第十二章 船东违约的救济

1. SAJ 与 NEWBUILDCON 的有关条文

这方面在 SAJ 是 Article XI 如下：

“1 Definition of Default:
The BUYER shall be deemed to be in default of performance of its obligations under this
Contract in the following cases:
(a) if the BUYER fails to pay any of the First, Second and Third Instalments to the
BUILDER within three (3) days after such Instalment becomes due and payable under the
provisions of Article II hereof, or

(b) if the BUYER fails to pay the Fourth Instalment to the BUILDER concurrently with the
delivery of the VESSEL by the BUILDER to the BUYER as provided in Article II hereof, or

(c) if the BUYER fails to take delivery of the VESSEL, when the VESSEL is duly tendered
for delivery by the BUILDER under the provisions of Article VII hereof.

2 Interest and Charge:

If the BUYER is in default to payment as to any Instalment as provided in Paragraph (a) and
(b) of this Article, the BUYER shall pay interest on such Instalment at the rate of … per cent
(…%) per annum from the due date thereof to the date of payment to the BUILDER of the
full amount including interest, in case the BUYER shall fail to take delivery of the VESSEL
as provided in Paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the BUYER shall be deemed in default of
payment of the Fourth Instalment and shall pay interest thereon at the same rate as aforesaid
from and including the day on which the VESSEL is tendered for delivery by the BUILDER.

3 Effect of Default:
(a) If any default by the BUYER occurs as provided herein before, the Delivery Date shall
be automatically postponed for a period of continuance of such default by the BUYER.

(b) If any default by the BUYER continues for a period of fifteen (15) days, the BUILDER
may, at its option, rescind this Contract by giving notice of such effect to the BUYER by
cable confirmed in writing. Upon receipt by the BUYER of such notice of rescission, this
Contract shall forthwith become null and void and any of the BUYER’s Supplies shall
become the sole property of the BUILDER.
In the event of such rescission of this Contract, the BUILDER shall be entitled to retain any
Instalment or Instalments therefore paid by the BUYER to the BUILDER on account of this
Contract.

4 Sale of VESSEL:
(a) In the event of rescission of this Contact as above provided, the BUILDER shall have
full right and power either to complete or not to complete the VESSEL as it deems fit, and to
sell the VESSEL at a public or provide sale on such terms and conditions as the BUILDER
thinks fit without being answerable for any loss or damage.

(b) In the event of the sale of the VESSEL in its complete state, the proceeds of the sale
received by the BUILDER shall be applied firstly to payment of all expenses attending such
sale and otherwise incurred by the BUILDER as a result of the BUYER’s default, and then to
payment of all unpaid Installments of the Contract Price and interest on such Installments at
the rate of … per cent (… %) per annum from the respective due dates thereof to the date of
application.

(c) In the event of sale of the VESSEL in its incompleted state, the proceeds of sale
received by the BUILDER shall be applied firstly to all expenses attending such sale and
otherwise incurred by the BUILDER as a result of the BUYER’s default, and then to payment
of all costs of construction of the VESSEL less the instalments so retained by the BUILDER
and compensation to the BUILDER for a reasonable loss of profit due to the rescission of this
Contract.

(d) In either of the above events of sale, if the proceeds of sale exceeds the total of amounts
to which such proceeds are to be applied as aforesaid, the BUILDER shall promptly pay the
excess to the BUYER without interest, provided however, that the amount of such payment to
the BUYER shall in no event exceed the total amount of Instalments already paid by the
BUYER and the cost of the BUYER’s Supplies, if any.

(e) If the proceeds of sale are insufficient to pay such total amounts payable as aforesaid,
the BUYER shall promptly pay the deficiency to the BUILDER upon request.”

在 NEWBUILDCON，有关条文如下：
“15 Payments
…
(d) (v) In the event of late payment of Instalments by the Buyer, the Builder shall have the
right to suspend work under this Contract in accordance with Clause 39 (c) (Suspension of
Work).

34 Permissible Delays
(a) The Delivery Date shall be extended if any of the following events cause actual delay to
the delivery of the Vessel: …
(ii)(5) Suspension of work pursuant to Clause 39 (c) (Suspension and Termination –
Suspension of Work);

39 Suspension and Termination

…
(b) Builder’s Termination
The Builder shall have the right to terminate this Contract forthwith upon giving notice to the
Buyer in the event that:
(i) The guarantor giving the Instalment Guarantee or Performance Guarantee on behalf of the
Buyer under Clause 14(a) (Buyer’s Instalment/Performance Guarantee) is deemed insolvent
pursuant to Sub-clause (d) below, unless the Buyer can provide a replacement Performance
Guarantee acceptable to the Builder within 30 days and provided that notice of termination is
given before an acceptable Buyer’s Instalment or Performance Guarantee is received by the
Builder, or
(ii) The Buyer fails to pay any sums due under this Contract for a period of twenty-one (21)
Banking Days provided that the Builder thereafter gives the Buyer at least 5 Banking Days
notice of its intention to terminate under this Clause, and within that period the Buyer fails to
remedy the breach and provided that notice of termination is given before the Buyer pays the
outstanding sums due, or
(iii) The Buyer fails to take delivery of the Vessel tendered in accordance with this Contract,
or
(iv) The Buyer is in breach of Clause 14 (Guarantees).
(c) Suspension of Work
Without prejudice to Sub-clause (b) above the Builder shall have the right to suspend work
under this Contract if the Buyer fails to pay any instalment stated in Box 11 due for a period
of fifteen (15) Banking Days until payment of such outstanding sums.
…
(f) Effect of Builder’s Termination
If this Contract is terminated by the Builder, the Builder shall have the right to retain the
Buyer’s Supplies together with any instalments paid by the Buyer and shall have the right and
power either to complete or not to complete the Vessel as it deems fit but in any event shall
sell the Vessel (either in its complete or incomplete form), including those Buyer’s Supplies
which are installed or have been utilised on board the Vessel, at the best price reasonably
obtainable at a public or private sale on reasonable terms and conditions.

(i) In the event of the sale of the Vessel in its complete form the proceeds of the sale received
by the Builder shall be applied in the following order:
(1) to pay of all expenses incurred by the Builder in respect of the sale and otherwise incurred
by the Builder as a result of the Buyer’s default;
(2) to payment of all unpaid instalments of the Contract Price including any which would
have been payable after the date of termination and interest on such instalments at the rate of
interest stated in Box 30 from the respective due dates thereof to the date of application.

(ii) In the event of the sale of the Vessel in its incomplete form the proceeds of sale received
by the Builder shall be applied in the following order:
(1) to payment of all expenses incurred by the Builder in respect of the sale and otherwise
incurred by the Builder as a result of the Buyer’s default;
(2) to payment of all unpaid instalments of the Contract Price to the extent due but not yet
paid at the date of termination and interest on such instalments at the rate of interest stated in
Box 30 from the respective due dates thereof to the date of application;
(3) to payment of all costs of part construction of the Vessel less any paid instalments and less
any sums credited under (2) above.
(4) to payment of the Builder’s reasonable net loss of profit caused by the Buyer’s default.

(iii) In either of the above events if the proceeds of sale exceed the sums to which such
proceeds are to be applied as aforesaid the Builder shall promptly pay any such excess to the
Buyer without interest thereon, provided that the amount of such payment to the Buyer shall
in no event exceed the total amount of instalments paid by the Buyer. The Builder shall at the
same time either permit the Buyer to remove the Buyer’s Supplies which are not installed or
utilized onboard the Vessel (if any) from the Shipyard for the cost and expense of the Buyer,
or give credit to the Buyer for the full value thereof.

(iv) If the proceeds of sale are insufficient to pay the Builder the total amounts due from the
Buyer as aforesaid, the Builder may sell the Buyer’s Supplies which are not installed or
utilized onboard the Vessel (if any) at the best price reasonably obtainable at a public auction
or private sale on reasonable terms and conditions, applying the proceeds of such sale toward
the unsatisfied amounts due from the Buyer, and giving credit to the Buyer for any excess.

(v) If the proceeds of sale are still insufficient to pay the Builder the total amount due from
the Buyer as aforesaid, the Buyer shall pay to the Builder the amount of such deficiency, plus
interest at the rate stated in Box 30 to cover periods whenever payments from the Buyer
became overdue.”

2. 概述

这条文是针对船东在造船合约下的违约/毁约，但由于合约下的履行绝大部分都是船厂
的义务，所以真正会导致船东在建造船舶过程中的违约 /毁约就基本上只有两种情况。
第一种就是船东没有去准时支付分期付款的船价，第二种就是拒绝接收船舶。船东其他
的违约/毁约也会有，例如是船东的供应晚了去交给船厂，或是根据第 9 章 17.6 段所介
绍的死亡日期尚未届临船东就去中断造船合约，等。但在这里主要去针对前两种的违约
/毁约。

前两种情况也会是相关联的，例如拒绝接收船舶就会同时不去支付最后的一笔船价。而
且，两种情况的违约通常都会是相比订立造船合约的时候，航运市场下跌而导致了船
东希望从合约中脱身或是以此去向船厂施压以求其同意减船价。举例说，在 Stocznia v.
Latco (2002) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 436，在 1992 年订立 6 条冷藏船的造船合约时，该类船舶的
市场走势强劲。但到了 1993 年，这 1 年左右的时间内，市场大跌。造船合约的船价大约
是 2,800 万美元，而市场价下跌至 2,000 万美元。这导致了船东去委任了一位挪威的海
事顾问，代表他向船厂争取减价，而报酬就是减去多少船价的 5%。该海事顾问向船东
表示他会试图去争取 20%的减价与把交船日期押后。之后该海事顾问去船厂并向船厂建
议 30%的降价与把交船日期押后。这一个建议后来在诉讼的时候被 Thomas 大法官说是
“完全不现实”（wholly unrealistic）。至于该海事顾问向船厂提出减价的原因是冷藏
船市场十分差劲，船东也没有长期的租约，船价太低而导致无法找到融资，反正是船
东付不出钱与没有能力去接受船舶。在被船厂拒绝后，证据显示该海事顾问去建议船东
不要支付下一笔到期的分期付款（安放龙骨），因为这会导致船厂严重的现金流通困
难而被迫去作出让步。该建议是这样说：
“It is quite clear that further discussions at this point will not lead to any solution. It is my
opinion that we will only know if a commercial solution is possible after Latreefers ( 船东)
have failed to pay the next instalment due 3.12.93. The Yard is dependent on this cash and if
they don’t receive same they could get into serious difficulties (read cash flow problems).”

再回去探讨有关船东拒绝或延误支付船价的分期付款，在上述的节录可以见到 SAJ 与
NEWBUILDCON 的标准格式合约有了非常详细的明示条文去针对。这些内容会稍后去
探讨。众所周知，如果明示条文写得很清楚，它就有机会去超越法律的默示地位。而在
船东拒绝支付的情况下，这显然是一种违约/毁约的行为。船厂如果去接受而中断合约
的话，就会有疑问，到底船厂到底可否去索赔普通法下的损失？或是，船厂还是受制
于上述节录的计算条文，虽然它们之间基本上有很多相同之处。这方面在 Stocznia v.
Latco (2002) Lloyd’s Rep. 436 的一连串判决中有详细针对，而且有不同看法。这方面稍
后会去介绍，以下段节先去介绍有关普通法下的违反约定了的支付船价时间 /时限的救
济。

3. 合约规定的时间/时限是保证条文或是条件条文？

违约会带来无辜方的损失索赔应该是无可质疑的法律默示地位，这包括了合约承诺方
到了规定的时间/时限没有去履行他的承诺，例如是船东没有去按规定时间支付给船厂
有关船价的分期付款。如果船东是清楚明确拒绝支付或说明是他付不起，这是毁约
（repudiation）。但如果船东只是说要比约定的时间晚一两天才支付，这不足构成毁约。
但他还是属于违约（breach），船厂可以向船东提出索赔损失应是明确，例如是这一两
天延误的利息。至于船厂是否有索赔损失以外的权利，也就是去中断合约，这就是在这
里要去探讨的问题。换言之，就是去探讨这一个违约到底是违反条件条文（condition）
或是保证条文（warranty）。

在造船合约中会有许多各种时间/时限针对各方面，这不光是针对分期付款。例如，会
有条文针对一个时间/时限船厂要提供还款担保，船东要提供履约担保，船东要批准船
厂的图纸/蓝图，船厂要在试航前给船东的多少天书面通知，交船日期，等等。显然，
每一方面所针对的时间/时限不会是有一样程度的重要性。显然，交船日期十分重要，
船东会有很多安排去针对这一个船厂的承诺，例如去安排接收船舶后的租约或营运。所
以，已经有过判例说交船日期是条件条文，违约可以导致船东去中断造船合约：
McDougall v. Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd (1958) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 345。但针对船厂要试航
前给船东的通知，就不像有同样的重要性，一有违反可被视为是违反了条件条文。

如果合约没有特别条文去针对承诺的时间/时限如果违反能否去除了索赔损失外也可以
去中断合约或有其他的救济，就要看普通法的默示地位了。在 United Scientific Holdings
Ltd v. Burnley Borough Council (1978) AC 904，这一个先例是针对房屋租约，贵族院认
为时间通常不是重要。法 院会去给一个一 般性的推断是时间不是重要（ a general
presumption that time is not of the essence），除非有其他方面可以去推翻这一个假设。

也可去介绍有关租约的案例，例如在 The “Georgios C” (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7，它是有

关没有准时作出支付，Denning 勋爵是这样说：
“The effect of a stipulation as to time always depends on the true construction of the
contract. A default in payment does not automatically give the other a right to determine it.
Usually it does not do so. It only does so if there is an express provision giving the right to
determine, or if the non-payment is such as to amount to a repudiation of the contract. That is
shown by Martindale v. Smith (1841) 1 Q.B. 389; and by the well-known judgment of Lord
Blackburn in Mersey Steel and Iron Company (Ltd.) v. Naylor, Benzon & Co., (1884) 9 App.
Cas. 434, at p. 444. In the present case the non-payment was clearly not such as to amount to
a repudiation. It was obviously a mistake. The charterers thought, as the bank were closed on
Saturday and Sunday, Monday would do. They were wrong in so thinking. But they were not
repudiating the contract.”

