NSHQ Socc Manual Oct2014

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE PARA
PREFACE 9
CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATO

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND
General 11 1-1
NATO Organization 11 1-2
Joint and Multinational Approach to Operations 12 1-3
Special Operations 12 1-4
The Special Operations Component Command Concept 13 1-6
Special Operations Forces Force Generation 14 1-7
Special Operations Component Command Headquarters 14 1-8
Functions
Organization 15 1-9
Special Operations Component Command Elements 16 1-10
Special Operations Component Command Staff Functions 19 1-11
and Responsibilities
CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

General 29 2-1
Principles of Command 29 2-2
Command and Control Considerations 30 2-3
Redeployment 31 2-4
Responsibilities 31 2-5
Command Organization 32 2-6
Command and Control Options 33 2-7
Command Relationships 33 2-8
Command and Control of Deployed Forces 37 2-9
Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces 37 2-10
Integration
Operational Environment Geometry 38 2-11
Liaison 40 2-12
CHAPTER 3 – EFFECTS AND TARGETING

General 43 3-1
The New Battlespace 43 3-2
Effects-based Targeting 43 3-3
Joint Coordination Process 44 3-4
Joint Targeting 45 3-5
Joint Targeting Process 46 3-6
Joint Targeting Cycle 47 3-7
Types of Target 49 3-8
Combat Engagement 50 3-9
Target Lists 50 3-10
The Vital Link Between Intelligence and Operations in 52 3-11
Effects-based Targeting
Audience Levels of Effects-based Targeting 52 3-12
Order of Effects 53 3-13
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PAGE PARA
Non-kinetic Targeting and the Indirect Approach 54 3-14

Consequence Management 58 3-15
Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage 59 3-16
Analysis and Development 59 3-17
The F2UID Cycle 61 3-18
Target Prioritization 66 3-19
Collective and Individual CARVER 68 3-20
F3EAD 69 3-21
Legal Considerations 71 3-22
Technical Exploitation Operations 72 3-23
Summary 73 3-24
CHAPTER 4 – INTELLIGENCE
General 75 4-1
Special Operations Forces Intelligence Considerations 75 4-2
Intelligence Support to NATO Special Operations 75 4-3
Special Operations Component Command Intelligence 79 4-4
Operations Relative to the Intelligence Cycle
Intelligence Support to Targeting 81 4-5
Intelligence Support to Special Operations Component 82 4-6
Command Planning Process
Intelligence Sharing in a NATO Special Operations Forces 84 4-7
Community
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process 85 4-8
Counter-intelligence 85 4-9
Collection Disciplines by Source Type 85 4-10
Intelligence Functional Disciplines – Subject Areas 85 4-11
CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND

RECONNAISSANCE
General 87 5-1
Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements 89 5-2
Management
F3EAD 91 5-3
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Matrix 92 5-4
Information Delivery 92 5-5
Special Operations Component Command Intelligence, 93 5-6
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process
CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING
General 95 6-1
Special Operations Component Command Planning Process 95 6-2
Hasty Special Operations Component Command Planning 98 6-3
Process
CHAPTER 7 – OPERATIONS
General 107 7-1
Future Operations (J35) 110 7-2
Current Operations (J33) 115 7-3
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PAGE PARA
CHAPTER 8 – AIR OPERATIONS

General 123 8-1
Special Operations Component Command’s Role 124 8-2
Command and Control of NATO Special Operations 124 8-3
Air/Aviation
Special Operations Liaison Element 126 8-4
Special Air Warfare Planning 127 8-5
Air Tasking Cycle Products 130 8-6
Airspace Control Means 131 8-7
Fire Support Coordination Measures 131 8-8
CHAPTER 9 – COMMUNICATIONS
Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Forces 133 9-1
Communications Systems
Communication and Information Systems Principles 134 9-2
Communication and Information Systems in Support of 137 9-3
Command and Control
Communication and Information Systems Security Domains 143 9-4
The NATO Special Operations Forces Network 144 9-5
Overall Responsibilities within NATO Communication and 145 9-6
Information Systems
Commander Roles and Responsibilities with Regard to 146 9-7
Communication and Information Systems
Communication and Information Systems Planning 146 9-8
Communication and Information Systems Tools 147 9-9
CHAPTER 10 – KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION

MANAGEMENT
General 157 10-1
Information Management Cycle 158 10-2
Common Reference Point 160 10-3
Information Sharing 161 10-4
CHAPTER 11 – LOGISTICS
General 163 11-1
Logistic Functional Areas 163 11-2
J4 Directorate Responsibilities 165 11-3
Logistic Support 165 11-4
Planning 166 11-5
Base Operating Support 170 11-6
Host-nation Support 170 11-7
Contracting Support 171 11-8
CHAPTER 12 – MEDICAL SUPPORT AND MEDICAL

OPERATIONS
Medical Support Fundamentals 175 12-1
Operational Medical Support Capabilities and Organization 176 12-2
Special Operations Forces Leaders Casualty Response 180 12-3
Capabilities
Medical Planning Considerations 180 12-4
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ANNEXES:
A. Notional Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Manning List

B. Position Functions and Responsibilities
C. Special Operations Component Command Liaison Procedures
D. Special Operations Component Command Tools and Checklists
E. Target Intelligence Package
F. Special Operations Component Command Rules of Engagement
G. Hasty Special Operations Component and Command Planning Process
H. Logistics Estimate
I. Logistics Preparation of the Theatre
J. Personnel Recovery
K. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
L. Formats and Reports
M. Special Operations Forces Campaigns
N. Special Operations Air Command
O. Lexicon
P. References
ENCLOSURE:
1. Extract of Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3, Volume III: Operations/Situations Reports

(Section 20: Rules of Engagement Request and Section 22: Rules of Engagement
Implementation)
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PREFACE
1. The activation of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) and the addition of
a special operations component command (SOCC) for NATO special operations are now
solidified in the Alliance and its doctrine. Therefore, the main objective of the SOCC Manual is
to provide a primary reference that reflects best practices of key doctrinal concepts for special
operations activities related to the SOCC during joint operations. This manual incorporates
important special operations fundamentals while tying together lessons learned from
collaboration, education, training, and recent deployments. The SOCC Manual is intended to
be used by special operations forces (SOF) framework nations (FNs), troop-contributing nations
(TCNs), special operations leaders, and operations/staff personnel for education, training, and
deployments. Although the SOCC Manual is primarily focused for use by a NATO SOCC, it
provides a useful reference for other NATO components, for non-NATO SOF, and for all special
operations and support personnel serving outside the SOCC headquarters (HQ).
2. The SOCC Manual is written at the component and operational levels where campaigns
and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained. It can be used at any level as a
reference. This edition reflects major changes since the December 2009 version and
incorporates recent changes in MC 437/2, Special Operations Policy, and AJP-3.5(A), Allied
Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. The SOCC Manual is not a doctrinal publication but
directly supports AJP-3.5(A) and all other applicable Allied joint publications. The definitions
contained herein do not establish or modify NATO policy and doctrine, but help to express them
more clearly.
Figure 1. Hierarchy of NSHQ Manuals
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3. The success of campaigns and major operations requires detailed planning, coordination,
synchronization, and execution. Successfully integrating special operations into multinational
operations begins with a thorough understanding of special operations and the ability for SOF to
utilize various processes and procedures while fully integrating into the joint force at all levels.
This manual describes the fundamental aspects of special operations and provides guidance on
integrating SOF at the operational level. These operations are complex and contain different
tasks that span the range of military operations.
4. Most special operations are planned at the tactical level by the forces that execute the
operation; the plans are then submitted for approval at the appropriate level. The SOCC
Manual does not dispute nor is it proposing that special operations are or should be driven from
the top down. This manual highlights the fact that the SOCC is required to synchronize special
operations in the joint campaign and to ensure SOF are properly supported while providing an
operational environment that maximizes the opportunity for SOF to succeed.
5. Important information is highlighted throughout this manual. The following icons focus
the user’s attention on the crucial pieces of information and best practices.
Best Practice. This icon highlights ideas and processes that

have proven successful during real-world operations and
exercises. Best practices offer tips and strategies that may
help the user succeed.
Important Note. This icon highlights the most important (key)

concepts that users will want to remember and offers
reminders of information provided elsewhere in the manual.
Red Flag. This icon serves as a warning to users, highlighting

common pitfalls so that users can avoid making the mistakes
others have made in the past.
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CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

COMPONENT COMMAND
1-1. General. SOF are strategic assets to be employed to help achieve strategic and specific
operational-level objectives. Special operations may be conducted as part of Article 5 collective
defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs) in order to contribute effectively
in fulfilling NATO’s three essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and
cooperative security. SOF differ from other joint forces principally through their unique
capabilities, agility, and flexibility. They are not a substitute for conventional forces. SOF are
commanded through a SOCC, usually under an operational-level HQ alongside land, air, or
maritime forces. The force generation of SOF differs from other NATO forces principally due to
the lack of a standing SOCC in the NATO Command Structure (NCS); therefore, a SOCC must
be generated for every operation involving the employment of SOF.
1-2. NATO Organization. The Alliance is made up of several civilian and military staff
structures and levels of command. The political and strategic levels of command are where a
nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys
national, including military, resources to achieve them.
a. North Atlantic Council. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political
authority and powers of decision. It consists of all the permanent representatives of all
member countries. The NAC is the only body within the Alliance that derives its authority
explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty.
b. The Military Committee. The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military
authority in NATO, providing NATO’s civilian decision-making bodies – the NAC, the
Defence Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group − with advice on military
matters, primarily in the areas of policy and strategy.
c. Strategic Commands1
(1) Allied Command Operations. Allied Command Operations (ACO) is

commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) based at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). ACO’s core tasks are to
assess risks and threats, conduct military planning, and identify and request the
forces needed to undertake the full range of Alliance missions as and when
agreed upon by the NAC. More information and key responsibilities are provided
in AJP-01(D).
(2) Allied Command Transformation. Allied Command Transformation

contributes to preserving the peace, security, and territorial integrity of the
Alliance’s 28 member states. This is accomplished by leading the military
transformation of Alliance forces, capabilities, and doctrine using new concepts,
such as the NATO Response Force (NRF), and new structures to improve the
Alliance’s military effectiveness. More information and key responsibilities are
provided in AJP-01(D).
d. The Operational Level of Command. This is the level at which campaigns and
major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives
within theatres of operations (TOOs) or areas of operations (AOOs). At the operational
1 AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, dated 21 Dec 10.
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level, military forces are employed to achieve military-strategic goals. SOF provide NATO
operational-level commanders with a powerful and very flexible capability to create desired
effects that support desired strategic objectives and the military end state.
e. The Tactical Level of Command. This is the level at which military forces are
employed to conduct military tasks and to achieve military objectives. This level of
planning and execution is conducted by the various component commands (CCs). As
there is no standing CC for SOF in NATO, nations commit to providing a framework for
command and control (C2) during crises or contingencies, while the NSHQ provides the
day-to-day situational awareness (SA) of potential special operations prior to activation of
the SOCC FN.
ACO/SHAPE
NSHQ
Strategic Level
HQ JFCBS* HQ JFCNP*
Joint
HQ AIRCOM ** HQ MARCOM **
Command/Operational Ramstein Northwood
HQ LANDCOM***
Izmir
SOCC**** LCC ACC MCC

Component
Command/Tactical
*JFC will form a JTF HQ for MJO(+). Each will have subordinate CC HQ from HQ LANDCOM, HQ
MARCOM, and HQ AIRCOM.
**HQ AIRCOM or HQ MARCOM may C2 from static locations air or maritime heavy SJO.
***HQ LANDCOM does not C2 SJOs. It will set up a LCC HQ for MJO.
****SOCC is non-standing. NSHQ provides a standing SOCC Core element for a designated SOCC FN.
Figure 1-1. NATO Command Structure

Figure 1-1 – NATO Command Structure
1-3. Joint and Multinational Approach to Operations. Military success relies on a joint
effort with components and other capabilities unified under a single command structure.
Successful joint operations and campaigns require interoperability across components to
maximize the comprehensive effect of the joint force and the complete range of its capabilities.
It is not simply about separate operations conducted in isolation organized under a single
command. NATO special operations provide the joint force with means to develop and execute
unconventional operations across the spectrum of conflict and in sensitive environments,
independently or with conventional forces.
1-4. Special Operations. Special operations are military activities conducted by specially
designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, manned with select personnel, using
unconventional tactics, techniques, and modes of employment. These activities may be
conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or with conventional
forces, to help achieve the desired end state. Politico-military considerations may require
clandestine or covert techniques and the acceptance of a degree of political or military risk not
associated with operations by conventional forces. Special operations deliver strategic- or
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operational-level results or are executed where significant political risk exists. Special
operations are, by nature, joint. SOF are organized in a joint manner with aviation, maritime,
and land units from the TCNs, constituting a mission-specific SOCC with a joint staff to plan and
direct special operations.2
a. Special Operations Screening Criteria
(1) Special operations are those activities that deliver strategic- or operational-
level results or are executed where significant political risk exists.
(2) Special operations are conducted by mature, highly trained and educated
operators due to the heightened risk of negative consequences of mission
exposure or failure.
b. Principal Tasks
(1) The three principal tasks of NATO SOF are military assistance (MA),
special reconnaissance (SR), and direct action (DA).
(2) NATO SOF principal tasks are applied to support—but are not limited to—
these activities: counter-insurgency (COIN); counterterrorism (CT); countering
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as well as chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials; hostage release operations
(HROs); and faction liaison.3
1-5. Special Operations Forces Campaigns. Special operations are an integral part of
Allied campaigns. While special operations can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific
Allied objectives, the majority of special operations are designed and conducted to enhance the
likelihood of success of the overall campaign which is usually done by a supporting SOF
campaign. Special operations may complement—but must not compete with or be a substitute
for—conventional operations. For more information, see Annex M.
1-6. The Special Operations Component Command Concept
a. The SOCC is a multinational or national joint CC formed around an FN. SOCCs

are non-standing HQs in the NATO Force Structure that are tailored for each operation
according to the number of special operations task groups (SOTGs) assigned and the
degree of C2 required. The term SOTG is generic and can refer to a special operations
land task group or a special operations maritime task group (SOMTG). The FN forms the
nucleus of the SOCC by providing, as a minimum, the commander, key staff personnel,
and command and control information systems (C2IS) down to SOTG level and base life
support functions. The FN will also be expected to coordinate the combat service
support (CSS) functions for the component and is expected to provide at least one SOTG
and a tactical airlift capability to effect SOF insertion/infiltration and extraction/exfiltration.
Under certain circumstances, NATO-enabled C2IS may be provided to the SOCC to
facilitate, augment, or replace reliance upon the FN’s organic C2IS. Nations providing
SOTGs should provide staff officers/non-commissioned officers to the SOCC,
commensurate with the number of SOTGs contributed. Other NATO nations can
contribute personnel to the SOCC contingent upon approval from the respective FN. The
SOCC commander (COM SOCC) employs and controls SOF and can act as a supported
2 AJP-3.5(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, dated 17 Dec 13.
3 AJP-3.5(A).
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or supporting commander as directed by the operational-level commander. A SOCC is

comprised of a combination of command and liaison elements, and force elements that
are described in the following paragraphs.4
b. Other TCNs may provide special operations land task groups, SOMTGs, special
operations air task units (SOATUs), or special operations air task groups (SOATGs) to
the SOCC. The deployed SOATUs may be organic to the SOTGs or be organized in an
SOATG or in a special operations air command (SOAC) when multiple SOATGs are
assigned.
1-7. Special Operations Forces Force Generation.5 Force generation in NATO is a process
balancing the operational commander’s requirements against the realities of national capabilities
and considerations. Overall force generation in NATO is the responsibility of Deputy SACEUR
and is executed by SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre Force
Generation. The NSHQ J5 supports the force generation process for SOF in SHAPE. The formal
force generation process is outlined in MC 133/4 and culminates in the annual Global Force
Generation Conference, where nations formally commit their forces for the next year to NATO
operations and the NRF. This requires timely national engagement.
a. The force generation of SOF differs from other NATO forces principally due to the
lack of a standing SOCC in the NCS. As a result, a SOCC HQ must be generated for
every operation involving the employment of SOF.
b. At full operational capability, the NSHQ is able to provide a rapidly deployable

initial core of an operational SOCC. This capability does not replace the requirement of a
SOF FN but does serve as a requisite enhancement to SOF generation. To learn more
about NATO SOF force generation and the NSHQ’s role in the process, see the Bi-SC
Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations, dated 11 Jul 13.
c. At the tactical level, SOTGs and SOATGs are the units utilized for force
generation. An SOTG is a self-sustaining, national grouping of land or maritime SOF,
normally generated from a single nation. SOATGs, likewise, are normally from a single
nation, but they may also be combined organizations.
1-8. Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Functions. Once the FN

stands up the SOCC, it has command responsibility for planning and coordinating special
operations and is granted the authority necessary to accomplish such missions as may be
assigned by the joint force commander (COM JFC). The following functional responsibilities
and related activities will be conducted:
a. Deploy and establish a SOCC HQ capable of conducting NATO J1 through J8

staff functions and exercise C2 of assigned task groups.
b. Plan for, direct, monitor, and assess special operations.
c. Coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations into the joint operations
area (JOA), campaign, and major operations.
4AJP-3.5(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, dated 17 Dec 13.
5For additional information on force generation in NATO, see MC 133/4, NATO Operations Planning, dated Jan 11,
MC 437/2, Special Operations Policy, dated 21 Apr 11, and the Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance
Operations, dated 11 Jul 13.
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d. Plan, task, and C2 SOF aviation (see paragraph 1-9b for more information).
e. Exchange and incorporate liaisons as required.
f. Provide C2IS down to the task group level.
g. Coordinate basic support infrastructure and provide protection for the SOCC HQ,
as required.
h. Coordinate, provide, and monitor CSS for deployed SOF.
1-9. Organization
a. Notional Special Operations Component Command Organization. Figure 1-2

presents a notional SOCC organization.
Figure 1-2. Notional SOCC Organization6
b. Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Functional

Structure. It is possible to organize the SOCC into centres based on operations,
6 In accordance with MC 324/3, The NATO Military Command Structure, dated 30 Jan 13, operational commands will be
joint force commands (JFCs), e.g. JFC Brunssum, and the deployed battle staff will be designated joint task force
headquarters (JTF HQ). AJP-3.5(A) still refers to joint force headquarters instead of JTF HQ.
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support, and signal functions. Figure 1-3 presents how the SOCC may physically locate
various directorates to optimize functions and to execute the command’s responsibilities.
Figure 1-3. SOCC HQ Functional Structure
1-10. Special Operations Component Command Elements
a. Special Operations Air Command. Establishing a SOAC is the preferred

organizational solution to C2 special air warfare forces. COM SOCC may establish a
SOAC to plan, task, and control joint special air operations and subordinate air task
groups and units (both special operations and direct support units provided from the
conventional forces). A SOAC may also be required in a large-scale, SOF-only operation
where it must perform as the air component for all supporting (SOF and conventional) air
missions. Operational control (OPCON) of these specialized air assets normally remains
with the contributing nation, but tactical control (TACON) is usually transferred to COM
SOCC. The SOAC may apportion excess SOF sorties to the air component only by
exception and only upon approval from COM SOCC. While significant consideration
must be given to appointing the SOAC commander (COM SOAC) from the nation
contributing the preponderance of special air warfare resources, it is almost always more
successful to assign the SOAC function to the special air HQ most able to effectively
plan, allocate, task, and control the activities of multiple SOATGs across a TOO. The
SOAC, ideally, co-locates with the SOCC HQ but should have the capability to operate
from a separate location.7 For more information on the SOAC structure, see Annex N.
7 For more information on SOF aviation, see the NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual, dated Mar 12.
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b. Special Operations Task Groups8
(1) An SOTG (land or maritime) is a self-sustaining, national grouping of land or

maritime SOF that is normally generated from a single nation. If nations choose to
form a multinational SOTG, appropriate pre-deployment training is required. An
SOTG is normally composed of:
(a) An HQ that is capable of conducting the S1-S6 staff functions.
(b) Subordinate SOTUs.
(c) CIS units.
(d) CSS elements.
(2) Combined SOTGs are not common and should be considered carefully to
capitalize on habitual tactical-level relationships or on the requirement for certain
capabilities. In these instances, a single commander is designated for the
combined SOTG. Regardless of these considerations, combined SOTGs should
only be authorized when an appropriate level of combined training has been
achieved and with the proper approval by the SOF FN and SACEUR.
c. Special Operations Air Task Groups. An SOATG is normally a national grouping

of special air warfare capabilities. SOATGs are tactical-level HQs composed of multiple
subordinate SOATUs that group fixed-wing (FW), rotary-wing (RW), and/or tilt-rotor aircraft
in a single unit. In addition, an SOATG normally includes special operations-qualified
airmen providing air-land integration functions in support of the SOCC. If no SOAC is
appointed, the SOATG assumes all special air warfare C2 functions that are normally
assigned to the SOAC. An SOATG is normally a national organization; however, when the
situation warrants two or more national subordinate SOATUs, representatives from each
nation are required as liaison officers (LOs) to the HQ.
d. Special Operations Command and Liaison Elements. Joint operations are

inherently complex, making deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization critical
components of operational warfare. Two-way liaison is an essential element in the
coordination of special operations. Liaison between all components of the joint force is
vital for effective employment of SOF, as well as for the prevention of fratricide. Special
operations commanders have specific elements available that facilitate C2 and liaison.
All of these elements significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent
planning, and enhance mission accomplishment of the entire combined joint force. COM
SOCC dispatches liaison elements with appropriate communication means to other HQs
as necessary. Conversely, COM SOCC may receive liaison elements from other
commands or HQs, particularly in the event of tactical-level integrated or converging
operations between SOF and conventional forces, or when there is a
supported/supporting relationship between the SOCC and other CCs. Additionally, a
SOCC can dispatch other liaison elements as required; as well, the NSHQ can provide
planning and liaison elements on request of an operational-level commander. The size,
duration of employment, and scope of duties of these liaisons elements will vary
according to their assigned functions.9
8 SOTG Manual, dated 11 Dec 09.

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Figure 1-4. Special Operations Command and Liaison Elements (Possible Locations)
(1) Special Operations Command and Control Element. When SOF

operate directly in the AOO of conventional forces, COM SOCC may establish a
special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to synchronize,
deconflict, and coordinate operations with conventional forces. The SOCCE
remains OPCON to the SOCC, but normally co-locates with the appropriate level
conventional force HQ (maritime or land). A SOCCE is a C2 element with OPCON
or TACON of SOTGs or SOTUs operating in an AOO. The SOCCE can receive
SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed
SOTGs/SOTUs. A SOCCE is tailored as applicable, usually 8-10 personnel, and
exchanges liaison with the appropriate conventional HQ. Note: Until such time as
a SOCCE is required at the land component command (LCC) or maritime
component command (MCC), a SOCC LO will be positioned at the LCC and MCC
in order to establish a minimum but permanent liaison. In Figure 1-5, COM SOCC
has deployed several SOTGs to operate in the LCC’s battlespace. As a result he
has deployed a SOCCE to the LCC. No SOTGs have been deployed to the MCC,
so only an LO remains.
Figure 1-5. Special Operations Command Elements
(2) Special Operations Planning and Liaison Element. A Special

Operations Planning and Liaison Element (SOPLE) is an element dispatched from
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COM SOCC to an operational HQ (e.g. JTF HQ) during crisis response planning
and execution. The SOPLE, in close coordination with the SOF advisor (SOFAD),
contributes to the planning, refinement, and execution process at the joint level,
synchronizing and integrating the SOF portion into the campaign plan. SOPLE
and SOFAD collaboration will result in full integration of special operations
throughout the campaign and the creation of nested SOF effects in support of the
operational-level commander.10
(3) Special Operations Liaison Element. The special operations liaison element
(SOLE) is a liaison team provided by COM SOCC to the appropriate air component
command (ACC). Additional information on the SOLE is provided in paragraph 8-4.
1-11. Special Operations Component Command Staff Functions and Responsibilities
a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)
(1) Functions. The J1 is the principal staff directorate for personnel matters.
(2) Responsibilities
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all personnel issues.
(b) Monitors unit strengths through periodic personnel status reports,

casualty reports, and reports of critical personnel shortages.
(c) Prepares personnel reports and the personnel portion of situation

reports (SITREPs).
(d) Provides representation in the SOCC planning group (SOCCPG)

when required.
(e) Prepares SOCC personnel estimates.
(f) Writes Appendix 2 (Personnel Administration) to Annex R (Logistics)

to SOCC operation plans (OPLANs).
(g) Establishes and operates the personnel reception centre and the
joint visitors bureau as required.
(h) Requests personnel augmentation as required.
(i) Directs, coordinates, and monitors entitlements, benefits, morale,

welfare, recreation, and postal services.
(j) In consultation with the J3, administers policies and procedures for
indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility
of the SOCC.
(k) Assists in the reintegration task for formerly isolated SOCC

personnel, when applicable.
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(l) Ensures evaluation reports are prepared for outgoing SOCC

personnel.
(m) Maintains records to support and processes recommendations for

awards and decorations.
(n) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including support requests (SPTREQs) and requests for
information (RFIs), pertaining to personnel issues.
(o) Maintains and updates the current personnel situation slides for the
daily commander’s update briefings (CUBs).
(p) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on the personnel

situation.
(q) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
b. Intelligence Directorate (J2)
(1) Functions. The J2 is the principal staff directorate for intelligence, counter-
intelligence (CI), and security matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all intelligence issues.
(b) Monitors and maintains the up-to-date situation of adversary forces

and third party forces, other than friendly forces.
(c) Prepares and provides intelligence-related reports and the

intelligence portion of other reports.
(d) Provides representation in the SOCCPG.
(e) Prepares SOCC intelligence estimates.
(f) Prepares target intelligence packages (TIPs).
(g) Develops priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
(h) Writes Annex D (Intelligence) and the intelligence-related portions of

the main body of SOCC OPLANs.
(i) Writes the intelligence portion(s) of SOCC operation orders

(OPORDs)/fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
(j) Tailors intelligence architecture to mission requirements.
(k) Identifies communication link requirements for feeding intelligence.
(l) Provides intelligence support within the joint operations centre (JOC)
and to the SOCCPG.
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(m) Establishes open-source intelligence reach-back capability.
(n) Tasks SOCC organic, dedicated intelligence assets.
(o) Establishes intelligence fusion with other partners as required.
(p) Provides support to the SOCC J3 in the planning and execution of

information operations (Info Ops) and its constituent activities, such as
operations security (OPSEC) and deception.
(q) Acts as the central point of contact for RFIs within the SOCC HQ.
(r) Prioritizes, tracks, and answers RFIs when possible and validates
and forwards other RFIs as appropriate.
(s) Maintains and updates the meteorological situation and enemy

and/or third party (other than friendly) forces slides for the daily CUBs.
(t) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on the

meteorological situation and/or on enemy/adversary and/or third party
(other than friendly) forces.
(u) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
c. Operations Directorate (J3)
(1) Functions. The J3 is the principal staff directorate for current operations,
training, and short-term planning. If no J5 is established, J3 also performs the J5
functions.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on operational matters for assigned, attached,

and supporting forces.
(b) Monitors the current operational status of friendly forces.
(c) Assists COM SOCC during the assessment of SOCC operations.
(d) Prepares the operations portion of SITREPs.
(e) Provides representation in the SOCCPG.
(f) Prepares SOCC operations estimates.
(g) Conducts current and future operations planning within the J3’s event
horizon.
(h) Writes warning orders (WNGOs) and OPORDs/FRAGOs for

emerging tasks within the J3’s event horizon.
(i) Assists COM SOCC in the direction and control of operations.
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(j) Prepares and issues orders to the SOCC subordinates as authorized

by COM SOCC.
(k) Coordinates SOCC integration with other combined joint force

components.
(l) Coordinates SOCC requirements for additional forces and resources

with supporting commanders.
(m) Establishes interface with interagency and multinational

organizations, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and other organizations in order to synchronize
SOCC efforts with these organizations.

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to current
operations and future operations within the J3’s event horizon.
(o) Maintains and updates the current/future operations slides for the
daily CUBs.
(p) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on current

operations and future operations within the J3’s event horizon.
(q) Coordinates and supervises training of SOCC forces.
(r) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
d. Logistics Directorate (J4)
(1) Functions. The J4 is the principal staff directorate for logistic matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all logistics issues.
(b) Monitors SOCC equipment readiness status.
(c) Prepares logistic reports and the logistics portion of SITREPs.
(e) Prepares SOCC logistics estimates.
(f) Establishes liaison element with joint logistic support group (JLSG) to
coordinate in-theatre logistical requirements.
(g) Writes Annex R (Logistics) (less Appendix 2 (Personnel

Administration) and Appendix 3 (Medical Support)) and Annex S
(Movements) to SOCC OPLANs.
(h) Writes the administration/logistics paragraph and, if applicable, the

logistics annex of SOCC OPORDs/FRAGOs.
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(i) Provides logistic oversight of SOF in the operational area.
(j) Recommends supply rates of critical resources and stock levels for
SOCC forces.
(k) Ensures the accountability of supplies and equipment.
(l) In conjunction with J5 and TCNs, plans and supervises the strategic
deployment and redeployment of forces assigned to the SOCC.
(m) Plans, coordinates, and monitors the administrative movement of

personnel, equipment, and supplies.
(n) Assists J3 in supporting the operational resupply of SOF.
(o) Ensures that adequate logistic support is provided for prisoners or

detainees who are under the control of the SOCC.
(p) Ensures that adequate logistic support is provided for displaced

civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the SOCC.
(q) Coordinates and manages external logistic support for the SOCC.
(r) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to logistic issues.
(s) Maintains and updates the current logistic situation slides for the
daily CUBs.
(t) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on the logistic

situation.
(u) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
e. Plans Directorate (J5)
(1) Functions. The J5 is the principal staff directorate for future operations
planning.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on future plans.
(b) Provides representation in the SOCCPG.
(c) Prepares SOCC estimates for future operations.
(d) Assists the SOPLE in providing input for SOF employment in JFC
OPLANs.
(e) Writes SOCC concept of operations (CONOPS) and OPLANs,

assisted by functional area specialists across all SOCC staff branches.
(f) Determines forces required for the execution of SOCC OPLANs.
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(g) Coordinates strategic deployment and redeployment planning with

the TCNs.
(h) Writes FRAGOs for emerging tasks outside the J3’s event horizon.
(i) Coordinates planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and

national HQs, as required.
(j) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to future
operations outside the J3’s event horizon.
(k) Maintains and updates the future operations slides (outside the J3’s
event horizon) for the daily CUBs.
(l) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on future operations

outside the J3’s event horizon.
(m) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
f. Communication and Information Systems Directorate (J6)
(1) Functions. The J6 is the principal staff directorate for CIS matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all CIS issues.
(b) Monitors the SOCC CIS readiness status.
(c) Prepares CIS status reports and the CIS portion of SITREPs.
(e) Establishes the SOCC HQ CIS requirements and develops the

SOCC CIS architecture.
(f) Prepares SOCC CIS estimates.
(g) Writes the command and signal paragraph of SOCC OPLANs and
Annex P (Electronic Warfare) and Annex Q (Communication and
Information Systems) to SOCC OPLANs.
(h) Writes the command and signal paragraph, and, if applicable, the
CIS annex of SOCC OPORDs/FRAGOs, as appropriate.
(i) Manages and maintains the SOCC HQ CIS.
(j) Establishes communications with subordinate units (SOTGs and

SOACs or SOATGs/SOATUs) and with SOCC liaison teams located with
the JFC and with other joint force components.
(k) Establishes SOCC communications and electronics operating

instructions.
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(l) Manages and supports friendly force tracking equipment.
(m) Recommends and manages cyber defence measures.
(n) Assists J2 in establishing sensitive, compartmented information

facilities as required.
(o) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to CIS issues.
(p) Maintains and updates the CIS situation slides for the daily CUBs.
(q) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on the CIS situation.
g. Financial Directorate (J8)
(1) Functions. The J8 is the principal staff directorate for financial matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all financial issues.
(b) Provides representation in the SOCCPG when required.
(c) Writes Annex FF (Financial Support) to SOCC OPLANs.
(d) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to financial
issues.
(e) Prepares and/or presents briefings on financial issues, if and when

required.
(f) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
h. Medical Advisor
(1) Functions. The medical advisor (MEDAD) is the principal staff member for
medical matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all medical issues.
(b) Assesses and monitors medical assets in the SOCC operational

area, including organic and supporting Allied/coalition, host nation (HN),
and NGO health service support.
(c) Prepares medical reports and the medical portion of SITREPs.
(d) Provides representation in the SOCCPG when required.
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(e) Prepares SOCC medical estimates.
(f) Writes Annex QQ (Medical) to SOCC OPLANs.
(g) Writes the medical portion and, if applicable, the medical annex of
SOCC OPORDs/FRAGOs.
(h) Plans and manages operational health care to SOCC personnel,

including medical force protection (FP), emergency medicine, primary
health care, secondary health care, and evacuation.
(i) Manages SOCC medical logistics.
(j) Plans and manages medical assistance to the civilian populace

(including medical civic action programmes such as medical seminars) and to
prisoners/detainees who fall under the care and responsibility of the SOCC.
(k) Provides medical technical supervision of SOCC medical treatment

facilities (MTFs).
(l) Exercises and evaluates medical readiness of SOCC forces.
(m) Oversees SOCC medical training.

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to medical issues.
(o) Maintains and updates the medical situation slides for the daily CUBs.
(p) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on medical issues.
(q) Provides preventive medicine, emergency medicine, and primary

health care for SOCC HQ personnel if qualified medical care providers are
available and when no dedicated medical personnel are available in the
HQ, outside the medical branch staff.
i. Legal Advisor
(1) Functions. The legal advisor (LEGAD) is COM SOCC’s advisor on all legal
issues who ensures that SOCC operations are conducted in accordance with
international law, TCN domestic law, HN law, and NATO regulations, as applicable.
(a) Advises COM SOCC and staff on all legal issues.
(b) Participates in the SOCCPG and other working groups and boards,
as appropriate.
(c) Reviews the SOCC proposed target nomination list.
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(d) Reviews JTF HQ and SOCC OPLANs/OPORDs for any legal

considerations that may affect the implementation of the plans or orders.
(e) Assists in the establishment of memorandums of understanding and

technical arrangements.
(f) Assists J5 and J3 in rules of engagement (ROE) development.
(g) Writes Annex AA (Legal) to SOCC OPLANs.
(h) Assists J5 or J35 in writing Annex E (ROE) to SOCC OPLANs.
(i) Prepares the legal issues portion of the CUBs and other briefings as
required.
(j) Assists in the review of subordinate units’ CONOPS and, if

applicable, participates in subordinate units’ CONOPS briefings to COM
SOCC and/or staff.
(k) Produces ROE cards, as required.
(l) Assists J3 in ROE training of SOCC personnel.
(m) Oversees legal issues related to prisoners of war (POWs) and

detainees.
(n) Oversees the reporting and investigation of incidents, including law of

armed conflict (LOAC) violations, claims, loss of equipment or funds, and
personal injury or death.
(o) Advises COM SOCC on disciplinary issues.
(p) Oversees and reviews, in coordination with J8, SOCC contracting

and procurement for compliance with fiscal law.
(q) Provides information on local laws and legal customs.
j. Political Advisor
(1) Functions. The political advisor (POLAD) is COM SOCC’s advisor on all
politico-military issues to ensure that SOCC operations are conducted in
accordance with NATO policy.
(a) Advises COM SOCC and staff on all local, national, regional, and
international political issues.
(b) Advises COM SOCC and staff on relationships with IOs and NGOs.
(c) Establishes and maintains contact with appropriate embassies in the

JOA.
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(d) Reviews JTF HQ and SOCC OPLANs/OPORDs for any political

considerations that may affect the implementation of the plans or orders.
(e) Reviews the SOCC proposed target nomination list for political
implications.
(f) Reviews POW and detainee handling operations for political

implications.
(g) Prepares briefings as required.
(h) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
k. Public Affairs Office
(1) Functions. The public affairs (PA) office is the principal staff directorate for
PA matters.
(a) Advises COM SOCC on all PA issues.
(b) Provides representation in the SOCCPG when required.
(c) Writes Annex X (Public Affairs) to SOCC OPLANs.
(d) Monitors, tracks, reviews, and processes all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including SPTREQs and RFIs, pertaining to PA issues.
(e) Coordinates activities with the SOCC Info Ops staff.
(f) Coordinates the use of combat camera assets.
(g) Maintains and updates the PA slides for the daily CUBs.
(h) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings to external

audiences approved by COM SOCC and the concerned national contingent
commanders.
(i) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOCC.
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CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-1. General. The terms command and control are closely related and are often used
together; however, they are not synonymous. For more information, see AD 80-20, Allocation
of Forces and Transfer of Authority, dated 5 Jun 12.
a. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual to direct, coordinate,

or control military forces. It is the process the commander uses to assert his will and
intentions upon subordinates to achieve the desired objectives and end state.
b. Control. Control is that authority exercised by a commander over part of the

activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his
command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.
All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. Control is how the
commander and his staff organize, direct, and coordinate the actions of assigned forces
to implement orders and directives.
2-2. Principles of Command. NATO SOF adhere to the NATO principles of C2. Because of
the nature of special operations, a clear chain of command is essential.11 For the purpose of
this manual, those principles are:
a. Unity of Command. Provides the necessary cohesion of the planning and

execution of operations. As a minimum, a commander would normally have OPCON
over all NATO or attached forces within a JOA. When unity of command cannot be fully
achieved, unity of effort must be assured by establishing clear coordination
arrangements.
SOF Example: Upon transfer of authority (TOA), COM SOCC exercises OPCON of all
forces contributed by the nations to the SOCC.
b. Continuity of Command. Command should be continuous throughout a

campaign. For long duration campaigns, a succession of HQs should be arranged to
ensure continuity of command.
SOF Example: Over the course of a long-term campaign, the SOCC FN is relieved by a
subsequent SOCC FN, ensuring effective continuity of command.
c. Clear Chain of Command. The structure of the C2 system is hierarchical and

should be defined and understood by all levels of command. Where necessary and
appropriate, direction and orders to subordinate units may include tasks to specific force
elements, subject to limitations imposed by command relationships, national caveats, or
other restrictions.
SOF Example: The SOCC FN is a subordinate command directly under the JTF HQ.
The SOCC FN assumes OPCON of SOTGs and SOATGs provided by the TCNs when
delegated from the JTF HQ.
d. Integration of Command. Ensures the capabilities of the contributing nations are

applied effectively to achieve the operational commander’s objectives. An effective and
comprehensive liaison structure that links the SOCC to the JTF HQ, the other
11 AJP-01(D), pp. 6-2.
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NSHQ 80-002
components, and other organizations, such as national contingent HQs, NGOs, local
authorities, or IOs, may be an essential part of the SOCC’s C2 structure.
SOF Example: COM SOCC deploys liaison elements to the JTF HQ and other
components to ensure the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of the SOCC’s
forces are appropriately addressed during planning, deployment, execution, and
redeployment. Liaisons from subordinate units assigned and attached to the SOCC are
requested and supported. Additionally, liaisons from other joint force components are
requested, if and when required.
e. Mission Command. Mission command stresses the importance of understanding

what effect is to be achieved rather than specifying the ways in which it should be done.
Commanders encourage freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully in the
event of unexpected setbacks or unforeseen opportunities. Mission command also
encourages initiative and promotes timely decision-making by subordinate commanders.
Commanders must clearly state their intentions, constraints and restraints, and
designated objectives. They must also provide sufficient forces, resources, and authority
to accomplish the assigned tasks.
SOF Example: COM SOCC issues orders to subordinate units that are clear and allow
the SOTGs and SOATGs the maximum flexibility on how to accomplish assigned tasks.
2-3. Command and Control Considerations
a. Preparation. During the preparatory phase, there may be a delay in assigning a

JTF HQ, which could cause a corresponding delay in identifying and activating the
SOCC.12 The NSHQ may assume responsibility for initial SOF planning and preparation
in consultation with the SOFAD at the JTF HQ and the proposed SOCC FN. At the
appropriate point, the NSHQ transfers responsibilities to the SOFAD and SOCC FN.
(1) The command relationship between COM JTF HQ and COM SOCC should
be specified in the initiating directive issued by the establishing authority. C2
arrangements among the components and specific responsibilities should be
established during the operational-level planning process.
(2) Annex K (Special Operations) to the operational-level OPLAN provides

broad guidance to the joint force, including the SOCC, concerning command,
control, and organization of SOF.
b. Deployment
(1) Nations are responsible, in close coordination with SACEUR, for the
deployment of their national contingents. The JTF HQ is often only able to monitor
the progress of unit movements until TOA. SHAPE develops the multinational
detailed deployment plan, then monitors and coordinates the use of strategic lift
assets through the Allied movement coordination centre (AMCC). The NSHQ
places a liaison element in the AMCC to represent SOF and to coordinate,
synchronize, and deconflict the movement of NATO SOF into and out of the JOA,
in consultation with the SOCC FN and the JTF HQ’s SOFAD.
12 AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, dated 16 Mar 11, paras 0305, 0307, and 0308.
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(2) Once Alliance political authorities approve the OPLAN and release the
execution directive, SACEUR issues the activation order that initiates the
deployment of forces and the release of national SOF to SACEUR.
c. Employment
(1) C2 of subordinate SOTGs, SOATGs, and conventional forces should be

clearly established in the SOCC’s CONOPS and subsequent OPLAN.
(2) Initial C2 arrangements should be designated in the SOCC CONOPS and

refined in the OPLAN or support plan (SUPPLAN). C2 arrangements are modified
as required during the employment phase.
d. Termination and Transition
(1) Termination and transition considerations should be addressed in the

planning process, before deployment, or as soon as possible during the initial
phase of the campaign. Transitions between SOCC FNs normally take the form of
relief in place and should address all aspects of C2, employment, sustainment,
FP, and strategic communications.
(2) The keys to successful transition include:
(a) Early planning with the in-place SOCC FN, as well as the other
actors in the operational environment including HN, IOs, and NGOs, if and
as applicable.
(b) Establishing realistic objectives, goals, and end states.
(c) Providing seamless transition of intelligence and communications

systems and processes.
(d) Maintaining unity of effort and purpose.
(e) Establishing robust C2 infrastructure—people, equipment, and

processes—to manage the transition.
(3) SOF are encouraged to utilize the TOA process to enhance the arriving SOCC
FN’s SA, develop relationships with other actors, and continue progress toward the
operational-level end state. A common method of transition is for the incoming unit to
shadow the outgoing unit, either partially or completely, for half the transition period,
then to switch roles for the remaining time to complete the transition process. This is
often referred to as a left-seat/right-seat ride.
2-4. Redeployment. C2 of redeploying SOF out of the JOA is very complex. The same level
of effort should be applied to redeployment as was given to deployment planning. SACEUR
retains operational command (OPCOM) of all assigned forces until TOA to their contributing
nations. Depending on the desires of the contributing nations, TOA can be upon departure of
forces from the JOA or their arrival at the point of debarkation.
2-5. Responsibilities. In NATO, nations retain full command (FULLCOM) of their military
forces contributed to a NATO operation. Nations normally delegate OPCOM of assigned forces
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to SACEUR, who retains this authority until TOA back to the TCNs. In certain cases, nations
may choose to grant SACEUR only OPCON.13
a. SACEUR normally delegates OPCON of assigned forces to COM JFC as soon as

appropriate. Unless otherwise restricted by national caveats or other political
considerations, COM JFC can further delegate OPCON to a subordinate commander.
Therefore, it is expected that COM JFC delegates OPCON of national SOTGs and
SOATGs contributed to a NATO operation to COM SOCC.
b. COM SOCC normally retains OPCON of assigned SOTGs and SOATGs, but may
delegate TACON of tactical units for limited periods or for specific missions.
c. COM SOCC reports to the highest appropriate operational-level commander,

normally COM JFC, as directed by SACEUR. In the event of activation of a JTF HQ, the
SOCC is placed OPCON under the designated COM JFC. SOF commanders should:
(1) Provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command using accepted

special operations C2 structures and practices consistent with NATO SOF policy. 14
(2) Provide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and
support operations.
(3) Ensure the SOCC is fully integrated into the strategic- and operational-level
planning processes.
(4) Match unit capabilities with mission assignments.
2-6. Command Organization. The NATO military structure allows for three models of
command. Each model offers a C2 option that may be appropriate for specific operations.1516
a. Fully Integrated. Fully integrated forces are based on proportional shares. This
often results in a binational or multinational construct at the CC-level HQ. The working
language within the HQ is agreed to by the contributing nations. Commanders of such
multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis.
b. Lead Nation. One nation assumes responsibility for the planning and execution of
an operation. The lead nation (LN) normally provides the commander, key staff, C2,
information and communications capacity, structure, doctrine, and logistic coordination of
the force. Other nations can assign contributions to this force and can fill staff positions
in the LN’s HQ.
13 AJP-3(B), pp. 1-26, para 0194a.

14 SOF policy is detailed in MC 437/2.
15 AJP-01(D), pp. 3-4 – 3-5.
16 For more information, see AD-20, Allocation of Forces and Transfer of Authority, dated 5 Jun 12.
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SOF Example: During the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission,
several nations took the lead when establishing a NATO SOF HQ at the joint force (ISAF)
level, each conducting a 6- to 12-month rotation in this role. Although this CC was
named differently, they provided the core of a SOCC HQ in the absence of a standing
SOCC HQ in NATO.
c. Framework Nation. The FN is expected to consolidate all forces and personnel

required to perform the task of a SOCC. This includes HQ related personnel as well as
the SOTGs, covering all required capabilities.
SOF Example: During the planning for possible NATO operations in Libya, one nation
accepted the responsibility of FN for special operations if required and activated. That
nation was prepared to provide a COM SOCC and key staff, the CIS infrastructure to
support the HQ, an SOTG, and some tactical airlift support. The SOCC FN had prepared
for the commitment prior to the contingency and had been certified during the
STEADFAST series exercises at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre.
2-7. Command and Control Options. According to AJP-01(D), there are two broadly
defined options for C2 of forces within NATO operations:17
a. Deployable Operational-level Command. This option is essential in order to

preserve NATO’s ability to conduct NA5CROs. Operational-level command is normally
exercised by a COM JFC from a JTF HQ. It is possible to split the command between an
element that remains at the primary HQ location and another that deploys forward and
uses technology to reach back to the main HQ. The commander determines which staff
functions he wants represented in the forward deployed staff element. This option allows
the JTF HQ to command more than one concurrent operation, if required. To learn about
the NCS JTF HQ responsive C2 deployment and NATO SOF role in the process, see Bi-
SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations.
b. NATO Response Force. The NRF option allows COM JFC to deploy an element
of the JTF HQ that is not dual-hatted with the main HQ. Those J1-J9 staff functions
needed by the commander to establish a physical presence in theatre would be
represented in the deploying element of the HQ staff. The NRF also makes use of
technology to extend its capabilities and reach-back to the main HQ.
2-8. Command Relationships.18 Command is the authority to direct, coordinate, and control
assigned units; implicit is the ability to assign missions, issue directives, and allocate force
groupings. Control is inherent in command. A common understanding of the degrees of
authority is a prerequisite for effective cooperation under NATO military command structures.
These terms form the basis for this common understanding (see Figure 2-1):
a. Full Command. FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a

commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations
and administration and exists only within national services. Nations that assign forces to
a NATO operation always retain FULLCOM of those forces.
b. Operational Command. OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to

assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces,
17 AJP-01(D), pp. 3A-5 – 3A-6.

18 AJP-3(B), pp. 1-26 – 1-27.
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NSHQ 80-002
and to retain or delegate operational and/or TACON as the commander deems

necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics.
c. Operational Control. OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to

direct forces assigned to accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited
by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON
of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of
components of the units concerned nor does it include administrative or logistic control.
d. Tactical Command. Tactical command (TACOM) is the authority delegated to a

commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the
mission assigned by higher authority.
e. Tactical Control. TACON is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control
of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
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NSHQ 80-002
Least Control
Most Control
AUTHORITY
NATO NATO NATO NATO
FULLCOM
OPCOM1 OPCON TACOM TACON
Direct authority to deal with
nations, diplomatic missions, X
and agencies
Delegated to a commander X X X
Assign/reassign subordinate
X
commanders/officers
Assign separate employment of
X
unit components
Reassign forces X
Assign missions/designate X
X
objectives (limited)2
Assign tasks X X X
Local direction/control X
X X X
designated forces (limited)3
Directive authority for logistics X4 X5
Directive authority for
X
administration/discipline
Directive authority for joint
X6 X7
training
The national authority will LEGEND

always retain FULLCOM as per FULLCOM – Full Command
AJP-3(B). OPCOM – Operational Command
OPCON – Operational Control
TACOM – Tactical Command
TACON – Tactical Control
COM JFC – Joint Force Commander
Has this authority X

Denied authority or not specifically granted
Notes:
1. For NATO SOF, OPCON is delegated through SACEUR (AJP-3.5(A) refers).
2. Limited due to national caveats.
3. Limited due to national caveats.
4. National assets through national support elements only.
5. Under COM JFC and through a military integrated logistics unit.
6. For training under national authority, e.g. pre-deployment training.
7. For training under COM JFC authority, e.g. in-theatre training.
Figure 2-1. C2 Relationships
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f. Supported and Supporting Relationship.19 A supported/supporting relationship is

not a command relationship, but it does allow for great flexibility as organizations aid,
protect, complement, or sustain other forces. A supported commander may be designated
for an entire operation, by phase of an operation, by function, or any combination of
phases, stages, events, and functions. Supported/supporting relationships afford an
effective means to weight various phases of NATO operations. Within a joint force,
components or elements can support or be supported based on assigned tasks.
Therefore, commanders may be both supported and supporting at the same time.
SOF Example: COM ACC is the supported commander for direct attack of enemy
centres of gravity (COGs) during the initial entry phase of an operation. The SOCC is
supporting the ACC with air-land integration teams that are finding, fixing, and
designating high pay-off targets (HPTs), according to COM JFC’s prioritization
guidelines. At the same time, the ACC is supporting the SOCC with intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); personnel recovery (PR); and air-to-air refuelling
(AAR) resources during DA missions to capture designated high-value targets (HVTs).
(1) Supported Commander. The supported commander has the authority to

establish the general direction of the supporting efforts. General direction includes
the designation and prioritization of targets and objectives, timing and duration of
supporting actions, and other instructions necessary for coordinated and efficient
operations. The establishing authority (normally COM JFC) is responsible for
specifying the degree of authority the supported commander is granted. The
establishing directive is essentially an order that provides the purpose of the
support relationship, the desired effects and objectives, and the scope of actions
to be taken. As a minimum, COM JFC’s establishing directive should include:
(a) Time, place, and duration of the supported effort.
(b) Priority of the supported mission to other missions given to

supporting commanders.
(c) Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to deviate from the

supporting mission in the case of an opportunity or emergency.
(d) Degree of authority granted to the supported commander.
(e) Control measures.
(f) Air support processes.
(g) Campaign synchronization.
(h) Intelligence collection planning.
(i) Non-organic logistic support.
(j) FP responsibilities.
(2) Supporting Commander. The supporting commander determines the

tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed by the
19 AJP-3(B), pp. 1-24 – 1-26.
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supporting forces. The supporting commander advises and coordinates with the
supported commander on employment and limitations, such as logistics; assists
with planning; and ensures that support requirements are appropriately
communicated to the supporting commander’s organization. The supporting
commander must fully understand the needs of the supported force and must take
all actions possible to fulfil those needs within existing capabilities that are
consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.
2-9. Command and Control of Deployed Forces
a. COM SOCC exercises C2 of his SOF and conventional forces within the
authorities specified by nations through SACEUR and COM JFC. A thorough
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each of these forces is necessary to
conduct effective and successful special operations.
b. COM SOCC should ensure that lateral and higher HQs have a complete
understanding of the SOCC’s operational capabilities. It is useful to brief the
conventional force HQ operating in the same operational area as NATO SOF as this
fosters mutual support and trust, harmonizes goals and objectives, and synchronizes
operations. Likewise, it is also beneficial for the SOCC to request and receive a
capabilities briefing from the conventional force HQ for the same reasons.
c. Suggested topics for these capabilities briefings include mission, intent, and
purpose; battle rhythm and coordination requirements; task organization; operational
area assessment; overview of specific capabilities and equipment such as C2IS, air and
aviation capabilities, and organic ISR; unique support requirements; and projected
timelines for deployment and employment.
2-10. Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces Integration. When properly
integrated, conventional forces and SOF can capitalize on their inherent strengths to achieve
COM JFC’s intent. Ignoring conventional forces and SOF integration issues during planning
may introduce operational complexities that either increase risk or mitigate potential
complementary effects.
a. Interoperability. Successful conventional forces and SOF integration should

ideally begin during peacetime. Practising conventional forces and SOF integration
procedures and addressing interoperability challenges during training and exercises
provide the best means of reducing missed opportunities, unnecessary delays, and the
potential for collateral damage, including fratricide, during conflict. Additionally, building
trust through personal relationships has proven to be key for successful integrated
conventional forces and SOF operations.
b. Employment Considerations
(1) In general, a supported/supporting C2 relationship provides the best

framework for integrated conventional forces and SOF operations at the CC level.
This relationship allows the supported commander (SOF or conventional forces) to
set goals and objectives while allowing the supporting commander the flexibility to
determine methods and tactics (paragraph 2-8f provides additional detail
concerning support relationships).
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(2) Delegating mission approval authority to the lowest possible level increases
timeliness of support and flexibility. The units responsible for conducting the
operations must be included early in the planning process to ensure proper
coordination, integration, and synchronization of unit capabilities and limitations.
c. Special Operations Forces Supported by Conventional Forces. Conventional

forces possess a variety of capabilities, including a greater number of personnel,
equipment, and infrastructure, that can be used to support special operations. To ensure
effective integration of forces when the SOCC is the supported force, the staffs should:
(1) Conduct a joint feasibility assessment to determine the viability of a

proposed mission and target for conventional forces employment.
(2) Determine if the mission is an appropriate use of conventional forces.
(3) Determine if required resources are available.
(4) Capitalize on the strengths and minimize the limitations of each force’s
potential contributions, specifically addressing manoeuvre, fires, intelligence,
logistic support, C2IS, and FP.
(5) Establish clear command relationships among the tactical units.
d. Conventional Forces Supported by Special Operations Forces. When the

conventional forces are supported, that commander must understand the inherent limitations
of SOF; SOF normally operate in small elements and do not possess sufficient combat
power to confront enemy forces for a sustained period. However, properly used SOF offer
specialized, yet complementary, capabilities to the conventional forces commander. To
ensure that conventional forces are effectively supported by SOF, the staffs should:
(1) Ensure SOF provide inputs on how they can best support the conventional
forces commander’s intent and CONOPS.
(2) Conduct an assessment to determine if SOF operational mission criteria

have been met.
(3) Provide special operations liaison and planning support to conventional

forces early in the planning and coordination process.
(4) Capitalize on the strengths and minimize the limitations of each force’s
potential contributions, specifically addressing manoeuvre, fires, intelligence,
logistic support, C2IS, and FP.
(5) Establish clear command relationships among the tactical units.
2-11. Operational Environment Geometry. Operational environment geometry provides a

common understanding of how the JOA is organized and labelled. The modern operational
environment continues to expand beyond traditional boundaries and is becoming more
dispersed and non-contiguous as adversaries conduct operations simultaneously on global,
regional, and local scales.
a. Boundaries and Areas. All boundaries and areas are mission related, temporary,
and limited by agreed-to parameters, such as time, location, and function. COM JFCs do
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not have an area of responsibility (AOR); rather, SACEUR defines their JOA as required
by their mission.
(1) Joint Operations Area. A JOA is a temporary area defined by SACEUR in

which a designated JFC plans and executes a specific mission at the operational
level. A JOA is mission specific and is normally associated with a joint force. The
designated JFC plans and conducts military operations within a JOA to accomplish
a specific mission.
(2) Area of Operations. An AOO is an operational area defined by COM JFC

within a JOA for the conduct of specific military activities. Normally, an AOO does
not encompass the entire JOA of the JFC, but is sufficient in size to accomplish
assigned missions and protect forces.
(3) Area of Interest. The area of interest (AOI) is the area of concern to a
commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including
the commander’s areas of influence, operations, and/or responsibility and adjacent
areas.
(4) Joint Special Operations Area. A joint special operations area (JSOA) is
an area of land and/or sea and airspace assigned by a COM JFC to the
commander of joint SOF to conduct special operations.
(a) COM JFC establishes a JSOA when requested and justified by the
SOCC. COM SOCC may further assign a specific AOO within the JSOA to
a subordinate commander. The scope and duration of the special
operation, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations
all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed
into a JSOA. A JSOA may be limited in size to accommodate a short
duration DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing
broad range of special operations. COM JFCs may use a JSOA to
synchronize and facilitate simultaneous employment of conventional forces
and SOF in the same general area. When a JSOA is designated, COM
SOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.
(b) Establishing a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent

operations simplifies the control of special operations. A JSOA usually
reduces the likelihood of collateral damage and fratricide as well. However,
COM SOCC should consider the perceived value of isolating SOF against
the possible greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign.
(c) Use of JSOAs should be carefully considered because, although they

provide a three-dimensional battlespace to SOF, COM SOCC must also
manage the battlespace. This responsibility normally includes managing
displaced personnel, collecting and managing POWs, and managing
airspace and fire support coordination. A SOCC is not normally manned or
equipped to operate as a battlespace control centre without significant
augmentation and liaison support from the other components. One
technique to avoid unnecessary interference with ACC operations is to
significantly limit the JSOA’s size and altitude.
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b. Operating in an Area of Operations Assigned to Another Commander. When

operating within another commander’s AOO in the absence of an assigned operational
area for their own exclusive use, SOF must comply with that commander’s authority.
Targeting, fires, force tracking, and land management must be in accordance with the
direction provided by the AOO commander. SOF units operating within an AOO must
keep the AOO commander apprised of their locations and recognize that the AOO
commander retains the authority for establishing fire support coordination measures
(FSCMs) and clearing fires.
2-12. Liaison
a. Cross Cultures in NATO. NATO operations require significant coordination,

integration, and collaboration. Differences in languages, cultures, equipment,
capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the challenges that require close
cooperation. The maximum use of liaison personnel, especially in operations with non-
NATO contributing nations, enhances interoperability and contributes significantly to
mission success.
b. Liaison Networks. COM SOCC should establish a liaison network, beginning

with the higher command and the other components. In addition, liaisons should be
exchanged with the HN and any local, regional, or international organizations involved in
the campaign or operating in the battlespace with the SOCC, as required.
c. Responsibilities
(1) SOF liaison elements represent COM SOCC and his staff to the receiving
commanders, promoting a valuable understanding of the commander’s intentions
to both the sending and receiving HQs.
(2) The senior officer in the SOF liaison element should have the authority to
speak for COM SOCC and should be of sufficient rank to influence decision-
making in the HQ to which they are assigned.
(3) Personnel assigned to a SOF liaison element must have sufficient

knowledge of joint SOF capabilities and limitations and of the intentions and
priorities of the staff sections they represent. LOs should be innovative and
tenacious, as well as diplomatic and sensitive to the operational challenges, staff
processes, and battle rhythm of the receiving HQ.
(4) COM SOCC is responsible for ensuring SOF liaison elements deploy with
sufficient communications equipment to permit near-instantaneous
communications with the SOCC up to the NATO SECRET level.
d. Coordination with Higher Headquarters20
(1) COM SOCC provides a senior officer who is vested with the authority to
make recommendations and facilitate decision-making to the Joint Coordination
Board (JCB).
(2) The SOCC is represented in the Joint Operations Planning Group by a

senior officer and appropriate staff who have the expertise and credibility to assist
20 Based on liaison guidance in AJP-3(B).
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with the planning process. The senior officer also has the authority to facilitate
decision-making.
(3) The SOPLE contains sufficient qualified subject matter specialists to

represent the SOCC staff’s interests at the various sub-boards, meetings, working
groups, and other coordination mechanisms. The size of the SOPLE is sufficient
to meet the JTF HQ’s battle rhythm.
e. Coordination with Lateral Headquarters
(1) Placing liaisons among the components is the primary method of

coordination and ensuring critical information is rapidly assessed and
disseminated up and down the chain of command.
(2) The requirement for liaison elements is likely to require a large number of
high quality personnel. This is especially true for a relatively small component
such as the SOCC. Still, the ability to synchronize activities among the
components makes this a valuable utilization of quality individuals.
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CHAPTER 3 – EFFECTS AND TARGETING
3-1. General. The comprehensive approach to operations demands that all agencies, military
and non-military, be considered during the development of any course of action (COA) that
involves NATO force participation in any Article 5 operation or NA5CRO. This ensures that all
resources, assets, and enablers are leveraged to ensure collective success. This chapter
outlines the concept of effects-based targeting and the major components of the comprehensive
approach.21 The SOCC, in support of the JTF HQ, must ensure that the effects of kinetic or
non-kinetic actions are thought through logically and sequentially with an understanding of how
those actions affect the targeted and non-targeted actors. It is important for SOF, particularly at
the SOCC level, to develop significant coordination between all agencies, military and non-
military, that form elements of the comprehensive approach. Ideally some kind of fusion cell
within the SOCC, shared between J2 Intelligence, J3 Operations, and J9 Info Ops, should be
established to bring together these battlespace players. Without this interaction collective
success, which the comprehensive approach aims to deliver, may not be possible.
3-2. The New Battlespace. The new battlespace should be considered a four-dimensional
space with the fourth dimension being the cognitive one created by the effects of targeting
(kinetic and non-kinetic) that influences all friendly, non-friendly, and neutral audiences. To be
effective in this new battlespace, the physical actions on the surface, above the surface, and
below the surface (the three physical dimensions) must be examined further. NATO SOF
operators must critically develop and understand targets so they can consider the desired effect
that an action has on individuals, groups, and/or the overall campaign or operation.
3-3. Effects-based Targeting. The objective(s) drives the targeting process. Prior to kinetic
or non-kinetic targeting, an overall objective must be determined. Targets should be
researched and nominated with an objective or with a series of objectives in mind. By using
some simple strategies and concepts, such as find, feel, understand, influence, and disrupt
(F2UID), enhanced for SOF purposes, the SOCC can better develop and analyse enemy,
friendly, and neutral targets for direct and indirect methods in support of the desired objective(s)
(see Figure 3-1). A determination can then be made how to best achieve the desired objective.
An example of this concept is the disruption of an improvised explosive device (IED) cell.
Targeting a cell leader may seem like the best method of disrupting a cell, but a leader is often
well protected and subsequently difficult to target. A more detailed examination of the cell may
expose sub-elements that can be considered critical vulnerabilities. These sub-elements will be
more susceptible to targeting and may potentially have a more detrimental effect on the cell’s
activities. Another example is a community leader who supports the local population but who
also recruits or provides other support to the enemy. A better understanding of human
motivation, or of individual motives and their connections with governmental, non-governmental,
and non-friendly actors, may provide insight into the use of non-kinetic means through Info Ops
to target the community leader to weaken his support to the enemy.
21Effect is defined in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) as “a change in the state of a
system (or system element) that results from one or more actions or other causes.”
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Figure 3-1. Effects-based Targeting
3-4. Joint Coordination Process. The joint coordination process is undertaken on behalf of
the JFC by the JCB. The JCB assigns execution responsibilities; directs the main effort;
provides priority and weight of effort for each line of operation; and deconflicts, synchronizes,
and harmonizes all aspects of tactical activities, effects, and support to operations.
Responsibilities of the JCB include:
a. Providing joint objectives to the CCs (including support to HN and inter-agency

activities).
b. Specifying the inter-component command and support relationships required to

undertake tactical activities (including apportionment of air assets and operational
reserve forces).
c. Reviewing and recommending approval of the joint coordination order (JCO).
d. Reviewing and recommending approval of products and outputs from coordination

boards such as the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and the Information
Operation Coordination Board.
e. Approving the allocation of ISR assets to the components as recommended by the

Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (DARB) and overseeing the effect of ISR allocations
to the joint campaign.
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3-5. Joint Targeting. Joint targeting is the process The joint targeting cycle is a
by which all interested parties (military, inter-agency, command function at both the
and HN) nominate targets and determine the effects operational and component level
required to achieve the desired objective. and assists with determining the
effects necessary to achieve the
a. Joint targeting translates political and
commander’s objectives,
military guidance into desired effects against identifying the actions
the enemy at the tactical level. The OPLAN, in necessary to create them based
concert with the CCs’ SUPPLANs, articulates on the means available,
the military effort that can be provided within a selecting and prioritizing
TOO to support the desired targeting effects.
targets, synchronizing lethal and
Key to establishing the joint targeting process is non-lethal capabilities, and then
the ability to coordinate, deconflict, prioritize, assessing their cumulative
integrate, synchronize, and assess effects- effectiveness, taking remedial
based targeting efforts. Joint targeting provides action if necessary.
the means to achieve COM JFC’s effects- AJP-3.9(B)
based objectives; mitigates collateral damage;
and ensures the consideration of first-, second-, and third-order effects. It focuses the
processes and resources among all interested parties, provides lethal and non-lethal
targeting options, and can be modified to fit any phase of an operation. Figure 3-2 is an
example of an effects planning matrix.
Line of Operations Effect Task

Supporters do not oppose government authority
Disarm Militias
Paramilitary militias disbanded or marginalized
Security
Defeat Adversary Adversary units unable to conduct operations
Military Units Adversary unit leaders integrated into political process
Functional Public Country-wide access to routine health care
Health System Significant threats to health at International Red Cross acceptable levels
Development
Functional Public Infrastructure and resources to provide education to all
Education System Operational primary and secondary education system available to all
Legitimate Routine, peaceful, free, and fair elections
Government Elections perceived as legitimate by population
Governance
Government able to Government able to deal with internal security issues
govern entire country Government exercises authority over provinces and ethnic groups
NATO JTF HQ and HN Coherent priorities between HN and NATO mission
Coordination Effective liaison at all levels and across functions
Coordination Conditions and resources for displaced persons and refugees return are
NATO JTF HQ and
established and functioning
NGO Coordination
NGOs return to provide development assistance
All required forces in combined joint statement of requirements available
NATO JTF HQ
and deployed
Capabilities and Resources
Air support meets/exceeds NATO requirements
Enablers
NATO JTF HQ European population and media support NATO mission
Perceived Positively HN population supports NATO mission
Figure 3-2. Effects Planning Matrix
b. Effects-based planning allows for the harmonization of SOF, conventional, HN,

and non-military agencies’ kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities in order to provide a
comprehensive approach to targeting. It should be noted that the effects planning matrix
provides guidance on desired effects and tasks but does not provide individual target
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detail. The target detail is formulated by interested parties and submitted through the
joint targeting cycle once they receive direction and guidance in the JCO. The effects
planning matrix does not provide information regarding measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) or measures of performance (MOPs); these should be provided in the OPLAN
and reinforced in the components’ SUPPLANs.
(1) Measures of Effectiveness. MOEs in military operations are defined as

tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of
assigned tasks. MOEs are a prerequisite to the performance of assessment.
Assessment of such indicators normally takes place at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of operations, and goes beyond counting craters or vehicles
destroyed. These measures help determine progress toward accomplishing tasks,
creating effects, and achieving objectives. Well-devised MOEs, along with other
measures and indicators, should be observable and measurable, enabling the JTF
HQ staff and components to understand the causal linkage between specific tasks
to create the desired effects and objectives, as well as to guide future action.
These MOEs should be developed as early as possible within the planning
process. Simply put, MOEs evaluate the effectiveness of the effect on the target
and are generally subjective and not simple quantifications.
(2) Measures of Performance. MOPs are tools to more effectively measure

success and are generally quantifiable results. MOPs are more objective
evaluations from the executing perspective (e.g. number of missions completed,
leaflets dropped, personnel recruited and trained).
3-6. Joint Targeting Process. The joint targeting process links activity at the strategic,
operational, and component levels. This allows the translation of strategic guidance and the
JTF HQ’s direction into tactical-level activities in accordance with COM JTF’s targeting priorities
through the joint targeting cycle at the operational level. Within each component, tactical-level
targeting activities allow component commanders to contribute to and act on the joint targeting
process. The process and the different levels of activity are illustrated in Figure 3-3.
Figure 3-3. Joint Targeting Process22
22 D3A stands for decide, detect, deliver, and assess.
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3-7. Joint Targeting Cycle23
a. The joint targeting cycle consists of six phases and is applicable to both the
deliberate and dynamic approaches (see paragraphs 3-8c(1) and 3-8c(2) respectively).
This cycle focuses targeting options on the JFC’s objectives for operations, while
diminishing the likelihood of undesirable consequences. The joint targeting cycle is
inextricably linked to the intelligence process and feeds both the short- and long-term
planning processes.24
b. The joint targeting cycle is replicated in Figure 3-4 to highlight the SOCC’s
contribution to the theatre-level process. Timescales for the joint targeting cycle are
normally 72-96 hours (similar to the air tasking cycle) from target nomination to
execution. This can be shortened or lengthened depending on the type of target and the
effect to be achieved.
Figure 3-4. Joint Targeting Cycle
(1) Objectives, Guidance, and Intent. This phase is where political, strategic,
and operational guidance is translated into effects-based targeting. The OPLAN
and JCO provide the required objectives, guidance, and intent to be enacted by
the components. From a SOCC perspective, the SOPLE is ideally placed to
influence the JTF HQ’s guidance to the SOCC to ensure the desired effects are
matched against available capabilities and resources. On receipt, the SOCC J3
targeteer forwards the OPLAN, JCO, SOCC’s SUPPLAN, and relevant guidance
to the subordinate SOTGs/SOATGs. This starts the SOTG process of identifying
23 AJP-3.9(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, Study Draft 4, dated 2014, paras 0202 – 0204.
24 Details on how these processes interact can be found in AJP-3.9(B).
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and developing the targets to support the operational design and desired effects
outlined in the JTF HQ and SOCC’s guidance.
(2) Target Development. This phase involves analysis of the enemy through
multiple methods in order to identify and prioritize legal targets that support the
JTF HQ and SOCC’s objectives. Once the SOTG/SOATG’s targets are identified
and analysed, the targets are nominated through the SOCC J3 targeteer. The
SOCC J3 targeteer scrutinizes the nominations prior to incorporation into the
SOCC’s target nomination list (TNL). The TNL is forwarded to the JTCB through
the appropriate LO who presents the case for each target to be included on the
draft joint prioritized target list (JPTL). Once the draft JPTL is approved, it is
broken down into prioritized target lists (PTLs) and distributed back to the
components. On receipt of the SOCC PTL, the J3 targeteer ensures that the
targets on the PTL are legal, suitable, feasible, and acceptable before allocation to
subordinate elements for further development and execution.
(3) Capabilities Analysis. Prioritized targets are matched against appropriate

capabilities (lethal and non-lethal options) to achieve the desired objectives while
minimizing undesirable consequences. During this phase, commanders look at all
possible options to identify how best to engage the target and to achieve the
desired effect. Additional support requirements are also identified during this
phase and CONOPS developed. Initial coordination between the SOTG/SOATG
and SOCC J35 may take place at this stage.
(4) Force Planning and Assignment. This takes the capabilities analysis and
matches it with the required forces to complete the prosecution of the target. From
a SOCC perspective, this phase includes J35 staffing and authorization of the
CONOPS, confirmation that assets have been allocated to support the submitted
SPTREQs, and that the battlespace deconfliction is complete.
(5) Execution Planning and Force Execution. This is the CC’s responsibility
and includes the direct planning and prosecution of the target plus coordination of
the assets required to complete the assessment phase. This phase is truly for the
tactical (executing) commander to control; the operation centre monitors the
mission and provides assistance if required.
(6) Combat Assessment. This provides tactical- and operational-level

assessments that inform both MOEs and MOPs. From a tactical level, this phase
focuses on task success in terms of target impact and achievement of the desired
effect. From an operational perspective, this phase provides measures of success
related to the operational design, indicates whether the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs) are being answered, and affords the opportunity for
the JCB to review/change the guidance as required. At all levels, this phase should
be continuous and inform the next joint targeting cycle. Commanders contribute to
this phase by submitting intelligence reports (INTREPs), SITREPs, and operation
summaries (OPSUMs), which are all tactical assessments that can be modified by the
SOCC to inform the operational assessment.
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3-8. Types of Target
a. A target is defined as an area, structure, object, person, and/or group of people

against which lethal and/or non-lethal activity can be directed to create specific
psychological and/or physical effects.25
b. NATO SOF are resourced and enabled through the all-source centre (ASC) to
deal with several types of targets:26
(1) High-value Target. An HVT is defined as a target identified as critical to an

actor or organization for achieving its goal. Successfully influencing such a target
will seriously hamper or support the actor or organization.
(2) High Pay-off Target. An HPT is defined as an HVT, the successful

influencing of which will offer a disproportionate advantage to friendly forces.
HPTs are defined by the value they offer to friendly forces rather than other actors.
(3) Time-sensitive Target. Time-sensitive targets (TSTs) are derived from

NAC-approved TST categories, and from these, specific targets are designated by
the JFC. Once identified, they are given the highest priority, requiring an
immediate response because they are either highly lucrative, fleeting targets or
pose a threat to campaign objectives. TSTs can be prosecuted using both the
deliberate and dynamic approach.
c. Targeting in NATO falls into two broad targeting categories, deliberate and
dynamic.
(1) Deliberate Targets. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets

known to exist in an operational area with lethal and/or non-lethal actions
scheduled against them. Targets may be engaged in accordance with a timed
schedule or held on call to be prosecuted if the situation demands it. In all cases,
target data has sufficient detail to allow the capability matching and force
assignment elements of the joint targeting cycle to be planned and conducted.
This enables the JFC to establish the means for achieving his objectives and is
often sequenced to include actions to be taken over a number of days. Resources
are subsequently assigned corresponding to the level of effort dedicated to this
category, which can vary over the length of the campaign or operation. This is
most effective when target parameters, such as location, are well known or
predictable.
(2) Dynamic Targets.27 The dynamic approach normally prosecutes targets

known to exist in the AOO. They have received some target development, but,
were not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in
the deliberate process. Sometimes unexpected targets emerge that meet criteria
specific to operational objectives. On these occasions, additional resources will be
required to complete the target development, validation, and prioritization,
although they can be prosecuted by redirecting existing assets.
25 AJP-3.9(B).
26 For more information on the ASC, see paragraphs below 4-3b(2).
27 Dynamic targeting should not be confused with time-sensitive targeting. Dynamic targeting is a reactive process
rather than a time compressed process.
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3-9. Combat Engagement
a. Combat engagement, or more commonly known as troops in contact, is not part of

the joint targeting process. It usually includes attack against an adversary and normally
involves joint fires coordinated at the tactical level in accordance with ROE. Combat
engagement should not be confused with dynamic targeting.
b. The joint targeting process and combat engagement provide a continuum from
deliberate targeting to self-defence, reducing planning time and requiring fewer tactical
directives and targeting constraints (see Figure 3-4).
Figure 3-5. The Engagement Continuum
3-10. Target Lists.28 See Figure 3-6.
a. Joint Target List. The joint target list (JTL) is a comprehensive list of targets
compiled by the JTCB; each target on the JTL is scrutinized to ensure it complies with
strategic targeting guidance, national limitations, and national caveats. Targets on the
JTL will not be cleared legally against ROE and international law criteria until selected for
engagement and nominated on the JPTL. Once compiled, all further joint targeting
activities will be derived from the JTL.
28AJP-3.9(B), paras 0414 – 0420. More target lists and databases are available in joint targeting; only the most
common ones relevant to the SOCC are listed in this chapter for reference purposes.
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b. Joint Prioritized Target List.29 The JPTL, a subset of the JTL, is a prioritized list
of targets produced by the JTCB as an output of the target development phase of the
joint targeting cycle. Targets on this list have been scrutinized to ensure legal, strategic
targeting guidance, national caveat adherence, and risk assessment compliance. The
draft JPTL is submitted to the JCB by the JTCB for review and for the commander’s
approval. Once approved, the JPTL provides direction on which component is
responsible for target prosecution, the proposed means of attack, and the lethal/non-
lethal effect required to neutralize the target.
Figure 3-6. NATO Target Lists and Relationships30
(1) Lethal Effect. Lethal targeting requires the “application of force (including
deadly force), whose aim is to achieve the neutralization of a target. Will generally
consist of kinetic means, although may include methods deliberately designed to
bring about the same result.”31
(2) Non-lethal Effect. Non-lethal targeting is not defined but is considered to

include all other means apart from kinetic, e.g. Info Ops, show of force, civil-
military cooperation (CIMIC), reintegration/reconciliation, influence activities,
electronic warfare (EW), cyberattack, economic sanctions.
c. Prioritized Target List. The PTL is a subset of the JPTL and allocates prioritized
targets to each component. It is, in effect, the JPTL broken down into a component
target list and should include all targets that were on the component TNL, unless
29 During recent NATO campaigns, this has been called the joint prioritized effects list (JPEL).
30 AD 80-70, Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO, dated 27 Apr 10.
31 AD 80-70, pp. M-3.
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excluded by the JTCB, as well as other targets that may have been reallocated from one
component to another by the JTCB. The PTL should mirror the JPTL in providing
direction on the proposed means of attack and the lethal/non-lethal effect required to
neutralize the target.
d. Restricted Target List. The restricted target list (RTL) is a subset of the JTL;
some targets on the RTL may be on the JPTL. Targets on the RTL are legal targets that
are either temporarily or permanently restricted by the joint targeting process.
e. No-strike List. The no-strike list (NSL) is a subset of the JTL; it lists the targets
that must not be engaged due to international law considerations or for strategic policy
reasons as directed by the NAC. Targets on the NSL cannot be prosecuted until
transferred to the JPTL.
f. Target Nomination List. A TNL is compiled by each component in accordance

with direction contained in the JCO. It is a prioritized list of component targets that is
forwarded to the JTCB as part of the joint targeting process. The TNL contains new
targets that have yet to be included on the JTL (and that may also be nominated for the
JPTL) as well as existing targets on the JTL that the component wishes to nominate for
the JPTL for engagement.
3-11. The Vital Link Between Intelligence and Operations in Effects-based Targeting.
Effects-based targeting is intelligence driven but operationally led. Simply put, the SOCC J3
must decide which targets to prosecute and, in conjunction with the J2, determine what type of
effect the strike against the target may have in both physical and non-physical categories. J2,
while key to the process, must understand COM SOCC’s guidance and intent, and the J3
director’s focus. That being said, J2 should have input into which targets are selected by being
able to tell J3 which targets will help accomplish the commander’s intent and how. J2 must
ensure that all intelligence collection, exploitation, analysis, fusion, and dissemination are done
with clear targeting objectives and effects in mind. The transition from target development to
prosecution should be seamless. The coordination and synchronization of ISR should be cued
properly so that the appropriate elements or assets are prepared to execute as intelligence is
being collected, analysed, fused, and disseminated in near real-time (NRT). J2 anticipates
requirements and adjusts collection plans accordingly.
3-12. Audience Levels of Effects-based Targeting. Before anything or anyone is targeted,

the affected audience levels must be understood. This is an important factor and must be
considered in both deliberate and hasty planning to determine decisive points/conditions,
desired effects, objectives, and end state.
a. Political/Strategic. This level includes the political, NATO strategic, and

international community audiences, as well as the populations within the Alliance nations,
that influence decisions.
b. Operational. The operational level includes the in-theatre infrastructure, HN

government, and security forces.
c. Tactical. Targeting of physical infrastructure at the local level in asymmetrical

conflict is sometimes necessary to deny the enemy an advantage, but physical targets
should be carefully analysed to ensure tactical necessity, decisiveness, and impact to
audiences. During the prosecution of physical targets, every effort must be taken to
reduce collateral damage, thus depriving the adversary of an Info Ops victory.
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Additionally, audiences may be the intended targets of both direct and indirect means, for
example, in a COIN environment.
(1) Unopposed or Friendly. Audiences who support the government and

security forces, and are not hostile or violent against international support to the
COIN efforts.
(2) Opposed or Hostile. Audiences who oppose the government, its security
forces, and any external assistance to counter the insurgency. This may include
both active and passive supporters of the insurgents who are unwilling to take up
arms or to participate in violence or attacks.
(3) Undecided or Fence Sitters. The audience that is uncommitted or largely

neutral but whose support is sought by both the friendly and hostile audiences.
3-13. Order of Effects. Once objectives are defined at the various levels (strategic,
operational, and tactical), the SOCC must ensure that targets and actions complement or
support those objectives. This requires a predictive approach to ensure the follow-on effects
are anticipated and considered fully. It also may require effects to be mitigated prior to, during,
and after mission execution. The ability to analyse second- and third-order effects is essential
to evaluating MOEs as part of the assessment phase of targeting. See Figure 3-7.
a. First-order Effect. The physical or direct effect that a kinetic action has on the
target or those around the target. The first-order effects of destroying a target such as a
bridge may be cutting off a vital line of C2 for the enemy but also crippling a critical line of
supply for humanitarian aid or displaced personnel movement.
a. Second-order Effect. The indirect effect on a system or parts thereof provided by

the passage of information. Accuracy is not relevant as opinions and rumours present
the event in a negative or positive light. In the case identified in the first-order effect, the
population may believe the bridge was targeted to stop the flow of displaced persons and
are not concerned with the disruption of the enemy C2.
b. Third-order Effect. Another indirect effect that impacts the cognitive plane with
all audiences, targeted and non-targeted. The third-order effect is based on the final
message or information being reinforced by post-operation actions as well as information
promulgated by the targeted audience. The stronger of the two eventually prevails,
regardless of the facts. Friendly forces must predict the opposing messages to mitigate
them effectively. In the case identified above, friendly forces must demonstrate that the
bridge was used by enemy C2 and that another route for the movement of humanitarian
aid and displaced persons will be established.
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Figure 3-7. Evaluating Hierarchy of Effects for Planned SOCC Operations
3-14. Non-kinetic Targeting and the Indirect Approach. There are many ways and means
to achieve non-kinetic effects. Given the nature of SOF, the SOCC is poised to provide NATO
and the JFC with a highly knowledgeable and extremely flexible non-kinetic capability. SOF are
involved either directly or indirectly with various non-kinetic activities including:
a. Military Assistance. MA includes SOF task activities that do not fall within the
SR and DA mission sets. MA is key to success in the new battlespace. To conduct MA
properly, one must understand that it includes most non-kinetic activities supported by
kinetic activities conducted by SOF. In a COIN environment, everything done within the
battlespace falls within the MA mission set. This is because each and every action
taken, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, produces both a direct and indirect effect that
causes people or organizations to change their behaviours and the way they think.
b. Information Operations. All kinetic

and non-kinetic actions generate a message. “In conventional ops, we use
The SOCC and its subordinate elements are Info Ops to explain what we are
versatile Info Ops enablers in the battlespace. doing. In COIN, we design
Info Ops are integral to the successful physical ops to enact our
execution of military operations. The goal of influence campaign.”
the joint force is to shape the information
David Kilcullen
environment to achieve information Counter-Insurgency in Iraq:
superiority. Info Ops contribute to information Theory and Practice, 2007
superiority by both defending military
decision-making from adversary attacks and by influencing and degrading an adversary’s
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decision-making capability, thereby producing an information advantage. Achieving

information superiority requires integrating Info Ops capabilities into the planning
process, into the commander’s intent and CONOPS, and applying Info Ops across the
range of military operations. The JTF HQ integrates military actions and capabilities
throughout the operating environment to create and/or sustain desired and measurable
effects on target audiences, while protecting and defending the JTF HQ’s own forces,
actions, information, and information systems. It must be kept in mind that integrating
special operations and Info Ops requires a high level of coordination to achieve the
desired effect.
(1) Definition. Info Ops are a military function to provide advice and
coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on
the will, understanding, and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries, and
other NAC-approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.32
(2) Information Activities. Information activities are actions designed to affect

information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and
include protective measures.
(3) Core Capabilities. The core Info Ops activities that focus on changing,
influencing, or reinforcing perceptions and attitudes include psychological
operations (PsyOps); presence, posture, and profile; deception; EW; physical
destruction; key leader engagement (KLE); and computer network operations.
(4) Supporting Capabilities. Information activities that focus on preserving

and protecting Alliance freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment
include OPSEC, information security (INFOSEC), physical security, and CI.
(5) Related Capabilities. There are two military capabilities, CIMIC and
defence support to public diplomacy, that can be used to achieve information
objectives.
(6) Public Affairs. PA and Info Ops are separate but related functions. Both
directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation, and deter
adversary actions; however, the efforts of PA and Info Ops differ with respect to
audience, scope, and intent. Therefore, coordination between PA and Info Ops
must be assured at all times and at all levels to ensure consistency in the message
released by the military to outside audiences and to promote overall effectiveness
and credibility of the campaign. Beyond coordination of efforts and messages, PA
has no role in performing the Info Ops function.
(7) Role of Special Operations Forces. Special operations personnel interact

with a wide range of Info Ops capabilities through indirect methods that support
joint force efforts. The SOCCPG should consider the addition of an Info Ops or
effects planner to focus and centralize Info Ops efforts. SOCC planners should
also consider obtaining Info Ops support from other components or external
assets. During the SOCC planning process (SOCC-P2), the Info Ops focus
should consider:
32 AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, dated 23 Nov 09, pp. 1-3.
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(a) Counter Command Activities. These activities are direct, action

specific, and deal with neutralizing key enemy organizations, networks, and
cells. Physical destruction is coordinated through the joint targeting
process, with the aim of destroying or degrading rather than influencing the
adversary’s C2. The priorities for physical destruction, in terms of
resources and targets, are provided by COM JFC and are critical to
ensuring the appropriate tasking of assets. Once COM JFC has given
guidance as part of the planning process, targets are nominated to support
the targeting objectives and priorities. Total destruction of an adversary’s
C2 nodes is rarely achievable, is only effective for a short time, or is
undesirable because it denies other exploitation opportunities. Political
constraint may also impede achieving the desired effect through these
activities. The key to counter command activities target planning is a
thorough coordination and identification of critical and vulnerable nodes.
(b) Operational Security.

Offensive Info Ops can be
OPSEC, or information protection
defined as “the synchronized
activities, is the process that gives
execution of actions taken to
the appropriate security, using
accomplish established
passive or active means, to deny
objectives that prevent effective
adversary knowledge of the
C2 of adversary’s forces by
dispositions, capabilities, and
denying information to, by
intentions of friendly forces. The
influencing, by degrading, by
OPSEC process is not an assured
destroying the adversary’s C2
protection of all information;
system, or by influencing beliefs
balancing risk is a commander’s
of hostile persons.”
decision. Oppressive OPSEC rules
may be counterproductive in terms Canadian Land Force Info Ops
of resource costs and limitations on B-GL-300-005/FP-001
friendly activity. Conversely,
relaxed OPSEC rules allow greater freedom of action for friendly forces but
increase the risk of compromise. While much of the detail of OPSEC is
managed by J3, the JTF HQ needs to be aware of some of the more sensitive
issues concerning SOF at the operational level. These might include the
effects that restrictive OPSEC may have upon the relationship with the media
and how this might influence the maintenance of public support. The need to
balance concerns about OPSEC with the synchronization of efforts across
components may require the attention of COM JFC.
(c) Influencing Activities. Influencing activities are those actions

whose primary purpose is to influence will. This may be achieved by the
promotion of identified themes to approved audiences through verbal and
non-verbal messages. Influencing activities seek to predispose, persuade,
convince, deter, disrupt, compel, or coerce approved audiences to adopt or
reinforce options or to create inaction. Influencing activities can capitalize
on, increase the effectiveness of, or in some cases remove the need for
kinetic attacks. As part of a comprehensive approach, influencing actions
focus the impact of existing actions against vulnerabilities to ensure that
their effect is coherent, supports joint force objectives, and conveys the
desired message. Influencing activities also generate actions (tasks),
ranging from a show of force to the dropping of leaflets, specifically
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intended to promote themes and thus influence will. Influencing activities

must be fully synchronized with strategic communications to ensure
maximum effectiveness.
c. Civil-military Cooperation. CIMIC involves the resources and arrangements that

support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and
military, and civil populations in areas where military forces are or plan to be employed.
Such arrangements include cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies,
organizations, and authorities.
(1) COM JFCs need to establish relationships with a variety of civilian

authorities and organizations, as CIMIC may be a central part of the mission, for
example, in the case of disaster or humanitarian relief. The force may be partially
dependent on the civilian population for resources and information, and may rely
on the civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may even be
impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without their cooperation.
However, merely establishing good relations might be enough to deny the same
advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. Whatever the situation,
commanders have a moral and legal responsibility toward the civilian populations
in their areas that can only be met by cooperating with the civil government and
international bodies.
(2) The aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of the
civilian population and institutions within the JOA to create civil-military conditions
that offer COM JFC the greatest possible moral, material, and tactical advantages.
Implicit in this is the denial of such advantages to an actual or potential adversary.
The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that support
the achievement of a lasting solution to the crisis. In essence, CIMIC is a force
multiplier in that it reduces the reliance on military force to achieve the mission
while minimizing public interference with the effective conduct of military
operations.
(3) A major part of CIMIC activity is conducted by deployed troops, with the J3
in the JTF HQ as the principal staff focus. To be effective, however, CIMIC
depends on a multifunctional approach within and beyond the HQ. Thus, CIMIC
should not be seen as a separate function. There is a requirement for close
working relationships across staff branches and, where necessary, the
involvement of senior commanders, and principally COM JFC. For instance, a
CIMIC project is reported factually by PA. If it is important enough, the project is
reported by the international media, which creates international public support for
the mission and its objectives. Public awareness also creates support for the
international donor agencies as well as the IOs and NGOs when they launch their
respective funding campaign at home. As another example, PsyOps, for its part,
links the project to key theme(s) and messages addressed to designated target
audience(s), as part of COM JFC’s communication plan. The SOCC and its
subordinate task groups play a key role in CIMIC operations. SOF are likely to
establish good contact with local nationals, thereby gaining their trust. This trust
allows SOF to identify potential CIMIC operations or projects that the people truly
want, not what military forces think the people want. CIMIC can assist in
developing reliable and sustainable human intelligence (HUMINT), in establishing
good relationships, and in assisting with KLE. When possible, CIMIC operations
should be built into a SOF tactical plan before, during, and after, and identified
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within the Info Ops and consequence management aspects of the SOF CONOPS
(see Chapter 7 for detailed information regarding SOF CONOPS). CIMIC allows
for additional shaping of the environment and information gathering. As an
enabler built into the SOF CONOPS, it reinforces SOF positive gains achieved in
the past and mitigates foreseen or anticipated negative impacts as a result of
planned actions. CIMIC staff should be approached early and asked to consider
the value of SOF in their planning. SOF can be supported by CIMIC enablers or
support CIMIC planning and security.
d. Psychological Operations. PsyOps is defined as “planned psychological

activities using methods of communications and other means directed to approved
audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the
achievement of political and military objectives.”33 The psychological dimension of
conflict is as important as the physical. Conflict is a struggle of wills that takes place in
people’s minds as well as on the battlefield. The attitudes and behaviour of people
(friend, foe, and the undecided or uncommitted) may be central to determining the
outcome of conflict and the nature of the post-conflict environment. Therefore, it is
necessary to understand the motivation of various target audiences—leaders, military
forces, populations—in order to shape their perceptions, affect their will, and persuade
them to accept the outcome desired by NATO. The employment of any element of power
projection, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension.
PsyOps, as a key element of most Info Ops activity, are a vital part of the broad range of
NATO diplomatic, military, economic, and informational activities.34 Currently PsyOps
are categorized as strategic, crisis response, and combat PsyOps. Each of the
categories overlaps as PsyOps are not easily grouped.
3-15. Consequence Management. Not all effects are positive. Planning at all levels within
the SOCC must assess the various consequences of their planned actions and attempt to
mitigate those consequences before, during, and after each operation. The following areas
should be considered by the mission planning element, included in the SOF CONOPS, and
briefed to COM SOCC before mission execution. It is important to note that the executing unit is
asking COM SOCC to accept the risks identified and to be prepared to provide support if and
when the requirement to mitigate consequence of action exists.
a. Most Likely and Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action. It is difficult to

pinpoint the exact action an enemy will undertake to win or to survive. By understanding
who the enemy is, their capabilities and resources, and their overall support from other
actors, intelligence personnel are in a better position to consider the enemy’s most likely
and most dangerous reactions to a plan of action and from there develop ways to
overcome or to mitigate that risk. Enemy reaction (physical and non-physical) must be
assessed based on structure, capabilities, resources, and links.
b. Risk to Own Forces. Operations that are designed to achieve desired second-
and third-order effects are typically complex in planning and execution. The more
complex an operation, the greater the potential for risk to friendly forces. Detailed
analysis must be conducted to ensure the risk to friendly troops is worth the desired
effects. If it is not, additional planning may have to be done in order to reduce or mitigate
the risk.
33 AJP-3.10.1(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, dated 22 Oct 07, para 0102
34 AJP-3.10.1(A), para 0104.
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c. Risk to NATO Mission. Every NATO member’s physical actions are seen as a
NATO message by all targeted and non-targeted parties. Special operations personnel
at all levels must be cognizant of this fact. In today’s informational environment, an
individual tactical action may have strategic level impacts. For SOF, planning at all levels
must demonstrate that direct and indirect effects will not undermine the NATO mission
and objectives.
d. Risk to Host Nation’s Government. All NATO deployed forces, including SOF,
must understand the potential effects their actions may have on the HN’s government.
NATO actions must not undermine the support of the population toward their government
and security forces. All SOCC missions should avoid risking the credibility of the HN’s
government.
3-16. Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage.35 Collateral damage is the unintentional or
incidental physical damage to non-combatants, non-military objects, and/or environment arising
from engagement of a legitimate military target. The JTF HQ, through the respective JFC,
receives targeting guidance from the NAC, through SACEUR, that has a pre-authorized level of
collateral damage. Beyond this level, the JTF HQ, through the JFC, must seek the authority of
SACEUR, and ultimately the NAC, to approve a target prosecution. Even within approved
collateral damage levels, the JTF HQ must decide if any expected collateral damage would be
excessive or not, related to the military advantage offered by prosecution of each target, and
take all reasonable precautions to avoid it.
a. Collateral Damage Estimation.36 The collateral damage estimate (CDE)

provides COM SOCC with an expectation, but not a certainty, of collateral damage, to
inform his targeting decision. CDE facilitates the legal consideration of proportionality,
and the methodology and policy for CDE will be laid down in the OPLAN.
b. High Collateral Damage Risk. Civilian casualties and collateral damage should
be avoided at all costs. When the risk is considered high, approval must be sought
through the appropriate levels of delegated authority in accordance with respective
NATO targeting directives and any mission specific tactical directives. Special operations
units must be able to demonstrate that all efforts are made to avoid civilian casualties
and collateral damage. If they cannot be avoided, appropriate consequence
management planning must be put in place.
3-17. Analysis and Development
a. Within complex operating environments, the key to success is directing limited

SOF resources to achieve a significant effect that supports the commander’s intent for
the operation engaged in. It is this requirement for detailed target development and
potential effects analysis that demonstrates one of the key differences between SOF and
conventional operations, as highlighted in Figure 3-8. To achieve the desired results,
time must be spent utilizing all available intelligence and information sources (civilian and
military) to build a multilayered picture of the operating environment. Only then can SOF
truly determine the effect they are going to have.
35 Collateral damage as defined in AJP-3.9(B).

36 For more information on CDE, refer to AJP-3.9(B), paras 0124 to 0127.
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Figure 3-8. Conventional Targeting versus SOF Targeting
b. It can be detrimental to leap directly into the hard targeting process of find, fix,
finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate (F3EAD), covered in paragraph 3-21, particularly
in a theatre dominated by non-conventional warfare. The SOCC must develop a true
understanding of the operational environment and map out all the friendly, non-friendly,
and undecided actors at play. Without the knowledge of how all these elements work,
how they are linked, and the relationship that one has to another, it is impossible to
determine the true effect of potential operations. Fundamental to this process is the
requirement to conduct detailed target analysis. There are various tools and methods
that can be utilized in order to develop this picture. These tools are contained within the
process of F2UID. It must be emphasized that this is not a quick process. Time and
resources must be invested to ensure the relevance of information and products. If the
process is performed successfully, the overall level of operational effectiveness may be
greatly improved.
c. F2UID is a tool that can be utilized at various SOF levels to develop a picture and
to describe the operational environment. It provides the baseline understanding of the
indigenous population and the complex network of connections formed by family, tribes,
economics, crime, and internal conflict. Once the information is displayed and
processed, it allows the user to develop ways to influence and disrupt the target through
kinetic or non-kinetic means. This cycle relates to the concept that the targeting process
is intelligence driven, but command led. The cycle needs to be continuously reviewed
and refocused to coordinate with operational developments, operational intent, and
updated PIRs. The F2UID cycle can be seen as an aggressive cultural intelligence
model. All available sources must be used and targeted in the right way in order to build
a comprehensive picture of the AOO/AOR.
d. Making F2UID work at the SOCC level requires close collaboration with the
targeteers in the J2 and J3. The J2 has the tools available to process, exploit, and
disseminate information; however, the J3 has the ability to acquire additional information
that may be vital to understanding the situation from the operational perspective. All
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resources and relationships should be exploited to provide increased clarity to the

developing operational picture at each level of targeting. While ISR is the key to many
aspects of target system analysis, information provided through partnering, MA, and KLE
becomes increasingly significant as operations develop. This information also gains
significance during HN-led evidence-based operations where HUMINT becomes a key
information source.
3-18. The F2UID Cycle
Find
Disrupt Feel
Influence Understand
Figure 3-9. F2UID Cycle
a. Find. In line with the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment

(CPOE), the initial find stage is the opportunity to set the scene, establish the operational
AOI, and start to understand the environment. Once this information is obtained, the
relationships between each variable must be identified. Various networks that are active
within the AOO may be identified; these may be supportive networks that can provide
positive influence and information or possible threat networks intent on disrupting local
stability and security. Based on the results of the initial find activity, collection
requirements are identified according to gaps in knowledge. Without collection efforts to
fill these gaps, it is unlikely that desired objectives will be achieved. The J2 and J3
targeteers should work closely to develop collection requirements that meet the
operational objective. This first step identifies various influencing factors and actors
included in eight operational variables for analysis and assessment.
(1) Political. Since modern warfare at its base level is about political power,
an understanding of the HN political landscape is critical. This includes both
formal and informal political leaders in the AOO. Key officials and parties within
the formal political system need to be identified. Within the informal arena, tribal
and ethnic groups and other informal leaders should be recognized.
(2) Military. Identify capabilities of the security sector including armed forces
and police along with the capabilities of the enemy.
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(3) Economic. Gather general information regarding the standards of living

and economic variables within the AOO including cost of living, labour market,
energy provision, etc. Often the perception of the economic situation influences a
population’s level of support for central governance and/or the enemy.
(4) Social/Cultural. An important aspect to success for hostile actors and

coalition forces (Alliance and HN) in modern conflict is the support of the
population. A common tactic of the opposition is to create friction between
different groups within society to gain or increase the level of support from any
faction that shares a common element with the opposition. Groups may be
aligned due to various influencing factors, including ethnicity, religion, race, social
rank, language, tradition, etc. A key to countering opposition efforts and to avoid
alienating the local populace is to ensure an understanding of this local
environment and the cultural landscape within an AOO.
(5) Information. Opposition leaders seek to control, manipulate, and distribute

information within the population they wish to influence. An understanding of how
information is accessed and used is needed to counter and target this activity and
area of influence.
(6) Infrastructure. This relates to the basic facilities required for the
community to function. Key infrastructure may include electricity, sewers, medical
facilities, water, academic provision, etc. The degradation or destruction of local
infrastructure often assists the opposition since it negatively affects both the HN
and its population.
(7) Physical Environment. Consider the factors of terrain, weather, and

climate.
(8) Time. This can be a key factor due to its influence on nearly all aspects of
the battlespace. Each actor within an AOO may look at time in a different way.
Activities of the insurgents may be timed to influence local politics or undermine
the local security situation. Alliance forces may be hindered over time by
deteriorating support for an ongoing campaign.
b. Feel. In order to appreciate the AOO, it is beneficial to utilize the ASCOPE

concept (defined below). During this process, a number of civil considerations are
analysed from various perspectives: the population, the opposition, and the forces
involved. This helps identify areas of influence and weakness, leading to more accurate
and effective targeting. This analysis also identifies those areas, groups, and individuals
that may be of interest for exploitation, influencing purposes, or direct targeting.
(1) A – Areas. Develop knowledge on demographics and where particular

tribes, ethnicities, religious communities, or criminal enclaves exist and operate.
These different areas may be supportive, permissive, or hostile. There are a
number of social network analysis tools that include population support and ethnic
support overlays.
(2) S – Structures. Consider how certain structures of interest are used by the
opposition and friendly forces. If the SOCC plans to use a structure, ensure that
the impact on the local populace is low or mitigated. This becomes an important
CIMIC task. Examples are government buildings, television and radio stations,
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electrical power plants and dams, oil refineries, sewage treatment plants,
churches/mosques, and schools.
(3) C – Capabilities. The ability of the local authorities to provide the essential
services that impact the quality of life, especially for the neutral population. If the
local government cannot provide the basic services, the area becomes an AOI for
the opposition. Examples include administrative, security, emergency services,
public health, food, water, and sanitation.
(4) O – Organizations. Analyse all the key organizations within an area. This
can include religious, political, loyalists, labour unions, criminal organizations, and
community organizations. Also evaluate other actors within IOs, NGOs, and other
coalition forces that may have differing aims, objectives, and purposes.
(5) P – People. Build on the previous steps to determine the background,

motivations, and goals of the human infrastructure within the AOO.
(6) E – Events. Certain events trigger emotions within the population. Some
examples are national and religious holidays, changing seasons, and elections.
c. Understand. The flow of information

“By understanding why
does not stop, and all information must be
relationships exist between
analysed and fused if it is to be used for
actors and how actors interact,
operations. For this reason, the understand
the analyst is afforded a window
phase of F2UID is the most important. It
into the inner workings of the
requires a level of cooperation between the
network.”
intelligence and operations cells. Again,
intelligence drives the process of Brian Reed – Network Approach to
understanding, but it is led by operations. Understanding an Insurgency, 2009
Analysts have a variety of tools and processes
to develop, display, and manage information in order to mould it into a useable form for
understanding purposes.
(1) Predictive Analysis. Analysts can plot and display information on network
activity, for example, to identify patterns that assist in predicting future events.
Once patterns emerge, it is easier to focus collection and operational activity to
potentially disrupt future actions.
(2) Link Analysis. Understanding links at the social and network levels is
fundamental to predicting what type of effect can be achieved through
operationally focused targeting.
(3) Network Analysis. Once various actors and organizational networks are
identified, develop an understanding of how each is related to another by utilizing
social network analysis methods. It is not sufficient to simply draw a line on a
network diagram. It is important to appreciate why that link exists and how it has
developed within the structural and social process. There are a number of goals
for a social network analysis approach:
(a) Visualize relationships between actors and uncover organizational

structures.
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(b) Study factors that influence and define strength of relationships, such
as age, cultural background, previous history, and experience.
(c) Identify critical vulnerabilities in information flow and decisive points

or conditions.
(4) i2-Analyst Notebook. The most effective and utilized analysis tool for
network analysis is i2-Analyst Notebook. Analysts are able to input a myriad of
data from multiple sources into the system and generate a pictorial representation
of an operational network. Links are displayed to aid analysis of these links in
order to best describe the relationships within a network.
Figure 3-10. i2-Analyst Notebook Example
(5) Additional Methods. Additional methods by which connections can be

analysed and displayed without such tools include:
(a) Time Evaluation Chart. This method displays significant dates and
activities associated with an overall network or specific event. When plotted
out, it enables basic predictive analysis that potentially reveals patterns in
behaviour and relationships between events.
Figure 3-11. Example Time Evaluation Chart
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(b) Association Matrix. An association matrix is a method to establish

connections between individuals based on graded intelligence. Within the
matrix, links between individuals are established as confirmed, probable, or
possible, based upon the confidence of reporting. As the picture develops,
so does the matrix. This matrix only demonstrates basic links and not why
or how the associations are made or motivated.
Figure 3-12. Example Association Matrix
(c) Activities Matrix. The activities matrix is a way to begin assessing

associations. By linking individuals to specific activities and events, it is
possible to begin developing an understanding of various roles and
responsibilities. Some individuals may be associated with but not involved
in the activity of a network. Others may emerge as key to elements of the
network including logistics and supply, training, recruitment, etc.
Figure 3-13. Example Activities Matrix
(d) Link Diagram. With the populated association and activities

matrices, it is possible to create a link diagram based on existing
information. The link diagram should have more meaning than either of the
matrices alone. A link diagram also helps to identify gaps in knowledge that
can be used to update the intelligence collection activities.
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Figure 3-14. Example Link Diagram
(6) Understanding the Links. Once the associations and activities are
established, it is necessary to understand the basis of the relationships and the
motivations behind the associations. It is necessary to look beyond basic links
and acknowledge that for a network to operate, individuals have roles and
responsibilities that may or may not be key to the network’s operational
capabilities.
d. Influence. To influence is the action or process of producing effects on the

actions, behaviour, and opinions of an actor. A detailed target analysis identifies actors
who may be affected. Once an actor has been identified as a potential target, targeting
activities should be coordinated through the targeting process.
e. Disrupt. To disrupt is to prevent effective interaction or cohesion of the enemy

combat and combat support missions. If the SOCC is unable to produce a desired effect
through indirect or influence means, it must look to disrupt an adversary’s activities by
conducting either lethal or non-lethal kinetic operations.
3-19. Target Prioritization
a. Target prioritization is required to take place at all levels of operational activity.

Key to the process is that each level of prioritization can be linked back to operational
objectives outlined in the OPLAN or SUPPLAN. Unless a target can be defined in
relation to these objectives, it is difficult to justify and is unlikely to be selected for
approval by the appropriate authority.
b. CARVER (defined below) is a tool that is utilized to conduct target prioritization. It

is based upon a weighted scoring system that can be applied to any target, whether an
enemy system or sub-system (electricity, transportation, etc.), operational unit, or an
individual actor within a network. An individual can be prioritized within the wider
network, then a further CARVER score used to examine desired effects of different COAs
on that actor. Each category is given a score, then the total is calculated and compared
to dictate priority in relation to desired outcome. Figure 3-15 is an example rating scale.
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CAVER rating scales (1–3, 1–5, 1–9, etc.) may be adjusted depending on the weight
given to the individual criteria. The scoring categories are:
(1) Criticality. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in

targeting. Criticality is related to how much a target’s destruction, denial,
disruption, and damage impair the adversary’s political, economic, or military
operations, or how much a target component will disrupt the function of a target
complex. In determining criticality, individual targets within a target system must
be analysed with relation to the other elements critical to the function of the target
system or complex. Critical targets may also be selected for SR missions.
(2) Accessibility. To damage, destroy, disrupt, deny, or collect data on a
target, SOF must be able to reach it with the necessary equipment, either
physically or via indirect means. During SR missions, SOF not only must observe
the target, but must also remain in the area undetected for extended periods of
time. The SOF unit must be able to safely exfiltrate once the mission is complete.
Weather, light data, physical security measures, and the adversary disposition at
the target area are all considered. In some cases, accessibility is judged as either
feasible or infeasible.
(3) Recuperability. In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how
long it will take the adversary to repair, replace, or bypass the damage inflicted on
a target. Primary considerations are spare parts availability and the ability to
reroute production. A target is not a valid SOF target if it can be repaired or
bypassed in a short amount of time or with minimal resources.
(4) Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if SOF have the means and expertise
to attack it. At the strategic level, a broader range of resources and technology is
available to conduct the target attack. At the tactical level, resources may be
limited to organic personnel, weapons, and munitions or assets that can be
attached, borrowed, or improvised.
(5) Effect. The target should be attacked only if the desired effects can be
created to achieve the objective. These effects may be of a military, political,
economic, informational, or psychological nature. The effect on the populace is
viewed in terms of alienating the local inhabitants, strengthening the resistance
movement, or triggering reprisals against the indigenous people in the immediate
target area. The effect on the populace may also impact SOF’s infiltration,
exfiltration, and evasion and recovery routes. Collateral damage must be
calculated and weighed against the expected military benefit to determine if an
attack would be advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage
includes, but is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic
impacts of the proposed attack.
(6) Recognizability. The target must be identifiable under various weather,

light, and seasonal conditions without being confused with other targets or target
components. Sufficient data must be available for SOF to find the target on the
ground and to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The
same requirement exists to distinguish target critical damage points and target
stress points from similar components and their parent structures and
surroundings. With appropriate training or augmentation, SOF also should be able
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to recognize appropriate computer programs, communications circuits, or similar

targets of Info Ops missions.
CARVER VALUE RATING SCALE (NOTIONAL)
C A R V E R
Loss would be Easily Extremely SOF definitely Favourable Easily recognized
mission stopper accessible and difficult to have the means sociological by all with no
5 away from replace with and expertise to impact; OK confusion 5
security long down attack impact on
time (1 year) civilians
Loss would Easily Difficult to SOF probably Favourable Easily recognized
reduce mission accessible replace with have the means impact; no by most, with little
4 performance outside long down and expertise to adverse impact confusion 4
considerably time (< 1 year) attack on civilians
Loss would Accessible Can be SOF may have Favourable Recognized with
reduce mission replaced in the means and impact; some some training
3 3
performance relatively short expertise to adverse impact
time (months) attack on civilians
Loss may Difficult to gain Easily SOF probably No impact; Hard to recognize,
reduce mission access replaced in a have no impact adverse impact confusion probable
2 2
performance short time on civilians
(weeks)
Loss would not Very difficult to Easily SOF do not Unfavourable Extremely difficult to
affect mission gain access replaced in have much impact; assured recognize without
1 1
performance short time capability to adverse impact extensive
(days) attack on civilians orientation
Note: For specific targets, more precise, target-related data can be developed for each element in the matrix.
Figure 3-15. Example of CARVER Value Rating Scale
3-20. Collective and Individual CARVER. There are two ways in which CARVER rating
scales can be utilized.
a. Collective CARVER Rating Scale. This type of prioritization is most likely to take
place at the JTF HQ and SOCC levels with the targeteers utilizing this method to allocate
a prioritization score for a target. This can be slightly simplistic and must be adjusted and
amended constantly as new information emerges. A target’s rating must be explained
within the context of current operational activity.
b. Individual CARVER Rating Scale. This type of prioritization should take place at
the SOCC and task group levels. Once focused on a target, a CARVER rating score can
be utilized to rate potential kinetic (lethal or non-lethal) and non-kinetic influence and can
disrupt activities and effects.
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Figure 3-16. Individual CARVER Example
3-21. F3EAD. F3EAD has replaced the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess cycle as the
primary targeting cycle for NATO SOF.37 The important emphasis within this cycle is the
relationship between the operations and intelligence functional areas, which are both intimately
involved in the process. When compared to the D3A cycle used by the other components, one
can see (Figure 3-18) how the F3EAD and D3A overlap and merge. This allows the SOCC and
conventional components to synchronize their respective targeting cycles and overall effects.
a. Find. The find component of F3EAD is the process of establishing a start point for
intelligence collection. These start points often take the form of target nominations,
which can be generated internally by individual units or can be directed from external
HQs. Once planning guidance is received practitioners employ the full range of
intelligence capabilities to obtain a start point for the rest of the process. The targeting
start point can be deliberate or opportunity-based and can focus on a known personality,
facility, organization, or some other type of signature.
37 AJP-3.5(A).
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Figure 3-17. F3EAD Cycle
Figure 3-18. High-value Individual Targeting Process: F3EAD within D3A
b. Fix. Once a target is identified, the full gamut of intelligence collection examine
capability is applied against the target in order to develop operational triggers to fix the
target in space and time. Once the target is fixed it is at the point where intelligence
effort has progressed enough that the operations function has sufficient information to
execute the mission, whether that mission be kinetic or non-kinetic.
c. Finish. The finish phase is the conclusion of an operational mission whether kinetic
or non-kinetic in nature. Under legacy targeting methodologies, the finish phase was
considered the main effort. This made sense in prior wars that were focused more on
physical destruction of enemy forces and infrastructure as a means to end his will to resist.
However, in an information-age era of protracted conflicts, risk aversion, non-state actors,
and networked warfare, the main effort cannot be on finishing enemy forces in a traditional
sense, in large part because the nature of warfare has changed. Therefore, F3EAD does
not end in the finish phase; indeed, with finish, the main effort of F3EAD is just beginning.
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d. Exploit. The exploit phase is considered the most critical single step in the
process as it leads to the finding, fixing, and finishing of the next target and the
perpetuation of the cycle. In the F3EAD model, exploitation is the process of examining,
interrogating, and processing captured enemy personnel and materiel for intelligence
purposes. The overall aim of the exploitation effort is to produce enough actionable
intelligence and/or prosecutorial evidence to perpetuate the F3EAD process as rapidly as
possible. A relatively new inclusion in such a cycle is the inclusion of prosecution of
enemy forces within the exploitation phase, which sees intelligence turned into evidence
that can enable future prosecution under national or international law. This process
begins here and is followed through into the next analyse phase.
e. Analyse. The analyse phase is where the information gained in the find, fix,
finish, and exploit phases turns into intelligence that can be used to drive operations.
Analysis can be performed by SOF in theatre or passed to alternative fusion centres via
reach-back for further in-depth analysis.
f. Disseminate. The last step in the F3EAD process is the disseminate phase.
Dissemination of intelligence information gleaned through the SOF targeting process
helps to create a network to defeat a network throughout the intelligence enterprise and
helps eliminate intelligence stovepipes. Wider dissemination to conventional, coalition,
and even HN military forces, interagency partners, and civilian leadership contributes
enormously to the success of F3EAD by expanding the intelligence and operations
networks in support of SOF missions.
3-22. Legal Considerations
a. International conventional and customary law, together with the domestic law of
participating nations, governs the conduct of NATO operations. This imposes boundaries
on targeting decisions and actions. While, for policy and other reasons, targeting
direction and guidance may be more restrictive than that permitted by international law, it
may never be more permissive. Military commanders must receive training in
international law, as appropriate, and be supported by a LEGAD. LEGADs will play a key
role in reviewing the targeting products to ensure compliance with legal principles. To
counter any subsequent legal challenge to the targeting process, it is imperative that a
formal record is kept of the decision-making process and any advice given during that
process. The wide utility of information activities expands the need for legal compliance
beyond that normally associated with traditional lethal targeting. The information
environment is pervasive, with few clear boundaries of identity ownership and attribution.
Activities intended to have an influence on a particular target may affect third parties not
involved in the crisis and/or those outside the JOA.
b. The international security situation may require a broad range of responses,

sometimes within a single operation. This may include using force within the context of
an armed conflict, supporting humanitarian goals, aiding in the stabilization and
reconstruction of a failed or failing state, and/or enforcing a United Nations Security
Council resolution, which may or may not occur within a situation of armed conflict.
Consequently, operations may occur within a complex legal framework regulating the use
of force. Each nation interprets and characterizes the situation and the applicable legal
framework including relevant international law, Security Council authorizations, its own
domestic law, and in some circumstances, HN law, when making targeting decisions.
General descriptions of international legal principles related to targeting are:
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(1) Military Necessity. Any target prosecuted must offer a definite military
advantage. In addition, no more force should be applied than is absolutely
necessary to create the desired effect. Therefore, if there is a choice between
targets in order to realize a similar military advantage, the target that offers the
least risk of collateral damage should be chosen. Military necessity never justifies
a breach of international law.
(2) Humanity. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of unnecessary

suffering, injury, or destruction not necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate
military purposes. Once a military purpose is achieved, further infliction of
suffering is unnecessary.
(3) Distinction. Offensive action must only be directed against military

objectives and combatants, making a clear distinction between them and civilian
objects and civilians. All feasible precautions will be taken in the choice and
methods of any target prosecution to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental loss of
civilian life or other unwanted effects. Particular care must be taken when
considering sites of religious or cultural significance and specially protected
objects.
(4) Proportionality. No engagement may be launched, and any engagement

in progress must be stopped, in which the expected collateral damage would, in
total, be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct anticipated military
advantage. Note that the application of this rule is judged not on the actual
collateral damage or the actual military advantage of the attack, but upon the
collateral damage expected and foreseeable at the time the attack was planned,
and the military advantage anticipated. The anticipated military advantage refers
to the advantage to be gained from the attack considered as a whole, and not from
isolated or particular actions. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to
tactical gains, but is linked to wider strategic goals.
3-23. Technical Exploitation Operations
a. Technical exploitation operations (TEOs) assist greatly with the two targeting
processes (F2UID and F3EAD) identified in this chapter. If assigned, the TEO
coordinator will advise COM SOCC regarding theatre-wide exploitation operations and
will be the point of contact for the establishment of SOCC-level exploitation protocols and
procedures. The SOCC TEO coordinator will also help direct exploitation planning
efforts, employment of exploitation equipment, and procedures for subordinate units to
follow to assure a systematic approach to the methods of collection, exploitation, control
of collected items, and immediate analysis of materials of interest. Collected items will
be forwarded to an exploitation analysis centre or a forensics laboratory located in
theatre for more detailed analysis. Exploitation results must be processed in accordance
with evidence control procedures established by the SOCC TEO coordinator and must
follow a specific chain of custody, to include detailed documentation of relevant items.
Depending on SOCC manning, if no TEO coordinator is assigned, the operations director
will work with the chief of staff to determine if the role of the TEO coordinator should be
delegated as an additional duty to a member of the operations centre.
b. The resulting analysis and rapid exploitation of materials on the battlefield (Level
1), upon mission completion (Level 1+), and in field laboratories (Level 2) will result in
information to assist the intelligence, targeting, and planning cycles. This information and
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any resulting intelligence will assist the SOCC in the prosecution of TSTs when combined
with pre-existing intelligence and will contribute to the validation of executing evidence-
based operations. Subordinate units providing MA may use the procedures established
by the TEO coordinator in assisting HN judicial systems in providing evidence, gathered
by properly disseminating exploitation results, that associates analysed, such as
materials of significance to detained individuals.
3-24. Summary. The SOCC remains an influential actor within the joint force, capable of
conducting both kinetic and non-kinetic effects-based targeting. The fusion of both intelligence
and operations, coupled within a well-established targeting process, enhances special
operations and impacts COM JFC’s desired effects. Understanding the defined joint force
objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels helps everyone involved in the
targeting process to develop well-defined targets based on logical assessments of the
anticipated effects. Applying the F2UID process is key to understanding the overall effects that
targeting actions will have on all the actors within the AOO. Furthermore, determining target
prioritization ensures scarce SOF and joint force resources are apportioned appropriately and
proportionately before the F3EAD cycle is applied to specific targets. When it is understood that
each and every action taken by any joint force asset, including SOF, generates an effect, and
that effect further generates a message to the various actors, then it will be clear that the
content and processes described in this chapter are critical to success in the battlespace.
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CHAPTER 4 – INTELLIGENCE
4-1. General.38 Joint intelligence staffs in NATO aim to provide the joint force and component
commanders with timely and actionable intelligence for planning, execution, and support of
military operations in peace, crisis, and conflict.
4-2. Special Operations Forces Intelligence Considerations
a. The nature of special operations generally requires intelligence support more

detailed than that needed by conventional forces. The scope of special operations often
requires detailed information on the military, social, economic, political, and cultural
dynamics of the operational area. To obtain the requisite support, planners and
operators must establish a connection and collaborate with Alliance and national
collection analysis and production agencies. These intelligence relationships and
interfaces must be established in peacetime to provide support across the spectrum of
conflict to allow SOF maximum possible access to intelligence.
b. To plan and conduct successful operations, SOF require an in-depth

understanding of potential adversaries and the environment in which they intend to
operate. SOF are normally supported with actionable intelligence, allowing them to be
employed at short notice against HVTs and HPTs. The rapid dissemination and
dispersal of intelligence among elements at both the tactical and operational levels is
imperative for special operations. Intelligence often drives operations, making timely,
detailed, and fused products vital. When intelligence is limited, SOF mission planning
may be dependent on national sources, strategic agencies (e.g. intelligence fusion
centres), NGOs and/or HN support, and SR. The planning process must capitalize on
special capabilities, such as linguists or liaison personnel.
c. The intelligence directorate (J2) is principally responsible for the timely

management of the SOCC collection requirements and intelligence RFIs. The use of
LOs to the JTF HQ and intelligence centres can facilitate the responsiveness of
intelligence support. Seamless integration into the theatre intelligence architecture
enables connectivity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence
operations for access to products and databases. This access requires implementation
of the push and pull concept of information dissemination.
4-3. Intelligence Support to NATO Special Operations
a. Theatre-level Intelligence Support. The JFC J2 is the primary intelligence

organization that provides intelligence support to joint warfighting at all levels. The JFC
J2 construct fuses the main support capabilities of all NATO, JFC, combat support, and
combat units into a one-stop shop for intelligence provision and passes the information to
senior, subordinate, and supporting commands. The JFC J2 is the single source for RFI
processing and validation and in-theatre intelligence analysis, production, and
dissemination. The JFC J2 coordinates support from other intelligence organizations
above and below its echelon for RFIs it is unable to fulfil. The JFC J2 also has the
mission of providing direct intelligence support to a deploying joint force.
38 AJP-2.1(A), Intelligence Procedures, dated 19 Sep 05.
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Figure 4-1. Intelligence Support to NATO Special Operations
b. Joint Task Force Headquarters-level Intelligence Support
(1) Responsibilities. The JTF HQ provides the conduit for intelligence flow to
and from the SOCC and theatre and national supporting agencies. The
mechanism to provide that support is a tailored intelligence organization provided
by the JTF HQ called an ASC.
(2) All-source Centre
(a) A tailored subset of the theatre JTF HQ J2, the ASC provides
intelligence support to JTF operational forces and performs common
intelligence functions. It may have liaison and augmentation from national
agencies.
(b) By design, the ASC is scalable, can expand to meet the needs of the
JTF HQ, and is tailored to fit the operating environment based on identified
JTF HQ requirements.
(c) The ASC is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that
provide services and products required by the JTF HQ, staff, and components,
to include the SOCC. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis
teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems.
Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources;
an ASC’s capability for joint and all-source analysis is the key to operational
intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.
(d) The ASC should provide support upward to the JFC J2, COM JFC,
and the JFC staff and should provide support downward to the SOCC and
other components in support of the JTF HQ.
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(e) Analytical efforts of the ASC should have an operational focus, with
responsibility for helping the JTF HQ to better understand adversary
capabilities, intentions, and potential COAs.
(f) In addition, the ASC may be used to manage intelligence resources

and efforts, and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and
supporting commands’ intelligence activities. The ASC collection managers
must also play an important role in nominating SR missions for tasking to
the SOCC. This should be done in close coordination with special
operations planning experts on both the JTF HQ and SOCC staffs to ensure
the appropriateness of SOF for the missions being nominated.
Figure 4-2. Notional ASC Organization
c. Special Operations Component Command All-source Centre
(1) Activation. Once a SOCC is activated, an ASC may be formed under the
SOCC J2 to provide a robust support capability for the SOCC’s critical mission
functions and the SOCC component commanders’ mission requirements. The SOCC
J2 facilitates daily intelligence requirements: collection, analysis, and production.
Joint personnel augmentation for the ASC may be requested by the SOCC.
(2) Functions. The ASC is the primary centre that serves the commander, the
J2, the staff, and subordinate commanders for all intelligence requirements. The
ASC complements existing intelligence channels and the structure is tailored to
support the mission requirements. The SOCC has a limited organic collection
capability and is dependent on theatre intelligence systems for indications and
warnings. The ASC construct provides increased timely and tailored intelligence
flow as a result of increased tasking of intelligence resources. No echelon of
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command has sufficient assets to collect information and produce intelligence to

meet all needs. All functions relative to the intelligence process are managed
through the ASC.
(3) Responsibilities. SOCC intelligence responsibilities are derived from the

supported commander’s intelligence requirements. While the SOCC J2 retains
certain duties for the immediate J2 staff, there is a great dependency on the
synergy of an all-source analytical support entity that can manage the flow of
requirements and information. ASC responsibilities may include:
(a) Develop threat assessments.
(b) Determine the adversary situation.
(c) Evaluate the operation’s effectiveness.
(d) Provide operational intelligence support to SOCC components.
(e) Focus the intelligence effort downward in support of the forward-

deployed SOF components.
(f) Develop TIPs based on timely, operationally accurate information.
(g) Conduct future target development.
(h) Coordinate with the LEGAD to ensure compliance with intelligence

oversight requirements.
(i) Provide information collected by SOCC assets to the JFC J2.

