Professional Documents
Culture Documents
第十八章 完整合约条文
第十八章 完整合约条文
第十八章 完整合约条文
1. 概述
今天在一些比较复杂或有律师协助草拟的合约,都去加上一条完整合约条文。这种条文
会是越来越多见到,例如是在一些合资、合并/收购、技术转让、保险、造船、提供服务、
货物买卖,和解协议等合约都可以见得到。有说法是在这些商业合约中见不到这种条文
才是罕见。像造船合约这样经过漫长与复杂的谈判才达成的协议,这条文是有它的好处。
因为将来出了争议,很容易会去带出在谈判时候可能发生过的误述
(misrepresentation),不恰当引导(undue inducement)或/与附带保证/协议(collateral
warranty/contract)等等这类的争议。是真是假也难以决定,因为很多时候谈判只是口头
的。根据口头证据去认定到底有否发生过这些事情,也并不科学,也只能是由仲裁员去
认定谁的话可信一些。还有,一出这种争议,要去处理会是十分昂贵的,例如开庭就已
经是免不了。为了避免这种麻烦的事情,一种好的办法就是在合约中加上一条完整合约
条文。作用是去把在谈判时曾经发生过(即使是事实)的误述、不正确的承诺、附带保
证等等都去排除,一切都以该双方签署的合约为准。
但凡事都有利有弊,关键还是看订约人士的水平。完整合约条文的好处是要在订约方充
分了解合约内容后才能体现出来的,例如其中一位订约方在谈判的时候听到对方作出
某些重要的陈述,承诺或保证,但却没有在合约内体现出来,就要去坚持必须在合约
内加入这陈述,承诺或保证才去签署。但如果好像小部分中国领导,根本不去细看合约,
看也看不明白,反正外国公司船东拟定的合约拿来就签署,就会是死无葬身之地了。
笔者先去简单介绍什么是在订立合约之前双方在谈判中会出现的误述与附带保证 /协议,
而它们会是如何影响双方在后来签署的合约。
2. 误述
误述是指一方对另一方所作出的错误陈述(不论是针对事实或法律)而导致合约的产
生,这就会好像非法或胁迫等原因一样,令该合约的产生有重大缺陷,所以在早期法
院就对其给予救济,允许受到误述一方可以撤销合约。,且如果误述是欺诈性
(fraudulent)的话,还可以索赔损失。但误述与非法或胁迫有一点不同就是,后者情况
是 令 合 约 在 一 开 始 就 无 效 ( void ab initio ) , 但 前 者 的 情 况 是 令 合 约 可 变 为 无 效
(voidable)。这表示如果被误述方觉得合约对自己有利或是有关的误述没有造成什么
伤害,可以不去撤销合约让合约继续下去。除了可去撤销合约,如果误述是欺诈性的,
被误述方还可以去索赔损失。由于误述发生在合约产生之前,所以它还可以构成是一种
侵权。这表示在一个误述的诉讼,被误述方可以去以合约或侵权作为诉因。它们在责任
方面是没有什么分别,但在计算损失方面,就会有很大的差别,容后介绍。
到了 1967 年,英国还立了《误述法》。立法对什么是构成误述没有改动,但去把误述的
类别从本来的两种(无辜与欺诈性的误述)变为三种,多加了一种“疏忽的误述”
(negligent misrepresentation)。在立法之前与贵族院的 Hedley v. Byrne Co Ltd v. Heller
& Partners Ltd (1964) AC 465,法院把疏忽的误述归类在无辜的误述内。立法也去针对
一些轻微的无辜或疏忽的误述,去让法院或仲裁庭不支持判合约撤销,而是以金钱赔
偿替代。总结来说,现在有关误述的法律已经变为一个复杂的普通法、衡平法与立法的
混合。
2.1 什么是误述
误述是指误述方(或他的代理人)去向被误述方以行动或文字作出了一个虚假或错误
的陈述。误述通常是针对一个事实,例如一个光棍去向对方误述他是一个富豪,去误导
卖方同意卖货给他。法律现在发展针对对于法律的误述,以前的说法是大家都应该了解
法 律 , 不 存 在 对 法 律 的 误 述 : Beattie v. Ebury (1872) L.R. 7 Ch.App 777 ; Beesly v.
Hallwood Estates Ltd (1960) 1 WLR 549。但这方面也有了改变。
2.1.1 以行动作出的误述
行动可以是误述方听了被误述方的话之后,去点头或摇头,甚至是去作出微笑,反正
客观去看就是意图诱导对方相信一个不真实的事实:Walters v. Morgan (1861) 3 De G.
F. & J. 718。另一个例子可以是房东的代理人带租客或买方看房时,房屋有严重的缺陷 ,
但刻意去遮盖起来,例如是去以油漆、粉刷或设置遮蔽物,。这可以构成是欺诈性的误
述:Gordon v. Selico Co. Ltd (1985) 2 E.G.L.R. 79。针对船舶的买卖,也曾经有过同类的
先例,这是在 Schneider v. Heath (1813) 3 Camp 506,案情涉及了卖方故意让船舶(木
船)下水,不让买方在船舶检查的时候去看见船底有腐蚀与舵机损坏。
但以行动作出误述的案件比起文书的误述是少得多,第一是很难去证明,第二是对某
一个行动可以去作出除了误述外的其他解释。
以行动作出误述也可以去探讨不作出披露或者保持缄默会否有危险会构成误述。一般的
说法是,不作出披露并不构成误述,因为每一个订约方都应该自己去注意他自己的利
益而不是靠对方去提醒。而即使不作出披露是背后有不安好心无辜的意图,例如有买方
问也不问就开出高价来买一件商品,而卖方完全知道买方可以以一般的价格在附近的
商店买到同样的商品,但法律并不要求卖方去作出这样的披露。至于保持缄默,这只是
一个中性的行为,不能说这也是作出了误述。在这方面,《Chitty on Contracts》29 版的
6-013 段这样说:
“The general rule is that mere non-disclosure does not constitute misrepresentation ,for there
is, in general, no duty on the parties to a contract to disclose material facts to each other,
however dishonest such non-disclosure may be in particular circumstances.”
此外,在普通法下也有一些合约要求绝对善意(uberrinae fidei),主要是涉及一些信
托关系(fiduciary relationship),也会有要求不能去不披露或保持缄默。
2.1.2 以口头或以文书作出误述
这在大部分的案件,就是误述方曾经以口头或文书作出误述。如果是口头的话,也会存
在双方的争议就是被指是误述方通常会否认有这样说过,最后是取决于法院或仲裁庭
相信谁。所以口头的误述指控显然又是比不上文书的误述这么肯定。至于文书的误述就
可以在谈判的时候大家以信函往来或者电文往来中作出的误述,也可以是先是口头误
述(在谈判中或在电话交谈中),但后来以文书作出追认。
2.1.3 意见的表述
误述是针对过去与现在存在的事实,但凡事总有例外,法律也要去配合现实。其中一个
现实就是去兜售自己的产品或服务常有的“卖花赞花香”是合法的,这被称为是
“sales talk”或“sales bluff”。这种手法,主要是表现在给意见(statement of opinion)
上,比如自我吹嘘说我认为这个产品应该是最好的。当然,自我吹嘘如果过了火,也会
造成误述。这里又是一个分水线怎样划分的问题,考验是在 De Beers Abrasive Products
Ltd v. International General Electric Co. of New York Ltd (1975) 1 WLR 972 中的“一个合
理的人听了对方所说会否把它严肃地当一回事”(whether a reasonable man would take
the claim as being a serious claim or not)。
意见的表述(给意见方通常不必负责任)与事实的陈述(误述要负责任)也不容易区
分,因为它们可以混合在一起。这也不是根据给意见方或陈述方去怎样限制他所讲的话,
例如在一个陈述前以文书写明“在我的意见”(in my opinion)或“根据我所最相信
的”(to the best of my belief),这只是形式。
意见的陈述也会变成误述,第一种情况就是给的意见并非是善意。这在立法也有针对,
例如在 1906 年的《海上保险法》,它的第 20 (5)条文说:“A representation as to matter
of expectation or belief is true if it be made in good faith.”。
第二种情况就是意见中默示了一个事实的陈述,这会发生在事实只是给意见方知道,
而听的一方不知道。这一来,意见就默示了给意见方根据事实去作出的意见是正确的,
因为听的一方会有倾向去相信或依赖。相反,如果事实的真相是双方都知道,这一来给
意见方所给的意见才不会被默示为对事实的陈述。这方面著名的说法是 Bowen 大法官
在 Smith v. Land & House Property Corp. (1884) 28 Ch. D. 7 先例所说如下:
“it is often fallaciously assumed that a statement of opinion cannot involve the statement of
fact. In a case where the facts are equally well known to both parties, what one of them says
to the other is frequently nothing but an expression of opinion. The statement of such opinion
is in a sense a statement of fact, about the condition of the man’s own mind, but only of an
irrelevant fact, for it is of no consequence what the opinion is. But if the facts are equally
known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the fact involves very
often a statement of a material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify
his opinion.”
