WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH, VOL. 29, NO.

7, PAGES 1907-1912, JULY I993

Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions

ELINOR OSTROM

Workshopin Political Theory and Department of Political Science,

Indiana University, Bloomington

Craftinginstitutionsrelatedto the supplyanduseof irrigationsystemsrequireskillsin understand-

ing how rules, combinedwith particularphysical,economic,and culturalenvironments,produce
incentivesandoutcomes.If the usersandsuppliers of irrigationsystemsdesigntheir own institutional
arrangements to copewith the physical,economic,social,and culturalfeaturesof each system,the
variety of institutionalarrangements couldbe immense.Examiningspecificrules of particular
systems, however,is like focusing on specificblueprints of successful irrigationprojectsaroundthe
world. Recenttheoreticaland empiricalwork on institutionaldesignhasattemptedto elucidatethe
core designprinciplesusedin long-enduring, self-organized irrigationinstitutionsthroughoutthe
word. By "designprinciple"is meanta characteristic thathelpsto accountfor the success of these
institutions
in sustainingthephysicalworksandgainingthecompliance of generationsof usersto the
rulesin use.By "longenduring"is meantthattheirrigationsystemhasbeenin operationfor at least
severalgenerations.Eightdesignprinciples identifiedin priorresearch arediscussed andanalyzed.

[I]rrigation
development
mustconfronttheissuesof gover- environment,one needsto think about it as an on-going
nanceand enlist human and other resourcesand proceduresto investmentprocessin an uncertainenvironment.
arrange
appropriateinstitutions
andorganizations
in addition
to If theusersandsuppliers
of irrigationsystems
designtheir
appropriate
irrigationtechnologies. own institutionalarrangementsto cope with the physical,
(Coward, 1980, p. 16) economic,social,and culturalfeaturesof each system,the
variety of institutionalarrangementscould be immense.
This, indeed,appearsto be the case. Major studiesof
INTRODUCTION irrigationsystemslocatedin differentpartsof the word
illustrate the substantial differences in the rules used on
For the next severaldecades,the mostimportantquestion irrigation
systems
locatedin differentregions
[Uphoff,1986;
relatedto waterresourcedevelopmentis that of institutional Sengupta,1991;Carruthers,1988;Maass and Anderson,
19861.
design ratherthanengineering
design.Institutional
designis
Examiningspecificrulesof particularsystems,however,
a different
processthanthatof engineering
design.Crafting
is likefocusing
on specific
blueprintsof successful irrigation
institutions
is an on-goingprocessthat is enhancedwhen
both the users and the suppliers of irrigation water are
projects aroundtheworld. No blueprint is the same. No set
of rules-in-use is the same either when local participants
involved
in a designprocess.
Theterm"crafting,"to referto
the activities associated with the design of institutions, activelycraftrulesto fit their own changing
circumstances
over time. Althoughblueprintsvary, commonengineering
emphasizes(1) the artisanship
involvedin the design,oper-
ation,appraisalandmodificationof rule-ordered principles
behavior structures.underlietheblueprintsusedto constructphysical
Similarly,underlyingthe specificrules estab-
[Ostrom,1980],and(2) the on-goingnatureof "gettingthe
lishedfor particularsystems
are designprinciplesthatusers
process
right" [Uphoff, 1986]. have discoveredfor themselves as they have faced the
Craftinginstitutionsrelatedto the supplyand use of
irrigationsystems requireskillsin understandinghowrules,
problems involved incrafting theirownirrigation institutions
[see Ostromet al., 1993a].
combined withparticular physical,economic, andcultural Recenttheoreticaland empiricalwork on institutional
environments, produce incentives andoutcomes. A consis-
designhasattempted to elucidate thecoredesign principles
tentfindingof manyanalystsis thatthereis no "onebest usedin long-enduring, self-organized irrigationinstitutions
way" to organizeirrigationactivities[Chambers,1980; throughout theworld[Ostrom, 1990].By "design principle"
Ostrom, 1990;Levine,1980;Coward,1979;Uphoff,1986]. is meanta characteristicthat helpsto accountfor the success
Giventhe absenceof a singleor even a smallset of of theseinstitutionsin sustainingthe physicalworks and
institutionalsolutions
to theproblemof organizing irrigation
systems, rulesto enhance thesupplyanduseof anypartic-
gainingthecompliance ofgenerations ofusers totherulesin
use.By "longenduring" is meantthattheirrigationsystem
ularphysical system mustbe devised, tried,modified,and hasbeenin operation for at leastseveralgenerations. The
triedagain inanon-going process ofinstitutional
artisanship.methodology usedto derivethesedesignprinciples anda
To do thisrequiresconsiderable investmentof timeand fullerdevelopment of theirimplications arecontained in the
resources in learningmoreaboutthe effectsof various workbyOstrom [1990]. A description ofthelargenumber of
institutional
rules on the behaviorof participants and the
irrigationsystems in the projectfilesand somegeneral
resultstheycanachieve. Thusinstead ofthinkingaboutthe patterns of relationshipsis contained in theworkby Tang
choiceof institutionsas a one-shotdecisionin a known
[1991,1992].Althoughit is impossible to evaluatethe
Copyright!993by theAmerican Geophysical
Union. efficiencyof thesesystems precisely, therepeated willing-
nessof theusersof thesesystems to investlargeamounts of
Papernumber92WR02991.
0043-1397/93/92WR-02991
$05.00 laborandotherresources
is strongevidencethat individual
1907
1908 OSTROM:DESIGN PRINCIPLESIN IRRIGATIONINSTITUTIONS