Information of CI interest, particularly information derived from military
source operations, must be coordinated first with the SOCC J2X (if formed)
in order to effectively forward to and integrate with the JFC J2X (if formed).
d. Special Operations Component Command Support to NATO Special

Operations Forces Tactical Operations
(1) The SOCC’s subordinate elements are the primary intelligence users of
support and resources from the SOCC. The SOCC should ensure that
subordinate elements understand the capabilities and procedural requirements to
effectively utilize SOCC support. The SOCC should actively engage subordinate
elements and anticipate intelligence requirements due to the sensitive nature of
some collection assets; subordinates may not be fully aware of the range of
support capabilities available.
(2) Although the SOTG is the tactical end user for much of the SOCC
intelligence, the SOTG can and does play a key role in the HUMINT portion of
intelligence collection. Depending on the mission scenario, the SOTG and its
SOTUs should be in constant contact with the indigenous population. This contact
provides the atmospherics and key bits of information necessary to conduct and
evaluate SOF operations.
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e. External Support to NATO Special Operations
(1) Intelligence Reach-back. Intelligence reach-back is a concept that fuses

intelligence organizations, processes, and technology to create a virtual
intelligence centre. This requires a robust intelligence fusion structure that
includes collection resources, robust CIS investments, qualified personnel, training
programmes, and infrastructure. To ensure operational success, it is therefore
essential to have connectivity between the customers and the intelligence reach-
back structure with respect to both bandwidth and systems.
(2) National Intelligence Centres. The primary role of national intelligence

centres (NICs) in a NATO theatre is to support deployed national assets, but they
also provide releasable national intelligence and information in support of the
NATO mission. Requests from the SOCC J2 that might be answered by NICs are
submitted via collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
(CCIRM), through relevant classified systems and networks. The NICs are
requested to respond back to the SOCC J2 (via CCIRM), and the J2 disseminates
the intelligence to appropriate elements as required. Connectivity to CCIRM and
access to appropriate NATO intelligence systems and software, as agreed through
the intelligence architecture, is essential for both sharing and coordinating issues.
(3) NSHQ. NATO does not have a standing SOCC to maintain SA of events
happening within the sphere of interest. Prior to SOCC activation, the necessary
appraisal of the international environment may be supported by the NSHQ. The
NSHQ has a standing SA centre and is linked to SHAPE through the Director
Special Operations office, guaranteeing a direct link to the strategic level.
(4) Special Operations Intelligence Branch/NATO Intelligence Fusion

Centre. The Special Operations Intelligence Branch/NATO Intelligence Fusion
Centre provides timely, effective, network-enabled intelligence in support of the
planning and execution of NATO operations. This includes gathering, processing,
and disseminating intelligence products. Additional support is provided in the form
of a responsive RFI database.
(5) Strategic Agencies. Similar to NICs, national intelligence agencies may

provide additional collection, processing, and dissemination support to NATO
SOF. Requests to national intelligence agencies by the SOCC J2 are submitted
through the appropriate LOs. Examples of national intelligence agencies are the
Defence Intelligence of the United Kingdom and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence in the United States.
4-4. Special Operations Component Command Intelligence Operations Relative to the

Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence operations follow the intelligence cycle. Intelligence operations
have to be integrated into overall joint operations to achieve not only the SOCC’s objectives but
those of the JFC and subordinate elements (see paragraph 5-2 for more information).
a. Direction. Intelligence requirements provide the direction for current and future
SOCC intelligence operations during the planning and direction phases of the process.
CPOE is the process that initially drives J2 planning and direction. It enables the J2 to
focus and direct activity to identify, prioritize, and validate intelligence and system
requirements. To support requirements, joint intelligence architecture provides
capabilities for tailored intelligence to the SOCC and component commanders. These
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intelligence structures and assets can also dedicate capabilities for critical short duration
special operations mission planning.
(1) Special Operations Intelligence Requirements. The currency, level of

detail, and scope of special operations intelligence requirements place unusual
demands on theatre and national intelligence systems. Special operations often
require more intelligence collection, research, and analysis than conventional
operations. Detailed information from theatre and national sources must be
tailored so it can be displayed, understood, and used by the tactical SOF element
that will plan and conduct the mission. Some missions may require replicas,
models, and diagrams. The scope of special operations intelligence requirements
may also include cultural, social, economic, informational, and political dynamics
of the operational area. The SOCC’s information requirements (IRs) compete for
limited collection resources and all requirements may not be satisfied. SOCC
intelligence requirements linked to theatre PIRs have the best prospects for timely
support.
(2) Planning. Early planning for intelligence is essential to conduct successful

special operations. The very precise information required by special operations
tactical commanders about operational areas and targets may not be readily
acquired by national technical intelligence sources. Intelligence planning for
special operations, as with conventional force intelligence planning, involves
managing the SOCC intelligence staff in the execution of the intelligence process
to provide mission-specific and -oriented intelligence that supports operational
objectives, planning, and decisions. See paragraph 4-6 for additional information
on intelligence planning by phase of the SOCC-P2.
(a) The uniqueness of special operations intelligence support is in the

timeliness, quantity, integrity, authenticity, and specificity of the information
required. The planning timelines for special operations require responsive
intelligence support.
(b) Intelligence organizations and agencies supporting SOF must be

involved at the earliest stage of mission planning to ensure responsiveness
to SOF mission requirements.
(c) In planning for time-sensitive, potential, or emerging special

operations missions (hasty planning), the J2 must anticipate IRs to
planners, access all available information, and ensure requirements are
incorporated into collection planning and/or modify existing collection plans.
b. Collection. Collection requires validating, prioritizing, and tasking through the J2

collection manager. The SOCC point of entry into the collection process is with the
SOCC collection (CCIRM) manager. Collection includes identification and positioning of
assets and/or resources to satisfy collection objectives. It also includes acquisition of
information and delivery of this information to processing and/or production elements.
Neither the SOCC J2 nor the SOCC forces have the organic collection assets to satisfy
all information needs.
(1) Intelligence Data Flow. Intelligence data normally flows to the SOCC through
established intelligence channels. The SOCC J2 acts as the theatre SOF collection
manager and ensures that validated subordinate unit intelligence requirements are
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incorporated into the theatre intelligence collection plan. The J2 also initiates and
develops intelligence relationships with all theatre intelligence organizations and
maintains contact with liaison elements at the JTF HQ. These liaison elements can
ensure that theatre-validated SOF intelligence requirements are addressed rapidly
and efficiently within respective directorates or organizations.
(2) Collection Management. The six elements in the collection management

process include requirements development, collection plan development,
collection tasking, dissemination, evaluation of reporting, and collection plan
updating. Within the SOCC, collection requirements and operations management
personnel:
(a) Identify and prioritize intelligence requirements originating both

internally and externally to the SOCC.
(b) Assess collection and reporting implications of each requirement.
(c) Develop a collection plan in accordance with established priorities.
(d) Identify potential collection opportunities to the J3.
(e) Forward intelligence RFIs and PIRs to the appropriate organization

or intelligence directorate for disposition.
(f) Maintain awareness of the operational capability of collection

systems.
(g) Evaluate and manage answered RFIs for content and timeliness.
(h) Support and validate subordinates’ RFIs.
c. Processing. During processing and exploitation, collected data is correlated and

converted into forms suitable for analysis and production. The components of processing
are collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, interpretation, and fusion. Data may be
further exploited to gain the fullest possible advantage. The majority of responsibilities
during this phase rests with the supported CC J2s, who have the most capabilities and
assets to perform this function. The SOCC is both a provider and user of processed and
exploited data.
d. Dissemination. Dissemination is the fourth stage of the intelligence cycle and

consists of the timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any
suitable means, to those who need it.
(1) Timeliness. Intelligence is useless if it arrives at its destination too late.

The majority of intelligence, certainly at the operational and tactical levels, is time
sensitive. Intelligence decays or loses its value with the passage of time.
(2) Appropriateness. The intelligence must answer the requirements of the

users. It must be in a format and language relevant to the needs of the recipient
and disseminated by a common system.
4-5. Intelligence Support to Targeting. The primary function of the J2 in support of the
targeting process is to identify and recommend critical adversary vulnerabilities that can be
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exploited to attain objectives. Support includes locating and portraying the components of a
target or target complex and providing the information required to effectively apply friendly
capabilities to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, or otherwise dissuade or coerce the adversary.
The SOCC J2 targeting officer and ASC HVT analysts collaborate with targeting personnel in
the operations directorate and are responsible for TIPs. Annex E provides an example TIP and
Chapter 3 provides more information on targeting.
4-6. Intelligence Support to the Special Operations Component Command Planning

Process. Advanced planning for intelligence is essential for successful special operations. The
very precise information required about operational areas or targets might not be readily acquired
by theatre intelligence agencies. Obtaining information to support special operations may require
developing new intelligence sources. The SOCC J2 provides special operations planners with
intelligence tailored to support the planning process and is involved in all stages of planning to
ensure responsiveness of the intelligence system. Intelligence tasks for each phase of the
SOCC-P2 are outlined in Table 4-1. Additional information regarding SOCC-P2 is provided in
Chapter 6. Additionally, the J2 develops mission-specific intelligence requirements that support
the operational objectives of the plan and should consider:
a. PIRs and other intelligence requirements.
b. Existing all-source intelligence collection requirements and priorities.
c. Gaps in the basic intelligence databases for recommended changes in collection

priorities.
d. Unique intelligence production requirements to execute the assigned special

operation.
e. Dissemination of intelligence products.
f. Intelligence communication and reporting requirements.
Table 4-1. Intelligence Tasks during the Planning Process
Planning Phase Steps Intelligence Tasks

Situation Awareness Commander initiates CPOE SA monitoring
and develops knowledge Support to CPOE development
requirements (KRs)
Appreciation Receive initiating Review initiating directive
directive/WNGO Database review
Commander starts own Send initial RFI(s)
planning process in anticipation Stage SOCCPG
of receiving a mission Prepare initial briefing for operations
Commander organizes planning group (OPG) (CPOE)
planning staff or staff does it for SA monitoring
him/her
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Orientation Commander’s initial guidance Receive initiating directive/WNGO
Mission analysis/brainstorming Take initial OPG briefing/joint
Produce draft mission intelligence preparation of the
statement battlespace and expand into mission
Mission analysis briefing analysis briefing. Focus on situation,
Prepare commander’s planning enemy intent, deployment, capability,
guidance (CPG) COGs, weaknesses, strengths, likely
actions, other key factors, desired end
state, key Info Ops targets (target sets)
Stage and participate in mission
analysis briefing
Ensure entire staff understands the
mission
Prepare intelligence portion of CPG
SA monitoring
CONOPS Development Review CPG Review CPG
Staff analysis Staff estimate—expand on key
Develop COAs adversary factors and identify others
Decision briefing (cultural, political, social, time and
Approve friendly COAs space, etc.)
Develop adversary COAs—minimum
most likely and most dangerous
(develop more as time permits)
Adversary COAs must lead toward
attacking friendly COG
Develop synchronization matrix for each
adversary COA
Determine wargame technique to be
used
Stage/conduct wargame
Ensure that key enemy results are
recorded
Record all major friendly decision points
and anticipate collection requirements
to support these decisions
Prepare intelligence portion of decision
brief
Finalize adversary COAs based on
commander’s direction and disseminate
Develop HVT list
Develop target intelligence (Targeting)
Help develop/write CONOPS
Write intelligence annex
SA monitoring
Plan Development Develop CONOPS Intelligence plan development
Force identification Ensure intelligence plan is synchronized
Develop plan from CONOPS with other plans
Support joint targeting process
Support the development of HPT list
Seek approval of intelligence plan(s)
SA
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Execution and Force deployment SA monitoring during deployment
Assessment Conduct special operations Review intelligence plans, especially
Combat assessment collection plan
Plan review and assessment Further analyse intelligence plans—
Revised decision briefing for wargaming, rehearsal or operational
commander (if required) research modelling
Support revised decision briefing for
commander
Execute intelligence plan
Ensure integration of intelligence assets
Transition Prepare for next phase and/or SA during transition
redeployment of forces
4-7. Intelligence Sharing in a NATO Special Operations Forces Community. Intelligence

is a sovereign asset. Intelligence from a TCN comes from a sovereign domain and is owned,
controlled, and used by that nation. Each nation has different national laws governing the
disclosure and release of their intelligence. Intelligence sharing in a NATO SOF environment
creates challenges because NATO relies on Alliance nations, other nations, the NATO military
structure, and open sources for the provision of its intelligence.
a. Key Definitions
(1) Release: A nation gives the intelligence to another nation for its use.
(2) Disclosure: A nation shows the intelligence to another nation for its use.
b. Authority, Responsibilities, and Roles. Intelligence collection, production, and

dissemination in a NATO environment present unique challenges and depend on the
capability to standardize operations and communications between joint force elements.
When operating in a NATO intelligence environment, it is critical that COM SOCC and
staff know and understand what their authority, responsibilities, and roles are in the
intelligence sharing process.
c. Disclosure Policies and Procedures. Intelligence sharing procedures between

NATO allies and counterparts should be agreed upon early in the SOCC-P2. The SOCC
J2 should have knowledge of foreign disclosure policies and procedures. TCNs should
obtain disclosure authorizations through the SOCC as early as possible when the SOCC
will be involved in multinational intelligence activities. Procedures should be put in place
to expedite new releases once operations have begun and all nations, agencies, and
centres are encouraged to provide information or intelligence that could be used to
enhance the success of the NATO mission. If not in conflict with security regulations and
caveats, the principle write for release should be considered for intelligence products,
though the distribution of intelligence products will always be considered to follow the
well-known need-to-share principle.
d. Liaison and Interoperability. Communication, experience, and standardization

all impact the timeliness and effectiveness of NATO SOF operations. Linguist and liaison
personnel play a paramount role in the sharing of intelligence in the multinational
environment. To enhance interoperability of the NATO SOF effort, intelligence must be
written simply to be rapidly exploitable and properly classified to ensure release.
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4-8. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process.39 ISR links ISR systems
and sensors to cue manoeuvre and offensive strike assets, with particular emphasis on the
timely passage of both critical and targeting information. It encompasses the collection,
coordination, and management of information and intelligence. The SA provided by tailored ISR
capabilities is fundamental to good decision-making. Chapter 5 provides a detailed description
of SOCC involvement and tasks in the ISR process.
4-9. Counter-intelligence.40 CI is a critical FP asset that offers the SOCC varied support
including operations, investigations, collection, and theatre analysis. The SOCC J2X (if
established) coordinates with the JTF HQ J2X (if established) to acquire support for special
operations. The SOCC may consider early deployment of CI personnel to establish
communications with HN security forces. An effective CI programme can detect, counter, and,
where possible, exploit foreign and/or adversary intelligence collection activities directed against
SOF. CI contributes to the overall aspects of OPSEC and FP by detecting and dealing with
possible breaches in security. CI activities support the commander by detecting, evaluating,
counteracting, and preventing hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or
assassination operations from occurring. The focus for CI includes:
a. How the adversary’s intelligence structure works.
b. Intelligence systems and platforms available to the adversary.
c. How vulnerable SOCC forces are to adversary intelligence.
d. How the adversary has been known to target and how planners can anticipate
where the adversary might target deployed forces.
e. Success of adversary intelligence efforts as indicated by operations executed

against the population and security forces.
4-10. Collection Disciplines by Source Type. Intelligence sources are the means or
systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information on conditions, situations,
and events. The primary source types, also referred to as collection disciplines, are HUMINT,
imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence
(SIGINT), and open source intelligence.41
4-11. Intelligence Functional Disciplines – Subject Areas. The functional disciplines of

intelligence cover subject-focused aspects of intelligence production and often require specialist
analytical expertise. They contribute to general intelligence production but may also generate
functionally focused products for specific purposes and in response to specific intelligence
requirements of customers.42
39 AJP-2.1(A).
40 AJP-2,Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine, dated Jul 03.
41 AJP-2.1(A), pp. 2-27 to 2-29.
42 AJP-2.1(A), pp. 2-29 to 2-31.
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CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
5-1. General
a. The term ISR is used to describe capabilities that link surveillance,

reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems and sensors to cue manoeuvre and
offensive strike assets. ISR also contributes to the non-kinetic effects required by the
modern comprehensive approach to operations (reconciliation, reintegration,
stabilization, mentoring, Info Ops, and PsyOps). ISR enables commanders and decision-
makers at all levels to be better informed of current events, enemy intentions, own force
dispositions, and population activity, all of which support the risk mitigation process when
conducting special operations in the comprehensive environment. ISR capabilities and
capacities have grown to such an extent that ISR is now considered a key enabler by
SOF and inter-agency commanders alike and, for the majority of special operations, ISR
support is now a GO/NO-GO criterion during CONOPS development and execution. The
comprehensive approach (of which SOF is a major enabler) depends on unfettered
access to timely, detailed, and fused all-source intelligence to enable successful mission
accomplishment. Ensuring that the desired battlespace effects are created in support of
COM JTF HQ’s campaign plan is a key tenet of SOCC operations. All-source ISR
intelligence plays a vital role in establishing targeting criteria, conducting target
development, prosecuting operations, and ensuring effective post-mission analysis.
b. ISR is fundamental to the command, control, communication, computers, and ISR

(C4ISR) function, which the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) defines as,
“The provision of information and intelligence to commanders that enables decision
superiority necessary to execute the commander’s intent, along with the appropriate level
of situational awareness, to the point of achieving the desired effect.”43 The ISR HUMINT
assets, sensor systems, and platforms that feed into the C4ISR system are characterized
in AJP-2.7 by the following:
“They can operate below the surface, on the surface, in the air and throughout
space. They can be manned as well as unmanned. They can image visible or
non-visible objects, penetrate surfaces, and detect and collect different
wavelengths of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra. All systems include one
or more sensors to collect information. Some systems can change their sensors
for specific operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems have two
common limitations; they are scarce resources and are generally high-value
assets.”44
c. From a SOCC perspective, the NATO C4ISR function must also be compatible
with and be able to support and operate in tandem with the inter-agency ISR
infrastructure to afford seamless and timely sharing of information. This, in turn, enables
the SOCC to better support the effects-based targeting process across the whole
spectrum of comprehensive operations.
43 JAPCC Roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO, Version 1, dated Nov 07.
44 AJP-2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance, dated 7 Jul 09.
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d. The integration and fusion of information and intelligence from multiple sources
(including inter-agency) are crucial to ensure the SOCC staff can make reasoned and timely
decisions. In the same manner that an infrared image can show an object that is hidden in
the visible spectrum, comparing multiple assessments of the same target produces a more
wide-ranging understanding of the target and how it affects the battlespace. This fusion of
multiple sensor products is not just of NRT and RT information; information is also assessed
against historical patterns and enemy doctrine. For example, collected surveillance may be
compared to pattern of life (POL) or pattern of normal assessments to detect anomalies that
otherwise might appear insignificant. This, in turn, can provide invaluable insight to the real
worth of the target and how best to apply effects-based targeting to negate the assessed
threat that the target creates.
Figure 5-1. The SOCC Intelligence Cycle
e. An additional factor that heavily influences the commander’s ability to use

collected intelligence is the management of the intelligence itself. The increasing volume
of ISR assets in the modern battlespace creates volumes of information and intelligence
that can quickly become unwieldy to the point of overwhelming in terms of analysing,
archiving, retrieving, and employing the relevant intelligence in a timely and productive
manner. Further complicating the utility of stored information is the fact that each
medium of intelligence gathering has different standardization agreements (STANAGs),
some of which are not adhered to by participant nations or their associated intelligence
agencies. The reconciliation of different standards of intelligence storage, processing,
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and dissemination is currently underway through NATO’s C4ISR project.45 However,

until the NATO C4ISR project matures, the challenge of information management
remains, but it must not be allowed to become detrimental to the SOCC’s overall support
to COM JTF HQ’s campaign plan or negate the possibility of a conviction through the
HN’s judicial system.
5-2. Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management. CCIRM

consists of two components: IRs management and collection coordination. For SOF, the two
components support special operations missions and support taskings/requirements. IRs
management begins with developing PIRs and IRs, which form the basis of the collection plan.
Collection coordination occurs through determining how the information and intelligence needed
to meet the IRs in the collection plan are to be collected. Specific questions are tasked to
organic elements for answering or, if no organic system is available, are passed on as RFIs to
the appropriate staff directorate or liaison element. ISR support for the SOCC and subordinate
units is best thought of within the context of the NATO intelligence cycle—direction, collection,
processing, and dissemination—and within the SOCC intelligence cycle depicted in Figure 5-1.
Important Note. Within the context of SOCC operations, ISR

is coordinated by the SOCC’s CCIRM process. CCIRM is the
process of developing the collection plan and managing its
conduct; it encompasses all activities that result in effective
and efficient employment of information and intelligence
collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and reporting. It
is important that the SOCC staff understand how the CCIRM
process is supported by the JTF HQ, the SOCC staff
functions, the other components, and the subordinate
SOTGs/SOATGs. An important part of the CCIRM process is
the liaison that is undertaken on behalf of the SOCC by the
SOPLEs, SOCCEs, SOLEs, and other SOCC liaison
elements/officers situated within the JOA.
a. Direction. The direction phase of the intelligence cycle implements COM SOCC’s
direction and guidance with respect to assigned and attached ISR capabilities. Once
COM SOCC has directed his ISR priorities (usually distilled from COM JTF HQ guidance)
for utilization of assigned and attached ISR resources, SOTG/SOATG planners are able
to structure the information requests and input to higher HQs’ CCIRM processes. They
may also request support from other friendly forces such as inter-agency or HN
organizations to supplement the SOCC’s own collection planning and capabilities. In
either case, the SOCC staff must identify the specific products requested to allow the
CCIRM process to match the correct collection capability to the required task. The
specific products are derived throughout the planning process, but are normally
developed in the appreciation phase of planning while conducting the CPOE.
b. Collection.46 The collection phase involves development of the collection plan,

exploitation of assigned, attached, or allocated collection assets and capabilities, and
timely processing and analysis of the collected information. In cases where the
45 JAPCC Roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO.

46 AJP-2.1(A) provides useful guidance to develop a collection plan.
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SOTG/SOATG is tasked to conduct special reconnaissance, the SOCC’s CCIRM

process will have already optimized the collection plan.
(1) Clear Direction. Provide clear direction to SOTGs/SOATGs and to

supporting components and agencies to help them produce the required
information.
(2) Centralized Coordination. The best utilization of the array of collection

assets available is through centralized coordination at the SOCC level, thereby
ensuring the optimum collection of information in a timely manner.
Notwithstanding this principle, many SOF missions benefit from the delegation of
C2 of the ISR capabilities to the subordinate SOTG/SOATG commander to reduce
sensor-to-shooter timescales.
(3) Time and Space. Time and space are major considerations for the
optimized use of allocated ISR assets. Since a SOCC’s organic assets are, in
most cases, in the AOO, time and space considerations are more prevalent when
using collection assets that have been assigned by a component other than the
SOCC. In particular, transit and loiter times may require detailed planning to
ensure the requested ISR coverage.
(4) Capability. The characteristics of the collection assets must be considered

when selecting a particular system. These are:
(a) Security and Risk. A balance has to be struck between the risk of
loss of the asset and the intelligence or information gain. Likewise, the
compromise of an asset may indicate to an adversary that collection is
ongoing and may warn of likely future intent. Often, using an unmanned
asset instead of putting operators at risk is the best option, yet in other
circumstances, having an experienced SR expert completing instant
analysis of the target is the only way to make time-sensitive decisions.
(b) The Operating Environment. The nature of the operating

environment, e.g. weather, terrain, or political constraints, may limit the
ability to collect information. This may require contingency plans to be put
in place to ensure the tempo of operations is maintained.
(c) Corroboration. This is the deliberate process of using more than

one asset to collect on the same target. Assigning combinations of ISR
assets and sensors from different bands of the electromagnetic spectrum
ensures a more detailed appreciation of the AOI. Corroboration is of
particular importance when supporting highly sensitive, inter-agency
operations.
c. Processing. Processing is defined as the conversion of information into

intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.47 In
most scenarios, the processing is done by highly specialized and trained analysts in
either a special operations intelligence cell (SOIC) or in an ASC if operating in a
comprehensive environment. There is, however, an increasing tendency in time-
sensitive missions for RT imagery and electronically-captured information to be sent
47 AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, dated 29 Apr 14, pp. 2-I-6.
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directly to the mission commander for instant processing and analysis. The procedures
and criteria used to process information are explained in AJP-2.1(A), Intelligence
Procedures. It is important to remember that the information collected on an ISR mission
is just that—information. Until it is compared with other ISR data or fused with existing
intelligence and interpreted by experts, it is possible for the raw information to be
inaccurate or misleading. Decision-makers, commanders, and mission commanders are
charged with making decisions using the best available intelligence. The dynamics of a
modern battlespace and emerging technology mean that decision-makers often receive
raw information direct from the sensor. There is a tendency to grab this information and
use it; however, time permitting and if at all possible, decisions should be made with
intelligence rather than information.
d. Dissemination. Dissemination is the distribution of processed intelligence, not the

delivery of ISR information to analysts (which is part of the collection phase).
Dissemination is an essential part of the SOCC’s SOIC mission that ensures intelligence is
shared by all interested parties in a comprehensive environment. Sharing information to
an ASC empowers the broader intelligence cycle, and intelligence gathered through
special operations is often critical to the processing phase of a higher HQ’s intelligence
cycle (including inter-agency or HN organizations). Intelligence can be disseminated
verbally or in written form through INTREPs, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), mission
reports (MISREPs), OPSUMs, or through a myriad of electronic forms. More sophisticated
command structures have complex joint and combined common databases with layers of
access depending on the user’s nationality, security clearance, need-to-know principle, and
the level of cooperation with other governmental agencies and other governmental
departments. The benefit of collaborative databases is the availability of a common
intelligence picture and awareness; the challenge is protecting sensitive intelligence and
sensitive sources when combined with all-source intelligence. Within NATO operations,
SOCC forces are mandated by ACO Forces Standards Volume X, Special Operations
Forces, to maintain a battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES)
network point of presence to facilitate this intelligence sharing.
5-3. F3EAD. The F3EAD process used to provide support to deliberate and dynamic or time-
sensitive targeting can also be used by an SOTG/SOATG to identify the ISR capabilities that
are required for each phase of an operation to develop a target. Different capabilities are
required depending on the phase of the F3EAD cycle.48 Examples of capabilities that can be
utilized in a collection plan to support the F3EAD targeting cycle are shown in Table 5-1.49
Table 5-1. F3EAD Targeting Cycle Assets Allocations
F3EAD Process Find/Fix Finish Exploit/Analyse/

Disseminate
Archived Material x x
Change Detection x x x
Common CIS Architecture/Capacity x x x
Communications Rebroadcast x x
Full-motion Video x x
Fusion Cells x x x
48 AJP-3.9(B), Chapter 5. AJP-3.5(A) further explains the process from a targeting perspective.
49 Chapter 3 provides additional information on targeting.
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F3EAD Process Find/Fix Finish Exploit/Analyse/

Disseminate
Geolocation x x x
Ground Moving Target Indicator x x
HUMINT x x x
Imagery x x x
Pattern of Life x x
Pattern of Normal x x
Technical Exploitation Operation x x
Wide Area Surveillance x x
Voice Intercept x x
5-4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Matrix. The SOCC is an essential

and influential part of COM JTF’s campaign collection plan and, as mentioned previously, most
likely has its own CCIRM process. To ensure the SOCC provides maximum effect to the JTF, it
must ensure that it has visibility and access to the other component, inter-agency, and HN
collection plans. One tool that is particularly useful to ensure that all ISR assets are utilized in
the most effective and efficient manner is the ISR matrix. The ISR tracking matrix is a tool used
in the JOC for monitoring asset visibility and is the responsibility of the J3-ISR in collaboration
with the J2-CCIRM. The ISR matrix matches ISR assets to named areas of interest (NAIs) and
target areas of interest (TAIs) as listed in the collection plan. The collection plan ensures that
prioritized NAI/TAIs have suitable ISR capability coverage. The ISR matrix ensures that every
asset is suitably employed for the duration of its mission. Figure 5-2 is a sample ISR matrix.
Figure 5-2. Sample Notional ISR Matrix
5-5. Information Delivery. The final consideration during the collection phase is how best to
reduce the delivery delay (the time between a sensor capturing the information and the
information being delivered to an analyst). Reducing the delivery delay allows for a quicker
response time (the time between making an information request and receiving the intelligence
that answers the request), and is essential in outmanoeuvring the enemy in the modern,
dynamic battlespace. Some means of reducing delivery delay include using data links to
transmit information to analysts in RT or NRT; shortening the distance between sensor and
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analyst (for example, locating an analyst in a manned reconnaissance platform, or at least LOs
who can direct RT sensors to provide the troops on the ground with the latest information); or,
having more frequent, shorter duration cycles of ISR, thereby allowing the analysis of
information from the first cycle while later cycles of ISR are ongoing.
5-6. Special Operations Component Command Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Process
a. It is common for SOTGs/SOATGs not to have assigned ISR assets; they will most
likely have to bid to the SOCC for ISR support by submitting a SPTREQ for non-airborne
ISR capabilities or an air support request (AIRSUPREQ) for airborne ISR capabilities. The
SPTREQ/AIRSUPREQ should be submitted with the draft CONOPS to the J35 and
copied to the J2-CCIRM.
b. While the J35 is staffing the CONOPS, the J2-CCIRM will be ascertaining if the
request is valid, if it is in accordance with COM JTF and COM SOCC’s intent and
guidance, and whether the request can be supported from within the SOCC’s order of
battle (ORBAT) of assigned ISR assets that are supporting the collection plan.
(1) If the SPTREQ/AIRSUPREQ is supported by the J2-CCIRM and if spare

capacity exists within the SOCC ORBAT, ISR assets may be detached to the
SOTGs/SOATGs under delegated C2 relationships for short durations to support
specific missions.
(2) If there is insufficient capacity or inappropriate capabilities within the SOCC

task organization to fulfil the SPTREQ/AIRSUPREQ, the J2-CCIRM can request
the required ISR support by submitting the SPTREQ/AIRSUPREQ to the SOPLE,
SOLE, or SOCCE (dependent on which HQ is designated as the DARB
coordinating authority) for DARB consideration.
c. The DARB is the coordinating authority for all theatre ISR assets but does not
have authority over ISR assets that are considered organic to a component commander.
J2-CCIRM staff members who submit SPTREQs/AIRSUPREQs for additional ISR
support should evaluate the likelihood of their requests being approved within the context
of COM JTF’s direction and guidance outlined in the JCO, the published JPTL, and the
JTF HQ’s ISR priorities. Alternative plans should be considered to compensate for low
priority requests that may be denied based on available ISR capacity.
d. SPTREQs/AIRSUPREQs for ISR support must be based on the IRs (desired ISR
product, type of sensor required, duration of mission) and not on the specific platform that is
perceived to be the best fit to collect the information. The CCIRM process will have more
flexibility, and therefore a higher likelihood of meeting the request, if effect and capability are
requested rather than specific units, assets, or air platforms.
e. Once the CONOPS has been authorized, it is handed over to the J33 to monitor
and assess during execution. This process is mirrored with the ISR support. Once a
SPTREQ/AIRSUPREQ has been approved by the DARB, it will be handed over to the
J3-ISR to monitor the execution of this part of the collection plan with the J2-CCIRM,
taking a more holistic view of the entire collection plan. Should an ISR contingency
occur, the J3-ISR, in liaison with the J2-CCIRM, will monitor and assist as required to
ensure the collection plan is maintained.
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f. Once assigned an ISR mission, SOCC staff members and SOTG commanders
should exchange as much information as practically possible with the supporting ISR unit
(while still retaining OPSEC). Understanding the task empowers the ISR mission
commander with the ability to manage contingency collection plans should changes
occur in the pre-planned collection scenario. Mission CONOPS, TIPs, target grid
reference graphics, etc., are all examples of information that will be of assistance to the
ISR mission commander when conducting the pre-planned collection plan or when
executing a contingency collection plan. If EW capabilities are planned to support the
mission, careful consideration of the effect on friendly forces’ activity must be undertaken
(including interference with electronic forms of finding, fixing, and tracking the enemy).
By virtue of their height above the ground and the line of sight that this provides, EW can
often cross into adjacent formations’ AOOs causing unplanned and detrimental effects.
g. Experience has proven that the best way to ensure success for short notice
SPTREQs/AIRSUPREQs is to submit detailed requests as early as possible, then to
employ charismatic, professional, and informed liaisons to champion the SOCC’s case
for support. The relationships formed by a proactive SOLE are often one of the major
determining factors in air and aviation allocations.
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CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING
6-1. General. The SOCC utilizes a component-level planning process to synchronize special
operations planning in relative parallel with operational-level planning. The SOCC-P2
complements the six phases, steps, and products of operational planning (Figure 6-1) outlined
in the COPD. The SOCC-P2 is outlined in paragraph 6-2 and is used during the different
phases of a NATO response to a crisis or for the creation of a SOCC SUPPLAN/OPLAN; the
process is described in greater detail in the SOCC Planning Handbook. An abbreviated version
of the SOCC-P2 is described in paragraph 6-3. This hasty planning process is used for
planning when time is constrained and when the planning will result in an order to the SOCC
and/or its subordinate elements. Hasty planning is not used to develop a SUPPLAN or an
OPLAN. At the tactical level (task groups and task units) the SOF decision-making process is
utilized for mission planning.
6-2. Special Operations Component Command Planning Process. The SOCC-P2 is used
for deliberate planning by a SOCCPG or J5 directorate and includes operational art and design.
Below is an overview of the six phases of the process.50
a. Phase 1 – Situation Awareness. The purpose of the situation awareness phase

is to develop and maintain a level of understanding to support assessments and
decision-making by COM SOCC and staff. Because NATO does not have a standing
SOCC to maintain awareness of events happening within the Alliance’s sphere of
interest, the NSHQ SA centre maintains an understanding of ongoing global events.
Phase 1 formally begins when SACEUR designates an AOI and assigns responsibilities
for situation monitoring to a JTF HQ. Although the NSHQ commander may not stand up
a SOCCPG at this point, the NSHQ and the SOFAD at the designated JTF HQ should
begin the knowledge development process. This process includes developing SOCC
RFIs, making initial judgements about the potential threats and risks, and building the
SOCC’s knowledge base concerning conditions, trends, population, and previous
assessments of the environment. A SOPLE may be deployed to assist and to augment
the assigned SOFAD. During this phase, SOCC planners initiate the CPOE and develop
their initial assessment.
b. Phase 2 – Appreciation. The purpose of the appreciation phase is twofold. First,

Phase 2 provides the opportunity for the commander and staff to fully develop their
understanding of the situation. Second, once the staff have developed their
understanding of the situation, they apply their professional expertise, judgement, and
critical thinking skills to provide sound special operations advice to COM JFC. For the
SOCC, Phase 2 begins with a WNGO from the JTF HQ. Throughout this phase, the
SOCC continues to develop and refine its CPOE. Activities during this phase include the
activation of SOCC planning elements, initiation of the estimate process, and
development of the commander’s initial guidance. It is important to appreciate the level
and scope of international engagement, including the legal and political aspects, and the
international media and public opinions. The SOCCPG must fully understand NATO’s
desired end state and strategic and military operational objectives.
50 SOCC Planning Handbook, dated 2013.
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Figure 6-1. SOCC-P2 Phases
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c. Phase 3 – Orientation. The purpose of the orientation phase is to determine the

operational problem that must be solved, the specific conditions the SOCC must create,
the key operational factors that influence the achievement of those conditions, and any
limitations on the SOCC’s freedom of action as the SOCCPG develops the overall
operational design. The orientation phase begins with the receipt of COM JFC’s
operational planning directive. This phase includes a review of the planning guidance, a
detailed mission analysis, the development of the commander’s operational design, and
the formulation of the commander’s initial intent. Mission analysis includes a thorough
examination of the higher commander’s mission, intent, and desired end state, as well as
all assigned and implied tasks, in order to precisely state the mission and desired end
state. This is complemented by a COG and factors analysis, the development of decisive
points/conditions, and the creation of the operational design (an updated COG and factor
analysis tool is available in Annex D, Appendix 1). The SOCCPG presents their mission
analysis to the commander to assist him in formulating his planning guidance. Phase 3
concludes with the commander issuing guidance to the SOCCPG for the development of
COAs and issuing the SOCC planning directive to subordinate commanders to initiate
planning.
d. Phase 4a – CONOPS Development. The purpose of the CONOPS development

phase is for the SOCC to determine the best way to carry out operations effectively and
efficiently in accordance with COM JFC’s intent. CONOPS development begins with a
review of the CPG as a basis for updating staff estimates and developing COAs.
Potential COAs are initially described in broad terms and tested for viability. Viable
COAs are coordinated with subordinate commands, refined through analysis, evaluated
through wargaming, and compared among themselves and against the opposing force
COAs to determine relative advantages and disadvantages. The results are presented in
a COA decision brief to the commander. On the basis of the commander’s decision and
any further guidance, the SOCCPG refines the selected COA and produces a coherent
component-level CONOPS and a joint statement of requirements (SOR), which are the
final products of this planning stage.
e. Phase 4b – Plan Development. The purpose of the plan development phase is

to turn the approved CONOPS into a plan that addresses deployment, employment, FP,
and sustainment of NATO SOF. Plan development must meet the criteria for timeliness
and adequacy as specified by the JTF HQ. A SOPLE is the SOCC representative at the
JTF HQ, the JFC, and/or ACO. The SOPLE ensures that the SOCC requirements and
requests are adequately addressed in the development of the JCO, the JTF HQ
synchronization matrix, and the JPEL. Once the JTF HQ CONOPS is approved by
SACEUR, the SOCC should expect an activation warning that is provided for
representatives to the force generation conference where nations commit their
contributions to the operation. An activation request is sent to each nation’s Ministry of
Defence to confirm their force commitments; SACEUR releases the Allied Forces List
(AFL). The AFL and the SOCC CONOPS are the basis for the SOCC SUPPLAN and
appropriate annexes. This phase also includes revisions to the JTF HQ Annex K,
Special Operations, based on any changes or adjustments received during the CONOPS
approval process and AFL.
f. Phase 5 – Execution and Assessment. Phase 5 is the execution of the

approved SOCC SUPPLAN. The SOCC’s task is to conduct special operations in
support of COM JFC’s goals and objectives. Throughout this phase, the SOCC must
monitor the environment and assess the outcome of SOF actions across the entire
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battlespace. Combat assessment is a continual process that occurs during every step of
planning and execution. If, during execution, adjustments are required to the SUPPLAN,
the SOCC may amend the plan based on the direction and guidance of COM SOCC and
with the concurrence of COM JTF. The tools available to amend or adjust a plan are a
FRAGO, JCO, or rewriting of the SUPPLAN. COM SOCC directs which format he
prefers or which best meets the higher commander’s operational or timeline requirements
for amending a plan during execution.
g. Phase 6 – Transition. The purpose of the transition phase at the SOCC level is to
transition to the next phase of the campaign, prepare for the next rotation of SOF, or
arrange the transition from one SOCC FN to a new FN. The goal is to ensure that the
transition between units, whether at the unit level or by the SOCC FN, does not become a
destabilizing influence in the operational area or TOO. The SOCC-P2 ensures a high level
of cooperation and coordination among the functional components in a TOO, directs the
integrations with local and regional civilian agencies, and provides for sufficient oversight
and higher HQ guidance of SOF transition plans in order to avoid any potential missteps.
6-3. Hasty Special Operations Component Command Planning Process. The hasty
SOCC-P2 is generally used for future operations and branch planning by the J35 or a
SOCCPG. The major difference between hasty SOCC-P2 and the process used during
deliberate planning is that the analysis of COGs, the development of operational design, and
wargaming are removed. It is ultimately the responsibility of the J35 or SOCCPG leader to
determine what additional steps may be omitted given the time available for planning. The
development of a realistic timeline based on the situation and the capabilities of the planners is
essential to the success and quality of the planning effort. The outline below is a
recommendation designed to aid hasty planning and may be modified to the situation. A
diagram of the hasty SOCC-P2 can be found at Annex G.
Important Note. Two useful techniques to assist with hasty

planning are to divide the planning group, when possible, into
small groups to accomplish various planning steps and to avoid
using formal PowerPoint presentations to build a plan. The use
of whiteboards and sharing results during periodic reviews can
save precious time while achieving the same result.
a. Phase 1 and 2 – Situation Awareness and Appreciation. Phases 1 and 2 of

SOCC-P2 are combined during hasty planning to conserve time; the purpose is to
understand the enemy and friendly situation related to the planning effort. The initiation
of planning may be directed by the commander, the J3, or the JTF HQ (in an order or
planning guidance). The combined step ends with an assessment briefing to the
commander and an issued WNGO.
(1) Organize and Gather Resources. Once planning is initiated, the J35 or
SOCCPG leader develops a timeline and assigns personnel to the planning effort.
The J35 or group leader may choose to create a smaller planning team and assign
a leader to the task to balance other competing requirements. Relevant
documents, assessments, and products are identified and consolidated for the
planning effort.
(2) Develop a Problem Statement. As soon as possible during this phase,

the planners develop a problem statement to guide the planning effort. This
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prevents losing focus of the problem as planning progresses through the phases
and steps. The problem statement is reviewed periodically by the group and is
modified as the level of understanding improves, due to the analysis of available
information.
(3) Review the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational

Environment. The CPOE is updated continuously during a campaign or
operation. If the planning group is not fully aware of the situation, they should
review relevant resources and products that may assist with the planning effort.
This step may be omitted if the planners have a complete understanding of the
situation related to the planning effort.
(4) Assess the Operational Area for Planning, Operational, and

Sustainment Impacts. The operational area is evaluated for impacts given the
threat and friendly situation. This step may be omitted if the planners have a
complete understanding of the area and operational impacts.
(5) Knowledge Development. Based on the review of the CPOE, assessment

of the operational area, and/or current level of understanding, planners identify
knowledge gaps and create KRs to fill the gaps. The KRs become RFIs to various
elements, internal or external to the SOCC, to facilitate planning. One individual
should be responsible for managing KRs and associated RFIs for the planning
effort. As the planning effort continues through the steps and following phases,
KRs and RFIs are continuously updated. Whenever information is received, the
group is updated.
(6) Review Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Develop

Information Requirements. Concurrent with developing KRs and RFIs, the
group reviews the current CCIRs and related intelligence to determine if additional
intelligence requirements exist for the situation. The IRs are monitored and
updated throughout the process.
(7) Review the Legal and Political Aspects. SOCC planners should be
familiar with the legal and political aspects of the current campaign or operation,
which includes international law, treaties, conventions, and guidance set forth in the
current OPLAN. The SOCC’s LEGAD and POLAD can assist with this step. This
step may be omitted if the planning group has an understanding of these aspects.
(8) Review the Rules of Engagement. The ROE is updated periodically and
should be considered simultaneously with the legal and political aspects for rules
that may impact the planning process. If the planning group understands the ROE
and/or receives advice from the LEGAD during planning, this step may be omitted.
Request specific ROE if required.
(9) Review the Current Media and Public Opinions. The current state of
public opinion and media attitudes can influence operations conducted by the
SOCC. It is important for planners to consider the opinions and attitudes that may
provide options during the planning process in order to achieve the desired effects,
prevent unintended consequences, and support the strategic communications
message. If the planning group is thoroughly familiar with the media and public
opinion situation, this step may be omitted.
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(10) Understand the Desired End State, Objectives, and Effects. The
planning group should review and critically analyse the documents and guidance
set forth for the planning effort. It may be useful to quickly develop a mini-design
sketch of the stated end state, objectives, and desired effects to help guide the
planning efforts. This is not a creation of a SOCC design for the planning effort or
an amendment to the current operational design; rather, it is a graphical depiction
of what is being directed to aid planning by the group.
(11) Conduct a Force Assessment. It is important for the planning group to

have a firm understanding of the pending, ongoing, and future operations along
with commitments of each of the SOCC’s subordinate elements. It is equally
important to understand the capabilities and limitations (e.g. national caveats,
assets) of the elements in order to aid future operations and branch planning. This
force assessment is aided through a review of SITREPs, CIS tools (SOF C2IS,
NetPlan, mission trackers, etc.), and update briefings. Various members of the
SOCC J3-Current Operations section may be invaluable in developing the
assessment based on their knowledge of the current situation and force
capabilities/limitations.
(12) Review the Current Command and Control Structure. Based on the
fluid nature of operations and limited resources available within the SOCC, it is
useful to review the current C2 structure after the force assessment. This aids
those in the planning process to consider all options during future phases and
steps that may require a change to the SOCC’s task organization and/or the need
for attaching or detaching forces to accomplish the mission.
(13) Determine Preconditions for Success. After completing the previous

steps of this phase, the planning group should identify any preconditions required
for the SOCC’s success of the assigned task or mission. These preconditions
should help generate additional RFIs, intelligence requirements, changes, and
supporting operations vital to achieve the overall objective.
(14) Conduct an Assessment Briefing. Assessment Briefing

The assessment briefing serves to provide
a common level of awareness to the At a minimum, the assessment
commander and/or J3 related to the briefing should include:
situation. The problem and desired end
state/objective
(15) Issue a Warning Order. If enough COM JTF’s mission
details are available, the SOCC should COM JTF’s intent
issue a WNGO to potential sections and Current SOCC missions and
units. This may be delayed until further tasks
information is developed during the SOF units and capabilities
planning process but should be issued as available for planning
soon as possible. Current C2 structure
Preconditions for success
b. Phase 3 – Orientation. Phase 3 of the
hasty SOCC-P2 is essentially an abbreviated
mission analysis, without design, to derive additional pertinent information required to assign
tasks, develop COAs, and create CONOPS and/or orders. Sufficient time should be
allocated to this step to ensure that the plan is feasible, suitable, complete, and achievable.
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(1) Determine Facts. The first step of Phase 3 is to review the pertinent
documents and guidance related to the planning effort and to determine what is
known about the situation that is relevant and has a bearing on the problem. Listing
the known facts after completing the previous combined phase helps to identify
additional knowledge gaps and expand the list of RFIs to enhance planning.
(2) Analyse the Assigned Mission and Objectives. Critically analyse the
mission, tasks, and objectives assigned to the SOCC. These should be separated
from the facts listed in the previous step.
(3) Review Target Intelligence Package.51 If a TIP is available and relevant

for planning, review the package for additional information to fill knowledge gaps,
to include in the facts, or to assist with collection planning efforts. Ensure relevant
intelligence requirements related to the target are included in the collection plan.
(4) Determine Specified, Implied, and Mission-essential Actions. Create a

list of specified actions (tasks) that are assigned to the SOCC. From this list,
develop actions or tasks that are implied and relevant to accomplishment of the
assigned mission that are not inherent or considered part of standard operating
procedures (SOPs). From the combined list, determine the actions considered
critical to mission success. There are generally three to five actions that, if not
completed, result in mission failure. As a result, the commander designates these
as mission-essential SOF actions.
(5) Assess the Impact of Time, Space, Force, and Information. To aid with
the development of assumptions and determining operational requirements and
risk, planners must consider the actions of SOF and enabling/supporting forces in
relation to time, space, and information.
(6) Develop Assumptions. The outcome of the previous step, coupled with
current knowledge gaps, necessitates the development of valid assumptions to
continue planning. Higher HQs’ assumptions are considered facts and not
assumptions for the SOCC. If an assumption proves opposite than what is
supposed, but it does not cause mission failure or a major revision to the plan or to
a branch plan, it is not an assumption but rather a planning factor that may be
useful elsewhere in planning. Every effort must be made to change assumptions
into facts through research, coordination, and the RFI process. Finally, do not
assume operational success or failure of the adversary; these are not valid
assumptions for planning.
(7) Determine Critical Operational Requirements. Analyse the list of actions

or tasks (specified, implied, and essential) to determine what operational support
and resource requirements are critical to mission accomplishment. Review the
basic strategic communication messages and determine what, if any,
requirements exist for the operation. Consider the preconditions beyond the
SOCC’s influence that are required for mission accomplishment and/or success;
update as required. Review the current KRs, finalize the list of IRs for the mission,
and coordinate with the J2 for collection planning.
51 See Chapter 3 for additional information regarding targeting, and Annex E for an example of a TIP.
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(8) Determine Requirements for Interaction with Relevant Actors.

Analysing the area where the mission is to take place identifies complementary
activities (military and non-military) that must be considered, coordinated, and/or
synchronized to achieve the desired effects. The requirements from this step
result in tasks to various elements of the SOCC or to subordinate units in the order
developed during Phase 4b.
(9) Identify limitations. Limitations are divided into two categories, constraints
(what must be done) and restraints (what may not be done), that limit freedom of
action in accomplishing the mission. These limitations must be considered during
the next step, risk assessment development.
(10) Develop the Risk Assessment. The planning group’s initial risk
assessment primarily addresses the risk to the mission and the operational risk to
the force; tactical risks to the force and mitigation measures are the responsibility
of the commander executing the mission. A simple matrix outlines the identified
risks, impact to the operation, mitigation measures that reduce or limit the
probability and severity, and residual risk analysis.
Table 6-1. Operational Risk Assessment
Operational Risk Assessment
Consequence
Source Severity Probability
for
Collateral Negative Info Ops High – could result in failure to Moderate

damage (close air implications accomplish one or more objectives
support (CAS),
HN security Erode popular
forces, etc.) support
Enhance enemy
propaganda
Risk Management Residual Risk

Use of ground controllers for CAS (Severity/Probability)
Positive identification (PID) of target before execution
High/Low
Use of ISR for mission support
Deconflict battlespace manager (BSM) with battlespace owner
Incorporate PsyOps into the mission
Conclusion
Acceptable – no risk management actions required
(11) Analyse Operational Objectives. Based on the SOCC’s targeting

methodology (effects-based targeting covered in detail in Chapter 3), consider the
commander’s desired effects in relation to the operation being planned. This
allows the operation to be placed into greater context within the overall campaign.
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(12) Develop Requirements for Strategic Communications. If requirements

for strategic communications were identified in step 7, planners must express
them in terms or themes and messages to influence actors by indirect means (e.g.
Info Ops or PsyOps).
(13) Develop Tentative Missions for Subordinate Commanders. Based on

the completed steps of mission analysis (steps 1-12), the planning group develops
tentative missions and objectives for subordinate units. It is important to consider
all the actions and tasks identified and to remember that the exact element(s) may
not be identified at this point, so the mission statement may remain generic;
missions will be refined, assigned, and coordinated with the appropriate
subordinate elements during CONOPS development. Mission statements must
cover the who, what, when, where, and why of the operation but leave the how to
the commander executing the operation.
(14) Develop the Commander’s Initial Intent. The planning group leader may
choose to draft the initial intent based on experience and/or personal knowledge of
the commander. The commander’s intent reflects the commander’s enduring
vision of the operation while enabling subordinate elements’ mission command
and initiative. The intent should include:
(a) The purpose of the operation.
(b) The general phasing (sequencing) of the operation.
(c) The identification of the main effort.
(d) The level of acceptable risk and unacceptable risk.
(e) The desired end state related to operational (joint force) objectives.
(15) Update the Force Estimate. The planning group updates the force
assessment conducted during the previous phase to analyse capabilities required
for the operation compared with the forces available. Planners should identify
significant shortfalls that may constitute a risk to the assigned mission and may
require the commander’s attention. Planners must anticipate supporting and
enabling requirements for the operation and may begin early coordination or
submit the appropriate requests in an effort to secure the required support.
(16) Estimate Command and Control Requirements. Once the force estimate
is complete, consider the preliminary C2 structure from the previous phase to
assess if any potential conflict exists that requires a task organization change or
the need to attach forces to or detach forces from the SOCC.
(17) Conduct the Mission Analysis Brief. At the end of the brief, confirm the
proposed initial intent to the commander and receive the commander’s guidance
for COA development.
c. Phase 4a – Concept of Operations Development. The CONOPS development

phase begins after receiving the CPG. All the information, products, and lists compiled
during the previous steps require monitoring, periodic review, and updating as applicable.
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(1) Gather and Review Guidance. It is important to capture the commander’s

guidance and to review it immediately upon receipt. It is helpful to determine how
the group will handle COA development—unified or split into subgroups. It is also
important for the leader to determine if he will participate in COA development or
remain neutral in order to monitor and guide the COA development to ensure the
concepts meet the commander’s guidance and are completed in a timely manner.
A standard template for depicting each COA should be utilized to ease comparison
and the decision brief. See Annex D, Appendix 2, for a sample COA template.
(2) Develop Enemy Courses of Action. Even though the hasty SOCC-P2
does not include wargaming, it is important that the enemy COAs are considered
during planning and are included in the order. The group’s intelligence planner,
working closely with the J2 directorate, determines the enemy’s most likely and
most dangerous COAs.
(3) Develop Special Operations Forces Courses of Action. Most hasty

planning conducted by the SOCC is not oriented on the enemy and often is
focused on solving problems or presenting possible solutions for future operations
or branch planning. The COAs may compare forces regarding a change to the
SOF mission or to execute a target, leaving the actual tactical planning and
wargaming to the executing unit.
(4) Analyse Courses of Action. Even though the planning effort may not be
enemy centric or require wargaming, the planning group is still responsible for
analysing and testing COAs for viability (suitability, acceptability, feasibility,
exclusivity, completeness, and compliance with NATO doctrine).
(5) Compare Courses of Action. The commander’s COA development

guidance should be fully understood before choosing the method of comparison.
In hasty planning, time generally permits utilizing only one of the three methods
available for comparison.
(a) Compare Courses of Action against Commander’s Selection

Criteria. This is the preferred method when the commander is provided
with selection criteria for COA selection.
(b) Compare Courses of Action’s Advantages and Disadvantages.