另可介绍 Esso v. Mardon (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 305 先例,案情涉及了 Esso 去将一个加
油站卖给 Mardon 先生,在订约前 Esso 告诉 Mardon 先生车会经过加油站的流量与预计
会有的汽油销售量。但 Mardon 买了过来发觉根本不是这么一回事,导致亏大本 。
Mardon 先生向 Esso 起诉索赔,但 Esso 抗辩的理由是他不过是对于将来的汽油销售量
给了一个意见而已。但法院判是 Esso 对加油站的汽油销售量的估计的意见也可构成误
述,因为 Mardon 先生是没有办法知悉或估计汽油的销售量,完全依赖 Esso 在这方面
丰富的经验技术得出的这个意见。如果这一个意见不正确,也就会构成误述。
2.1.4 对将来意图的表述
对将来的意图或愿望,这不会是事实,也不一定将来会变成事实。可以说,人生在世不
如意之事十之八九。所以,对将来的意图或愿望会变成事实的反而不多。这样看来,在
这种情况下一般不会构成误述。 Saville 大法官在 Bank Leumi Le Israel B.M. v. British
National Insurance Co. Ltd (1988) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 71 说:
“A statement as to a future state of affairs can in itself neither be true or false at the time it is
made, since the future cannot be foretold.”
但总有例外,因为去表述将来的意图,就需要在表述时有计划去将来这样做。如果根本
没有这个计划,这将来意图的表述就有可能是欺诈性的误述了。例如是在 Edgington v.
Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D. 459 先例,某公司出了一份邀请认购债券说明书声明说公司
意图将募幕得的钱改建公司大楼,买马和车,以及发展公司业务。但后来实际上这些钱
被用于还债。法院判是公司董事要负责侵权的欺诈误述责任(tort for deceit),上诉庭
的 Bowen 大法官讲了几句名言如下:
“This is an action for deceit, in which the plaintiff complains that he was induced to take
certain debentures by the misrepresentations of the defendants, and that he sustained damage
thereby …
A mere suggestion of possible purposes to which a portion of the money might be applied
would not have formed a basis for an action of deceit. There must be a misstatement of an
existing fact; but the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion
… A misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s mind is, therefore, a misstatement of
fact.”
总的说,在表述这意图或愿望时,陈述方或表达方已是在讲假话,他在表述当时根本
已经没有计划,愿望或能力去把这意图将来变为事实,这就变了是事实的误述。正如在
《Chitty on Contracts》29 版的 6-008 段总结这方面先例说:
“With regard to a statement of intention, this may be looked upon as a misrepresentation of
existing fact if, at the time when it was made, there was not the will or the ability to put the
intention into effect; for the promisor’s state of mind was not what he led other party to
believe it to be.”
Bowen 大法官也说到要去证明一个人在表述将来的意图时的一刻,脑袋里是想去作出
误述,这并非容易。但如果做得到,就可以成立误述,说:
“the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is
very difficult to prove that the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be
ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s
mind is, therefore, a misstatement of fact.”
除了证明困难外,表述方还可以作出抗辩说明他的意图有了改变是由于其他原因。举例
说,一票货物的买方在订约时实际上意图将来收货后不去支付货价。如果这真的是发生
了,卖方也不必去理会到底有否误述,反正根据买卖合约与 1979 年《货物销售法》他都
可以去追讨这一笔货价。但如果卖方在交货前就想去从该买卖合约合法脱身,恐怕证明
买方误述就是少数的途径。误述就是证明买方表述在收货后去支付货价,但事实上他的
脑袋根本不是这样想的:Shackleton Ex p. Whittaker; Re (1875) L.R. 10 Ch.App. 446 ;
Ray v. Sempers (1974) A.C. 370;Re Gerald Copper Chemicals Ltd (1978) Ch. 262。如果卖
方只能证明买方根本没有钱可以去支付货价,这恐怕不足够去证明买方误述(或是预
期违约),因为买方可以去争辩说自己有办法融资或借钱去解决这个问题。
这也可以去多举一个假设的例子,以造船合约作为背景。船东在订约前口头或文书向船
厂表述如果在订约后拿不到还款担保(refund guarantee),他没有意图去向船厂索赔,
这导致了后来的造船合约中船厂去承诺在 30 天内取得还款担保,但没有进一步去说明
如果船厂取不到合约就会自动撤销。这一来,船厂取得还款担保本来通常是一个后续条
件,现在去把条文改为是一个船厂的严格责任。但 30 天后,在船厂无法取得还款担保
时,船东却向船厂提出违约的索赔。船东固然是否认他在订约前向船厂承诺或表述过他
将来不向船厂索赔,而即使仲裁庭相信船厂不相信船东,也存在船东只不过是表述了
他将来的意图。这表述与违背其内容时间相隔很短,可以比较容易显示船东当时在讲假
话或误述他当时脑袋里的真实想法。但船东仍可能去争辩如期间发生了一些事情而导致
他意图的合理改变。
所以,在商业活动中,不要去随便相信与依赖对方对将来意图的表述。例如在期租租船
合约,不要因为承租人在谈判的时候表达意图去装棉花或散粮而忽略了对租约条文的
重视,例如订明禁止装废铁(scrap)或其他不适宜的货物,因为是新造船舶。否则将来
承租人要去装废铁,因为租约没有去禁止,船东就无话可说了。至于谈判时候表达的意
图,承租人很容易可去解释,就是在表述的时候的确是这一个意图,但后来棉花或散
粮的货物谈不拢,而非要去作出改变。
如果在谈判中去作出意图的表述,而被表述方觉得表述的内容很要紧,就应该要求把
表述的内容加入到合约内作为一个承诺,以防对方事后抵赖,这也是商业人士应有的
习惯。
2.1.5 法律的误述
传统的误述只是针对一个过去或现在存在的事实,但事实与法律有不同对待,英国法
律认为法律方面的错误表述并不构成误述。这主要是根据一句老话,就是对法律的无知
并不是一个借口或抗辩的理由(Ignorance of the law is no excuse or defence)。配合这个
说法有 Ellenborough 勋爵在 Beattie v. Ebury (1872) L.R. 7 Ch.App 777 所说的“每个人都
应该被当作熟悉法律;否则会有太多以无知作为理由”( every man must be taken to be
cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance
might not be carried. It would be urged in almost every case.)。这一句话也带来了另一个
考虑就是如果接受法律的误述就会影响合约的保证性,因为给了太多去逃避合约责任
的救济。另一个说法是认为对法律的陈述只能是一个意见,是陈述方自己对法律的理解。
但在现实中,不承认这一种误述也带来了很大的争议。首先是在现实的环境中并不正确,
因为有太多订约人士其实不了解法律,或是订约双方有同等程度的了解。正如 Atkin 勋
爵在 Evans v. Bartlam (1937) A.C. 473 中说的:
“I am not prepared to accept the view that there is in law any presumption that any one, even
a judge, knows all the rules and orders of the Supreme Court.”
另一个大问题就是事实与法律并不容易分得开,比如是去解释一份文件,该份文件的
存在与有什么文字是一个事实问题,但文字的解释就是一个法律的问题。有时候就会分
不清,例如在 Wauton v. Coppard (1899) 1 Ch. 92,案情涉及了一个地产代理对买方陈述
该物业的地契(deed of covenant)条文并不限制买方的用途,这一个陈述并不正确。但
法院判这是事实的误述,而不是法律的误述,说:
“The agent was not asked by the claimant as to the construction of the deed, or on any
question of law, but merely whether as a fact there were any covenants affecting the property,
having regard to the purpose for which the plaintiff wanted it.”
所以,有不少看法是认为应该去废除这个事实与法律误述的区别对待。而有一些英联邦
国家的法律,例如是新西兰,据说已经废除了这种区别对待。在大陆法国家,也没有对
这方面作出区分,包括在“Unidroit Principles”与欧共体合约法原则。
但这一个先例只是针对“复原”(restitution),而不是合约方面,这还要看进一步的
发展。
2.2 侵权的误述
这种误述与导致产生合约的误述有很大不同,它通常指一些对事实,意见或法律的误
述导致依赖的一方蒙受损失。所以,它不去区分事实,意见或法律。它追究的反而是作
出这个陈述到底是否涉及疏忽,如果是,作出的一方就要负上赔偿责任。这方面的法律
现在主要是针对一些专业人士,例如是律师,会计师等等,因为一般人会去依赖他们
作出的陈述或误述。正如 Morris 勋爵在 Hedley Byrne Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd
(1964) AC 465 所说的:
“if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his
judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon
himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on
to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then a duty
of care will arise.”
此先例是打到了贵族院,它是关于银行提供客户资信的责任,银行在客户的要求下,
给了原告一个对某客户资信满意的文件(原告与该客户有广告上的商业往来)。但事实
上并不正确,该客户欠银行不少钱,银行有疏忽,令原告受损。但有关的误述并不涉及
合约的产生或信托关系,以前没有这方面的先例。所以在高院, McNair 大法官判是原
告没有这方面的诉因,说:
“I am accordingly driven to the conclusion by authority binding upon me that no such action
lies in the absence of contract or fiduciary relationship. On the facts before me there is clearly
no contract, nor can I find a fiduciary relationship.”