farmers receive more benefitsfrom these systemsthan the Addingwell-tailoredappropriation

andprovisionrulesto
costs they assume for maintaining them. These self- boundaryrules helps to account for the sustenance of
organizedsystemsare sustainableover time even thoughthe irrigationsystemsthemselves.Different rules are usedin
technical efficiency of many of them could probably be self-organizingirrigation systemsto mobilize resources
for
improved. It is not at all unusual for farmers to devote 3-4 construction,for maintenance,and to pay water guards.In
weeks of labor per year to operate and maintain these long-enduringsystems,thosewho receivethe highest pro-
systems. Farmers who invest valuable time that could be portionof the water are also requiredto pay the highest
devoted to other activities to clean canal sections,repair proportion of thecosts.Coward[1979]identified thisdesign
diversionworks, and operate weirs are "voting" with their principleasa majorcharacteristicof the successful irrigation
backs. They indicate a continued willingnessto contribute systemshe had examined. It was also identifiedby Olson
resources. While all such systemsimpose sanctionson those [ 1969]as a very generalprinciple,calledfiscalequivalence,
who do not contribute agreed-upon resources, the size of of any public institutionthat would achieve efficientuseof
these sanctions is sufficiently small that one cannot use resources.No singleset of rules defined for all irrigation
coercion as the basis to explain the continuity of the sys- systemsin a region would produce this equivalence,as
tems. illustratedin the conclusionof this article. Craftingrulesto
The following sections will present and discuss eight equalizebenefitsandcostshasto take into accountmanyof
designprinciples identified in prior researchas characteriz- the unique features of each irrigation system.
ing long-enduringirrigation systems.
DESIGN PRINCIPLE THREE:
COLLECTIVE-CHOICE ARRANGEMENTS
DESIGN PRINCIPLE ONE:
CLEARLY DEFINED BOUNDARIES Most individualsaffectedby operationalrules are included
The boundaries of the service area and the individuals or
in the group who can modify these rules.
Irrigation systemsthat use this principle are better ableto
householdswith rights to use water from an irrigation system tailor rules to local circumstances since the individuals who
are clearly defined.
directly interact with one another and with the physical
Defining the boundaries of the irrigation system and of
world can modify their rules over time so as to betterfit them
those authorized to use it can be thought of as a foundation
to the specificcharacteristicof their setting. Users who
for organizingcollectiveaction. So longas the boundariesof
designinstitutionsthat are characterizedby the first three
who has rights to the water remain uncertain, no one knows
principles,clearly definedboundaries,benefit-costcongru-
what they are managing,or for whom. Without definingthe
ence, and user participationin collective choice,shouldbe
boundariesof a system and closing it to "outsiders," local
able to devise effectiveoperatingrules if they keepthe costs
irrigatorsface the risk that any benefitsthey produceby their