This method is the preferred method used in the absence of defined selection
criteria. It is possible for the planning group to present criteria for the
commander to consider based on the experience level of the planning group.
(c) Compare Friendly and Opposing Courses of Action. This

method is rarely used during hasty planning as the plan is generally not a
tactical plan of action.
(6) Conduct the Decision Brief. The planning staff brief COM SOCC on
friendly and enemy COAs; one is recommended. COM SOCC will decide which
COA, or combination of COAs, fits his overall intent best. At the end of the COA
decision brief, provide the commander an update on the timeline and way ahead,
and request additional guidance, if required. Be prepared for the commander to
modify the COA selected and/or to provide the planning group with guidance that
must be quickly addressed to finalize the plan and to issue orders.
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(7) Produce the Concept of Operations. To aid the planning efforts of the
executing unit, once identified, the planning group should use the SOCC’s vast
array of capabilities to create a shell of a SOF CONOPS to accompany the order.
The planning group must not attempt to complete the tactical plan or related
portion of the CONOPS; leave the tactical details and mission command to the
executing unit. If the CONOPS requires approval by the JTF HQ, a courtesy copy
may be provided to the SOPLE or appropriate LO, indicating a full CONOPS will
follow once developed by the executing unit, staffed by the SOCC, and approved
by the commander.
d. Phase 4b – Plan Development. During this final planning phase for the J35 or
planning group, the order is finalized and issued to the appropriate elements. The J35
staffs the completed CONOPS when submitted by the executing unit. The planning
group should continue supporting collection planning efforts until the CONOPS is
completed and transitioned to the J33.
e. Phase 5 – Execution and Assessment. The planning group transitions the

CONOPS to the J33 (JOC) for execution and assessment. See Chapter 7 for more
information on CONOPS handover.
f. Phase 6 – Transition. For hasty SOCC-P2, this step is not required and is
therefore eliminated; however, branch or sequel planning may be required upon
conclusion of the operation.
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CHAPTER 7 – OPERATIONS
7-1. General. The SOCC operates at the component level and translates strategic and
operational objectives, end states, and desired effects into tasks. The J3 directorate serves as
the commander’s staff that functions as the centre for synchronizing, coordinating, and
deconflicting all aspects of special operations, operational support, targeting, and operations-
intelligence integration to provide a flexible capability to the JTF HQ. All taskings, orders, and
mission execution authority emanate from the operations directorate. The authority granted to
the J3 is at the discretion of the commander and therefore implies close coordination and
constant communication with other staff directorates, deputies, leaders, and staff members. All
members of the SOCC staff must differentiate between staff authority, coordination, and mission
command. Only commanders exercise mission command, and staff members must not confuse
their responsibilities with authority over subordinate elements while coordinating or executing
routine staff functions.
a. Operations. In the context of Allied joint operations, SOF conduct three principal
tasks: MA, SR, and DA. Within the spectrum of conflict, the SOF principal tasks are
applied to support, but are not limited to, COIN, CT, countering CBRN weapons, HROs,
and faction liaison.52
(1) Military Assistance. MA is a broad spectrum of measures and activities

that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising,
mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, but
is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with
local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; and civic actions
supporting and influencing the local population.
(2) Special Reconnaissance. SR is conducted by SOF to support the

collection of PIRs by employing unique capabilities or ISR assets. SR places eyes
on target in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. Activities within SR
include environmental reconnaissance, threat assessment, target assessment,
and post-strike reconnaissance.
(3) Direct Action. DA is a precise offensive operation conducted by SOF that

is limited in scope and duration in order to seize, destroy, disrupt, capture, exploit,
recover, or damage HVTs or HPTs. SOF DA differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision
utilized to create a specific effect, and usually incorporates a planned withdrawal
from the immediate objective area. Activities within DA include raids, ambushes,
and assaults; terminal guidance operations; recovery operations; precision
destruction operations; and opposed boarding operations.
b. Concept of Operations. For SOF, the term CONOPS has dual meanings with
similar purposes. The term CONOPS “describes the course of action in broad terms.”53
When the SOCC-P2 is used to develop a SUPPLAN or OPLAN, a written CONOPS is
submitted for approval in accordance with the COPD, Appendix 3 to Annex D. For special
operations missions, a CONOPS also describes a COA but with sufficient detail normally
found in a five-paragraph OPORD. This is normally a bottom-up driven process with a
CONOPS developed by the executing unit; however, it is occasionally necessary for the
52 AJP-3.5(A).
53 COPD, pp. 6-2.
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SOCC to initiate the CONOPS development and for the executing unit to finalize the plan of
action. To streamline the developmental process, to aid staffing and coordination, and to
facilitate rapid approval, a simplified PowerPoint CONOPS is used for special operations.
SOF CONOPS is covered in greater detail in paragraph 7-2. See Appendix 3 to Annex D for
the NSHQ SOF CONOPS template.
c. Battlespace Management. Battlespace management allows for the safe and

effective employment of combat power and encompasses operational environment
geometry (see paragraph 2-10) and control measures (see paragraphs 8-7 and 8-8).
Although the SOCC normally does not own battlespace, it is imperative that operations
are coordinated and deconflicted, and that the appropriate control measures are in place
prior to mission execution. Even though task groups plan and often coordinate their
operations directly with the battlespace owner, the SOCC should review all CONOPS to
ensure the mission is properly synchronized and should monitor the mission to assist
with resolving unforeseen issues. Requests requiring the SOCC’s support normally
accompany the executing unit’s CONOPS.
d. Joint Fires. Joint fires is defined as fires applied during the employment of forces
from two or more components, in coordinated action toward a common objective. The
SOCC has limited ability to support joint fires; therefore, task groups often coordinate
fires directly with the battlespace owner. During task group planning, additional fires may
be requested by submitting the appropriate request to the SOCC who validates and
actions the request internally or initiates coordination through the appropriate liaison
element. It is important to remember to request a capability or desired effect and not a
particular weapons system or platform. See Chapter 3 for more information regarding
effects-based targeting. Fires can be on call or contingency joint fires. See Figure 7-1.
(1) A forward air controller (FAC) can request fires based on pre-planned on-
call requests for effects.
(2) Multiple avenues are available to service the request: directly to the aircraft
if assigned to support, via the Tactical Air Request Net to an airborne or regional
C2 node for coordination, or to an air operations centre (AOC) at the next level up
for coordination.
(3) The FAC, JOC, AOC, combined air operations centre (CAOC), and airborne
C2 centre all have defined authorities and assets to address the FAC’s request.
(4) The assignment of fires is based on anti-surface force air operation, ISR,
and TST prioritization matrices that reflect the JTF HQ’s priorities.
(5) Support does not have to be an airborne capability; pre-coordinated naval

gunfire support, medium- or short-range rocket systems, artillery systems, and
mortar support can all be employed to meet joint fires support requests.
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Figure 7-1. Joint Fires
e. The Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess Cycle. The functions of the SOCC’s
operations directorate are to plan, direct, monitor, and assess (PDMA) special operations.
The PDMA cycle can be entered into at any point. It is designed to aid the commander in
making decisions and to focus the SOCC’s support to subordinate elements.
Figure 7-2. PDMA Cycle
f. J3 Directorate Organization. Within the operations directorate, there is a division

that separates current and future operations from future plans and other staff
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directorates. Working at the component level, the operations directorate is organized

and staffed to work up-and-out to the JTF HQ, laterally to other components, and down-
and-in to the various SOCC staff directorates and subordinate elements. Other staff
directorates provide personnel, as required, to support planning efforts or as watch
officers to the operations centre.
Figure 7-3. Operations Organization
7-2. Future Operations (J35). The J35 is a relatively small section. The daily tasks of the
J35 include orders production, future operations and branch planning, CONOPS staffing, and
any other required operational problem solving or research projects. Future operations planning
differs from future plans (J5) in the timescale the planning effort normally encompasses.
Planning in the J35 normally supports an existing plan by developing branches and/or by
supporting the campaign with future operations planning that normally ranges from about 10
days from execution to handover to the J33 where current operations are monitored within the
72-hour joint air tasking/air tasking order (ATO) cycle. However, in today’s operational
environment, the J35 staff could very well find themselves planning for kinetic and non-kinetic
operations that go well beyond the 10-day timeframe, e.g. for enduring operations such as
network targeting, KLE, COIN, and Info Ops. The key takeaway is that the planning
responsibility for 10 days and out is no longer just the sole remit of J5.
a. Organization. See Figure 7-4. The J35 is led by a director with a small group of
experienced subject matter experts (SMEs) manning the core of the section.
Experienced SOF ground, air, and maritime personnel provide their respective expertise
to support the section’s responsibilities. The intelligence planner is a member of the J2
directorate assigned to the J35. The effects planner is responsible for effects-based
targeting in support of the comprehensive approach to operations, which may include
Info Ops, PsyOps, CIMIC, and fires. Members of the J35 should be familiar with the
SOCC-P2, SOF CONOPS procedures, and orders production, as well as maintaining
situational understanding of the overall OPLAN, current operations, and operational
environment. Section members may have additional responsibilities beyond their
individual areas of expertise and are expected to contribute their overall military
experience and operational knowledge to any or all aspects of planning and problem
solving. It is the J35 director’s responsibility to organize the J35 to accomplish the
required tasks that may require dividing the personnel into teams. Other staff
directorates, members of the J33 (e.g. task group LOs and J33 ISR), and members of the
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special staff provide representation during planning, as required. See Annexes A and B
for additional information regarding J35 manning and individual duties and
responsibilities.
Figure 7-4. J35 Organization
b. Concept of Operations Development. The SOF CONOPS process is dynamic and

follows these broad steps in support of the task group planning cycle at the SOCC level:
Figure 7-5. SOTG Planning Cycle
(1) Initiation. The development of SOF CONOPS is normally initiated from the
bottom (task group or task unit level) up to the SOCC for staffing and approval,
based on the operational situation at the tactical level, and is driven by COM
SOCC’s guidance, tasks, and objectives. Initiation may occur from the joint force
and component level, when the situation requires specific capabilities that only
SOF possess, in order to achieve a desired effect in support of the overall
campaign. If the mission is tasked by the JTF HQ, the SOCC conducts a
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feasibility assessment, initiates hasty planning, and provides orders throughout the
CONOPS process.
(2) Concept of Operations Development and Staffing. Regardless of how

the mission is initiated, the SOCC’s role is to assist with support and coordination
and not to delay the process. If the mission is initiated from the top (SOCC level
or above), the SOCC should consider how they can anticipate and support the
development process and not simply issue orders. The J35 is responsible for
drafting the CONOPS to assist the subordinate element, but not to develop the
plan for execution. Ultimately, it is the executing unit that finalizes the CONOPS
and submits it to the SOCC with any requests (examples are in Annex L) requiring
the SOCC’s assistance. The SOCC staffs the CONOPS, conducts coordination,
and submits requests for support beyond the SOCC’s organic support capabilities
(see paragraph 7-2c).
(3) Concept of Operations Approval and Execution. Once the CONOPS is

staffed, COM SOCC is formally briefed on the operation and provides his approval
and any additional guidance. If required by procedures or policy, the CONOPS
may require additional approval from COM JFC through the SOPLE prior to
execution. Once final approval is received from the appropriate level, a mission
execution order (MEO) is produced and submitted through the J33 via the
executing unit’s LO. The J35 conducts a formal handover briefing to the J33 with
the appropriate personnel in attendance; these briefings are routinely supervised
by the deputy J3.
(4) Assessment. Once the mission is complete, the executing unit submits a
formal OPSUM to the SOCC for assessment. The OPSUM provides an overview
of the operation, the result(s) of the operation, lessons learned, recommendations,
result(s) of target exploitation (if applicable), and any photographs/videos that may
support future targeting or operational effects. See Appendix 5 to Annex L for an
OPSUM format.
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Figure 7-6. SOF CONOPS Process
c. Concept of Operations Staffing. The J35 should receive the completed SOF
CONOPS from the executing unit with the required SPTREQs to begin the staffing
process. Ideally, SPTREQs should be received outside the joint targeting/ATO cycle (72-
hour window) to simplify asset or mission support coordination, but they may also
accompany the CONOPS when submitted.
(1) The CONOPS is reviewed internally by the J35 but must receive concurrence
from members of other staff directorates, the J3, and the special staff. A CONOPS
staffing checklist and worksheet is available in Appendices 4 and 5 to Annex D to aid
the staffing and concurrence process. For time-sensitive operations, all the CONOPS
reviewing members of the SOCC may be consolidated in one location to accelerate
the approval process. Missing or unclear portions of the CONOPS may require the
executing unit’s LO to clarify or to resolve the issues prior to continuing the staffing
process. In many cases, the CONOPS is easily updated at the SOCC level and
rarely requires returning it to the executing unit for adjusting.
Important Note. It is not the responsibility of the J35 to

evaluate the tactical plan of action or to disapprove the
CONOPS; it is the responsibility of the J35 to ensure it is
complete, accurate, and covers all the pertinent information
required for staffing and approval by the commander.
(2) The CONOPS is reviewed by the J3, or deputy, prior to the CONOPS
briefing to the commander. The CONOPS approval briefing is short and provides
key facets of the operation to the commander for his approval. A format for a
CONOPS briefing is provided in Appendix 6 to Annex D. If the CONOPS requires
a higher-level approval, it is forwarded to the SOPLE for approval then returned to
the SOCC. After approval the MEO is sent to the executing unit. See Appendix 4
to Annex L for a MEO format.
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(3) The CONOPS handover between the J35 and J33 is a working meeting
normally chaired by the deputy J3. The CONOPS briefing presented to the
commander serves as the agenda to cover all the main points of the CONOPS
and to ensure the operation, support, timings, and key events are thoroughly
understood so the JOC can monitor the operation. Normally, the executing unit’s
LO ensures that all the pertinent files related to the operation are available to the
JOC, the CONOPS is entered into the mission tracking system, and that the
CONOPS is briefed during the CUB. After handover, the MEO is finalized and
submitted to the executing unit.
Figure 7-7. CONOPS Staffing Timeline
d. Orders Production. Although special operations missions are occasionally

directed from the top down with the results of hasty SOCC planning included in a draft
CONOPS, the CONOPS is not an order and must be accompanied by an executive
document that directs the operation. An order is an official document that is directive in
nature and carries with it FULLCOM authority over the forces in the SOCC. Additionally,
the SOCC issues orders internally to direct change or action, for routine matters that are
operational in nature but not tied to an executable plan, or for directing a unit to conduct a
military operation. In many instances, a daily FRAGO is issued to cover routine matters
or to direct and inform the SOCC and its subordinate elements. The release authority for
orders normally rests with the J3; orders are issued through the JOC. A sample order
format is available in Appendix 1 to Annex L. The types of orders include:
(1) Warning Order. A WNGO is a preliminary notice of an order or action

which is to follow. The WNGO is issued as soon as possible outlining critical
information based on what is known at the time. It is for informational use only
and does not direct tactical action; it allows subordinate units to prepare.
(2) Operation Order. An OPORD is an executable plan that directs a unit to

conduct a military operation.
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(3) Fragmentary Order. A FRAGO is an order used to send timely changes of

existing orders to subordinate and supporting commanders. It is an abbreviated
form of an OPORD, issued as required, that eliminates the need for restating
information contained in a basic OPORD. Normally, a FRAGO does not include
annexes unless the information in the annex to the original OPORD is significantly
changed requiring the publication of a revision. When a FRAGO accompanies a
draft CONOPS, the information that is contained within the CONOPS should not
be repeated in the FRAGO; rather, the FRAGO should simply refer to the
CONOPS in the appropriate portion of the order.
Best Practice. Good orders:

Provide factual information. There is no scope for
assumed, wrong, or incorrect information in an order.
Are authoritative and positive. The author uses direct
language.
Are timely, simple, and complete. Orders should be issued
in time to allow subordinate units to plan and prepare their
own actions, should outline the plan simply, and should
include all necessary information.
Allow initiative. Do not detail the how. That is for the
subordinate unit to complete on receipt of the order.
Use brevity; are concise and clear without ambiguity. Do
not cover details already included in other orders (use
references as required); do not use jargon or include
ambiguous information.
The author is responsible for effective communication based
on his/her knowledge of the situation. The individual
responsible in the future operations section for orders
production must be intimately familiar with the plan and able to
draft orders that will gain approval quickly.
e. Special Projects. Special projects or problem solving is often handed to the J35
based on their level of experience and ability to utilize established planning and problem
solving procedures to arrive at a solution. Examples of special projects include:
(1) Examining current processes and procedures to develop new or more

efficient methods.
(2) A comprehensive review of the CCIRs to develop updated PIRs and friendly
forces information requirement (FFIRs).
(3) Reviewing a serious incident or mission for lessons learned and methods in
order to exploit results (effects-based targeting).
(4) Researching, drafting, or responding to official strategic, operational, or

external correspondence for the commander.
7-3. Current Operations (J33). The primary responsibility of the J33 is the JOC. The JOC is
the focal point for monitoring all ongoing operations and communications in order for the
commander to gain and maintain SA, understand the battlespace, and make timely and well-
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informed decisions. The JOC must be manned and organized to meet the requirements of the
mission, the commanders, and the subordinate elements.
a. Manning. The JOC is continually manned, normally through two 12-hour shifts. A
list of positions for a notional SOCC is available in the manning document in Annex A.
Individual duties and responsibilities are covered in Annex B.
(1) Operations Staff Officers. Operations staff officers are typically members
of the operations directorate of the FN who serve as the leaders and functional
experts (e.g. land, maritime, air, effects) in the JOC.
(2) Permanent Watch Officers. Permanent watch officers are members of

other SOCC directorates or are augmentees from FNs who provide special
functions (such as Info Ops, intelligence, and information management) to the
JOC.54
(3) Liaison Officers. LOs are generally more senior or experienced and
represent their own commander. They assist the SOCC by monitoring,
coordinating, advising, and assisting. LOs require permanent workspace in the
JOC and a full suite of communications and CIS capabilities. LOs are expected to
follow the normal procedures of the JOC and to fully participate in staff interaction
and planning, as required.
b. Layout. The JOC layout (Figure 7-8) should be functional. Layouts are often
established in SOPs then modified based on the number of actual personnel manning the
centre and the facility utilized. Monitors at the front of the centre serve as the focus of
attention and individual workspaces are arrayed by function to optimize efficiency,
communications, assessments, and decision-making. Monitors are used to display
important information or live video feeds. Large posters or wall art are hung to provide
information that is more enduring or permanent, that is important, and used regularly by
all personnel in the JOC (e.g. CCIR, mission statement, maps). Temporary workspaces
must be available to key members of the command, special staff, and leaders. The J3,
deputy J3, and J2 usually have a separate workspace, but they also have temporary
positions in the JOC.
54 Augmentees differ from LOs as they belong to the receiving command (SOCC).
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Figure 7-8. JOC Layout
c. Battle Rhythm. The JOC manages the daily routine by developing a battle
rhythm (see Appendix 8 to Annex D for an example) that must accommodate
requirements from the JTF HQ, the commander’s schedule, and daily suspenses. The
battle rhythm should effectively support all areas of the operations directorate by
determining what events are necessary, their logical sequencing, and frequency. It must
also consider the daily routine of the personnel in the JOC, e.g. allowing for meals; the
JOC director or battle captain must have procedures to continue normal functions while
personnel are away from their positions. Considerations for building a battle rhythm start
from the JTF HQ level and work inward to develop a coherent and complete schedule.
(1) Consider the JTF HQ’s shift change, CUB, commander’s teleconference(s),
boards, cells, working groups, and daily SITREP suspense to determine what
events involve or impact the SOCC. This prevents scheduling SOCC events
during critical periods and conflict. Indicate when the ATO cycle begins each day.
(2) Determine what SOCC meetings are required and recommend times that
have the least impact during the day. Most staff directorates only operate during
an extended day shift, so avoid scheduling meetings during the night shift.
(3) Based on the SITREP suspense to the JTF HQ, determine when
subordinate SITREPS are due to the SOCC. Avoid requiring SITREPS during
high operation tempo periods (e.g. during night operations) to ensure the quality
and completeness of the input. Daily SITREP production should not span both
shifts and should be completed by either the day or night shift depending on the
JTF HQ suspense. Indicate when the daily INTSUM will be published by the J2.
(4) Determine when to hold the daily CUB based on all the previous factors,
avoiding meal times, and consider the commander’s daily schedule.
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(5) Determine the shift change, providing two 12-hour shifts that accommodate
all the factors above. Normally for special operations, the night shift is heavily
involved with monitoring operations, thus requiring continuity of personnel. The
day shift normally manages the majority of the administrative requirements,
reports, coordination, meetings, and the CUB.
d. Monitoring Operations. Tracking multiple operations involves the PDMA cycle

occurring simultaneously for each ongoing operation. The challenge is to effectively
utilize tracking mechanisms and tools to maintain a common operational picture (COP).
Information management is essential to assessing what is important, what must be
displayed, and what requires decision-making. Chapter 10 provides more information
regarding knowledge and information management. Monitoring operations may require
tools (see Appendix 9 to Annex D for examples) for:
Figure 7-9. Monitoring Operations
(1) Operations Tracking. An operations tracker, sometimes referred to as a

battle tracker, is important to monitoring the status of all operations and should be
prominently displayed on a screen or monitor at all times. The operations tracker
should show ongoing, pending, and recently completed operations. A simple
productivity tool, such as a spreadsheet or a table in PowerPoint, is a quick and
easy method of maintaining SA of operations. More advanced tools, such as
NATO Common Operational Picture (NCOP) also have a battle tracking function.
The NSHQ and NSHQ SOCC Core both use NCOP.
(2) Mission Tracking. A mission tracker provides detailed information

regarding the timings and key events of a mission. This function is one of the
prominent capabilities built into NetPlan and provides a graphic representation of
the mission, enhances coordination and synchronization, and simplifies battle
tracking following the mission execution checklist.
(3) Asset Tracking. To aid in monitoring key platforms and FFIR, an asset
tracker provides a continual summary of the status of critical items such as
aviation and ISR systems.
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(4) Capability Tracking. If required, critical capabilities should also be

monitored in the same way as assets. Commonly tracked capabilities usually fall
into the categories of logistics, communications, and operational support, e.g.
infiltration/exfiltration, ISR, PR, CAS.
e. Battle Drills. During operations, it is not uncommon for an unplanned situation to

develop or for an operation to deviate from the original plan. Initial reporting of the
contingency is often hurried, incorrect, or based on incomplete facts. Ascertaining the
correct information is always a challenge due to communication challenges and the fact
that the executing unit(s) are also trying to complete an operation while reporting the
occurrence. Having JOC procedures in place that all members can refer to that define
roles, information required, and communication procedures allows the occurrence to be
managed efficiently and controlled while the JOC continues with routine business. The
normal routine of the JOC must be maintained during an occurrence; therefore, battle
drills must be practised periodically to ensure familiarity and continuity for JOC members.
Battle drills normally exist for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), PR, TSTs, troops in
contact, emergency CAS, emergency exfiltration, emergency resupply, serious Info Ops
events, and downed aircraft. Battle drills are normally posted on a monitor once an event
occurs; the complexity of the drill varies. Appendix 10 to Annex D provides samples of a
few possible battle drills.
f. Wake-up Criteria. Wake-up criteria are often tied to battle drills, CCIR events,
and operational requirements. A wake-up criteria matrix is created taking into account
individual requests, commander’s guidance, and operational procedures. The matrix is
managed by the JOC director and battle captain and is used to direct who should be
contacted during the quiet hours should a specific event or crisis occur; it normally is tied
to key leaders, directors, special staff, and certain functional experts. Appendix 11 to
Annex D provides a sample wake-up criteria matrix.
g. Current Operations Planning Responsibilities. Although the majority of the

JOC’s responsibilities are focused on directing, monitoring, and assessing, an operations
centre also supports planning efforts during crisis actions or unexpected contingencies
such as PR, mass casualties, downed aircraft, unplanned resupply, and support to time-
sensitive targeting. These efforts may be controlled by the JOC director and select
individuals who quickly develop options to deal with the crisis or incident. When more
detailed planning or time is available, the J33 may provide personnel to assist with
planning that would occur in the J35, allowing the JOC to continue monitoring operations.
h. Assessments. In addition to assessing operations covered in paragraph 7-2b(4),

the JOC also reviews the daily SITREPs, INTSUMs, and a myriad of communications for
pertinent information. This information is reviewed for relevant knowledge that supports
the CCIRs, IRs, MEOs and MOPs, operational and targeting requirements, and
comprehensive approach indicators. Knowledge management is critical to timely
decision-making and is required to support the operations directorate’s planning,
directing, and monitoring functions for the commander.
i. Targeting. To enhance special operations, lethal and non-lethal targeting that

utilizes kinetic and non-kinetic operations both directly and indirectly is used to achieve
desired effects. This is a tremendous capability to the JFC and makes SOF a very
unique component. To understand how SOF utilizes effects-based targeting to support
the comprehensive approach to operations, see Chapter 3. Additionally, the JOC is
responsible for managing TSTs and for coordination during trigger-based operations.
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j. Communications. Communications using both voice and CIS systems are vital
to the JOC’s PDMA cycle and to personnel responsibilities. Multiple systems should be
available to both communicate and pass on information. Refer to Chapter 9 and Chapter
10 for more details.
k. Daily Situation Report. SITREPs are used by HQs, commanders, and leaders to
monitor the daily situation and operations from a bottom-up perspective. SITREPs are
produced daily by each of the subordinate SOTGs and by the SOAC (or SOATG if providing
special air warfare C2 functions), capturing all relevant information from their subordinate
units and/or elements that is required to be reported to the SOCC. Upon receipt of the
subordinate SITREPs, the SOCC produces a consolidated SITREP for distribution in
accordance with JTF HQ guidance. Due to the nature of special operations and its
operational effects, the SOCC’s SITREP is reviewed by a large audience at the operational
and strategic levels. For this reason, the SOCC’s SITREP is not merely a product created
by cutting and pasting information from subordinate elements into a compiled document to
forward to the higher HQ. Staff officers and leaders must take the time to compile the
SITREP so that it includes pertinent information relevant to readers and must ensure the
SITREP includes critical analysis to provide an accurate picture of the TOO from the SOCC’s
perspective. A SITREP format is available in Appendix 7 to Annex L.
l. Commander’s Update Briefing. The CUB is a useful tool for maintaining SA and
is normally a 60-minute briefing presented once daily to the commander, command
group, special staff, and other staff directors. It is important to determine the time,
attendees, and location so the CUB becomes part of the daily battle rhythm. Ideally, the
CUB occurs during a time period when there is the least amount of turmoil or scheduling
conflicts. The CUB is often held in the JOC, which provides an excellent venue for the
briefing; many of the participants are members of the J33. The disadvantage to holding
the CUB in the JOC is that the CUB can distract from the JOC’s primary monitoring
function, and if held in the JOC, it must be carefully orchestrated so that it does not
interfere with or impede required tasks. A second option is to have the CUB in a
conference room; however, conference rooms are normally smaller than the JOC and
can still potentially interfere with JOC functions by pulling personnel away from the JOC.
Regardless of the preferred or selected option, the JOC director must ensure that the
CUB fulfils the intended purpose and that it does not interfere with the JOC’s functions
and tasks. All JOC personnel must understand their individual and collective
responsibilities during the CUB period and should treat the time and required activities as
a daily battle drill. The JOC director and battle captain normally split responsibilities
during the CUB with one focused on the briefing while the other continues to provide
direction and monitor operations. The CUB is broadly divided into weather, intelligence
update, operations update, air update, planning and orders, and support information
(other staff directorates). This can vary depending upon the situation and will be based
on COM SOCC’s direction and guidance. What cannot be overstated is that the CUB
must be more than just a briefing; it must include assessment of recent events in order to
provide the commander with both SA and the option to make decisions. If the briefer
simply reads the slides, the intent and effect of the CUB will be lost. All of the briefers
involved in the CUB must be able to provide assessment of their area and have the
information to answer follow-on questions. A CUB outline is provided in Appendix 12 to
Annex D.
m. Shift Change Briefing. The purpose of a shift change briefing is to highlight what
has changed during the last 12 hours and not to simply repeat the latest CUB. All
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members of the outgoing and incoming shifts should be in attendance along with
leadership representatives from the operations and intelligence directorates. The shift
change ideally occurs during gaps in the battle rhythm when interruptions or key events
are less likely to disrupt the transition. Shift change is run by the JOC director and
should take no more than 20 minutes in total (short briefing followed by a personal shift
change for each position). An abbreviated format is used to convey what has changed
over the last 12 hours or what information is relevant and required to present during the
transition. Relevant slides from the CUB may be used to present pertinent information
that should cover, at a minimum:
(1) Weather forecast and impacts.
(2) Intelligence update.
(3) Operations conducted in the last 12 hours and projected for the next 12
hours.
(4) Other relevant operational or administrative information presented during a

CUB is briefed by exception (only if it is relevant for everyone’s transition).
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CHAPTER 8 – AIR OPERATIONS
8-1. General. Special air warfare is defined as those activities conducted by air/aviation
forces using tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to conventional
forces.55 Special air warfare is normally conducted across the entire spectrum of conflict in
support of the SOCC’s contribution to COM JFC’s campaign plan. This chapter addresses the
planning and execution related to special air warfare at the SOCC level within a TOO. It
highlights how the SOCC staff should contribute toward the successful integration and
synchronization of air warfare operations in support of the SOCC’s requirements by engaging
with the theatre planning and targeting processes to achieve the JTF HQ’s strategic and
operational level goals and objectives. As part of this responsibility, the SOCC staff should
have an understanding of not only how and when to interact with the theatre-level processes,
but also of the effect these processes have on the tempo of the subordinate SOTGs/SOATGs.
For greater detail on special air warfare, consult the NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual.
Figure 8-1. Air's Importance to SOF
a. Airspace control primarily complements and supports the JTF HQ’s campaign plan
without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of
any theatre forces. Each component commander must be able to use the airspace with
maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the JTF HQ.
Airspace control procedures are designed to prevent mutual interference, to facilitate air
defence identification, to safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic, to
enhance combat effectiveness in support of the JTF HQ objectives, and to prevent
fratricide.
b. When designated by the JTF HQ, the ACC must establish an airspace control
system, prepare an air operations directive (AOD), promulgate the relevant airspace
control orders, implement airspace control means (ACM), and harmonize regional
airspace control plans (ACPs). Rapidly distributing the airspace control order and its
updates to all force commanders within the AOR is a crucial factor in the operation of an
airspace control system.
c. All component commanders must comply with the AOD; however, the JTF HQ
provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the ACC and the other component
55 Special Air Warfare Manual, pp. 3.
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commanders in theatre cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the ACC does not imply
that the agency assumes OPCON or TACON over any air assets.
8-2. Special Operations Component Command’s Role. It is important for the SOCC staff
to understand the integration and synchronization for air operations, the processes involved,
and the various considerations required at the SOCC level. The intent of this chapter is to
provide a basic understanding so that SOCC staff know who, what, where, when, why, and how
to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize air operations in support of the SOCC’s
plans and operations in order to comply with COM JFC’s direction and guidance. Additional
information and guidance are available from the various SOF air personnel assigned to the
SOCC staff. There is a range of fundamental operational activities conducted by organic and
direct support air/aviation forces that are used by NATO SOF to achieve operational and
strategic effects. The primary mission of special operations air forces is enhanced air mobility—
specialized air transport activities via FW, RW, or tilt-rotor aircraft. Other special air warfare
activities may include ISR, CAS, close combat attack, AAR, forward arming and refuelling point
operations, and PR. In the event that no ACC is involved in the operation, the SOCC must be
prepared to perform all duties normally delegated to the ACC; these include, but are not limited
to, producing and publishing an ATO, airspace control order, and special instructions (SPINS).
To support SOCC planning, the SOCC J3 air and J5 SOF aviation plans officers should know
the capabilities of the assigned assets, including weather minima, national caveats, and any
other operational limitations. To collect all the required data, they may ask the subordinate units
to complete the matrix in Annex L.
8-3. Command and Control of NATO Special Operations Air/Aviation
a. The C2 of special air warfare forces is extremely flexible and can be adjusted
during operations to best meet the needs of the tactical situation, of the commander’s
intent, and of any national considerations. In NATO, the NSHQ is the primary point of
direction and coordination of NATO special operations-related activities, to include
providing an operational command capability when directed by SACEUR. 56 Nations
retain FULLCOM and OPCOM of the special operations and conventional air/aviation
task units that they contribute to a joint force, but normally transfer OPCON of their
contributed forces through SACEUR to the highest operational level SOF commander,
normally a SOCC, for designated NATO exercises and operations.
b. It is a tenet of NATO special operations that C2 of NATO SOF should be exercised

within the special operations chain of command.
c. COM SOCC is given sufficient authority to accomplish assigned missions and

operational tasks assigned to the SOCC by the JTF HQ. The SOCC normally exercises
OPCON of assigned special operations land, maritime, and air/aviation forces. COM
SOCC typically retains OPCON of assigned SOTGs/SOATGs and delegates TACON or
TACOM of SOTUs/SOATUs for limited periods of time or for specific missions. COM
SOCC may also be given TACON of aircraft and capabilities provided by other
component commanders.
d. There are three methods (paragraph 8-3e) of commanding and controlling special
air warfare forces in a TOO depending on mission, environment, complexity, duration,
size of the force, and national concerns. COM SOCC chooses a method consistent with
the principles of special air warfare. No matter which method is chosen, the goal of each
56 ACO Forces Standards Volume X, Special Operations Forces, dated Aug 10.
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method is to effectively manage limited air/aviation resources to best meet the needs of
the SOCC while still addressing the political concerns of the TCNs. The fundamental
objectives of special air warfare C2 are:
(1) Provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
(2) Ensure joint special operations requirements and contributions are

effectively addressed in the ACC’s planning, targeting, apportionment, allocation,
synchronization, and combat assessment processes.
(3) Provide sufficient and effective special air warfare expertise to plan, task,
support, and direct special air operations.
(4) Integrate special air warfare and conventional air/aviation capabilities and
assets into NATO special operations activities across the spectrum of conflict.
(5) Manage the physical and political risk inherent in special operations by
matching special operations and conventional air/aviation capabilities against the
full range of special operations mission requirements.
e. Management of the SOCC’s air/aviation resources may be accomplished by

assigning C2 duties to an SOATG, by retaining management responsibilities at the SOCC J3
air, or by designating a SOAC. While any of these three arrangements may effectively
exercise C2, the creation of a SOAC is best in situations where there are large numbers of
SOATGs or where the special air warfare activities require complex planning. COM SOCC,
with the advice of the TCN airmen, chooses the appropriate manner.
(1) Command and Control of Special Operations Forces Air/Aviation

through a Special Operations Air Task Group. COM SOCC often chooses this
method for commanding and controlling special air operations during small
operations of limited duration or during single nation operations. An SOATG is
typically a national, tactical level air C2 organization that has a limited span of
control (two to five SOATUs of varying types) and usually has a relatively small
command element. Due to its small size and limited C2IS capacity, an SOATG is
restricted in its ability to plan, apportion, allocate, task, and control sorties in
support of special operations. Normally, an SOATG can C2 approximately six to
eight sorties (any combination of FW, RW, and tilt-rotor) in a 24-hour period at a
sustained rate. If an ACC is appointed by the JTF HQ, then the SOATG must also
perform all of the air integration and coordination duties normally assigned to a
SOAC (described below).

through the Special Operations Component Command J3 Air. During certain
NATO expeditionary operations where COM SOCC is designated as COM JTF, it
may be reasonable and expedient to assign management responsibilities for all
air/aviation resources to the SOCC J3 air. Scenarios where this may be
appropriate might be a non-combatant evacuation operation or a humanitarian
relief operation assigned to NATO SOF. Implied in these scenarios is that the
number of sorties, the air/aviation resources available for execution, and the
missions assigned are limited in scope, complexity, difficulty, and duration. During
such situations, the SOCC J3 air is responsible for building and publishing an
ATO, managing airspace and air traffic control requirements, and coordinating with
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civilian aeronautical agencies in the affected region. These responsibilities are in

addition to the normal C2 functions of planning, tasking, controlling, and sustaining
assigned and attached special air warfare and conventional air/aviation forces.
The approximate sortie rate a SOCC J3 air can typically sustain is two to six
sorties in a 24-hour period. As a SOCC J3 air section is typically small, it requires
major augmentation in personnel to maintain a 24-hour planning, execution, and
assessment battle rhythm. Further, additional and different C2IS equipment,
specific to the theatre air C2 system, may be required from those systems
normally found in the SOCC HQ.

through a Special Operations Air Command. Appointing a SOAC to C2 the
range of air/aviation resources proffered by the nations to support NATO SOF is
nearly always the best course of action. This method of C2 best meets the
principles of special air warfare: centralized control, decentralized execution,
strategy-to-task, and balance. The SOAC, if appointed, is normally formed around
the SOATG HQ that is best able to plan, task, control, and sustain organic special
air warfare and any assigned or attached conventional air/aviation forces across a
TOO, and which meets the political concerns of the TCNs. This C2 method can
function effectively across the spectrum of special operations, but is absolutely
vital during large and long duration operations. A SOAC is manned and resourced
to C2 the sorties generated by two to five SOATGs. With augmentation, however,
a SOAC can sustain a greater span of control. When a SOAC is assigned, the
SOATGs maintain a C2 perspective that is focused on the SOATUs and the needs
of the SOTGs in their assigned regions. The SOAC provides the tactical level C2
perspective as COM SOCC’s single manager and point of contact for special air
warfare resources and requirements.
8-4. Special Operations Liaison Element. The SOLE is the SOCC’s liaison to the ACC.
COM SOCC will task organize the SOLE based on mission requirements, the operational
situation, and command relationships. The members of a NATO SOLE provide expert,
component-level planning support, operational expertise, and coordination between the special
operations component and the Allied air component. The SOLE will coordinate and
synchronize special operations air, land, and maritime operations with joint air operations. The
SOLE director will place LOs at key positions with the ACC’s staff, regardless of how the ACC is
organized, to fully integrate with the ACC’s processes.
Figure 8.2. SOLE Liaison with ACC and CAOC
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a. The SOLE director works directly for COM SOCC. The time-sensitive nature of
many decisions in the CAOC requires that the SOLE director be given the appropriate
authority to represent COM SOCC on critical issues where time is especially important.
This authority is caveated, however, by the realization that the SOLE director is an LO
and does not have operational C2 authority of SOF. Any decisions made without prior
coordination with COM SOCC must be done by exception in time-sensitive situations.
COM SOCC retains the command authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution
of special operations by units assigned to, under OPCON, or under TACON of COM
SOCC.
b. Staff members assigned to the SOLE will be sourced primarily from the nations
contributing SOATGs and SOATUs, although SOLE staff officers may be provided by any
nation. Though most of the manpower should have an air/aviation background, all
special operations components (land, maritime, and air) must be represented to ensure
the SOLE is able to adequately address land and maritime special operations, in addition
to special air warfare. These special operations SMEs will coordinate, integrate, and
synchronize all special operations in the theatre with the air operations orchestrated by
the ACC.
c. The nucleus of the SOLE should come from the SOCC FN, which may not
necessarily be the nation providing the preponderance of special air assets. In nearly all
cases, there will not be enough qualified personnel available from the FN to fill all
manpower requirements in the SOLE, especially throughout enduring operations.
Augmentation from other nations will usually be required. Furthermore, in the course of
enduring operations, the staff will have to be replenished as a part of the management of
personnel deployment cycles. The manning of the SOLE, as part of the SOCC crisis
establishment, should be specified in the CJSOR and filled as a normal part of the force
generation process for new and enduring operations.
d. There is no such thing as a typical SOLE. Each SOLE must be sized to best meet
the needs and requirements of the operation or exercise at hand. For long duration
operations, a good rule of thumb to follow when designing a SOLE within the NATO
context is 13 people. The SOLE must be configured and prepared for 24-hour
operations, 7 days per week. During exercises and limited operations, a smaller SOLE
may be appropriate.
e. The SOLE’s duties and responsibilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of the
Special Air Warfare Manual.
8-5. Special Air Warfare Planning
a. Air planning at the component level is where air/aviation requirements are

coordinated to support special operations and are synchronized with joint operations and
theatre-level planning processes such as the joint air tasking cycle and joint targeting.
Operational planning using the SOCC-P2 or in support of the JTF HQ’s comprehensive
operational planning efforts is covered in Chapter 6. Tactical-level special air warfare
planning is covered in the Special Air Warfare Manual, Chapter 5, paragraphs 5-12
through 5-19.
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Figure 8-3. Joint Air Tasking Cycle
b. Joint air operations are planned, coordinated, synchronized, and executed via the
joint air tasking cycle (Figure 8-3) to promote the efficient and effective employment of
available air/aviation capabilities. This is a repetitive process of planning, coordinating,
allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing the effects of joint air operations conducted
within the bounds of the JTF HQ’s operational guidance in a dynamic battlespace. The
joint air tasking cycle efficiently accommodates changes in the tactical situation and
allows for late notice AIRSUPREQs from all the components. There are six distinct steps
to the ACC’s joint air tasking cycle, explained below, all of which require associated
meetings, products, and/or decisions. The SOCC has a stake in each of these steps,
although not always to the same level or degree. To maximize joint campaign effects,
the SOCC J3 air/SOAC participates in this process through the SOLE and integrates
special operations contributions as a force multiplier while leveraging conventional air
capabilities to support the SOCC’s requirements. The SOLE director ensures the SOCC
has a presence in the most important of the associated meetings; the SOLE contributes
to the products and to the decisions, when appropriate, to meet COM SOCC’s intentions
and guidance. Successfully representing the SOCC and addressing the
SOTG’s/SOATG’s needs during the joint air tasking cycle requires the SOCC J3
air/SOAC and the SOLE to be completely familiar with COM SOCC’s intentions,
guidance, and developed CONOPS. Furthermore, the SOAC and the SOLE must be
able to clearly articulate the requirements, intentions, and effects throughout the
development of the various products produced by the ACC’s staff during the joint air
tasking cycle. In addition, the SOLE must be able to converse with the CAOC staff to
ensure adequate support during the execution of CONOPS. The following paragraphs
outline each phase of the joint air tasking cycle.
(1) Joint Task Force Commander/Component Coordination. The joint air

tasking cycle begins 72 hours prior to ATO execution day with COM JTF’s
guidance to the components. COM JTF provides direction and guidance for
articulating his intentions, planning guidance, targeting priorities, desired effects,
and end state in the form of a JCO. The ACC strategy team uses COM JTF’s JCO
to develop the ACC’s intent, to set priorities for employment of air power by
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mission set (e.g. strategic attack, air interdiction, CAS), to establish priorities for
categories of targets, and to recommend decision criteria for changing
apportionment of air support to the components. The product from this step is the
AOD (see paragraph 8-6a).
(2) Target Development. Step two of the cycle starts approximately 48 hours
prior to the ATO. To achieve unity of effort across the JOA, the ACC’s combat
plans division uses the AOD and the JPTL to begin processing all potential air
targets nominated by the components. Cross-component synchronization of air
and special operations capabilities begins here, in the long range planning cell.
Normally, by this stage of the process, SOCC targets have already been approved
by COM JTF.
(3) Weaponeering and Allocation. Approximately 36 hours prior to execution,

during the weaponeering and allocation phase, the master air attack plan (MAAP)
team integrates target details, target objectives, target area threats, and the
probability of achieving desired effects to build force packages using available joint
air resources and capabilities. These force packages are then applied to the JPTL
to create an ATO shell. The MAAP is the foundation of the ATO. During this
phase, joint air assets are allocated to the components based on COM JTF’s
apportionment direction and guidance.
(4) Air Tasking Order Development. As with the joint air tasking cycle, ATO
development typically begins 72 hours prior to the execution day. On any given
day, there are three ATOs in planning and one in execution (Figure 8-4). The ATO
battle rhythm is based on the creation, refinement, production, and execution of
the four ATOs. The ATO development function begins 24 hours prior to execution
when the ATO production team implements the MAAP, including the designed
force packages, and assigns them and available component resources to units for
tasking. Throughout the ATO development process, including the SPINS and
airspace control order, the components may submit critical changes based on the
tactical situation or if there is new COM JTF guidance.
Figure 8-4. Air Tasking Order Battle Rhythm
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(5) Air Tasking Order Execution. Approximately 12 hours prior to ATO

execution, the ATO is promulgated to the components to allow units, crews, aircraft
maintainers, and weapons-loading personnel time to plan the missions and to prepare
the aircraft for the next day’s sorties. Beginning at execution hour and continuing for
24 hours, the current operations division in the CAOC executes the current ATO.
Their responsibilities include monitoring execution of the planned sorties against
assigned objectives and tasks, and adjusting the ATO to accommodate changes to
the tactical situation, asset changes, and TST management.
Important Note
The SOLE must notify the SOCC/SOAC whenever air
support sorties previously allocated to SOF in the ATO are
redirected to support other operations. Proposed changes
to critical support requirements should be resolved at the
lowest possible level but may require the SOLE director’s
engagement to ensure correct asset availability.
The SOLE serves as a communications conduit to the
SOCC/SOAC, contributing to the overall SA and
management of the dynamic battlespace.
The SOCC/SOAC and SOLE should plan for and practise
dynamic targeting procedures with the CAOC to ensure
successful engagement of TSTs, and anticipated and
unanticipated targets during time compressed periods.
(6) Combat Assessment. The goal of this phase is to evaluate the results of
joint air operations and measure the results against COM JTF’s campaign
objectives. Combat assessment is a continual process throughout each step of
the joint air tasking cycle, but is emphasized during the ATO execution step. This
allows COM JTF and component commanders to establish future targeting
objectives and re-attack recommendations. The SOCC can contribute to the
combat assessment phase by forwarding SOTG battle damage assessments. In
addition, special operations may yield qualitative assessments of a campaign’s
effects not obtainable through technical means. The SOLE serves as a conduit for
the ACC’s combat assessment team to access the SOCC’s human perspective on
weapons effects.
8-6. Air Tasking Cycle Products
a. Air Operations Directive. Based on the JCO, the ACC normally produces, in
consultation with the other forces, an AOD for the entire JOA.57 The AOD normally
contains a series of annexes outlining how the ACC intends to support specific missions
during the specified AOD period. Capabilities of particular interest to COM SOCC
include CAS, ISR, TST, AAR, and PR. Special air warfare is not normally an annex to
the AOD; however, nothing prevents the ACC from requesting that the SOCC provides
one. If requested, the SOCC J3 air/SOAC should develop the annex in cooperation with
the SOLE plans team.
57 Special Air Warfare Manual.
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b. Air Tasking Order. The ATO is the tasking authority for assets apportioned to the
ACC. Other component commanders’ air operations are listed in the ATO in order to
ensure their coordination.
c. Airspace Control Order. The air space control order is the summary of those
control procedures and measures required to implement the AOD within a specified
period of validity.
d. Special Instructions. The SPINS is a separate document published and updated

on a 24-hour cycle that provides clear instructions based on authoritative guidance. It is
an integral part of the ATO and is disseminated by the ACC to provide details to the
tactical operators on how to adhere to planning guidance for mission tasking,
coordination, and execution. The SPINS is a control mechanism that the ACC uses to
provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail to execute the air
campaign.
8-7. Airspace Control Means. The ACM enables the effective and safe employment of air
power in crowded airspace that may have to accommodate both combat and peacetime
considerations. The ACM are coordinated through the ACP, the airspace control orders,
SPINS, and battlespace C2 nodes.
a. Restricted Area. A restricted area is the airspace of defined dimensions above

the land areas or territorial waters of a state within which the flight of aircraft is restricted
in accordance with certain specified conditions.
b. Force Air Coordination Area. The force air coordination area is an area
surrounding a force within which air coordination measures are required to prevent
mutual interference between all friendly surface and air units and their weapon systems.
c. Restricted Operating Zone. A restricted operating zone (ROZ) is established to

reserve airspace for specific activities in which the operations of one or more airspace
users is restricted. The request for a ROZ is made using an ACM request (ACMREQ)
that is submitted to the SOLE and published in the ACP and the airspace control order.
A sample ACMREQ is provided in Appendix 12 to Annex L.
d. Special Corridor. A special corridor is an area established to accommodate the

special routing requirements of specific missions. A special corridor can be used for
infiltration/exfiltration during special operations and is only active during a given time to
keep as much airspace as possible open for other users. The request for a special
corridor is made using an ACMREQ that is submitted to the SOLE and published in the
ACP and the airspace control order.
8-8. Fire Support Coordination Measures. FSCMs are employed by land or amphibious
manoeuvre commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously
provide safeguards for friendly forces. Commanders position FSCMs consistent with the tactical
situation and in coordination with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.
a. Permissive. Permissive measures allow fire support elements to use weapons

without further coordination.
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(1) Fire Support Coordination Line. A fire support coordination line is a

boundary used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems against
surface targets.
(2) Free Fire Areas. Free fire areas are designated areas of free fire.
b. Restrictive. Restrictive measures require coordination with controlling agencies

prior to engaging targets. They are declared to protect teams, units, or assets, and are
activated for a specific time period.
(1) Restricted Fire Areas. Restricted fire areas (RFAs) are designated areas
of restricted fire in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that
exceed those restrictions are not delivered without coordination with the
established HQ.
(2) No-fire Areas. No-fire areas are designated areas of no fire.
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CHAPTER 9 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM SUPPORT
9-1. Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Forces Communications Systems
a. Special operations communications systems provide SOF components at all levels

with access to a worldwide communications network structure that allows for seamless
information transfer through a mature, global infrastructure. The communications system
combines information sources, fusion centres, and distribution systems that are used to
pursue special operations operational objectives. Multiple SOF operational elements are
connected to and supported by these systems, which are compliant with NATO and
international standards, creating a fully automated, operationally responsive, tailored
communications support system.
(1) Seamless. SOF elements are connected in peacetime, in transit, and while
deployed by a digital seamless communications system. SOF communications
systems support every phase of a mission profile and have a reach-back capability
to routine resources of information for planning, execution, and status updates
from any location. The communications architecture includes requirements for
entry ports, high-speed networks, and assured C2 connectivity.
(2) Robust. SOF communications systems are robust networks that are
flexible and interactive and that can adapt to the changing information exchange
requirements (IERs) of SOF.58 Multiple means must be a part of the robust
network including multiple routes, alternative sources of connectivity, bandwidth on
demand, and modularity and scalability.
(3) Redundant. SOF elements require a communication system able to

provide services over multiple paths. This increases the chance of uninterrupted
information delivery. Redundancy is a vital element of CIS flexibility.
(4) Standards Compliance. Adherence to standards for the SOF

communications system architecture ensures hardware and software compatibility,
plus the ability to interface and exchange data among SOF, with other
components, or with TCN forces as required.
(5) Frequency Spectrum. Special operations assets are not limited to just
those controlled by the SOCC operational C2 structure; therefore, the entire
frequency spectrum is utilized for communications. The range of frequency
spectrums used is dependent on national systems, using them to the greatest
extent possible to drive access of the information sphere down to the lowest SOF
operational level.
(6) Protected. A robust cyber defence is essential while SOF communications

are HVTs for adversaries of all types, including foreign military, terrorist groups,
special interest groups, and hackers. As a consequence, it is imperative that SOF
communications architectures consider the need to protect these critical resources
from Info Ops attacks by designing a multilayered security architecture on local
area networks and wide area networks. As INFOSEC implements confidentiality,
58IERs for SOCC are contained in draft MC 593/1, Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2) Services
Capabilities in Support of Joint NATO Operations in a Land-based Environment, dated 10 Dec 12.
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integrity, and availability, cyber defence comes up to protect and defend those
implementations, thus improving information assurance.
Figure 9-1. Information Assurance
(7) Size, Weight, and Power. SOF operations can be constrained by physical
size and weight, including batteries or other power source to sustain the operation. In
this respect, SOF communications have to be portable, compact, and lightweight.
(8) Scalable and Modular. SOCC CIS must be able to easily scale from a single
LO to a full-scale SOCC. Equipment must be modular and scalable to provide
maximum flexibility. Scalability provides the system with the ability to handle a
growing amount of work in a capable manner and to be enlarged to accommodate
that growth. Thus, CIS can easily adapt to support operational requirements.
(9) Sustainable. Spare equipment must be forward deployed to ensure

minimum down time.
9-2. Communication and Information Systems Principles59
a. Structure. CIS components, liaison, and support have to be provided between

force elements and commands from senior to subordinate, from supporting to supported,
from reinforcing to reinforced, between adjacent units as directed by the first common
senior element, and by a unit to an attachment.
b. Discipline. CIS discipline refers to managing the flow of information from

gathering to storing, through processing and directing to reporting, and through the use of
physical and procedural measures. CIS discipline requires prioritization of information
flow since available CIS may be limited and will have a finite capacity.
c. Economy of Employment. Avoiding duplication, carefully defining and managing

user requirements, and imposing strict transmission discipline achieves economy of CIS
employment.
d. Interoperability
(1) This principle is partially attained through the provision of CIS in accordance
with the general principles of responsibility for the different levels of command to
communicate as stated in paragraphs 9-2a and 9-3j. In particular, the SOCC is
responsible for the CIS within its HQ, its liaison elements, and with the subordinate
units down to the level of the SOTGs. In the same manner, each SOTG is
responsible for providing CIS to its subordinate units. To achieve full
59 AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems, dated 6 Apr 11.
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interoperability, the SOCC and subordinate units’ CIS should be compliant with
NATO standards.
(2) The comprehensive approach to operations requires that some level of

interoperability has to be achieved with non-military partners, including NGOs and
IOs. The lack of interoperable CIS in such an environment may require greater
use of LOs.
e. Flexibility. Deployed CIS must be flexible to allow for a response to changes in

scales of effort, operational tempo, and posture. SOF operations require portable,
compact, and lightweight CIS, as weight (including battery weight) and volume are
important flexibility limitations, especially during dismounted operations where resupply is
not possible. SOF operational elements require multiple CIS, including:
(1) Primary. Primary CIS providing connectivity between higher command and
subordinate elements (e.g. JTF, SOTG/SOATG).
(2) Alternate. Establishment of alternate CIS connected via a separate bearer

providing secondary means in the event of system failure.
(3) Contingency. CIS established to support a specific mission/task and is

rapidly deployable providing communications from HQ to the subunit level as
required (e.g. fire support, MEDEVAC, combat search and rescue).
(4) Emergency. CIS established to support a wide range of elements from

HQs to individuals, designed to be used during times of emergency when all other
CIS are unavailable (includes situations involving isolated personnel). May be
achieved using an insecure system (e.g. satellite phone).
NOTE: Users must ensure that they utilize the full extent of communications available
to ensure redundant means of communications exist and are tested daily. Additionally,
users must utilize the correct system or CIS tool for the type of message being sent,
information sharing, and priority/urgency of the communication. An easy way is to
prioritize the systems based on type and urgency of communications using a PACE
(primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan.
Telephone/VoIP Radio JChat Email
Urgent Message/
Primary Alternate Contingency Emergency
Communications
Routine Traffic or
Emergency Contingency Alternate Primary
Information
Figure 9-2. Prioritizing Communications Systems
f. Information Assurance. These are the five pillars of information assurance.
(1) Availability. Information must be accessible and usable on demand by an

authorized system user. Availability is assured through effective information
management and robust CIS processes, including backup policy, redundancy, and
local storage of critical information.
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(2) Integrity. Information may not be altered or destroyed in an unauthorized

manner.
(3) Authentication. The measure of assurance designed to establish the

validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an
individual's authorization to receive specific categories of information.
Authentication assures that the sources of information can be validated on receipt
or initial access.
(4) Confidentiality. Information must be protected so that content access is

only granted to authorized personnel. NATO SOF must be able to communicate
up to NATO SECRET level.
(5) Non-repudiation. The measure of assurance by which the sender of data

is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is assured of the sender's
identity, so that neither can later deny having processed the data.
g. Spectrum Management. The use of the frequency spectrum must be managed

and coordinated at all levels to ensure the most effective use of limited frequency assets.
h. Data Security. The survivability of the systems must be such that they continue
to deliver predefined levels of performance despite hostile actions, natural disasters or
any other severe calamities, and human technical fallibility. Due to the nature of SOF
operations, a data recovery plan shall be implemented at the SOCC level.
i. Timeliness. Information must be available in time to make timely decisions. SOF

operational elements should be able to communicate anywhere and anytime with their
higher HQs.
j. Information Sharing. Emphasis must be on the responsibility to share, balanced by

the security principle of need-to-know. Due to the nature of SOF operations, the SOCC’s
information sharing requirements should be thoroughly planned and specified in its IER.
k. Prioritization. The CIS required is roughly proportional to the scale of the

operation. For the SOCC HQ, irrespective of the scale of forces deployed, the minimum
level of CIS capability is established by the high capability of reach-back and exchanging
of information due to the F3EAD cycle required for every SOF operation.60 During the
SOCC’s planning, it is important to determine what capabilities are required to meet the
requirements and scale of the operation. The required systems are prioritized based on
the SOCC’s plan to ensure that critical systems needed are available and fulfil the
capabilities necessary for the operation.
l. Resilience. Resilience is achieved by having redundant capabilities. This includes

the distribution and replication of CIS and its associated data, and protection against attack.
Resilience also includes the requirement for having properly trained personnel to run and
manage CIS. In austere environments, the initial network is usually not robust and may be
severely degraded when disturbed. In those cases, the initial CIS deployment package
should provide the foundation to build the remainder of the network incrementally.
60SACEUR’s Special Operations Component Command Core Capability Concept of Operations, dated Jun 13,
para 3f, Annex D.
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m. Capacity. To avoid slowing decision-making and to meet the predicted demand,

sufficient CIS capacity should be available. In those cases where military CIS capacity is
limited, early use of commercial CIS may have to be made to increase the capacity.
9-3. Communication and Information Systems in Support of Command and Control61
a. Command is the process by which the commander’s will is planned and those
intentions are impressed on subordinates. Control is the process through which the
commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, directs, and coordinates the activities of the
forces allocated to him. To achieve this, the SOCC uses standardized procedures in
conjunction with the available CIS. Together these two processes form a C2 system that
the commander, staff, and subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control
operations. The CIS (J6) staff provide advice on the creation of the most effective C2
system while considering the capabilities of the available CIS.
b. The scope and scale of the CIS needed to support C2 is determined by a

combination of the C2 structure, its geographic dispersal, the level of information to be
exchanged between each C2 entity, and the application of reach-back (Figure 9-3). The
C2 structure and its geographic dispersal are determined by operational factors on a
case-by-case basis and tailored to each mission. Reach-back is the process of obtaining
products, services, and applications in a timely manner, from deployed or static rear
elements, minimizing the HQ’s footprint in theatre. The effectiveness of reach-back relies
on the provision of robust, deployable, flexible, and sustainable CIS services.
Figure 9-3. CIS Capabilities
c. The J6 is usually responsible for establishing a SOCC signal centre (SIGCEN) to

facilitate CIS management and network control. Activities that are critical to SOCC CIS must
61 AJP-6.
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be fully coordinated between the SOCC J6 and the higher-level joint force’s joint CIS support
centre (SUPCEN). The functions of the SOCC SIGCEN are to support the SOCC C2
facilities; to exercise supervision over activities that deal with CIS, including spectrum
management and information assurance of subordinate commands; and to plan for and
provide or facilitate connectivity between the SOCC, the SOCC’s detached liaison elements
and subordinate units’, supported components’, HN’s, and other units’ communications
systems, as appropriate.
d. SOCC CIS will provide C2 capability to its own elements and subordinate units
throughout the different phases of a NATO response worldwide. Figure 9-4 depicts an
example of how SOCC CIS means will be phased in its capability during a notional NATO
operation.
Figure 9-4. CIS Phasing In Theatre Example
e. To fulfil COM SOCC’s C2 requirements, the J6 should be included in the planning,

coordination, and execution of CIS architectures and JOA CIS.
f. The J6 identifies CIS vulnerabilities and develops procedures and capabilities to

protect friendly CIS. They develop information assurance plans and support the
development of OPSEC plans; assess the impact of adversary information activities on
friendly systems; and maintain a joint restricted frequency list in conjunction with Info
Ops, J3 staff, and J2 staff. The J6 coordinates specialist support relating to protection of
own CIS and coordinates the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for a wide array of
communications and electronics resources.
g. Cyberattacks against NATO and SOCC CIS are a credible threat during today’s
conflicts that could hamper the SOCC’s mission. To protect its CIS, the SOCC will
implement a cyber defence plan underpinned by strict adherence to NATO and national
cyber defence policies and close coordination with the NATO Computer Incident
Response Centre (NCIRC). Moreover, cyber defence has to be integrated into the
SOCC’s planning cycle and battle rhythm through the SOCC cyber defence working
group. This working group should be made up of one representative from each of the
SOCC centres. Its mission is to analyse the threat, evaluate vulnerabilities, and mitigate
any possible risks that may impact the SOCC’s mission.
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h. To have an effective C2 process, the SOCC will be supported with RT and NRT
information by implementing fully integrated basic services, both secure and non-secure:
voice, facsimile (if required), data, and video teleconferencing. The communications
concept is based upon military/commercial satellite systems, military combat net radio,
and the SOCC information systems.
i. Main communications systems may be disrupted by, among other means, enemy
fire, electronic countermeasures, effects of electromagnetic pulse, and equipment failure.
Commanders should ensure that they can exercise C2 in these circumstances.
j. Provision of CIS and the minimum level of connectivity of that CIS, both for training
and operations, are carried out according to STANAG 5048 as follows:62
(1) Higher to lower.
(2) Supporting to supported.
(3) Left to right (or clockwise).
k. Provisioning also will be done from reinforcing to reinforced, by a unit to an

attachment, and between adjacent units as directed by the first common senior element.
Figure 9-5. CIS Support Concept
l. Moreover, the NATO CIS concept identifies three levels of responsibility for
providing CIS support throughout the SOF chain of command:
62STANAG 5048, The Minimum Scale of Connectivity for Communications and Information Systems for NATO
Land Forces, dated 6 Feb 01.
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(1) Level 1 NATO Responsibility—comes up to support SOCC based on IERs.
(2) Level 2 SOCC Responsibility—at this level, the SOCC, and if required,
complemented by the NSHQ, supports its own HQ and detached elements and its
subordinate SOTGs, according to the actual in-theatre requirements.
(3) Level 3 National Responsibility—underneath SOTGs, the nations are

responsible for CIS provisioning of their own SOTUs.
m. In this respect, the NSHQ can provide its tactical CIS, based on BICES, and extend
SOF-BICES CIS from the NSHQ to the deployed SOCC and to the SOCC’s subordinate
SOTG formations. When it comes to the strategic level, communications between NATO
higher HQs and the SOCC are provided through the deployable communication and
information systems (DCIS) capabilities.63 This is part of the NATO capability package
development programme CP 149 (DCIS capabilities), which includes communications
gateway shelter with associated transportable satellite ground terminal and ultra-high
frequency (UHF) single channel satellite system, line of sight (LOS) communication
bearers, and high-frequency radio with secure voice and data. This and other emerging
operational requirements will be satisfied using the NATO contingency CIS assets pool
(Figure 9-6).
Figure 9-6. DCIS Support Principles
63 In accordance with the DCIS CONOPS, DCIS capability is composed of CIS assets, non-CIS equipment,
infrastructure, and trained personnel. DCIS is not expected to be available to the SOCC before 2017. Currently
LINC-E (Limited Interim NATO CIS – Expanded) provides the SOCC with a point of presence (PoP) that gives TO
provision and connectivity to NATO SECRET wide area network (NSWAN)/MISSION SECRET wide area network
(MSWAN). Conversely, when DCIS is fully operational, it will be prepared, transported, installed, operated, and
maintained by personnel of the NATO CIS group.
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n. Across the NATO-led mission templates, the following NATO common funding
principles apply:64
(1) CP 149 (DCIS) connectivity. A C2 entity that is eligible for this connectivity
will be provided with wide-area network (WAN) access and interconnections to
nations’ module capabilities, providing the NATO service interface to nationally
provided CIS. CP0A0149 connectivity is provided to any C2 entity that qualifies
for through or TO provision.
(2) When participating in a NATO operation, the SOCC is entitled to TO

provision. That means that the SOCC will be provided with the required NATO C2
services installed on site. A TO provision is limited to a local area network (LAN)
infrastructure and user equipment in support of 10 active users. The overall CIS
infrastructure of the C2 entity is the responsibility of the FN/multinational entity
(Figure 9-7).
Figure 9-7. The TO Provision Principle65
o. Liaison is the contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of

military forces that facilitates mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.
Liaisons can be enhanced by embedding personnel in the deployed forces who have
reach-back capability to their parent unit. When it comes to the SOCC, their liaison
elements must enjoy independent and secure communications through suitable small-
scale CIS packages. A good example of this capability is the NSHQ mission support
system (NMSS) medium or lite kit (NMSS-M or NMSS-L) (Figure 9-8.).
64 (Draft) MC 593/1, Chapter 3, para 3.2.1. pp.16.