即使是立法也有规定说明支付的时间 /时限不是重要，这是 1979 年英国《货物销售

法》Section 10 如下：
“(1) Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract, stipulations as to
time of payment are not of the essence of a contract of sale.
(2) Whether any other stipulation as to time is or is not of the essence of the contract depends
on the terms of the contract….”

接下去是另一个十分重要的贵族院先例 Bunge v. Tradax (1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1，判是

在涉及商人之间的协议（例如是货物买卖合约）通常对时间 /时限的规定会被视为是重
要，即是一条条件条文。Wilberforce 勋爵是这样说：
“the statement of the law in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn, vol 9, 1974, paras 481-92,
including the footnotes to para 482 (generally approved in the House in [United Scientific
Holdings Ltd v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904]), appears to me to be correct, in
particular in asserting (1) that the circumstances of the case indicate that this would fulfil the
intention of the parties, and (2) that broadly speaking time will be considered of the essence in
‘mercantile’ contracts …”

这样看来，针对一些市场波动很快或是针对一些实质重要性的合约义务的履行，有关
的时间/时限被视为是条件条文机会就很大了。在国际货物买卖（FOB/CIF 买卖），就
有很多先例针对货物的付运日期（Suzuki v. Burgett & Newsam [1922] 10 Lloyd’s Rep.
223），开出信用证日期（Etablissements Chainbaux SARL v. Harbormaster Ltd [1955] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 303），支付定金（The “Blankenstein” [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 93），FOB 买
方要给 15 天通知给卖方有关船舶备妥装货（Bunge v. Tradax），等都被视为是条件条
文。这种商业合约都涉及了十分波动的商品市场，而且像开出信用证或支付定金都是对
卖方安排付运货物前的实质性重要保障。

但这种决定基本上还是以假设的双方订约意愿来作为根据，不存在所有商业合约有关
时间/时限的约定都被视为条件条文。而且，法院为了不鼓励去中断合约，会去尽量避
免判一些不像是太重要的违约是违反条件条文。这里可去节录《The Law of Contract》一
书 2007 年第三版在 7.25 段所说如下：
“However, the basis for such decisions is the presumed intention of the parties: the courts do
not apply a rule that all time stipulations in commercial contracts are conditions. For example,
time of payment is not usually essential where a sale of goods contract provides for payment
in exchange for the goods (成文法请看上述《货物销售法》之 S.10[1]与案例法请看 Decro-
Wall International SA v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 361; Cf Harold Wood
Brick Co Ltd v. Ferris [1935] 2 KB 198). Outside the context of standard form commercial
contracts there is, and has always been, a reluctance to treat time stipulations as conditions in
the absence of express agreement. For example, in Bettini v. Gye (1876) 1 QBD 183 it was
alleged that an opera singer had breached his contract to arrive in London ‘without fail at least
six days before the commencement of his engagement’. The court, assuming the allegation to
be proved, held that it was not a sufficient justification for the employer’s decision to
terminate as the term was not a condition. Notwithstanding the clear and somewhat emphatic
words (‘without fail’) the court said that as the term did not go ‘to the root of the matter’ it
was not a condition.”

去总结，如果合约方很希望有肯定性，特别是针对一些他们认为重要的违约，最好就
是去明示规定。这里最好的例子就是期租合约的条文规定要准时支付租金，否则船东可
撤船。这种租约条文通常只是针对租金而不针对租约下其他要支付的费用，所以在 The
“Tropwind” (No. 1) (1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397，承租人晚了去支付保险的加保费，这没
有在明示条文中有所针对。所以，晚了支付会带来的后果又要回头去看普通法的地位。
这显然并不是有实质的重要性，所以法院判只是违反了保证条文，船东以这个理由去
撤船反而是自己毁约。

4. 合约规定的时间/时限如果是保证或中间条文可否去把它提升为条件条文？

如果合约规定的时间/时限并非太重要，违反它只是破坏了保证条文或不能肯定是条件
条文，会否无辜方可以去设法将其提升为条件条文，进而在继续违反的情况下有了根
据可去中断合约？这种做法是可以在违约发生后去给违约方一个通知，把时间 /时限变
为重要。这种做法可以被称为是“serve a notice making time essential”。这通知的内容要
包括：（1）通知承诺方他所要履行的义务；（ 2）规定一个合理时间（根据实际情
况）要求履行；（3）清楚说明这一个通知是去把时间/时限变为重要或说明承诺方如
果不依照该通知履行就会给无辜方一个权力去中断合约。

要强调的是，这一个通知只能是在承诺方发生了违约后才能去作出。在 Green v. Sevin

(1879) 13 Ch D 589，Fry 大法官说：
“It has been argued that there is a right in either party to a contract by notice so to engraft
time as to make it of the essence of the contract where it has not originally been of the
essence, independently of the delay on the part of him to whom the notice is given. In my
view there is no such right. It is plain upon principle, as it appears to me, that there can be no
such right. That which is not of the essence of the original contract is not to be made so by the
volition of one of the parties, unless the other has done something which gives a right to the
other to make it so. You cannot make a new contract at the will of one of the contracting
parties. There must have been such improper conduct on the part of the other as to justify the
rescission of the contract sub modo, that is, if a reasonable notice be not complied with.”

有时候去决定到底是否承诺方已经违约也不一定容易。如果合约有明确规定，例如在
2008 年 7 月 15 日必须支付一笔钱，这是容易知道承诺方有否违约。就是过了 7 月 15 日
的子夜还未支付的话，就应该是违约了。但如果没有明示规定，承诺方支付这笔钱就要
根据合理时间了。这不一定容易去明确肯定，但在 Green v. Sevin 先例看来，被承诺方
还是要等到肯定过了合理时间后，才能去作出这一个通知，并且要进一步给对方合理
时间去履行承诺。另在 Smith v. Hamilton (1951) Ch 174，Harman 大法官判是太短的延误
（在此案例是 1 天），被承诺方并不适当去马上发出这个通知给承诺方/违约方。但这
一个先例已经被推翻：Behzadi v. Shaftesbury Hotel Ltd (1992) Ch 1。该先例判是只要一
发生违约，被承诺方可以马上去发出通知给承诺方/违约方。

至于为什么给了这一个通知就可以把一个保证或中间条文提升为条件条文，毕竟合约
条文并不是单方面可以去作出改变的。这里的理论看来是如果承诺方继续不去理会该通
知，就会构成了毁约或是一个基本性的违约。毕竟，总不能因为起初的违约是保证条文，
承诺方可以永远漠视下去。毕竟，有一些违约光靠赔偿损失的救济并不足够或是根本没
有真正的金钱损失。这方面的分析可去看澳大利亚先例 Louinder v. Leis (1982) 149 CLR
509，其中 Mason 大法官解释违反一个针对时间/时限的保证条文并不显示毁约，但不
去理会无辜方的通知，内中并去多给了一段合理时间让他去履行承诺，这就是毁约，
而毁约就可以让无辜方去合法中断合约。Mason 大法官是这样说：
“Accordingly, delay beyond the stipulated date will give rise to a liability in damages. But
because equity treats the time stipulation as non-essential, mere breach of it does not justify
rescission by the innocent party … Unreasonably delay in complying with the stipulation in
substance amounting to a repudiation is essential to justify rescission. It is to this end that,
following breach, the innocent party gives notice fixing a reasonable time for performance of
the relevant contractual obligation. The result of non-compliance with the notice is that the
party in default is guilty of unreasonable delay in complying with non-essential time
stipulation. The unreasonable delay amounts to a repudiation and this justifies rescission.”

同样的通知也需要在另一种情况下去作出，就是承诺方违反了一个条件条文，但无辜
方没有去行使选择权中断合约，也就是去确认了合约。这一来，如果稍后改变主意，无
辜方就要靠发出同样的通知去把已经放弃了的选择权恢复，才能去中断合约。在澳大利
亚的先例 Flaconer v. Wilson (1973) 2 NSWLR 131，Machoney 大法官是这样说：
“A term in a contract may be such that from the inception of the contract a breach of it
would not give rise to a right of rescission; or it may be such that, although initially an
essential term, the parties, by allowing the stipulated time to pass or otherwise, have reduced
the term to one, a breach of which will not warrant rescission…. In my opinion, in each of
these cases, a party may, by giving a proper notice making time of essence, bring into being a
right of rescission.”

这方面可去看 Etablissements Chainbaux SARL v. Harbormaster Ltd (1955) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.

303，案情是有关 18 台船舶主机的 FOB 买卖，其中在 1951 年 6 月订立的买卖合约内有
关买方需要开信用证，条文写得不清楚，只说是在几个星期内，如下：
“—Payment to be
by a letter of credit payable against shipping documents in favour of [sellers] to be opened in
London within a few weeks.”

但买方无法开出信用证，而期间双方不断在交谈包括卖方一度建议买方先支付 15%的
定金（去给卖方有一定程度的保障），而信用证就可以在接近付运日期时才开出。反正
是，到了 10 月 22 日，卖方以买方没有开出信用证为由去中断了该买卖合约。

Devlin 大法官判买方没有及时开出信用证是违反了条件条文，但有权去选择中断合约
却是因为买卖双方在期间的交谈可以说是被无辜的卖方放弃了（waived）。这一来，如
果后来谈不拢，卖方想恢复这一个权利，就必须要去作出一个通知，给买方一个合理
时间去开出信用证，如果买方做不到，卖方才有权去中断合约。Devlin 大法官是这样说：
“Now, the position of a party who has started out with a contract where time is of the
essence and has allowed the time to go by is, I think, quite clearly laid down in the authorities.
He has got to make time of the essence of the contract again in the normal case, and that
means that he has to give a notice giving the other side what is a reasonable time in all the
circumstances to comply with their obligations, and it is only after they fail to do that that he
is entitled to cancel the contract.”（如果被承诺方在时间十分重要的合约承诺而又任由
承诺方把履行的时间一再推迟的话，他要在后来改变他的处境就必须再次把履行承诺
的时间提升到一个重要的地位，这就意味着他必须给承诺方通知，让他再有合理时间
去履行其承诺，而只有在承诺方未能做到后，被承诺方才能中断合约）。

在笔者的《国际商务游戏规则—英国合约法》一书第十一章 6.1.2 段，也有很清楚的解释

法律在这方面说法的道理：
“如果一份买卖合约规定信用证在 5 月份前开出，装船期在 6 月份，买方没能按时开
证，卖方还一再催促买方，这样做有危险会被视为是确认合约。到了 5 月中旬或 5 月底，
买方仍未能开证（但没有说他不开，只是要求延长时间）。那么卖方这时候意欲中断合
约（原因可以是千变万化，例如是市场价格上涨，或是有另一个买方出更好的价钱，
或是卖方突然对买方的经济能力有怀疑，等）就必须先给买方一份通知，要求买方在
一段合理的时间内，如之后的 7 天内开出信用证，否则卖方将中断合约。若在 7 天之内
买方仍未开证，而这 7 天应该是完全足够去履行，卖方便可中断合约了。当然，如果买
方收到这份通知就随即答复卖方：他在这 7 天内也不能开出信用证，那么卖方就可以
马上解约，而不必等到这 7 天过后。因为一来买方明确回答不能在 7 天内开出信用证已
构成是毁约（repudiation），二来就算多这合理的 7 天事实上也无助于买方履约。

这也很有道理，因为卖方在催促时，虽然合约中开出信用证的限期已过，已是毁约，
但这催促会令买方去采取行动开证，例如去向他的银行打通关节。但尚未来得及去开证，
卖方已改变主意，甚至背后是因为市场突然急升的原因，去突然以买方没有依约开证
中断合约，这怎会是公道？

所以，卖方要么不去催促，买方一旦毁约没有在规定的时间 /期限内去开出信用证（违
反条件条款），就中断合约。要么就在催促后不果，卖方改变主意就要去发出通知给买
方，去明确再给一段合理时限，并说明届时买方没有开证的话就中断合约。如果去催促
或作出其他弃权和禁止翻供的行为后，反而麻烦；要去发出合理时间通知后才能去中
断合约。否则会有大难，因为本来是买方毁约，现在变是卖方毁约了。”

在 《 国 际 商 务 游 戏 规 则 — 英 国 合 约 法 》 一 书 也 有 介 绍 另 一 个 早 期 先 例 Hughes v.
Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) 2 App. Cas 439 一案，其中一个重要内容是去看这一个
合理时间的通知是怎样去厘定，而在此先例可以是长达 6 个月。可去节录如下：
“ 在 Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. 一案中，房东（原告）按租约规定通知租户
（被告）必须在 6 个月内修理所租的房屋，否则将解除租约收回该房。租户收到通知后
表示愿意修房，但同时建议房东将所租房屋售予他。而且租户还讲明，如果房东愿意售
房，双方洽谈买卖期间他不会开始修房的工作。房东在给出修房通知一个月后，开始了
与租户有关售房的谈判，结果双方没有谈成，谈判于一个月后终止。期间租户一直未有
修理所租的房屋，当原来给与租户通知的 6 个月过后，房东即提出撤租。官司打到了贵
族院，法官判房东无权在给出通知后 6 个月撤租。法官指出：房东开始与租户谈判售房
的行为，已令租户相信房东无意在谈判期间执行其严格的法律权利。事实上房东已构成
默示的承诺（implied promise），同意租户在该期间可以不修房子，之后房东要在 6 个
月后撤租，等于是对先前承诺的反悔，因此不能被法院支持，否则会造成不公。贵族院
的这个判定，实际上与有关弃权与禁止翻供的理论完全一致。不过法官在判词中也指出，
在双方售房谈判破裂后，房东应给与租户一段合理时间去进行修理工作。因此，房东通
知租户修理房屋的 6 个月时限自谈判终止之日起计算，若租户此 6 个月后仍未进行修
理，则房东仍可撤租。也就表明，房东先前的弃权或禁止翻供并不会导致他丧失依约要
求租户 6 个月内修房否则撤租的权利。他的这项合约权利仅仅是一定期间（售房谈判期
间）被暂时中止了。而这段权利中止的期间，实际上就是承诺方引导对方相信他无意严
格执行原有权利的期间。要么承诺方令对方的这种信赖终止，如该案中双方谈判破裂，
又或者承诺方给与对方合理的通知表明其将重新执行合约的权利，那么承诺方原有的
权利一般是可以全面得到恢复的。”

