Colonialism has left Africa fragmented and divided, and it was the vision of its vibrant

leaders such as President Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania, President Jomo Kenyatta of
Kenya, President Modibo Kéïta of Mali, and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, just to
name a few, who sought to unite the continent not only in politics but economically as well
(Haynes 1988). It is through continental and regional integration that the path to African
unity will be paved (Wapmuk and Ali 2022). However, for many years Africa as a block
remained a spectator in the multi-lateral negotiation forums with lack of united voice being
its disadvantage but the continent hopes that enactment the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFTA) will strengthen its bargaining power in the multilateral forums (de Melo and
Tsikata 2014). This paper seeks to argue that the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) is unlikely to succeed or it would be delayed in the post Covid-19 era due
continuous diminishing transportation and energy infrastructure resulting from reprioritised
funds in the recovery from Covid-19; political instability impacting the public administration
responsible for policy implementation; public rejection of the initiatives policies, and
sovereignty insecurities as possible impediments and propose probable mitigating actions to
be undertaken by the regional economic communities members states. The structure of the
paper is: i) definition of the concept of regionalism and regional integration; ii) the different
programme initiatives the continent endeavoured towards its integration; and iii) four
challenges in place with possibility to hinder the successful implementation of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Regional integration has become a must for Africa's growth, and all stakeholders are
responsible for ensuring that the continent's integration is realized. (Economic Commission
for Africa 2016). Regionalism is concerted effort by neighbouring nations to improve their
economic, social and political relations through working together on market integration,
developmental and regional integration (Lee 2002). The Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) now African Union (AU) as umbrella body has initiated numerous efforts towards
uniting its member states politically and economically. Regional integration was the initial
step with formation of multiple regional Economic Communities (RECs). The RECs were
formed under the auspices of a treaty signed in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1980, with a reinforcement
signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1991, to establish the African Economic Communities (AEC);
and most recently, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) broadened the
scope of the treaties. (Oyejide 2000).

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Regional integration has become a must for Africa's growth, and all stakeholders are
responsible for ensuring that the continent's integration is realized. (Economic Commission
for Africa 2016). Regionalism is concerted effort by neighbouring nations to improve their
economic, social and political relations through working together on market integration,
developmental and regional integration (Lee 2002). The then the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) as the umbrella body has initiated numerous efforts
towards uniting its member states politically and economically. Regional integration was the
initial step with formation of multiple regional Economic Communities (RECs). The RECs
were formed under the auspices of 1980 Lagos Plan of Action; the 1991 Abuja Treaty
establishing the African Economic Community (AEC); and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) (Oyejide 2000).

The Lagos treaty (‘Plan’) of 1981 was mainly concerned with the immediate events at the
time in relation to African states gaining their freedom from colonial masters hence it pushed
for the continent’s emancipation while diminution dependence on the colonial masters and
‘Western’ countries as a matter of principle (Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna 2014). According to
Christopher Clapham (1998), there were few issues that besieged the Lagos Plan of Action,
with two being: i) the thinking that the economic development of African states must be
delinked from colonial masters and "the West," as the relationship was that of exploitation by
the masters without beneficiation by the colonies; and ii) through integration, Africa would
see a reduction of imports from external economies, but the nation states were not near ready
for the industrialization scale required for self-sufficiency and meet regional demands.

The Abuja Treaty had six a six-prompt approach towards realisation of Africa and its RECs
integration in the 34 years period given starting in 1994. The realisation of African Economic
Community (AEC) was a must, but other stages included i) doing away with intra-regional
tariffs replacing them with single external tariff for the region; and ii) a formation of customs
unions in the regions (Nyirabu 2004). Mukamunana and Moeti (2005) argue that the
intensions to realise Abuja Treaty were make weak by unstable political environment in the
member states, insufficient trade regimes, poor infrastructure such as transportation and
energy for manufacturing, and incoherent macro-economic policies in the nation states.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established as a response the
triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment of primarily the women and youth
among regional member states and increase chances of achieving sustainable economic

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growth and stability in the areas of i) democracy and good governance; ii) peace and
security; iii) engagement of the private sector in the development agenda and promotion of
regional integration; and iv) implementation of pro-poor policies in the health, education,
infrastructure, and agriculture sectors (Nsouli and Funke 2003).

The following RECs have been established towards realisation of the three programmes
above (Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna 2014):

 East African Community (EAC) in East Africa.

 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa.
 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa.
 Southern African Development Community (SADC); and
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in Southern and Eastern
Africa.

COMESA, EAC and SADC worked together and established an expanded free trade
agreement referred to as the Tripartite FTA (TFTA) (Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna 2014).
According to Muna Ndulo (1993) the consistent violation of obligations made in the
agreements that were signed and the insufficient utilization of the mechanisms that were
developed by these agreements were cited as the primary reasons for the integration of the
regional communities' inability to be successful; there was a lack of the necessary political
will for integration to succeed. This paper highlights diminishing transportation and energy
infrastructure resulting from reprioritised funds during Covid-19; political instability
impacting the public administration responsible for policy implementation; public rejection of
the initiatives policies.