但在贵族院有了改变,法院认为如果一方有特别的技能(special skill)与知识,用来协
助另一方给与意见(advice)或信息(information),他就有一个“小心的责任”
(duty of care)。如果有疏忽,破坏了这责任,他(比方是银行)应附上侵权的责任
(liability in tort)。
要多说一句的是只要有这种关系,即一方有小心的责任(duty of care),则他收不收
费用并不是免责的理由:Mutual Life and Citizen’s Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt (1970) 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 441。所以,虽然有不少人来问笔者有关海事方面的意见,笔者一般也会免
费提供。但一旦有错,有疏忽误述,仍是难逃赔偿责任。
疏忽误述的危险在于它的无边无际,影响深远。所以,对谁能去依赖这误述,自称为受
害方的人士必须去局限。为此,贵族院在 Hedley Byrne 定立了以下的三个大精神:
(i)误述方可以合理预见某受害方会去依赖误述。比如,该案例的银行可以预见到原
告会去依赖这份 Bank reference,但如果这份文件被原告给了其他不知名的朋友拿来参
考与依赖,就不应是银行可以合理预见的了,银行也不会对这些不知名的朋友负上任
何责任。
(ii)误述方与受害方之间有足够的密切关系(necessary proximity)。
(iii)客观环境上看要求误述方向受害方尽“小心的责任”(duty of care)是公平与合
理的(just and reasonable)。
有了这一个局限,就可以避免这种侵权下的误述会带来无边无际的责任。
在这一个课题下,就带来了有关造船合约的一个问题,就是如果船级社批准船厂建造
船舶时的各方面的测试或检验,而事后被船东发现船级社有疏忽,可否指称船级社有
误述导致他的损失?显然,船级社只是与船厂有合约关系,但船东与船级社在建造时
没有合约关系,只能说船东是的确合理依赖了船级社对船舶的批准去接收船舶的。船级
社对此问题是有所针对,他们往往在提供服务的合约中与所作出的证书上会说明他们
对错误的陈述(有关船舶状况)是不负责任的。但这只是针对合约的关系,而合约是船
厂与船级社之间的,应该就不包括船东与船级社。他们之间如果船级社有误述责任,应
该还是属于侵权的误述。
只去一提是针对船级社的侵权责任,目前在英国法律是非常保护船级社的。这可以从贵
族院的著名先例 The “Nicholas H” (1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 299 看出。该案例是货方起诉日
本船级社(NKKK),案情是该船舶在装满了铅铝精矿(lead and zinc concentrates)后,
发觉船旁出现裂缝。日本船级社于是前来检验,而第一次是要求船东作出永久修理,即
要完全修妥才开。但这一来会对船东非常不利而且昂贵,比如,当地附近没有适当或廉
价的修船设备;船舶已装满货物,要卸一部分下来才能修,等等。于是船东派代表飞来
装港与日本船级社检验师交涉,最后估计在压力下,日本船级社把永久修理的要求改
为暂时修理后即可开航。
在途中,裂缝扩大导致船舶沉没。看来,日本船级社这暂时修理的决定会是错误的,有
疏忽的。货方在起诉船东并获得互保协会赔偿 50 万美元后(这金额是《海牙规则》下的
限额),对余下赔不到的 550 万美元向日本船级社追偿。
在高院,Hirst 大法官判日本船级社负责,认为在本案特殊的情况下有“足够的密切关
系”(necessary proximity),因为:
(I)日本船级社完全可去主宰船舶开航与否,非是船东可听可不听船级社的要求;
(ii)时间上非常接近:日本船级社犯了错,船舶随即开航,很快沉没,一浪跟一浪,
不是几个航次后才出事。
(iii)检验师在犯错时,明知船舶上有货,所以应合理预见到如果疏忽会对货物带来
的后果,也有了“小心的责任”。
这样看来,船级社可以放胆去作出他们认为正确的决定,不必怕被其他依赖船级社决
定的人士将来以侵权起诉。而事实上是经常遇到这些第三者对船厂作出的威胁,例如在
二手船买卖或新造船的交船一刻,而双方对当时船舶质量有争议,往往单方面要求船
级社去对这些方面作出一个决定。如果船级社去这样做,就会有机会造成一定时间的延
误与船级社最后会提出新的要求,例如作出一些修理。这一来,就给了买方拖延的机会,
或有机会从一个亏本的新造船或二手船买卖合约中脱身。有关在二手船买卖中的这些手
法,在《船舶买卖法律与实务》一书第四章有详论。同样的手法也可以用在造船合约,
例如船厂与船东对试航或测试的结果有不同看法,而当时航运市场正在下跌,船东就
会设法向船级社施压,要求不要去批准与作出证书。而如果船级社不批准的话,这就会
是很明显船厂违反一个条件条文,船东就在航运市场下跌的情况下可以光明正大地拒
绝接收船舶。
2.3 导致合约产生的误述针对的时间
针对事实的误述,是指在订约时对事实的陈述并不正确,这正确与否是改变不了的,
因为这个事实后来可能会有改变,可能使得较早在订约前的陈述从不正确变成正确,
但这不影响它是一个误述。但针对法律的误述,就有不同之处。首先针对立法,如果是
涉及了实质权利,有了新的立法通常也不会有追溯力。所以在订约时有了误述,也不会
因为后来有了新的立法而有所改变。但普通法或案例法就有较大的问题,这是因为在订
约时对法律的陈述可以是完全正确(根据当时的普通法地位而言),但后来有了其他
更权威的先例作出了改变。这种改变是有追溯力的,这表示以前有关这方面所判的先例
都被后来更权威的先例改变了,并被视为是错误的判法。这表示本来是正确的陈述,后
来就变成是误述。这些方面在将来取消了事实与法律的误述的区分后,要去作出相应的
针对。
但如果在作出陈述的时候与受害方依赖该陈述去作出相应的行动(去确认合约)中间
有一段时间,就会存在陈述方有一个持续的责任。例如在最初作出陈述时,虽然是不正
确,但陈述方并不知情,这样充其量也不过是一无辜的误述。但之后陈述方知悉了陈述
的不正确,而当时双方还没有最后订立合约,如果他不去向受害方作出更正的话,就
会变成一个欺诈性的误述。而无辜的误述与欺诈性的误述会带来不同的后果与救济 。
Blackburn 勋爵在 Brownlie v. Campbell (1880) 5 App. Cas. 925 说:
“when a statement or representation has been made in the bona fide belief that it is true, and
the party who has made it afterwards comes to find out that it is untrue, and discovers what he
should have said, he can no longer honestly keep up that silence on the subject after that has
come to his knowledge, thereby allowing the other party to go on, and still more, inducing
him to go on, upon a statement which was honestly made at the time it was made, but which
he has not now retracted when he has become aware that it can be no longer honestly
preserved in.”
2.4 误述与合约产生及造成损失之间的因果关系
这里需要因果关系,但通常所用的措辞不是“导致”(cause)而是“依赖”(rely)
或是受到诱导(induce)。这是因为针对一个错误的陈述而导致的损失通常说是依赖而
不是导致。例如一名受害方路过建筑质量很差的一堵墙,结果因墙壁倒塌而受伤,那就
可以说是因为墙的建筑工艺差而“导致”了这个事故。但如果是针对一个误述,情况就
会是受害方去听取了一个错误的陈述,说这堵墙是非常坚固,令受害方放胆去走过它 ,
但半途因墙壁倒塌而受伤。这一来,这误述不能说是本身“导致”受害方受伤,应该是
说受害方“依赖”了这个误述而导致受伤。所以要有因果关系的话,误述必须是导致受
害方有所依赖去产生有关合约,而这就会在普通法令受害方有权去撤销合约。
至于受害方没有去依赖的例子,一个明显的情况是受害方根本还没有收到这个误述就
已经急不可待地确认了合约。又或者有证明不论有没有这个误述,受害方都肯定会去确
认这个合约。这种先例也有不少,只要能去证明。例如公司年报中有误述,但买股票的
一方根本没有去看这份年报:Re Northumberland and Durham District Banking Co, Ex P
Bigge (1858) 28 LJ Ch 50。或是,一辆二手车的卖方对二手车的里程表动了手脚,但买
方根本没有去看或去理会就购买:Horsfall v. Thomas (1862) 1 H & C 90。
但如果证据显示了受害方的确是有去依赖误述,但这只是其中一个原因,而受害方还
有其他原因去确认合约,这也已经足够构成误述的责任。毕竟是很难去作出太准确的分
析,到底受害方订约时在想些什么,正如在 Cranworth 勋爵在 Reynell v. Sprye (1852) 1
De G. M. & G. 660 所说:“it is impossible to analyze the operations of the human mind as
to be able to say how far any particular representation may have led to the formation of any
particular resolution, or the adoption of any particular line of conduct. No one could do this
with certainty, even as to himself, still less as to another.”
换言之,只要依赖误述不需要此误述是唯一(sole)或主要(predominant)原因导致受
害方去确认或订立合约,也不需要受害方证明如果陈述是完全正确的话他就不会去订
约。毕竟,在现实中去订立一个合约会有很多不同原因造成,而对方的误述只会是其中
一个原因。而这一来就已经足够让受害方去获得误述所带来的各种救济,例如去撤销合
约:Attwood v. Small (1838) 6 Cl. & Fin 232;Smith v. Kay (1859) 7 HLC 750;Mathias v.
Yetts (1882) 46 LT 497;Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch. D. 459, CA;Bristol and
West Building Society v. Mothew (1998) Ch. 1, CA。
法律也不追究受害方自己是否有错,例如他应该去采取一些很简单的查询就可以发觉
这个误述,正如 Baggallay 大法官在 Redgrave v. Hurd (1881) 20 Ch. D. 1 CA 中说的:
“The person who has made the misrepresentation cannot be heard to say to the party to
whom he has made that representation, ‘You chose to believe me when you might have
doubted me, and gone further.’ The representation once made, releases the party from any
investigation, even if the opportunity is afforded.”