of changingthese rules relatively low.
efforts will be reaped by others who do not contributeto
The presenceof effectiveoperationalrules,however,does
theseefforts. Thus for irrigatorsto have a minimalinterestin
not accountfor usersfollowing them; nor is the fact thatthe
coordinatingpatternsof appropriationand provision,some usersthemselves designedand initially agreed to the opera-
users have to be able to exclude other potential usersfrom
tional rules an adequateexplanationfor generations of
takingwater. The presenceof boundariesconcerningwho is
compliance by individuals whowerenot originallyinvolved
allowedto appropriatefrom a resourcehasbeenusedsince in the initial agreement.It is not even an adequateexplana-
the work of Ciriacy-WantrupandBishop[1975]asthe single tion for the continuedcommitmentof thosewho werepartof
definingcharacteristic
of "commonproperty"institutions as the initialagreement.Agreeingto followrulesex anteisan
contrastedto "open access"institutions.The impression is easy"commitment"to make.Actuallyfollowingrulesex
sometimesgiventhat this is all that is necessaryto achieve post,whenstrongtemptations arepresent,is thesignificant
successfulregulation.Making this attributeone of eight, accomplishment. Game-theoretical analysesof the tempta-
rather than a uniqueattribute, puts its importancein a more tion to stealwater and the resultantgame amongirrigators
realistic perspective. who must monitor the behavior of other irrigators are pre-
Simplyclosingthe boundaries is usuallynot enough.If sented in theworksby Weissing andOstrom[1991a, b, 1993].
thoseirrigatorswho have authorizedaccesscanprofitably The problemof gainingcomplianceto rules, no matter
use more water than is available, farmers at the head-endof
whattheirorigin,is frequentlyassumed awayby theorists
thesystemwill takesomuchwaterthatthoseatthetail-end positing all knowing andall powerful external authorities
maynot havea predictable andadequate flow of waterfor thatenforce agreements.In thecaseof manyself-organizing
agricultural use.The actualyieldof the systemmaybe far systems, noexternal
authority hassufficient
presencetoplay
lessthan it could be even thoughsomefarmersreap consid-
anyrolein theday-to-day enforcement of therulesinuse.
erable benefits. Consequently,in additionto closingthe Thusexternalenforcement cannotbe usedto explain high
boundaries,rules limitinguse and/ormandatingprovision levelsof compliance. In the long-enduring systems,how-
are needed whenever water scarcity is present.
ever,irrigators
themselves
makesubstantial
investments
in
monitoringand sanctioning
activities.This leadsusto con-
DESIGN PRINCIPLE TWO: sider a fourth and fifth designprinciple.
PROPORTIONALEQUIVALENCE
BETWEEN BENEFITS AND COSTS DESIGN PRINCIPLE FOUR: MONITORING

Rulesspecifying
the amountof waterthat anirrigatoris Monitors,
whoactively
auditphysical
conditions
and
allocatedare relatedto local conditionsand to rulesrequir- irrigator
behavior,
areaccountable
to theusers
and/or
are
the users themselves.
inglabor,materials,and/ormoneyinputs.
 OSTROM:
DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
IN IRRIGATION
INSTITUTIONS 1909