Alemayehu Geda and Haile Kebret (2008) traces the roots of regional integration to the
standard trade theory which states that free trade is more positively favourable to multiple
nation state as compared to other types of trades. This is on the basis that countries working
together as a trading block they eliminate multiple forms of barriers to their trade between
and this results in enhanced welfare these member states as regional integration creates a net
trade (i.e., offsets between imports and exports) (ibid). Recently, the African Union has
commissioned the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which compel its member
states to do away with almost 90 percent of tariffs on good transiting between these nation
states with the remaining 10 percent envisioned to be eliminated in the near future (Manboah-
Rockson 2021). Furthermore, the AfCFTA intends on reducing the extreme delays endured at

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the ports and boarders in transit of good and services (ibid). However, Alemayehu Geda and
Edris Hussein Seid (2015) argue that the current import exports between the member states
will not be able to replace the multiple products imported from other continents as not many
nations states have the capability to supply/export goods that meet the bulk of the continent's
demand.

According to Anna Louise Strachan (2018), there are numerous advantages that regional
integration presents to member states. Those includes:

 Expanded markets on condition that there is capacity for production of good and
service to meet the demand of the broadened market.
 Regional income convergence or divergence varies depending on the type of
cooperation and degree of income gained through integration.
 Increase in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) due to expansion of the market and
product rationalisation.
 Access to the labor force and scarce skills through integrated labor markets perpetuated
by free movement of people.

However, the aforementioned limited benefits may not be realised if the risk of adequate
infrastructure, political stability, the public rejection of the initiative policies such as the Free
Movement Protocol, and sovereignty insecurities.

Inadequate infrastructure

Infrastructure is one of the significant attributes of trade facilitation, as a good public

infrastructure provides added advantages such as opening market access and lowering the
cost of trading (Roland-Holst 2006). Transport and electricity networks have helped the
Euro-Mediterranean region, which includes 28 European countries and 15 Mediterranean
Rim countries in Africa and the Middle East, to become more integrated and grow
economically (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021).
The question is whether the African Regional Economic Communities are privileged to this
determinant. It is this paper’s view that the response is in the negative based on the following.

COVID-19 has wreaked havoc in the fiscus of many countries across the world, and they
have had to reprioritize their budget dedicating major part to health care services. This meant
that infrastructure maintenance would be lowered on the priority list. Rupa Ranganathan and
Vivien Foster (2011) indicate that it would need two point one billion US Dollars ($2.1

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billion) per annual for a period of ten years to construct new and maintain existing
infrastructure corridors (including the road, rail, air, and ports) which would be difficult
burden for small revenue countries within Southern African Development Community
(SADC).

Political stability

One of the most important parts of regional integration is political stability, because political
instability affects the public administration, which creates and implements government
policies across RECs and includes diplomatic representation in these regional forums.
According to Anna Strachan (Strachan 2018) it is crucial for regional integration to be sown
in a democratic conditions of the regional member states with stable political climate. This
paper refers to the following countries that are currently in conflict and the regional bodies
they are members of:

Country Regional Body

Libya  Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
 Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA)
 Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA)
South Sudan  None
Central African Republic (CAR)  Economic and Monetary Community of
Central Africa (EMCC/CEMAC)
Mozambique  Southern African Development
Community (SADC)
Ethiopia  Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA)
Cameroon  Economic and Monetary Community of
Central Africa (EMCC/CEMAC)
Burkina Faso  West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU/UEMOA)
 Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS)
Mali  Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS)
 West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU/UEMOA)
* Source: theglobaleconomy.com

Over and above the aforementioned countries which are in conflict, there are countries’
political stability is at high risk which will impact the stability in their regional economic
communities. The following countries were rated between -1 (weak) and - 2.68 (worst) on the
index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (The Global Economy 2021).

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 Country Political Stability Index Rating
Eritrea -1.01
Egypt -1.02
Zimbabwe -1.03
Kenya -1.09
Mozambique -1.23
Chad -1.34
Burundi -1.36
Cameroon -1.41
DR Congo -1.61
Niger -1.62
Burkina Faso -1.64
Nigeria -1.78
Sudan -1.94
Ethiopia -2.07
C.A. Republic -2.10
Mali -2.35
Libya -2.37
Somalia -2.68
* Source: theglobaleconomy.com

The index that is presented above is constructed by taking the average of several other
indices, such as those that are provided by the World Economic Forum, the Economist
Intelligence Unit, and the Political Risk Services, which assess the risk of a country's
government being weakened and/or deposed through unconstitutional and/or coup d'état
activities, including terrorist activities.