5. SAJ 标准格式合约有关条文的解释
在 SAJ 的 Article XI，规定了如果船东违约，没有去支付到期的船价分期付款 ，就会有
以下的后果：

5.1 船东要支付利息

根据 Article XI (2)，船东就要支付这一笔欠下船价的利息。利率是双方约定的，而为了
让船东准时作出支付，通常船厂会去坚持较高的利率。再说，船厂本身融资的成本恐怕
也要付出高昂的代价。所以，笔者见过一些相当高的“合约利率”（ contractual interest
rate ） ， 例 如 是 每 个 月 2% 复 息 ， 或 年 利 率 以 伦 敦 银 行 之 间 拆 息 的 利 率 或 称 为
LIBOR（London Interbank Borrowing Rates）加 3%或 5%不等。这些利率都不会是仲裁
庭会去给与的，除非双方已经约定。当然，合约利率也不能高到变为惩罚性
（punitive），而变为无效。有关这个课题在第四章议定赔偿有详论。

5.2 船东要支付所有的收费与使费

也是根据 Article XI (2)最后一句，说明是船东必须支付船厂“所有的收费与使费”（all

charges and expenses）。这样的一句话是十分广泛，表示所有因为船东违约所导致的收
费或使费，船东都要承担。由于是明示规定，所以也没有普通法下计算损失的一些局限，
例如受害方（船厂）要去合理减少损失。举一个例子，船厂因为船东没有及时支付，导
致了现金流转的困难而必须再去向银行作出融资。这融资的费用也应该根据这一条文可
以向船东索赔。这方面可以去节录《The Law of Shipbuilding Contracts》一书第三版之 188
页所说如下：
“… the scope of this obligation is very broad indeed, there being no requirement upon the
builder (as would be necessary in a claim for damages) to demonstrate that the costs he has
incurred were reasonably to have been contemplated when the contract was signed as the
foreseeable consequences of such a default. Under Article XI.2 the builder is, for example,
entitled to recover arrangement or commitment fees (in addition to interest charges) incurred
on monies borrowed to finance the buyer’s late payments. Where, alternatively, the default
consists in the buyer’s failure to take delivery of the vessel following a valid tender, the
builder will normally recover the costs of maintaining and insuring the vessel for his own
account until her acceptance.”

5.3 交船日期的延长

根据 Article XI (3)(a)，它规定了交船日期自动作出相应的延长。这等于船东如果晚了一
个月才支付船价分期付款，交船日期也自动延后一个月。在文字 /措辞是没有去理会到
底这一个船东的违约是否有真正造成延误。毕竟，即使是船东违约，船厂在造船的工程
也可以照常进行，完全不造成延误。所以，这一条文的规定是与普通法的地位不同，因
为它根本不去理会船东违约与交船延误之间的因果关系（causation）。所以，笔者知道
有去以 SAJ 订约的船东坚持对这一个条文作出修改，就是船东的违约必须延误了船厂
的造船工程才可以去延长交船日期。

顺便一提是根据英国普通法，即使是船东违约，船厂的救济并不包括去因此停工。这样
做是有“你做初一，我做十五”的不法味道。在涉及了建造连接英法之间的隧道的著名
先例 Channel Tunnel v. Balfour Beatty (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291 中，在上诉庭，Staughton
大法官提到英国法是不允许无辜方因为对方的违约而去停工或暂停自己一方的合约承
诺，他是这样说：
“It is well established that if one party is in serious breach, the other can treat the contract as
altogether at an end, but there is not yet any established doctrine of English law that the other
party may suspend performance, keeping the contract alive. It is said that there is authority, at
any rate in the Commonwealth, which would support such a doctrine.”

即使船东的违约是十分严重，例如是拒绝支付船价，这一个法律地位还是不会改变。除
非船厂去接受船东的毁约而导致了造船合约的中断，否则是合约存在就船厂必须履行
他自己的义务，不能因为船东的违约而去暂停履行（停工）或采取其他的非合约允许
的反击手段。

针对这一方面，NEWBUILDCON 倒是有第 15 (b)(v)条文去给船厂权利可在这种违约情

况下去暂停造船工程。这一来，明示地位就超越了默示地位。而在第 34 (a)(ii)(5)条文，
也去规定了这一段暂停工程的延误可去延长交船时间。

5.4 违约超过 15 天船厂可以去中断造船合约

根据 Article XI (3)(b)，它说明了如果船东违约（不准时支付船价的分期付款或拒绝接
受船舶）超过了 15 天，船厂就有一个选择权可以去中断合约。这里有配合普通法之处，
但也有去明示条文给了船厂额外的合约权利或作出改变。如果船东的违约是清楚说明他
没有能力或不愿意支付船价或接收船舶，这就是毁约，船厂可以根据普通法去马上接
受毁约并中断造船合约。但根据这一条文，船厂就要多等待 15 天才能行使中断权利。但
如果船东的违约只是延误作出支付，在文字或行动中，船东都明确坚持他会履约并尽
快作出支付。这一来，就不一定是毁约。而在普通法下，光是晚了作出支付但没有拒绝
作出支付，会只违反保证条文而已，救济只是局限在索赔损失。这方面在本章第 3 段有
详及。如果在没有明示规定的情况下，船厂想去把船东支付船价的分期付款去明确提升
为条件条文的后果，让船厂有权利去中断造船合约，船厂就会需要依照本章第 4 段介
绍 的 做 法 去 给 船 东 一 个 通 知 把 时 间 / 时 限 变 为 重 要 （ serve a notice making time
essential），然后过了合理时间船东还是没有作出支付的话，船厂就可以行使这一个中
断合约的权利。但这些普通法的做法在 SAJ 的有关条文是不需要去考虑，因为它已经明
示规定了船东违约超过 15 天（不论违约是不是违反保证条文），船厂就有权利去中断
合约。

在 Article XI (3)(b)，也说明去中断合约，船厂有权去保留船东已经预付了的部分船价
的分期付款，作为最后结算之用。另也说明船东所供应的物料被视为是船厂的财产，表
示船东无权去要求把这些供应向船厂要回来。这也是现实，因为船东违约有可能是发生
在交船前最后一两期的分期付款，甚至是拒绝接收船舶。在这个时候，船东所供应的物
料或设备根本已经被永久装置上船，无法去退还。但即使是有这条条文，它的有效只会
在有关的物料或设备所有权在船东，这样才会有权去承诺供应的所有权变为是船厂所
拥有（supplies shall become the sole property of the builder）。但会有情况船东实际上还
没有去付清这些物料或设备的价格，而船东与供应商之间的买卖合约也有一条“保留
所有权条文”（retention of title clause）。这一来，不论造船合约根据 SAJ 标准格式是
怎样说有关这些物料的所有权，也不会去约束真正的供应商。他们会在船东如果不去付
清欠下的价格的情况，向船厂直接行动，要求让他们去取回这些供应或设备，因为这
些供应商已经在合约中保留了所有权。

最后去一提的是，上述的情况通常不会在航运市场十分景气时发生。但会有特殊的情况，
就是船东无法得到融资，导致了没有钱去作出船价的分期付款而被船厂中断造船合约。

5.5 船厂作出信贷

在造船市场不景气的时候，船厂为了抢生意，经常要在政府的资助下对船东作出信贷
安排。这一来船厂等于是船东的融资银行，所以也需要有融资银行必定会坚持的还款保
障 ， 例 如 是 船 舶 抵 押 ， 船 东 集 团 的 履 约 担 保 与 “ 加 速 还 款 条 文 ” （ accelerated
payment），等。这种船厂信贷可参考 Anangel v. IHI (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep.526 先例，在
造船合约中约定船东只需要以 4 期的分期付款来支付船价的 20.1%，就可以接收船舶了。
而其余的 79.9%就在交船后的 8 年半分期摊还。有关的条文是如下：
“Deferred Payments: 79.9% of the Contract Price shall be paid by the Buyer to the Builder
in 17 equal semi-annul amounts commencing six months after Delivery and Acceptance of
the vessel, plus interest on the amount outstanding on the due date of each payment as
applicable and at the rate of 9.5% P.A. on the Dollar Portion and 8.75% on the Yen portion.”

反正是造船合约如果涉及了船厂信贷，就在这一条船东违约的救济条文针对船厂有权
在船东违约 15 天后可去中断合约，加上相应的条文，特别是“加速还款条文”，说明
所有将来摊还的船价马上到期支付或一并计算。这条文的作用在笔者《船舶融资与抵
押》一书第 382-384 页有介绍，如下：
“4.2.2.1 执行权利之一：加促归还债务与利息惩罚
已在 4.2.2 小段在介绍契据的第 12.1 条款时说道这明示条款说是一有‘违约事件’
（event of default）就尚欠债务马上清还，这可称为债务的‘加促’（acceleration）。

‘加促条款’的作用与对银行十分重要的是：
（一）阻吓船东不敢去拖延还款与作出其他违约。
（二）反正要去执行 / 行使抵押权利（ foreclose ），会有许多工作与花费（例如律师
费），只为一期的欠债，只有几十万或一、二百万美元划不来。索性所有贷款都要清还，
最好几百万或上千万美元，显得划得来。
（三）既然去行使了权利，即银行对船东已完全失去了信心，何苦再拖下去 5 年、6 年
不等的半年一次分期付款？
（四）若遇上船东被清盘或 /与其他债权人去‘对物诉讼并申请法院出售船舶等的违约
事件，本来银行享有抵押担保可去独立与优先排列，但仍未到期的分期付款谈不上是
欠债，所以轮不到去分摊。但今后不会再有船舶去出售抵债了。故必须去‘加促’将来
的分期付款，可把余下的贷款一次性分摊回来。

英国法律（合约法）对‘惩罚条款’（penalty clause）有约束：请参阅笔者的《国际商
务游戏规则—英国合约法》一书的第七章。

对债务的加促条款不被视为惩罚条款： The Protector Endowment Load & Annuity Vo. V.

Grice (1880) 5 QBD 592 (C.A.); Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880) 5 App. Cas. 685
(H.L.); Latter v. Colwill (1937) 1 All ER 442 (C.A.) 。但对将来会要支付的利息去明示要马
上清付会构成是惩罚条款而被判是无效： The “Angelic Star” (1988) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 122
(C.A.)。在债务/本金加促归还下，再要去全数付清利息是有惩罚味道。Donaldson 大法官
在该先例说：
‘Clearly a clause which provided that in the event of any breach of contract a long term
loan would immediately become repayable and that interest thereon for the full term would
not only be still payable but would be payable at once would constitute a penalty as being ‘a
payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party …’

但若明示条款只要债务人去补偿债权人因此加促导致所谓‘breakage cost’的损失（例
如是 2%而不是‘LIBOR 加 2%’），这不是惩罚条款。

有时候会在保证契约约定在船东发生违约事件后，在今后归还债务要提高利息。显然，
这情况是银行不执行 /行使其他的权利。这种明示条款是否算是惩罚条款看个别案件而
定：Lordsvale Finance plc v. Bank of Zambia (1996) QB 752。例如，提高利息/利率至完全
不合理程度。若只是合理程度提高，可以解释是船东违约后的抵押将被视为高风险而需
要更高成本/麻烦今后去监督/管理这笔贷款/债务，而非是为了去惩罚。 Colman 大法官
在 Lordsvale Finance plc 先例说：
‘… such authority as there is does suggest that at least on three occasions since 1725 the
courts have been prepared to enforce increased rate of interest or analogous payments where
the increase applied as from the date of default … London is one of the greatest centres of
international banking in the world. There and in New York, most of the world’s international
syndicated loans are set up. Such loans almost invariably provide for enhanced rates or
default interest to apply. It would be regrettable if the English courts were to refuse to give
effect to such prevalent provisions whilst the courts of New York are prepared to enforce
them…. If the increased rate of interest applies only from the date of default or thereafter
there is no justification for striking down as a penalty a term providing for a modest increase
in the rate.’”

