Fall of Dhaka 1971

In 1966 Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman, leader of Awami League, East Pakistan announced his six-
point political and economic program for East Pakistani provincial autonomy. He demanded:-

1. The government be federal and parliamentary in nature, its members to be elected with
legislative representation on the basis of population.
2. The federal government have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense only
3. Each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts
4. Taxation would occur at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by
constitutionally guaranteed grants
5. Each federal unit could control its own earning of foreign exchange; and
6. Each unit could raise its own militia or paramilitary forces

The Agartala Conspiracy Case was a sedition case in Pakistan during the Ayub Regime against
Awami League, brought by the government of Pakistan in 1968 against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
the then leader of the Awami League and East Pakistan, and 34 other people. The case was filed
in early 1968 and implicated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others in conspiring with India against
the stability of Pakistan. The case is officially called State vs. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and
others, but are popularly known as Agartala Shoŗojontro Mamla (Agartala conspiracy case) as
the main conspiracy was purported to have taken place in the Indian city of Agartala in Tripura
state, where Sheikh Mujib's associates met Indian military officials.

The national revolt against military rule had forced Ayub Khan to concede, on 21 February 1969,
to the demand for parliamentary elections. Next month he transferred power to General Yahya
Khan, who began his constitutional quest for a settlement to Pakistan's political crisis. Yahya
announced a Legal Framework Order under which elections were to be held in December 1970.
Yahya earned the respect of all the participants by adhering to his promise of impartiality and
honesty. The 1970 national elections have been the only instance, to this day, of a free,
untampered exercise of democratic rights in Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Awami League won
all but two of the 153 seats to the National Assembly. The League's victory was never in doubt,
although its overwhelming magnitude came as a surprise. The result in West Pakistan was far
more complex. Bhutto's PPP emerged as the major party, winning eighty-one out of the 148
seats.

Yahya wanted Mujib and Bhutto to reach some understanding on the future constitutional
framework before he summoned the session of national assembly. Both Mujib and Bhutto had
taken irreconcilable position on the future constitutional framework which had created a
deadlock. Mujib wanted to impose a constitution on the basis of six point agenda on the basis of
simple majority, even if it meant no participation from West Pakistan. It was unreasonable
because constitutions being the fundamental law of the state are passed by consensus and with
large majorities such as 2/3rd or 3/4th. Bhutto was being equally unreasonable; he was willing to
share power but not to sit in opposition in national assembly. He came up with the strange and
unintelligible proposal that power should be transferred simultaneously to Mujib in the Eastern
wing and to him in the western wing. He was in fact proposing two separate constitutional and
political entities within a state. Yahya was caught in the middle. He had to retain power in West
Pakistan in order that he continued as President. All these forces were working against one
another.

Yahya saw his role of arbiter as involving commitments from the Awami League to tone down
the six points. Pressed by factions within the army, he sought reassurance for this by demanding
to see a draft constitution before transferring power to the Awami League. Mujib became wary
of Yahya's conditions, demanding that an immediate announcement be made to call a session of
the newly elected National Assembly. The PPP manifesto had criticised the Awami League's
demands for a separate currency and a separate militia on the grounds that this implied an
effective partition into two nation-states. The PPP's emergence as the main party in West
Pakistan, particulary Punjab, lent greater authority to their criticisms. Bhutto took a strident view
of the importance of his party, declaring that the question of the six points had to be settled
before the convening of the National Assembly. Since the Awami League had a majority in the
legislature, Bhutto sought a constitutional accord prior to a meeting of the National Assembly.
To this end, he allied himself with the hawks in the army, threatening to „break the legs‟ of party
members who dared to attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly, scheduled for 3
March 1971. The failure of the Mujib-Bhutto talks to thrash out a broad consensus on the future
constitution had convinced Bhutto that Mujib could not back down from implementing a
confederation. Confident of support from within the army, Bhutto pressed Yahya for a
postponement of the National Assembly session.