DESIGN PRINCIPLE FIVE: how groundwater producersorganizedself-governing insti-

GRADUATED SANCTIONS tutionsseeBlomquist[!992].
To explaincommitment in long-enduring
water-userorga-
Userswho violate operationalrules are likely to receive
nizations,one cannotposit external enforcementas Levi
graduated sanctions (depending ontheseriousness andcon- [1988]does.In manyinstances,irrigatorscreatetheir own
text of the offense) from other users, from officialsaccount-
internalenforcementto (1) deter thosewho are temptedto
ableto these users, or from both.
breakrulesandthereby(2) assurequasi-voluntary compliers
Now we are at the crux of the problem.In long-enduring that othersalsocomply. Given the evidencethat individuals
systems,
monitoring
andsanctioning
areundertaken
notby monitor, then the relative costs and benefits must be differ-
externalauthoritiesbut by the participantsthemselves.The ent thanpositedin prior work. Either the costsof monitoring
initialsanctionsusedin thesesystemsare also surprisingly are lower or the benefitsto an individual are higher, or both.
low. Even though it is frequently presumed in modem The costs of monitoringare low in many long-enduring
theoreticalwork that participantswill not spendtime and irrigation systems as a result of the rules in use. Water
effortto monitor and sanctioneach other's performance, rotation systems,for example, usually place the two actors
substantialevidence exists that irrigatorsdo both in long- most concerned with cheating in direct contact with one
enduringuser organizations[see Tang, 1992]. another. The irrigator who nears the end of a rotation turn
To explainthe investmentin monitoringand sanctioning would like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the
activitiesthat occurs in these robust, self-governinginstitu- amount of water obtained). The next irrigator in the rotation
tions,the term "quasi-voluntary compliance," usedby Levi system waits nearby for him to finish, and would even like to
[1988,chapter3] to describethe behaviorof taxpayersin start early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the
systemswhere most taxpayers comply, is very useful. secondfrom an early start, and the presence of the second
Payingtaxesis voluntaryin the sensethat individualschoose irrigator deters the first from ending late. Neither has to
to comply in many situations where they are not being invest additionalresourcesin monitoring activities. Monitor-
directlycoerced. On the other hand, it is "quasi-voluntary ing is a by-product of their own strong motivations to use
becausethe noncompliant are subject to coercionmif they their water rotation turn to the fullest extent. Many ways
arecaught" [Levi, 1988, p. 52]. Levi stressesthe contingent that workteams are organized encourage monitoring as a
natureof a commitmentto comply with rules that is possible natural by-product.
in a repeatedsetting. Strategicactors are willing to comply When monitoringis accomplishedby an agentaccountable
witha setof rules,Levi [1988]argues,when(1) theyperceive to other users, several mechanisms increase the rewards for
that the collective objective is achieved, and (2) they per- doing a goodjob or exposingslackards to the risk of losing
ceivethat others also comply. Levi is not the first to stress their positions.In somesystems,a percentageof the finesis
how individuals who interact with one another over time are
kept by the guards. In other systems, guards are paid a
able to use contingent behavior to overcome free-riding proportionof the crop at the end of the year. With this type
problems(see, for example, Axe!rod [1981, 1984]; Oakerson of payment, the guard's own payment is dependent on
[1988]; Lewis and Cowens [1983]). But Levi stresses the keepingthe reliability of the system as high as possibleso
importanceof coercion as an essentialconditionto achieve that the farmers being served can produce as much on their
theform of contingentbehavior she has identifiedas quasi- fields as possible. All of the formal guard positions are
voluntarycompliance. In her theory, enforcementincreases accountableto the users. Monitors can easily be fired if
the confidence of individuals that others are not allowed to discovered slacking off. Since the users tend to continue
be free riders and that those who contribute are not suckers. monitoringthe guards as well as each other, some redun-
As long as individuals are confident that others are cooper- dancyis built into the monitoringand sanctioningsystem.A
ating and joint benefits are being provided, they comply failure to deter rule breaking by one mechanismdoes not
willingly to provide a collective benefit by contributing triggera cascadingprocessof rule infractionssinceother
resources.On irrigation systemsthat are owned and oper- mechanismsare potentially available. Consequently, the
atedby governmentagencies,the agencycouldalsoprovide costs and benefits of monitoring a set of rules are not
the type of monitoringand sanctioningLevi has in mind. independentof the particularset of rules adopted.Nor are
Wade[1987] has a similar view of the willingnessof many they uniform in all settings.
irrigatorsto comply with reasonablerules if they were
assuredthat others would also comply and that those who DESIGN PRINCIPLE Six: CONFLICT
did not would be sanctioned.
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