65 (Draft) MC 593/1.
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Figure 9-8. NSHQ Mission Support System Overview
p. A joint CIS control centre (JCCC) will implement C2 OPCON of all DCIS on behalf
of the theatre commander. The JCCC’s role is to act as the single in-theatre interface
point for the management and operational direction of DCIS that is deployed in support of
the mission. Its function includes coordination to establish internal and external (e.g.
NGO, HN, IO) CIS for the JTF. The JCCC is manned by JTF HQ J6 and NATO CIS
group personnel, and the JTF HQ chief J6 chairs the JCCC. The SOCC should consider
sending an LO to the JCCC as this centre is the focal point for operational CIS events in
theatre.66
q. The NATO DCIS assets in theatre are operated by the deployable CIS module
(DCM), a signal unit coming from a NATO signal battalion. The DCMs report to the
SHAPE CIS group that forms part of the JCCC (see Figure 9-9). Local management
activities at DCM locations are conducted by the DCM staff. Overall network and service
management is performed by the central network management centre. The centre
provides status information in the form of a CIS picture to the JCCC in theatre. In case
the central network management centre is not available and the deployment has to work
in autonomous mode, the network management capability co-located with the JCCC will
conduct the necessary in-theatre management activities and create the CIS picture. In
addition to CIS service and network management and awareness aspects, the JCCC
includes an information security officer of primary responsibility, responsible for all
information assurance aspects in theatre, including crypto key management and incident
management (in close operation with NCIRC and NATO Information Assurance
Technical Centre). The JCCC shall also establish the nucleus of a theatre management
cell, supervising all theatre-wide frequency regulation and coordination activities.
66 (Draft) MC 593/1, Chapter 3, para 3.3.7, pp. 29.
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Figure 9-9. CIS C2 Arrangements in NATO-led Operations67
9-4. Communication and Information Systems Security Domains68
a. A security domain is a set of CIS, or parts of CIS, with characteristics,

establishment, operation, and management that follow certain security rules established
by an authority. CIS equipment and systems are part of the security domain once they
have been accredited by the appropriate NSHQ authority. Establishing security domain
boundaries implies the information exchange within a certain security domain is, in
principle, not shareable with others following different rules, although they may be
technically interoperable. Security domains are also characterized by the maximum
classification of the information that may be exchanged or stored inside the limits of the
domain.
b. In the context of a NATO operation, there are usually three types of main security
domains.
(1) NATO Domain. The security rules for this domain are established by
NATO, normally of a permanent character, and apply not only to deployed forces
but to all NATO CIS.
67 (Draft) MC 593/1.
68 AJP-6.
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(2) Mission Domain. The security rules for the mission domain are
established by the JTF HQ and agreed to by participating nations that are
implemented for a specific operation. Normally, this domain has a subsidiary
character with regard to NATO domains since it is established when the CIS
provided by nations for the operation are not able to accomplish the rules of the
NATO domain, or because nations do not have the capability to get their units
integrated into the NATO domain.
(3) National Domain. This domain contains those CIS, or equipment, that
follow security rules established by a specific nation.
9-5. The NATO Special Operations Forces Network
a. The NATO SOF Network (NSN) is a BICES-connected network that provides

SOF-specific services. It is connected to the BICES network core, operates at the NATO
SECRET level, and provides access to all information services available from BICES.
The NSN adds the capability to provide SOF-specific information, intelligence, and
collaboration. It provides email, file, web, and collaboration services including Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony, chat, and web conferencing.
b. National SOF HQs across NATO and non-NATO partners are able to access SOF
relevant information from the NSHQ’s SOF-BICES portal, otherwise known as the SOF
community of interest. At the operational and tactical levels, the deployed NSN terminals
have direct connectivity with the NSN. This connectivity can be made by satellite
communications (SATCOM) or over the Internet (Figure 9-10).
Figure 9-10. SOF-BICES (NATO SOF Network)
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c. SHAPE, through cross-domain solutions, will ensure NSWAN and MSWAN are
fully interoperable and connected with BICES at static and deployed locations to the
extent necessary to fulfil the IERs set out for the SOCC in MC 593/1, including but not
limited to JOCWatch, NCOP, JChat, network interoperable real-time information services
(NIRIS), integrated command and control (ICC), joint targeting system, logistic functional
area services (LOGFAS), tool for operational planning functional area service (TOPFAS),
maritime command and control information systems (MCCIS), land command and control
information system (LCCIS), and other NATO functional area services (FASs) required to
conduct operations.69 While some of these FASs are not reachable using BICES, DCIS
will provide them through the minimum military requirement.70
d. The NSHQ is currently in the process of creating the NATO SOF toolbox as the
baseline of those tools that SOF require for operational purposes. These tools will be
either NATO standard toolsets, NATO intelligence toolsets, or NSHQ developed
capabilities.
9-6. Overall Responsibilities within NATO Communication and Information Systems 71
a. NATO regulations have established certain overall responsibilities for establishing

NATO CIS. With this regard, the exchange of information to ensure effective C2 in
support of joint operations requires CIS connectivity between:
(1) Superior and subordinate HQs at all levels.
(2) The HQ of a unit being supported and the supporting unit.
(3) Land, air, and maritime systems, and space-based platforms as required for
mutual support.
b. Higher formations provide required connectivity to lower formations. Taking into

consideration those responsibilities, the installation, operation, and maintenance of
NATO CIS are governed by the following general principles:
(1) NATO is responsible for the extension of secure CIS connectivity to the
highest level of national or multinational tactical command in a TOO.
(2) LNs or FNs and multinational commands provide connectivity and services
for multinational or national entities and subordinate formations; however, NATO
facilities may be used, if available.
(3) Nations provide the infrastructure for their own national rear links; however,
NATO facilities may be used, if available.
c. Secure CIS connectivity supporting C2 should be provided to the maximum extent

possible. Secure information sharing between NATO and non-NATO users involved in
the mission should be provided by a separate security domain and protected at the
MISSION SECRET classification.
69 SACEUR’s Special Operations Component Command Core Capability Concept of Operations, para 6b4.
70 CP 149-DCIS. Access to a major PoP if co-located. Small PoP if deployed independently.
71 AJP-6, Chapter II.
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9-7. Commander Roles and Responsibilities
a. Ensure adequate and effective CIS support for the SOCC C2 structure, including
the provision of appropriate CIS to the SOCC HQ (including its liaison elements) and the
connectivity between the SOCC HQ and its subordinate SOTGs and other subordinate
units. When deployed, provision of adequate CIS to provide connectivity between the
SOAC and its subordinate SOATGs and/or SOATUs.
b. Publish SOCC CIS plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the
assigned mission.
c. Exercise overall management of all CIS supporting the SOCC.
d. Review and coordinate SOCC CIS plans prepared by subordinate commands.
e. Ensure CIS interoperability is achieved within the SOCC and with the superior,
subordinate, and other CC HQs.
f. Ensure the integration of the SIGCEN planning and battle rhythm into the SOCC
tactical planning, decision-making process, and battle rhythm.
g. Ensure the integration of those external CIS resources supporting the SOCC.
h. Coordinate the joint spectrum management plan with the higher-level JFC, when
established.
i. Ensure the maintenance of INFOSEC and systems security.
9-8. Communication and Information Systems Planning72
a. CIS planning is cyclical and iterative in nature and is conducted continually, in

close synchronization with J3 and J5, to ensure it is consistent with the overall planning
effort. Planning will be done according to the COPD.
b. Key planning factors that form the basis of the CIS estimate are:
(1) The time available for planning, deployment, and reaction to contingency
plans.
(2) The scale and type of operation being undertaken.
(3) Ongoing, concurrent operations.
(4) An understanding of the IER and information providing systems and

facilities.
(5) The availability of in-service CIS and the ability to react to urgent
operational requirements, including the availability of commercial CIS equipment.
(6) Bandwidth and channel availability.
72 AJP-6, Chapter III.
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(7) The availability of and ability to control and manage the electromagnetic
spectrum.
(8) The training standards of those required to deploy, operate, and maintain
CIS, particularly that which is newly procured.
(9) The international standardization of technical protocols.
(10) The interoperability of CIS within and between subordinates and with other
components and multinational partners.
(11) Information assurance.
9-9. Communication and Information Systems Tools
a. Tools. The SOCC’s IERs are detailed in MC 593/1. Nevertheless, those IERs
should be reviewed and tailored to every SOCC operation. What remains unchangeable
regardless of the operation is the need for the SOCC to work on tools that reside on at
least three different domains: NATO SECRET, MISSION SECRET, and NATO
UNCLASSIFIED. These domains are services and capability oriented.
b. Functional Area Services
(1) Joint Command and Control
(a) JOCWatch. Provides common web-based interface for JOC staff to

manage, analyse, and publish information on incidents of relevance to the
command. It is normally run by the information manager, battle captain, or
watch keeper within the JOC.
(b) Joint/NATO Common Operational Picture. Viewing tool to provide

capability to build and view the joint situation. An aid to joint SA and joint
planning. Mainly used by the JOC staff.
(c) JChat. This CIS tool is used by members of the SOCC and
associated subordinate and liaison elements to communicate and pass
information via instant messaging and chatrooms. It includes an incident
reporting capability that is compatible with JOCWatch. Users can monitor
multiple functional windows as well as tailored communications with
individuals. Mainly used by the JOC staff.
(2) Operations Support
(a) Tool for Operational Planning Functional Area Service. TOPFAS

is the data planning support system for the operational planning and force
activation in accordance with the NATO Operational Planning Process.
Provides a common database and suite of planning tools, a repository of
operational plans, and an audit trail for the force generation process.
Although this tool was not designed to be used at the tactical level, it is a
useful tool for the SOCC during the planning phase of an operation as it
allows concurrent and parallel planning among all levels of command.
Mainly used by the operations centre.
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(b) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Analysis. Nuclear, biological,

and chemical (NBC) analysis is for prediction and evaluation of NBC
situation and associated NBC hazard. It is also used for NBC warning and
reporting procedures. Mainly used by the operations centre.
(3) Maritime Command and Control: Maritime Command and Control

Information System. MCCIS maintains and disseminates the recognized
maritime picture. Provides essential SA of maritime assets. Also able to display
air and land assets. Mainly used by the JOC staff.
(4) Air Command and Control
(a) Integrated Command and Control. Maintains and disseminates

the recognized air picture. Provides SA and planning tools. Includes joint
targeting system, time-sensitive targeting tool. Mainly used by the JOC
staff.
(b) Flexible, Advanced Command and Control Services for NATO

Time-sensitive Targeting. Flexible, advanced C2 services for NATO joint
time-sensitive targeting (FAST) is a software tool developed to support joint
time-sensitive targeting. A stand-alone tool that is launched from ICC that
has the ability to interface with ICC databases. Mainly used by the JOC
and ASC staff.
(c) Joint Targeting System. The joint targeting system is a thick client
within ICC used to identify, visualize, and query targets and targeting
information. Mainly used by the JOC, deployed ASC staff, and also by the
J2 shop in garrison during the planning phase of an operation.
(5) Tactical Data Links
(a) Network Interoperable Real-Time Information Services. NIRIS

provides flexible means of interfacing, distributing, and displaying NRT
maritime, ground, air tactical, friendly force, and convoy tracking
information.
(b) Friendly Force Tracking. Provides NRT information about the

position, identification, and security classification of the SOCC’s own forces,
which ultimately contributes to fratricide avoidance.
(6) Special Operations Forces Command and Control
(a) NetPlan. NetPlan is a CIS time-based tactical planning tool

designed for developing, coordinating, and monitoring operations; NetPlan
may be used by the SOTUs/SOTGs for planning. The SOTUs/SOTGs
forward their plans to the SOCC with a CONOPS to allow for coordination,
deconfliction, and incorporation into battle tracking.
(b) NATO Common Operational Picture. NCOP is a tool of ICC that

provides a wide spectrum of SA. The functionality of NCOP allows the JOC
staff to mission track current and future operations and to view the SOF
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ORBAT. It includes a CONOPS and phase editor and is useful as a tool for
component and future operations planning.
(c) Special Operations Forces Battlefield Information Collection and

Exploitation System. The NSHQ’s C4ISR tool to support its mission at its
garrison location and forward deployed units (forward support base/NSHQ
SOCC Core). It is an independent domain inside BICES managed and
administered by the NSHQ. It has access to the same functional services,
core services, tools, and products as BICES, allowing the exchange of
information and intelligence up to the NATO SECRET level. See paragraph
9-5 for more information. It is the NSHQ SOCC Core’s main C4ISR system
used across all centres, detached elements, and subordinate units.
(7) Logistic Support: Logistic Functional Area Services. LOGFAS

embraces functionalities, such as ADAMS, CORSOM, EVE, GEO, LDM, and
LOGREP, to support all kinds of logistic tasks to plan and carry out operations and
exercises. It supports the different phases of operations from operation planning,
deployment of operation equipment and personnel, supply support, and
redeployment of operation contingents.
(8) Intelligence Support
(a) Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System. The

BICES domain consists of national intelligence products supported by the
connectivity and servers of the BICES Group Executive. Nations place
intelligence products in national contribution databases that can be
accessed by customers anywhere. Mainly used by the ASC staff and the
NSHQ SOCC Core through SOF-BICES.
(b) NATO Intelligence Toolbox. The NATO Intelligence Toolbox

(NITB) provides a fully web-based productivity and collaboration
environment for both intelligence producers and consumers. NITB provides
a collection of integrated services allowing intelligence staffs to store,
retrieve, visualize, and disseminate intelligence products.
(c) Joint Operation/Intelligence Information System. Joint

operation/intelligence information system (JOIIS) is an ORBAT and situation
display system for red and blue forces. It enhances the commander’s SA,
supports military situation monitoring and assessment, facilitates ORBAT
management and exchange of status information between JOIIS sites, and
improves the decision-making process. Mainly used by the ASC staff.
(d) Analyst Notebook. Provides the capability to uncover relationships

between entities that may not have been apparent during the collection of
the data. Stand-alone application with the database installed locally. It
needs an Aladdin Hardlock device, or a dongle, for the software to run.
(e) Palantir. Palantir is a data, application, and computing platform used

by several national SOF and intelligence organizations to determine statistical,
relational, temporal, geo-spatial information, and threat and social network
analyses and blend them all seamlessly within the same platform.
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(f) Signals Intelligence Communications and Information System.

Signals intelligence communications and information system (SIGINT
COINS) utilizes the NATO CTS-WAN, which is not connected to any other
network such as NSWAN or BICES. SIGINT COINS is used by ASC staff.
(g) ACO Open Source System. Supports ASC and public affairs office
by disseminating information from open sources, including media.
(h) Full-motion Video. This service delivers a sufficiently robust (CIS-

based) capability for the dissemination, storage, archival, and retrieval of
NRT full-motion video (FMV) and FMV-derived IMINT products. Interim
Geo-spatial intelligence tool (iGeoSIT), ICC, and NITB are the current
NATO supported tools for this service.
(9) Geo-spatial: Interim Geo-spatial Intelligence Tool. Provides easy,

interactive visualization of all operationally relevant geo-spatial information, e.g.
maps, satellite images, town plans, aerial photos. It can be used as a pseudo-
COP when it is fed with information from ICC, MCCIS, CPOF, and LCCIS. It is
used by the JOC staff.
(10) Spectrum Management: Spectrum XXI. This is a frequency

management stand-alone tool. It is used by the SIGCEN staff.
(11) Reports and Returns: Document Assisted Reporting Tool. The

NSHQ’s tool that quickly and accurately populates data in standardized report
formats. Data entered once can be used multiple times without cutting and
pasting. This tool also prompts the user when a report is required or received and
can calculate metrics based in user defined formulas. What is more important for
a SOCC is that it combines subordinate reports into one report and facilitates
multiple users collaborating on the same report.
c. Core Functional Area Services
(1) Geo-spatial: Core GIS. Provides functional services with a core set of
geo-spatial services and data across NATO. It provides ASC with a cartographic
workshop service including hardware and software to acquire, create, maintain,
and publish geo-spatial information.
(2) Collaboration
(a) LYNC. This is a collaborative platform for presence, instant

messaging, voice, video, meetings, and whiteboarding. Used across all
SOCC key posts.
(b) SharePoint 2010. Provides intranet portals, document and file

management, collaboration, and search facilities. It is used SOCC-wide.
(3) Informal Messaging: Microsoft Outlook. Provides email, a calendar,

and contacts. It is used SOCC-wide.
(4) Document and Records Management: Document Handling System.

This is a NATO Bi-SC electronic document repository. It is used SOCC-wide.
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(5) Tasker Management: Tasker Tracker Enterprise. This is the main

NATO tasker management system.
(6) Formal Messaging Allied Integrated Message System. This is an allied

integrated message system or AIMS. It is a NATO off-the-shelf message
preparation (ACP-127 Format) application, which enables a staff user to draft and
release formal military messages.
d. Core Services
(1) Voice. Voice services are not considered a C2 capability.
(a) NATO Core Network (Unclassified). NATO Core Network is a non-

secure NATO telephone system provided, managed, and maintained by the
NATO Communication and Information Agency. This service is provided by
DCIS.
(b) Defense Switched Network (Unclassified). Defense Switched

Network is a non-secure U.S. and NATO telephone system provided,
managed, and maintained by the U.S. military. This service is not a default
capability provided for a SOCC but can be requested by submitting a
requirement directly to the hosting organization, the U.S. military.
(c) Mobile Phone Communication (Unclassified). This capability can

be provided in areas where a mobile phone infrastructure is in place. It is
not a reliable source of communication and is restricted to use within the
buildings of SOCC HQs.
(d) Commercial Voice over Internet Protocol Communication

(Unclassified). This service is not a default capability of the SOCC and is
not to be considered as critical service or a C2 capability. However, where
a commercial VoIP backbone is implemented, this can be as an extension
to the SOCC capabilities either as a reach-back or a stand-alone capability.
(e) BICES Voice over Internet Protocol Phone Communication

(Classified). BICES VoIP is the primary voice communication service
provided to the NSHQ SOCC Core. BICES VoIP is to be considered a
critical priority service but not as a C2 capability.
(f) BICES Video Phone Communication (Classified). BICES video

phone communication is the primary video communication service provided
to the NSHQ SOCC Core. BICES video phone communication service is to
be considered a critical priority service but not as a C2 capability.
(g) Satellite Phone Communication (Unclassified and Classified).

Satellite phones are emergency assets or in some cases the only asset that
provides telecommunication connectivity. These assets are only for official
calls.
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(2) Video Teleconference
(a) The use of video teleconference (VTC) is to facilitate the transfer of

information among the SOCC HQ, its superior HQ, its subordinate SOTGs,
and its liaison elements.
(b) The NSHQ SOCC Core has the capability to host or to participate in
VTCs at the NATO SECRET classification level on the NATO BICES
network and NSWAN. The latter is through x-domain connectivity.
(c) Unclassified VTCs can be conducted at individual workstations

equipped with webcams utilizing LYNC (paragraph 9-9c(2)(a)).
e. Communication Systems Assets
(1) Trunk Communications. NATO general-purpose communication system

provides a multi-protocol label switching high bandwidth in excess of 100 Mb/s
connectivity throughout NATO and should be leveraged where possible to ensure
the most efficient use of the limited SATCOM resources. Figure 9-11 depicts the
high-level principle of NATO CIS connectivity in support of land-based operations,
and introduces the typical type of CIS C2 entities involved.73 On the left-hand
side, the deployable entities are represented: a NATO-provided HQ with through
provision, a C2 entity supported with NATO TO provision, as the SOCC, and two
national deployed CIS. The fixed (strategic) elements on the right-hand side show
pivotal DCIS support functions, e.g. a DCIS garrison site (for on the job training,
operation and maintenance, and mission preparation), the central element of the
DCIS service and network management, and a services gateway between DCIS
and the NATO General Communications System.
Figure 9-11. High-level Communication Layer Principle of NATO CIS Organization in a

Land-based Operation
73 DCIS CONOPS, draft, Figure 5-5.
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(2) Satellite Communications. The SOCC AOO may preclude the use of
military/commercial SATCOM systems together with the multi-channel. Therefore,
interconnections of both bearer systems are taken into account for augmenting
trunk connectivity. CP-130 will provide worldwide NATO SATCOM access for the
SOCC.74
(3) Ultra High Frequency Single Channel Satellite Communications. The

SOCC will have dedicated UHF single-channel SATCOM terminals provided by
DCIS. The first priority for the UHF single-channel SATCOM net would be to
provide COM SOCC with an all informed, secure voice command net to his senior
commanders. Examples of nets are:
(a) JTF-Comd – Voice
(b) JTF-Data – HPW
(c) SOCC-Comd – Voice
(d) SOCC-Data – HPW
(e) SOCC-Air – Voice
(f) SOCC-ISTAR
(g) SOCC-CAG
(4) Very High Frequency Communications. The SOCC will require local
very high frequency communications on a case-by-case basis.
(a) The SOCC Command Net provides a redundant means of

communication between all NSHQ SOF units, in the event of outages or
unavailability of other secure nets. During combined operations, it can also
be used as a command net to facilitate coordination between different task
forces. The SOCC Command Net is also used as a tactical net by COM
SOCC when operating outside of the immediate SOCC HQ area. This radio
net is likely to utilize 25 kHz channel radio assets.
(b) Movement Control Net
(c) Quick Reaction Force’s Dedicated Net
(d) Emergency Net
(e) Other nets as needed
(5) High Frequency Communications. The SOCC will require high frequency
radio as a fallback rear link capability of very low capacity in the event of SATCOM
unavailability. This capability is provided by DCIS.
74CP-130 is a constellation of satellites created by a 1-year memorandum of understanding signed by NATO and
three nations (GBR/FRA/ITA) in 2002. This capability is expected to be in place post 2016.
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(6) Line of Sight Communications. The long-range and short-range LOS

microwave radio communications provide a terrestrial bearer system that can be
used to link together the SOCC, superior, and subordinate units without using
satellite capacity. The LOS systems have constraints on range and are only
usable where the distance between nodes and the intervening terrain make a LOS
radio path feasible.
f. Deployed Capability Packages
(1) NSHQ Mission Support System. The NMSS is a preconfigured

communication solution, mobile, versatile, easy to upgrade, and designed to
support a variety of NATO SOF mission templates. The NMSS is a hardware kit
with SATCOM reach-back capabilities to classified resources. Each kit can be
configured as a stand-alone capability or may be integrated into a larger
communications structure. The NMSS comes in three configuration kits (Figures
9-4 and 9-8):
(a) NMSS-L (Lite Kit). Ready to deploy in 2 days. It provides classified

and unclassified communications services for liaison elements,
commander’s communications, and advanced parties. It supports standard
BICES services, as well as data (SharePoint, Web), email, VoIP, and JChat
for up to two users.
(b) NMSS-M (Medium Kit). Ready to deploy in 2-10 days. It provides

classified and unclassified communications services for deployable teams,
joint planning advisory teams, liaison elements, and advanced parties or
forward elements. It supports standard BICES services as well as data
(SharePoint, Web), email, VoIP, JChat, and email messaging (COP) for up
to six users.
(c) NMSS-H (Heavy Kit). Ready to deploy in 20 days. It provides

classified and unclassified communications services for SOTGs, forward
support base, fixed forward site (e.g. special operations forces fusion cell),
and serves as end state communications. It supports standard BICES
services as well as data (SharePoint, Web), email, VoIP, VTC, FMV, JChat,
and email messaging (COP) for up to 16 concurrent users.
(d) Deployed Network Operations Centre Packages. See Figure 9-4.
1/ Initial Command and Control Element. Ready to deploy in

0-20 days to support 17-52 personnel; it consists of several NMSS-H,
depending upon the number of users to be supported, and provides
basic CIS services for quick stand-up or insertion with minimal
technical manning team.
2/ Forward Coordination Element. Ready to deploy in 20 days

to support 53-120 personnel; it consists of two 10-foot fully capable
deployed network operations centres (DNOCs). It provides
additional services such as COP, CPOF, etc.
3/ Mature Operation Package. Ready to deploy in 30-180 days

to support 120+ personnel; it consists of one 20-foot fully operational
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DNOC, one 10-foot DNOC, and extra space for additional networks
(SIPR, NIPR, CENTRIX, NSWAN, FMN). It provides advanced
intelligence services and packages.
4/ Special Operations Task Group Deployed Packages.

Ready to deploy in 20 days. It supports 1-32 SOTG users with basic
CIS services for quick stand-up or insertion. Depending on the
number of users, there are three service slices of hardware: Slice 1
for 2-8 users, Slice 2 for 8-16 users, and Slice 3 for 16-32 users.
g. Frequency Management
(1) Frequency management activities ensure effective and efficient use of the
frequency spectrum by friendly forces during operations and exercises while
assisting with supporting actions that deny spectrum use by opposing forces.
(2) Frequency spectrum is a critical resource, and efficient and effective use of
it is critical and will remain critical to mission success. Spectrum XXI is the NATO
tool designed to facilitate the frequency management. See paragraph 9-9b(11).
(3) Frequency management deals with the whole radio frequency spectrum and
with all devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiation for communication
(voice, data, video) and non-communication purposes:
(a) Radio stations
(b) Radio relay
(c) SATCOM
(d) Radars, sensors
(e) Air-ground-air communication
(f) Tactical digital database including RT video streams
(g) Navigation
(4) Within the SOCC, a frequency manager authority will be assigned to J6 with
the responsibility of requesting frequencies for the systems in use and to manage
the spectrum within the SOF component.
(5) The frequency manager develops and maintains policy on the use of the
spectrum, prepares the joint restricted frequency list, and develops and maintains
the electronic environment database for planning, coordinating, and controlling use
of the spectrum within the AOR.
(6) Units request frequencies using the NATO 14-point format or U.S. Standard
Frequency Action Format.
(7) The tools for managing the radio frequency spectrum will comply with the
following capabilities:
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(a) Supports operational planning and management of the RF with an

emphasis on assigning compatible frequencies and performing spectrum
engineering tasks in a joint operational environment.
(b) Allotment plan generation creates a set of frequencies that are

available to be assigned.
(c) Frequency assignment provides radio channels to end users to meet

their operational needs.
(d) Interference analysis analyses existing frequency assignments for

potential interference.
(e) Interference report reports an interference problem and the way to

resolve the problem.
(f) EW deconfliction assesses the impact of a planned electronic attack

(jamming) on existing receivers during operations and exercises.
(g) Joint restricted frequency list management tool used to preclude

assets from being jammed by friendly forces conducting EW activities.
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CHAPTER 10 – KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
10-1. General. Knowledge and information management provides quality information to the
right user at the right time in a usable form that facilitates understanding and decision-making.
The goal of knowledge and information management is to provide relevant and precise
information that supports the SOCC and commander’s SA and understanding, facilitating timely
and effective decisions made ahead of the adversary. The knowledge and information
management system and processes encompass the organization, users, and consumers,
including the different forms of communication, information, and data encountered on a daily
basis. The procedures and information systems assist with the collection, processing, storage,
protection, access (display), dissemination, and disposition of information. Individual users are
the starting point of information management; they have a baseline of information along with
knowledge of the SOCC’s information management process that guides their daily decisions as
they receive new data and information. Leaders decide what information is of the greatest
value, how to manage the knowledge discerned from that information, and how to display,
disseminate, and utilize the knowledge to assist with operational decisions.
Figure 10-1. Daily Information Flow
a. Information Management. Information management is the collection and

management of an organization's information resources that are acquired from multiple
sources for the purposes of optimizing access and dissemination in a controlled
environment. Information management entails organizing, retrieving, acquiring, and
maintaining information that overlaps with the practice of data management.
b. Knowledge Management. Knowledge management comprises a range of

processes and procedures that identify, create, represent, distribute, and enable the
adoption of insights and experiences focused on improving the performance, sharing of
lessons learned, integration, and improvement of an organization. Knowledge
management overlaps organizational learning and leverages information management
and technology to focus on best practices and information that is critical to decision-
making.
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10-2. Information Management Cycle
Figure 10-2. Information Management Cycle
a. Information Management Planning. Early information management planning in

the pre-deployment phase of operations establishes important guidelines for information
management prior to collection. Information management planning is key during
planning; it creates protocols on how information will be managed and is the foundation
of maintaining a concrete management plan. Establishing information management
policies enables control of who can access the SOCC-specific information, what they can
do with it, and how long they can retain it.
b. Data Collection and Creation. The physical act of data collection is the driving
force behind developing information that is pertinent to a SOCC and its subordinate units.
This action is conducted on an everyday basis as information is pushed and pulled for a
variety of needs. As data is collected, similar to the intelligence cycle, it is analysed and
converted into pertinent information.
c. Organization and Storage. The organization and storage of collected information

allows for a unified structure to be formed, making searching for relevant information
simple and less time consuming. Various levels of organization can be found from the
SOCC down to subordinate units. At each level, systems are established that organize
and store specific information.
(1) Personal Workspace. An individual’s personal workspace is the micro

level of information organization, and members of the SOCC staff must have their
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workspaces organized in a manner that is easily managed and accessible. By

maintaining an organized virtual workspace, files, data, and important information
can be found in the event the individual is not available to access his or her
workspace.
(2) Primary Work Area. The primary work area of a staff section encapsulates
all relevant information pertaining to that working group.
(3) Collaborative Workspace. By establishing a collaborative workspace,

users maintain the ability to create, review, and edit information, whether through
physical or virtual means. A collaborative workspace offers multiple users access
to relevant information all at the same time. The use of tools such as SharePoint
and portals allows staff member access to a net-centric collaborative tool.
(4) Shared Workspace. Shared workspace between two primary work areas
allows multiple sections of staff to push and pull necessary information that
corresponds to their specific function.
(5) Common Access Area. Creating a common access area standardizes

and makes accessing specific genres of information easy and efficient. Using a
web information services environment (WISE) establishes a common access area
where users have access to varying degrees of staff pertinent knowledge and
information.
Figure 10-3. Information Organization and Storage
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d. Use and Dissemination. Information is only valid if it is disseminated and used

appropriately. Once information is collected, it is necessary to apply it to and decide on how it
applies to a specific mission, or even to COM SOCC’s intent. Information is generally viewed as
being goal oriented; SOCC staff members and leaders are responsible for deciding how that
information relates to a current problem. The analysis of information ultimately leads to actionable
intelligence that will be used to drive current and future operations. Because of this, the
dissemination of information through the use of collaborative tools remains an imperative task that
all members of a SOCC must participate in. Information that remains unused is also useless.
Figure 10-4. Dissemination of Information
e. Protection, Maintenance, and Preservation. Establishing information

assurance, protection, and security policies is an important step in the protection of
information within the SOCC. Protection policies run deeper than simply putting
protocols into place that can safeguard information; protocols include who can access the
information and what they can physically do to it as well.
f. Disposition. The analysis of information is required to convert the most pertinent

information into knowledge. Disposition routines ensure the availability of useful
information over time, while archiving and disposing of information that is no longer
deemed to be of value.
g. Evaluation. Evaluating the current information management cycle is imperative in

critiquing the functionality of the information management plan. By evaluating the cycle,
flaws in the process may be identified and adjusted accordingly. Evaluation also allows
the effectiveness of information dissemination to be tracked, as well as any interference
that may be occurring. Creating key metrics for performance within information
management planning allows for assessing the overall effectiveness of the information
management programme.
10-3. Common Reference Point. The SOCC should adopt and maintain an electronic common
reference point as the principal knowledge portal for information sharing and content
management. The electronic common reference point is functionally organized and mission-
centric. It can be any system that meets the needs of the SOCC and also provides the ability to
exchange information. For example, many HQs find that a web information centre meets its
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needs, while other commands with greater resources may choose to use a portal or other web-
based system. Regardless of the system used, simplify it for the user with standardized formats.
Discourage staff sections from establishing their own duplicate electronic common reference
points, which could lead to information management challenges. Posting information on an
electronic common reference point is considered a passive means of information sharing, and
places responsibility on the provider for ensuring availability of time-sensitive information. Posted
information is controlled and is considered proprietary. A new report should be posted to clarify,
change, or amend any previously posted information. Ensure information posted on the common
reference point is in compliance with local information assurance and security policies.
10-4. Information Sharing
a. Value. Information sharing entails the creation, storage, and dissemination of

information either by push or pull means. It ensures that a SOCC maintains shared SA
and has access to all relevant information. Information sharing provides the SA
foundation for everything else, such as collaboration. There are numerous push and pull
means to share information and the appropriate means is dictated by type of information
and its urgency.
b. Physical Means. The SOCC may organize around physical means, such as
centres, boards, cells, and working groups, to conduct the PDMA process. Physical
information sharing is done primarily by face-to-face discussions in these forums, and
also shared via LOs and through various documents.
c. Virtual Means. Virtual information sharing allows the SOCC HQ, when
geographically separated from SOF units and staff, to have access to the same
information. This occurs both horizontally, within the SOCC HQ and adjacent units and
staffs, and vertically, with SOF components and the JFC. A net-centric approach
provides an easily accessible point for information sharing. Information can be posted by
all authorized users on a webpage and easily found in either logically defined directories
or by use of an advanced search engine. Information can also be pushed via email and
message traffic or shared by VTCs. Members of the SOCC HQ staff, LOs, SOF HQ
component, and higher/adjacent commands can all push or pull information in
accordance with defined access permissions.
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CHAPTER 11 – LOGISTICS
11-1. General
a. The nature of special operations often requires independent forces operating in

austere, remote locations without a robust logistics infrastructure. SOF logistics are
expeditionary in nature and are tailored and structured for rapid deployment into austere
environments. To maintain the necessary flexibility and independence in such
circumstances, a SOCC logistics support element is necessary to bridge the gap to
conventional logistics support. SOF require both standard and SOF-peculiar (non-standard)
materiel, often in an accelerated manner through non-standard channels.
b. CSS for special operations is characterized by a multifaceted environment that

includes deployment, initial entry, build-up and integration, and redeployment. NATO
SOF can expect to be among the first NATO military elements deployed in response to a
NA5CRO situation. The challenge for SOCC planners is the coordination required to
address both operational and national considerations. Special operations elements
(SOTGs and SOATGs) are expected to operate in any environment without support or
replenishment for a minimum of 30 days (this includes all classes of supply). Once
deployed, the SOCC must be able to ensure the sustainment of the task groups through
various methods as determined during pre-deployment planning. The SOCC J4 has the
in-theatre responsibility for coordinating the logistic support for NATO SOF during
planning, execution, and redeployment.
c. The SOCC J4 staff or national support elements (NSEs) cannot be expected to

replicate all logistic functions for SOF operations; therefore, it is critical that the J4 staff
liaise and coordinate with the JTF HQ J4, the JLSG, other CCs, and other agencies and
organizations as appropriate while resolving problems at the lowest possible level. If a
theatre-level multinational joint logistics centre is established, the SOCC also liaises with
the centre but may consider the requirement of establishing a special operations combat
SUPCEN for SOF. It is highly recommended that a core manning element from logistics
operations/plans, movement and transportation, and engineer functional areas be
considered for the initial deployment of forces. If an operational liaison and
reconnaissance team (OLRT) is deployed from the JTF HQ, a SOCC J4 representative
should accompany the team.
d. Although contracting and funding are responsibilities of the J8, they are covered in
this chapter. Medical functions are covered in Chapter 12.
11-2. Logistic Functional Areas. The SOCC J4’s responsibilities encompass the areas of
supply and materiel services; logistic information management; equipment maintenance and
repair; movement and transportation; reception, staging, and onward movement/integration
(RSOM/RSOI); petroleum logistics; explosive ordnance disposal; medical logistics;
infrastructure engineering for logistics; medical support; contracting; and host-nation support
(HNS), as well as the related functions of CIMIC, NATO standardization, interoperability, and
environmental protection.
a. Supply. Each SOF element has organic support capabilities to sustain or provide
support to their units. Resupply of deployed SOF elements in remote or denied areas is
planned and executed as an operational task and may require the use of non-standard
transportation or SOF aviation assets. The JLSG and NSEs can assist the SOCC J4 in
fulfilling logistic requirements. Agreements concerning the common user item list (CUIL)
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can reduce duplication of effort and greatly assist SOF logistic support. When a TCN
component or agency is designated as the CUIL lead to provide selected common items,
such as food, water, or fuel, they support multiple deployed elements.
b. Maintenance. Equipment unique to a TCN remains the maintenance

responsibility of the TCN deployed element. Special operations elements may have the
capability to perform limited maintenance but often require deployment of specialty
personnel or support units to maintain and repair equipment that is unique to special
operations. When practical, maintenance facilities for cross-TCN use and retrograde
procedures for returning repairable items should be established. Multinational use of
salvage assets should be emphasized. Maintenance priorities normally emphasize
return of mission-essential weapon systems to combat readiness.
c. Fuel. While most fuelling operations are included in base support, during
expeditionary operations the SOCC and deployed forces may require fuel support from
organic resources until NATO establishes an appropriate fuel resupply infrastructure.
Fuel support for special operations aircraft includes testing and certification of HN fuel
supplies using NATO standards of acceptability and supervising local military and civilian
refuelling personnel to ensure safe refuelling operations with NATO combat aircraft. The
SOAC J4 is responsible for ensuring the SOATGs provide sufficient personnel trained
and certified to accurately assess and verify the quality of HN fuel, HN storage
procedures, and planned defences against possible contamination and attack.
d. Transportation. Given the nature of most special operations, time constraints,

planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on
common-user transportation assets. Generally, strategic movement assets support SOF in
the deployment, resupply, and redeployment phases of the operation. SOF organic airlift
assets normally provide SOF with intra-theatre lift support (insertion, extraction, and
resupply). When SOF operations exceed organic SOF lift capability, then common-user
transportation assets should be considered. The SOCC J4 is responsible for coordinating all
non-operational associated transportation. This is usually done through a joint movement
coordination centre or a similar organization established for movement control. The SOCC
and subordinate units are responsible for the coordination of administrative transportation at
their respective levels; however, transportation to and from SOF operational areas,
especially resupply or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) in support of deployed operational
elements, is often conducted as tactical operations under J3 direction.
e. Medical Support. Normally, an LN provides medical support to NATO forces in a

TOO. The SOCC medical staff coordinates preventive medicine practices to mitigate
any environmental factors that may impact the SOTGs/SOATGs. The medical staff
provide detailed medical planning and medical intelligence to COM SOCC prior to
deployment and recommend organizational and personnel actions to counter potential
threats to personnel health. The medical staff also plan for and coordinate the
MEDEVAC procedures. The SOCC may maintain a Role 2 medical facility and a special
operations surgical team, while the SOTGs/SOATGs maintain a Role 1 medical facility,
as dictated in AFS Volume X, Special Operations Forces. Additional information is
provided in Chapter 12.
f. Infrastructure Engineering. The SOCC J4 Engineer coordinates SOF

requirements with the higher command’s engineer. The higher command engineer
supervises both combat and general support engineer units and operations, real estate
activities, environmental protection, and other infrastructure support-related activities.
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g. Contracting. For large-scale operations exercises, the SOCC J4 must have

access to contracting support. In some instances, the higher command or JLSG may
retain responsibility for contracting. For smaller operations, a designated SOF TCN
component may provide a contracting officer. Deployed task groups are responsible for
ensuring funds are in place before any contracting actions are taken. While a contracting
officer may support the entire SOCC, the SOCC HQ and all special operations elements
should deploy with organic paying agents and field ordering officers to handle small
purchases. The SOCC LEGAD should be contacted for advice on contracts and related
matters. Contracting support is discussed further in paragraph 11-8.
h. Funding. Funding is typically not fronted for contingency operations; therefore,

SOF TCN elements must record incremental costs associated with the operation for
reimbursement. Guidance for recording and filing for reimbursement should be provided
to SOF elements as early as possible. Legal advice from the SOCC LEGAD on
expenditures, to ensure compliance with regulations and fiscal law, should be sought and
special attention given to initiatives that train or equip any foreign forces.
11-3. J4 Directorate Responsibilities. The primary J4 staff directorate responsibilities at the

SOF component level are covered in Chapter 1.
11-4. Logistic Support
a. Specific logistic requirements are initially determined by both the SOCC and its
subordinate units. Identifying logistic requirements is critical to coordinating theatre
support; it begins with receipt of the mission and continues throughout the planning
process. For contingency planning, these requirements are normally identified in a
formal SOR. The SOR identifies requirements in sufficient time to allow for the
necessary planning, coordination, and procurement.
b. NATO logistics doctrine emphasizes a shared responsibility for logistic support

from both NATO and the TCN; this methodology applies directly to the relationship
between the NATO SOCC and the nations contributing special operations units. The old
paradigm of nations having sole responsibility for logistics and CSS falters in NA5CROs
and expeditionary operations. While nations may choose to maintain full responsibility
for CSS of their deployed special operations units, the deployed NATO SOCC has the
authority and the responsibility to establish a CSS organization tailored to the
requirements of the situation being faced. The SOCC, through the J4, develops the
special operations CSS organization best suited to coordinate logistic and support
functions for the special operations land, maritime, and air units under SOCC C2.
Because logistics support of air and aviation units is complex and plays such a large role
in the successful accomplishment of special air operations, COM SOCC normally
delegates the responsibility of coordinating the logistic and CSS requirements of the
special air warfare units to the SOAC.
c. NATO has developed a logistic process to provide advantages during

expeditionary operations. COM SOCC tasks the SOCC J4 to apply the appropriate
NATO concepts of logistics support across the entire special operations component. Just
as with conventional units, the J4 limits competition for scarce resources and ensures the
SOTGs and SOATGs are adequately supported and able to safely perform their assigned
missions. The SOCC J4 ensures supplies and services are apportioned according to
COM SOCC’s intent and priorities. Special operations peculiar materiel and services are
defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is
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no TCN common requirement. The identification of special operations-peculiar

requirements is an operational decision that is tied to the commander’s CONOPS and
mission requirements. To ensure that the process is effective, the SOCC may issue
policy to subordinate units on how to obtain this support. Implementing this policy
requires close coordination among the supported element, the SOCC, and the higher
command. The SOCC should monitor the process to assist and expedite it when
required. Logistics concepts the SOCC J4 may employ include:
(1) Lead Nation Logistic Support. During the force generation process, one
nation may agree to assume responsibility for coordinating or providing logistic
support to all or part of a joint force. This concept is also applied to the SOCC.
The LN often provides common supplies such as Class I (rations and water),
Class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (ammunition) to the entire
SOCC on a prearranged, cost-reimbursable basis. The LN status is usually based
on geographic considerations rather than classes of supply, e.g. if a TOO is
broken up into LN regional commands or multinational divisions (MNDs) then the
LN in a region or MND often assumes the responsibility for coordinating logistic
support in multiple classes of supply for all units, including the SOTGs and
SOATGs within that regional area. In a large TOO, it is likely for more than one
LN to be designated and for each LN to assume responsibility for a specified
range of logistic support for the specific geographical area.
(2) Role Specialist Nation Logistics Support. Each NATO member nation
has particular logistic strengths and capabilities that when combined can create a
powerful CSS infrastructure to enable joint special operations. Under a role
specialist nation arrangement, one nation assumes primary responsibility for a
particular class of supply common across the entire SOCC. For example, one
nation may be best suited for providing aviation fuels or perhaps medical support.
The difference between role specialist nations and LNs is that role specialist
nations provide support in a single commodity or service while LNs coordinate or
provide multiple commodities and services.
11-5. Planning
a. Logistics planning for special operations should be conducted by NATO’s premiere

logistic planning tool, LOGFAS, from the operational level down to the tactical level
(higher command, SOCC, and SOTG) and should be a collaborative effort to ensure that
CSS is integrated into operational planning. Planning for support should begin early in
the planning process; planning is a continuous process that spans cold start planning,
TOA, through termination of the conflict or military operations.
b. Collaborative planning between the higher command HQs and components is a

common occurrence. It is important to maintain liaison and information sharing during
planning for CSS. Whenever possible, a J4 representative should accompany the
SOPLE to the JTF HQ to assist with operational planning for SOF and to pass
information required for the SOCC planning efforts. A logistics planner should be
assigned to the SOCC’s J5 directorate or SOCCPG. In the absence of a permanent
logistics planner, the J4 should temporarily dedicate the requisite personnel to the
planning effort to ensure that CSS requirements and considerations are incorporated into
the plan.
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c. The aim of logistic support planning is to:75
(1) Develop logistic planning factors, requirements, and concepts for logistic
support.
(2) Determine the organization and structure required for logistic support.
(3) Determine requirements, limitations, and shortfalls for CSS to the SOCC.
(4) Determine the availability of and requirements for JOA-level logistic support,
HNS, and/or local contracting (additional information regarding HNS and
contracting is provided in paragraphs 11-7 and 11-8).
(5) Develop the concept for transition or for concluding the operation.
(6) Conduct movement, medical, HNS, infrastructure, contracting, and funding

planning.
(7) Examine the logistics requirements and capabilities of non-NATO nations

contributing forces.
d. This section is not intended to explain logistics planning as CSS is integrated into
operational planning using either comprehensive operations planning or the SOCC-P2.
Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual, the SOCC Planning Handbook, or the COPD for
additional information regarding planning and associated steps or processes.
Considerations for logistics planning for SOF during each of the six phases of operational
planning utilizing either COPD or SOCC-P2 (Figure 6-1) include:
(1) Phase 1 – Situational Awareness. During this normal state, SOCC

planners are developing knowledge about and monitoring areas or situations that
are of possible interest to SOF. Additionally, logistic factors of interest in an
assigned AOI may initiate the knowledge development process. Once the CPOE
begins, logistics planners should develop or review the existing logistics
preparation of the theatre (LPT) and begin developing logistic KRs (see Annex I
for more information on LPT). These logistic KRs should be considered when the
staff assist with developing the initial commander’s CCIRs. Finally, SOCC
planners develop RFIs and seek SA with other agencies, organizations, and/or the
SOFAD in preparation for future planning phases.
(2) Phase 2 – Appreciation
(a) Once the WNGO is received, it may be necessary for the

commander to initiate planning. As required, the J4 should provide logistics
planners to the effort (SOCCPG and SOPLE) and provide liaison personnel
to the JLSG as soon as established. Throughout this phase, the CPOE and
LPT are further developed and refined. As information, orders, and
guidance become available, the information should be analysed and
development of the logistics estimate should begin to assist developing
COAs and the concept for logistic support.
75 AJP-4(A), Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, dated Dec 03.
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Important Note. The logistics estimate and concept for

logistic support should be developed early and updated during
all the planning phases. These two products will become the
most important tools to ensure that OPLANs are sustainable
and will prove to be invaluable for CONOPS and SUPPLAN
development.
(b) Planners review provisional TOO, JOA, and preliminary C2

arrangements for specific capabilities or concerns regarding logistic support
to the SOCC. If partner and non-NATO nations are incorporated into the
proposed SOCC, planners must assess how this impacts the concept for
logistic support. Planners analyse the logistic situation during this phase by
identifying logistic requirements and concerns; analysing planning factors;
and determining the feasibility of supporting the force through logistics
planning criteria such as contracting vendor data, TCN support, HNS,
movement and transportation asset availability, ports of embarkation and
debarkation, lines of communications (LOCs), supplies and maintenance
requirements, and infrastructure capabilities and requirements.
(3) Phase 3 – Orientation. Once the JTF HQ’s operational planning directive
is received, detailed mission analysis begins to frame the operational problem,
develop an overall operational design, and provide guidance for COA development
and subordinate component planning. Throughout Phase 3, logistics planners
must update the CPOE, LPT, logistic planning factors, logistics estimate, RFIs,
and CCIRs based on receipt of new information and mission analysis. Key steps
for logistics planners during this phase are:
(a) Review new information received in the planning directive and any
additional assessments.
(b) Determine facts and develop assumptions relevant to logistics

planning.
(c) Identify limitations, restraints, and constraints of the situation and the
potential impact for providing support.
(d) Participate in COG analysis, operational design, and risk analysis.
(e) Present key logistic factors and information in the mission analysis
brief.
(f) Recommend logistic guidance for inclusion in the component

planning directive and WNGO(s).
(4) Phase 4a – Concept of Operations Development. The role of logistics

planners during this phase is to incorporate a concept for support into each COA
developed and to ensure they are sustainable. Key steps for logistics planners
during this phase are:
(a) Review COM SOCC’s planning guidance for COA development and
sustainment.
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(b) Review information from SOF liaisons dispatched (e.g. as members

of the OLRT and JLSG).
(c) Review information from SOF members of the OLRT.
(d) Provide logistics expertise to COA development, wargaming, and

COA comparison, ensuring logistic support options are viable.
(e) Recommend COA selection based on logistics or support selection

criteria.
(f) As part of the planning staff, develop and present the COA decision
briefing.
(g) Develop the service support paragraph of the CONOPS.
(h) Assist with developing a proposed combined joint statement of

requirements (CJSOR) that includes required forces for the SOCC’s
sustainment and support efforts.
Important Note. It is important for SOCC logistics planners to

ensure that the COAs developed are tested for viability from a
logistics perspective and are sustainable as specified in the
SOF operational mission criteria (see AJP-3.5(A)).
(5) Phase 4b – Plan Development. During this phase, logistics planners

assist with the development of the SOCC’s OPLAN/SUPPLAN from the CONOPS
by addressing sustainment for deployed SOF in paragraph 4 and in Annexes R
(Logistics) and S (Movements). Depending on the situation, additional annexes
addressing support-related functions may be required. The logistics estimate and
concept for support are key tools to aid in the development of the logistics portions
of the SUPPLAN. In addition, it is important to communicate with the SOPLE(s) to
ensure sustainment requirements are addressed at higher HQs. Logistics
planners assist with refining the CJSOR as required and develop and analyse the
force flow, taking into account national and operational concerns. It is important
for planners to optimize the sequencing of units and capabilities while limiting the
impact of national restraints.
(6) Phase 5 – Execution and Assessment. During the execution of the

approved SOCC OPLAN/SUPPLAN, the J4 directorate monitors logistics
effectiveness and assesses the impact of environmental changes on SOF support.
If significant changes to the OPLAN/SUPPLAN are required during execution,
logistics planners may be required to assist with amending or adjusting the plan
through a FRAGO, JCO, or rewrite of the SUPPLAN. COM SOCC directs which
option is required based on the situation. Additionally, logistics planners must be
prepared to assist with planning for branches and sequels that arise during
operations or the campaign.
(7) Phase 6 – Transition. During Phase 6, SOCC logistics planners assist

with transition planning to ensure continuous support for operations while
minimizing the normal turbulence that occurs during this phase. Logistics planners
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may also be required to assist with planning for terminating operations and the
redeploying of SOF including the disposition of materiel and infrastructure.
11-6. Base Operating Support
a. SOF normally operate from one or more forward mounting base (FMB) and a
variable number of forward operating bases (FOBs). An FMB is a base, usually on an
airfield, that may be located within the JOA and from which operations may be launched
into the JOA. An FMB should be secure and should not be directly exposed to, or at risk
from, adversary action. An FOB is a locality within the JOA from which subsequent
operations are projected.
b. Services and support provided to SOF units transiting or assigned to a permanent

or established expeditionary site are done on a reimbursable basis between the provider
and the parent SOF organization unless otherwise directed by COM JFC. COM JFC
designates a component or representative who acts as the joint base operating support
integrator, or provider, for the requesting SOF organization at each operational location,
thereby maximizing efficiencies and/or mitigating shortfalls. The base operating support
designee provides master planning for facilities and real estate with the responsibility to
coordinate contracting support, the efficient use of mission support resources (including
collecting and prioritizing construction projects), seeking funding support, environmental
management, FP, and hazardous waste disposal.
11-7. Host-nation Support. HNS can be a significant force multiplier as an alternative to

deploying additional logistic support. The use of HNS may increase the timeliness of response
to a developing situation and may reduce the burden on scarce transportation assets required
to deploy forces. While HNS may be encouraged for general or common support items, the use
of HNS in SOCC operations must be weighed against OPSEC and other mission requirements.
HNS responsibilities and authorities must be coordinated with the SOCC establishing authority
or higher chain of command.
a. Factors for Consideration with Host-nation Support
(1) Nations without a viable government infrastructure may not be able to

provide logistic assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through
local contractors.
(2) To maximize the SOCC logistic effort, HNS functions should be centralized
and coordinated within the J4.
(3) Contracting personnel, either assigned or available to the SOCC, who are
trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable
assistance to the J4.
(4) HNS agreements should include the authority for the SOCC to coordinate
directly with the HN provider for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real
estate.
(5) Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations
with local nationals. The SOCC J2 should assist in obtaining personnel for use in
negotiations.
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(6) A LEGAD must be involved in the HN agreements process.
(7) Determining a lead agency for contracting and negotiating for support is
critical.
(8) Authority for negotiations must be obtained from COM JFC.
b. Existing Host-nation Support Agreement
(1) The SOCC J4, in coordination with the JFC J4 (or JLSG) and LEGAD,
reviews the current HNS agreement and identifies the logistic support items in that
agreement that the SOCC might request the HN to provide. The SOCC then
requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement,
delivery of these logistic support items.
(2) The SOCC J4 identifies additional HN logistic support that is required and
begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement) to obtain that
support.
(3) The SOCC J4 ensures that the components use existing HNS, if applicable,
to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.
(4) SOCC subordinate commanders inform the SOCC J4 if an acquisition and

cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist,
the SOCC coordinates through the JTF HQ to take actions to initiate an ACSA with
the HN. An ACSA is a logistic tool for development during contingency planning.
It is impractical to try to start the ACSA process for near-term operations or during
a crisis.
c. Non-existing Host-nation Support Agreement
(1) The SOCC J4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support and
develops a concept of requirements for HNS. The SOCC concept of requirements
for HNS is coordinated through the JFC (or JLSG) for approval and action.
(2) The supported COM JTF reviews and approves the HNS requirements.
The framework agreement provides the procedures and the authority for the
supported JFC to conduct military-to-military negotiations to obtain HNS through
subordinate implementing agreements. As appropriate, the SOCC J4 and LEGAD
should review the authority to negotiate and conclude implementing agreements
with the HN to determine the appropriate authority. Once the implementing
agreement is established, the SOCC J4 provides a detailed SOR to the HN, either
directly or through the element authorized to conduct HN liaison. Once
negotiations begin, a LEGAD must be involved in the process to ensure
adherence to all applicable laws and regulations.
11-8. Contracting Support. Contracting support can reduce the logistic demands on the
SOCC while acting as effective PA and CIMIC tools for increasing HNS for an operation. For
major operations, the SOCC should include a contracting and disbursing agent on the J8 staff
(see Annex A). If the operations are combined, contracting may be consolidated at a
centralized activity. For smaller operations, a designated component (or JLSG) may provide the
contracting officer. Regardless of the contracting support arrangement utilized, it is important to
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identify the funding mechanism for the exercise or operation. Units are responsible for ensuring
that funds are in place before any contracting actions are taken. In nearly all operational
situations, the SOCC J8 contracting actions should be coordinated closely with, and approved
by (if required), the JTF HQ J8, lead component, or agency contracting organization as
appropriate. The SOCC J8 should consider contractor manning requirements, time phasing,
contracting procedures, and command responsibilities for essential services when planning for
contracting support.
a. Manning Requirements. To provide adequate contracting support for the

deploying SOCC, several factors must be evaluated and compared with the tasked unit’s
initial deployment package list. Generally, a SOCC deployed to an improved site can be
supported by a single contracting and disbursing agent. The individual can be assigned
to the SOCC J8 or to one of the co-located SOF components and be available to support
other SOF units. The individual may also support other component locations. When
determining the required number of contracting personnel, consider:
(1) The availability of central supply and contracting support within the AOR at
locations other than the unit deployment base.
(2) The amount of pre-existing facilities available at the deployed location to

support unit organizations.
(3) Distances between the deployment site(s) to contractor sources, as well as

travel conditions and communication systems.
(4) The existence of pre-positioned supplies and pre-existing service contracts

or support from other contracting units (and how quickly these assets can be made
available to the SOCC).
(5) The extent of HNS provided directly to the unit and its effect on the
contracting workload.
b. Time Phasing. A contracting officer should be among the first deployed and
among the last to withdraw. To be effective, a contracting officer needs secure access to
suppliers, transportation, and communication support.
c. Contracting Procedures. The following procedures should be pre-coordinated to

the maximum extent possible:
(1) Identify key personnel who will interface with contracting personnel. These
personnel should be trained in fund accountability, purchase request validation,
purchase acceptance, quality assurance, and any delegated purchasing authority
procedures.
(2) Identify facilities for the contracting office and delivery sites for users if
these can be predetermined from site survey information.
(3) Adapt communication procedures to existing telephone capabilities, off-

base line access, priorities for telephone usage, and radio network availability. It
is essential to coordinate and prioritize these communications requirements with
the supporting communications elements well in advance of the deployment.
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(4) Identify paying agents tasked to provide paying agent support to the
contingency contracting officers.
(5) Identify the LEGAD for contracting purposes.
(6) Identify personal security requirements during off-base contracting trips.
(7) Identify all support services required at the site, to include interpreters, local
national drivers, or other support required by circumstances at the deployment
location. Coordination with the logistic support functional area manager and the
establishment of priorities and time phasing for these needs are also essential.
(8) Identify contractors and provisions for reasonable assurance that these
contractors will continue to perform during crisis situations.
(9) Ensure LEGAD reviews all contracts and contracting procedures.
(10) Identify those tasks and elements of the mission from which contractors will
be excluded because of their non-military status.
d. Command Responsibilities for Essential Contract Services. Commanders

relying on contractor support should:
(1) Review contractor services annually to determine which services will be

essential during a crisis. This review should include identifying essential services
in statements of work and provisions for reasonable assurance of continued
performance during crises in contractor contingency plans. Data on the
contractors, as well as plans for replacement personnel, should also be reviewed.
(2) Conduct an annual assessment of the impact of unanticipated or premature

loss of essential contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing
and deploying forces.
(3) Include provisions in contingency plans for obtaining essential services from
other sources when reasonable assurance of continued contractor performance
cannot be provided.
(4) Include provisions in contingency plans to assume or supplement the

contractor supplied essential services at the earliest opportunity during crisis
situations when alternate sources can be identified to perform essential NATO
contractor services.
(5) Establish policy for handling information on essential contractor employees

overseas as sensitive data, to be safeguarded under the direction of the
contracting officer and released to authorized personnel only.
(6) Provide for the retention of contractor employees in contracts supporting

MA requirements.
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CHAPTER 12 – MEDICAL SUPPORT AND MEDICAL OPERATIONS
12-1. Medical Support Fundamentals
a. Aim. SOF medical support enables the commander’s objectives through

preserving life, minimizing disabilities, and enhancing operational capability. This
conserves manpower, improves morale, and increases the likelihood of mission success.
b. Components of Operational Health Care
(1) Force Health Protection. Force health protection includes actions taken to
counter the effects of the environment, of occupational health risks, and of disease
through preventive and reactive measures.
(2) Emergency Medicine. This is the clinical discipline specializing in the

triage and immediate care of casualties in an acute care situation.
(3) Primary Health Care. Primary health care covers integrated, accessible
health care services provided by clinical personnel who are trained for
comprehensive first contact, and who provide for the continuing care of individuals
experiencing signs and symptoms of ill health or having health concerns.
(4) Secondary Health Care. This is the provision of hospitalization and

specialized clinical care requiring training and equipment levels beyond that which
could normally be provided at the primary care level.
(5) Patient Evacuations. This is the movement of injured or ill personnel from
either a point of injury or a medical treatment facility to a higher or more
appropriate level of care.
c. Principles of Medical Support
(1) Timeliness of Treatment. Patients must receive the appropriate medical

care at the right place and at the right time. Time is the most critical factor that
significantly influences survival rate, complication rate, rate of recovery, and the
casualty’s ultimate quality of life.
(2) Continuity of Care. A casualty’s recovery depends on the continuance of

appropriate care throughout the medical chain, which includes in-transit care
during evacuation to and between MTFs.
(3) Triage Based on Clinical Need. Triage (i.e. the dynamic process of
sorting casualties to identify the priority of treatment and evacuation of the
wounded given the limitations of the current situation, the mission, and the
available resources) is based solely on clinical need, not on the patient’s
operational importance or origin.
(4) Use of Commonly Accepted Standards of Care. Medical support to

NATO forces must meet standards acceptable to all participating nations.
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d. Timelines. The current NATO medical planning timelines, also known as the 10-
1-2 guidelines, state three key timelines (Figure 12-1):
(1) 10 Minutes After Injury. Haemorrhage and airway control for the most
severe casualties should be achieved within 10 minutes of wounding.
(2) 1 Hour After Injury. MEDEVAC assets should reach the seriously injured
casualty with skilled medical aid within 1 hour of wounding, at the latest.
(3) 2 Hours After Injury. Casualties requiring surgery should, where possible,
be in a facility equipped for such surgery within 2 hours of wounding.
Figure 12-1. NATO Medical Planning Timelines
12-2. Operational Medical Support Capabilities and Organization
a. Capabilities within the Continuum of Care. A continuum of care must be

maintained throughout the treatment-evacuation chain, providing appropriate clinical
support to the casualty at all times. Medical resources and assets are distributed into
response capabilities on a progressive basis. The minimum capabilities of each clinical
support facility impact the requirements for each higher-level facility. While under
operational conditions the flow of casualties generally follows the pattern of the
continuum of care, this organizational pattern is not rigid. One or more response
capabilities may be bypassed if more appropriate for the treatment of a patient’s
condition.
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b. Difference between Special Operations and Conventional Operations

Medical Support
(1) The nature of special operations missions often requires small, highly
skilled, self-contained operational elements capable of operating on short notice.
They must function in remote and hostile locations, in all geographic
environments, for prolonged time periods, and following insertion by land, air, or
water. The requirements to provide medical support in this context differ
significantly from those required to support conventional operations.
(2) Conventional medical capabilities are most often unable to support special
operations due to their capability limitations.
(a) They are not normally maintained at high states of readiness and,
hence, are not rapidly deployable with the SOF who require their support.
(b) They are usually not designed to operate independently and in

remote and hostile environments. Conventional medical capabilities lack
the tactical training required to adapt quickly and easily to a variety of
adversary and environmental threats over extended distances from base.
(c) Typically, conventional medical capabilities are inherently large and

heavy when compared to SOF operational elements. Thus, they require
more time and space to deploy. They have limited training for insertion by
land, sea, and air into operational environments. Their size often presents
challenges for clandestine operations, and they often lack the mobility to
conduct highly mobile, small unit operations.
c. Treatment Capabilities and Organization in Support of Special Operations
(1) Since SOF require immediate medical care when conducting discreet or
covert operations in remote locations, advanced treatment capabilities need to be
integrated at the lowest level of SOF operational elements.
(2) Individual SOF operators should be trained as SOF advanced first

responders who are capable of performing tactical combat casualty care at a level
beyond that of conventional forces combat lifesavers.
(3) An SOTU should have at least one special operations combat medic
(SOCM), historically known as patrol medic or team medic. The SOCM is capable
of performing advanced tactical combat casualty care and of managing selected,
relatively common tactical medical emergencies.
(4) Depending on the situation, an SOTU may have one or more special
operations independent duty medics (SOIDMs) capable of performing advanced
and long-term patient care for both trauma injuries and non-trauma related medical
conditions. SOIDMs are also capable of performing basic veterinary care.
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(5) An SOTG, a large SOTU, or an SOATG/SOATU should have a Role 1

medical capability providing primary medical support and medical supervision of
SOCMs and SOIDMs in the units.76
(6) A SOCC or SOTG should have access to a special operations surgical

team capable of performing damage control surgery in austere and far forward
locations when a conventional Role 2 capability is not readily available.77
(7) Since SOF medical support is significantly limited, it must rely on

conventional or HN/national civilian health care systems for capabilities it cannot
provide. The eventual use of HN or civilian medical capabilities means SOF must
balance OPSEC with clear communication with these medical assets.
(8) The special operations-specific treatment capabilities described above can

be achieved in several ways and may have differing characteristics.
(a) SOCMs and SOIDMs can either be SOF operators with additional
special operations medical training or medical service personnel with
additional special operations tactical and technical training. Regardless of
their origin, SOCMs and SOIDMs are routinely required to provide
advanced, skilled medical aid to combat trauma patients, which, according
to overarching Allied medical doctrine, would normally be reserved for
medical service personnel (i.e. Role 1 capabilities).
(b) SOCMs and SOIDMs can either be organic or attached to an SOTU.
(c) SOCMs and SOIDMs, whether organic or attached, can have a

primary operational/combat or a primary medical role. When serving in a
primary medical role, they can either be combatants or non-combatants.
(d) Other than SOF medics (SOCMs and SOIDMs), medical and surgical
treatment capabilities in support of special operations can either be organic,
attached, or in support of SOF. When attached or in support, they can
either be dedicated to SOF or can be a dual-use capability, trained to
support special operations in addition to conventional operations.
(9) In addition to, or instead of, some of the aforementioned special operations-
specific treatment capabilities, conventional forces treatment capabilities may be
used when SOF are operating inside conventional forces operational areas.
76 A Role 1 MTF provides primary health care, specialized first aid, triage, resuscitation, and stabilization.
Generally, Role 1 medical support is a national responsibility, and it must be readily and easily available to all force
personnel. Included within the basic Role 1 capabilities are basic occupational and preventive medical advice to
the chain of command; routine sick calls and the management of less injured and sick personnel for immediate
return to duty; casualty collection from the point of wounding; and preparation of casualties for evacuation to the
higher-level MTF.
77 A Role 2 MTF is capable of the reception and triage of casualties, as well as performing resuscitation and
treatment of shock at a higher level than Role 1. These facilities will routinely include damage control surgery and
may include a limited holding facility for the short-term holding of casualties until they can be returned to duty or
evacuated. Role 2 MTFs may be enhanced to provide basic secondary care including primary surgery, intensive
treatment unit, and nursed beds.
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d. Patient Evacuation Capabilities and Organization in Support of Special

Operations
(1) The seriously injured or ill casualty needs to be evacuated as soon as

possible, for both clinical imperatives and morale reasons, to the most appropriate
MTF. The most appropriate facility may not necessarily be the closest medical
facility.
(2) Patient evacuation may occur under different tactical circumstances:
(a) As a separate evacuation mission, while the main force continues

tactical operations.
(b) With the main force, following mission abort due to the requirement
to evacuate one or more casualties.
(c) With the main force as it exfiltrates from the objective.
(3) Patients can be evacuated from the battlefield by any ground, air, or
maritime platform able to transport personnel. Often the use of SOF tactical
platforms is the only feasible option to transport casualties to MTFs within
acceptable timelines. Therefore, SOF ground, air, and maritime tactical platforms
should routinely carry medical kits and evacuation equipment to be able to perform
this function without having to rely on medical kits carried by SOF medical care
providers.
(4) When conducting patient evacuation, additional medical personnel should

arrive with the evacuation asset, if available. Even when SOF medics are present,
their capabilities may be limited. If possible, arriving tactical evacuation platforms
should be manned with additional medical personnel and resupply equipment to
augment the medic on the ground.
(a) The SOTU’s medic may be among the casualties.
(b) The SOTU’s medic may need to continue to support the unit’s
mission and, therefore, not be available to provide care on the evacuation
platform.
(c) The SOTU’s medic may be engaged in combat and, therefore, not at
the pickup location.
(5) Depending on the availability of accompanying treatment capabilities,

patient evacuation is designated as CASEVAC or MEDEVAC.
(a) CASEVAC is the evacuation of patients without qualified medical

personnel during transport.
(b) MEDEVAC is the medically-supervised process of moving any

person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between MTFs for continued
treatment.
(6) The continuum of patient care must be maintained throughout evacuation.