Two days before the scheduled inaugural session, the convening of the National Assembly was
postponed indefinitely. Yahya did not personally announce the postponement, a distance which
has been interpreted as demonstrating his reluctance to follow this course. In any case, Yahya's
constitutional quest had failed, as the junta prepared for a military crackdown. The East
Pakistanis reacted violently to the postponement and the immediate results were the violent
demonstrations and disturbances in Dacca. The army was called to cope with this situation. Also,
on that day Yahya named General Tikka Khan, as East Pakistan‟s military governor. On the 23rd
March 1971, General Yahya summoned a conference of the leaders at Dacca. Again, Mujib
refused to attend and there after General Yahya fixed the 25th for the meeting of the assembly.
Bengalis following Mujib‟s lead defiantly celebrated “Resistance Day” in East Pakistan instead
of the traditional all-Pakistan “Republic Day” on 23rd march 1971. The new flag of Bangladesh
was hoisted on all government and private buildings. Meanwhile Due to the rebellious act of the
Awami League situation major portion of the territory of East Pakistan was in rebels‟ hands;
some also fled to India or had left their work place. And Educational Institutions were the main
centers of organized rebellion.

On the 24th and 25th march, Mr. Bhutto met the president to discuss the proposals of Awami
League. On the evening of the 25th the Pakistan‟s People‟s Party was informed about the final
proposals of Awami League. At about midnight between the 25th and 26th Dacca was awakened
to the nose of gunfire; military crackdown has started. General Yahya ordered military action to
quash Awami league rebellion. He had already left Dacca.

Since the commencement of the political crises and the military action in East Pakistan on 25th
march March 1971, certain significant changes had taken place:-

1. Excessive use of firepower and force in the Dacca, during the night of 26 and 26th march
of 1971.
2. Senseless and wanton arson and killings in countryside during the course of sweep
operation following the military action.
3. Killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors, engineers etc, and burying them in
mass graves not only during the early phases of the military action but also during the
critical days of war in December 1971.
4. Killing of East Pakistanis civilian officers, businessmen, industrialists or their mysterious
disappearances from their homes by or at the instance of army officers performing
martial law duties.
5. Killing of Bengali officers and men of units of the East Bengal regiment, East Pakistan
rifles and police force in the process of disarming them or on the pretence or quelling
their rebellion.
6. Raping of large number of East Pakistani women by the officers and men of Pakistan
army as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture.
7. Wanton destruction of bridges, rail and road communication and other vital installations.
8. Deliberate killing of members of hindu minority community
9. It appears that as long as General Tikka Khan was in command the troops were kept
under control and they did what was necessary in military sense. General Tikka khan
advised advided army contingent to stay away from local population.
10. When he was replaced by Lieutenant General Niazi, things changed for the worse. The
general was known to be a debauch who indulged in wine and women. What was worse,
that he encouraged men under his command to indulge in excesses like rape of women
and theft of valuables. It was under him that shameful excess took place.
11. Role of India: India had entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union, thus
ensuring substantial supplies of sophisticated weapons in all fields, and decisively tilting
the military balance against Pakistan. Refugee problem invited India to intervene and
India attacked on eastern front and its troops entered East Pakistan and a full scale war
was started on 22nd November 1971.
12. By the month of October and November 1971, India had concentrated on the
border of East Pakistan a force equivalent to nearly twelve divisions.
13. Mukti Bahini- Bengali liberation army was trained and equipped by India. Mukti Bahini
fought against Pakistani army. The Indian involvement strengthened the movement of
separation of East Pakistan.
 14. The prolonged military action in East Pakistan had completely alienated the local
population, with the result that the Pakistan army was faced not only with
external aggression, but also with the constant threat of internal subversion.