但如果受害方的确有去作出了查询并且发觉了这个误述,但他还是去确认合约,这就
表示了另一个重要的问题就是他并没有依赖这一个误述。当然,受害方去作出查询并不
代表他能够完全知悉真相,所以误述方会有很大的举证责任说明受害方完全通过查询
可以知道事实真相,所以后来确认合约并没有去依赖误述。这也是现实,例如在近年来
的合并收购的商业活动蓬勃,其中涉及了不少的卖方被指控向买方作出误述。但在这种
交易,买方通常会在订约前会来一个“尽职合理努力”(due diligence)的查询/查帐,
岂非是卖方就因此可以随意去误述而不必负责了?这方面美国上诉庭有一个先例把这
一点说得很清楚,它是 New York Life Insurance Co v. Strudel 243 F 2d 90 (5 Cir 1957),
如下:
“The mere fact that in order to test the truth of the representations some independent inquiry
is made, which necessarily is really in the nature of a fishing expedition rather than a
systematic search that will necessarily reveal the truth if carried out with reasonable
thoroughness, does not indicate lack of reliance; to hold so would enable a liar who falsifies
facts peculiarly within his own knowledge to subject [a representee] to an unconscionable
squeeze play: if [the representee] makes any independent checks he would claim that it isn’t
‘relying’ and thus [the contract] is not voidable … the only alternative for the company would
be to indicate 100 per cent faith and reliance by making no investigation whatsoever, at the
risk of having a court later determine that inconsistencies in the application or information
otherwise brought to their attention should have caused them to make at least such an inquiry
as a prudent man would have made.”
换言之,受害方唯一要去证明的就是他对这个误述或多或少有所依赖才去确认了合约。
而法院或仲裁庭主要去看陈述本身是否有一定的重要性与受害方会不会合理去依赖这
个陈述。如果是的话,通常会相信或假设受害方所说的就是他有去或多或少作出依赖。
这方面可以节录 Jessel 大法官在 Mathias v. Yetts 所说如下:
“if a man has a material misstatement made to him which may, from its nature, induce him
to enter into the contract, it is an inference that he is induced to enter into the contract by it.
You need not prove it affirmatively. The man who makes the material misstatement to induce
the other to enter into the contract cannot be heard to say that he did not enter into it, to some
extent, at all events, on the faith of that statement, unless he can prove one of two things:
either in fact that the man did not rely upon it, and made inquiries and got information which
showed that the misstatement was untrue, and still went on with the contract, that is one thing;
or else that he said, expressly or impliedly, ‘I do not care what your representations are; I
shall not inquire about them. I shall enter into the contract taking the risk.’”
2.5 法院对误述的救济
法院对误述所带来的合约所给与的救济主要是允许受害方有一个权利在发觉误述后去
撤销此合约,主要是在 19 世纪发展起来的,这是衡平法院所作出的救济,因为衡平法
院是不能去给与受害方金钱上的赔偿,这是普通法院的权力。这种区分到了今天也不再
存在,因为英国法院已经把普通法院与衡平法院合并了。
2.5.1 撤销合约
这个选择的权利是在受害方,他可以去撤销( rescind)合约,但他也可以去确认
(affirm)合约:Reese Silver Mining Co v. Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64;Hackender, Hill &
White v. Feldia AG (1966) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 449。在后者的情况是如果合约替受害方带来很
大的利益,而相比下误述所带来的损害是微不足道,受害方就不会因为误述而去撤销
合约了。
受害方去撤销合约的权利也可以因为在发觉误述后过了一段合理时间仍不去作出选择
而消失。一个简单的例子就是在租房子或租一艘船舶时,房东或船东作出了事实上的误
述。但受害方在发觉后并不去撤销有关合约,因为当时的市场上涨,去这样做并不明智。
但过了半年后市场有所逆转,受害方就以误述的理由想去撤销有关合约,这显然是不
允许的。Jenkins 大法官在 Leaf v. Internaitonal Galleries (1950) 2 KB 86 说:
“contracts such as this cannot be kept open and subject to the possibility of rescission
indefinitely…. I think that, at all events, it behoves the purchaser either to verify, or, as the
case may be, to disprove the representation within a reasonable time, or else stand or fall by
it. If he is allowed to wait five, ten, or twenty years and then reopen the bargain there can be
no finality at all.”
由于是这样的法律地位,所以精明的商业人士会有取巧的机会。例如船东发觉在订约过
程中自己有误述,这可能是无辜甚至是疏忽,船东就一发觉并知道当时的航运市场高
涨,应该马上通知承租人有这个误述。估计承租人怎么都不会舍得撤销租约,这一来就
令该误述不了了之了。相反,承租人如果私下知道了曾经有什么误述,也会在航运市场
高涨的时候不吭声徉做不知,然后在航运市场下跌的时候才挖出来大做文章。
撤销合约的权利也可以是因为再也无法去复原或回归到合约订立前的地位而消失。一个
简单的例子就是货物买卖,卖方对货物作出了误述。但问题是买方在收到该批货物之后
已经把它转售或使用了。这一来,撤销合约也无法将货物退还。这方面的权威说法是
Crompton 大法官在 Clarke v. Dickson (1858) El. Bl. & El. 148 中说的:
“When you enunciate the proposition that a party has a right to rescind, you involve in it the
qualification, if the state of things is such that he can rescind. If you are fraudulently induced
to buy a cake you may return it and get back the price; but you cannot both eat your cake and
return you cake.”
因为误述而导致受害方可以撤销合约的权利还会因为其他的情况而消失。例如,其他无
辜 第三者 的权利会 受到影响 。或是一 个 仲裁协议会有不同的地位,这在 Harbour
Assurance v. Kansa General International Insurance (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81,Steyn 大法官
说:
“a widely drawn arbitration clause will survive avoidance of the contract. When the
arbitrator declares that the contract is avoided it operates retroactively, i.e. it operates ab
initio. [Nonetheless, having] declared the contract avoided, the arbitrator may proceed in the
same or a subsequent award to unscramble the monetary consequences in the light of claims
and cross claims.”
另是,会有情况是合约中有条文约定去禁止受害方撤销合约,而此条文看来是有效。在
Toomey v. Eagle Star (1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 88,在出争议的再保保单中,就有一条这样
的条文说:“(a) This contract is neither cancelable nor voidable by either party.”。由于被
告主要的抗辩就是在订立合约的时候是受到了原告的误述与不披露一些重要事实的影
响,所以自己有权去撤销合约。这就无可避免要去针对这一条条文到底能否不让被告去
这样做。Colman 大法官是这样判:
“I have come to the conclusion that it is indeed possible to write a clause into a contract
which does in fact exclude the right to rescind the contract for material misrepresentation or
material non-disclosure.
Does the wording of cl. (a) achieve this? In my judgment it does. It seems to me that the
express use of the words ‘neither cancelable nor voidable by either party’ clearly comprehend
that the parties have contracted out not only of terminating the contract by giving notice by
way of cancellation, but also of terminating the contract by seeking remedies in Court which
would avoid the contract either for misrepresentation or non-disclosure.”
但 Colman 大法官认为只是针对无辜的误述不可以撤销合约,不包括疏忽或者欺诈性的
误述。这是很浅显的解释合约原则,就是疏忽如果想去免责,就必须要用清楚无误的措
辞。而如果涉及欺诈性,更是超越一切,无法去包括在内。而 Colman 大法官这样判其实
也不奇怪,这等于英国的法律是承认与执行一条完整合约条文,道理是差不多的。
去总结,误述并不会自动令一个合约无效,这不像非法或胁迫。前者只是属于可令合约
无效(voidable),后者就是令合约一开始就自动无效(void ab initio),不存在需要
受害方去行使选择权,毕竟受害方没有权去选择确认一个非法的合约。
由于可以去撤销合约的误述也包括无辜的误述,加上误述会是很微不足道,但毕竟受
害方能说服法院或仲裁庭他是有去依赖(即使是程度很低)误述才确认这个合约,就
会觉得这位所谓的受害方在此情况下撤销合约似乎是有些过分取巧了。毕竟在现实中受
害方会去选择撤销合约的情况,往往是受到其他因素的影响,例如是市场波动导致他
去这样取巧。所以,在 1967 年的《误述法》已经在 Section 2(2)说明在一些非欺诈性的误
述,法院或仲裁庭可以去宣告受害方不能去撤销合约,只能索赔损失。这变了是无辜的
误述,本来不存在可去索赔损失,普通法唯一的救济就是可去撤销合约,但现在在立
法下变了也会要去面对损失的赔偿。有关这些方面都可以看《国际商务游戏规则—英国
合约法》一书第五章。
2.5.2 损失赔偿
除了撤销合约的权利外,受害方还可以向误述的一方提出损失索赔。这现在包括了所有
类别的误述,即使是无辜的误述。无辜的误述也要面对损失赔偿,是因为 1967 年《误述
法》的规定。但这损失赔偿的计算与欺诈性或疏忽的误述是不一样的,本来在 1967 年的
立法就已经说明不针对欺诈性的误述,而针对疏忽的误述,有关的条文是 Section
2(1),赔偿是针对受害方因为误述而产生的损失,说:
“2. Damages for misrepresentation
(1) Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made to him
by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if the person making
the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof had the misrepresentation
been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the
misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground
to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were
true.”