ß.. in many situationsindividual irrigatorswill restraintheir Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost,
waterrule breakingif they are confidentthat otherswill also
local arenasto resolve conflict among usersor between users
refrainandif they are confidentthat they will stillget as much
waterasthey are fairly entitledto (evenif not as muchas they and officials.
wouldlike). They will morelikely refrainfromcheatingif they Applyingrulesis rarelyan unambiguous task. Even such
are confidentthat by doingso they will not be the 'suckers.' a simpleruleas "eachirrigatormustsendoneindividualfor
Wherepeopleare motivatedby an 'I'11restrainif you restrain' oneday to helpcleanthe irrigationcanalsbeforethe rainy
calculation,then an institution(such as an irrigationdepart-
ment)that convincesthem that theseexpectations arejustified seasonbegins"canbe interpretedquitedifferentlyby differ-
canpromotevoluntarycompliance
withtherules[Wade,1987, ent individuals. Who is or is not an "individual" according
p. 178]. to this rule'?Does sendinga child below 10or an adultabove
70 to do heavyphysicalwork meet this rule?Is a "day" of
In highlydeveloped economies, wateruserscanorganize work fulfilledby someoneworking for 4 hoursor 6 hours'?
themselvesand hire their own monitors. For an analysisof Doescleaning the canalimmediatelynextto one'sownfarm
1910 OSTROM:
DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
IN IRRIGATION
INSTITUTIONS

qualifyfor meetinga community obligation? For individuals Long-enduring, large,andcomplexirrigationsystems are

who seekways to slidepast or subvertrules,there are usuallyorganized into manytiersof nestedorganizations.
alwayswaysto "interpret"the rulein orderto arguethat Workteamsmaybeestablished of groupsassmallasfouror
they meet it while subvertingthe intent. Even individuals fiveindividuals.
All irrigators
usinga particular
branchofan
who intendto follow the spirit of a rule can make errors. irrigationsystemmay be the basisfor anotherlevelof
Whathappens if someone
forgetsabouta labordayanddoes organization. A thirdlayermayinvolve allfarmersservedby
not appear?Or, what happensif the onlyable-bodiedworker one headworks.A fourth layer may involve all systems
is sick, or unavoidablyin anotherlocation? served
by thesameriver.If theseventh
andeighth
design
If individuals aregoingto followrulesovera longperiod principles hold,all of theseirrigationorganizations
wouldbe
of time, somemechanism for discussing andresolving what recognized andnestedin externally organizedpolitical
juris-
is or is not a rule infractionis necessary to the continuance dictions.(See Coward [1979]for his discussionof various
of rule conformance itself. If some individuals are allowed to aspects ofthisdesign principle;seealsoOstrom[1988,1989,
freerideby sending lessvaluableworkersto a required labor 1991].)
day, otherswill considerthemselvesto be suckersif they By nestinglayersof organization within one another,
sendtheir strongestworkerswho couldbe usedto produce irrigatorscan take advantageof many different scalesof
private goodsrather than communalbenefits.Over time, organization.Small-scalework teams are an effectivetech-
only childrenand old peoplewill be sentto do work that niquefor overcoming
freeriding.Everyonemonitors
every-
requiresstrongadultsand the systembreaksdown. oneelsein situationswhereshirkingis obvious.Large-scale
If individualswho make an honestmistakeor face per- enterprisesallow systemsto take advantageof economiesof
sonal problems that prevent them from following a rule scalewhere they are relevant and to aggregatecapitalfor
cannotfind mechanismsto make up their lack of perfor- investment.By utilizingmorethan a singlescaleof organi-
mance in an acceptableway, rules can be viewed as unfair zation, many farmer-managedirrigation systemshave sus-
and conformancerates decline.While the presenceof con- tainedlarge-scaleirrigation systemsfor long periodsof time
flict resolutionmechanisms doesnot guaranteethatusersare relying primarily on their own resources without extensive
able to maintainenduringinstitutions,it is difficultto imag- help from external agencies. Projects that have been con-
ine how any complex system of rules could be maintained structedby externalagencieswithout any investmentby the
over time without such mechanisms. In many irrigation irrigators themselves could learn substantially from the
systems, conflict resolution mechanismsare informal, and successfulefforts of farmers to sustaintheir own complex
those who are selected as leaders are also the basic resolvers systemsover time [see Maass and Anderson, 1986;Siy,
of conflict. 1982; Pradhan, 1989a, b].