This paper argues that, with only 10 out of 54 (18.5%) countries in Africa that can be
regarded as sufficiently stable according to the index, i.e., 1. Botswana; 2. Cape Verde; 3.
Mauritius; 4. Seychelles; 5. São Tomé and Príncipe; 6. Namibia; 7. Gambia; 8. Rwanda; 9.
Ghana; and 10. Zambia (The Global Economy 2021), there is still considerable effort that the
African Union must undertake in effort to eliminate some of the core root causes to possible
instabilities in the remaining 81.48% countries especially those in the -1.00 rating. Countries
in conflict divert resources away from infrastructure and economic activity support, such as
funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are critical in manufacturing
and product provision in integrated economic activities. The instability in these African
countries diminish economic prospects of the primary country but also turn to directly and
indirectly impact its neighbouring countries via refugee seeking and economic migration
which impact the movement of people in the continent.

Public rejection of the initiatives policies

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One of the goals of regional integration implementation is to facilitate free movement of
people across the region in search of employment opportunities for individuals, while
companies benefit from scarce skills across the region. According to Margaret Monyani and
Ottilia Anna Maunganidze (2022) the success of the AfCFTA is also dependent on the
implementation of the Free Movement Protocol which is a policy by the African Union to
facilitate the movement of people on the continent. The protocol has not been signed by
notably South Africa and Nigeria (Wapmuk and Ali 2022). Undocumented migrants are the
highest contributors to the cross-border migration in the SADC region with South Africa and
Botswana being the primary destinations (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2014) with an estimated
4.2 million foreign-born migrants leaving South Africa (Mukumbang, Ambe, and Adebiyi
2020).

South Africa has been experiencing an antiimmigration sentiments amongst its citizens with
the immigrants being blamed for the high unemployment rate as it is believed that they turn
to accept any kind of remuneration even those in violation of labour prescripts (Kalitanyi
2010). Due to public pressure around the immigration, the South African government has
enacted immigration laws that has a negative impact on its regional obligations as it failed to
advocate amongst its citizens the principles of regional integration (Mwanawina 2016). When
read in conjunction with the Immigration Regulations of 2014, the Immigration Act 13 of
2002 and the Immigration Amendment Acts are in contrast to the spirit of SADC’s free
movement of people, as they burden and, to some extent, prohibit movement to South Africa
as a visitor, an employee, spouse and children, and a company (ibid). Therefore the public
anti-immigrant attitude hinders South Africa's migration policy and its standing in regional
multilateral forums in relation to the Free Movement Protocol (Gordon 2022).

Sovereignty insecurities

For continental and regional integration to be fully realized, there must be a willingness
among member states to relinquish a piece of sovereignty to a supranational body like the
AU. As part of their sovereignty to the AU, the AU member states have let go of some of the
tenants under their control; however, the powers assigned to the regional bodies are limited
(Zhai 2016). Jeffrey Herbst (2000) argues that, national interests and to some extend those of
the elites in the nation states are obstacle to surrounding some of the sovereignty powers to
the supranational organisations such as the AU because those institutions will be out of reach
from their manipulation.

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The deteriorating economic situation within the different member states of the regional
economic communities makes matters difficult. The COVID-19 pandemic did have an
extreme impact on the fiscus of these nation states, as they had to refocus their budgets
towards primary healthcare for their citizens, diverting many resources from programs that
would contribute towards regional integration. The fear of economic migrants’ influx into
"better" performing economies has materialized in the case of Zimbabweans, whether
undocumented or not, finding their ways to South Africa and Botswana in Southern African
Development Community. It is unfortunate that the source nation states' political instabilities
should be resolved by the very citizens who are migrating in search of immediate relief from
poverty. The REC must ensure they have adequate mechanisms to hold the peer leadership in
the region accountable for destabilizing their nation states by holding on to power through
undemocratic means. This paper sought to to argue that African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) is unlikely to be unsuccessful or delayed post Covid-19 due continuous
diminishing transportation and energy infrastructure resulting from reprioritised funds during
Covid-19; political instability impacting the public administration responsible for policy
implementation; public rejection of the initiatives policies, and sovereignty insecurities as
possible impediments and propose probable mitigating actions to be undertaken by the
regional economic communities members states.

Migration policy frameworks advocating for unrestricted movement of people will prove
difficult to implement as an integration objective due to a skewed economic imbalance.
Therefore, there is a need for the REC have an honest look into prevailing causes of political
instabilities in their RECs. Some of the reasons may be that member states are afraid of
losing their monopoly over politics and state arms if they cede some of their political and
policymaking authority to supranational bodies like the AU and the REC. Furthermore, the
member states do not have a reliable means of accounting for their population and measures
towards digitisation of population registers will assist in knowing who is transiting between
boarders with ease

8 2261255
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