For casualties initially taken to a forward surgical facility with only a limited holding
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capability (such as where a special operations surgical team would be), a

subsequent evacuation to a more capable facility may be necessary before
evacuation to a definitive care facility. This transfer may be necessary within a few
hours of surgery, depending on the condition of the patient and other
circumstances, e.g. particularly intensive care capability and capacity. If no
separate critical care transportation personnel are available, a special operations
surgical team may have to provide en route critical care for patients being moved
to a higher-level surgical facility, following damage control surgery performed at a
forward location.
(7) Evacuation of casualties requires coordination with multiple entities, such as

the patient evacuation and coordination centre when using conventional
MEDEVAC assets or the SOCC JOC when using organic evacuation assets.
12-3. Special Operation Forces Leaders Casualty Response Capabilities. The occurrence
of a casualty during special operations is not an isolated medical issue, but a tactical medical
problem in which there may be a direct conflict between what is best for the casualty and what
is best for the mission. SOF leaders at all levels should be educated on the operational
consequences of casualties and how to manage such events. Realistic, leader-directed
casualty battle drills should be embedded into SOF unit tactics and tactical training exercises.
12-4. Medical Planning Considerations
a. Medical Threat Assessment
(1) SOF frequently operate in remote, austere areas and may therefore be
exposed to health risks not normally seen in other areas of the JOA. This factor,
coupled with the fact that SOF operate on short response times, routinely
necessitates proactive planning for the provision of robust preventive medicine
measures, such as immunizations against a wide variety of potential diseases.
(2) Proper medical planning should include identifying and understanding the
most likely medical threats to the force. Mitigation should include using individual
protective equipment, modifying medical kit, and/or adjusting the overall medical
posture.
b. Special Operations Forces Task-specific Medical Support. Planning for

medical support for SOF must take into account specific factors that may be highly
variable between the different SOF principal tasks.
(1) Military Assistance. Planning for MA missions consists of understanding

its core two elements, namely medical engagement and medical partnering.
Medical engagement and partnering relate to medical operations aligned with
command objectives that improve populace health or enhance HN medical
infrastructure capacity and capability. Medical civil action programmes, medical
seminars, continuing medical education programmes, and veterinary medical
opportunity programmes are examples where teaching is the primary means of
assistance.
(2) Special Reconnaissance. Medical risks associated with SR missions

include environmental conditions prevalent in austere operational areas,
physiological effects of prolonged inactivity during extended surveillance in
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confined spaces, and management of illness and injury in clandestine

environments for prolonged periods of time.
(3) Direct Action. Medical risks associated with DA missions are typically
related to combat trauma. In addition to medical support for the SOF element
conducting the operation, treatment of wounded non-combatants and adversary
combatants should be planned for.
c. Medical Operations to Support Local Populations. When planning to provide

medical care to civilians, such as medical seminars and other types of medical civic
action programmes (MEDCAPs), SOF planners should ensure that these medical
operations support the SOCC and JTF HQ’s overall objectives and do not undermine
them through unintended medical and tactical consequences. In COIN operations,
medical programmes are valuable tools when properly aligned with operational
objectives. MEDCAPs should fully integrate HN providers and officials to promote the
capacity of the HN government and to foster greater self-sufficiency. Medical seminars
provide education, thereby promoting self-reliance and improving the sustainability of
medical interventions. They may forge relationships and promote interoperability through
collaboration between local medical providers, governmental leaders, HN forces, and
NATO forces. While the benefit of continued relationships with an AOO is difficult to
quantify, the positive impacts of successful medical programmes usually result in better
access to information provided by the local population, eventually leading to an increase
in security.
d. Casualty Estimates. Special operations are routinely conducted using speed and
surprise to gain relative superiority and achieve mission success. Casualty estimation,
therefore, cannot be extrapolated from historically derived formulae gleaned from
conventional unit warfare. It is, however, important to assess the potential number and
type of casualties a specific SOF mission may expect. Experience and knowledge of
similar prior missions, unit competence, the enemy, and environmental factors should
allow the medical planner to provide the command a realistic casualty estimate.
e. Evacuation Timelines. Planning for medical support is primarily driven by clinical

timelines. The medical planning timelines presented in paragraph 12-1d integrate the
following planning assumptions:
(1) 20 to 30 minutes notice to move for RW aerial evacuation assets.
(2) Up to 30 minutes flight time to the casualty pickup point.
(3) 5 minutes of ground time to load the casualty on board.
(4) Up to 40 minutes flight time to reach the MTF’s helicopter landing point.
(5) A 15-minute transfer from the landing point to the operating room.
f. Special Operations Surgical Teams Employment Criteria. Planning for the

employment of special operations surgical teams is made in the context of timely
accessibility of other hospital resources. Since these highly specialized assets are a
scarce resource, their use should be planned for those operations that carry a significant
risk of trauma casualties or are difficult to ascertain risks and that are in the absence of
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more robust MTFs to which casualties can be evacuated within established evacuation
timelines.
g. Redundancy of Evacuation Assets. Evacuation plans should routinely include

the use of alternate evacuation assets. Such assets can be air, sea, or land based and
fall under the categories of MEDEVAC and CASEVAC. MEDEVAC platforms are
vehicles dedicated to MEDEVAC and configured as such. They provide required medical
equipment and trained medical personnel for en route care. CASEVAC, on the other
hand, is the evacuation of casualties using any platform not dedicated to the task of
MEDEVAC. En route care and equipment for CASEVAC must be resourced separately if
planned for.
h. Medical Logistics. SOF medical logistics personnel should plan for and ensure
that adequate stock levels of medical supplies are maintained and that resupply of
medical items can be conducted when needed. Special consideration should be given to
the provision of temperature-sensitive blood and blood components far forward, to be
used by the lowest-level SOF operational elements. For extended operations in a
resource-constrained environment, SOF may require guidance on potential applications
of expired pharmaceuticals when no other options are available.
i. Operations Security
(1) The need for OPSEC often requires access restrictions on medical planning
information to other component- or higher-level conventional medical planners.
The SOF medical planners should provide only sufficient information to ensure the
required conventional medical support is in place with the least opportunity of
mission compromise.
(2) Regardless of the other criteria that determine the requirement to use
special operations surgical teams, there may be cases where OPSEC requires
their employment instead of a readily available conventional MTF.
(3) Selected missions may have a requirement to safeguard the patient’s

identity to prevent compromising a SOF unit’s presence and jeopardizing its
mission. In those cases, alias patient tracking systems may have to be used to
maintain accountability of injured SOF personnel inside the conventional medical
system.
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ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
NOTIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

MANNING LIST
1. This annex presents a proposed manning list for a SOCC. It is designed as a tool and
reference for consideration and is not authoritative in nature. Each FN must determine which
positions are critical and which ones they are capable of manning. Additionally, this manning
list should not limit any nation from adding personnel or making adjustments to their current
SOPs and practices. Positions that are vital, but not critical, are included as positions for
consideration for manning by TCNs in the second column (CODE) below.
2. The position details provide special operations planners and units with the suggested
rank, background, work schedule, and work location (if outside their directorate) for each
position in a SOCC. Each nation’s rank structure may differ from the recommended rank for
each position. The background column identifies those positions that should be manned by
SOF personnel, those with specific SOF backgrounds, or specialists who should have SOF
experience or have worked with SOF in the past. In the event COM SOCC must establish a
SOCCE while deployed, positions for that consideration are identified in the location column.
Table A-1. Notional Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Manning List
POSITION DETAILS
(RECOMMENDED)
CODE1 ELEMENT POSITION
BACK- SHIFT
RANK GROUND LOC2
(D/N)
1 COMMANDER OF6 SOF D/N
2 DEPUTY COMMANDER OF5 SOF D/N X
3 CHIEF OF STAFF OF5 SOF D/N
COMMAND
COMMAND SENIOR ENLISTED
4 GROUP OR 9 SOF D/N
ADVISOR
5 STAFF ASSISTANT OR8/7 SOF D/N
6 STAFF ASSISTANT OR8/7 D
7 LEGAL ADVISOR OF4 SOF D/N
8 PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER OF3 SOF D/N
SPECIAL STAFF
9 POLITICAL ADVISOR CIV CIV D/N
10 MEDICAL ADVISOR OF4 D/N
11 J1 DIRECTOR OF4 SOF D
12 TCN J1 J1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF3/2 N
13 TCN DIRECTORATE J1 PLANS OFFICER OR8/7 D/N
14 J1 PERSONNEL NCO OR6/5 D X
15 J2 DIRECTOR OF5/4 SOF D/N
16 TCN J2 DEPUTY/ASC DIRECTOR OF4/3 SOF D/N X
17 J2 CCIRM OFFICER OF3/2 D
18 J2 CCIRM ASSISTANT OR8/7 SOF N
J2
J2 INT DATABASE ASSISTANT
19 DIRECTORATE3 OR8/7 D/N
(RFI)
20 J2 TARGETING OFFICER OF3/2 SOF D/N
21 TCN J2 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF3/2 D
22 J2 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF3/2 D JOC
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POSITION DETAILS
(RECOMMENDED)
BACK- SHIFT
RANK GROUND LOC2
(D/N)
23 J2 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST OR9/8 N
24 TCN J2 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST OR9/8 N JOC
J2 COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
25 OF2/1 D
OFFICER
26 TCN J2 HUMINT NCO OR8/7 N
J2 GEO-SPATIAL INFORMATION
27 OF2/1 D/N
SYSTEM OFFICER
28 J2 PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 D/N J35
29 J2 PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 D/N J5
30 METOC ANALYST OF2/1 D JOC
31 TCN METOC ANALYST OR8/7 N JOC
32 J3 DIRECTOR OF5 SOF D/N
33 J3 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF4/3 SOF D/N
34 J3 JOC DIRECTOR OF3 SOF D
35 TCN J3 JOC DIRECTOR OF3 SOF N
36 TCN J3 BATTLE CAPTAIN OF3/2 SOF D X
37 J3 BATTLE CAPTAIN OF3/2 SOF N
38 J3 WATCH KEEPER OR9/8 SOF D
39 TCN J3 WATCH KEEPER OR9/8 SOF N
J3 CURRENT OPS ASST/PR
40 OR8/7 SOF D/N
CELL LEAD
41 TCN J3 CURRENT OPS ASST/PR CELL OR8/7 SOF D X
J3 CURRENT OPS ASST/PR
42 OR8/7 N
CELL
43 J3 TARGETING OF3 SOF Air D
J3
44 J3 TARGETING OR8/7 SOF D/N X
DIRECTORATE4
45 J3 JOINT FIRES/BSM OF3 SOF D
46 TCN J3 JOINT FIRES/BSM OR8/7 SOF N
47 J3 EFFECTS COORDINATOR OF3 D
48 TCN J3 EFFECTS COORDINATOR OR8/7 N
49 J3 AIR (RW/FW) OF3 SOF Air D
50 TCN J3 AIR (RW/FW) OF3 SOF Air N
51 TCN J3 AIR LIAISON (ISR) OF3/2 D
52 J3 AIR LIAISON (ISR) OR8/7 SOF N
J35 FUTURE OPERATIONS
53 OF3 SOF D/N
DIRECTOR
54 J35 SOF LAND PLANNER OF3/2 SOF D/N
55 J35 SOF MARITIME PLANNER OF3/2 SOF D/N
56 J35 SOF AVIATION PLANNER OF3/2 SOF D/N
57 TCN J35 EFFECTS PLANNER OF3/2 SOF D/N
TCN J4 LOGISTICS PLANS BRANCH OF4 SOF N
59
HEAD
J4
J4 LOGISTICS PLANS STAFF OF3/2 D
60 DIRECTORATE
OFFICER
TCN J4 LOGISTICS OPS BRANCH OF3/2 D
61
HEAD
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POSITION DETAILS
(RECOMMENDED)
BACK- SHIFT
RANK GROUND LOC2
(D/N)
J4 LOGISTICS OPS STAFF OF3/2 N
62
OFFICER
63 J4 ENGINEER OFFICER OF3/2 D
J4 INFRASTRUCTURE COORD OR8/7 D
64
NCO
65 J4 LOGISTICS OPS NCO (M&T) OR8/7 D
66 TCN J4 LOGISTICS PLANS NCO OR8/7 N X
67 J5 PLANS DIRECTOR OF4 SOF D
TCN J5 PLANS DEPUTY
68 OF3 SOF D
DIR/ASSESSMENT
69 J5 J5 SOF LAND PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 SOF D
DIRECTORATE J5 SOF MARITIME PLANS
70 OF3/2 SOF D
OFFICER
71 TCN J5 SOF AVIATION PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 SOF D
72 J5 OPERATIONS ANALYST OF3/2 SOF D/N J7
73 J6 DIRECTOR OF4 SOF D/N
74 TCN J6 DEPUTY DIRECTOR/COMMS OF3 SOF N
75 J6 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF3 D X
TCN J6 COMMUNICATIONS PLANS
76 OF3/2 D
OFFICER
J6 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
77 OF3/2 D/N
J6 OFFICER
78 TCN DIRECTORATE J6 COMMUNICATIONS NCO OF8/7 N X
J6 INFOSEC/COMMUNICATIONS
79 OF3/2 D
SECURITY OFFICER
80 J6 INFO MANAGEMENT OF3/2 D/N JOC
81 J6 INFO MANAGEMENT OR8/7 N X
82 J6 HELP DESK TECHNICIAN OR8/7 D
83 TCN J6 HELP DESK TECHNICIAN OR7/6 N
85 J7 J7 DEPUTY/TRAINING OFFICER OF3 SOF D
86 DIRECTORATE J7 TRAINING OFFICER OF3/2 SOF D
87 J7 TRAINING NCO OR9/8 SOF D
88 J8 DIRECTOR OF3/2 D/N
J8
89 J8 PLANS/FINANCE MANAGER OF3/2 D/N
DIRECTORATE
90 J8 CONTRACTING/BUDGET NCO OR8/7 D/N
91 SOPLE CHIEF OF5/4 SOF D
92 TCN SOPLE DEPUTY CHIEF OF4/3 SOF N
93 SOPLE INTEL/ISR SME OF3/2 D/N
94 SOPLE TARGETING OF3/2 D/N
SOPLE SOPLE EFFECTS
95 OF3/2 D/N
(DETACHED) PLANNER/COORD
96 MAIN5 SOPLE OPERATIONS ANALYST OF3/2 SOF D/N
97 SOPLE SOF PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 SOF D/N
98 SOPLE CSS PLANS OFFICER OF3/2 D/N
SOPLE ASSISTANT/INFO
99 OR8/7 SOF D/N
MANAGER
100 SOPLE CHIEF OF4/3 SOF D
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POSITION DETAILS
(RECOMMENDED)
BACK- SHIFT
RANK GROUND LOC2
(D/N)
101 SOPLE SOPLE CURRENT OPS OF3/2 SOF N
102 (DETACHED) SOPLE CURRENT OPS OF3/2 SOF D/N
103 FORWARD6 SOPLE AIR/TARGETING OF3/2 SOF Air D/N
SOPLE CURRENT OPS/INFO
104 OR8/7 SOF D/N
MANAGER
105 LO TO LCC OF4/3 SOF D
106 TCN LO TO LCC OF3/2 SOF N
107 LO TO MCC OF4 SOF D
108 LO TO MCC OF3 SOF N
109 SOLE DIRECTOR OF5 SOF Air D
110 SOLE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF4 SOF Air N
SOLE CURRENT OPERATIONS
111 OF3/2 SOF D
OFFICER
LIAISON
SOLE CURRENT OPERATIONS
112 OFFICERS OF3/2 SOF N
OFFICER
(DETACHED)7
SOLE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
113 OF4/3 SOF D
PLANNER
SOLE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
114 OF4/3 SOF N
PLANNER
SOLE SOF INTELLIGENCE
115 OF3/2 D/N
OFFICER
116 SOLE ISR SME OF3/2 D/N
117 LO TO JLSG OF3/2 SOF D
1 JLSG TO SOCC OF3/4 D/N
2 ACC TO SOCC OF3/4 D/N
3 MCC TO SOCC OF3/4 D/N
LIAISON
4 LCC TO SOCC OF3/4 D/N
OFFICERS
SOTG LO TO SOCC (2 PER TASK
5-6 (ATTACHED)8 OF2/3 D/N
GROUP)
SOAC/SOATG TO SOCC (2 PER
7-8 OF2/3 D/N
ELEMENT)
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Table Notes:
(1) Code: Positions that are vital, but not critical, are identified for possible TCN manning.
(2) Location: Items marked with an “X” may serve as a SOCCE if required.
(3) The J2 directorate facilitates daily intelligence requirements. Collection, analysis, and production are handled
by the ASC if established.
(4) Positions within the J3 identified as SOF (unless designating a specific requirement) should represent both
maritime and land capabilities based on the mission and organization of the SOCC. Positions coded for TCNs
may require the FN to fill positions, identified as critical during planning, when TCN personnel are unavailable.
Effects coordinators and planners should have Info Ops/PsyOps/CIMIC experience.
(5) MAIN – with JFC/JTF HQ Main.
(6) FORWARD – with JFC/JTF HQ forward element. Positions identified as SOF (unless designating a specific
requirement) should represent both maritime and land capabilities based on the mission and organization of the
SOCC.
(7) This represents the absolute minimum number of personnel that should be considered for LO positions;
additional personnel may be required depending on the mission. Positions identified as SOF (unless
designating a specific requirement) should represent both maritime and land capabilities based on the mission
and organization of the SOCC.
(8) Each subordinate element of the SOCC should provide two LOs (day and night) to represent their unit in the
JOC. The aviation command, if designated, responsible for the C2 of SOF Air should provide two LOs (day and
night) to the SOCC’s JOC.
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A-6
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ANNEX B TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
POSITION FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Command Staff. The command staff is normally composed of the commander (COM
SOCC), deputy commander, command senior enlisted (CSEL) advisor, and an information
management specialist. Within the command staff, COM SOCC and staff coordinate and direct
the daily activities of the entire SOCC organization; approve actions, orders, and plans as
authorized by the SOCC; and ensure SOCC decisions and concepts are implemented by
directing and assigning staff responsibilities.
a. Commander. The commander is the final authority that lawfully exercises

command authority over subordinate staff and subunits within the SOCC. This includes
the authority and responsibility for effectively using available SOCC resources and for
planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling SOF for
the accomplishment of assigned JTF missions. The commander is ultimately responsible
for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned SOCC personnel.
b. Deputy Commander. The deputy commander assists the commander in

exercising command authority of subordinate SOCC staff and subunits. The deputy
commander position is an administrative staff position versus a command position. He
typically assists COM SOCC by managing day-to-day activities such as management of
COM SOCC’s schedule, screening of documents or other products, and oversight of
COM SOCC’s administrative support staff. When the commander is absent the deputy
commander will assume the duties there of.
c. Chief of Staff. The chief of staff is the head of staff in the SOCC HQ. He controls
members of the staff for the purposes of coordinating their work and ensuring the staff is
fully integrated into the higher JTF HQ’s battle rhythm. While the chief of staff is without
inherent power of command by reason of assignment, he may be delegated to exercise
command in COM SOCC’s name.
d. Command Senior Enlisted Advisor. The CSEL member is a critical part of the
SOCC command group. He reports to COM SOCC directly and acts as an advisor for all
non-commissioned members in the SOCC HQ. The CSEL is the main link between COM
SOCC and the enlisted non-commissioned service members under his charge.
Responsibilities can include providing advice on the best utilization of an SOTU, ensuring
COM SOCC’s intent is being met, ensuring SOPs are being followed and common sense
is being applied, providing feedback to the commander during all phases of planning,
identifying possible combat technical deficiencies and suggesting improvements,
influencing and enforcing policies, overseeing and evaluating training in new techniques
and manoeuvres, and serving as a role model to all enlisted soldiers.
2. Special Staff
a. Legal Advisor. The LEGAD in the SOCC employs legal expertise and resources
to control and exploit the legal environment across the full spectrum of operational
missions. LEGADs also provide legal counsel to the SOCC/CC and the support staff.
Additionally, the LEGAD provides expertise and advice on issues such as HNS, ACSA,
international agreements, status of forces agreements, legal basis for operations,
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command structure, claims, support to civilian agencies, contract law, fiscal law, basic
legal assistance, and civil law issues. The LEGAD also advises COM SOCC with the
LOAC, and ROE issues.
b. Public Information Officer. The public information officer (PIO) provides

accurate, timely, and unclassified information about operations to the public and military
personnel. Additionally, the PIO enables operations by mitigating against political
constraints on operations arising from false or misleading information or enemy
propaganda. Besides focusing on counterpropaganda, the PIO must also be prepared to
contend with various operational scenarios such as combat and non-combat losses,
publicized POW/missing-in-action situations, collateral damage events, and fratricide.
c. Political Advisor. The POLAD provides analysis and advice to COM SOCC on
political perspectives and foreign policy positions on political-military issues. The POLAD
conducts research and analysis on potential employment of NATO forces in the AOR and
is responsible for contact with countries in the AOR on matters of political interest. The
POLAD serves as the focal point for resolution of political-military issues impacting
operations.
d. Medical Advisor. The MEDAD provides expert advice to COM SOCC and staff
for all medical support issues. The MEDAD plans, initiates, and helps direct the
execution of medical activities. He or she also reviews, recommends changes, and
assists in interpreting medical regulations, procedures, equipment lists, guides, manuals,
and other matters pertaining to all areas of medical/clinical interest in support of the
entire SOCC staff.
3. Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1). The director of manpower and personnel
is the principal staff assistant to COM SOCC on all manpower and personnel management
issues. The J1 is responsible for executing personnel policies, implementing procedures as
required, and supervising the administrative requirements for all SOCC personnel. The J1
plans officer is responsible for the overall management of future manning requirements in
support of the SOCC SOF mission. Finally, the J1 personnel NCO supports all J1 duties to
include monitoring SOTG strengths and accountability by means of daily personnel status
reports, maintaining records to support recommendations for unit and NATO
awards/decorations, and assisting the J1 director in identifying available manpower resources in
support of the SOCC mission and goals.
4. Intelligence Directorate (J2). The director of intelligence is the principal staff assistant
to COM SOCC for providing intelligence on enemy locations, activities, and capabilities, and
probable enemy COAs. The J2 has overall authority and responsibility for the ISR processes
within the SOCC, provides intelligence support to SOTGs within the assigned AOOs, and
serves as the principal advisor to the J3 on all ISR architecture and support requirements.
Additionally, the J2 coordinates intelligence and information collection and analysis to support
COM SOCC and the SOCC. The J2 section also provides LOs to the SOCC and intelligence
staffs, as required.
a. CCIRM Officer. The CCIRM officer is directly responsible for the CCIR process
and is in a management position that enables the timely flow of intelligence by
coordinating the information collection effort and facilitating the provision of intelligence.
The CCIRM officer has two specific duties: IRs management and collection coordination.
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NSHQ 80-002
b. Intelligence Database Assistant. The intelligence database assistant is

responsible for the RFI process with each SOTG. This includes the collection and
subsequent coordination for each RFI.
c. Targeting Officer. The targeting officer leads, supervises, coordinates, and

conducts the targeting process in support of COM SOCC’s mission objectives. The
targeting officer also coordinates the deployment and employment of targeting personnel
and equipment, including those assigned to specific SOTGs.
d. Intelligence Officer. Intelligence officers observe threat levels, gain information

through observing the AOR, and direct security operations and other activities that
involve ISR operations. The intelligence officer collects and reports significant findings to
the J2 director in support of the overall SOCC mission. The intelligence officer also
supports all SOTGs with valuable ISR information, as required.
e. Meteorological and Oceanographic Analyst. The meteorological and

oceanographic (METOC) analyst collects, tailors, and reports weather information to
meet the short-, medium-, and long-range mission needs of the SOCC and subordinate
units. In addition, the METOC analyst evaluates the impact of terrestrial, oceanographic,
and space weather on weapons, weapon systems, and operations on both friendly and
enemy forces.
5. Operations Directorate (J3). The J3 ensures all units are mission ready and capable of
performing tasked operational missions. This includes monitoring unit deployments and bed
down locations, combat readiness, mission rehearsals, FP, and mission execution.
a. Current Operations Analyst. The role of the current operations analyst is

contingent upon the level of operations and is the focal point for the collection of mission
and operations information provided to the SOCC by the SOTGs. Required reports
should address the operational status of forces, weapons, and control system equipment
employed by the SOTGs. The current operations analyst also manages and maintains
the J3 logbook.
b. Targeting Officer. Targeting officers monitor execution of the current day’s ATO
and coordinate with the SOCC’s dynamic targeting cell to provide direct support (target
identification, targeting data, battle damage assessment, etc.) to the SOTG’s re-role,
dynamic, and TST targeting mission processes.
c. Joint Fires Officer. The joint fires officer of the SOCC oversees the application of
joint fire support, artillery, rockets, and offensive operations in support of AOR
operations. Responsibilities include coordinating and synchronizing all aspects of
operational fires with CCs, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces.
d. Effects Coordinator. The effects coordinator conducts and coordinates the air
operations targeting process in support of SOCC mission objectives. He or she
coordinates and nominates targets with the SOCC for each ATO that achieves the
desired kinetic and/or non-kinetic effects. The effects coordinator also coordinates with
J2 on targeting-related collection requirements.
e. J3 Air Liaison (ISR). The J3 air liaison (ISR) is responsible for the oversight,
planning, and coordination of ISR operational missions in direct support of the J3. The
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J3 air liaison works closely with J2 intelligence officers to ensure ISR targets are
effectively and safely prosecuted in direct support of the SOATGs.
f. J3 Air (RW/FW). The J3 air supports the SOCC J3 in integrating air and joint fires
operations into current SOATG missions. Specific responsibilities include briefing the J3
director on all aviation issues, coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the aviation
ORBAT, assisting and planning requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.
g. Future Operations Officer. The future operations officer is directly responsible to

the J3 director for the planning, allocation, and tasking of NATO air and space forces in
accordance with upper echelon guidance. The specific responsibilities of the future
operations director should include ensuring the production, revision, and dissemination of
detailed future plans are ready to be included in future ATOs. This is accomplished by
establishing effective coordination with the SOCC and/or SOAC.
h. J35 Special Operations Forces Land Planner. The SOF land planner should be
an army officer supporting the SOCC with information on future army operations, tactics,
and equipment. Specific responsibilities include briefing the J3 director on all land
issues, coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the ground ORBAT, assisting and
planning land airlift requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.
i. J35 Special Operations Forces Maritime Planner. The SOF maritime planner
supports the SOCC J3 in integrating naval air, naval fires, and amphibious operations
into future SOCC operations. Specific responsibilities include briefing the J3 director on
all maritime issues, coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the maritime ORBAT,
assisting and planning requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.78
j. J35 Special Operations Forces Aviation Planner. The SOF aviation planner
supports the SOCC J3 in integrating air and joint fires operations into future SOATG
missions. Specific responsibilities include briefing the J3 director on all aviation issues,
coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the aviation ORBAT, assisting and planning
requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.
6. Logistics Directorate (J4). The director of logistics is the principal staff assistant to
COM SOCC for AOR implementation of combat support capabilities and processes. This
encompasses the coordination and supervision of force bed down, transportation, supply,
maintenance, logistics plans and programmes, and related combat support activities for the
SOTGs. In general, the J4 implements guidance and policy to ensure effective logistics support
to all SOTG forces. The J4 director also advises the commander concerning combat support
issues that affect the accomplishment of the SOCC mission.
a. Operations Officer. The role of the logistics operations officer is to support

SOCC operations with C2 during logistical movements. He or she also directs
distribution management operations to include managing airlift distribution functions such
as receiving, inspecting, tracing, tracking, packaging, and shipping of supplies,
equipment, and war readiness spares.
b. Plans Officer. The plans officer is responsible for logistics pipeline management
and time-sensitive delivery of materiel in support of SOCC mission requirements. He or
78 Planning requirements will vary based on type of mission.
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she integrates agile combat support and contingency planning efforts into the overall
logistics plan in direct support of the SOTGs.
7. Plans Directorate (J5). The director of plans and requirements serves as the principal
staff assistant to COM SOCC for all consolidated planning functions. In coordination with the
J4, the J5 conducts comprehensive force-level movement and execution planning for the
SOTGs. This involves preparation and subsequent refinement of the force flow, bed down, and
redeployment of SOCC and SOTG personnel. The J5 may perform long-range theatre
engagement (deliberate planning) that falls outside of the SOCC’s operational focus. Close
coordination must occur between J5 and the SOCC to ensure planning efforts are
complementary.
a. Land Plans Officer. The SOF land planner should be an army officer supporting
the SOCC with information on army operations, tactics, and equipment in support of
future operations. Specific responsibilities include briefing the J5 director on all land
issues, coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the ground ORBAT, assisting and
planning land airlift requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.
b. Maritime Plans Officer. The SOF maritime planner supports the SOCC J5 in
integrating naval air, naval fires, and amphibious operations into future SOCC operations.
Specific responsibilities include briefing the J5 director on all maritime issues,
coordinating with all SOTGs, monitoring the maritime ORBAT, assisting and planning
requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.
c. Aviation Plans Officer. The SOF aviation planner supports the SOCC J5 in
integrating air and joint fires future operations in support of SOATG missions. Specific
responsibilities include briefing the J5 director on all aviation issues, coordinating with all
SOTGs, monitoring the aviation ORBAT, assisting and planning requirements, and
interfacing with intelligence teams.
8. Communications Directorate (J6). The director of communications is the principal staff

assistant to COM SOCC for communications and automated information systems. This
includes establishing AOR communications and automated systems architecture to support
operational and mission requirements. Key responsibilities of the J6 may include coordinating
all communications and information functions of the SOCC, maintaining liaison with
communications and information functions with other components, and supporting SOTG
mission requirements.
a. Communications Officer. The communications officer provides support to COM

SOCC and has specific working knowledge of the SOF mission. The communications
officer has the following responsibilities: acts as the single focal point for SOCC
communications problem and resolutions; maintains display systems to track status of all
links, circuits, systems, and information networks; continuously tracks system and circuit
status and advises the J6 director on any system outages; and receives and consolidates
reports from attached, assigned, and/or subordinate units for transmittal to higher HQs.
b. Communications Plans Officer. The communication plans officer is the chief of

future SOCC communication planning and is responsible to the J6 director for oversight of
SOTG communications planning support. The communications plans officer has the
following responsibilities: acts as the single focal point for AOC communications planning
activities; coordinates new AOC communications requirements with the J6 director; and
supports SOTGs to determine priority of activation and restoration of systems.
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ANNEX C TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND LIAISON PROCEDURES
1. General
a. Liaison personnel provide the critical links between COM SOCC and higher,
lateral, subordinate, supporting, and supported HQs. Liaison personnel received from
other HQs provide COM SOCC with current information and SA about their parent units’
capabilities, activities, and intentions. SOCC provided liaison personnel improve COM
SOCC’s integration, coordination, synchronization, harmonization, and deconfliction of
operations by providing dedicated communications links, physical presence, and the
specialist knowledge required during critical phases of mission planning and execution.
b. COM SOCC must identify the liaison personnel and equipment requirements at an
early stage of any operation to gain maximum effect and influence. The size,
composition, and duration of liaison elements vary with the situation and stage of the
campaign; they should be under constant review to ensure they are continually providing
effect and worth.
c. It is critical that both the SOCC staff and subordinate SOCC units understand that
they are responsible for the liaison task and that they must provide the appropriate
personnel support for the liaison to be effective. It is worth noting that liaison personnel
work for their parent commanders, not the receiving commanders of the units to which
they have been sent. Therefore, liaison personnel must be able to function in the
working environment; personnel selected to be SOCC liaisons should be credible,
articulate, trusted, empowered, and proven problem solvers. Although rank is secondary
to the personal attributes listed above, it should be considered so that the rank of the
liaison personnel is appropriate to the working environment, the required level of access,
and the perception of the host unit’s staff. The receiving command, element or
organization is responsible for providing a workspace, communications access, and
appropriate CIS for the liaison to function. Under special circumstances, liaison
personnel may be required to bring their own CIS and communications equipment to
maintain a functional connection with the SOCC.
2. Functions. Liaison functions include informing, advising, and assisting the receiving
unit’s staff, and monitoring, integrating, coordinating, synchronizing, harmonizing, and
deconflicting operations. Liaisons perform these functions while ensuring the parent
commander is informed of the situation, intentions, and operational requirements of the HQ to
which liaison personnel are attached.
3. Procedures
a. COM SOCC must identify the requirement for liaison personnel (received and
provided) and make the request for liaison staffing at the earliest opportunity. Specific
qualifications and functions should be highlighted to identify the right personnel to fill the
positions. Responsibility for the liaison personnel (received and provided) and the
nominal chain of command and reporting procedures should be determined now, too.
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b. The SOCC should consider providing liaison personnel to the JTF HQ; exchanging
liaison personnel with other component commanders, HNs, and relevant non-agency
organizations; and receiving liaison personnel from supporting and subordinate forces.
c. Liaison personnel received by the SOCC should perform their duties within the
SOCC staff branch that is responsible for SOCC functions related to the liaison
personnel’s assigned duties.
d. As the personal representative of their commander, LOs normally attend all staff
meetings and briefings that affect their parent command.
e. Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations
of their parent unit and should have the personal qualities, experience, and sufficient rank
to influence the decision-making process.
f. Liaison personnel should be empowered to answer certain routine SOCC queries

on behalf of their commander; the level of authority should be delegated prior to
deployment. The SOCC should not formally task other HQs through received liaison
personnel; this should be achieved through normal, established C2 channels. However,
effective liaison personnel should keep their parent commander informed of pending
tasks and changes of intent by providing informal, advance copies as they become
available.
4. Special Operation Component Command Liaison Personnel Checklist. The

following checklist may assist SOCC liaison personnel in performing their functions. It can be
modified for other liaison roles as required.
a. Before departure, SOCC liaison personnel should be thoroughly briefed on:
(1) The OPLAN and the SOCC SUPPLAN.
(2) The current SOCC intent, lines of operation, activities, and future plans.
(3) The current SOCC ORBAT to include subordinate units’ current operations;
capabilities; support assets, support requirements; logistics requirements; and any
planned changes to the current situation.
(4) The current status of relevant SOCC missions including TTPs, doctrine,
potential issues, and future likely tasks.
(5) OPSEC applicable to liaison personnel’s role.
(6) Level of empowerment, decision-making authority, and point of contact to

refer decisions to when beyond the liaison’s authority.
b. Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each of the SOCC
staff branches.
c. Understand clearly the mission, role, and responsibilities of the liaison task, and
obtain written direction to present to the receiving commander.
d. Ensure that arrangements for working space, communications, accommodation,

and transportation meet requirements for the liaison task.
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e. Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.
f. If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter

requirements.
g. Become familiar with theatre command relationships and identify who and where
the liaison task will best influence.
h. On arrival at the receiving HQ, the SOCC liaison personnel:
(1) Report to the commander or representative: state their mission and exhibit
their written directive or credentials; offer advice and assistance; and be prepared
to brief on the SOCC’s current situation, activities, intentions, and capabilities
(OPSEC permitting).
(2) Visit each staff branch: build rapport, provide information, and obtain
information for transmission back to the SOCC.
(3) Establish two-way communication with the SOCC and exchange updated
information, as required.
i. During the liaison tour, liaison personnel:
(1) Remain informed and cognizant of the SOCC’s current situation and future
intentions to provide relevant information, advice, and assistance to the receiving
commander and staff.
(2) Accomplish the liaison task without interfering with the dynamics of the
receiving HQ.
(3) Report promptly to the SOCC if they are unable to accomplish the liaison
task.
(4) Report all matters within the remit of their liaison task to the SOCC.
(5) As permitted, inform the receiving commander of the content of reports

dispatched to the SOCC.
(6) Inform the appropriate staff officer or commander about relevant and
significant problems experienced by the SOCC that could affect ongoing
operations.
(7) Inform other commands and vice versa, make suggestions to enhance the
effective employment of the SOCC, and recommend improved receiving HQ
procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of the SOCC in support of operations.
(8) Ensure that the liaison personnel’s location is known at all times.
(9) Advise the SOCC (if possible) of departure from the liaison personnel’s
location.
(10) Attend the receiving HQ’s daily briefings and meetings (including relevant
boards and cells) that affect the SOCC.
C-3
NSHQ 80-002
(11) Keep an appropriate record of actions and reports.
(12) Report their departure to the receiving commander at the completion of the
liaison task.
j. Upon return to their own HQ, liaison personnel should:
(1) Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent

information received during their liaison task (detailed information concerning the
mission of the receiving HQ, unit locations, future locations, and commander’s
intent).
(2) Pass on requests from the receiving commander and the staff.
(3) Pass on mission requirements and requests for information from the
receiving HQ.
(4) Provide a written report to COM SOCC on all activities undertaken during
the SOCC liaison task.
C-4
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND TOOLS AND CHECKLISTS
This annex provides several tools and checklists that can be used to assist with the planning
and monitoring of SOCC operations.
APPENDICES:
1. Centre of Gravity/Critical Factor Analysis Matrix

2. Course of Action Template
3. Special Operations Forces Concept of Operations Template
4. Concept of Operations Staffing Checklist
5. Concept of Operations Staffing Worksheet
6. Concept of Operations Briefing Format
7. Special Operations Component Command Concept of Operations Medical Plan
8. Battle Rhythm
9. Battle Tracking
10. Battle Drills
11. Wake-up Criteria
12. Commander’s Update Briefing
D-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
CENTRE OF GRAVITY/CRITICAL FACTOR ANALYSIS MATRIX
Purpose: Serves as the analytical basis for operational design and operational art.
Centre of Gravity (COG) Critical Capabilities
… is a principal source of strength or power for … is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the
achieving one’s aim. COG its strength.
Physical and/or moral entities that are the primary Every COG has some primary ability (or abilities) that
components of enemy/friendly strength, power, and makes it a COG in the context of a given scenario,
resistance in the context of a specific scenario, situation, or mission—including phases within
situation, or mission. campaigns or operations. To state it simply: what
Both physical and moral COGs exist and function in can this COG do to you that puts great fear (or
an adversarial context of a struggle between two concern) into your heart in the context of your
powers possessing relative physical and moral mission?
strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis each other. Within a critical capability, the key word is the verb: it
At the strategic level, they are usually leaders and can destroy something, or seize an objective, or
populations determined to prevail. prevent you from achieving a mission.
At operational and tactical levels, they are almost Critical capabilities should be influenced/denied in an
invariably specific military forces. opponent and exploited in a friend.
Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) Critical Requirements (CR)
… exist when a critical requirement is deficient, … are specific conditions, components, means, or
degraded, or missing and exposes a critical capability resources that are essential to achieving and
to damage or loss. sustaining critical capabilities.
CVs exist when critical requirements, or components Examples:
thereof, are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization or Good weather, precise intelligence, fuel and
defeat in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to ammunition resupply, equipment, training, etc.
achieve its critical capability. The lesser the risk and
cost, the better. Another force’s mission accomplishment as a
precondition.
Silver bullet type—focus on a single vulnerability for
an immediate result. International and/or popular support.
Lead bullet type—focus on a combination of Lines of communications.
vulnerabilities for a cumulative effect that produces To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend.
decisive results. Nouns, things.
A noun with modifiers.
Conclusions
Which weaknesses, gaps, or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics,
capabilities, relationships, specific resources, or influences can be exploited to create a decisive point or
condition?
Moral Centre of Gravity Physical Centre of Gravity

Centres of moral power Concentration of forces
Strike effective moral blow Mass
Direct physical COGs Major battle involves a collision of two COGs
Give psychological support and purpose to physical Resistance contained in a COG
centres of gravity Strike effective physical blows
Leaders and political and social elites who live/work Centres of Macht (physical power)
in the capital
Leaders who determine both the national interest
and the community of interest in an alliance
D-1-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
COURSE OF ACTION TEMPLATE
COA:
Phase: Objective:
COA :
Phase: Objective:
End State: DPs:
Endstate: DPs:
Tasks:
Tasks:
Risks:
Risks: CCIRs:
CCIRs:
D-2-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TEMPLATE
D-3-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS STAFFING CHECKLIST
D-4-1
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D-4-2
NSHQ 80-002
D-4-3
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS STAFFING WORKSHEET
D-5-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BRIEFING FORMAT
D-6-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS MEDICAL

PLAN
D-7-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
BATTLE RHYTHM
D-8-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
BATTLE TRACKING
D-9-1
NSHQ 80-002
D-9-2
NSHQ 80-002
D-9-3
NSHQ 80-002
D-9-4
NSHQ 80-002
D-9-5
NSHQ 80-002
D-9-6
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
BATTLE DRILLS
D-10-1
NSHQ 80-002
D-10-2
NSHQ 80-002
D-10-3
NSHQ 80-002
D-10-4
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
WAKE-UP CRITERIA
D-11-1
NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
COMMANDER’S UPDATE BRIEFING
This is an outline of the CUB and may be modified based on the situation. Each agenda item in
the format may represent multiple slides. A standard CUB template and examples are available
from the NSHQ J7 directorate.
D-12-1
NSHQ 80-002
D-12-2
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX E TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE
1. Target Intelligence Package Special Reconnaissance/Direct Action Missions. As

part of the special operations mission planning folder, the J2 is responsible for preparing TIPs
with the support of the JFC joint intelligence operations centre to support the targeting and
mission planning process. TIPs should provide specific, fused, all-source intelligence data.
This data should provide the tasked unit with all of the information required to conduct the
planning activity. While packages may vary depending on the type of target, the basic
components will remain the same. Contents should include information on target identification,
operating environment and threats, key intelligence reporting and assessment (including link
analysis if necessary), prioritization and effects analysis (CARVER), and Info Ops
considerations. While the J2 controls the TIP, the J3 must ensure that it plays an active role in
ensuring that all relevant intelligence and information collected during special operations is
captured accordingly in the TIP. An example TIP is explained in this annex.
2. Target Intelligence Package Outline
a. Cover sheet must contain:
(1) Assigned JTF HQ JPTL/JPEL number
(2) Target name
(3) All given names or variations of spelling (also known as (AKA))
(4) Nominating agency (SOCC, ACC, etc.)
(5) Lead agency (who will continue to collect intelligence and prosecute the
target)
(6) Date folder created
(7) Date of last input
(8) Relation to any other higher TIP
(9) Where is the TIP to be held (JTF HQ J2, SOCC J2)
b. Target Data
(1) Position
(2) AOO/AOI
(3) Tribe/Sub-tribe
(4) Significance
(5) Desired Effect
E-1
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(a) Non-lethal
(b) Capture
(c) Kill
(6) Target location imagery
(7) Last known location
(8) Nominating agency
(9) Target lead
c. Background Information
(1) Physical description
(2) Education/Languages
(3) Government/Official links
(4) Family/Key associations
(5) Photo of target
d. Target’s AOO
e. Target’s AOI
f. Network Analysis
g. Individual Link Analysis
h. INTSUM Sheet/Reporting Index
i. Particular Reports
(1) Report date
(2) Classification
(3) Source
(4) Report type and grading
(5) Report
j. Kinetic and Non-kinetic CARVER Analysis
(1) Overall effect
(2) Capture (advantages/disadvantages)
(3) Kill (advantages/disadvantages)
E-2
NSHQ 80-002
(4) Non-kinetic effect (advantages/disadvantages)
(5) CARVER score (individual and total)
k. Constraints, if prohibited or restricted target
l. Legal Aspects (POL, PID, ROE, CDE, and target engagement authority)
3. Target Intelligence Package Example Data. The TIP can take the form of a paper
folder or PowerPoint presentation depending on the preferences of J2 and J3 contributors. The
entries below are purely examples of the type of data contained and should be used as a guide
for development of a comprehensive product.
a. Cover Sheet. The cover sheet (Figure E-1) of the TIP must include the target
name and identifier along with information on the nominating and lead agency. Most
importantly the date of last update and last report are included to ensure currency.
Figure E-1. Cover Sheet
b. Vetted Target Information. An overall summary of the target including basic

details of significance, expectations, and main mission considerations. When complete,
this slide can be lifted quickly and used for CONOPS development.
E-3
NSHQ 80-002
Figure E-2. Vetted Target Information
c. Intelligence Report Summary. A review of intelligence reporting by way of a

quick glance summary including information on type, source, intelligence grade, and
basic detail. This slide should be close to the front of any TIP and act as a table of
contents for all intelligence for easy reference.
Figure E-3. Intelligence Summary
E-4
NSHQ 80-002
d. Information Credibility Matrix. Information credibility grading is detailed in

Figure E-4. It is a subjective process by which only the respective SOCC or SOTG J3
and J2 can determine the credibility of the report, based on the trust level associated with
the source or capability that provides the information. For example, a SIGINT platform
such as a remotely piloted vehicle that you own and control over your AOO would be A1.
A HUMINT source from the indigenous population who has built up a good relationship
with you and your team might be a B3 or C1.
Figure E-4. Information Credibility Grading
e. Background Information. Basic background details of the target will be outlined

on this slide. If there are multiple sub-targets/individuals of low, medium, or high
importance within a cell, additional background slides can be added to the TIP.
Figure E-5. Background Information
E-5
NSHQ 80-002
f. Link Analysis. Link analysis should include a picture of the overall network that
represents where the target/individual exists within the network. Link analysis also
provides additional detail and analysis of the target/individual.
Figure E-6. Individual Link Analysis
g. Area of Operations/Area of Interest. The AOO and AOI with respect to the
target should be outlined in as much detail as possible. Additional imagery slides can be
added as required and should begin with overall area pictures and narrow down to small
target pictures. These slides will be critical for future CONOPS target requirements in
order to determine ROE, PID, POL, and CDE.
Figure E-7. Area of Operation/Interest
E-6
NSHQ 80-002
h. Key Intelligence Reporting. A summary of key INTREPs is collated and

presented. This must include details of reliability, provide a narrative of the report,
reference other related or supplementary reports, and end with a J2 comment or
assessment. A TIP can have as many reporting slides as required.
Figure E-8. Key Intelligence Reporting
i. Effects Analysis (CARVER). Target analysis is conducted in line with the

CARVER rating scale (Chapter 3), and the target is scored to determine the desired
effect.
Figure E-9. CARVER
E-7
NSHQ 80-002
E-8
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX F TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1. Introduction
a. ROE are the authorization for or limitation on the use of force during military
operations. Formulation of ROE is influenced by a variety of factors. ROE must be
lawful in light of international as well as national law. Within this framework the
NAC/Defence Planning Committee will provide political direction for the conduct of
military operations, including authorization for and limitation on the use of force or actions
that might be construed as provocative.
b. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime and operations prior to

commencement of an armed conflict, ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led
forces to use force. Following a declaration of counter aggression, ROE generally will
limit the otherwise lawful use of force.
c. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions, but will provide
directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances,
conditions, degree, and manner in which force and/or actions will be permitted.
2. Aim. The ROE process consists of three major phases that starts with the development
or evaluation phase based on operational requirement and performed by the different command
levels. It is thereafter given a review with basis in legal limitations and political requirement.
Finally, the highest political level approves it. See Figure F-1.
Figure F-1. ROE Process
3. Rules of Engagement Process. Within the NATO ACO structure, MC 362/1 contains a
compendium of strategic and operational ROE and NATO policy for approving and
implementing ROE for all NATO military operations that are likely to form the bases of any ROE
for all forces under NATO command.
F-1
NSHQ 80-002
a. Ordinarily, the strategic commander (SC) includes within the draft OPLAN a
proposed ROE profile. NAC/Defence Planning Committee will review the proposed
OPLAN and provide an initial ROE profile and add policy guidance within the approved
OPLAN/OPORD. National caveats may at this time be implemented in the ROE profile.
The ROE profile is contained in Annex E to the OPLAN/OPORD. Additional ROE may be
requested. Operational justification must be provided for any proposed changes to an
ROE profile. ROE implemented by higher echelons will be processed into a SOCC ROE
implementation. The profile given will be displayed in OPLAN/SUPPLAN. ROE
implementation will be done via JTF HQ generated FRAGO promulgated to the CCs for
their action.
b. The subordinate commanders may hold implemented ROE at their level, but will
not be allowed to give more permissive ROE than implemented by higher echelon.
Figure F-2. ROE Implementation and Approval Process
4. Internal within the SOCC. The SOCC will be involved in the process of development of
the ROE profile. Otherwise the HQs have to evaluate the given ROE profile. During the
mission analysis, the political and legal part of the given ROE profile, or the profile to be
developed, will be analysed and will be taken into account in the directions given to the further
work in the staff. The ROE will be a fixed agenda item for the coordination work of the OPG. J5
is responsible for the ROE process, conducts the overall coordination within the staff, and
cooperates closely with LEGAD. All functional areas of the HQ will contribute to the given ROE
profile as directed by the OPG meeting. Inputs by functional areas will be evaluated again in
following OPG meetings. Final review will be done by LEGAD, who will prepare the ROE annex
and coordinating instructions. LEGAD will also be responsible to prepare for COM approval of
ROE requests and ROE implementation.
F-2
NSHQ 80-002
Figure F-3. ROE Evaluation Process
5. Rules of Engagement Request/Request for Information. During current operations,

the OPSCEN is responsible for the handling of ROE. The JOC/operations will process any
ROE request, ROE implementation, and RFIs. The chief of the JOC will make sure to involve
functional areas as required, and will call for meetings to coordinate issues spanning cross the
different functional areas. LEGAD will be involved in the entire process and will review the staff
findings. LEGAD will prepare ROE requests or ROE implementation as needed for COM
approval and further processing.
F-3
NSHQ 80-002
Figure F-4. ROE Request and RFI Staff Internal
6. Rules of Engagement Messages. Standard NATO ROE messages are given in MC

362/1, APP-9, and Bi-SC 80-3. ROE authorizations are used solely by NAC/Defence Planning
Committee to approve overall profile, to deny requested ROE by the SC, or to give additional
political guidance. The SC and lower level commands will use ROE implementation messages
to implement, cancel, or give amplifying instructions to ROE. All commanders at subordinate
levels will be able to request implementation of ROE or RFI, or clarification through an ROE
request message. Message formats are provided in Enclosure 1.
Figure F-5. ROE Request and Implementation Flow
F-4
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
HASTY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND PLANNING PROCESS
G-1
NSHQ 80-002
G-2
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX H TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
LOGISTICS ESTIMATE
1. Background. During the planning phase of an operation it is essential to produce a

logistics estimate to provide a sound basis for supporting the operation. Relevant information
must be evaluated prior to making planning decisions, taking initial action, or the further conduct
of an operation. The logistics estimate outline below is an ideal format and may be modified to
support the SOCC’s planning requirements. During hasty or accelerated SOCC-P2, the
estimate may be streamlined to meet planning requirements. Logistics data is also required to
assist in CPOE and focuses on the operational environment (e.g. geography, infrastructure,
climate, demography). There is no specific format of the logistics estimate, but the key
elements and the broad sequence of the logistics estimate are set out here.
a. COM SOCC’s mission (not dealt with below)
b. The logistic determinants (the four Ds: destination, distance, duration, and demand)
c. Key factors
d. Principal logistic deductions (including subordinate commands’ input)
e. Logistic courses open
f. Logistic recommendations
2. Logistic Determinants. The key operational parameters are defined in the format below.
a. Destination
(1) Environment and climate
(2) Infrastructure
(3) Geography
b. Distance
(1) Strategic LOC from strategic base to AOO
(2) In JOA LOCs
(3) Support/mounting/logistic bases and available transport
(4) Strategic lift requirements and allocations (air, land, and sea)
(5) Loop time
c. Demand. Establishing the demand requirements (steady, cyclical, surge)

depends to a large extent on the overall strategic and operational planning. A close
liaison with COM and J5 is required.
H-1
NSHQ 80-002
(1) Mission and tasks
(2) CONOPS
(a) Shore-based maritime support facilities
(b) Potential land conflict/intensity/equipment utilization
(c) Air basing plot/sortie rate
(3) C2
(4) HNS
(5) Combat arms and combat support options
(a) Maritime component
(b) Land component
(c) Air component
(6) Deployment options
(7) Classes of supply
d. Duration (Time, Volume, Risk, Endurance)
(1) Deployment
(a) Activation
(b) Transportation
(c) RSOM
(2) Operation
(3) Handover
(4) Termination/redeployment
3. Key Factors. The following key factors have to be included with the determinants.
a. Host-nation Support Intentions/Capabilities. Consider in JOA,