5.6 船厂中断造船合约后出售船舶与损失计算

这是根据 Article XI (4)，它在文字/措辞说明是船厂在中断造船合约后有权去在公开或

私下的安排去把船舶出售。在出售之后所收到的船价去首先支付所有出售船舶的费用
（例如会涉及要支付经纪人佣金），然后去支付在造船合约下还没有支付的船价（加
上利息）。最后多出来的就是去交出给船东，但这笔钱是不能多过船东已经支付了的船
价分期付款与船东供应物料的价值（如果有的话）。最后是说如果出售船舶所收到的船
价如果不足支付上述的各项，船东就要尽快把差价支付给船厂。

另要一提的是 Article XI (3)的最后一句是说明船厂可去保留船东已经支付了的船价分期

付款作为最后的结算。

这一来，根据这一条文的损失计算办法公式，应该是：已经支付了的船价分期付款 +
出售船舶所得船价 — （出售船舶费用 + 还未支付的船价[加上利息]）= 剩余要归还给
船东的金额。（Instalments paid + proceed of sale – [cost of sale + balance of contract price]
= balance for the purchaser ）。但这样 计算 有一 点 不合 理 ，举例说造船合约船价是
100,000 英镑，船东已经预付了 40,000 英镑，即船东没支付的船价是 60,000 英镑。另把
船舶出售的费用是 10,000 英镑，而出售所得船价是 90,000 英镑。这一来计算是如下：
40,000 + 90,000 – (10,000 + 60,000) = 60,000 英镑。

但这并不合理，因为船厂总共收到的钱是 40,000 + 90,000 = 130,000 英镑，但要在结算

后去支付给船东 60,000 英镑，而合约的船价是 100,000 英镑。

所以在 Stocznia v. Latvian (1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 132，Staughton 大法官认为在这样的条

文下，正确的计算只是去针对出售所得的船价的摊分，并要去把船东已经预付的部分
船价考虑在内。这一来，上述例子的计算就变成是：90,000 英镑（出售所得船价）-
10,000 英镑（出售船舶费用）- 60,000 英镑（船东没支付的船价）= 20,000 英镑。这表
示只需要去把 20,000 英镑退还给船东，但船厂自己就可以保留（ 40,000 + 90,000）-
20,000 = 110,000 英镑。这正是代表船厂除了可以把造船合约船价全数要回外，另加上
10,000 英镑的出售船舶费用。而船东虽然已经预付了 40,000 英镑的部分船价，但只获得
20,000 英镑的退还，损失了 20,000 英镑。但这是活该，因为违约的是船东。

6. NEWBUILDCON 标准格式合约有关条文的解释

在第 39 (b)(ii)条文，可以看到与 SAJ 标准格式合约不同的是它定下的时限是 21 个“银

行工作天”，注意这与 SAJ 的“天”不同。过了这个时限船东还不支付到期的船价的话，
船厂就要给船东至少 5 个银行工作天的通知告诉船东“他中断造船合约的意图，除非
船 东 在 这 个 期 间 内 去 作 出 支 付 ” （ of its intention to terminate under this Clause, and
within that period the Buyer fails to remedy the breach）。虽然 NEWBUILDCON 是新的标
准格式合约，还没有什么先例针对，但由于明示条文中有对该通知内容的要求，所以
有很大机会适用在期租下船东要给承租人的“反技术取巧通知”（anti-technicality
notice）的各种争议。可以说，这通知的内容并不容易去完善，经常找到可以挑毛病的
地方，这方面可参阅杨大明律师所著的《期租合同》一书第十八篇 18.6.4 段。

在第 39 (f)条文，是针对船厂中断造船合约并安排去把船舶出售后的损失计算或最后结
算（final accounting），这稍后在第 7 与 10.1 段有介绍。从第(i)项针对已完工船舶的出
售情况可以看到 NEWBUILDCON 在这方面相比 SAJ 写得更好与更正确。从条文可见，
在 这 种 情 况 下 船 厂 是 去 针 对 出 售 船 舶 所 收 到 船 价 的 摊 分 （ … the proceeds of sale
received by the Builder shall be applied …）。而要退还给船东的金额为：出售所得船价—
（出售船舶费用+船东没支付的船价）。这正是上述 Staughton 大法官在 Stocznia v.
Latvian (1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 132 先例中判是正确的计算办法。

7. SAJ 标准格式合约是否必须要出售船舶后才能计算损失

在 Stocznia v. Latvian (1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 132 先例，该造船合约有一条条文基本上与

SAJ 标准格式合约条文十分接近，说明船厂有所有的权利去完成或不完成该船舶的建
造并去在一个公开或私人安排的买卖出售该船舶（the Seller shall have the full right and
power either to complete or not to complete the Vessel and to sell the Vessel at a public or
private sale …）。这带来一个争议就是船厂在这种文字下是否必须去出售该船舶，然后
在收到出售所得船价后作出上述最后结算（final accounting）的分摊，如果有不足之处
才能向船东要求赔偿？如果是，这就表示船厂可能要很长时间后才能向船东索赔，因
为在航运市场不好的时候出售船舶不会容易，而船东会去违约 /毁约也往往是在这种不
景气的市场。在 Stocznia v. Latvian 先例中，上诉庭的 Staughton 大法官认为船厂是必须
去把船舶出售，因为该条文是明确规定，说：
“But the clause is to my mind significant because it is mandatory. It does not provide an
option, which the yard may ignore if they choose. Otherwise there would be no point in
laying down the detailed procedure which the clause contains. As I have already said, I think
that on a true interpretation of the clause a sale is mandatory; and it certainly is when
mitigation requires there to be a sale. The owners then obtain an indefeasible right to such
share of the proceeds as the clause confers on them. The common law rights of the yard are
displaced by the regime of clause 5.05.”

但这被贵族院推翻，Goff 勋爵认为 Staughton 大法官的看法太广泛（too sweeping），

说：
“… the yard’s ‘full right and power’ to sell the vessel under clause 5.05 (2) was (contrary to
the opinion expression by Lord Justice Staughton) no more than a power of sale and as such
not mandatory; …”

8. 索赔船价与损失的分别

针对这一个问题，首先就是去节录 1979 年《货物销售法》的 Section 49 (2)如下：

“Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of
delivery and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may
maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has not passed and the
goods have not been appropriated to the contract.”（在一个买卖合约，如果规定了一个明
确的日子要支付货价，而买方错误地去漠视或拒绝支付，卖方有权起诉索赔货价，虽
然有关的货物所有权还没有转移与还没有拨归）。

上述的立法条文十分适用在船价的分期付款，就是到了约定要支付一期的分期付款
（比如说是安放龙骨或安装主机要支付的 10%船价），但船东没有支付，船厂就可以
马上起诉索赔这一笔欠下的部分船价，作为是一个“追债的行动”（action for debt）。
这一个索赔并非是普通法下的损失索赔，所以是没有像损失不可预见（ remoteness），
因果关系中断（causation）与有否去减少损失（mitigation）等的争议。也不存在船东可
以去争议说船厂没有这么大的损失，他就算违约船厂最后也只应损失 5%的船价。因为
这不是索赔损失，而是“索赔船价”（action for price）。由于没有抗辩的余地，船厂通
常是可以在法院以廉宜与快速的“简易判决”（summary judgement）起诉船东（或他
的担保人），好像在 Stocznia v. Latvian (1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 592，或之前的 Hyundai v.
Pournars (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 502 与 Hyundai v. Paradopoulos (1979) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 130。
如果因为在造船合约有仲裁条文而必须要去仲裁，估计仲裁庭也会对索赔船价去很快
为这笔钱作出一个中间裁决书。

9. Stocznia v. Latvian 先例介绍

9.1 有关索赔已经欠下的船价
这是比较近期的一个先例，前后有 5 次诉讼被报道，涉及了各种不同的争端。已经提到
过，它涉及了 6 艘冷藏船的建造，而船东在造船市场下跌后刻意不去支付船价的分期
付款，试图去逼船厂减价。在造船合约，船价是以 4 期的分期付款支付，第一期是收到
银行的还款担保后支付 5%的船价，第二期是在安放龙骨后支付 20%，第三期是在船舶
下水后支付 25%，第四期也是最后一期，是在交船支付余下的 50%。

其中在第一与第二艘冷藏船，船厂是安放了龙骨，这是去把两个船舶双层底的“分段
预制船体”（pre-fabricated blocks）去在干坞焊接在一起。根据造船合约的有关条文，
船厂也要求了挪威船级社 DNV 向船东发出确认这一步已经完成。确认是说：“At the
request of Gdansk Shipyard’s Quality Control head, we confirm that bottom sections D1 and
D2 have been joined on the slipway on 3 rd December 1993.”按照条文规定，船东必须在
1993 年 12 月 3 日后的 5 个银行工作天支付给船厂这 20%的船价，总数高达 11,055,600
美元。但船东没有支付，这最终导致了船厂在 1994 年 3 月 3 日去把造船合约中断，并
向船东追讨这一笔欠下的 20%船价。结果是，船厂在第一审的简易判决胜诉，Clarke 大
法官的判决也被贵族院支持。

但另有一个古怪的争端，就是船厂把第一与第二艘冷藏船安放了的龙骨去当作后来 4
艘冷藏船的安放龙骨，并去给船东通知与要求支付 20%的船价。船厂没有去陆续真正为
每艘船安放新的龙骨是因为去这样做需要成本以及需要干坞。而现在船厂的做法不会带
来什么成本，因为只是一些表面上的做法，就是把安放在第一与第二艘船舶的龙骨上
以油漆标记的船壳号码去涂改为后面 4 艘船舶的号码，就代表是为后 4 艘船舶安放了
龙骨，船厂也就对所有的 6 艘船舶都会有了权利去向船东索赔船价（action for price）。

船东既然第一与第二艘冷藏船都不支付，显然也不会对后来 4 艘船去作出支付。所以，
船厂也就陆续接受毁约中断了其余 4 艘船的合约。在时间上是如下：

船舶 安放龙骨通知 合约中断时间

第三艘 1994 年 4 月 14 日 1994 年 5 月 16 日

第四艘 1994 年 4 月 15 日 1994 年 5 月 16 日
第五艘 1994 年 6 月 13 日 1994 年 7 月 12 日
第六艘 1994 年 6 月 17 日 1994 年 7 月 18 日

可以想得到的是船厂去这样做，就是为了走了这一步就可以去根据 1979 年《货物销售

法》之 Section 49 (2)以简易判决索赔其他 4 艘船的 20%船价，而不需要等待一个漫长的
争议去计算与证明损失。船厂也的确是在第一个诉讼针对第一与第二艘冷藏船的船价索
赔（Stocznia v. Latvian [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 592）这样做了。但在这第二个诉讼，船厂
并没有成功。Waller 大法官拒绝给与船厂简易判决，并允许船东去抗辩到底船厂能否以
第一与第二艘船舶的龙骨安放当作是后来 4 艘船舶的龙骨安放。这一点最后上诉去到贵
族院，判是船厂不能去这样取巧。其中 Lloyd 勋爵是这样解释：
“My instinctive answer, and that which would, I think, be given by any fair-minded man, is
‘of course not’, then only ever were two hulls. How can two hulls be made to serve the
purpose of six contracts? The renumbering of the hulls was an artifice to enable the plaintiffs
to recover six keels laying instalments when they had only laid two keels.

Would it then have made any difference if, as was suggested in the course of the argument,
the plaintiffs had dismantled the two keel sections of hulls 1 and 2, taken them back to the
works returned them to the berth, and rejoined them as the two keel sections for hulls 3 and 4?
My answer would be no. For the plaintiffs were obliged under the general law, and
specifically under clause 5.05(2), to mitigate their damages under contracts 1 and 2. This they
have in fact done in the real world, by completing hulls 1 and 2 and selling those vessels to
Lorient Maritime ( 这 是 事 后 船 厂 找 到 的 新 买 方 ， 买 的 是 第 一 与 第 二 艘 船 舶 ). If the
plaintiffs had dismantled the keels, and then rebuilt them for the sole purpose of claiming the
keel laying instalments on hulls 3-6, so far from doing what was reasonable to mitigate their
damages on contracts 1 and 2, they would have been acting most unreasonably so as to
increase their damages on hulls 3-6, or at any rate to accelerate their cash flow.

And so I turn to the wording of clause 5.02(b). Mr. Justice Waller held that it was arguable
that the wording does not enable the plaintiffs to say that the first and second sections of hull
3-6 were joined at a time or place where those vessels were being construed. They were
joined on the berth where hulls 1 and 2 were being constructed. In my opinion Mr. Justice
Waller was right. Indeed I would go further, and decide the point not in favour of the buyers
under R.S.C., O. 14 (这是高院命令针对简易判决). One can fest the position by assuming
that vessels 3-6 had been sold to a different purchaser. Would the purchaser of vessel 3 have
been obliged to accept sections which had already been constructed in the workshop and
joined on the berth in respect of another vessel? Clearly not. I agree that under clause 11.01
the property in the two sections would have remained in the plaintiffs. But under clause
6.01(b) the purchaser of vessel 3 would have been entitled to appoint a supervisor to
supervise every aspect of the construction of the vessel. Thus the purchaser of vessel 3 could
in theory have objected to the keel sections of hull 1 being appropriated to his contract, since
his supervisor would not have had any opportunity to inspect, for example, the integrity of the
welding. No doubt the purchaser would in practice have accepted the keel section of hull 1 by
agreement. But on the facts as they are, the buyers never agreed to the keel sections for hulls
1 and 2 being renumbered 3-6. if the plaintiffs rely on a technicality to recover the keel laying
instalments on hulls 3-6, they should not be surprised to receive a technical answer.”
这道理也说得通，否则船厂是可以为 6 艘船只去为第一艘安放龙骨或装置主机，就去
引发了所有 6 艘船舶的付款了。毕竟，整个造船合约还有其他条文要去兼顾，例如船东
的总管可以为每一艘船舶的建造过程进行参与，怎会变了只有一艘船的参与。