至于在欺诈性误述与疏忽误述之间的损失赔偿计算,一个分别就是如果受害方也有过
错的话,在欺诈性误述下就不存在要受害方去分摊损失。但在疏忽的误述,在这种情况
下就会根据 1945 年的《The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act》下要受害方与误
述方去分摊损失了,虽然这本质上是一个合约的索赔。这方面的法律请看《国际商务游
戏规则—英国合约法》一书的第十四章第 13 段。
还有是欺诈性误述的损失索赔是可以根据合约或侵权(tort of deceit),这里就会有分
别,因为计算并不相同。在合约法下的计算是以金钱去把受害方回归到合约没有被违反
的地位,也就是著名的复原原则(restitutio in integrum):Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9
Ex. 341。但是在侵权,计算是去把受害方所有的损失去要回来,将他回归到这个虚假的
陈述根本没有发生过的地位,也等于是没有这一个合约。以下去举一个例子说明它们的
分别,假设 A 把一辆二手车卖给 B,但对该车辆的车龄作出了虚假陈述,说是 2 年,
实际已有 5 年的车龄。B 买下了该二手车,并支付了 50,000 元,而当时一辆 2 年车龄的
同类二手车的市场价格是 55,000 元,但一辆 5 年车龄的同类二手车就只值 35,000 元。
这一来,根据合约法的计算,A 要赔偿 B 去让他回归到合约没有被违反(误述)的钱
是 20,000 元。但根据侵权去作出计算,就是要去看 B 如果没有去买下该辆二手车的地
位,就是他不必去付给 A 车价 50,000 元。但问题是他没有去撤销合约的话,就必须在
计算损失的时候把他得到的利益计算在内,就是他手中有了一辆值 35,000 元的二手车。
这一来,A 根据侵权要赔给 B 只是 15,000 元。这看来是索赔以合约计算比侵权更为有利,
但这是因为 B 买这辆二手车买得划算,是以 50,000 元买了一辆市值 55,000 元的汽车。
但换种情况,又会有不同的计算了。例如是在同样的例子下,一辆 2 年车龄的同类二手
车的市场价格不是 55,000 元,而是 45,000 元。这情况会是 B 买该车买贵了,也有可能
是市场下跌了。这一来,以侵权的计算仍是不变,损失是 15,000 元,但如果以合约法的
计算,就只能得到 10,000 元的赔偿,就足够去把 B 回归到合约如果没有被违反(误
述)的地位。所以如果在欺诈性侵权可以根据合约或侵权索赔损失,就要计算清楚,虽
然这不影响受害方去把两种计算不同的办法都作为是替换的索赔(alternative claims)。
2.6 误述的类别
已经提过,误述的类别在早期的普通法下只是分为两种,就是欺诈性的误述与无辜的
误述。这情况到了 1967 年的《误述法》才通过立法分为三种,多了疏忽的误述。在早期的
判例之中,欺诈性的误述并非与道德上的欺诈是同一码事。只要涉及一个不正确事实的
陈述,陈述方就会是被指称他没有采取合理小心令陈述正确。这直到 Derry v. Peek
(1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 贵族院才对何谓欺诈性误述有了一个定义如下:
“First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short
of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has
been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether
it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the
third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such
circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false
statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest belief in its truth. And
this probably covers the whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is false, has
obviously no such honest belief. Thirdly, if fraud be proved, the motive of the person guilty of
it is immaterial. It matters not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to
whom the statement was made.”
这一个准则,可以说也是在欺诈侵权(tort of deceit)下的准则。在上述说法的欺诈性误
述,也不必要去与刑事的欺诈划上等号。例如,三种的其中一种就是误述方鲁莽地
( reckless ) 去 作 出 一 个 陈 述 , 这 一 个 定 义 在 Angus v. Clifford (1891) 2 Ch 449 与
Thomas Witter Ltd v. TBP Industries Ltd (1996) 2 All ER 573,是指陈述方根本不关心与
漠视有关陈述事实的真相。但这显然并不是一个刑事责任的欺诈。欺诈性误述也不必达
到 刑 事 的 不 诚 实 , 这 在 一 个 著 名 的 倒 签 提 单 日 期 先 例 Standard Chartered Bank v.
Pakistan National Shipping (2000) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 218 中,Evans 大法官说:
“… it is not necessary that the maker of the statement was ‘dishonest’ as that word is used in
the criminal law. The relevant intention is that the false statement shall be acted upon by a
person to whom it is addressed. If the false statement was made knowingly and that intention
is proved, then the basis for liability for the tort of deceit is established.”
另一种情况从中可以看到欺诈性误述不必与刑事的欺诈划上等号,就是如果一个代理
人或雇员去向受害方作出一个欺诈性的误述,是在履行他被委任的工作时去作出的,
作为雇主就会要对此负上责任,即使他本人在代理人或雇员误述时并不知情:Lloyd v.
Grace, Smith & Co (1912) AC 716 HL;Alliance & Leicester Building Society v. Edgestop
Ltd (1993) 1 WLR 1462 ; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. (now General Bank
Nederland N.V.) v. Export Credits Guarantee Department [2000] 1 AC 486 HL。
在造船合约,欺诈性误述经常会发生,例如船东向船厂作出了有关他的经济实力或背
景的错误陈述,会是希望船厂去跟他订立造船合约或不需要他提供履约担保。但更多的
会是船厂向船东作出错误的陈述,特别是在他的造船经验与技术能力等方面。一种情况
可以想到的就是订约时船厂对船东作出交船日期的陈述,船厂拍胸脯保证可在某一期
限内交船,但却明知或去客观调查后就应该知道是根本做不到的,这就会构成欺诈性
的误述。船东在能证明船厂欺诈性误述的情况下,不仅可以索赔损失,更可以在市场下
跌时去撤销合约。而船厂不能光是肯去支付造船合约下的延误交船的议定赔偿就能去解
决误述的问题。
最后是无辜的误述,它的准则应该就是陈述方证明他的误述是在合理基础的情况下作
出的。但完全无辜的误述其实也不容易成立,在造船合约,可以想得到的一种情况就是
船厂给船东的图纸中的数据其中有一个不准确的地方,但没有被任何人发觉。而之后船
东在营运时根据图纸中的数据去向承租人作出陈述,这如果后来被发觉不准确,就会
是一 个 无辜的误述了。但可 另去 举 一个著名先 例 Howard Marine v. Ogden (1978) 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 334,Ogden 有一个在英国 Tyneside 港口的挖泥合约,而为了这工程,他
要去租进两条挖泥船。Howard Marine 手上有两条挖泥船,很想租给 Ogden。Ogden 对船
舶不懂,唯一关心的是能否装载足够重量的污泥开航去大海倾倒。在谈判时,Howard
Marine 派 出 他 的 经 理 O’Loughlin 先 生 去 Ogden 的 办 公 室 。 而 在 谈 到 装 载 量 时 ,
O’Loughlin 先生说每一艘挖泥船应可装载 850 立方米,重约 1,600 吨的污泥。这 1,600 吨
是 如 何 得 来 的 数 字 呢 ? 这 是 O’Loughlin 先 生 去 查 了 劳 合 社 的 记 录 ( Lloyd’s
Register),说是该船载重量(deadweight)是 1,800 吨,故在去掉油、水等后确应能装
载污泥大约 1,600 吨。
劳合社这一个历史最悠久的船级社的船舶记录是出名可靠的,但在该案,实在是有错
误。该挖泥船的真正载重量是 1,194.94 吨,非是 1,800 吨。结果在交船后,Ogden 发觉只
能装载 1,055 吨,等于挖泥的效率要降低与要多开航几次出去大海倾倒污泥,于是去减
付租金。Howard Marine 因此而撤船,并起诉要回欠下的 9 万多英镑租金。但 Ogden 反索
赔 60 万英镑的损失,指是 Howard Marine 的误述所引起的。在第一审,高院判 Howard
Marine 胜诉,可得回 9 万多英镑租金。但去了上诉庭,结果被推翻。上诉庭判是 Howard
Marine 虽没有对 Ogden 在装载污泥的重量上有任何附带保证(collateral warranty),但
他曾作出无辜的误述。而在 1967 年《误述法》下,无辜的误述再也不必去依赖有否附带
保证,受害方可直接在 Section 2(1)之下索赔损失。
照说,O’Loughlin 先生根据劳合社的记录而作出误述,应属无辜,应可以免除赔偿责
任。但在上诉庭,仍是在这一点上以 2 比 1(Denning 勋爵是少数意见,认为可免赔偿
责 任 ) 判 Howard Marine 败 诉 , 因 O’Loughlin 先 生 手 上 有 其 他 船 舶 文 件 ( German
Shipping documents)可去看到船舶的正确载重量,判是一个疏忽的误述。至于 Denning
勋爵认为是无辜误述,原因在 Ogden 两次问及挖泥船的载重量都是以电话的方式,所
以 O’Loughlin 先生只是随意地根据劳合社船舶记录来回答,而没有去对照船舶档案。如
果 Ogden 是要一个查得清清楚楚的准确陈述,他应该是用信函作出查问,而不是以口
头形式在电话交谈中查问。所以 Denning 勋爵认为在该情况下,Howard Marine 作出的
误述是有一个合理基础(reasonable ground)而不必负责。
在本案还有一重要之处,是租约内有一条第 1 条文说明挖泥船在交船时被承租人
(Ogden)接受,即表示已对船舶检验过并对一切满意:“ On handing over by the
owners, the vessel shall be tight, staunch and strong but charterers’ acceptance of handing
over the vessel shall be conclusive evidence that they have examined the vessel and found her
to be in all respects seaworthy, in good order and condition and in all respects fit for the
intended and contemplated use by the charterers and in every other way satisfactory to
them.”