DESIGN PRINCIPLE SEVEN: MINIMAL CONCLUSION

RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS TO ORGANIZE These eight designprinciplesare' quite general. The spe-
The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not cific way that suppliersand usersof long-enduringirrigation
challengedby external governmental authorities. systemshave crafted rules to meet these principlesvary
This principle is related to the fact that many water-user substantiallyin their particulars. Successful, long-enduring
groupsorganize in a de facto manner but are not recognized irrigationinstitutionsthat appearto be quite differentapply
by nationalgovernmentsas legitimateforms of organization. similardesignprinciplesin differentways. For example,
Consequently, the officials of the organization may not long-enduringirrigation systemsdevelop methodsto equate
legally open a bank account in the name of the organization the costsof buildingand maintainingthe irrigation systemto
or represent the interests of their members before adminis- the benefitsthat are achieved, or to designprinciple2. Some
trative or judicial bodies. Decisions taken by user-group examplesmay help the reader understandthe diverskyof
organizations may not be enforced by police or formal specific rules that meet design principle 2.
courts. Without official recognition of the right to organize, it The Zanjeras of Northern Philippines
is quite difficult to hold either user-group officials or mem-
bers accountable for their actions.
These self-organizedsystemsobtain use rightsto previ-
ouslyunirrigatedland from a large landownerby buildinga
De facto organization is sufficient in isolated locations
canal that irrigates the landowner's land and that of a
where irrigation is usedprimarily for subsistenceagriculture.
zanjera. At the time that the land is allocated, eachfarmer
But when roads are constructed that create market opportu-
willing to abideby the rules of the systemreceivesa bundle
nities for surplus products, the level of conflict over the
of rightsand dutiesin the form of atars. Each atar defines
allocation of water to different farmers is likely to escalate.If
threeparcelsof land locatedin the head, middle,andtail
governmentagentsuse their authority to supportthosewho sectionsof the serviceareawherethe holdergrowshisorher
refuse to follow the rules of a de facto organization, it is hard
crops.Responsibilitiesfor constructionand maintenanceare
for the other participants to continue following the rules
allocatedby atars, as are voting rights. In the rainy seasons,
either. An effective irrigator organization lacking formal
water is allocatedfreely. In a dry year, water may be
recognitionmay crumble rapidly when its authority to make
allocatedonlyto the parcelslocatedin the headandmiddle
legitimate rules for its own members is challengedand not portions.Thus everyonereceiveswater in plentifuland
supportedby the formal governmentof a regime. scarcetimesin roughproportionto the amountof atarsthey
DESIGN PRINCIPLE EIGHT: NESTED ENTERPRISES possess[see Siy, 1982; Coward, 1979].

Appropriation,provision,monitoring,enforcement,con- Thulo Kulo in Nepal

flict resolution, and governanceactivities are organizedin Whenthis systemwasfirst constructedin 1928,27 house-
multiple layers of nestedenterprises. holds contributedto a fund to construct the canal and
 OSTROM:
DESIGNPRINCIPLES
IN IRRIGATION
INSTITUTIONS 1911

receivedsharesto the resultingsystemproportionateto the of CommonPropertyat DukeUniversityon September 28, 1990.It