9.2 已经欠下的船价是否受后来毁约的影响

这里的争议就是船东虽然欠下了第一与第二艘冷藏船安放龙骨所引致的到期支付第二
期 20%的船价，但会否受到后来船厂去根据造船合约的第 5 条文把合约中断的影响？
也就是，船厂再也不能去索赔第二期的船价，而是要根据有关条文去把船舶出售之后
来一个最后结算 （final accounting）？这种争议在贵族院的 Hyundai v. Paradopoulos
(1980) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 已经出现过，就是该先例的希腊船东指韩国现代船厂在中断造
船合约后，就必须根据有关的条文作出最后结算，并且把原来已经产生的权利（就是
第二期船价支付）销毁。船东依赖的先例是 Dies v. British and International Mining and
Finance Corp Ltd. (1939) 1 K.B. 724，案情是有关一个合约买卖来福枪与弹药，货价是
27 万英镑。但在订约的一天买方要支付 10 万英镑给卖方（军火商）作为预付部分货价。
但结果是买方没有去接收货物，但竟然事后去向卖方索赔与要求归还预付的 10 万英镑。
这 里 也 涉 及 了 “ 完 全 得 不 到 这 一 个 交 易 的 约 因 / 对 价 ” （ total failure of
consideration），Stable 大法官同意之余也依赖了权威书籍《Benjamin on Sale》第七版之
989 页所说如下：
“… In ordinary circumstances, unless the contract otherwise provides, the seller on
rescission following the buyer’s default, becomes liable to repay the part of the price
paid.”（在一般情况下，除非买卖合约另有规定，卖方在买方的过错下去中断合约后
要归还已经支付了的货价。）

所以船东说既然是第二期的船价去支付给了现代船厂，后者也必须与第一期船价一起
归还给船东。所以，这欠下的第二期船价就根本不必多此一举去支付给船厂，双方只要
来一个最后结算即可。船东这种争议显然就为了拖延时间，因为去支付第二期船价就可
以简易判决处理。

贵族院不接受船东的这个说法，但没有去推翻 Dies v. British and International Mining

and Finance Corp Ltd.的高院先例。贵族院是通过另一个途径支持船厂，就是说造船合约
并非是单纯的货物买卖合约，而同时是一个建造合约。所以，建造合约针对这一方面的
法律地位适用。接下去，贵族院就去依赖了建造方面权威的《Hudson on Building
Contract》一书第十版之 255 页所说如下：
“Where the contractor has become entitled to an instalment payment, he will not normally
forfeit his right to such payment by a subsequent abandonment of repudiation of the contract,
but will be entitled to sue for any unpaid instalment if he has satisfied the conditions for it to
become due, subject, of course, to the employer’s right to counterclaim for damages for
breach of contract. In Taylor v. Laird (1856) 25 LJEx 329 the plaintiff undertook to serve as a
commander of a vessel at pay of £50 per month but wrongfully abandoned the contract after
eight months having been paid for seven only. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover £50 for the eighth month, Pollock C.B. saying ‘There [--i.e. in the contract --] ‘per
month’ means each month or monthly and gives a cause of action as each month accrues
which once vested is not subsequently lost or divested by the plaintiff’s decision or
abandonment of his contract.
… Every obligation which has accrued due between the parties before the rescission of the
contract, and which so creates a then existing cause of action, remains unaffected by the
rescission and can still be enforced. It makes no difference in this respect where such accrued
obligation and existing cause of action is one in favour of the party rescinding the contract or
is one in favour of the other party …”

所以，贵族院判是船东或他的担保人（在该造船合约下希腊船东作出了个人担保）必
须支付欠下的第二期船价，不受事后船厂中断造船合约的影响。其中 Fraser 勋爵说：
“For these reasons I am of option that the cancellation of the contract did not release the
buyer from his liability for the second instalment, the due date for payment of which had
passed before cancellation. That remained and still remains, a debt due by the buyer to the
builder.”

9.3 是谁毁约？

这里的争议就是船东早在 1993 年 10 月已经向船厂表明是无法支付船价并不接受该 6 艘

冷藏船，但船厂没有去接受毁约令造船合约中断。相反，船厂在 1994 年的 4-6 月去为后
来的 4 艘船舶给船东安放龙骨的通知，这是一个明显的确认合约存在（ affirmation of
contract）行为。这一来，船厂后来再去接受毁约并中断造船合约就是船厂自己毁约，
因为一旦确认合约后就再也回不了头。因为原来的毁约不去接受的话，该毁约不再存在，
合约仍是有效。除非后来另有新的毁约出现，双方都不能以原来的毁约为由去中断合约。
这方面详论请看本书第十九章之 6.4.4/6.4.5 段。注意是第一与第二艘船舶就不涉及这方
面的争论，因为她们的龙骨已经安放，而且船东没有支付第二期船价，所以船厂可以
根据造船合约第 5 条文去中断。但其余的 4 艘船舶由于不被贵族院接受为已经安放了龙
骨，变了合约的中断是要去看普通法的毁约有否被接受的问题。

表面看来，去说是船厂毁约好像很说不过去。但经常会有情况是在法律上（或合约条
文）应该如此解释的，商业上看来却似乎不合情理。例如在期租合约下承租人长期拖欠
租金，可怜的船东在无可奈何下去把船舶撤走，但事前去给了一个有缺陷的撤船通知，
结果反而被判是船东自己毁约而不是承租人毁约。这里也是同样情况，虽然商业上来看
似乎有不合理，但依照法律就是如此解释，合约已经被船厂中断，如果船东的毁约较
早前被船厂确认了合约，船厂后来去中断合约，那只能是船厂自己毁约了。

这在第一审 Stocznia v. Latco (2001) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 537（也是该案件第四个被报道的诉

讼，其中 Latvian 与 Latco 指的是一个公司），Thomas 大法官不接受船东的说法，理由
是船厂对其余四艘船舶的安放龙骨通知并不是一个无条件或无保留的确认合约行为。而
且船东是完全知道船厂只是在尽最后的努力，如果船东还是拒绝履行承诺，船厂就无
路可走必需接受毁约了。Thomas 大法官说：
“When the yard served the keel-laying notices in respect of vessel 3 and 4, in my view on
the evidence I have heard, the yard were not making an unconditional affirmation nor, in my
view, was their position so understood by Latreefers ( 船东). At the time of service of those
keel-laying notices in April, 1994, the yard’s position was clear, they still had some hope that
Latreefers might still perform and served the keel-laying notice for that purpose, but if
Latreefers did not perform, the yard would bring the contracts to an end.”

Thomas 大法官也有另一个理由去支持错误是在船东而不是船厂，就是即使把船厂的安
放龙骨通知视为确认合约，船东继续下去的毁约（拒绝支付船价）也给了船厂新的权
力去接受这些毁约。船东自辩说是再也没有新的文字或行动上的毁约，但 Thomas 大法
官不同意。例如在期间船厂多次通过大使馆给船东压力与要求船东履行合约，但全部被
船东漠视，等等。虽然沉默与不作为通常是不构成毁约，因为这只是中性的。但在个别
情况，例如在本案例，从整个事件去全面看，沉默与拒绝作出回应就会构成新的毁约 。
Thomas 大法官是这样解释：
“The question therefore is whether the breach was a continuing one and amounted to
repudiatory conduct. In my view it was. As I have set out, the Yard pressed for performance
on April 19, 1994 and May 4, 1994; there was no response. It does not seem to me that the
failure to respond can make a difference; if, for example, Latreefers had replied and said that
they were not going to perform, then there would clearly have been a new repudiatory act.
Can it make a difference that they were silent in the face of a demand for performance, if the
inference from silence was their continuing refusal to perform? As that is the inference I
draw, I do not think it can make a difference, as by not responding in the circumstances of
this case they were making clear that they were not going to perform. The matter can be
tested by asking whether in such circumstances the Yard were meant to proceed to start to
build the vessels and wait until such time as to a fresh actual breach. Had they done so, I am
sure that it would be said rightly that they had failed to mitigate in circumstances where it was
obvious that Latreefers were not going to take the vessels.

I have reached my decision on the basis that there can be inferred in this case a continued
refusal to perform which amounted to continuing repudiatory conduct and that there is no
distinction in this respect between a continuing actual breach and continuing anticipatory
breach.”

这一审的判决在上诉庭也是第五个诉讼（Stocznia v. Latco [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 436）

中被支持。

9.4 船厂是否要接受船东是否支付船价的毁约

在同一个先例，也涉及了另一个合约法的问题，这在《国际商务游戏规则 —英国合约
法》第十三章有关毁约有详论。适用在本案例的话，就是船东可否在船厂安放龙骨之前，
预先告诉船厂他不会支付第二期的船价。这显然是毁约行为，船厂可以在合理时间内接
受毁约并马上计算损失（在《国际商务游戏规则—英国合约法》第十三章 3.7 段）。但这
一来，由于造船合约中断的时候第二期船价支付的条件还未成熟，也就不存在有简易
的债务索赔了。再去换另一种情况探讨这个问题，就是船厂不接受毁约（根据《国际商
务游戏规则—英国合约法》第十三章 3.5 段受害方有权不接受毁约而坚持要违约方去履
约），并且坚决把船舶造下去，然后在较后的日子让船舶下水而导致第三期船价支付
的条件成熟，再向船东去索赔。要看个别不同案情，会有情况是船厂如果能够向船东或
担保人取得三期船价共 50%，会是足够补偿损失有余，而且还有赚。当然，船厂如果去
这样做并确认合约的存在，就会有危险船舶市场突然急升，船东很快改变立场，导致
船厂根本来不及再去给通知追问船东是否继续毁约并准备去接受去中断造船合约。

在上述的千变万化的情况下，就带来了一种说法，就是受害方如果没有合法利益，就
必须去接受毁约以减少损失。受害方不能去坚持对方继续履约，令合约继续有效，这是
浪费与不合理的做法。这方面在《国际商务游戏规则—英国合约法》第十四章 12.6 段有
详细介绍，其中提到了 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor (1962) A.C. 413; 2
W.L.R. 17 的上诉庭先例，节录如下：
“该案例原告为当地议会长期提供垃圾箱，他与被告签约在垃圾箱上为被告的修车厂
业务做广告牌，为期三年。被告于签约当日即反悔并毁约（repudiated the contract）。也
难怪，在垃圾箱上做自己的业务广告，人家会想‘我的车拿到你那里修理恐怕真的要
变成垃圾啦’，谁还敢找你！亏被告也想得出来。所以合约墨迹未干他就要反悔。可原
告并不接受被告的毁约，继续依约为被告做这种广告（也真够损的），整整三年！最
后原告索赔依据合约他履行应得的价款（广告费），上诉庭以微弱多数（法官）判定：
原告可全数索回其履约应得的价款，他并无义务一定要接受被告的预期毁约、中止合约
而索赔违约的损害赔偿，而一天没去中止合约，不存在有减少损失‘责任’的说法。结
果原告胜诉。该案中也有少数法官认为，原告本应中止合约以减少损失，因为他本可接
受对方毁约而从那时起索赔有关损害，比如将来估计的利润等，但他却选择了花费更
多的钱去执行一个对方不再需要的合约，这虽没有违反合理减少损失的原则，但整体
说是一种无谓的浪费。这听来也不无道理，但毕竟这个判例更倾向支持前一种原则，即
无辜方有权选择是否接受毁约。”

该书接下去谈到一种叫做合法利益（legitimate interest）理论的出现，就是受害方在完
全没有合法利益的情况下，不能不合理去拒绝接受毁约，把合约的存在拖下去而导致
损失扩大。该书也介绍了几个有关的先例，如 The “Alaskan Trader” (1983) 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 645；The “Puerto Buitrago” (1976) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 250 与 The “Odenfield” (1978) 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 357。这方面在 Stocznia v. Latvian Shipping (1998) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 609 的高院
一审也有去针对，就是船厂应否去接受船东的毁约，并且不应该去安放龙骨，尤其是
第 3-6 艘船舶，为了让支付第二期船价的条件成熟。高院的 Clarke 大法官认为即使是有
这一个理论的存在，也只能适用在十分极端的例子，即损失索赔是足够的救济，而且
去让合约继续存在是完全不合理。他这样说（在[1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 602）：
“Thus, on the footing that the principle exists, it is that an innocent party is entitled to
continue to perform a commercial contract which has been repudiated by the other party
unless he has ‘no legitimate interest, financial or otherwise, in performing the contract’ (per
Lord Reid) or he should ‘in all reason’ accept the repudiation (per Lord Denning), or where it
would be ‘wholly unreasonable’ to keep the contract alive (per Mr. Justice Kerr) or where it
would be ‘not merely unreasonable but wholly unreasonable’ to do so per Mr. Justice Lloyd.

I do not think that there is any real difference between those different ways of putting the
principle. The question is therefore whether the buyer has an arguable case that the builder’s
decision to lay the keel of hull 1 or 2 was wholly unreasonable. Since the general rule is that
there is no requirement for the innocent party to act reasonably in deciding whether or not to
accept a repudiatory breach as putting an end to a contract, the burden of establishing the
defence is upon the defendant.”

在该先例，判是船厂去安放龙骨令支付第二期船价的条件成熟没有什么不合理之处，
更谈不上是完全不合理（wholly unreasonable）。笔者看来，船厂如果遇上同样的情况，
不要说是第二期的船价支付，就是第三期或第四期，例如是船舶下水作为支付的条件，
船厂去坚持下去令条件成熟也谈不上是完全不合理。这是因为船舶建造了一半，船厂通
常也会去把该船舶建造完毕才设法转售，即使半途发生船东毁约的情况。去这样做为唯
一的危险是由于船厂这样做是确认合约的存在（affirm contract），所以船价市场逆转
变了是急促上升的话，导致船厂再想去以船东违约中断造船合约会来不及。因为船东会
去马上作出改变，不再继续毁约，而是马上作出支付或确认愿意支付，船厂就再也没
有机会去中断合约了。

9.5 普通法与造船合约条文之间的关系

这一个争议是船厂在第一与第二艘冷藏船的问题上产生了其他的结果性损失
（consequential loss），例如是对船厂造成延误的损失。这些损失在普通法是可以去索
赔，只要不是在订约时无法合理预见或与船东的违约因果关系没有被打断。光是去把这
两艘船舶完成建造过程然后出售给新船东 Lorient Maritime，然后根据造船合约的第 5
条文的最后计算（final accounting）就不足够去补偿船厂的损失，因为没有去把这种结
果性损失包括在内。这里可去以船厂的修改索赔请求去说明：“ For the avoidance of
doubt, the Claimant claims damages in respect of [Latreefers’] breach in relation to vessels 1
& 2 and, on a true construction of clause 5.05, the yard is entitled to recover damages on the
measure recoverable at common law.”