在第一类,这种真正的不恰当引导通常是涉及一些道德上的敲诈(moral blackmail),
例如是丈夫威胁妻子说他们之间的婚姻能够维持下去就要妻子完全照他的话来行事。另
一种情况是一位年老的 B 与其住在一起的年轻的 A,A 跟 B 说如果 B 不这样做(例如
同意把财产转让给 A),A 就今后不照顾 B:Langton v. Langton (1995) 2 FLR 890。在商
业的情况是,如果银行 A 对客户 B 表示如果后者不同意一些财物安排,就会乐意看到
他的孩子(不是 B 本人)因为提供 给银行一些伪造的文件而被起诉: Williams v.
Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200。在另一个同样事实的先例,名为 Mutual Finance Ltd v. John
Wetton & Sons Ltd (1937) 2 KB 389,Porter 大法官是这样说:
“it extend to any case where the persons entering into the undertaking where in substance
influenced by the desire to prevent the prosecution or possibility of prosecution of the person
implicated, and were known to be intended to have been so influenced by the person in whose
favour the undertaking was given.”
显然是这种起诉并不针对一些合法与正常的诉讼,否则许多双方和解达成的协议就变
得无效了。在这种情况下,也谈不上有什么不恰当。
第二类是双方的关系可以去假设有不恰当引导,例如是律师与客户之间,医生与病人
之间,或是双方关系显示了受害方十分信任被指作出不恰当引导的一方。这可节录
Barclays Bank plc v. O’Brien 先例,Browne-Wilkinson 勋爵所说如下:
“the complainant only to show, in the first instance, that there was a relationship of trust and
confidence between the complainant and the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to
presume that the wrongdoer abused that relationship in procuring the complainant to enter
into the impugned transaction. In Class 2 cases therefore there is no need to produce evidence
that actual undue influence was exerted in relation to the particular transaction impugned:
once a confidential relationship has been proved, the burden then shifts to the wrongdoer to
prove that the complaint entered into the impugned transaction freely, for example by
showing that the complainant had independent advice. Such a confidential relationship can be
established in two ways, viz,
Class 2(A)
Certain relationships (for example solicitor and client, medical advisor and patient) as a
manner of law raise the presumption that undue influence has been exercised.
Class 2(B)
Even if there is no relationship falling within Class 2(A), if the complainant proved the de
facto existence of a relationship under which the complainant generally reposed trust and
confidence in the wrongdoer, the existence of such relationship raises the presumption of
undue influence. In a Class 2(B) case therefore, in the absence of evidence disproving undue
influence, the complainant will succeed in setting aside the impugned transaction merely by
proof that the complainant reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer without having to
prove that the wrongdoer exerted actual undue influence or otherwise abused such trust and
confidence in relation to the particular transaction impugned.”
相比误述或附带保证/协议,不适当引导在一般的商业合约中应该比较少见。
4. 附带保证/协议
但由于去接受这附带保证/协议的说法是对一份双方已经签署了的主合约带来冲击,因
为它引入了新内容,甚至会去与主合约内的部分内容起矛盾。此外,它也冲击了另一个
基本说法就是如果有了签署的合约,就不应该去看双方谈判时的口头或文书证据,这
就是著名的“口头证据规则”(parol evidence rule)。所以法院对这附带保证/协议说法
的接受是采取谨慎与怀疑的态度。它作为一份附带协议,也必须满足可以构成一份有效
合约的要求。首先,就是订约双方有意图去成立这法律关系,这方面可举 Heilbut,
Symons & Co v. Buckleton (1913) AC 30 为例,Moulton 勋爵说:
“Such collateral contracts, the sole effect of which is to vary or add to the terms of the
written contract, are therefore view with suspicion by the law … Not only the terms of such
contracts but the animus contrahendi (拉丁文,指订约意图 ) on the part of the parties to
them must be shown.”
附带保证/协议也需要有约因/对价,而这方面往往就是上述提到的一方不作出这承诺另
一方就不会去签署主合约,但也可以是其他的形式。Moulton 勋爵在同一案例也有提到
这方面,说:
“It is evident, both on principle and authority, that there may be a contract the consideration
for which is the making of some other contract. ‘If you will make such and such a contract I
will give you one hundred pounds,’ is in every sense of the word a complete legal contract. It
is collateral to the main contract, but each has an independent existence, and they do not
differ in respect of their possessing to the full the character and status of a contract.”
曾经一度认为是附带保证/协议只能去增加主合约的内容,但不能去与之起矛盾或对其
作出改变。但这说法看来并不正确,在 City & Westminster Properties Ltd v. Mudd (1959)
Ch 129,就涉及了一个附带保证/协议导致主合约中的一个权利变为无效。案情是涉及
了一家店铺的租赁合约到期需要去续约,双方在谈判的时候,房东说是要求在租赁合
约中加多一条条文说明店铺只能作为商业用途使用。但作为租客,Mudd 先生说是他一
直住在店铺内,所以不能接受这一条多加的条文。结果是房东告诉 Mudd 先生他可以继
续住下去,也因为是有了这个保证,结果双方就签了这个租赁合约,内中有条文禁止
在店铺内居住。但后来,房东要去执行该租赁合约,不准 Mudd 先生住下去。但 Harman
大法官认为房东曾经作出过一个附带保证/协议,不准他去反悔,说:
“There was a clear contract acted upon by the defendant to his detriment and from which the
plaintiff [could not] be allowed to resile.”
附带保证/协议的说法甚至适用在一种情况,就是作出保证的一方与去依赖该保证的一
方并没有直接的主合约关系。这是在 Shanklin Pier Ltd v. Detel Products Ltd (1951) 2 KB
854,案情是有关一个码头所有人想去对其进行重新油漆。他收到一个厂家名为 Detel
Products Ltd 的保证,说他们的油漆是非常优质,可以维持 7-10 年的寿命。根据这个保
证,码头所有人就与其油漆包工在协议内规定使用 Detel 的油漆。但油漆使用后发觉质
量很有问题,3 个月后已经出现掉漆现象。码头所有人于是控告 Detel Products Ltd 要求
赔偿,但问题就是订购油漆的合约实际上是油漆包工和 Detel Products Ltd 签订的。但法
院认为这不影响 Detel Products Ltd 与码头所有人之间的附带保证/协议,并且 Detel 需
要对这方面负责。
The inference of a contract in such a case is relatively straightforward. It has been said that
its basis is simply an undertaking as to the future which is intended to be binding. The crucial
requirement, therefore, is to establish that the promisor’s assurance was intended to be
contractual, bearing in mind that the evaluation of contractual intention will be made on an
objective basis. If there is evidence that the assurance was important to the promisee in
influencing his decision to enter into the ‘main’ contract, and that that fact was apparent to
the promisor, it will be relatively easy to infer that the promisor intended his assurance to be
binding.”
5. 完整合约条文的写法与后果
这种条文在订约自由下是可以有不同的写法,也会带来不同的后果。例如好像在 Alman
and Benson v. Associated Newspapers Group Ltd. Ch D (Unreported, 20 June 1980) 案例中
一条比较简单的完整合约条文:“ This agreement, when taken together with the agreed
drafts or the executed engrossments of them, constitutes the entire agreement and
understanding between the parties with respect to all matters therein referred to.”。
又或是好像 Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemicals Corp v. ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd.
(1999) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 387, CA.先例中的:
“Entirety of agreement
This CONTRACT comprises the entire agreement between the PARTIES, as detailed in the
various Articles and Annexures and there are not any agreements, understandings, promises
or conditions, oral or written, expressed or implied, concerning the subject matter which are
not merged into this CONTRACT and superseded hereby. This CONTRACT may be
amended in the future only in writing executed by the PARTIES.”。
另是 Inntrepreneur Pub Co v. East Crown Ltd (2000) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 611 先例中的:
“Any variations of this Agreement which are agreed in correspondence shall be incorporated
in this Agreement where the correspondence makes express reference to this Clause and the
parties acknowledge that this Agreement (which the incorporation of any such variations)
constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties.”。
笔者在最近的一个和解协议也见到了这样的一条条文:
“This agreement constitute the entire agreement between the Parties relating to the subject
matter of this Agreement. Each of the Parties acknowledges and confirms that in entering into
this Agreement, it is not relying upon any statement or representation made by or on behalf of
any other Party, whether or not in writing, at any time prior to execution of this Agreement
which is not expressly set out herein. Each of the parties expressly agrees that it will not have
any right of action in relation to any statement or representation, whether oral or written,
made by or on behalf of any of the other Parties in the course of any negotiations which
preceded the execution hereof. This agreement may be varied or modified only by the written
agreement of the Parties.”。
这种条文的本意都是想去局限或排除在合约内明示条文 /文字以外的争议,例如是附带
保 证 / 协 议 ( collateral warranty/contract ) 、 默 示 条 文 ( implied terms ) 、 误 述
(misrepresentation)、引导(inducement)、商业习惯做法/惯例(custom/usage)、侵权
的共同责任(concurrent liability in tort)等。换言之,如果这种条文被法官/仲裁员接受
是有效,就表示去解释合约就只能去看有关合约四个角之内的明示条文/文字。
这种条文还可以带来另外一个重要的后果,就是对一些不喜欢在最近 30 年来英国法院
在 解 释 文 书 合 约 时 从 传 统 的 字 义 上 解 释 ( literal method ) 走 向 广 泛 本 质 上 解 释
(expanded contextual method)的趋势中去以一条明示条文扭转方向。
6. 完整合约条文的本质
看所用的文字,完整合约条文在本质上会被视为是免责条文,所以解释起来会严格对
待。加上,这种条文会带来严重的后果(如可以阻止法官/仲裁员去考虑合约的本质/背
景),所以在近年来很富有争议性。支持方会说这是订约自由的大原则,订约方没有理
由不被允许在合约中说明这份文件就是双方完整的约定,而且以明示条文改变普通法
是长久以来一直的做法。反对方会说在绝大部分情况下都不能在一份文件中去包罗万有
的制造一份完整合约,总会有一些变数是没有在文件中出现。所以是必须对背景要有了
解才会找到正确的答案。这可以从接下去的介绍中感受得到。
这是一个现实情况,所以如果在文书合约去多加入一条完整合约条文,不理解的订约
方不见得就会光理解这条文,但合约其他所有的条文就反而不理解。所以,允许这条文
去有效的排除附带保证/协议与误述在针对订约方的合约知识是强弱悬殊的情况下是一
种不公平的做法。
难怪,特别是针对消费者的合约,这种条文是很受到质疑与敌视。英国的法律委员会在
其 1986 年名为“The Parol Evidence Rule”(Law Com 154) 的报告之 2.15 段有说道这种
条文如果是去排除或减免对误述的责任,是无效的。另针对附带保证 /协议,该报告说,
并在较早时已提到过:
“Without legislative provision such a clause cannot, we think, have conclusive effect. It may
have a very strong persuasive effect but if it were proved that, notwithstanding the clause, the
parties actually intended some additional clause, the court would give effect to that term
because such was the intention of the parties.”