FMB/FOB/staging area.
(1) Infrastructure
(a) Movement (airport of debarkation/seaport of debarkation)
(b) Medical
(c) Communications
H-2
NSHQ 80-002
(d) Utilities
(e) Facilities (ports, warehousing, storage)
(f) Real estate/accommodation
(2) Freedom of movement/transit permission
(3) Medical assistance
(4) Services
(a) Transport/material handling equipment (MHE)-lease/hire
(b) Lifting capabilities
(c) Freight and containers
(d) Recovery and maintenance
(e) Civilian labour
(f) Accommodation
(5) Food and agriculture
(6) Civil disaster response
(7) Industrial preparedness
(8) Classes of supply
(a) Food
(b) Water
(c) Spare parts
(d) POL construction and fortification
(e) Ammunition
b. Multinational Intentions and Capabilities
(1) Establishment of an NSE: location and capabilities
(2) Establishment of a JLSG: location, capabilities, and C2
(3) Strategic transport and transport coordination
(4) Transit, storage, and handling
(5) Supply classes as above
(6) Maintenance
H-3
NSHQ 80-002
(7) Medical
(8) Infrastructure
(9) Troop welfare
(10) Laundry
(11) Postal service
(12) Procurement and contracting
(13) Legal support
c. United Nations Intentions/Capabilities. As specified for multinational intentions,

capabilities.
d. Third Party Logistic Capabilities. As specified for multinational intentions,

capabilities.
e. Threat
(1) LOC
(2) Potential rear area
f. Humanitarian Demands
g. Dates/Timing
(1) Earliest
(2) Latest
h. Command and Control Options
(1) JLSG
(2) Support command
(3) RSOM
(4) Military logistic units
(5) NSE
i. Required Logistic End State
(1) Residual commitments on handover
(2) Termination/redeployment
j. Summary of Likely Logistics Tasks
(1) Resources required
H-4
NSHQ 80-002
(2) Potential shortfalls
4. Principal Logistic Deductions. Subordinate commands are requested to provide

information about logistics and CSS: sustainability options; resupply requirements; relief
options and impacts; and in-theatre localities and LOCs. On receipt of subordinate commands’
comments, the operational HQ consolidates its findings and draws out the following
deductions/tasks.
a. Sustainment
(1) Levels
(2) Shortfalls
(3) Impact
b. Logistic/Combat Service Support Order of Battle
(1) Levels
(2) Shortfalls
(3) Impact
c. Multinational Issues
(1) Coordination
(2) Cooperation
(3) Role specialized nation
(4) Lead nation
(5) Military logistic units
(6) Multinational support agreements
d. Host-nation Support
e. Forward Mounting Base/Forward Operating Base
f. Time and Space
g. Command and Control
(1) JTF HQ logistical combat operations centre
(2) JLSG
(3) Support command
(4) Military logistical units
(5) NSE
H-5
NSHQ 80-002
h. Logistical Communication and Information Systems. Use of LOGFAS.
i. Showstoppers
j. Tasks
(1) Specific (among others)
(a) Surveillance and intelligence
(b) Military exercising and training
(c) Pre-emptive deployment/show of force
(d) Preparation of deployment of additional forces
(e) Maritime embargo
(f) National evacuation support
(g) Support to humanitarian aid operations
(2) Implied (among others)
(a) Reconnaissance tasks/OLRT employment
(b) RSOM tasks and staging areas activation
(c) Ensure HNS agreements
(d) Provide supply, medical, and infrastructure for humanitarian

aid/identify IOs/NGOs’ capabilities and needs
(e) Ensure lines of supply and logistic support in definite areas
(f) Set up FOB in specific areas
(g) Set up safe havens for refugees
5. Courses Open/Variables. Consider each of the deductions for each option.
6. Recommendations
a. COA
b. Reconnaissance requirements
c. FMB/FOB
d. Logistic/CSS ORBAT
e. Scope for logistic concept (e.g. logistic main effort, logistic priorities, main logistics)
H-6
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ANNEX I TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
LOGISTICS PREPARATION OF THE THEATRE79
1. LPT is a key tool available to the commander and his planners in building a flexible
operational SUPPLAN. It is designed to optimize logistics by analysing countries or geographic
regions and anticipating basing requirements, selecting and evaluating LOCs, identifying
available resources for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them, and projecting stock
assets. The aim for SOF logistics planners is to reduce the cost of moving supplies, equipment,
and people into an objective or contingency area; provide for the timely arrival of logistics
assets, which is balanced according to the mission; and allow better use of scarce strategic lift
capabilities.
2. Ideally, the process is an ongoing effort during planning Phase 1, Situation Awareness,
and is focused on countries or theatres of interest to SOF. It is impossible to anticipate every
contingency, so the LPT for a given SOF deployment may begin when the country or
geographic region is directed. Logistics planners build a logistics information database that may
be used for developing the concept of support for the SOCC’s OPLAN. Because it is a complex
and time-consuming function, logisticians cannot afford to wait until deployment begins to start
the LPT. Anticipation by logistics planners at all command levels can preclude inserting forces
into a completely bare base of operations.
3. The logistics planner must not underestimate the time and resources required to
accomplish this level of detailed analysis and planning. It may be necessary to collaborate with
other components, HQs, or elements depending on the situation. Once completed, the LPT is a
living document that is in a continual state of review, refinement, and use. It should be used as
the basis for negotiations, and the commander should use it routinely when performing the
planning functions, especially in forces deployment planning and HNS negotiations.
4. The focus of the logistics elements of the information development process is on supply
and field services; however, a detailed LPT should collect information on all logistics areas and
if available, coordinate with the SOCC engineer. There is no specific format for an LPT but
topics for consideration include:
a. Geography: climate and terrain in the AOO to determine types of equipment

needed and when, e.g. the use of water information to determine the need for such
things as early deployment of water production, filtration, and distribution units.
b. Supply: items that are readily available in the AOO and can be used in support of
forces. Subsistence items (Class I: fresh food and (bottled) water), bulk petroleum, and
barrier materials are the most common.
c. Facilities and services: availability and limitations of warehousing, cold storage

facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities,
sanitation capabilities, and hotels.
79 The genesis for this section was derived from ALP-4.2 (A), Land Forces Logistic Doctrine, dated 4 Feb 10, pp. 4-
4 to 4-5, and modified for use by SOCC logistics planners.
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d. Transportation: road and rail networks, inland waterways, airfields, truck

availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, and MHE as well as
traffic flow, choke points, and control problems.
e. Maintenance: maintenance facilities that could support NATO equipment. For

example, does the country have adequate machine works for possible repair parts, or
does the country have dealers for the supply of spare parts for military equipment?
f. Medical aspects: information on all health-threatening aspects and necessary

preventive medicine programmes related to the JOA; availability of medical facilities,
especially acceptable Role 3 capacity.
g. General skills: skills of the general population of the country. Are interpreters
available? Will a general labour pool be available? What skills are available that can be
used in logistics support operations? For instance, will drivers, clerks, MHE operators,
food service personnel, guards, mechanics, and longshoremen be available?
h. Political situation: willingness or resistance of trade unions and/or civil workers to

support armed forces or military operations.
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ANNEX J TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
1. References. While draft joint PR doctrine and TTP have been developed in NATO since
2004, currently no single ratified doctrinal publication exists. However, in 2011, Bi-SC Joint
Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines were issued. This document, which is
periodically updated, provides, in a single volume, best practices to plan, prepare, and conduct
PR during NATO operations, until such time that formal NATO PR doctrine and TTP become
available.
2. Personnel Recovery and Isolated Personnel Definitions80
a. Personnel Recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect
the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.
b. Isolated Personnel. Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their
unit or organization, in a situation that may require them to survive, evade, resist
exploitation, or escape while awaiting recovery.
3. Personnel Recovery Options
a. Diplomatic. The diplomatic option uses official government channels and may
include negotiations.
b. Military. The military option includes the planning and execution of activities by
commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to report, locate, support,
recover, and reintegrate isolated personnel.
c. Civil. Civil efforts may include sanctioned or unsanctioned intervention by

intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and influential private
citizens, and may be conducted independently by those organizations or individuals
without the knowledge of their governments.
4. Personnel Recovery Categories. In the military option, several PR categories (also

known as PR capabilities) may exist. Depending on the situation, commanders may want to
rely entirely on a single category or a combination of all or several categories.
a. Individual. The individual category consists of the capabilities possessed by

individuals who are well trained in survival and evasion TTP. These capabilities are
described in two subcategories, unassisted and opportune.
(1) Unassisted. Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own

recovery as much as possible, especially when situations or environments may
hamper other methods of recovery. The unassisted recovery requires the
capabilities that enable an isolated person to survive and independently evade
80The term recovery exists and is approved (to include personnel extraction); see AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms
and Definitions. The term personnel recovery (PR) exists and is approved; see AAP-15, NATO Glossary of
Abbreviations, dated 5 May 14.
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capture back to friendly control. Evasion aids may be issued to assist the evader
to successfully survive and avoid capture.
(2) Opportune. This is an assisted recovery whereby an isolated person takes

advantage of an opportunity to use the aid of others who are not normally
considered in friendly force planning, following either an inadvertent discovery or a
deliberate decision to seek help.
b. Unit. The unit category consists of PR performed by the unit to which the isolated
personnel belong. Commanders at all levels are responsible, within their means and
capabilities, for the recovery of their own personnel if they become isolated.
c. Component. The component category consists of PR performed by military

forces of a single functional component.
d. Joint. The joint category consists of PR performed by military forces of two or

more components.
e. Combined with Other Organizations and Agencies. This category consists of

the PR executed with capabilities from both military forces and personnel from other
organizations and agencies working in concert, in which either one can have the lead.
5. Personnel Recovery Methods
a. Different tactical methods exist to conduct PR, which may carry varying names
and use different TTP, depending on the nation or the service conducting the operation.81
b. SOF PR methods include:
(1) Special Operations Forces Recovery Operations
(a) SOF recovery operations are DA operations to locate, identify, recover,

and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items
critical to national security in areas sensitive, denied, or contested.
(b) SOF recovery operations are often characterized by thorough

intelligence analysis, detailed planning, and rehearsals, and may employ
unconventional tactics, techniques, discreet search, indigenous assistance,
and the frequent use of ground combat elements.
(c) SOF recovery operations are PR operations only when conducted to

recover isolated personnel.
(d) SOF recovery operations conducted to recover isolated personnel

under adversary control are primarily national operations, not normally
conducted by NATO SOF.82
81Terminology may include search and rescue, combat search and rescue, and combat recovery, among others.
Currently, no universally accepted NATO definition exists for any of these methods.
82There are indications, however, that multinational SOF recovery operations are likely to occur more frequently in
the future.
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(2) Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
(a) Definitions
1/ Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) is the recovery of

isolated personnel by SOF and/or other government agencies and/or
surrogate/local forces trained for this purpose and using pre-
established indigenous networks.
2/ Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) is NAR conducted

unilaterally by SOF.
(b) Specified Tasks
1/ Contact. Actions that lead to positive control of isolated

personnel.
2/ Authenticate. Actions taken to authenticate the identity of an

isolated person to be recovered.
3/ Support. Actions taken to provide sustainment to the isolated

person and ensure their well-being.
4/ Move. Transport of isolated personnel from contact point to

exfiltration site.
5/ Exfiltrate. Final action to remove isolated personnel from

hostile territory to definitive control in permissive environment.
(c) Comparison. Figure J-1 explains the differences between NAR and
other PR methods.
Figure J-1. Comparison of NAR and PR Methods Other than NAR
(3) The relationship between SOF recovery operations, NAR, DA, and PR is
shown in Figure J-2.
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Figure J-2. SOF Recovery Operations, NAR, DA, and PR Relationship
6. Personnel Recovery Execution Tasks. PR execution focuses on five tasks and

supporting activities that must be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred: report,
locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The capability to complete the five PR execution
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tasks does not reside with a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff
elements, forces, and isolated personnel.
a. Report. The report task consists of actions required to provide notification that
personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition
of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed.
b. Locate. The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and confirm the
identity of isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and
continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive
authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.
c. Support. The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person
and to the isolated person’s next-of-kin. Support efforts include establishing
communications, increasing the isolated personnel’s SA, providing morale-building
support, suppressing adversary threats, and delivering subsistence and supplies or
providing directions to a cache. Psychological support and guidelines to the next-of-kin
on how to handle media are vital parts of the efforts to support the isolated personnel.
d. Recover. The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of
commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under
the physical custody of a friendly organization. Once in custody, the recovery force will
normally perform one last authentication. Isolated personnel have a significant
responsibility in the recovery process. The force designated to perform the recover task
may range from a single recovery vehicle to a complex task force and may be dedicated
or not.
e. Reintegrate. The reintegrate task involves the use of systematic and controlled
methods to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until
they are fully reintegrated with their unit, their family, and society. The goal of the
reintegrate task is to gather critical information from recovered isolated personnel to feed
the process of lessons learned, while protecting their health and welfare and to allow
them to return to duty as expeditiously as possible, physically and emotionally fit.
7. Response Options
a. Immediate. The PR tasks may be conducted by accompanying, on-scene, or

other assets that can be quickly launched or diverted.
b. Deliberate. Commanders choose this method when an immediate response may

not be possible due to environmental, political, or threat considerations. Deliberately
planned missions give planners the flexibility to utilize all necessary/available assets to
complete the PR tasks.
8. Planning
a. During the planning process, commanders continually assess operational PR

requirements against the force PR capabilities. Assets that are capable of conducting
PR should be integrated within the force when operations start. If a PR capability does
not exist, commanders must either assume or mitigate the risk, or delay operations until a
PR capability is established.
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b. Commanders and staffs must consider all available PR options, categories, and
methods to successfully plan for PR operations within their operational area.
Commanders cannot control or, in many cases, influence non-military options, but should
ensure that all military efforts are coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with any
diplomatic and civil options being planned.
c. Planning factors for PR usually include, but are not necessarily limited to,
environment, threat, isolated personnel number, status, and training level, distances,
recovery forces availability and capabilities, C2 structure, communications capabilities,
ROE, and time constraints.
d. Primary factors in successful PR operations are SA, operational flexibility, and

multi-system redundancy. No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to
all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. Usually, a mix of
categories and methods should be planned for to cover all foreseeable contingencies.
e. Details of the PR plan will be specified in Annex V to the joint force OPLAN and to
the components’ SUPPLAN or OPLAN. See Appendix 1 for an annotated generic Annex
V to a SOCC OPLAN.
9. Preparation
a. Education and Training
(1) Responsibility for PR training remains within the nations. Exercises should
include PR scenarios on a routine basis.
(2) Personnel at risk of becoming isolated should conduct in-theatre training in

accordance with that risk and with the environment in which their anticipated
missions will take place. Combat survival83 training criteria may be established as
part of theatre entry requirements for all deployed personnel. SOF will routinely
require the highest level of combat survival training, which includes practical
individual survival skills training, evasion training with live opposing forces, and
practical conduct after capture training.
b. Equipment. The capability to survive, evade, and be recovered is enhanced by

providing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products, some of which may be
theatre- or environment-specific.
c. Review of Documents and Personnel Recovery Guidance. Prior to

deployment or to each mission, the applicable PR guidance should be reviewed, and the
required documents to facilitate PR operations should be completed or reviewed. This
will include the completion or review of evasion plans of action and isolated personnel
reports for designated personnel.
10. Command and Control
a. COM JTF has overall responsibility for PR in the JOA. He normally exercises
command authority for PR through a joint PR centre (JPRC), which is responsible for the
83Some nations use SERE as an alternate term for combat survival. Depending on the nation, SERE is an
acronym for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, or survival, evasion, resistance, and extraction. On 1 Feb
07, NATO agreed to use the term SERE as an acronym for survival, escape/evasion, resistance, and extraction.
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planning and execution of all joint PR operations, to monitor and support PR operations
by joint force component, and to coordinate and deconflict PR operations by joint force
components and other forces or organizations.
b. Each functional component or major regional commander is responsible for the

planning and execution of PR operations in support of his own component and/or within
his own AOO. This function will normally be performed through a component or regional
PR coordination cell (PRCC), the responsibilities of which include coordination with the
JPRC and other component or regional PRCCs, among others. A functional component
commander or major regional commander may have to contribute to joint PR as tasked
by COM JFC. If designated by COM JTF, a component or regional commander will
establish the JPRC. In this case, the CC also retains a PRCC capability to conduct
component or regional PR missions in addition to its JOA-wide responsibilities. When a
CC cannot accomplish a PR mission alone, any shortfalls should be reported to and
support requested from COM JTF through the JPRC.
c. Responsibilities for PR may be further delegated to subordinate units within CCs.

Within these subordinate organizations, a PR point of contact (POC) may be designated
to serve as the primary coordinator for all PR issues. When units are unable to execute a
PR mission on their own, assistance will be requested from the next higher commander,
through the PR POC(s), up to the PRCC, or JPRC, as appropriate.
d. Possible C2 structures for PR are shown in Figure J-3.
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Figure J-3. C2 Architecture for PR
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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX J TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
GENERIC ANNEX V TO A SPECIAL OPERATION COMPONENT COMMAND OPERATION

PLAN
REFERENCES: List each reference document used or required for this annex. Use a new
line for each annex, preceded by a subsequent letter for each reference.
1. Situation. Include any PR-specific information not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN
using appropriate subparagraphs as for an OPLAN format. If no PR-specific information is
available, refer to main body of OPLAN and, for adversary forces information, to Annex D
(Intelligence).
2. Mission. State the mission of the SOCC with regard to PR in a single phrase, containing
who (e.g. the SOCC), what (e.g. conduct PR of …), where (e.g. throughout the JOA), when (e.g.
if and when required), and why (e.g. in order to ensure isolated personnel’s safe return under
friendly control).
3. Operations Design
a. Commander’s Intent. Concisely describe COM SOCC’s overall purpose and

desired end state of PR operations. The commander’s intent may also include an
assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable. It is not a summary of the
CONOPS and should be enduring throughout the campaign or operation, by focusing on
the desired end state rather than on sequential events. It provides an overall framework
within which subordinate commanders may operate and pertains even when a plan no
longer applies or when circumstances require subordinates to make decisions departing
from the original plan, enabling mission command and allowing subordinates to exercise
initiative. The commander’s intent focuses on the end state. Typically, the commander’s
intent statement is three to five sentences long.
b. Scheme of Operations. Describe how the commander visualizes the execution

of PR operations from start to completion. The scheme of operations states, normally in
planned phases of accomplishment, how the commander plans to accomplish the
mission, identifying the major forces involved, the general nature, sequence, and purpose
of operations to be conducted, including general plans for employment of supporting
assets when applicable. The scheme of operations focuses on the method used for the
operation. The scheme of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into several
subparagraphs.
c. Forces and Resources. List organic PR resources and their location as required,
including, if and as applicable:
(1) Designated PR forces (e.g. all SOTGs and RW SOATGs/SOATUs).
(2) Dedicated PR forces (if any).
(a) …
(b) …
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(3) PR coordination elements (e.g. PRCC, PR POCs).
(a) …
(b) …
(Note: Only cover friendly forces/resources organic or attached to the SOCC.

Information concerning the mission of supporting friendly forces not attached or
organic to the SOCC should be included in paragraph 1.)
4. Execution
a. Tasks to Subordinate Commanders
(1) List specific tasks, in this and all subsequent subparagraphs. Use a
separate subparagraph for each immediately subordinate unit. Place tasks that
affect two or more units in Coordinating Instructions. Note: Only tasks for
subordinate units should be listed. Do not list tasks for staff branches or for the
PRCC. These should be covered in internal staff documents such as SOPs or
standing operating instructions.
(2) …
b. Coordinating Instructions. This is the final subparagraph of paragraph 4 and

contains instructions applicable to two or more elements of the task organization. It can
be further divided into subparagraphs as required. The following subparagraphs are for
guidance only and may be deleted or modified while others may be added. There are no
fixed titles, and there is no fixed order of appearance. For instructions that are too
lengthy to be included here, appendices to Annex V may be used.
(1) Tasks to …. List tasks that affect more than one unit. Use a separate
subparagraph for each grouping of units that have the same task(s), and within
each subparagraph, use a new line for each task.
(2) Personnel Recovery Planning Guidance. Include guidance related to PR

planning, such as planning assumptions, subordinates’ PR planning
responsibilities, identification and reporting of organic capability shortfalls,
coordination considerations, entitled personnel, minimum requirements to launch,
additional requirements to execute, NO-GO criteria, and expectation management.
(3) Geographic Responsibilities for Personnel Recovery. Describe, if not

already clear from the mission statement, intent, and scheme of operations, the
areas throughout which commanders are responsible for PR.
(4) Personnel Recovery Coverage Gaps. Describe, if applicable, which parts of

the operational area cannot be covered by recovery forces.
(5) Timelines. Specify timelines for deployment and redeployment of PR

assets, in relation to the overall force deployment.
(6) Personnel Recovery Procedures. List PR procedures not included in SOPs

for subordinate units and not (to be) included in SPINS to the ATO, including, as
appropriate:
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(a) Isolated Personnel Immediate Actions. Include instructions for

immediate actions when isolated in a hostile, friendly, neutral, and/or
uncertain environment, as applicable.
(b) Area- and Season-specific Survival Instructions.
(c) Evasion Routes and Destinations. Specify types, locations, and

servicing time windows of evasion destinations, including contact points and
recovery points, and instructions for actions at those locations, including
actions if access is denied.
(d) Evasion Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Include instructions

for discreet evasion (including camouflage, movement, and the use of
shelters) and for overt evasion (including dress, modes of travel, route
selection, and dealing with local restrictions such as curfews).
(e) Isolated Personnel Procedures for Contact with the Local Population.
Include conditions, contact procedures, use of evasion aids, and behaviour.
(f) Notification Methods and Procedures. Include instructions for

reporting isolation events, monitoring emergency frequencies, and
acknowledgement, recording, and relay of distress transmissions. (Note:
Do not provide details of communications procedures here; these will be
detailed in paragraph 6).
(g) Location Methods and Procedures. Include instructions for

development, publication, and dissemination of names, locations, validity,
and use of search and rescue points.
(h) Authentication. Include methods and general procedures for

authentication. (Note: Do not provide the actual PR codes here or instructions
for their use; these will be detailed or referred to in paragraph 6.)
(i) Support. Include types of support available to perform the support

task and conditions and procedures for their provision, including instructions
for aerial delivery of resupply packages, airdrop of support personnel, fire
support, communications with isolated personnel, and support to families of
isolated personnel.
(j) Isolated Personnel Procedures for Recovery by Friendly Forces.

Include general isolated personnel actions during recovery, RW/tilt-rotor
recovery procedures (including landing site selection criteria, hoist recovery
procedures, and isolated personnel actions), ground force contact
procedures, and recovered isolated procedures when in custody of friendly
forces. (Note: Do not provide details of communications procedures here;
these will be detailed in paragraph 6.)
(k) Recovery Forces Procedures for Recovery of Isolated Personnel.

Include PR task force procedures, such as actions of mission coordinator,
on-scene commander, rescue mission commander, and ground operations
team actions, as appropriate. (Note: Do not provide details of
communications procedures here; these will be detailed in paragraph 6.)
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(l) Reintegration Instructions. Include identification of reception

locations, medical and psychological assistance, combat survival and
intelligence debriefing, decompression and repatriation guidelines,
reintegration support arrangements between nations, and instructions for
reintegration of returned isolated personnel not belonging to the combined
joint force.
(m) Precedence of Personnel Recovery Instructions. Specify

precedence of PR instructions, if detailed in different publications.
(n) Instruction if Capture is Imminent.
(o) Conduct-after-capture Procedures. Include instructions for captivity

as a POW, peacetime government detainee, and/or hostage, as applicable.
(p) Escape Instructions. Include conditions, methods, techniques, and

procedures for escaping captivity from anticipated types of captivity.
(7) Personnel Recovery Assets Notice-to-move Time.
(8) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
(a) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List those intelligence requirements

concerning the adversary and the environment that COM SOCC considers
critical to assist him in reaching a decision and making his plan.
1/ …
2/ …
3/ …
(b) Friendly Forces Information Requirements. List requirements for

information COM SOCC needs to know about his own forces and
supporting capabilities that might affect the commander’s ability to
accomplish the mission.
1/ …
2/ …
3/ …
(c) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List friendly information

COM SOCC does not want to reveal to the enemy, e.g. key questions likely to
be asked by adversaries about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and
activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness.
1/ …
2/ …
3/ …
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(9) Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery. Provide the concept for

intelligence support to PR. This should reflect the guidelines for intelligence
support to PR, including processes and products, that are included in Annex D
(Intelligence) to the OPLAN and may include, as appropriate:
(a) Instructions for establishment of connectivity and procedures

between intelligence staffs and PR C2 nodes.
(b) Instructions for preparation of support products for PR.
(c) Recommendations for establishment of communications procedures.
(d) Instructions for monitoring friendly distress frequencies and

adversary communications.
(e) Instructions for transmission of information related to a potential or

confirmed PR incident.
(f) Instructions for intelligence collection in response to a potential or

confirmed PR incident.
(g) Instructions for time-sensitive intelligence support for PR, including

dissemination of analysed combat information.
(h) Instructions for tasking ISR assets in support of PR.
(i) Instructions for intelligence debriefings of recovery force members

and recovered personnel.
(j) Requests for information procedures.
(10) Information Operations in Support of Personnel Recovery Operations.

Describe how Info Ops will support PR operations. Specify the contribution of each
capability, activity, or process, as required, including PsyOps, OPSEC, deception,
EW, CIMIC, KLE, and others as required. Refer to Annex O (Information Operations)
and Annex L (Psychological Operations) to the OPLAN, as required.
(11) Public Affairs Guidance. Provide guidance for PA, such as instructions for
control of media releases related to isolation events, isolated personnel, and PR
operations, key themes, and messages in case isolation events become publicly
known. Provide information to be given to isolated personnel’s next-of-kin for
dealing with the media. Provide coordination requirements with operational
commands during isolation events and PR operations. Refer to Annex X (Public
Affairs) to the OPLAN as required.
(12) Education and Training. Describe requirements for pre-deployment

education and training and in-theatre training requirements and opportunities.
Include requirements for PR staff personnel, for dedicated (if applicable) and/or
(potentially) designated recovery forces, and the requirements for basic,
intermediate, or advanced combat survival training for different categories of
individuals (as potentially isolated personnel).
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(13) PR Points of Contact. Describe the requirements for establishing PR POCs

within each unit and their responsibilities for pre-mission PR planning, preparation,
and training.
5. Service Support. Describe administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to PR

operations and which are not (to be) included in SOPs for subordinate units and not (to be)
included in SPINS to the ATO. The following subparagraphs are for guidance only and may be
deleted or modified while others may be added. There are no fixed titles, and there is no fixed
order of appearance. Subparagraphs can be further divided as required. For instructions that
are too lengthy to be included, appendices to Annex V may be used.
a. Legal Status of Isolated Personnel. Describe the legal status of isolated

personnel, including evaders, escapees, POWs, detainees, and hostages, as applicable.
Provide guidance on applicable legal references and on rights and duties of different
categories of isolated personnel.
b. Dress. Provide instructions for the wearing of uniforms, including those applicable
after an isolation event occurs. Include minimum to be worn/carried.
c. Individual Survival Equipment. Describe requirements for individual survival

equipment, including both basic equipment and additional equipment to be carried, such as
personal locator beacons, evasion aids, and other equipment for extended survival/evasion,
as appropriate. Specify requirements for fire making, water collection/disinfection, shelter
making, navigation, signalling, survival medicine, and food gathering.
d. Collective Personnel Recovery Equipment. Describe requirements for

collective equipment for designated units, such as personnel locator systems,
programme loaders, and ancillaries.
e. Resupply. Provide guidance for preparation and pre-positioning of aerial delivery

bundles containing survival equipment and supplies.
f. Medical Support. Describe medical support for PR operations, including

locations and general capabilities of MTFs.
g. Potential Isolated Personnel Planning Documents. Provide instructions for

formats, completion, storage, forwarding, and destruction of potential isolated personnel
PR planning documents, including isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPs) and evasion
plans of action.
h. Management of Evasion Aids. Provide instructions for acquisition and

management of evasion aids.
i. Information of Next of Kin. Provide guidance on responsibilities and timings for

informing isolated personnel’s next-of-kin.
j. Accounting. Provide instructions for implementation of procedures to determine

the status of (potentially) isolated personnel within the force, and for passage of that
information through command, PR, and J1 staff channels.
6. Command and Signal. Describe command and signal instructions applicable to PR

operations and which are not (to be) included in SOPs for subordinate units and not (to be)
included in SPINS to the ATO. The following subparagraphs are for guidance only and may be
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deleted or modified while others may be added. There are no fixed titles, and there is no fixed
order of appearance. Subparagraphs can be further divided as required. For instructions that
are too lengthy to be included, appendices to Annex V may be used.
a. Command and Control. Describe the location of PR coordination elements,

command relationships over recovery forces, and launch and execute authority over
recovery forces, including details on delegation and succession of command. Describe
command relationships between recovered isolated personnel and assisting
units/agencies. Add a C2 diagram for visual clarification, if appropriate.
b. Liaison. Describe liaisons to be maintained and the conditions under which

designated units and PR coordination elements are granted direct liaison authority for
planning PR missions.
c. Signal Instructions
(1) Communications Architecture. Provide instructions for communications

between PR C2 nodes, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. Specify primary,
alternate, contingency, and emergency communications methods. Add diagrams
showing PR communications architecture for visual clarification, including electronic
communications between PR C2 nodes and communications between isolated
personnel, personnel recovery task forces, and PR C2 nodes, as appropriate.
(2) PR Codes. Provide the following codes and/or instructions for their
development, publication, dissemination, and use: theatre code words (including PR
word, number, or letter of the day/week/month/quarter, as appropriate), countersigns
(challenge and reply/password), near and far recognition signals, duress codes, and
local authentication codes, as applicable. Include instructions for the validity of codes
for multiple-day missions and actions on compromise of PR codes. Refer to the ATO
SPINS for aircrew-specific additional authentication codes, if applicable.
(3) Use of ISOPREP Data. Provide instructions for the use of ISOPREP data.
(4) Use of International Distress Signals. Provide guidance on the use of

international distress signals, including conditions for their use, if applicable.
(5) Survival Radio Programming Data. Provide survival radio programming

data, including frequencies, pre-set data burst messages, software application
version, identification codes, almanac updates, points to be loaded, and/or
instructions for their development, publication, and dissemination. Refer to the
ATO SPINS for aircrew-specific additional authentication codes, if applicable.
(6) Survival Radio Registration Procedures. Provide instructions for the

registration of survival radio emergency beacons, if applicable.
(7) Communications Procedures. Provide PR electronic and non-electronic

communications procedures and schedules, including no-radio procedures and/or
instructions for their development, publication, and dissemination. Refer to the
ATO SPINS for aircrew-specific additional authentication codes, if applicable.
(8) Communications Satellite Coverage. Provide details on satellite coverage for

PR communications, including satellite coverage time windows, relayed frequencies,
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minimum sending time for activation, notification delay, and restrictions on their use,
and/or instructions for their development, publication, and dissemination.
(9) Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grids. Provide search and rescue
numerical encryption grid information and/or instructions for its development,
publication, and dissemination. Refer to the ATO SPINS for aircrew-specific
additional authentication codes, if applicable.
(10) Checklists. Provide instructions for the use of mandatory checklists for PR
communications, including execution checklists.
d. Reports. Provide instructions for PR message formats and classification.
APPENDICES: (only to be mentioned if applicable)
1. [Title of Appendix 1]
2. [Title of Appendix 2] (This is an example of how to format an appendix that is more than
one line long.)
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NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX K TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats. NATO SOF must be fully
prepared and ready to operate in a CBRN environment, which may result from the employment
of CBRN weapons or from the release of toxic industrial materials, either intentional or
accidental. SOF exposure to CBRN threats can occur in two broad contexts:
a. SOF may be employed deliberately to contribute to the prevention of WMD

proliferation and to the defence against CBRN threats under any of the three NATO
policy pillars to prevent, to protect against, and to recover from CBRN threats.
b. SOF may encounter CBRN threats during any mission not related to those
described in paragraph 1a.
2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence
a. Principles
(1) Threat Assessment. Threat assessments are based on accurate and

timely all-source intelligence.
(2) Risk Management. CBRN risk and vulnerability assessments are required
as part of any full assessment of the operational risk to a force. Contamination
avoidance, within the dictates of mission requirements, should be a primary
consideration.
(3) Interoperability. Every effort must be made to optimize overall CBRN

defence posture through the harmonizing of respective nations’ and, where
appropriate, HN’s capabilities and information exchange at operational and tactical
levels.
(4) Prioritization. Since it is unlikely that specialist CBRN defence capabilities

will be available in sufficient quantities to support all force elements to the same
degree, priority needs to be given to operationally essential personnel, equipment,
and infrastructure.
(5) Flexibility. CBRN defence must be flexible, modular in application, and

capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat and operational environment
while cognizant of differing national guidelines.
b. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Enabling

Components
(1) Detection, Identification, and Monitoring. This component detects and

characterizes CBRN incidents, identifies the agents and hazards, delineates areas
of contamination, and monitors the changes. The CBRN detection component
also includes the tasks of surveillance, reconnaissance, and survey. SOF may
conduct surveillance for determining the presence or absence of CBRN hazards
during any mission, as part of its own FP measures. In addition, SOF may be
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NSHQ 80-002
deliberately tasked to conduct reconnaissance to confirm the presence or absence

of CBRN hazards, or to conduct a survey, which may include sampling to
determine the nature and degree of CBRN hazards in an area of confirmed or
suspected contamination and to delineate the boundaries of the hazard area.
(2) Information Management. This component concerns the management of

all forms of CBRN defence related information associated with threats. SOF CIS
networks can be used to disseminate CBRN defence data.
(3) Physical Protection. Individual protection and collective protection are

required so personnel can survive CBRN incidents and continue to operate in a
CBRN environment. Measures to protect facilities, aircraft, maritime craft,
vehicles, and equipment are also included.
(4) Hazard Management. This component limits the impact of CBRN hazards.
Hazard management is based on the principles of pre-hazard precautions, hazard
control through avoidance, control of hazard spread, control and management of
individual exposures, and decontamination.
(5) Medical Countermeasures and Support. This component serves to

diminish the susceptibility of personnel to CBRN hazards and to determine if
personnel have been exposed. The treatment and evacuation of casualties in a
CBRN environment, whether contaminated or not, must be considered. SOF
medical staff members are responsible for advising their commanders on medical
countermeasures and support and SOF operators, SOF medics, and supporting
medical personnel must be trained and equipped to deal with anticipated CBRN
threats.
3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Planning Considerations
a. Mission
(1) Purpose. The purpose of SOF missions in a CBRN environment should be

unambiguous. It should be clear whether or not the mission contributes to the wider
task of preventing WMD proliferation or defending against CBRN threats. As SOF
may be the only force available to effectively deal with those potentially devastating
threats, understanding the context is required to properly apply the SOF mission
criterion that the expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.
(2) Direct Action
(a) Risk of release of CBRN substances, following attacks against the

adversary’s infrastructure, affecting the ability of SOF to operate in the area,
in addition to the possibility of causing collateral damage.
(b) Requirement for decontamination of recovered personnel and

equipment.
(3) Military Assistance
(a) Operational, logistical, and training requirements in addition to those

for similar missions without a CBRN threat.
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NSHQ 80-002
(b) Psychological impact on friendly forces working with SOF while

under a CBRN threat, including its management if the perception exists that
own SOF have CBRN defence equipment not available to local forces.
(c) Deterrent effect of training local forces to operate in a CBRN

environment on an adversary’s intention to use CBRN weapons.
(d) Ability of personnel to accomplish the required tasks while wearing

protective equipment.
b. Environment
(1) Weather.
(2) Topography.
(3) Type, concentration, toxicity, and persistency of CBRN agents.
(4) Extent of (potentially) contaminated areas.
(5) Population in (potentially) contaminated areas.
c. Adversary
(1) CBRN warfare capabilities, including possible COAs for CBRN weapons
employment.
(2) CBRN warfare intent.
d. Friendly Forces
(1) Availability of individual and collective CBRN protective equipment.
(2) Life expectancy of protective clothing and equipment.
(3) Availability of CBRN detection and identification equipment.
(4) Availability of CBRN warning and report information.
(5) Medical prophylaxis against CBRN agents.
(6) Evacuation, decontamination, and medical treatment of casualties (both

friendly and adversary).
(7) Decontamination of equipment.
(8) Resupply of expendable CBRN defence items.
(9) Safe transportation of CBRN samples.
(10) Requirement for and availability of external support from CBRN defence
units.
(11) CBRN defence training and readiness.
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(12) Interoperability with supporting or supported conventional forces.
(13) Air insertion/extraction support. Special operations missions that involve

aviation assets should consider the possibility of both external and internal aircraft
contamination. Aircraft contamination may occur at FMBs/FOBs, during infiltration
or exfiltration, and in the objective area, each requiring specific measures to
counter the CBRN threat, such as dispersal, an increase in flying altitude, and
optimum landing site selection and landing techniques.
e. Time
(1) Time during which personnel must wear individual protective equipment.
(2) Time available for task completion.
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NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
FORMATS AND REPORTS
This annex includes examples of various formats and reports.
APPENDICES:
1. Example Order/Plan Format

2. Example Warning Order
3. Example Fragmentary Order
4. Example Mission Execution Order
5. Example Operation Summary
6. Example Intelligence Summary
7. Example Situation Report
8. Example Intelligence Report
9. Example Mission Report
10. Example Medical Evacuation Request
11. Example Air Support Request
12. Example Airspace Control Means Request
13. Example Special Operations Air Task Group Assets Capability Matrix
14. Example Air Tasking Order
15. Example Support Request
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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE ORDER/PLAN FORMAT
Required classification at top and bottom of every page
ORIGINATING HQ DATE-TIME GROUP (DTG) SECTION
Follow internal SOPs for the order’s administrative information. It is recommended that the
originating HQ include its location and that the DTG uses Zulu (Z) time unless the order states
otherwise. When orders apply to units in different time zones, use Z time zone. In operation
and service support plans and orders, list the time zone applicable to the operation in the
heading of the order following the references. When an order or plan does not specify the
actual date and hour for beginning an operation, apply the proper reference designations (H-
hour/D-day, etc.).
REFERENCES: The heading of the plan or order includes a list of maps, charts, datum, or
other related documents the unit will need to understand the plan or order.
The user does not need to reference the SOP, but may refer to it in the
body of the plan or order. The user references a map using the map
series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number
and name, edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical
model of the earth used to calculate the coordinate on any map. Different
nations use different datum for printing coordinates on their maps. The
datum is usually referenced in the marginal information of each map.
Reference the base order or plan that a FRAGO modifies. Reference any
orders from higher or other guiding, relevant, or reference documents as
required.
TIME ZONE: The time zone used throughout the order/plan (including annexes and
appendices) is the time zone applicable to the operation. Operations across several time zones
use Z time.
TASK ORGANIZATION: Describe the allocation of forces to support the commander's

concept. Task organization may be shown in one of two places: preceding paragraph one, or
in an annex, if the task organization is long and complicated. In a FRAGO or WNGO, only show
the task organization if it has changed. Task organization is internal to the HQ writing the order
and does not include other forces or elements not under the originating HQ’s C2.
1. SITUATION. This paragraph should reflect the executing commander's appreciation of

the situation and should provide information to subordinate commanders for their appreciation
of the situation including the mission and intent of higher commander. If any of the sections
below are not provided or are not applicable, they should be omitted. The degree of detail will
be enhanced when a CONOPS is converted to a contingency operating plan or OPLAN.
a. General. This is information derived from the higher order or any guidance,
situational changes, or events that led to the development of the order/plan.
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(1) Background. Information on the background to the development of the

plan.
(2) Strategic Conditions. Describe the strategic conditions that led to the
development of the plan.
(3) Desired End State. The higher commander’s end state (if given).
(4) Objectives
(5) Planning Limitations (If given from higher HQs)
(a) Constraints that impose specific obligations that must be met.
(b) Restraints that set limits on what may be done.
b. Opposing Forces. Express this information in terms of two enemy echelons

below yours, if applicable. Describe the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs.
When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy COA in lieu of verbiage and refer to this in
the intelligence annex. Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against
NATO interests in the AOO. If you need to reference more sources, use the final
subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation. Refer to the intelligence annex,
the current intelligence estimate, or INTSUM.
c. Friendly Forces. Higher commander’s objectives and other forces and

commands whose listed actions will directly affect the issuing commander’s task but are
not a part of his task organization. Subparagraphs state the missions of flank units and
other units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the issuing HQ.
d. Attachments and Detachments. Do not repeat information already listed under

the Task Organization. Try to put all information in the Task Organization or in an annex
and state, See Task Organization or See Annex. However, when not in the Task
Organization, list units that are attached or detached to the HQ that issues the order.
State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when the order or
plan is effective (such as on order, on during phase changes). Use the term remains
attached when units will be or have been attached for some time.
f. Given Assumptions (OPLAN Only)
(1) Political Assumptions. List the political assumptions, including variations

or constraints that may be imposed by agencies outside the Alliance (such as the
United Nations, etc.) and considerations regarding neutral countries that may be
involved in the operation with NATO forces.
(2) Military Assumptions. List the military assumptions, including those

regarding transfer of OPCOM/OPCON to NATO commanders.
g. Tasks. List tasks identified from higher directed to your HQ.
2. MISSION. State the mission derived during the planning process. Use a clear, concise
statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place,
where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. The order of the elements may vary. There
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are no subparagraphs in a mission statement. The mission statement will cover on-order
missions.
3. EXECUTION
a. Commander’s Intent. State the commander’s intent derived during the planning
process. This summary should provide the commander’s overall intent and establish the
purpose of the plan. It is an important focusing statement for subordinate commanders.
(1) The Aim of the Operation.
(2) Military Objectives.
(3) Desired Military End State.
b. Commander’s Analysis (OPLAN Only). Gives briefly the commander’s

evaluation of the situation including:
(1) Centres of Gravity. Identifies the key COGs and decisive points that will
influence mission accomplishment.
(2) Preconditions for Success. Describes other factors that may influence
mission accomplishment.
(3) Risk Assessment. A brief description of the identified risks and an

assessment of their likely influence on successful mission accomplishment.
c. Conduct of Operations. The conduct of operations may be a single paragraph

that summarizes the overall operational concept. It may be divided into two or more
subparagraphs, or if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The
paragraph should be based on the COA statement from the decision-making process
and, at a minimum, will address close, deep, rear, security, and reserve operations as
well as describe the type or form of operation and designate the main effort. The
commander uses this subparagraph when he feels he must supply sufficient detail to
ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications
or further instructions. The statement should be concise, understandable, and may
address the following:
(1) The employment of major manoeuvre elements in a scheme of manoeuvre.
(2) A plan of fire support or scheme of fires supporting the manoeuvre with
fires.
(3) The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation.
These include reconnaissance and security elements, intelligence assets,
engineer assets, and air defence.
(4) Any other aspects of the operation the commander considers appropriate to
clarify the concept and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination
are too lengthy for this paragraph, they should be addressed in the appropriate
annexes.
(5) Any be-prepared missions.
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(6) When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate
phases, the overall concept may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each
phase. Designate phases as Phase followed by the appropriate Roman numeral,
for example, Phase III.
d. Force Capability Requirements. Include a general summary of the major force

capabilities required to execute the concept. A detailed initial SOR can be attached as
required. NOTE: THIS IS GENERALLY NOT USED IN ROUTINE ORDERS FOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONOPS.
e. Tasks. Clearly state the missions or tasks for each manoeuvre unit that reports
directly to the HQ issuing the order. List units in the same sequence as in the task
organization, including reserves. Use a separate subparagraph for each manoeuvre unit.
Only state tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place
tactical tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3f.
f. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units

and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in
paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. Paragraphs 3f(1)
– 3f(4) are mandatory for base plans and orders. The remaining paragraphs are optional
and are provided as a reference for consideration.
(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
(2) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). List once only

here. Do not list in intelligence annex.
(a) Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
(b) Essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).
(c) Friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).
(3) Risk reduction control measures. These are measures unique to this
operation and not included in unit SOPs and can include mission-oriented
protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria (corps
only), vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.
(4) ROE. (NOTE: ROE can be addressed within its annex.)
(5) Timeline.
(6) FP.
(7) Environmental considerations.
(8) Any additional coordinating instructions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to
clarify the service support concept. Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include:
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a. Logistics Concept. State the concept of logistics support to provide manoeuvre

commanders and their staffs a visualization of how the operation will be logistically
supported. This could include:
(1) A brief synopsis of the support command mission.
(2) Support command HQ or support area locations, including locations of the

next higher logistic bases.
(3) The next higher level’s support priorities and where the unit fits into those
priorities.
(4) The commander’s priorities of support.
(5) Units in the next higher organization logistically supporting the unit.
(6) The use of HNS.
(7) Significant or unusual logistics and support issues that might impact the
overall operation.
(8) Any significant sustainment risks.
(9) Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming,

fuelling, fixing, moving, and sustaining personnel and their systems.
(10) The support concept organized into a framework based on operational

phasing, or presented as before, during, and after operations format.
b. Logistics Standards and Requirements. Outline the changes to the expected

logistic storage and requests required to ensure timely support.
c. Movement. Provide movement planning and relevant information. This may be

provided in greater detail in the movement annex.
d. Medical Support. Provide a list of medical support standards expected by

subordinates along with a list of supporting medical facilities and their capabilities.
Greater details may be provided in the medical annex.
e. Personnel Support. Identify any personnel reporting, movement or rotational

procedures, and support capabilities/limitations.
f. Host-nation Support. List the HNS along with capabilities, limitations, and
restrictions that will be utilized for the operation.
g. Funding and Contracting Support. Outline the funds available including their
purpose and procedures for utilization. Provide details on obtaining and using
contracting support by all units. Include any restrictions or limitations for the use of
funding or contracting for the operation.
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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Command and Control. Identify the chain and succession of command (if not
addressed in unit SOPs), applicable locations (as required), and command relationships
critical to the mission.
b. Communications. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs; identify the
specific instructions in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are
submitted.
NAME (Commander’s last name)
RANK (Commander’s rank)
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative
signs the original, add the phrase For the Commander. The signed copy is the historical
copy and remains in HQ files.
ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title in the correct order. If a particular annex is not
used, place a not used beside that annex letter.
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE WARNING ORDER
(Change from oral orders, if any)
Copy No. _of_copies

[Issuing Headquarters]
[Place of Issue (may be in code)]
[DD][TTTT][Z][Mmm][YYYY]84
[Message Reference No.]
WNGO No. [number]
REFERENCES: Refer to the applicable plan(s) and/or order(s), and list each reference
document used or required for this WNGO. Where there is more than one
reference, use a new line for each one, preceded by a subsequent letter
for each reference. Include references to maps, charts, and relevant
documents, as appropriate. Map identification will be shown as follows:
map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet
number (and name, if required), edition, grid reference system (where
more than one grid reference system or if different from NATO military grid
reference system), scale (if required). It is not necessary to list here
standard orders, SOPs, etc., which may be referred to in the body of the
order.
TIME ZONE: (optional)
1. SITUATION. Provide a short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate, the

political situation, enemy forces in the area of operations, anticipated attitude and actions of
friendly nations, forces available for planning, and assumptions that may significantly affect
planning. This paragraph can be further divided into subparagraphs as required. There are no
fixed titles and there is no fixed order of appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be
included, annexes may be used.
2. MISSION. State the SOCC’s mission in a single phrase, containing who (e.g. the
SOCC), what (e.g. will conduct ...), where (e.g. throughout the JOA), when (e.g. on order), and
why (e.g. in order to ...). If the mission hasn’t changed from the OPLAN/OPORD the WNGO
refers to, repeat the SOCC’s mission from the OPLAN/OPORD in full. If the SOCC’s mission
has changed, provide a clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be accomplished by the
SOCC and its purpose. This paragraph must not be subparagraphed.
3. EXECUTION
Intent85: Provide either the intent for the new mission, or state no change.
84 DTG of signature. This is the DTG at which the order is issued. It is also the DTG at which the order is effective
unless stated to the contrary in paragraph 3 of the order. It must include a time zone suffix.
85 Some nations’ usage is to include the intent within the CONOPS subparagraph.
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a. Concept of Operations.86 Either state no change, or state the CONOPS for the
new SOCC mission, providing as much detail as available. If COM SOCC desires that
specific phases or COAs be examined, they will be listed here.
b. Tasks/Mission to [Name of Subordinate Unit]. Subsequent subparagraphs

assign specific missions or tasks to each directly subordinate force. Either select Task(s)
or Mission in the title. The mission is given in a single phrase, containing who (i.e. the
subordinate unit named in the subparagraph’s title), what (one or more tasks), where,
when and why (i.e. the purpose). Where a number of tasks is required, link the tasks by a
singular, unifying purpose. Alternatively, list only the task(s) of the subordinate unit. List
only those tasks vital to the completion of the subordinate’s mission. For missions planned
to be executed at an unspecified time in the future, use on order to designate the when.
Use a separate subparagraph for each directly subordinate unit. List only the units
concerned by the WNGO, in the logical or chronological order of the plan. When the
SOCC’s initial estimate reveals that it is likely that an SOTG will request support from other
SOCC subordinates (e.g. the SOAC), include a subparagraph listing the (supporting)
task(s) for the subordinate, unless contraindicated by OPSEC considerations.
c. Coordinating Instructions. This is the final subparagraph of paragraph 3. It can

be further divided into subparagraphs as required. Include instructions not routinely
covered by SOPs and not to be part of other paragraphs. There are no fixed titles and
there is no fixed order of appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be
included, annexes may be used. The following subparagraphs are for guidance only and
may be deleted or modified, while others may be added.
(1) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. List PIRs and/or FFIRs,

as required.
(2) Tentative Planning Timings. Include tentative timings for planning, such as
time for receiving orders, preliminary movements, earliest anticipated launch time,
and anticipated mission duration.
(3) Constraints. List known operational constraints, such as overflight

restrictions, port clearance requirements, border crossing restrictions, limitations
on movements or reconnaissance, etc.
(4) Rules of Engagement. List applicable ROE, ROE modifications, or required

modifications for the upcoming mission.
(5) Coordination Instructions. List instructions for coordination between

commanders involved in the upcoming operations, as required.
(6) Guidance
(a) Risk Guidance. Provide instructions for implementing control

measures to reduce risks to acceptable/manageable levels. Include risk
assessment requirements and residual risk levels above which SOCC or
higher HQ approval will be required prior to mission execution.
86Not to be confused with CONOPS meaning an abbreviated draft OPLAN, which is a formal stand-alone planning
product developed before a full OPLAN is finalized.
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(b) Operations Security and Deception Guidance. Provide instructions

for maintaining OPSEC before, during, and after the upcoming operation,
and for the use of deception plans, as applicable.
(c) Psychological Operations Guidance. Provide instructions for

PsyOps, as required.
(d) Intelligence Guidance. Provide instructions related to intelligence,

including intelligence support, as required.
(e) Counter-intelligence Guidance. Provide instructions for CI measures,

as required.
(f) Civil-military Cooperation Guidance. Provide instructions for CIMIC,

as required.
(g) Public Affairs Guidance. Provide instructions for PA, as required.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. Provide either new instructions not covered by SOPs, or

state no change. Include administrative and logistic arrangements such as legal status of
personnel, dress, equipment, resupply, medical support, and detainee handling instructions. This
paragraph can be further divided into subparagraphs. There are no fixed titles and there is no fixed
order of appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be included, annexes may be used.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Provide either new instructions not covered by SOPs or
communications and electronics operating instructions (CEOI), or state no change. Include
command and signal instructions as required, such as communications guidance, command
relationships, code words or nicknames for the operation, reporting instructions, directions for
granting direct liaison authority between commanders, and command post locations. This
paragraph can be further divided into subparagraphs. There are no fixed titles and there is no fixed
order of appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be included, annexes may be used.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Instructions for the acknowledgement of an order are given here if required.
The word ACKNOWLEDGE may suffice. An acknowledgement to a WNGO means that it has
been received and understood.
[commander’s last name in capitals]
[commander’s rank]
OFFICIAL: Use only when applicable. Have the original copy (No. 1) signed by the
commander or a specifically authorized representative. If the commander or designated
representative signs a master copy, no further authentication is required. If the signature is not
reproduced, authentication by the appropriate staff officer is required on all subsequent hard
copies and only the last name and the rank of the commander appear in the signature block.
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ANNEXES:
1. [Title of Annex 1]
2. [Title of Annex 2] (This is an example of how to format an annex title that is more than
one line long.)
Only mention annexes if applicable. The main purpose of annexes is to keep the basic text of
an order short. Annexes provide amplifying information that is not appropriate in the main
order, or information that amplifies a specific aspect of the order, not pertinent to all addressees
of an order. An annex is an integral part of an order. An annex may be written, or take the form
of a trace, overlay, overprinted map, sketch, plan, or table. It may be used to give the detail of
any part of the order where appropriate. The number and type of annexes used is governed by
the needs of the particular order. Each annex must be referred to in the text of the main
document. Annexes are lettered alphabetically in capitals (A, B, C, etc.). Annexes may have
one or more appendices which are numbered and must be listed under the heading
APPENDICES and which must similarly be referred to in their parent annex. They must contain
a security classification. Those annexes which are issued at different times from the main order
must, in addition, contain a heading, signature of the commander, or his appropriate
representative, or authentication, acknowledgement instructions, and a distribution list.
DISTRIBUTION: Give the distribution list in full, including addressees for action and for
information.
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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE FRAGMENTARY ORDER
(Change from oral orders, if any)
Copy No. _of_copies

[Issuing Headquarters]
[Place of Issue (may be in code)]
[DD][TTTT][Z][Mmm][YYYY]87
[Message Reference No.]
FRAGO No. [number]
REFERENCES: Reference the order being modified, and list all other reference documents
used or required for the FRAGO. Where there is more than one
reference, use a new line for each one, preceded by a subsequent letter
for each reference. Include references to maps, charts, and relevant
documents as appropriate. Map identification will be shown as follows:
map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet
number (and name, if required), edition, grid reference system (where
more than one grid reference system or if different from NATO military grid
reference system), and scale (if required). It is not necessary to list here
standard orders, SOPs, etc., which may be referred to in the body of the
order.
TIME ZONE: (optional)
TASK ORGANIZATION: Provide either new information or state no change. This information
may be provided in paragraph 3 or in an annex, which may be in text or graphical form. Under
this heading, as appropriate, give the subdivision of the force, including attached units, and
command relationships, together with the names and ranks of the commanders when
necessary.
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces. Provide either new information or state no change. This

subparagraph can be further divided as required. If too lengthy, an annex may be used
and referred to instead.
b. Friendly Forces. Provide either new information or state no change. This

subparagraph can be further divided as required.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Provide either new information or state no

change. Units attached to or detached, together with the names of commanders and the
times they are effective, may be listed here, in an annex, or both.
87DTG of signature. This is the DTG at which the order is issued. It is also the DTG at which the order is effective
unless stated to the contrary in paragraph 3 of the order. It must include a time zone suffix.
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d. Commander’s Evaluation. This is an optional subparagraph to be used when

directed. It gives briefly the commander’s evaluation of the situation.
2. MISSION. State the SOCC’s mission in a single phrase, containing who (e.g. the
SOCC), what (e.g. will conduct ...), where (e.g. throughout the JOA), when (e.g. on order), and
why (e.g. in order to ...). If the mission hasn’t changed from the OPLAN/OPORD to which the
FRAGO refers, repeat the SOCC’s mission from the OPLAN/OPORD in full. If the SOCC’s
mission has changed, provide a clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be accomplished by
the SOCC and its purpose. The mission is then given to COM SOCC from his superior, if
applicable. In certain circumstances, however, a COM SOCC may derive his own mission in
the interests of clarity and understanding. This situation may apply when the commander has
not received a clear and succinct mission from his superior, or when his mission analysis
reveals a critical task that is crucial to the success of his mission, and that, in his judgement,
must be emphasized. It is unlikely that the purpose of the mission will change and any new
mission statement should support the superior’s intent. Wherever possible, however, this
mission should be confirmed with his superior before being used as the basis of orders to
subordinates. This paragraph must not be subparagraphed.
3. EXECUTION
Intent:88 Provide either the intent for the new mission, or state no change. The
commander’s intent, which should be developed by the commander personally, is a
concise and precise statement of what COM SOCC intends to do and why. It includes
the operation’s purpose and the conditions that define the end state (i.e. the political
and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation that indicates the
objective has been achieved). The intent focuses on the end state and may contain key
tasks, but does not state the method for the force to achieve the end state.89 The intent
must be easy to remember and clearly understood two echelons down, to help
subordinates focus on what has to be accomplished so that mission accomplishment is
possible in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. Typically,
the intent statement is a few sentences long. This subparagraph is not numbered.
a. Concept of Operations.90 Provide either the CONOPS for the new SOCC mission
or state no change. Briefly describe the scheme of manoeuvre, i.e. how COM SOCC
visualizes the execution of the operation from start to completion, sequentially stating
where, when, and how the force is to achieve its purpose. If the operation involves two or
more clearly distinct and separate phases, number and describe each phase in a separate
subparagraph. If applicable, state the main effort (i.e. a concentration of forces or means
in a particular area and at a particular time to enable the commander to bring about a
decision) for each phase, if different by phase. Include key timings (for example, on order
or references to H-hour), priorities for fire or other combat support, and an outline of any
critical supporting plans (such as reserve options or deception) as required. The CONOPS
focuses on the method to achieve the end state.
b. Tasks/Mission to [Name of Subordinate Unit]. Subsequent subparagraphs

assign specific missions or tasks to each directly subordinate force, and give details of the
88 Some nations’ usage is to include the intent within the CONOPS subparagraph.
89 The end state will occur when the mission is achieved. Research has shown that expressing an end state in
tactical-level orders generally contributes to, rather than reduces, confusion on the part of subordinates. It might
therefore be recommended not to actually write the end state.
90 Not to be confused with CONOPS, meaning an abbreviated draft OPLAN, which is a formal stand-alone planning
product developed before a full OPLAN is finalized.
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NSHQ 80-002
task organization/groupings if not included under Task Organization or in an annex. Use

either Task(s) or Mission in the paragraph header. The mission is given in a single phrase,
containing who (i.e. the subordinate unit named in the subparagraph’s title), what (one or
more tasks), where, when, and why (i.e. the purpose). Where several tasks are required,
link the tasks by a single, unifying purpose. Alternatively, list only the task(s) of the
subordinate unit, especially when a complete mission statement is not possible, as is
usually the case when tasking reserves. List only those tasks vital to completion of the
subordinate’s mission. Do not include lesser or implied tasks; instead, include less
important tasks elsewhere in the FRAGO (typically under Coordinating Instructions) as
required. For missions planned to be executed at an unspecified time in the future after
the FRAGO becomes in effect, use on order to designate the when. For missions/tasks
that might, but not necessarily will, be executed after the FRAGO becomes in effect, use
be prepared to to designate the when. Use a separate subparagraph for each directly
subordinate unit. List only the units concerned by the FRAGO, in task organization
sequence, or preferably, in the logical or chronological order of the plan rather than by
administrative precedence, to help visualize how the plan will unfold. When the SOCC’s
initial estimate reveals that it is likely that an SOTG will request support from other SOCC
subordinates (e.g. the SOAC), include a subparagraph listing the (supporting) task(s) for
the subordinate, unless contraindicated by OPSEC considerations. Place tasks that affect
two or more units in Coordinating Instructions.
c. Coordinating Instructions. This is the final subparagraph of paragraph 3. It can

be further divided as required. Provide either new instructions or state no change.
Include instructions not routinely covered by SOPs and not to be part of other
paragraphs. Typically, such instructions might include tasks applicable to all
subordinates covered by the FRAGO, boundaries of operational area, routes, contact
points, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of different subordinate
elements. There are no fixed titles and there is no fixed order of appearance. For
instructions that are too lengthy to be included, annexes may be used. The following
subparagraphs are for guidance only and may be deleted or modified, while others may
be added.
(1) Tasks to [Subordinate Unit Names]. List tasks that affect more than one
unit. Use a separate subparagraph for each grouping of units that have the same
task(s), and within each subparagraph, use a new line for each task.
(2) Planning Guidance. Include guidance related to planning, such as planning

assumptions and planning limitations. Clearly define mission approval authority
and mission execution authority, and state if the subordinate’s CONOPS has to be
briefed to COM SOCC and/or staff.
(3) Operational Area(s). List the name(s) and detail operation limits
(coordinates, height limits, times of operation) of new operational areas (e.g.
JSOA, AOO) to be used for the upcoming operation.
(4) Timelines. Specify key planning timings, such as notice to move time,
earliest anticipated launch time, not-later-than time for action at the objective,
expected mission duration, etc.
(5) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
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NSHQ 80-002
(a) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List those intelligence

requirements concerning the adversary and the environment that the
commander considers critical to assist him in reaching a decision and
making his plan.
1/
2/
3/
(b) Friendly Force Information Requirements. List requirements for

information the commander needs to know about his own forces and
supporting capabilities that might affect the commander’s ability to
accomplish the mission.
1/
2/
3/
(6) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List friendly information the

commander does not want to reveal to the enemy, i.e. key questions likely to be
asked by adversaries about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities,
so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(7) Rules of Engagement. List applicable ROE, ROE modifications, or required

modifications for the upcoming mission.
(8) Operation Security Measures. Provide instructions for maintaining OPSEC

before, during, and after the upcoming operation.
(9) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Measures. Provide

instructions for mitigating the CBRN threat when operating in a (potentially)
contaminated environment, if applicable.
(10) Battlefield Identification Instructions. Provide instructions for the

identification of subordinate units during mission execution as required.
(11) Risk Reduction Control Measures. Provide instructions for implementing

control measures to reduce risks to acceptable/manageable levels; include risk
assessment requirements, and residual risk levels above which SOCC or higher
HQ approval will be required prior to mission execution.
(12) Mission Designation Numbers. List the mission designation number(s) for
the upcoming mission, if used.
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NSHQ 80-002
(13) Reporting Instructions. Provide reporting requirements for the subordinate

unit, such as specific periodic reporting and the requirement to submit an OPSUM
following mission completion. (Note: Do not provide details of communications
procedures related to reporting here; these will be detailed in paragraph 5).
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. Provide either new instructions not covered by SOPs

or state no change. Include administrative and logistic arrangements such as legal status of
personnel, dress, equipment, resupply, medical support, and detainee handling instructions.
This paragraph can be further divided into subparagraphs. There are no fixed titles and there is
no fixed order of appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be included, annexes may
be used.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Provide either new instructions not covered by SOPs or
CEOI, or state no change. Include command relationships (add a C2 diagram for visual
clarification, if appropriate); delegation and succession of command; liaisons to be maintained;
conditions under which direct liaison authority is granted for planning; current and planned
command post locations with their times of activation and deactivation; primary, alternate,
contingency, and emergency communications methods (add a communications architecture
diagram for visual clarification, as appropriate); electronic and non-electronic communications
procedures and schedules (including no-radio procedures); frequencies; call signs; code words;
countersigns (challenge and reply/password); recognition and identification instructions;
electronic emission constraints; and instructions for the use of execution checklists. For
additional aircrew specific information, refer to ATO SPINS, if applicable. This paragraph can
be further divided into subparagraphs. There are no fixed titles and there is no fixed order of
appearance. For instructions that are too lengthy to be included, annexes may be used.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Instructions for the acknowledgement of an order are given here if required.
The word ACKNOWLEDGE may suffice. An acknowledgement to a FRAGO means that it has
been received and understood.
[commander’s last name in capitals]
[commander’s rank]
OFFICIAL: Use only when applicable. Have the original copy (No. 1) signed by the
commander or a specifically authorized representative. If the commander or designated
representative signs a master copy, no further authentication is required. If the signature is not
reproduced, authentication by the appropriate staff officer is required on all subsequent hard
copies and only the last name and the rank of the commander appear in the signature block.
ANNEXES:
1. [Title of Annex 1]
2. [Title of Annex 2] (This is an example of how to format an annex title that is more than
one line long.)
Only mention annexes if applicable. The main purpose of annexes is to keep the basic text of
an order short. Annexes provide amplifying information that is not appropriate in the main
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NSHQ 80-002
order, or information that amplifies a specific aspect of the order, not pertinent to all addressees
of an order. An annex is an integral part of an order. An annex may be written or take the form
of a trace, overlay, overprinted map, sketch, plan, or table. It may be used to give the detail of
any part of the order where appropriate. The number and type of annexes used is governed by
the needs of the particular order. Each annex must be referred to in the text of the main
document. Annexes are lettered alphabetically in capitals (A, B, C, etc.). Annexes may have
one or more appendices which are numbered and must be listed under the heading
APPENDICES and which must similarly be referred to in their parent annex. They must contain
a security classification. Those annexes that are issued at different times from the main order
must, in addition, contain a heading, signature of the commander, or his appropriate
representative, or authentication, acknowledgement instructions, and a distribution list.
DISTRIBUTION: Give the distribution list in full, including addressees for action and for
information.
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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE MISSION EXECUTION ORDER
The MEO is a SOCC order used to authorize the SOTG to execute a mission. The MEO is
normally drafted by the J35 section and issued by J3 Current Operations once CONOPS
approval has been granted. CONOPS approval authority is normally promulgated via the
SOCC SUPPLAN or a theatre-specific tactical directive.
PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:
MISSION EXECUTION ORDER XXX/01 – OP (NAME)
REFERENCES: A. JFC OPLAN//FRAGO .../01 OP NAME, dated