Confrontation between the Awami League and Pakistani army became a civil war, with some
elements in East Pakistan supporting the latter, although most of the public was distressed by
the military operation, which went on for months. With Pakistan in a precarious position and
using the pretext of refugee presence on its soil, Indian troops entered East Pakistan where a
demoralized Pakistani army waited for some clear guidelines from Rawalpindi. Yahya Khan
and his junta opened the western front in November 1971, It did not deter India from seeking
complete control of Dhaka and the surrender by Pakistani troops headed by General A.K.
Niazi. After the ceasefire was signed on December 16, 1971, Dhaka fell and East Pakistan
became Bangladesh. In West Pakistan public furor over defeat and separation knew no
bounds. People blamed the generals, Indians, and the United Nations for their humiliation
and defeat; and Bhutto, who had been delivering fiery speeches at the UN security council,
was flown back from New York to head a crestfallen populace.

Both Pakistan and the young state of Bangladesh continued on, reliving memories of a
turbulent past while feeling unsure of an uncertain future. During the closing days of 1971,
killings, destruction, migration, refugee camps, and a sense of helplessness and anguish
characterized life both in the Indus Valley and the Gangetic Delta.

Causes of Fall of Dhaka

Economic Disparity

Bengali resentment was fuelled by the growing disparity between the two regions. At the time of
Ayub's coup, there was a difference of 30% in the per capita incomes of the two regions. By the
end of the second five-year plan (1965), the disparity of per capita income had risen to 45%. By
the time of Ayub's departure, the gap had risen to 61%. The tilt towards the western wing was
reinforced by development institutions such as the World Bank, “since it usually selected those
projects which promised the highest rates of return and they tended to be in West Pakistan”.
There were riots and protests against Ayub regime both in East and West Pakistan. In 1966 there
were 967 riots in West Pakistan whereas; in East Pakistan there were 6135 riots. (Pakistan
statistical yearbook 1967)

Political cause

The East Pakistanis noticed that whenever one of them, such as Khawja Nazimuddin,
Muhammad Ali Bogra or Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy was elected prime minister of Pakistan,
he was swiftly deposed by the largely West Pakistani establishment. Ayub's political structure,
far from rectifying ethnic imbalances, had maintained the supremacy of the Punjabi-mahajjir
élite. To be described as an inferior breed was not the kind of privilege Bengalis had in mind
when they had opted for Pakistan in 1947. Bhutto also refused to accept Mujeeb‟s Six Points. On
3rd March 1971 two leaders along with president General Yahya Khan met in Dhaka to decide
the fate of the country. Talks failed and this led to the breakup of Pakistan.

Military imbalance

Bengalis were under represented in the Pakistan Military. By 1965, there were only 5 percent
Bengali officers in the armed forces and only a few in high positions, with the majority in
technical and administrative posts. Moreover, despite huge defense spending East Pakistan
received none of the benefits such as contracts, purchasing and military support job. The Indo-
Pak war 1965 also highlighted the sense of military insecurity among Bengalis.

Social and cultural Diversity

The inhabitants of East and West Pakistan belonged to very different social structure. Their
ideologies as the people of East Pakistan were secular and the people of West Pakistan were
more traditional and conservative.

Language Issue

The first serious contention was started with Jinnah‟s announcement that Urdu will be national
language. There was a widespread agitation in support for Bengali language in East Pakistan.
When the capital of Pakistan was decided to set up in Karachi in West Pakistan, the people in
East Pakistan felt that they were not considered equal partners in the new nation. Ignoring their
language, Urdu was chosen as the national language. They protested that Urdu was the language
of only six percent people in Pakistan, whereas Bengali was spoken by 56 percent of the total
population of the country. The issue of language was mishandled by the central government.
However, Bengali was declared as national language along with Urdu in the constitution of 1956.

Reference:

Khan, Hamid. Political and Constitutional History of Pakistan 2nd ed. OUP, 2005.

Malik, Iftikhar H. The History of Pakistan. Green wood press, 2008.

Noman, Omar. A Political and Economic History Since 1947. Routledge, 2009.