amountthey invested. By selling additional shares, the is drawnfroma longerprojectreport[Ostrom,1992]writtenfor the
system hasbeenexpanded severaltimes.Measurement and Decentralization,Financeand Management(DFM) Projectthat is
sponsoredby the Officeof Rural and InstitutionalDevelopmentof
diversionweirs or gates are installed at key locations. Water the Bureaufor Scienceand Technologyof the U.S. Agencyfor
is automaticallyallocated to each farmer accordingto the InternationalDevelopmentundercontractnumberDHR-5446-Z-00-
proportionof sharesowned.Routinemonitoring andmain- 7033-00to Associatesin Rural Development,the Metropolitan
tenanceis allocatedto workteamsso that everyonepartici- StudiesProgramof the Maxwell Schoolof Citizenshipand Public
Affairsat SyracuseUniversityand the Workshopin PoliticalTheory
pates
proportionately
[seeMartinand Yoder,1983;Martin, and PolicyAnalysisat Indiana University. See Ostromet al. [1993b]
19861. for an overviewof our activities.The views expressed
are thoseof
the authoranddo not representthe officialviewsof the sponsoring
TheHuerta of Valencia in Spain
agency. The author deeply appreciates the assistanceof Patty
In 1435, 84 irrigators served by two interrelated canals in Dalecki and Gina Davis and earlier commentsof Roy Gardner,
Valenciagatheredat the monasteryof St. Francisto drawup RonaldOakerson,Vincent Ostrom, Larry Schroeder,Louis Siegel,
Shui Yan Tang, and JamesThomson.
andapproveformal regulationsto specifywho had fightsto
water from these canals, how the water would be shared in
goodand bad years, and how responsibilities
for mainte- REFERENCES
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Axelrod, R., The emergenceof cooperation among egoists,Am.
composed
of these plus six additionalcanals, now serves Pol. Sci. Rev., 75, 306-18, 1981.
about 16,000 ha and 15,000 farmers. The fight to water Axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New
inheresin the land itself and cannot be bought and sold York, 1984.
of the land. Rightsto water are approximately Blomquist, W., Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in
independently
to the amountof land ownedasare obligations Southern
proportionate California, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San
Francisco, Calif., 1992.
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activities[see Maass and Anderson, 1986; Ostrom, 1990]. enthusiasts, IIMI Rev., 2, 8--11, 24-25, 1988.
Thesethree systemsdiffer substantiallyfrom one another. Chambers, R., Basic conceptsin the organization of irrigation, in
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from the Social Sciences,edited by E. W. Coward, Jr., pp. 28--50,
acquireuse fights to land and water. They could be called Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1980.
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1975.
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Coward, E. W., Jr., Principles of social organization in an indige-
has maintained centuries-old land and water fights that
nousirrigation system,Hum. Org., 38(1), 28--36, 1979.
forbid the separation of water fights from the land being Coward, E. W., Jr., Irrigation and Agricultural Development in
served. The Valencian system differs from both "commu- Asia: Perspectivesfrom the Social Sciences, Cornell University
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arefirmly attachedto private ownershipof land. Underlying Levi, M., Of Rule and Revenue, University of California Press,
Berkeley, Calif., 1988.
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plethat the costsof constructing,operating,and maintaining in Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia: Perspectives
thesesystemsare roughly proportional to the benefitsthat from the Social Sciences,edited by E. W. Coward, Jr., pp. 51-62,
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Lewis, T. R., and J. Cowens, Cooperation in the commons: An
It is important to keep these differencesin mind in any applicationof repetitiousrivalry, report, Dep. of Econ., Univ. of
effortto do policy analysis. Slogans,such as "privatiza- British Columbia, Vancouver, 1983.
tion," may maskimportantunderlyingprinciplesratherthan Maass, A., and R. L. Anderson, ... and the Desert Shall Rejoice:
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Krieger, Malabar, Fla., 1986.
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volved are authorized to devise their own rules and are of Agriculture,Agricultural Projects Services Centre, and the
encouragedto learn about how others have successfully AgriculturalDevelopmentCouncil, Kathmandu,Nepal, 1983.
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Issues, Alternatives, and Choices, edited by V. Ostrom, D.
thehighlysalientproblems
thattheyface.The proportion
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Acknowledgments.
This paperwas originallydeliveredas the cisco, Calif., 1992.
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Addressto the InternationalAssociation
for the Study Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Corn-
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