但船东的回应是针对这一方面的违约/毁约，第 5 条文已经超越了普通法的地位，并针
对损失计算有了一个完整的规范（complete code）。笔者先去在此节录该造船合约的第
5 条文（与 SAJ 标准格式合约十分接近）如下：
“5.05 (1) If the Purchaser defaults in the payment of any amount due to the Seller under sub-
clauses (b) or (c) or (d) of Clause 5.02 for twenty-one (21) days after the date when such
payment has fallen due the Seller shall be entitled to rescind the contract.

(2) In the event of such rescission by the Seller of this Contract due to the Purchaser’s default
as provided for in this Clause, the Seller shall be entitled to retain and apply the instalments
already paid by the Purchaser to the recovery of the Seller’s loss and damage and at the same
time the Seller shall have the full right and power either to complete or not to complete the
Vessel and to sell the Vessel at a public or private sale on such terms and conditions as the
Seller deems reasonable provided that the Seller is also obliged to mitigate all losses and
damages due to any such Purchaser’s default.

(3) The proceeds received by the Seller from the sale and the instalments already paid and
retained shall be applied by the Seller as mentioned hereinabove as follows:
First, in payment of all reasonable costs and expenses of the sale of the Vessel.
Second, if the Vessel has been completed, in or towards satisfaction of the unpaid balance of
the Contract Price, or if the Vessel has not been completed in or towards satisfaction of the
unpaid amount of the cost incurred by the Seller prior to the date of sale on account of
construction of the Vessel, including work, labour and materials which the Seller would have
been entitled to receive if the Vessel had been completed and delivered.
Third, the balance of the proceeds, if any, shall belong to the Purchaser and shall forthwith be
paid over to the Purchaser by the Seller.

(4) In the event of the proceeds from the sale together with payments retained by the Seller
being insufficient to pay the Seller, the Purchaser shall be liable for the deficiency and shall
pay the same to the Seller upon its demand.”
本来以明示条文去超越普通法默示的地位是司空见惯，这包括针对损失的计算或是限
制赔偿责任。在本书第四章所介绍的议定赔偿（liquidated damage）条文就是一个很好
的例子。但去这样做，就必须是写得十分清楚无误，否则是不能超越普通法地位，就是
允许受害方可以向违约方索赔所有的损失去让他回复到合约被履行的地位，即所谓的
“复原”大原则。这一点 Goff 勋爵在本案例中也有去强调说：“… familiar principle of
construction that clear words are needed to rebut the presumption that a contracting party
does not intend to abandon any remedies for breach of the contract arising by operation of
law: see, e.g., Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. v. Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd. (1974) A.C.
689, 717, per Lord Diplock.”。

这一个问题并不容易，主要当然是去解释该造船合约的第 5 条文。但大法官之间也有不
同的结论，其中上诉庭主要是 Staughton 大法官作出判词，认为第 5 条文完全取代了普
通法。在贵族院，这一个判决被推翻，但 5 个法官之中也有 Lloyd 勋爵持不同意见。这
一点从后来第五个诉讼中 Rix 大法官所说可以看到，如下：
“Lord Lloyd at p.626, col.2; p.598A said that the only respect in which he disagreed with the
Court of Appeal was that cl. 5.05 did not interfere with a vested right in debt. Otherwise he
thought that damages ought to be assessed in accordance with that clause (at p.629, col.2;
p.602D). However, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton agreed with
Lord Goff rather than Lord Lloyd (at p.630, col. 2; p.603).”。

Rix 大法官与其他上诉庭的大法官判是船厂可以根据普通法的赔偿原则去向船东索赔，
不认为造船合约的第 5 条文去完全取代普通法，说：“For the reasons, and in accordance
with the Judge below, I would hold that cl. 5.05 is not a self-contained code, but is itself built
on the underpinnings of the common law remedies for breach of contract.”

其中的一些重要原因是第 5 条文没有与无法去完全取代普通法，例如是像 Goff 勋爵所

说就是船厂没有办法去把船舶出售给其他船东的情况条文没有针对。但这种情况在航运
低潮的时候是经常会发生，甚至有船厂自己被迫要成立船队去暂时营运。这一来，船厂
要向船东索赔损失就非得要去依赖普通法的地位。另外在第 5 条文里面有很多内容如
“the recovery of the Seller’s loss and damage”，“ the Seller is also obliged to mitigate all
losses and damages due to any such Purchaser’s default”与“the Purchaser shall be liable
for the deficiency”都显示了条文本身并没有完全去作出规范，还是需要去根据普通法
地位作出计算。例如是“不足之数”（the deficiency）就会要考虑船舶出售给其他船东，
但其他船东会有不同的要求而导致船舶的规范说明（specification）要有改变。这表示出
售的船价会高会低，主要去看改变的规范说明是提高还是降低。这在普通法是要去加以
计算在内，但在第 5 条文就没有去针对。
9.6 出售的船舶是否就是原来的船舶？

这一个争议涉及了第一与第二艘冷藏船只在安放了龙骨后就被船东违约 /毁约而导致了
合约的中断。之后船厂去把该两艘还在早期建造的船舶去出售给了新船东 Lorient
Maritime，并继续去完工与交船。但新船东显然是有他的要求，所以对原来船舶所要求
的规范说明作出改变。但这些都是小的改变，总共价值估计不超过船价的 5%。但这就带
来了疑问是该两艘冷藏船的出售是否就是造船合约第 5 条文所规定的需要计算损失的
出售。法院判是该艘船舶不受这些改变规范说明的影响还是原来的船舶被出售。其中
Lloyd 勋爵是这样说：
“The fact that the specifications were not identical is irrelevant. In practical terms the hulls
were completed and sold within the meaning of clause 5.05(2). If vessels 1 and 2 had already
been launched before rescission, there would have been no doubt as to the application of
clause 5.05(2). It would be absurd to require the yard to complete the vessels as a speculation
before selling to a third party. The fact that these particular contracts were rescinded at an
earlier rather than a later stage cannot affect the construction of the clause”

9.7 以侵权起诉船东的母公司或集团公司

在案例中，还涉及了船厂是以侵权向船东（Latreefers）的母公司或集团公司（Latco）
起诉索赔损失，理由是他以不法手段引诱他人违约/毁约（induce breach of contract）。
有关这些经济的侵权（包括阴谋、威吓），在笔者与杨大明律师所著的《禁令》一书第
3.2.3 节有介绍。

船东（Latreefers）是一家通过 Capco 去在曼岛（Isle of Man）注册的皮包公司，正如许

多国际船东在巴拿马或者利比里亚注册的皮包公司一样。船东公司的股票是不记名股票
（bearer shares），并由 Latco 集团的另一家公司 Latmar 所持有。至于船东的注册董事
实际上是由 Capco 的雇员担任。至于船东实质的操作（主要就是向船厂订购新船）都是
由 Latco 处理。另去一提的是 Latco 与 CAPCO 之间的协议（成立船东公司与之后的运
行）其中有条文规定 Latco 要经常保持船东有足够的资金，这是第 5.9 条文如下：“the
Managed Entity would be kept in sufficient funds by the client to honour its liabilities as and
when they become due…”

显然，船厂去向船东索赔这高达四千万美元以上的金额是毫无意义，因为船东只是皮
包公司而且正在清盘。如果船厂能够去向 Latco 索赔，这还有机会。但问题是在这一个
造船合约中，Latco 并没有去提供任何的履约担保（performance guarantee）。所以，船
厂就必须以侵权去起诉。但该案例还是第一次去以这种侵权的理由试图把母公司拖下水，
Thomas 大法官是这样说：
“232. There is, I was told, no case, so far as the researches of Counsel and solicitors have
gone, where a parent company has been sued for inducing breach of contract on the basis that
its subsidiary has acted on its instructions by the mere fact it is a subsidiary.”。

显然这是会带来很严重的后果，因为集团公司去成立子公司作为一个独立法人以减少
责任是国际上惯常的做法，正如 Staughton 大法官在 The “Coral Rose” (1991) 1 Lloyd’s
Rep. 563 说：
“The creation or purchase of a subsidiary company with minimal liability, which will
operate with the parent’s funds and on the parent’s directions but not expose the parent to
liability, may not seem to some the most honest way of trading. But it is extremely common
in the international shipping industry and elsewhere. To hold that it creates an agency
relationship between the subsidiary and the parent would be a revolutionary doctrine.”

但即使母公司与子公司是分开的独立法人，这不影响侵权，例如是母公司发出函件给
子公司要求或命令他去向另一家公司违约/毁约。这一来，如果另一家公司取得了该份
函件就可以指母公司直接引诱他人违约/毁约。但这种证据是不容易找到，甚至不会存
在。所以，在本案例是判法院不会因为 Latco 在背后控制船东就自动去作出推断船东的
毁约是由于 Latco 诱导。Thomas 大法官是这样说：“It seems to me to follow from the
principle in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., (1897) A.C. 22 that the mere fact that Latreefers
is a wholly owned subsidiary controlled by Latco does not enable the Court to draw the
inference that the directors simply did as they were told and treated requests as if they were
instructions simply to be carried out; Latreefers is a distinct legal entity. To infer in such
circumstances that the offices of the subsidiary were to be taken to have acted on the
instruction of its parent, would mean that the principle underlying the separate incorporation
of the subsidiary were ignored. …”

Latco 虽然没有直接引诱船东向船厂毁约，但最后在高院与上诉庭，Latco 都被判有间

接引诱船东向船厂毁约。这里首先要求解释什么是“间接引诱”（indirect inducement）
或“间接令船东无法履约”（indirect disablement）。以下不妨去节录笔者与杨大明律师
所著的《禁令》一书第 3.2.3.2.3 节：
“直接与间接令他人无法履约的分别有时候不大明确，但仍有必要去区分。大致上，间
接是去通过另一位第三者在中间隔一隔才令他人无法履约。
也是最好以案例去解释关系：在 James McMahon Ltd. v. Dunn (1965) 99 I.L.T.R. 45 ，被
告（A）去诱导一家装卸公司（ B）的工人（第三者的 C）去毁约：指 B 与 C 之间的雇
佣合约。但这进一步令 B 无法履行对一家船公司（D）的合约去装卸货物。之后原告的
D 向被告 A 起诉索赔，这就是间接令他人无法履约的例子。
直接与间接的主要法律上差异是：间接的侵权责任会太广泛，无边无际，对被告不公
平与太危险。例如（ B ）可能不只与一 家船公司（ D ）订约，而且与其他船 公司
E，F，G 与 H 也订了约。所以，法律去收窄在针对‘间接’的情况是：
（i）被告一定要去做不合法的事情才有责任： Torquey Hotel Co Ltd v. Cousins (1969) 2
Ch. 106 ； Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd v. Gardner (1968) 2 QB 762, 768 ； Davis v. Nyland
(1975) 10 S.A.S.R. 76 ； John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v. The Waterside Workers’ Federation of
Australia (November 11, 1976, N.S.W. Supreme Court, unrep: see [1976] A.C.L.D. 832) 。
（这与直接诱导其他人毁约不同的地方就是，直接诱导即使是合法，也要根据“多个
矛盾合约”（inconsistent transactions）看哪一个合约优先。）
（ii）因果关系不能中断，而且较严格的看待。说法是 B 对 D 的毁约是 A 去诱导 C 对 B
毁约的‘必然后果’（necessary consequence）。在 ‘直接’的令他人无法履约，程度
较低，只需要是‘合理后果’（reasonable consequence）。这一来，表示 B 无法去另找
工人进行装卸，合理也好，不合理也好，总之是 B 实在没有办法，只能去对 D 毁约。这
‘ necessary consequence’的说法可去看 Stratford (J.T.) & Son Ltd v. Lindley (1965) A.C.
269, 333 先例。”

把上述的说法去适用在本案例，法院认为 Latco 的确有去做不合法的事情（违约），这

就是违反他与 Capco 的第 5.9 条文去保持船东有足够的资金。另是因果关系没有中断，
Latco 的违约是导致船东向船厂毁约的必然后果。船东是皮包公司，否则他可能会有其
他融资的渠道，这就变了 Latco 的违约并非是必然会带来这一个后果。Rix 大法官是这
样说：
“The financing of Latreefers was of the greatest importance to the transaction, … Moreover,
the Judge finds that the London solicitors who arranged for the formation of Latreefers for
Latco ‘well aware of Capco’s terms and conditions’; that the management of Latreefers was
intended to be properly conducted by the (Capco) directors of Latreefers, and that those
directors, as independent contractors outside the hierarchy of a normal company group, may
express stipulation with Latco, the beneficial owner, for funding and for the proper conduct of
company’s business; and that, when the notice of keel laying instalments were served on
them, the directors were aware of the obligations of Latco under the Capco terms. In these
circumstances I regard it as impossible to think of the proper financing of Latreefers under the
Capco terms as an incidental matter, or insufficiently connected with Latco’s intentions
towards Latreefers and its contracts with the yard. Moreover, when they came to Latco ’s
strategy for dealing with those contracts, it did not merely decide to withdraw its financial
support for Latreefers; it deliberately used the withdrawal of its financial support as the means
to bring about the destruction of those contracts.”。

10. 船厂出售船舶

SAJ 与 NEWBUILDCON 标准格式在有关条文中都去说明船厂有权（但根据上述第 7 段

不是必要）去出售船舶，这是在船舶已经是完工但船东拒绝接收船舶才有的情况。但有
更大可能船东违约/毁约是发生在建造船舶的工程中，好像上述所分析的案例 Stocznia
v. Latvian。这一来，SAJ 与 NEWBUILDCON 也有清楚说明船厂可以去继续完成建造该
船舶，或是把该还未完工的船舶去出售（如果可以的话）。这些不同的做法实际上就是
配合普通法下无辜方要去合理减少损失的义务是一致，不过以明示条文说明船厂有这
一个权利就可以避免将来要去争议这样做是否是最明智与最合理地去减少损失。

10.1 船厂对船东要尽的责任

去出售船舶（不论是否完成建造），其中一个方面要去探讨的就是船厂要有什么责任
去出售船舶。在这里 NEWBUILDCON 第 39(f)条文中就说是“at the best price reasonably
obtainable at a public or private sale on reasonable terms and conditions.”。但在 SAJ 标准
格式 Article XI(4)中是说“to sell the VESSEL at a public or private sale on such terms and
conditions as the BUILDER thinks fit without being answerable for any loss or damage.”