B. SOCC SUPPLAN/FRAGO.../01 OP NAME, dated
C. SOTG CONOPS OP NAME, dated
D. Maps: Name, Series, Edition, Scale
TIME ZONE: (ZULU)
1. SITUATION. Provide an overview of the general situation if the situation has changed
since the mission tasking was issued, using the following headings.
a. Enemy Forces. Provide enemy composition, disposition, capabilities,

vulnerabilities, and intentions. Refer to the approved SOTG CONOPS, intelligence
annexes, INTSUMS, and other reports. If no change from the approved SOTG
CONOPS, indicate by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.
b. Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces other than those

subordinate to the SOCC HQ that may affect the action of the tasked SOTG. Refer to
the approved SOTG CONOPS for information; if no change, indicate by stating No
change from Reference C in this paragraph.
2. MISSION. Confirm mission statement; refer to approved SOTG CONOPS.
3. EXECUTION. Include any changes to the following:
a. Concept of Operations. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate

by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.
b. Subordinate Tasks. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate by

stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.
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c. Coordinating Instructions. Authorize the mission execution. Confirm the earliest

anticipated launch time and state any other instructions for coordination when the
mission involves conventional/HN or inter-agency forces. Include the allocated RFAs.
d. GO/NO-GO Criteria. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate by

stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. State the applicable administrative and logistic support

arrangements. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate by stating No change
from Reference C in this paragraph.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Indicate any changes to CEOI, HQ locations, code words,
code names, and liaison. If no change from the SOCC SUPPLAN and the approved SOTG
CONOPS, indicate No change from Reference B or C in this paragraph.
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE OPERATION SUMMARY
The OPSUM summarizes the conduct of an operation and identifies lessons learned; the
OPSUM forms the basis of post-op reports and ensures that the corporate body of knowledge is
not lost during an operation. The SOTG submits an OPSUM to the SOCC as soon as possible
after the post-mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element. Timescales for
OPSUM submission are normally promulgated via the SOCC SUPPLAN or a theatre-specific
tactical directive.
PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:
OPSUM: OP (NAME)
1. Background. Include the following data:
a. Subunit/call sign/strength (including HN involvement).
b. Period. Time over which mission was conducted.
c. Mission. Refer to approved SOTG CONOPS and replicate the mission statement.
d. Target location.
2. Operations Summary. Include the following data:
a. Evaluation of Results. State whether original plan was followed (if not, outline
deviations and rationale). State whether mission was successful or unsuccessful (if
unsuccessful, outline the reasons).
b. Friendly Losses (including HN if involved).
c. Enemy Losses/Detainees. Indicate count or estimate of enemy losses. Detail

who is responsible for handling detainees and to which organization they will be handed
over for onward processing.
d. Intelligence. Significant intelligence observations and reports. State whether a

separate INTSUM will be submitted for this mission.
e. Lessons Identified. Significant lessons identified, with emphasis on target

development, mission execution, and factors to be considered for further missions of this
sort.
f. Other. Other significant information.
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NSHQ 80-002
3. Recommendations. This paragraph should provide options for processing lessons

identified in paragraph 2e. This affords the SOCC the opportunity to mitigate risk from known
issues and ensures that lessons identified from previous missions are taken into account when
planning future missions of a similar nature.
4. Sensitive Site Exploitation/Technical Exploitation Operations. State whether TEOs

were undertaken and what, if any, significant material was taken off the target that can be
exploited; detail which organization will be completing the exploitation. Efforts must be taken to
document three types of association: the first linking materials to a location, the second the
association of materials to a person, and the third associating materials to a place. An
appropriate level of detail describing exploitation efforts and results should be compiled into a
logical and readable format and included in the post-operations report. This will ensure a
method of dissemination to various organizations internal to the SOCC is established to support
future operations.
5. Other. Any additional information from the operation (e.g. photographs, images,
forensics data) that may enhance the OPSUM, assist with future targeting and collection, or that
have Info Ops implications may accompany the OPSUM as a PowerPoint presentation or
storyboard.
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Intelligence staffs use the INTSUM to communicate a succinct summary of the intelligence
situation for the reporting period and to provide an assessment and estimation of the emerging
enemy situation. The format may be adjusted to meet the operational situation.
PRECEDENCE: The precedence for most INTSUMs is [Routine]. The higher HQs establish
procedures and provide guidance in the plan, an order, or subsequent procedural documents.
DTG: Written in day, Zulu time, month, year format [051500Z Sep 09]. The time INTSUMs are
submitted is established by the higher HQ.
FROM: SOCC
TO: JTF HQ
CLASSIFICATION: The classification guidance is provided in the plan, an order, or subsequent

procedural documents.
INTSUM: OP (NAME) (PERIOD OF REPORT)
1. General Summary. Provide an overview of the current situation.
2. Adversary Situation. Summarize the significant activities of the reporting period as they
have affected the subordinate elements/units. The SOCC J2 summarizes the bigger picture.
Include the following information on the land, air, and maritime forces:
a. Summary of activity.
b. Personnel and equipment losses.
c. New identifications (actors or systems).
d. Movements.
e. Assessed capabilities and vulnerabilities.
3. Other Actors. Summarize the significant activities of the reporting period as they have
affected the subordinate elements/units. The SOCC J2 summarizes the bigger picture. Include
the following information:
a. Summary of activity.
b. Personnel losses.
c. New identifications (actors or systems).
d. Movements.
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NSHQ 80-002
e. Assessed capabilities and vulnerabilities.
4. Assessment. Conclude the INTSUM with an assessment of the relative situation and
predictive analysis of what to expect in the next reporting period.
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE SITUATION REPORT
SITREPs are used by HQs, commanders, and leaders to monitor the daily situation and
operations from a bottom-up perspective. SITREPs are produced daily by each of the
subordinate SOTGs and the SOAC (or SOATG if providing special air warfare C2 functions),
capturing all relevant information from subordinate units and/or elements that is required to be
reported to the SOCC. On receipt of the subordinate SITREPs, the SOCC produces a SITREP
for distribution in line with extant COM JFC guidance. Due to the nature of special operations
and its operational effects, the SOCC’s SITREP is reviewed by a large audience at the
operational and strategic levels. For this reason, the SOCC’s SITREP is not merely a product
created by cutting and pasting information from subordinate elements into a compiled document
to forward to the higher HQs. Staff officers and leaders must take the time to compile the
SITREP so that it includes pertinent information relevant to readers and ensure that it includes
critical analysis to provide an accurate picture of the theatre of operations from the SOCC’s
perspective.
This annex provides a generic template with instructions and guidance to aid production of the
daily SITREP. During a deployment, guidance from the higher HQ and COM SOCC may
require modification of the SITREP format and information required in various paragraphs of the
report.
PRECEDENCE: The precedence for most SITREPs is [Routine]. The higher HQs establish
DTG: Written in day, Zulu time, month, year format (e.g. 051500Z Sep 09). The time SITREPs
are submitted is established by the higher HQs.
FROM: SOCC
TO: JTF HQ

SITREP (number) – SOCC OP (period of report) The number is a sequential reference

number that begins with 001 and continues throughout the operation. The period of the report
is for the specified previous 24-hour period as determined by the higher HQs and is written in
the same format as the DTG.
1. LOCSTAT. Provide the location of the SOCC HQ and personnel status—number of

deployed personnel under the C2 of the SOCC.
2. SITUATION
a. Enemy. Units that produce a daily INTSUM (e.g. the SOCC) may refer to the
INTSUM. Subordinate units that do not produce a daily INTSUM should provide an
updated INTSUM of the enemy situation during the 24-hour reporting period.
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NSHQ 80-002
b. Friendly. The friendly situation provides a summary of relevant information during

the 24-hour reporting period about HN security forces, partnering forces, key leaders,
and any organizations supporting NATO SOF that are not assigned to the SOCC.
c. Local Population and Atmospherics. Provide a summary of key or significant

events, summaries of any interaction with relevant actors, and any information regarding
media and public opinions (local atmospherics) that may be of value for targeting, Info
Ops, and/or strategic communications.
3. OPERATIONS. Provide a brief synopsis of the events listed in the operations paragraph
(e.g. number of operations by type, highlighted result of a particular mission, projected mission
execution of a significant operation).
a. Last 24 Hours
(1) SOTG/U XX. Each subordinate task group or unit that reports directly to the
SOCC is listed individually by unit designation with a summary of significant
activities during the previous 24-hour reporting period.
b. Next 24 Hours
(1) SOTG/U XX. Each subordinate task group or unit that reports directly to the
SOCC is listed individually by unit designation with a projection of significant
activities during the upcoming 24-hour reporting period.
4. AIR OPERATIONS. Provide a brief synopsis of the events listed in the air operations
paragraph (e.g. number of operations by type, highlighted result of a particular mission,
projected mission execution of a significant operation).
a. Last 24 Hours
(1) SOATG/U XX. Each subordinate air task group or unit that reports directly
to the SOCC, SOAC, or SOATG providing overall C2 (depending on the situation)
is listed individually by unit designation with a summary of significant activities
during the previous 24-hour reporting period.
(2) SOATG/U XX. …
b. Next 24 Hours
(1) SOATG/U XX. Each subordinate air task group or unit that reports directly
to the SOCC, SOAC, or SOATG providing overall C2 (depending on the situation)
is listed individually by unit designation with a projection of significant activities
during the upcoming 24-hour reporting period.
(2) SOATG/U XX. …
5. LOGISTICS STATUS. Information in this paragraph is determined by the commander or

higher HQs policy. Items to consider are listed below and are normally represented in a
remaining percentage of 30 days of supply (DOS). Colour codes may be used to highlight the
status and are designated by the commander or higher HQs policy. Paragraphs may also be
listed by classes of supply, tracking information important for monitoring logistics status. The
information provided below is a summary of the entire SOCC, including subordinate elements.
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a. Food. Green (93% of 30 DOS)
b. Water
c. Fuel
d. Ammunition
e. Sensitive and Major Items
6. COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT. The J3, or other designated member of the

command, may be tasked to provide a daily commander’s assessment based on their level of
situational understanding. Often, this is the first paragraph that is read by higher HQs or other
leaders at the operational and strategic levels; therefore, it must be well written and provide an
assessment or information of the greatest SOCC value. The commander’s assessment is
information that the commander wants to highlight for immediate action or that provides the
greatest contribution to COM JFC’s campaign design or desired operational effects. This
section should not simply repeat verbatim information contained in other sections of the
SITREP.
(commander)
(rank)
COM SOCC
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Intelligence staffs use the INTREP to communicate both routine and significant intelligence
information that might vitally influence current or pending operations.
PRECEDENCE: The precedence for most INTREPs is [Routine]. The higher HQs establish
DTG: Written in day, Zulu time, month, year format (e.g. 051500Z Sep 09). The time INTREPs
are submitted is established by the higher HQs.
FROM: SOCC
TO: JTF HQ

INTREP
1. What. Specify the activity identified, including number and type of personnel, and
number and type of equipment.
2. When. DTG of observation.
3. Where. Accurate location and any direction of movement if applicable.
4. How. Note method of acquiring intelligence if applicable.
5. Assessment/Comments
a. Reliability.
b. Deductions.
c. Conclusions.
d. Additional Comments. Any additional information needed for clarification of report.
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APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE MISSION REPORT
Mission Data Unit Data

Classification Unit (Name and Nation)
Operation Name POC
Mission ATO Identifier Unit Phone
MISREP Identifier Email Address
A Reporting Unit
1 Aircraft Type and Tail No
2 Call Sign
3 Aircraft Equipment and Capabilities
4 Type of Mission
5 Location of Mission/Event
6 Time Period of Mission/Event
7 Weather During Time Period of
Mission/Event
8 Supporting Assets
B General Text
1 Amplifying Notes to Support Section A
C Narrative
1 Supporting Narrative of Mission/Event
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST
MEDEVAC “9-LINE” REQUEST DTG UNIT

1 Location (Grid of Pickup Zone)
2 Call Sign and Frequency
Number of Patients and Precedence A B C
A – URGENT: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 2 hours (save LLE) after wounding
3
B – URGENT SURGERY: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 2 hours (surgical) after wounding
C – PRIORITY: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 4 hours after wounding
Special Equipment Required (Select equipment below by checking on the box.)
4
A – None B – Hoist/Winch C – Extraction D – Ventilator
Number of Patients/Type L A E
5
L – Litter (Stretcher) A – Ambulatory (Walking) E – Escorts (e.g. for child patient)
Security at Pickup Zone (Select security below by checking on the box.)
E – Enemy in P – Possible
N – No Enemy X – Hot Pickup
6 Area Enemy
Zone, Armed
I – IED Cleared S – Secured by V – Number of
Escort Required
20M Around FF Vehicles
Pickup Zone Marking Method (Select marking below by checking on the box.)
7 A – Panels B – Pyro C – Smoke D – None
E – Other (explain)
/ / / / / /
Number of Patients/Nationality/Status
/ / / / / /
8 A – Coalition Military B – Civilian with Coalition Forces
C – Non-coalition Security Forces D – Non-coalition Civilian
E – Opposing Forces/POW/Detainee F – Child
9 Pickup Zone Terrain/Obstacles
DO NOT DELAY LAUNCH OF MEDEVAC – SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION ONCE AVAILABLE
M Mechanism of Injury (and at what time) Time
I Injury or Illness Sustained
Symptoms and Vital Signs A B C

S
D E
A – Airway B – Breathing Rate C – Pulse Rate D – Conscious or Unconscious E – Other Signs
T Treatment Given (e.g. morphine)
Notes:
NATO APRV’S MSN AVN AUTH’S LAUNCH
W/U W/D/D W/U W/D
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NSHQ 80-002
APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST

DTG of Mission Unit Name
Mission Name POC
Received (ddmmmyyyy) Unit Phone
Approved By (Name) Email Address
A Requesting Unit
1 Unit (Name, Nation)
2 Call Sign
3 Frequency
4 Location Accuracy (low, medium, high)
5 Location/s (might be several)
Lat/Long or MGRS
6 Elevation (feet MSL)
7 Capabilities (weapons, signalling devices,
FAC, comms (LOS/BLOS), downlink, etc.)
8 Notes
B CAS/ISR
1 Action Requested
2 Target Type
3 Target Location Accuracy (low, medium, high)
4 Target location/s (list all) Lat/Long or MGRS
5 Target Size (feet/metres, L x W)
6 Elevation – feet MSL
7 TOT(z) (time window)
8 Attack Axis (deg mag)
9 Deconfliction (other assets operating in
vicinity)
10 Friendly Locations – Lat/Long or MGRS
11 Threats – type, location
12 Notes
C TRANSPORT/RESUPPLY
Pickup Point Deploy Point Cargo
Lat/Long Time(z) Other Info* Lat/Long Time(z) Other Info* PAX Cargo Total
or or MGRS Dimension Weight
MGRS (lbs)
Notes
* Other information to list: markers, call signs, frequencies, etc.
L-11-1
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APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE AIR CONTROL MEANS REQUEST
1 Type of ACM
2 DTG POC:
3 Priority A. Low B. Medium C. High
4 ACM Description
A Type/Number
B Shape
C Width/Radius
D Height/Elevation
E Period
F Coordinates
5 Reason for ACM
6 Enemy Information Threat:
Hazards:
Remarks:
7 Air Coordination: (SPINS Version/Change)
A Weapon Status
B Control Agency CAOC: Frequency:
C Type of Control
D Entry/Exit Procedures
E Remarks
8 Fire Coordination Yes No Reason
9 Offered By Name Position Date/Time
Report No:
Unit/Section Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
J3 Air Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
AOC Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
CAOC Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time
1 ACO ID
2 POC (further coordination if required)
3 Remarks
L-12-1
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APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR TASK GROUP ASSETS CAPABILITY MATRIX
1 General
a Unit name
b Contact details
c Assets
d Location
e Type and number
f National caveats
g Red card holder
2 Operational Capabilities
a Speed
b Range
c Instrument flying rules (IFR) capable
d Night vision device (NVD) capable
e Forward looking infrared (FLIR) capable
f Air refuellable
g Amphibious platform
3 Communications
TYPE FREQ RANGE (xxx.xxx-yyy.yyy) INCREMENT (zzKHz)
a HF
b VHF-AM
c VHF-FM
d UHF
e SATCOM C
f SATCOM M
g IRIDIUM
h GSM
i PLS
j Secure
4 Navigation
a Inertia navigation system (INS)
b GPS
c TACAN
d VHF omni-directional Range IVOR)
e ADF
f Doppler/map display
g UHF-DF
h PLS locator
i Blue force tracker
5 Infiltration and Recovery Capabilities
a Number of ambulatory passengers
b Number and type of litters
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c Special rescue equipment Yes/No

Hoist
Divers
Search and rescue (SAR) swimmer
Horse collar
Rescue basket
Forest penetrator
Fast roping capable
Special insertion and extraction (SPIE) capable
Rope ladder
Extractor kit
Emergency medical kit
d EF (numbers and composition)
6 Armament Self-protection
a Armament, type, and position (e.g. 762 mini-gun, 2,000 mds,
sidefire)
b EW suite: IRCM, CW jammer, MWS, etc.
c Flares
d Chaff
e Ballistic self-protection
f Laser range finder/pointer
7 Operational and Logistical Limitations
a Night flying capability
b Weather minima
c Maximum operating altitude
d What is the alert status when QRF?
e Other (operational) minima
f Maximum number of sorties per day/week/month
g Maximum number of flying hours per day/week/month
h Who can extend crew duty time or shrink crew rest time?
i Rotor turning refuel capable?
j What side is the fuel port on?
k NATO refuel nozzle capable?
l How long does it take to refuel aircraft (rotors turning and
cold refuel)?
m How much fuel does the aircraft take?
o FARP capability
8 Standard Combat Load
a Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 250lbs/120kg per
soldier)
b Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 200lbs/90kg per
soldier)
c Number of civilian pax (estimate 170lbs/80kg per person)
d Max weight of cargo given flight distances of 30 min, 1 hr, 2
hr, 3 hr
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APPENDIX 14 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE AIR TASKING ORDER
SOATGs/SOATUs may request from SOTGs to perform simple tasks that may not require the
development of a CONOPS, like the relocation of SOF troops or goods in friendly territory. For
these kinds of tasks the SOCC J3 air may issue an ATO, including the AIRSUPREQ from the
SOTG to the supporting SOATG/SOATU.
Appendix …..
AIR TASKING ORDER (ATO)
SOCC HQ
________
____Z___
AIRTASKORD____
REFERENCES:
1. SITUATION.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
ACKNOWLEDGE.
Signed._____________
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Table L-4-1. Example Air Support Request
1. Mission Data 2. Unit Data

a. DTG of Mission: a. Unit Name:
b. Mission Name: b. POC:
RECEIVED (ddmmyyyy) c. Unit Phone:
APPROVED BY (name) d. Email Address:
A REQUESTING UNIT
1 UNIT (Name, Nation)
2 CALL SIGN
3 FREQ
4 LOCATION ACCURACY (low, medium, high)
5 LOCATION(S) (might be several) – Lat/Long or MGRS
6 ELEVATION – feet MSL
7 CAPABILITIES (weapons, signalling devices, FAC, etc.)
8 NOTES
B CAS/ISR
1 ACTION REQUESTED (Surveillance, RECCE, Destroy)
2 TARGET TYPE
3 TARGET LOCATION ACCURACY (low, medium, high)
TARGET LOCATION(S) (might be several) – Lat/Long
4
or MGRS
5 TARGET SIZE (feet/m L x W)
6 ELEVATION – feel MSL
7 TOT(z) (time window)
8 ATTACK AXIS (deg mag)
9 DECONFLICTION (other assets operating in vicinity)
10 FRIENDLY LOCATIONS – Lat/Long or MGRS
11 THREATS – type, location
12 NOTES
C TRANSPORT/RESUPPLY
PICKUP POINT DEPLOYPOINT CARGO
Lat/Long Time (z) Other Lat/Long Time (z) Other Pax Cargo TOT
or Info or Info Dimen- Weight
MGRS (marker, MGRS (marker, sions (lbs)
call sign, call sign,
freq, freq,
etc.) etc.)
NOTES
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APPENDIX 15 TO
ANNEX L TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
EXAMPLE SUPPORT REQUEST

DTG of Mission Unit Name
Mission Name POC
Received Unit Phone
Approved By Email Address
Requesting Unit
1 Unit Name
2 Nation
3 Call Sign
4 Frequency
5 Location Accuracy (low, medium, high)
6 Location(s) (might be several)
Lat/Long or MGRS
7 Elevation (feet MSL)
8 Notes
TRANSPORT/(AIR) RESUPPLY
Pickup Point Deploy/ Dropping Point Cargo
Lat/Long Time(z) Other Lat/Long Time(z) Other PAX RIC Cargo Total
or MGRS Info* or MGRS Info* Dimension Weight
(lbs)
PERSONNEL
Number Skill requirements Additional information
L-15-1
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX M TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAMPAIGN
1. What Is a SOF Campaign, and How Does It Support the Joint Campaign?
a. A campaign is set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a

strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve
SOF, maritime, land, and air forces.91
(1) In support of the Alliance’s three core tasks, operations are directed at the
military-strategic level and planned, conducted, and sustained at the operational
and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational, or
tactical, based on their intended effect or contribution to achieving the stated
objectives. The relationship between the three levels is illustrated in Figure M-1,
which also shows that they are not directly linked to a particular size of unit.92
Figure M-1. The Levels of Military Operations
91 AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

92 AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine.
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(2) At the tactical level, operations and engagements are usually planned and
executed within an overall campaign. As SOF may offer the Alliance a unique
capability to achieve operational objectives and create strategic effects, 93 SOCCs
may approach a campaign in a manner different than other components. SOF
capabilities are generally applied through a longer period of time, usually by a
carefully balanced combination of all three principal SOF tasks to achieve these
operational objectives and to create desired strategic effects. Therefore, most
special operations in support of an overall campaign should be conducted within a
SOF campaign that sequences military tasks, activities, engagements, and
mission sets along (SOF) lines of operations within the SOCC operational design.
b. A SOF campaign should be defined as a set of mostly tactical special operations

planned and conducted to achieve operational objectives and create strategic effects
within a given time and geographical area, which normally involves maritime, land, and
air SOF and enablers.
2. How Does the Overall Campaign Translate Into a Supporting Special Operations
Campaign?
a. SOF integration in operational-level planning and collaborative, parallel planning is

described in NATO Allied joint publications, SOPs, the COPD, and the SOCC Planning
Handbook. The intent of this paragraph is not to summarize that standing body of work,
but rather to deliver a recipe to translate the overall campaign into a supporting SOF
campaign.
b. Key to developing a SOF campaign is full comprehension of the overall campaign

design. By making best use of its SOPLE and close coordination with the JTF’s SOFAD,
the SOCC can ensure the operational design of the operational commander already
supports and includes feasible and appropriate SOF employment.
c. Ideally, COM SOCC will set his objectives based upon a set of decisive conditions
(DCs) of the operational CONOPS and, by this, directly contributes to the operational
objectives and military strategic objectives, and allows SOF to create strategic effects.
d. To achieve the SOCC objectives, one or several lines of operations will be

developed with keystone DCs and effects on their way.
e. Figure M-2 shows an example of a joint operational design for a joint campaign,
while Figure M-3 provides an example of how the joint operational design could be
translated into a SOCC operational design for a SOF campaign.
93 AJP-03(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
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Figure M-2. Joint Operational Design
Figure M-3. Related SOCC Operational Design for a Supporting SOF Campaign
M-3
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M-4
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ANNEX N TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMMAND94
1. Special Operations Air Command. COM SOCC will usually appoint a SOAC to serve
as the single manager for special air warfare operations and conventional air/aviation
capabilities and resources assigned to the SOCC. COM SOAC is not required to be of the
same nationality as COM SOCC, although he often is. What is required, however, is a sense of
trust and shared purpose between the two commanders. The SOAC staff are augmented by
those NATO and other nations contributing air/aviation resources to the SOCC. While
significant consideration must be given to appointing COM SOAC from the nation contributing
the preponderance of special air warfare resources, it is nearly always more successful to
assign the SOAC function to the special air HQ most able to effectively plan, allocate, task, and
control the activities of multiple SOATGs across a theatre of operations. The minimum
functions of a SOAC include:
a. Provide an air operations centre able to perform J1, J2, J33, J35, J4, and J6
functions. The J5 function, long-range planning, is normally retained at the SOCC level.
b. Receive and integrate liaisons and staff personnel from the SOTGs, the SOATGs,
the ACC, the LCC, and the MCC.
c. Provide special air warfare expertise to the SOCCPG beginning at the

Appreciation phase of the operational planning process.
d. Provide joint special operations perspective, through a SOLE, to the ACC’s joint
air operations plan and air operations directive. Develop and provide a special air
warfare annex to the ACC’s air operations directive.
e. Develop, coordinate, and track AIRSUPREQs and ACMREQs from the

SOTGs/SOATGs to the ACC through the SOLE.
f. Communicate and collaborate with the SOCC SOLE, the SOCC/J3 air, SOCC/J3-
Fires, and the SOCC/J3-PRCC.
g. Coordinate air intelligence support with the ACC ISR division through the SOLE.
h. Coordinate space support for the SOCC through the SOLE to the ACC’s space
support team.
i. Coordinate SOTG and SOATG requests for conventional inter-theatre airlift and
intra-theatre airlift support with the SOCC/J4 and the ACC’s air mobility element.
j. Input SOTG and SOATG targeting requests to the ACC and the JTCB through the
SOCC/J35 and the SOLE or SOPLE, as appropriate.
k. Develop and provide Annex H, Special Air Operations, of the SOCC SUPPLAN.
94 Special Air Warfare Manual, dated 27 Mar 12.
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l. Provide inputs to the SOCC staff sections developing Annex V, Special Operations
Personnel Recovery; Annex R, Logistics; and Annex II, Joint Fire Support, of the SOCC
SUPPLAN.
m. Deploy within established NATO expeditionary force guidelines.
n. Deploy with at least 10 days of those classes of supply necessary to sustain the
SOAC HQ element.
o. Maintain appropriate OPSEC and force protection for the SOAC HQ and staff.
p. Provide or coordinate with the host base for appropriate secure workspaces for the
SOAC staff elements.
q. Coordinate combat support and combat service support for subordinate SOATGs
(in accordance with Chapter 7 of this manual).95
r. Retain organic force protection assets and a quick reaction force for its own
operations.
s. Retain full survivability in CBRN environments.
t. Designate the SOATU airbases as high air defence priorities and coordinate
protection accordingly at the Joint Defended Assets Working Group, through the SOLE or
SOPLE.
u. Provide base support infrastructure (e.g. lodging, meals, fuels, transportation,

ammunition handling, medical, crash/fire/rescue, and airfield management) if not
provided by the host base.
v. Assign sufficient English-speaking personnel to the appropriate staff positions to

enable interoperability.
2. Special Operations Air Command Staff Functions. The staff functions in a SOAC will
be set by COM SOAC to suit the specific operation. The doctrinal organization, roles, and
responsibilities, as depicted in Figure N-1, are recommended.
Figure N-1. SOAC Organization
95 See Chapter 7 of Special Air Warfare Manual.
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a. Special Operations Air Command Commander
(1) Functions. COM SOAC commands the SOCC’s subordinate special

operations air command, and acts as a functional component commander within
the SOCC, responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air
operations.
(2) Background. SOF OF-5 or higher, with command and/or staff experience
at the group/wing/regiment/battalion level and/or SOCC level, preferably in
previous NATO operations or exercises. Should be from the TCN providing the
preponderance of air assets and the means to control those assets for the
operation.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOCC on air operations.
(b) Serves as the single manager for special air warfare and for
conventional air resources assigned to the SOCC.
(c) Advises COM SOCC on the apportionment of organic and supporting

air resources.
(d) Directs the planning and execution of SOCC air operations.
(e) Coordinates and deconflicts SOCC air operations with conventional

air operations and, if applicable, with special air operations supporting SOF
not assigned to the SOCC.
(f) Exercises C2 (normally TACON) of ACC forces supporting SOCC

missions and requiring detailed integration, unless his C2 capability is
exceeded.
(g) Ensures contact with the SOLE director is established, and

expectations and common operating procedures are developed.
(h) Approves and issues plans and orders to the SOAC subordinate
units.
(i) Reports to COM SOCC as required.
(j) Directs in-theatre training of SOAC forces.
b. Special Operations Air Command Deputy Commander
(1) Functions. The SOAC deputy commander assists COM SOAC in his
duties.
(2) Background. OF-4 or higher, with command and/or staff experience as an

OF-4 or OF-3, preferably in previous NATO operations or exercises. Should be
from a TCN that provides air assets, other than the director’s, if applicable.
N-3
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(a) Assists COM SOAC in the discharge of assigned responsibilities for

the direction and control of operations.
(b) Assumes duties and responsibilities of COM SOAC in his absence.
(c) Performs other duties as directed by the COM SOAC.
c. Special Operations Air Command Air Operations Officer/Non-commissioned

Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC air operations officer/non-commissioned officer

(NCO) (SOAC Air Ops) is responsible for planning and directing the execution of
SOAC air missions. He also provides subject matter expertise regarding his air
operations specialty to the SOAC director and staff as required.
(2) Background. Air operations (SOF or conventional, as appropriate; RW or

FW, as appropriate); preferably air operations experience in previous NATO SOF
operations or exercises.
(a) Ensures joint special operations requirements, contributions,

capabilities, and limitations are fully addressed during the various boards,
working groups, conferences, and planning elements associated with joint
air operations.
(b) Provides special air warfare expertise to the SOCCPG.
(c) Provides joint special operations perspective to the ACC’s SUPPLAN

and development of the air operations directive.
(d) Develops, if requested by the ACC, in cooperation with the SOLE

plans team, the special air warfare annex to the air operations directive.
(e) Prepares Annex H, Special Air Warfare, to the SOCC SUPPLAN.
(f) Maintains in-depth knowledge of the SOTGs’ plans and intentions.
(g) Proposes apportionment and allocation of available aircraft across

SOTGs to support their missions.
(h) Assists the SOCC J3 air to prepare the air prioritization matrix or
other apportionment guidance, as applicable.
(i) Coordinates AIRSUPREQs for organic and direct support air support
assets with the SOATG planners.
(j) Approves and passes SOTG-initiated AIRSUPREQs for external air

support assets to the other components through the SOLE and the
SOCCEs.
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(k) Requests additional CAS, CCA, ISR, and EW support, when

necessary, through the ACC and/or the other component commanders to
fulfil air support requirements.
(l) Organizes, requests, and packages the supporting air resources to

support the SOCC’s execution requirements, unless these authorities are
assigned to the SOCC/J3 air and depending on the time available.
(m) Ensures that changes to the expected air support, especially mission
critical AAR, ISR, EW, CAS, and AI, are resolved early in the ATO
production process.
(n) Ensures, together with the SOLE, that all organic and supporting
special air warfare sorties, whether tasked for flying or on alert, have been
accurately inserted into the ATO.
(o) Maintains overall SA of all SOCC operations: weather, target

changes, and threats arising from theatre ballistic missiles or weapons of
mass effects.
(p) Maintains communications with the SOCC HQ and with the SOLE.
(q) Coordinates with the SOLE and the SOATGs to share information
vertically and horizontally, and to enhance SA among all the concerned
special air warfare elements.
(r) Monitors the TST net when established.
(s) Plans for and practises the dynamic targeting process with the CAOC
staff and the SOCC staff, together with the SOLE.
(t) Maintains mission folders for all SOAC operations.
(u) Updates the mission tracking sheet to reflect current mission

information.
(v) Provides input to the SOAC battle log as required or directed.
(w) Serves as the central C2 node during mission execution, and

coordinates with the SOCC/J3 air to ensure the SOCC’s JOC is kept
apprised of mission progress.
(x) Maintains SA of ongoing SOAC missions through pre-coordinated

secure communications procedures with the air mission commander,
including monitoring of arrival and departure times, execution of alternate
plans, enemy activities, crossing of control points, landing zone (LZ) and
drop zone (DZ) status, utilization of supporting fires, forward arming and
refuelling point/AAR activities, and any MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, and PR
actions.
(y) Provides assessments of ongoing air missions.
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(z) Provides input regarding target nominations in support of SOAC

missions.
(aa) Maintains and updates the operations/plans slides for COM SOAC’s
CUBs.
(bb) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on special air

operations.
(cc) Reviews, tracks, and coordinates all incoming/outgoing

correspondence, including requests for information, related to SOAC
operations.
(dd) Supervises assigned liaison and augmenting personnel.
(ee) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
d. Special Operations Air Command Maritime Operations Officer/Non-

commissioned Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC maritime operations officer/NCO (SOAC Mar) is

responsible for tracking and reporting the status of all ongoing SOCC maritime
air/aviation missions. He also provides subject matter expertise regarding
maritime operations to COM SOAC and staff as required.
(2) Background. Maritime SOF aviator.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOAC regarding maritime

operations.
(b) Maintains SA of all current maritime operations.
(c) Provides input to the SOAC battle log as required or directed.
(d) Monitors the TST net when established.
(e) Updates the mission tracking sheet to reflect current maritime

mission information.
(f) Coordinates with the SOCC/J33 maritime and J35 maritime to ensure
a full understanding of current and future SOCC maritime operations.
(g) Monitors the COP as it pertains to SOCC maritime missions.
(h) Assists in synchronizing SOAC air operations with SOCC maritime

operations.
(i) Prepares and presents the maritime operations portion of briefings.
(j) Maintains and updates the SOAC maritime operations slides for the
SOAC CUBs.
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(k) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence,

including RFIs, related to SOAC maritime operations.
(l) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
e. Special Operations Air Command Land Operations Officer/Non-

Commissioned Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC land operations officer/NCO (SOAC Land) is

responsible for tracking and reporting the status of all ongoing SOCC land
missions. He also provides subject matter expertise regarding SOF land
operations to COM SOAC and staff as required.
(2) Background. Land SOF.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOAC regarding SOCC land
operations.
(b) Maintains SA of all current land operations (conventional and SOF).
(c) Provides input to the SOAC battle log as required or directed.
(d) Monitors the TST net when established.
(e) Updates the mission tracking sheet to reflect current land mission
information.
(f) Coordinates with the SOCC/J33 land and J35 land to ensure a full
understanding of current and future SOCC land operations.
(g) Monitors the COP as it pertains to SOCC land missions.
(h) Assists in synchronizing SOAC air operations with SOCC land

operations.
(i) Prepares and presents the land operations portion of briefings.
(j) Presents the SOCC land operations slides for the SOAC CUBs.
(k) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence,

including RFIs, related to SOCC land operations.
(l) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
f. Special Operations Air Command Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Manager
(1) Functions. The SOAC ISR assists COM SOAC and staff to plan and
coordinate air and space ISR.
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(2) Background. Officer/NCO with airborne ISR expertise, preferably with

experience in previous NATO special operations or exercises. Space warfare
expertise is highly desired.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor on air and space ISR.
(b) Assists the SOAC operations, planning, and intelligence staffs to

allocate the available airborne ISR assets to answer the CCIRs and other
intelligence requirements.
(c) Recommends prioritization of airborne ISR assets to the SOCC ISR

manager.
(d) Ensures the ISR sorties from organic and direct support SOCC
assets are included in the ATO and airspace control order processes.
(e) Ensures the ISR sorties from external assets are requested from the
ACC, through the SOLE via AIRSUPREQs.
(f) Assesses the status and availability of airborne ISR assets.
(g) Monitors weather conditions over ISR objective areas and assesses
the impact on SOCC operations.
(h) Monitors and processes, as appropriate, AIRSUPREQs and

ACMREQs to support the SOCC’s ISR air assets.
(i) Assists in synchronizing SOCC airborne ISR operations within the

JOA.
(j) Monitors ATOs and airspace control orders to ensure that SOCC ISR
air operations and ISR support requirements are accurately represented.
(k) Prepares and presents the air and space ISR portion of briefings and
prepares the air and space ISR portion of SITREPs.
(l) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence,

including requests for information, related to air and space ISR.
(m) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
g. Special Operations Air Command Battlespace Manager
(1) Functions. The SOAC battlespace manager assists COM SOAC and staff
to monitor, coordinate, and direct the management of the battlespace for SOCC
operations.
(2) Background. Battlespace management experience, preferably in previous

NATO special operations or exercises.
N-8
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(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOAC and staff on

battlespace management.
(b) Monitors and processes, as appropriate, all SOCC ACMREQs.
(c) Maintains SA of ongoing SOAC/SOCC missions.
(d) Coordinates with the SOAC operations and planning staff (including
the joint fires element) and with the SOCC HQ to ensure a full
understanding of current air operations and fires.
(e) Monitors the TST net when established.
(f) Assists in coordinating urgent changes in airspace control means

(ACM) and boundaries in support of current SOAC/SOCC operations.
(g) Maintains and updates the current battlespace management slides

for the SOAC CUBs, if applicable.
(h) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence

related to battlespace management.
(i) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
(4) Airspace Control. Based on the JCO, the ACC will normally produce, in
consultation with the other forces, an AOD for the entire JOA. The ACC Airspace
Management Branch will produce an airspace control order to reflect the airspace
requirements of the ATO, in accordance with the AOD. Components are
responsible for providing sufficient information regarding their airspace
requirements to enable the ACC to achieve complete coordination while remaining
responsive to their needs.
(a) Special Operations Forces Combat Airspace. SOF combat

airspace management is done in two phases. First, the airspace managers
in the SOAC will deconflict the airspace requirements from the
SOTG/SOATG mission planners by time, altitude, and/or ground track.
Secondly, the airspace managers in the SOLE will deconflict the SOCC’s
requested airspace with the conventional forces, then integrate those
requests into the airspace control order. It is critical that all SOF ACMs are
deconflicted and published in the airspace control order to prevent fratricide.
Typical SOF ACMs are the infil/exfil corridors, helicopter air refuelling
tracks, gunship orbits, DZs/LZs, and ROZs.
(b) Restricted Operating Zone. A ROZ is established to reserve

airspace for specific activities in which the operations of one or more
airspace users is restricted (refuelling orbits, terminal approach holding
areas, DZ/LZs, etc.). The ROZ offers a short-term volume of airspace that
is reserved for a single activity. The designated commander can exercise
complete freedom for the specified action within the ROZ. A ROZ may be
permanently established in the airspace control order, but not activated until
specified criteria are met, or created for an operation or specific aspects of
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it. Activated ROZs will, however, impact the operations of those forces that
are excluded from them.
1/ A pre-planned ROZ will be published in the ACP.
2/ Requests for activation of ROZs will be made to the

parent/affiliated ACC via the SOLE.
3/ Unless defined in the ACP, promulgation of such zones should

include:
a/ Vertical and horizontal dimensions.
b/ Use (avoid reference to SOF).
c/ Times of activation.
d/ Controlling authority and frequencies (if applicable).
e/ Restrictions for other airspace users, e.g. weapon

control status.
(c) Infiltration/Exfiltration Routing Corridors. SOF may request

airspace corridors to accommodate the special routing requirements of
specific missions. It is often advantageous to segment a corridor and only
activate the section that is being used during a given time. To keep as
much airspace as possible available for other users:
1/ Requests for activation of corridors will be submitted to the

ACC via the SOLE.
2/ Activated corridors will be published in the airspace control

order.
3/ Promulgation of such corridors should include:
a/ Route by designators or easily identified references.
b/ Vertical and horizontal dimensions.
c/ Activation period(s).
d/ Users (RW, FW, or tilt-wing assets), where applicable.
(d) No-fire Area/Restricted Fire Area. No-fire areas (NFAs)/RFAs are

fire support coordination measures that may be used by SOF to protect
teams and/or assets on land or water from friendly fires. NFAs/RFAs used
by SOF are activated for a specific time and are controlled by the
designated unit.
(e) Fire Support Coordination Line. The fire support coordination line
(FSCL) within an assigned AOO is a line established by a land or maritime
force commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other
N-10
NSHQ 80-002
force elements that may affect the commander’s current and planned
operations. The FSCL applies to fires of air, ground, or sea weapon
systems using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets.
The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate
commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground
targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the positive control or
procedural clearance of the associated land or maritime force commander.
In exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets
beyond the FSCL must coordinate with all affected commanders to avoid
conflict and to harmonize joint objectives. In the context of this definition,
the term surface targets also applies to those in littoral or inland waters
within the designated AOO.
(f) Joint Special Operations Area. A JSOA is an area of land and/or

sea and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a SOCC to
conduct special operations. Use of JSOAs should be carefully considered:
not only do they provide both land and air battlespace to SOF, they also
come with battlespace managerial responsibilities to include displaced
persons management, enemy prisoner of war collection, etc. The SOCC
will normally delegate C2 responsibilities for the JSOA airspace to the
SOAC. Neither the SOCC nor the SOAC is normally manned to C2 a JSOA
for an extended period of time.
h. Special Operations Air Command Targeting Officer/Non-commissioned

Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC targeting officer/NCO (SOAC Targeting) assists

COM SOAC and staff in the targeting process during the planning and execution
of SOAC operations.
(2) Background. SOF targeting experience, preferably in previous NATO SOF

operations or exercises.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOAC and staff on targeting.
(b) Maintains SA of ongoing SOCC missions.
(c) Monitors the TST net when established.
(d) Provides assessments of ongoing missions.
(e) Submits the SOAC contributions to the SOCC target nomination list
to the SOCC HQ targeting officer/NCO.
(f) Reviews the prioritized target list, restricted target list, and the no-
strike list, and recommends changes as required.
(g) Forwards the prioritized target list, the restricted target list, and the
no-strike list to all subordinate units.
(h) Maintains and updates the targeting slides for the SOAC CUBs.
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NSHQ 80-002
(i) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence

related to targeting.
(j) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
i. Special Operations Air Command Joint Fires Element Officer/Non-

commissioned Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC joint fires element officer/NCO (SOAC Fires)
assists COM SOAC and staff to plan, coordinate, direct, monitor, and assess
airborne fires in support of SOAC/SOCC operations.
(2) Background. CAS experience, preferably FAC qualified.
(a) Serves as the principal advisor to COM SOAC and staff on joint fires.
(b) Plans, coordinates, and integrates organic and direct support CAS
for ground and maritime operations with the SOCC J33/J35 and with the
SOLE.
(c) Monitors the TST net when established.
(d) Coordinates with the SOLE and, if established, the joint air
coordination element to ensure a full understanding of current air operations
and joint fires.
(e) Provides assessments of ongoing joint fire support.
(f) Plans airborne fires requirements in support of SOAC/SOCC

operations.
(g) Coordinates FSCM, ACMs, and boundaries in support of SOAC

operations through the SOCC joint fires element.
(h) If employed in theatre, maintains the Common Grid Reference

System (CGRS)—sometimes referred to as kill-box—on the applicable
digital management system, and coordinates all SOAC operations in CGRS
with the SOCC joint fires element, and with the ACC through the SOLE.
(i) Monitors and processes, as appropriate, all AIRSUPREQs pertaining

to airborne fires.
(j) Monitors ATO development for impact on SOAC airborne fire support
requirements.
(k) Prepares and presents the airborne fires portion of briefings and
prepares the airborne fires portion of SITREPs.
(l) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence

related to joint fires.
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NSHQ 80-002
(m) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
j. Special Operations Air Command Intelligence Officer/Non-commissioned

Officer
(1) Functions. The SOAC intelligence officer/NCO (SOAC Int.) assists COM
SOAC and staff to coordinate air intelligence support to SOAC operations.
(2) Background. Intelligence or operations officer/NCO with air intelligence

and special operations experience.
(a) Advises COM SOAC and staff on intelligence issues.
(b) Serves as the primary point of contact within the SOAC for current
and future operations intelligence issues.
(c) Maintains SA.
(d) Provides intelligence updates to COM SOAC and staff.
(e) Monitors the status of air-related PIRs and CCIRs.
(f) Maintains the air and air defence threat database for the operational
area.
(g) Assists the information manager to maintain the threat portion of the
COP.
(h) Responds to intelligence-related RFIs.
(i) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
k. Special Operations Air Command Information Manager
(1) Functions. The SOAC information manager serves as the hub for
information management within the SOAC HQ.
(2) Background. Land/air/maritime operations with information management

experience.
(a) Displays up-to-date information, to include SOCC CCIRs related to

special air warfare, synchronization matrices, status boards, and significant
events displays.
(b) Manages the COP for the SOAC.
(c) Processes and tracks incoming and outgoing message traffic to

include RFIs and reports.
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NSHQ 80-002
(d) Prepares the overall presentation of and integrates the contributions

of different SOAC staff directorates into internal briefings, to include the
SOAC CUB.
(e) Directs the transfer of information between different data storage

systems, in coordination with the SOAC J6.
l. Special Operations Air Command Personnel Recovery Coordinator
(1) Functions. The SOAC PR coordinator (SOAC PR) plans and coordinates
SOAC PR operations, and provides subject matter expertise regarding PR to COM
SOAC and staff as required.
(2) Background. SOF land/air/maritime operations officer/NCO with formal PR

staff training, preferably with NATO PR exercise or operations experience.
(a) Serves as the principal PR advisor to COM SOAC and staff.
(b) Assumes duties and responsibilities of the SOCC PRCC chief, if the
establishment of the SOCC PRCC is delegated to the SOAC.
(c) Maintains SA of current operations.
(d) Coordinates with the SOCC PRCC, if established, to ensure a full

understanding of current PR operations.
(e) Maintains awareness of capabilities and status of dedicated and

designated PR assets in the JOA.
(f) Provides assessments of ongoing PR operations.
(g) Prepares the PR annex to SOAC plans and orders.
(h) Monitors ATOs to ensure that SOAC PR requirements are

represented.
(i) Stores SOAC personnel isolated personnel reports and subordinate

units’ evasion plans of action, as required.
(j) Assists COM SOAC and operations and intelligence staff to direct
SOAC PR operations.
(k) Maintains and updates the PR slides for the SOAC CUBs.
(l) Prepares and, when required, presents briefings on PR operations.
(m) Reviews and coordinates all incoming/outgoing correspondence

related to PR.
(n) Manages designated PR radio communications nets.
(o) Performs other duties as directed by COM SOAC.
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NSHQ 80-002
m. Special Operations Air Task Group Liaison Officers to the Special

Operations Air Command
(1) Functions. LOs from the SOATGs are the personal and official
representatives of their units’ commanders, and provide direct, face-to-face liaison
with COM SOAC and staff.
(2) Background. Must be experienced and have a complete understanding of

their units’ capabilities, resources, and limitations, preferably having served with
SOF before.
(a) Serve as the principal advisor to COM SOAC and staff on their units’
optimal employment, capabilities, and limitations.
(b) Monitor current operations of both the SOAC and their units and
understand how each affects the other.
(c) Coordinate current and future operations with the SOAC HQ and
other organizations represented in the SOAC HQ, as required.
(d) Participate in functional staff organizations’ meetings in the SOAC

HQ in accordance with the SOAC battle rhythm.
(e) Anticipate SOAC information requirements and provide advanced

warning of SOAC information requirements to their unit’s HQ, to allow for
maximum lead time available to prepare products.
(f) Ensure the proper routing of official correspondence, such as

taskings, plans, orders, reports, and other information, as required, from the
SOAC HQ to their unit’s HQ.
(g) Facilitate submission of required reports and other information as

required from their units to the SOAC HQ.
(h) Make decisions authorized by their sending units’ commanders.
(i) Maintain and update their units’ slides for the SOAC CUBs, if
applicable.
(j) Brief COM SOAC and staff on behalf of their units’ commanders.
N-15
NSHQ 80-002
N-16
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX O TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
LEXICON
PART 1. Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAR air-to-air refuelling

ACC air component command
ACM airspace control means
ACMREQ airspace control means request
ACO Allied Command Operations
ACP airspace control plan
ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AFL Allied Forces List
AIRSUPREQ air support request
AJP Allied Joint Publication
AMCC Allied movement coordination centre
AOC air operations centre
AOD air operations directive
AOI area of interest
AOO area of operation
AOR area of responsibility
ASC all-source centre
ATO air tasking order
BICES battlefield information collection and exploitation system

BSM battlespace manager
C2 command and control

C2IS command and control information system
C4ISR command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
CAOC combined air operations centre
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CC component command
CCA close combat attack
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCIRM collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
CDE collateral damage estimate
CEOI communications and electronics operating instructions
CGRS Common Grid Reference System
CI counter-intelligence
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communication and information systems
CJSOR combined joint statement of requirements
COA course of action
COG centre of gravity
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NSHQ 80-002
COIN counter-insurgency
COM commander
COM JFC joint force commander
COM SOCC special operations component command commander
CONOPS concept of operations
COP common operational picture
COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
CPG commander’s planning guidance
CPOE Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment
CPOF Command Post of the Future
CR critical requirement
CSEL command senior enlisted
CSS combat service support
CT counterterrorism
CUB commander’s update briefing
CUIL common user item list
CV critical vulnerability
D3A decided, detect, deliver, and assess

DA direct action
DARB Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board
DC decisive condition
DCIS deployable communication and information system
DCM deployable CIS module
DCOM deputy commander
DJHQ deployed joint headquarters
DNOC deployed network operations centre
DOS days of supply
DTG date-time group
DZ drop zone
EEFI essential elements of friendly information

EW electronic warfare
F2UID find, feel, understand, influence, and disrupt

F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate
FAC forward air controller
FAS functional area services
FCE forward command element
FFIR friendly forces information requirement
FMB forward mounting base
FMV full-motion video
FN framework nation
FOB forward operating base
FP force protection
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FULLCOM full command
FW fixed-wing
O-2
NSHQ 80-002
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HPT high pay-off target
HQ headquarters
HRO hostage release operation
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
ICC integrated command and control

IED improvised explosive device
IER information exchange requirement
IMINT imagery intelligence
Info Ops information operations
INFOSEC information security
INTREP intelligence report
INTSUM intelligence summary
IO international organization
IR information requirement
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISOPREP isolated personnel report
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J1 manpower and personnel directorate

J2 intelligence directorate
J3 operations directorate
J33 current operations
J35 future operations
J4 logistics directorate
J5 plans directorate
J6 communication and information systems directorate
J7 training and exercises directorate
J8 financial directorate
JAPCC Joint Air Power Competence Centre
JCB Joint Coordination Board
JCCC joint CIS control centre
JCO joint coordination order
JFC joint force command
JLSG joint logistic support group
JOA joint operations area
JOC joint operations centre
JOIIS joint operation/intelligence information system
JPEL joint prioritized effects list
JPRC joint personnel recovery centre
JPTL joint prioritized target list
JSOA joint special operations area
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF HQ joint task force headquarters
JTL joint target list
KLE key leader engagement

KR knowledge requirement
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NSHQ 80-002
LAN local area network

LCC land component command
LCCIS land command and control
LEGAD legal advisor
LN lead nation
LO liaison officer
LOAC law of armed conflict
LOC lines of communications
LOGFAS logistic functional area services
LOS line of sight
LPT logistics preparation of the theatre
LZ landing zone
MA military assistance
MAAP master air attack plan
MC Military Committee
MCC maritime component command
MCCIS maritime command and control information systems
MEDAD medical advisor
MEDCAP medical civic action programme
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEO mission execution order
METOC meteorological and oceanographic
MHE material handling equipment
MISREP mission report
MND multinational division
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
MSWAN MISSION SECRET wide area network
MTF medical treatment facility
NA5CRO non-Article 5 crisis response operation

NAC North Atlantic Council
NAI named area of interest
NAR non-conventional assisted recovery
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCIRC NATO Computer Incident Response Centre
NCO non-commissioned officer
NCOP NATO common operational picture
NCS NATO Command Structure
NFA no-fire area
NGO non-governmental organization
NIC national intelligence centre
NIRIS network interoperable real-time information services
NITB NATO intelligence toolbox
NMSS NSHQ mission support system
NMSS-H NSHQ mission support system heavy kit
NMSS-L NSHQ mission support system lite kit
NMSS-M NSHQ mission support system medium kit
O-4
NSHQ 80-002
NRF NATO Response Force

NRT near real-time
NSE national support element
NSHQ NATO Special Operations Headquarters
NSL no-strike list
NSN NATO SOF Network
NSWAN NATO SECRET wide area network
OLRT operational liaison and reconnaissance team

OPCOM operational command
OPCON operational control
OPG operations planning group
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OPSUM operations summary
ORBAT order of battle
PA public affairs
PDMA plan, direct, monitor, and assess (cycle)
PID positive identification
PIO public information officer
PIR priority intelligence requirement
POC point of contact
POL pattern of life
POLAD political advisor
PoP point of presence
POW prisoner of war
PR personnel recovery
PRCC personnel recovery coordination cell
PsyOps psychological operations
PTL prioritized target list
RFA restricted fire area

RFI request for information
ROE rules of engagement
ROZ restricted operating zone
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSOM reception, staging, and onward movement
RT real-time
RTL restricted target list
RW rotary-wing
SA situational awareness
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SATCOM satellite communications
SC strategic commander
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGCEN signal centre
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIGINT COINS signals intelligence communications and information system
O-5
NSHQ 80-002
SITREP situation report

SME subject matter expert
SOAC special operations air command
SOATG special operations air task group
SOATU special operations air task unit
SOCC special operations component command
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOCC-P2 special operations component command planning process
SOCCPG special operations component command planning group
SOCM special operations combat medic
SOF special operations forces
SOFAD special operations forces advisor
SOIC special operations intelligence cell
SOIDM special operations independent duty medic
SOLE special operations liaison element
SOMTG special operations maritime task group
SOP standard operating procedure
SOPLE special operations planning and liaison element
SOR statement of requirements
SOTG special operations task group
SOTU special operations task unit
SPINS special instructions
SPTREQ support request
SR special reconnaissance
STANAG standardization agreement
SUPCEN support centre
SUPPLAN support plan
TACOM tactical command

TACON tactical control
TAI target area of interest
TCN troop-contributing nation
TEO technical exploitation operation
TIP target intelligence package
TNL target nomination list
TOA transfer of authority
TOO theatre of operation
TOPFAS tool for operations planning functional area service
TST time-sensitive target
UAR unconventional assisted recovery

UHF ultra-high frequency
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

VTC video teleconference
WAN wide-area network

WMD weapon of mass destruction
WNGO warning order
Z Zulu
O-6
NSHQ 80-002
PART 2. Terms and Definitions
Key Term Definition Source
Assessment A considered process of appraisal to support Proposed in

decision-making. COPD
Branch A contingency option built into the base plan Proposed in
executed in response to anticipated opportunity or COPD
reversal to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve
the original objective.
Campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted to AAP-6
achieve a strategic objective within a given time and
geographical area, which normally involves maritime,
land, and air forces.
Concept of A clear and concise statement of the line of action AAP-6
Operations chosen by a commander to accomplish his mission.
Communication A collective term for communications systems and AAP-6
and Information information systems.
Systems
Communications An assembly of equipment, methods, and procedures AAP-6
System and, if necessary, personnel organized to accomplish
information transfer functions. It provides
communication between its users and may embrace
transmission systems, switching systems, and user
systems, and may also include storage or processing
functions in support of information transfer.
Degrade Actions taken to limit or otherwise restrict the Derived from
performance of a system or an actor from its intended term’s use in
function. This is normally a temporary condition. AAP-6
Desired Effect Those effects that have a positive impact on the Proposed in
achievement of the objectives. COPD
Destroy The application of destructive force intended to render Derived from
a system or elements of a system permanently term’s use in
incapable of functioning or otherwise performing its AAP-6
intended use.
Effect A change in the state of a system or system element Proposed in
that results from one or more actions or other causes. COPD
Information An assembly of equipment, methods, and procedures AAP-6
System and, if necessary, personnel organized to accomplish
information processing functions.
Measures of A metric used to measure a current system state. Bi-SC
Performance Operations
Assessment
Handbook
Measures of A metric used to determine the accomplishment of Bi-SC
Effectiveness actions. Operations
Assessment
Handbook
O-7
NSHQ 80-002
Key Term Definition Source
Neutralize Actions taken to render a system or elements of a Derived from

system temporarily ineffective or otherwise unable to term’s use in
perform its intended function. These actions may AAP-6
include applications of force or non-kinetic means,
deception, or information operations.
Operational Art The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or AAP-6
operational objectives through the design,
organization, integration, and conduct of strategies,
campaigns, major operations, and battles.
Operations The post operations summary of a special operation
Summary submitted to the SOCC within a specified time that
summarizes the scheme of manoeuvre, results, and
any significant events or relevant information.
Undesired Effects Effects that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of Proposed in
objectives. COPD
Unintended Effects that are not anticipated or envisioned to be Proposed in
Effects associated with the objectives and actions taken. COPD
These effects may be desired or undesired.
O-8
NSHQ 80-002
ANNEX P TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
The following bibliography lists the Allied publications and other documents related to this
publication. It is provided to supplement the reader’s knowledge of special operations. Unless
otherwise noted, only ratified and promulgated publications are listed.
Publication Title Date

AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 29 Apr 14
AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations 5 May 14
AD 80-20 Allocation of Forces and Transfer of Authority 5 Jun 12
AD 80-70 Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO 27 Apr 10
AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine 21 Dec 10
AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Jul 03
Doctrine
AJP-2.1(A) Intelligence Procedures 19 Sep 05
AJP-2.7 Allied Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance 7 Jul 09
AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 16 Mar 11
AJP-3.5(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 17 Dec 13
AJP-3.9(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, Study Draft 4 2014
AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations 23 Nov 09
AJP-3.10.1(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations 22 Oct 07
AJP-4(A) Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine Dec 03
AJP-6 Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information 6 Apr 11
Systems
ALP-4.2(A) Land Forces Logistic Doctrine 4 Feb 10
APP-11(C) NATO Message Catalogue 24 Sep 10
MC 133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning Jan 11
MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement 30 Jun 03
MC 437/2 Special Operations Policy 21 Apr 11
MC 593/1 Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2) Services 10 Dec 12
Capabilities in Support of Joint NATO Operations in a Land-
based Environment
STANAG 2014 Formats for Orders and Designation of Timings, Locations, and 17 Oct 00
Boundaries
ACO Forces Standard Volume X, Special Operations Forces Aug 10
Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations 4 Oct 13
Planning Directive, COPD Interim V2.0
Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations 26 Jul 13
Bi-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines 22 Feb 11
JAPCC Roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO Nov 07
Special Air Warfare Manual 27 Mar 12
P-1
NSHQ 80-002
SOCC Planning Handbook Jan 14

SOTG Manual 11 Dec 09
P-2
NSHQ 80-002
ENCLOSURE 1 TO
NSHQ SOCC MANUAL
DATED 20 OCT 14
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MESSAGE FORMATS
BI-SCD 80-3
VOLUME III
SECTION 20
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REQUEST
(ROEREQ)
20-1. PURPOSE: The ROEREQ is used to request authorisation through the

next superior command level to implement Rule(s) of Engagement (ROE(s)).
NOTE: Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to an OPLAN is the source

document for Rules of Engagement.
20-2. ORIGINATOR: a. SC’s through the Military Committee (MC) to North

Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence Plan Committee (DPC), addressing it for
information to Capitals and other the SC.
b. An RC or other Commander directly under the

Command or Control of an SC to his SC and addressing it
for information to adjacent Area Commanders and other
appropriate Commanders.
c. A JSRC or CC, or a CTG to its JSRC or CC,

addressing it for information to adjacent Area Commanders
and CTG’s.
d. A Unit or other Subordinate Commander to his

operational Commander or Controller whichever is
appropriate.
20-3 ADDRESSES: See above Paragraph 2.

NSHQ 80-002
BI-SCD 80-3
VOLUME III
SECTION 22
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
(ROEIMPL)
22-1. PURPOSE: The ROEIMPL is used by Commanders to implement and/or

cancel specific Rules of Engagement.
22-2. ORIGINATOR: SHAPE/HQ SACLANT
20-3 ADDRESSES: ACTION: RC concerned

INFO: AIG 6007 (in crisis)
AIG 6057 (in exercise)
AIG 5720
22-4. CONDITIONS FOR TRANSMISSION: As soon as authority is received to

implement ROE’s.
22-5. METHOD OF TRANSMISSION: Appropriate National and/or NATO

systems selected according to message precedence, security classification and
routing requirements from and means, ADP, courier, facsimile, radio, telephone,
teletype.
22-6. CATEGORY: 1, 2, and 3.
NOTE: In case of restricted of impaired communications capabilities, SC

messages are to be assigned one of the following categories (in decreasing order
of importance):
Category 1: Emergency Essential Command Function (EECF)

Category 2: Essential Command Function (ECF)
Category 3: Normal Command Function (NCF)
22-7. NATO CLASSIFICATION: NATO UNCLASSIFIED until completed;

thereafter normally NATO CONFIDENTIAL unless higher classification is justified.

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CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATO

CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 3 – EFFECTS AND TARGETING

Non-kinetic Targeting and the Indirect Approach 54 3-14

CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND

CHAPTER 8 – AIR OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 10 – KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION

CHAPTER 12 – MEDICAL SUPPORT AND MEDICAL

A. Notional Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Manning List

1. Extract of Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3, Volume III: Operations/Situations Reports

# SUBJECT DATE SIGNATURE

PLEASE EMAIL FORM WITH SUGGESTED CHANGES TO NSHQ/DOCTRINE AND

UNCLASSIFIED EMAIL: NSHQJ10ORGMB@NSHQ.NATO.INT

Figure 1. Hierarchy of NSHQ Manuals

Best Practice. This icon highlights ideas and processes that

Important Note. This icon highlights the most important (key)

Red Flag. This icon serves as a warning to users, highlighting

CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(1) Allied Command Operations. Allied Command Operations (ACO) is

(2) Allied Command Transformation. Allied Command Transformation

1 AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, dated 21 Dec 10.

SOCC**** LCC ACC MCC

Figure 1-1. NATO Command Structure

a. Special Operations Screening Criteria

1-6. The Special Operations Component Command Concept

a. The SOCC is a multinational or national joint CC formed around an FN. SOCCs

or supporting commander as directed by the operational-level commander. A SOCC is

b. At full operational capability, the NSHQ is able to provide a rapidly deployable

1-8. Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Functions. Once the FN

a. Deploy and establish a SOCC HQ capable of conducting NATO J1 through J8

b. Plan for, direct, monitor, and assess special operations.

e. Exchange and incorporate liaisons as required.

f. Provide C2IS down to the task group level.

h. Coordinate, provide, and monitor CSS for deployed SOF.

a. Notional Special Operations Component Command Organization. Figure 1-2

Figure 1-2. Notional SOCC Organization6

b. Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Functional

Figure 1-3. SOCC HQ Functional Structure

1-10. Special Operations Component Command Elements

a. Special Operations Air Command. Establishing a SOAC is the preferred

b. Special Operations Task Groups8

(1) An SOTG (land or maritime) is a self-sustaining, national grouping of land or

(a) An HQ that is capable of conducting the S1-S6 staff functions.

(b) Subordinate SOTUs.

(c) CIS units.

(d) CSS elements.

c. Special Operations Air Task Groups. An SOATG is normally a national grouping

d. Special Operations Command and Liaison Elements. Joint operations are

8 SOTG Manual, dated 11 Dec 09.

(1) Special Operations Command and Control Element. When SOF

Figure 1-5. Special Operations Command Elements

(2) Special Operations Planning and Liaison Element. A Special

1-11. Special Operations Component Command Staff Functions and Responsibilities

a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)

(a) Advises COM SOCC on all personnel issues.

(b) Monitors unit strengths through periodic personnel status reports,

(c) Prepares personnel reports and the personnel portion of situation

(d) Provides representation in the SOCC planning group (SOCCPG)

(e) Prepares SOCC personnel estimates.

(f) Writes Appendix 2 (Personnel Administration) to Annex R (Logistics)

(h) Requests personnel augmentation as required.