但针对国际商贸,由于订约双方被视为是有相同谈判力量(虽然笔者认为这是睁着眼
睛说瞎话,发展中国家与先进国家对合约的知识强弱悬殊,比起先进国家的销售方与
消费者之间的强弱悬殊有过之而无不及),所以会比较宽松对待去解释有关条文。在这
一方面可去节录 Gerard McMeel 教授的《The Construction of Contracts—Interpretation,
Implication and Rectification》一书之 24.08 段,如下:
“Secondly, given their proximity to, and often close relationship with, exemption clauses,
the question arises whether either the entire agreement clause or the non-reliance clause are
within the scope of the restrictions on exemption clauses introduced by principally the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977 and section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Whilst there is
authority both for and against statutory regulation, it is submitted that as a matter of principle
and as a matter of statutory construction both clauses are vulnerable to the argument that they
are regulated exemption clauses.”
7. 完整合约条文的好处
这条文的好处主要就是为了带来商业上的肯定性/稳定性(commercial certainty),只要
去看文书合约的明示条文/文字就可以知道订约双方的责任与义务。这不光是对订约双
方,也包括了其他依赖有关合约的第三方,例如是银行。这尤其是重要,就是今天的法
律环境在放宽口头证据/外来证据,导致今天的争议是越来越多。这不但使诉讼费用昂
贵,而且带来结果不稳定。虽然有了完整合约条文,也不能完全避免对口头证据 /外来
证据的处理: Proforce Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd (2006) EWCA Civ 69 ;Air New
Zealand Ltd v Nipppon Credit Bank Ltd (1997) NZLR 218,224, BZCA。但显然法官/仲裁员
会有很大保留甚至敌意,正如 Longmore 大法官在 Reeds Solicitors (a firm) v Norwich
Union Insurance Ltd (2005) EWCA Civ 323 中所说的:
“As always when an oral agreement is relied on … and there are subsequent written
agreements with entire agreement clauses, any court would look at a claimant’s case with a
great deal of scepticism.”
也有一些交易涉及了许多层面的谈判,例如班轮公司通过代理人或职员去揽货,天知
道他们为了揽货会去对货方说些什么。所以,去把这些可能是真或是假的误述、引导或
附带保证/协议去排除在该运输合约外,就会需要一条好的完整合约条文。
现实中,经常有订约方在出了争议后发觉合约条文/文字对他不利,就去回想谈判的过
程中对方是否曾经有误述,引导或作出附带保证 /协议以扭转劣势。只要是勉强能找到
一些蛛丝马迹,就会毫不犹豫的去争辩这些在文书合约外的争议。这经常导致诉讼变得
十分昂贵与最后结果不肯定,连带整个交易也不肯定,以为是订好了合约但还是有节
外生枝。
8. 完整合约条文的坏处
这条文的坏处主要是令双方有此条文的文书合约变得至关重要,必须条文 /文字订得好
与对自己一方有利,因为将来唯一的依据就是围绕这一个合约内的明示条文去争议。但
这对发展中国家的一方不利,特别是好像中国。因为中国人有一些无法配合国际做法的
传统。(一)就是很多人没有水平去订好一份文书合约;(二)就是对文书合约的重要
性根本不够重视与不理解。但现实中,中国公司在近年来大量与西方公司进行交易,估
计有数量不少与价值连城的合约就是在后者的口头承诺或保证下去签订,正如
Wedderburn 勋爵在上述所讲的那样。唯一的分别就是英国法律不断想去提升进而保护
它的消费者,但不会想去保护它认为是有平等谈判力量的国际对手。
笔者见过无数中方与西方订的合约,内中的明示条文完全一面倒对中方不利,处处是
地雷。坦白说笔者见过成千上万的合约,但是至今还没有见过是中方有一个合约可让西
方人上当或吃亏的例子。反正是在目前的一套世界通用的游戏规则中,在笔者看来中国
是百分之百的技不如人。这一来,如果合约中有一条完整合约条文(这种可能性越来越
大)就会导致中国在发生争议的时候更加没有办法去为自己辩护。例如笔者知道不久前
有一个合约被西方公司索赔将近一亿美元,中国企业坚持是在签署合约前,西方公司
口头承诺他肯定不会在中国企业拿不到当局批准的时候向中国企业索赔。结果就在这个
保证下去签署了合约,中方并作出严格的合约承诺会在一个月内拿到批准。这严格承诺
其实就是西方公司所拟订的合约条文中规定中国企业要去这样做,反正中国企业拿来
就签署。再发展下去可以想得到的就是中国企业无法取得批准而被西方公司提出这一个
巨额的索赔。本来中国企业如果被对方在订约前保证过不会为此提出索赔,就可去以附
带保证/协议作为抗辩,只要证据足够与证人表现好,会有机会胜诉。但可惜在该书面
合约中有一条完整合约条文,导致了难以去提出这一个抗辩。可见是这种条文的危险之
处,但任何事情都有好有坏,主要就是去看相关人士的水平。笔者相信中国不少的单位
领导都不会听说过这个完整合约条文,更不用说像西方公司领导的全面或比较了解并
懂得如何利用。
9. 完整合约条文的有关先例
在近 20、30 年来,开始有大量的先例针对完整合约条文的解释,内中也可以看到这条
文普遍被采用。
Alman and Benson v. Associated Newspapers Group Ltd. (Unreported, 20 June 1980) 是近期
大量有关完整合约条文先例中第一个去解释该条文的文字,案情是有关一家咨询公司
的股份买卖,双方的争议涉及了该合约的误述与撤销。被声称的误述是有关原告将来在
公司每天的业务中所处的领导地位。该合约有一条相对简单的完整合约条文,如下:
“11(1). This agreement, when taken together with the agreed drafts or the executed
engrossments of them, constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the parties
with respect to all matters therein referred to.”
Browne-Wilkinson 大法官判是该条文会可以去抗辩一个附带保证/协议的索赔,但不足
以也没有明示可去避免一个误述的索赔。换言之,该条文的文字/措辞不够广泛。他是这
样说:
“Clause 11 (1) provides that the written contract constitutes ‘the entire agreement and
understanding between the parties with respect to all matters therein referred to’. It is to be
noted that it does not in terms refer to representations. The defendants, however, submit that
the word ‘understanding’ covers the representation alleged in this case. I cannot accept this
submission. Although it is true that, in one sense, the common assumption by all parties that
the plaintiffs were to be in charge of the day-to-day running could be called ‘an
understanding’ between them, the plaintiffs are not suing on that bilateral ‘understanding’ but
on the representation of intention implicit in it. Clause 11 (1) plainly excludes any contractual
claim based a bilateral understanding, but it does not go further. In my judgment the word
‘understanding’ is directed to excluding any claims arising from warranties collateral to the
main agreement. If it were designed to exclude liability for misrepresentation it would, I
think, have to be couched in different terms, for example, a clause acknowledging that the
parties had not relied on any representation in entering into the contract. I therefore hold that
the word ‘understanding’ in this contract is not apt to cover representation, and accordingly
does not exclude the plaintiffs’ claim.”。(Browne-Wilkinson 大法官是说该条文只针对双
方的“理解”[understanding]。有关原告负责该公司以后每天的业务可以是一个双方的
理解,但这不代表一方向另一方作出的误述。要去把误述也加在完整合约条文内,文字
上就要有所不同,例如说明双方都没有依赖对方的陈述去订立本合约。由于“理解”一
词并不能去包括误述,所以原告可以根据误述提出索赔。)
但 Jacob 大法官判是该条文不足够去包括有关的不真实误述,说:
“The first thing to do is to construe the clause … in my judgment the first sentence does not
operate to exclude remedies for pre-contractual misrepresentations. It simply does not say it
does. If it said, for instance, ‘The vendor [scilicet purchaser] agrees he will have no remedy in
respect of any untrue statement made to him upon which he relied in entering this contract,
and that his only remedies can be for breach of contract’ the clause would probably have done
the job. Then, if he is sold a pup, he will have no remedy, unless it is a contractually
warranted pup … Unless it is manifestly made clear that the purchaser has agreed only to
have a remedy for breach of warranty I am not disposed to think that a contractual term said
to have this effect by a roundabout route does indeed do so. In other words, if a clause is to
have the effect of excluding or reducing remedies for damaging untrue statements, then the
party seeking that protection cannot be mealy-mouthed in his clause. He must bring it home
that he is limiting his liability for falsehoods he may have told.”
Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemicals Corp v. ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd. (1999) 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 387, CA 是一个重要的案例涉及技术转让,案情是有关在印度的 Deepak 计
划建造一个生产甲醇的工厂。生产是以一种名为 tube cooled methanol converters 的技术
进行,ICI 公司称这是一种经过很好验证的新技术并可由他在伦敦的许可商 Davy 去提
供。之后,Deepak 与 Davy 直接签署了一份技术转让合约并在 Davy 的协助下建起了工
厂。但工厂设备一直有温度超标的问题,并在投入生产后约半年,生产甲醇的转换器发
生爆炸,导致工厂停产与后来需要重建,损失是高达 1 亿英镑。Deepak 于是向 ICI 与
Davy 索赔损失,其中一个争议是 Deepak 指称 ICI 与 Davy 共作出过 8 项误述,而有关
的合约是有一条完整合约条文如下:
“Entirety of agreement
This CONTRACT comprises the entire agreement between the PARTIES, as detailed in the
various Articles and Annexures and there are not any agreements, understandings,
promises or conditions, oral or written, expressed or implied, concerning the subject matter
which are not merged into this CONTRACT and superseded hereby. This CONTRACT may
be amended in the future only in writing executed by the PARTIES.”
双方的争议是上述条文是否包括了一个附带保证/协议与房东有否作出过这样的被指控
的附带保证/协议。Lightman 大法官判是证据不足去证明曾经有作出过这种附带保证/协
议,所以严格来说是不必再去针对上述的完整合约条文作出解释。但 Lightman 大法官
还是有去针对,并先去解释该完整合约条文的目的与作用,说:
“The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a written agreement
from threshing through the undergrowth and finding in the course of negotiations some
(chance) remark or statement (often long forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) on which
to found a claim such as the present to the existence of a collateral warranty. The entire
agreement clause obviates the occasion for any such search and the peril to the contracting
parties posed by the need which may arise in its absence to conduct such a search. For such a
clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual terms are
to be found in the document containing the clause and not elsewhere, and that accordingly
any promises or assurances made in the course of the negotiations (which in the absence of
such a clause might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save
insofar as they are reflected and given effect in that document. The operation of the clause is
not to render evidence of the collateral warranty inadmissible in evidence as is suggested in
Chitty on Contract, 28th ed. Vol. 1, par. 12-102: it is to denude what would otherwise
constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect.”
接下去,Lightman 大法官认为在本合约的条文中的文字是足够去包括附带保证/协议,
说:
“That is the question raised in this case, where the formula of words used in the clause is
abbreviated to an acknowledgement by the parties that the agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between them. In my judgement that formula is sufficient, for it constitutes an
agreement that the full contractual terms to which the parties agree to bind themselves and
that what might otherwise constitute a side legal effect. That can be the only purpose of the
provision.”
Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corp v. Texaco Ltd (2003) EWHC 1964 (Comm) 是一个有关
CIF 的买卖,货物是 15,000 吨柴油,根据买卖合约,在装港的时候委任了一位独立的
专家去取样品以确定该票柴油符合合约规范说明,该专家也确认了是符合的。但到了卸
港的卡迪夫,买方声称柴油不符合规范说明而拒货。在诉讼中,买方指控装港的专家犯
了严重错误并要去举证在装港的习惯做法,就是他应把样品保留一段合理的时间。针对
习惯做法,卖方指出该买卖合约有一条完整合约条文,内容已经包括了排除习惯做法
的争议。该条文如下:
“…contains the entire agreement of the parties…and there is no other promise,
representation, warranty, usage or course of dealing affecting it…”
这警告是有道理的,有的默示条文是必须去加入合约而使合约有商业上的效力
(business efficacy),否则合约无法操作。这一来,不论是怎么广泛的完整合约条文都
不足以排除这种默示条文。另外,一些立法的默示,例如是英国 1979 年的《货物销售
法》里的各种默示条文,如卖方对货物的主权,也一般不能被排除,除非这个完整合约
条 文 写 得 足 够 清 楚 。 在 Gerard McMeel 教 授 的 《 The Construction of Contracts—
Interpretation, Implication and Rectification》一书中的 24.32 段对此有论述,如下:
“It is submitted that this case correctly excluded the custom or usage, which were expressly
referred to in the entire agreement clause. However other implied terms should be approached
more cautiously. It is clear that an entire agreement clause would be insufficient to exclude
the various statutory implied terms, as its language is insufficiently clear and express to meet
the strict tests for prima facie exclusion of those general default rules. It also appears to be
correct that the entire agreement clause is inapt to exclude those terms which are necessary to
make the contract work. This may be for the reason suggested by the Deputy Judge, or it may
be simply that the existence of the implied term contradicts the assertion in the entire
agreement clause that it represents the totality of the agreement. In those circumstances the
necessary implied term must trump.”
Infiniteland Ltd v. Artisan Contracting Ltd (2004) EWHC 955 (Ch) 案情是有关一个房屋承
建公司的买卖,在收购以前,买方曾经进行了一个全面的经纪上的尽职调查( financial
due diligence),包括可去全面检查的帐簿(books)。另在一个长达 7 个星期的时间内
卖方也提供了一份十分详细的有关公司经济状况的资料。买方后来指控卖方误述,但这
不被 Park 大法官接受,认为不可能在上述的情况会在酒店喝咖啡时的一个短暂的交谈
中涉及了公司业务状况的误述。所以误述在事实上不成立,但即使在法律上买方也是败
诉,这是因为合约中有一条完整合约条文,内容包括陈述,所以可去排除这个误述的
指控。该条文是:
“The purchaser has entered into this agreement on the basis of and in reliance on the
Warranties and the Purchaser acknowledges that it has not been induced to enter into this
agreement by any representation or warranty other than the Warranties.”
本先例 Proforce Recruit Ltd v. Rugby Group Ltd (2006) EWCA Civ 69 不是去针对完整合
约条文的解释,而是关于有了该条文是否可以避免去针对外来证据 /口头证据。在该先
例,原告要去提供事实证人(公司的主席与总经理)去协助解释合约内的明示条文。该
合约有一条完整合约条文,说道:“This agreement supersedes all prior representations,
agreements, negotiations or understandings”。在高院,Field 大法官认为有这样的条文下,
它不能去考虑外来证据去协助解释合约明示条文/文字,说:
“The effect of the words…is that the things superseded are to have no bearing on the
meaning of the agreement.”
但这在高院被改变,认为该完整合约条文不应针对明示条文的解释,说道:“ …was
not apt to govern the construction of the written terms”。
9.8 案例之八:Peekay Intermark Ltd v. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.
这一个先例 Peekay Intermark Ltd v. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.(2006)
EWCA Civ 386.是有关投资在 ANZ 银行推出的一种金融产品名为“Structured US Dollar
hedged Russian Treasury bill deposit”,它是与俄罗斯政府的债券挂钩。投资者是在 Isle
of Man 注册的一家公司,而背后真正的投资者估计是阿拉伯国家的一些富商。投资者的
代 表 在 ANZ 的 合 约 表 格 中 签 了 字 , 也 另 签 了 一 份 名 为 “ 风 险 披 露 声 明 ” ( Risk
Disclosure Statement)。声明中有说明是投资者确认已经阅读与明白有关风险的披露,
而在投资合约表格中也有各种风险的警告,包括俄罗斯政府的君主违约( sovereign
default)与新兴市场(emerging markets)的风险。后来,该金融产品出了事,发生了君
主违约。投资者起诉 ANZ 并指控他误述。在高院 Richard Siberry 大法官不认为投资合约
中的文件有去排除订约前的误述,并认为投资者只是粗略看了有关的合约表格,并签
了字。至于误述方面,Richard Siberry 大法官认为有误述,认定 ANZ 曾经口头对投资者
说这是一个在俄罗斯债券的直接投资(direct proprietary investment in Russian bonds),
但事实上这一个金融产品是对冲基金(derivative)或 structure deposit contract,大家风
险不同。
但该案件被上诉庭推翻,上诉庭对有关投资合约的文件内容比高院重视的多,并不认
为 ANZ 有任何错误的引导(inducement),判是投资者自己误解了该投资产品的性质 。
Moore-Bick 大法官又这样说:
“it is common to include in certain kinds of contracts an express acknowledgment by each of
the parties that they have not been induced to enter the contract by any representations other
than those contained in the contract itself. The effectiveness of a clause of that kind may be
challenged on the grounds that the contract as a whole, including the clause in question, can
be avoided if in fact one or other party was induced to enter into it by misrepresentation.
However, I can see no reason in principle why it should not be possible for parties to an
agreement to give up any right to assert that they were induced to enter into it by
misrepresentation, provided they make their intention clear, or why a clause of that kind, if
properly drafted, should not give rise to a contractual estoppel of the kind recognised in
Colchester Borough Council v. Smith (1991) Ch 448; affd (1992) Ch 421. However, that
particular question does not arise in this case. A clause of that kind may (depending on its
terms) also be capable of giving rise to an estoppel by representation if the necessary elements
can be established.”