundationalism, as he has been by some postmodernists. But
since he derives his argument from a quasi-empirical analysis of language prac-
tices, (to the effect that underlying h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n are interests for
emancipation and c o n n e c t e d n e s s as well as mastery), room is left for treating
this proposition as a historically contingent statement that can serve as a starting
point in dialogues involving different standpoints. Furthermore, his understand-
ing of communicative action, in w h i c h the claim to the validity of knowledge is
r e d e e m e d in the c o n t e x t of discourse aimed at c o m m o n understanding, reflex-
ively applies to his own theory. Thus, in the context of a t e m p e r e d postmodernist

Park 39
critique, social theory w o u l d proceed from inquiries that take place in diverse
sites of struggle against domination and oppression. Such practice could poten-
tially lead to a nonfoundational and nonelitist theory, avoiding some of the
defects that have incapacitated modernist social theory as an emancipatory ve-
hicle since its inception and especially n o w a century and a half later.
Participatory research carries the potential for this development.

Conclusion

If we are to overcome the impasse of modernist social theory conceived as

the practice of reason, we cannot continue to privilege social scientists as the
purveyors of certified knowledge. We must instead regard them as members of
communities, joined together with ordinary people, facing c o m m o n problems of
life. Any inquiry addressing these problems must, therefore, take seriously the
participation of the c o m m u n i t y in inquiries concerning its problems. The knowl-
edge of the world as ordinary people experience i t m w h a t matters, w h a t hurts,
w h a t feels good, w h a t puzzles, what makes sense, w h a t w o r k s m m u s t be the
basis for the choice of problems to be addressed and the procedures to be
followed (Smith 1987; Crook 1991). We must, in the final analysis, respect the
good-sense judgment that results from the sharing of concerns, perspectives,
and experiences in open discussion, carried out in good faith. This is a difficult
procedure to follow in the present-day atmosphere of pervasive cynicism and
fragmented communities, not to speak of academic elitism. It is also at times
c u m b e r s o m e and untidy to execute. W h e n all is said and done, the n e w partici-
patory paradigm cannot claim some indubitable foundational basis, and it does
not guarantee assured outcomes compatible with preconceived agendas or pro-
grams. But it is through this sort of pragmatic process that we live our lives and
do our science (Gadamer 1975; Rorty 1982). And it should be the way to fashion
a social t h e o r y that is true to the ideals of h u m a n emancipation.
Participatory research as it has emerged through practice provides the means
by w h i c h social theory can be turned around, so that it can more adequately
deal with the problems of c o n t e m p o r a r y society. Existing examples of participa-
tory research do not always present themselves in the light of the larger liberatory
goals that have informed this paper. 3 And there are participatory research ap-
proaches that do not appear to subscribe to these goals (Whyte 1991; Brown
and Tandon 1983). My purpose in putting participatory research in a metatheoretical
c o n t e x t was not to practice a kind of imperialism of naming by claiming an
exclusive right to define the concept. Others will understand participatory re-
search in different terms and practice it in different ways. My effort is rather an
attempt to depict an ideal type for the practice of the social sciences for this age
that is in line with their initial intentions, if not their self-understanding, from
w h i c h concrete examples must by necessity deviate. In this sense this article is
as m u c h about sociology as about an as-yet little recognized m e t h o d o l o g y in the
discipline.

40 The American Sociologist/Winter 1992

 In presenting my argument I have taken into account historical, theoretical,
and epistemological considerations. But above all my position has b e e n framed
by my o w n biography and sense of values, w h i c h must be t e m p e r e d in dialogue
with others in the spirit of improving the practice of sociology addressing the
problems that face us as social beings in this age.

Notes

Many thanks to Kathleen Tierney and Mark Lynd for their careful reading and criticism on earlier drafts of
this article.
1. The Center for Community Education and Action9
2. See, also, Horton (1993). For other representative examples of participatory research in the United States
and Canada, see, Park, Brydon-Miller, Hall, and Jackson (1993). The annotated bibliography published by
the Center for Community Education and Action (25 Maple Street, Florence MA 01060) contains a compre-
hensive list of references on participatory research. See, Center for Community Education and Action and
Center for International Education (1991). Incidentally, Myles Horton, the founder of the Highlander Folk
School (now the Highlander Education and Research Center), which played a major role in this project, was
to learn at the time of the project that what he and his school had been doing in the region in the name
of education for nearly fifty years is participatory research, a designation he enthusiastically embraced.
3. For an understanding of participatory research as a liberatory practice, see Rahman (1982).

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