先针对 SAJ，在 Simon Curtis 所著的《The Law of Shipbuilding Contracts》一书第三版认

为不是让船厂任意去决定，虽然文字上是说船厂可以决定什么是适合的价格去出售。该
书还是认为船厂有一个默示的善意责任，SAJ 的明示条文对该责任并没有去明确超越。
该书并去列举了两个先例来支持此说法：Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. Mutual Finance Ltd.
(1971) Ch. 949；Bishop v. Bonham (1988) 1 WLR 742。该书认为船厂在这方面的责任是
与融资银行在船东违约要去行使出售船舶的权利是一致，可去节录第 194 页的内容如
下：
“The SAJ form provides that the sale of the vessel may take place publicly or privately ‘on
such terms and conditions as the builder thinks fit without being answerable for any loss or
damage’. This is, however, clearly to be read as subject to an implied duty of good faith,
which the builder will breach if he knowingly sells the vessel at an undervalue. While there is
no direct judicial authority on this point, it is submitted that the builder’s obligations in this
situation are akin to those of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale who must ‘take
reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value of the mortgaged property at the date
on which he decides to sell it.”

至于融资银行的责任，在笔者的《船舶融资与抵押》一书有颇为详尽的介绍，可去部分
节录一些船厂要注意之处。其中也有介绍英国上诉庭的 Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v.
Mutual Finance Ltd.先例，并节录了 Salmon 大法官所说如下：
“Counsel for the defendants contends that the mortgagee’s sole obligation to the mortgagor
in relation to a sale is to act in good faith; there is no duty of care, and accordingly no
question of negligence by the mortgagee in the conduct of the sale can arise…. There are
some dicta which suggest that unless a mortgagee acts in bad faith he is safe. His only
obligation to the mortgagor is not to cheat him. There are other dicta which suggest that, in
addition to the duty of acting in good faith, the mortgagee is under a duty to take reasonable
care to obtain whatever is the true market value of the mortgaged property at the moment he
chooses to sell it…. The proposition that the mortgagee owes both duties, in my judgment,
represents the true view of the law.”（被告大律师争辩说抵押权方[银行]唯一的责任是善
意，没有小心的责任，所以不存在可去指控抵押权方在出售中疏忽[因为银行不必去小
心]。有法院说法是只要抵押权方不是恶意，他就安全。他唯一是不能去欺骗抵押方[船
东]。也另有法院说法是除了善意的责任外，抵押权方还有去合理小心的责任为了抵押
品[船舶]在选择出售之时能获得真正市场价格。我判是抵押权方有这两个责任是法律真
正的意见。）

另在同一个先例，Salmon 大法官也另有说到：
“It is well settled that a mortgagee is not a trustee of the power of sale for the mortgagor.
Once the power has accrued, the mortgagee is entitled to exercise it for his own purposes
whenever he chooses to do so. It matters not that the moment may be unpropitious and that by
waiting a higher price could be obtained. He has the right to realise his security by turning it
into money which he likes. Nor, in my view, is there anything to prevent a mortgagee from
accepting the best bid he can get at any auction, even though the auction is badly attended and
the bidding exceptionally low. Providing none of those adverse factors is due to any fault of
the mortgagee, he can do as he likes. If the mortgagee’s interests, as he sees them, conflict
with those of the mortgagor, he can give preference to his own interests, which of course he
could not do were he a trustee of the power of sale for the mortgagor.”（抵押权方[银行]不
是受托人/信托人。一旦有了权利，抵押权方有权去不论在何时为自己行使。即使时间上
不令抵押方[船东]感到愉快与再等一会可获得更高价也不会有关系。他有权去把担保[船
舶]变为金钱。没有任何阻止抵押权方接受在一个拍卖中最高的出价，即使是参与拍卖
的人不多或不热烈与出的价格极低。只要这些困难因素不是抵押权方的过错所引致。若
抵押权方与抵押方的利益起冲突，前者只需理会自己的利益，去优先对待，这一来，
自然不能是受托人了，因为受托人要把委托人的利益放在自己的利益之上。）

另 可 节 录 加 拿 大 的 Oak Orchard Developments Ltd. v. Iseman (1987) O.J. No. 361 (Ont
H.C.); aff’d (1989) O.J. Nol. 2394 (Ont. C.A.)中 Saunders 大法官说的：
“1. The mortgagee selling under a power of sale is under a duty to take reasonable
precautions to obtain the true market value of the mortgaged property at the date on which he
decides to sell. This does not mean that the mortgagee must in fact obtain the true value.
2. The duty of the mortgagee is only to take reasonable precautions. Perfection is not
required. Some latitude is allowed to a mortgagee.
3. In deciding whether a mortgagee has fallen short of his duty the facts must be looked at
broadly and he will not be adjudged to be in default unless he is plainly on the wrong side of
the line.
4. The mortgagee is entitled to exercise an accrued power of sale for his own purposes
whenever he chooses to do so. It matters not that the moment may be unpropitious and that by
waiting, a higher price could be obtained.
5. The mortgagee can accept the best price he can obtain in an adverse market provided that
none of the adverse factors are due to fault on his part.
6. Even if the duty to take reasonable precautions is breached, the mortgagor must show that a
higher price would have been obtained but for the breach in order to be compensated in
damages.”（在抵押权方[银行]决定在哪一天出售船舶，他就有责任去合理谨慎地去卖
的真正的市场价格。这不表示他会获得抵押品[船舶]的真正价值。抵押权方的责任只是
合理谨慎。并不需要完美。抵押权方也被给与了一点伸缩性。在看抵押权方有否不尽责，
应去广泛地看，他不会被判是没有尽责除非是明显地越过了错误的分水线。抵押权方可
为他自己的利益去选择任何时间去行使出售的权利。即使时间选得不令人[如抵押方的
船东]感到愉快，因为再去稍等后抵押品[船舶]价格会回升，也无所谓。抵押权方可以在
低迷的市场以最好的价格去出售抵押品，只要他自己没有过错去造成出售的困难[例如
去把所有抵押品一下子公开出售，毫无秩序与组织，使市场一时吸收不了，这种抵押
品也不应该这样去出售]。就算抵押权方违反了合理谨慎的责任，抵押方要去证明抵押
权方本可以取得一个更高的价格，但没有去这样做因此违反了 抵押权方的默示责任，
才能获得价格差别的损失赔偿[这表示抵押方有更高的对损失的举证责任]。）

这样看来，法律还是尽量想去保障银行的利益，毕竟这会是在船东违约下才要去行使
的出售船舶权利。同样看来，船厂也是在船东违约下去行使出售权利，也应会受到同样
的看待。这种争议在近期的 Gold Coast Ltd v. Naval Gijon SA (2006) Lloyd’s Rep. 48 也有
出现，虽然法院还没有对这方面做出最后的判决。该化学品船的约定船价是 3,800 万美
元，但由于判是船东比死亡日期早了几天去中断合约，所以是船东毁约。在合约中断的
时候，船东已经支付了船价的 80%给船厂。如果责任上是船东胜诉，船东就可以合法向
船厂取回支付了的船价，包括去向还款担保的银行要求支付（即使该担保不是限令担
保）。但如果责任上是船东败诉，船东就要在船舶可以交船的时候，对因为拒绝接收而
欠下了的 20%船价要去先对船厂作出支付，然后在最后的结算（final accounting）中去
看看有钱归还给船东或船厂可以进一步向船东索赔。这方面，Gloster 大法官是这样说：
“Had the buyers’ cancellation be upheld, it would have been entitled to the refund of all its
advance instalments plus interest…. Given, however, that the yard’s cancellation was upheld,
the yard became entitled to pay itself the unpaid 20% of the contract price (plus interest and
its expenses of maintaining and reselling the vessel) before accounting for the balance of the
net proceeds of sale to the buyer. This gives rise to issues about the circumstances of the
resell of the vessel by the yard.”

在该先例，其中的一个争议就是船厂在 2001 年 1 月 12 日把该化学品船以 3,350 万美元

转 售 给 一 家 挪 威 公 司 。 船 厂 在 2001 年 12 月 11 日 才 去 作 出 最 后 结 算 （ final
accounting），并且归还给船东 2,030 万美元。但船东认为这一个转售并不合理，船厂也
没有去减少损失，因为他早在 2000 年 10 月就已经给了船厂一个再要约（re-offer）的
3,200 万美元，但船厂没有接受去减少损失（有关“再要约”请看本书第十一章之
4.5.1.2 段）。这导致了后来转售被延误，并带来船厂要求的 470 万美元的保养船舶、利
息损失与转售费用。

10.2 船厂出售的时间

在这方面，如果船厂的责任与融资银行是一致，这出售的时间就是由船厂自己去选择。
这方面会带来船东的争议，例如是船东对航运市场乐观的话就会责怪船厂（或银行）
太心急去出售船舶，再多等一会就会市场好转了。也可能的确是如此，因为到了诉讼的
时候会可以去事后诸葛亮看到航运市场有了好转。也会是倒过来埋怨船厂不去尽快出售，
而是去犹疑不决而导致了错过出售的好机会，因为市场继续下滑。这一来，又要受到船
东的抗辩说船厂应该早出售船舶。但这方面已经有了明确的先例说明银行（或是船厂）
完全有权自己去决定。这里可以去举以下两个先例的说法。

在英国的 Colson v. Williams (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 530 (C.A.)中，Kekewich 大法官说：

“Where a mortgagee under ordinary circumstances thinks it necessary – and, as long as he is
not prohibited by the terms of his contract, he is the sole judge of what is necessary – to
realise his security, he can do so without hesitation. If there is a notice to be given he must
give it; if some conditions are to be observed they must be observed; but as regards the time
when he shall realise his security he is the sole arbiter, and no one can interfere with him he
may even do it from a bad motive…. The court has nothing to do with the motives of a
mortgagee.”（除非是受到了贷款合约的局限，抵押权方[银行]是可以全盘去决定什么
是适合去让他把抵押品[船舶]变为金钱，他可以是毫不犹豫地决定。如果有需要给通知，
他必须要给。如果有一些条件必须满足，他也必须去依从。但针对去出售抵押品的时间，
他是唯一的决定者，没有人可去干预他的决定，就算他有不良的意图…法院是管不了，
也证明不了抵押权方的意图。）

在加拿大的 Oak Orchard Developments Ltd. v. Iseman (1987) O.J. No. 361 (Ont H.C.); aff’d
(1989) O.J. Nol. 2394 (Ont. C.A.)中 Saunders 大法官说的：
“The principal complaint is that the property was sold too soon. Properties of this nature
requires a reasonable exposure in order to obtain the best price. It is not considered wise to
snap up the first offer. However, that strategy is not unavailable. It may sometimes be prudent
to accept an offer even if it is made soon after a listing. When the numbered company offer
was received, the market had been canvassed and no interest had been discovered.
Furthermore, the mortgagee was exposed to further loss of interest and perhaps principal by
delay in selling. Delay was costing her not only the interest on the money she had borrowed
but also the return on the principal if it were invested. The ultimate cost of delay was
unpredictable and had to be balanced against the possibility of a better offer that would at
least offset that cost. The first mortgagee had commenced sale proceedings. In my view,
Carolyn Iseman was entitled to sell in December, 1981, provided she took reasonable
precautions in an effort to obtain the true market value. She did not have to wait in the hope
that in time a better offer might be forthcoming.”（抵押方[船东]主要的抱怨是太早出售。
有些财产应去合理推广才能卖出好价钱。第一个出价抵押权方[银行]就马上去接受并不
明智。但有时候去尽快接受出价是谨慎做法，因为已经调查过市场发觉没有什么有兴趣
的买方。况且再拖下去银行会损失利息与可能售价会下跌。损失利息外也会失去利用这
笔钱进行投资的机会。抵押权方在 1981 年 12 月有权出售，只要合理小心去取得市场价
格。她不必去等待更高的出价。）

10.3 船厂出售的价格

这方面在笔者的《船舶融资与抵押》一书第五章之 4.3.2.2 段有介绍，可去节录如下：

“看来法律在这方面有一定的责任加在抵押权方 /银行，要它以决定出售之日的‘真正
价格’（true value）或拍卖‘最高出价’（best bid）去出售。但也在上一小段的许多先
例中说明了它有伸缩性，有一定容忍尺度，拍卖人少与出价低也无须去收回另择日子
再拍卖，等等。

去在市场出售一样东西/财产，可以面对以下不同的‘市场价格’（market value）：
（i）‘有利市场价格’（ preferred market value ）：买方急于需要这样东西 /财产，但
不易买到。
（ii）‘公平市场价格’（fair market value）：一个愿意的卖方遇上一个愿意的买方在
一 个 竞 争 市 场 中 所 同 意 的 买 卖 价 格 （ willing seller and willing buyer in a competitive
market）。
（iii）‘压迫价格’（distress value）：卖方急于要出售而市场的买方很有限。
（iv）‘救难价格’（ salvage value）：这是把东西/财产当作另外的用途出售，再也不
是原来的用途了，例如船舶出售不再用作航运营运，而是以废钢用途出售。

看来，不少先例是支持（ iii）的‘压迫价格’的： Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City

Corp. (1992) 148 N.R. 47 (P.C.) ； Standard Trust Co. v. Stoelze (1990) 71 DLR (4 th) 162
(BCCA) ； Yorkshire Trust Co. v. Armwest Development Ltd. (1986) 1 WWR 578 (Alta C.A.);
Skipton Building Society v. Stott (2000) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 257 等。

但没有太大理由下银行去以‘救难价格’出售，形同‘抛弃财产’（ throw away the

property），只求足够还债，是不可以的，因为抵押方在售价方面有合理谨慎的责任。
在加拿大上诉庭的 Wood v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1986) 29 OR （2 的）35 (Ont. C.A.) 曾有
一段话说：
‘if it mortgage debt is very small in relation to the value of the property, the mortgagee is
not entitled merely to sell the property at a price sufficient to pay off his mortgagee debt. The
general principle requires him to go further, and to take reasonable care to get a proper
price, otherwise, he would simply be sacrificing the rights of the mortgage. ’”

10.4 NEWBUILDCON 对船厂出售船舶的明示要求

在这里 NEWBUILDCON 第 39(f)条文中就说是“at the best price reasonably obtainable at

a public or private sale on reasonable terms and conditions.”，这是对船厂有一个比法律默
示更苛刻的责任。笔者虽然还没有这么快见到有关的先例，但既然文字上要求船厂必须
争取到合理可以取得的最佳船舶价格，笔者就认为至少要做到上述的“公平市场价
格”而不是“压迫价格”了。这一来，NEWBUILDCON 明示的要求是去在很大程度上
加重了船厂出售船舶的法律默示责任。

10.5 船东阻止船厂出售的办法

会有情况船东会想去阻止船厂去出售船舶，例如船东认为船厂错误中断了造船合约。笔
者更听说在船舶价格上升的市场下，船厂去不顾一切，不论有没有一个合理的理由说
是船东违约/毁约，硬去把该建造中或刚完工的船舶以高价出售。这一来，船东会去想
有什么救济的办法。正路地通过造船合约内的仲裁条文去进行金钱上的索赔会是漫长与
昂贵，而且会有其他的不足之处的顾虑，例如将来裁决书的执行会是困难。这就带来去
考虑其他救济的可能性，其中最主要的途径就是向有关法院（如果约定是伦敦仲裁就
是英国法院）申请履行指令要求船厂交船或禁令去阻止船厂出售船舶。这种救济的办法
在本书第十一章有介绍，也在第一章 15 段介绍的 Okura & Co Ltd v. Navara Shipping
Corporation SA (1981) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 561；(1982) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 537 先例中有被船东考
虑。本来，如果普通法的救济，也就是金钱的赔偿，是不足够的话，衡平法下是会去作
出好像履行指令或禁令的救济。这种普通法的不足够会是要说服法院裁决书将来难以执
行，或是建造的船舶十分特殊故无法去替代，船舶准时交船是有特殊的营运无法以金
钱去计算，等等。

10.5.1 履约指令要求船厂交船

法院通常是不愿意对建筑工程下履行指令，因为工程会是涉及很复杂的方方面面，不
好去监督有关禁令的执行。毕竟，如果违反法院的命令是一个严重的刑事行为。法院对
外国船厂去作出履行指令或禁令也有同样的顾虑，要更加小心。这在 Gyllenhammar &
Partners International Ltd. v. Sour Brodogradevna Split (1989) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 403，Hirst 大
法官拒绝作出履行指令，说：
“… a very complex contract requiring extensive co-operation between the parties on a
number of matters, particularly modifications, optional variations, and, perhaps most
importantly of all, matters of detail (some by no means unimportant) left undefined in the
specification. In my judgment these factors, coupled with the consideration that the work
would take place in a foreign yard, outside the Court’s jurisdiction, would tell strongly against
an order for specific performance being in principle appropriate in the present case. ”（造船
合约是一个十分复杂的合约，需要双方大量的合作，特别是在船舶的修改，选择权下
的改变，或可能是最重要的是一些没有在造船合约的规范说明中明确规定的地方。上述
的因素，加上考虑外国船厂并非在本法院的管辖下，可以说是很不适宜去作出履约指
令。）

但从近期的一些案例看来，英国法院对中国公司也不像太有顾虑去作出禁令，而其中
最 常 见 的 禁 令 就 是 止 诉 禁 令 （ anti-suit injunction ） 或 全 球 性 的 冻 结 禁 令 （ Mareva
Injunction）.。举一个近期的例子，在 The “Alexandros T” (2007) LMLN No. 725 就涉及
了英国法院向中保集团的太平保险公司作出了止诉禁令。至于中国公司或个别人士如果
去漠视的后果，笔者也已经听说过一起是有人因为这原因，在去英国时于希思罗机场
被捕。这样看来，英国法院在现在的心态恐怕不会太过顾虑去向中国船厂作出履约指令
或禁令。但已经说过，在复杂的造船工程，英国法院估计是不会去作出履约指令要求船
厂去完工并交船，原因在第十一章第 1 段有介绍。但估计如果船舶已经完工，只涉及交
船的一步，英国法院会是比较愿意在适合的案件中去作出履约指令要求船厂交船。

10.5.2 禁令阻止船厂出售船舶

至于在另一种情况，就是表面看来船厂合法去中断了造船合约，并行使他的出售船舶
权利，估计船东想以船厂出售船舶没有合理谨慎，或是价钱卖得太便宜等的理由去向
法院申请禁令阻止船厂这样做，恐怕就很不容易了。这里可去看有关融资银行的先例作
为参考，会发觉抵押方/债务人想去这样做是十分困难。这可去节录笔者的《船舶融资与
抵押》一书第五章 4.3.2.3 段如下：
“在明显不合理谨慎的情况下，加上仍未成交 /出售，法院在抵押方申请下会作出中间
禁令阻止，如上一小段的 Bookman v. National Trust (1983) 30 R.P.R. 229 (Ont. H.C.) 。船
舶抵押也是一样做法： Rhodes v. Buckland (1852) 16 Beav. 212, 51 E.R. 759 。但如果已订
下买卖合约，法院一般不愿意以禁令干预，除非能去证明第三者的买方是应该明知抵
押权方有违约行为，这情况当然很少发生：Selwyn v. Garfit (1888) 38 Ch. D 273 (C.A.)；
Jenkins v. Jones (1860) 2 Giff. 99, 66 E.R. 43 (V.C.)。又或是，证明给法院看买卖合约会涉
及 ‘ 欺 诈 ’ （ fraud ） ： Bettyes v. Maynard (1883) 49 L.T. 389 (C.A.) 。 本 章 之
4.2.2.4.5.1/4.2.2.4.5.2 小段讲到把船舶出售给抵押权方 /银行或密切关系买方，若加上价
钱比市价低太多，只是接近未曾清还的一笔贷款，就难免表面看来有疑问了。

若表面看来是无辜买方，即使有合理谨慎与否之争，法院也不会去做出禁令去损害第
三者而只让抵押方将来向抵押权方提出索赔损失： Woff v. Vanderzee (1869) 20 L.T. 353
(V.C.) ； The “Calm C” (1975) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 188 ； Abut v. Grand Falls Milling Co. (1997)
19 DLR (4th) 360 (NBCA)。除了不去伤害无辜第三者（买方），一般在金钱赔偿已是很
足够的救济情况下，法院也不愿意去作出禁令： Re Whatmough et & National Trust Co.
Ltd. (1979) 23 O.R. (2d) 452 (H.C.)。”

10.5.3 阻止新船东去诱导船厂毁约

诱导其他人毁约（induce breach of contract）已经谈到过，这是一种经济侵权。这里可能

会适用这个说法，就是船东去阻止新船东向船厂购买原来是属于他的船舶，而阻止的
办法就是去告诉新船东他有一个时间上较早的有效的造船合约，享有更高的权利，如
果新船东再去与船厂订一个合约就会是去诱导船厂毁约或导致船厂无法向原船东履约
了。这与“间接诱导他人毁约”（indirectly induce breach of contract），不是追究新船
东是否以不合法的手段去诱导，而是根据另一个理论的“多个矛盾合约”
（inconsistent transactions）去看哪一个合约优先。有关这方面的内容在笔者与杨大明律
师合著的《禁令》一书第二章之 3.2.3.2.4.1 段，可部分节录如下：
“去挑几个情况谈谈，第一种是被告为了保护他已存在的合约，财产或经济权利或利
益。例如，原告 A 与 B 订了一个合约买卖一批货物。但之后， B（卖方）却一物两卖，
另订了一个合约以更高价去出售并交了同一批货物给 C（被告）。而订约时，C 已经知
道了有 B 与 A 较早时的合约。这一来，当东窗事发后，会是 A 去对 B 采取行动/索赔作
用不大，因为 B 是皮包公司，就会想去向 C 以侵权起诉，指 C 不应去诱导他人（B）毁
约。看来，法院会是在这种“多个矛盾合约”（inconsistent transactions）的情况下判 C
确对 A 犯了侵权，有责任：British Motor Trade v. Salvadori (1949) Ch. 556。

换一个情况，是 C 在订约时并不知道 B 与 A 的较早合约，但事后（货仍未交接）被 A

告知，并被警告不要再去干扰 B 与 A 的合约。但 C 不理会，继续迫 A 交货，则会对 A 犯
上侵权而要负责了。正如 Clerk & Lindsell 的《Tort》一书（第 17 版）23-29 段说：
‘Moreover, inconsistent dealing … may, indeed, be commenced without knowledge by the
third party of the contract thus broken; but if it is continued after the third party has notice of
the contract, as actionable interference has been committed by him.’

再换一种情况，是 A 知道了 B 与 C 后来订的合约，而当时货仍未交，在 B 的手中。A 于

是迫 B 去对 C 毁约，甚至去法院申请命令要 B 毁约，而这一切的行动都不必怕 C 指控
A 犯了侵权，诱导 B 对 C 毁约，而要求各种救济如赔偿损失。正如 Buckley 大法官在
Smithies v. National Association of Operative Plasters (1990) 1 K.B. 310 所说的：
‘There are circumstances in which A is entitled to induce B to break a contract entered into
by B with C. Thus, for instance, if the contract between B and C is one which B could not
make consistently with his preceding contractual obligations towards A, A may not only
induce him to break it, but may invoke the assistance of a Court of Justice to make him break
it.”

以上几种“inconsistent transactions”看来都是 A 的地位优先，C 要退让。道理是 A 与 B

的合约订立更早，会被视为是拥有更优先的权利。这所谓“相等或更高的权利”
（ equal or superior right ）的说法，在 Edwin Hill v. First National Finance (1989) 1 WLR
225 提及说：‘Justification for interference with the ( 原告) contractual right based upon an
equal or superior right in the defendant must clearly be a legal right. Such right may derive
from property, … or from contractual rights.’”

在《禁令》一书，有一个船舶买卖的例子，在这里可以稍作改动适用在造船合约，如下：
A（船厂）把船舶卖给 B（原船东），造船合约早已订立但船舶还未交船。其间双方有
了争议或航运市场上升，A 可能是反应过火或出于贪念，另去与 C（新船东）进行买
卖的谈判，意图去对 B 毁约并把船舶以高价卖给 C。B 知道后马上试图破坏这宗交易，
其中的一个行动会是去以书面告知 C 说：“你应知道，或通过本通知知道，我与 A 已
经有一份造船合约（附上一份），你如果不马上终止诱导 A 对我的毁约，我将会对你
的侵权行为采取行动，包括去申请禁令或/与将来索赔损失。”当 C 收到这样的通知，
假设他与 A 的买卖合约还没有订立，只在谈判过程中，C 会是怕麻烦而去退缩。这正是
B 的企图，想去逼 A 非得把船舶交给自己不可。而对 C 而言，如果他不准备因为这样一
份通知而退缩，会可以回应 B 说：“我没有任何意图去诱导 A 对你的毁约，毕竟，我
查问过知悉 A 是绝对不会向你履约，说是因为 A 有权利去中断合约。所以，不论 A 是
否与我达成这一个买卖，A 也不会向你履约。”这道理是 C 即使对 A 有所诱导（去订新
的买卖合约），但对 A 向 B 的毁约（如果 A 实际上没有权利去中断合约）是根本没有
因 果 关 系 。 因 为 有 否 诱 导 ， A 也 已 经 最 后 决 定 了 不 去 向 B 履 行 合 约 ： Board of
Brookview Unit No. 18 if Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Teachers’ Federation (1972) 32
D.L.R. (3D) 33。

C 也可以为了小心去向 B 说 A 坚持他可以合法中断合约，而 C 是不了解这些细节，所

以去给 B 一段合理时间，例如 3 天或 5 天不等去向有关法院申请履行指令。如果 B 不去
这样做，C 就会在期限届满时去与 A 订立买卖合约。

再去换一种情况，就是 C 收到 B 的通知，但当时与 A 的买卖合约已经订立，可以说 C

也无法去脱身，就可以回应 B 说：“我刚与 A 订立了买卖合约，而在订约的时候我是
不知道 A 已经与你有一个同样的买卖/造船合约。在收到你的通知后，我什么也没有做，
反而是 A 在逼我履约接受船舶，毕竟我已经有一个合约的约束。所以，根本谈不上有什
么诱导。”